

CONFIDENTIAL

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

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PARTS 32 & 33  
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1933



CONFIDENTIAL

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXXII

JANUARY TO JUNE 1933



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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXXII.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 16/16/91]

No. 1.

*Consul-General Fowle to India Office.—(Communicated by India Office,  
January 2, 1933.)*

(Confidential.)

THE Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of his letter of the 29th November to the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India respecting a visit to Koweit in November 1932.

*Bushire, November 29, 1932.*

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Consul-General Fowle to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, November 29, 1932.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I have just returned from a visit to Koweit, where I stayed five days, and so had ample opportunity of making the acquaintance of his Excellency the sheikh, with whom, in company with Colonel Dickson, I had many conversations.

2. I had only met his Excellency for a few hours last year, and was glad of this opportunity of getting to know him better. I was favourably impressed by him. He is, I think, a moderately strong character, though inclined to be impulsive, and no match at "political poker" for that astute player His Majesty Ibn Saud—witness the incident of their interchange of letters on the subject of Nejd-Koweit claims, dealt with in my despatch No. 43 (copy to the Government of India and Jedda under my printed letter of the 17th September, 1932). His Excellency has attractive manners, and a pleasing personality. He is reported to be something of a miser (though this does not extend to his personal hospitality), but, in an impoverished State, this is no bad thing, as the late Sir Hugh Biscoe pointed out. He is, I think, genuinely loyal to us, and prefers Englishmen to other foreigners, but his loyalty has been very highly tried by what he considers our failure to assist him both in the matter of his date gardens and Ibn Saud's blockade, and there have been incidents lately—as both Colonel Dickson and I agree—which show that he is trying to "keep in" unofficially and *sub rosa* with both Nejd and Iraq. Nor do I see how he can be blamed for this. If, in his opinion, His Majesty's Government will not—or cannot—fight his battles for him, he sees no way but to resort to secret diplomacy in order to placate his powerful neighbours.



3. The questions on which he feels most strongly are the two mentioned above. I found it difficult to give any satisfactory replies (that is to say, replies which would appear to him satisfactory), in answer to his queries as to why His Majesty's Government did not assist him as to the blockade *vis-à-vis* Ibn Saud, and as to his date gardens *vis-à-vis* Iraq. He stated that, in both cases, he relied on the assurances of assistance and promises of His Majesty's Government; in regard to the former, the assurances conveyed to him, following on the Secretary of State for the Colonies' telegram of the 25th July, 1929, to the Political Resident; and in regard to the latter, the promises contained in Colonel Knox's letter, dated the 14th Dhilhijjah, 1332 (the 3rd November, 1914). He pointed out that in the matter of his own blockade in 1929-30 against Ibn Dawish and the other rebels against Ibn Saud, enjoined on him by His Majesty's Government, he was helping to kill and starve into surrender tribes—the Mutair, for example—who, though nominally Ibn Saud's subjects, were from old times really under Koweit, many of whom—including Ibn Dawish himself—being old friends and playmates of his. He stated with some emotion that he had received the most desperate appeals from these friends of his for assistance, which appeals it had wrung his heart to refuse. He also informed me that, at the same period, he had received confidential and urgent exhortations from the highest (Iraqi) quarters in Iraq to assist the rebels to the best of his ability in order that Ibn Saud should be definitely smashed. That they (the highest quarters) could do nothing, because of the English, but that, if he, the sheikh, would take action, they would help him secretly. And what, his Excellency asked me, had he gained by standing firm against those appeals and exhortations? Ibn Saud's blockade, instead of ceasing, had increased in severity, and was literally strangling Koweit to death. Moreover, his Excellency pointed out, his own notables in Koweit were continually attacking him on the subject of His Majesty's Government's attitude. "You stand by the English Government," they sneered. "What has the English Government done for you in the matter of your date gardens, or in the matter of Ibn Saud's blockade, which is now ruining us?"

4. I cannot say that, as His Majesty's Government's local representative, I enjoyed our conversations on these subjects, or that I particularly like repeating them for His Majesty's Government's information, but I would fail in my duty if I did not report what his Excellency's feelings are. As I have already indicated, I found it difficult to give replies to his Excellency's complaints. The line I took was twofold: First, that I would report the gist of his Excellency's views, which I have done; and second, that Koweit, placed between two more powerful neighbours, Nejd and Iraq, needed a strong friend, and that, from the long point of view, this friend was undoubtedly the British Government. His Excellency agreed with the latter dictum, and seemed to take some comfort from my reply. I cannot conceal, however, the disturbing fact that in Koweit, both with ruler and people, British prestige is on the wane, an opinion which Colonel Dickson, who is in the best position to know, fully endorses.

5. I do not wish to give the impression, however, that my conversations with his Excellency were confined to the two distressing questions mentioned above. My main object in paying a long visit to Koweit was not to find an immediate solution for its problems, which cannot be hoped for, but to establish personal and sympathetic contact with its sorely-tried ruler, and in this, with the assistance of Colonel Dickson, I think I succeeded. His Excellency and I had many conversations on more cheerful and general topics, and generally I think we established mutually cordial relations.

I am sending a copy of this letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

I have, &c.

T. C. FOWLE, Lieut.-Colonel,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[E 79/2/25]

No. 2.

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 4, 1933.)

(No. 480.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 17, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 220 of the 1st December regarding the rebellion in Asir, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a lengthy extract from the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 2nd December entitled "The Jizan Affair" and of a short communiqué published in the same paper's issue of the 9th December under the heading "News of Events at Jizan."<sup>(1)</sup> These documents bring up to date the history of the Asir revolt as seen from the point of view of Saudi publicity. But there is a mass of fact and motive behind them which is at present hidden. Some I have been able to gather from other sources; the rest can only be conjectured. The present is a suitable moment to attempt an interim survey.

2. The Province of Asir has for some years been commonly regarded as a likely source of trouble for Ibn Saud, but generally in connexion with the Yemen and the steps which the Imam Yahya might be expected to take to recover a territory which some have supposed to have been filched from him. Trouble has but seldom been foreseen in connexion with the tribes of Asir itself and never yet in connexion with the attitude of its present ruler, the Idrisi. He and his tribesmen could have been likened to fat trout in a pool, lorded over by a not-too-voracious pike, but both watched by a hungry old pike No. 2 lying in the border reeds.

3. The expected has not yet happened and, as far as I at present know (though there are increasing rumours to the contrary), pike No. 2 is still motionless. It is the trout who are up in arms and pike No. 1 is busy trying to eat them up. It is difficult to say just what roused them. Asir is a relatively thickly populated country (say, 1 million) and moderately rich in agriculture, lying as it does in the northern fringe of Arabia Felix. It has been the fashion in the Hejaz, and even amongst its more disgruntled inhabitants, impatient of Saudi rule, to regard Asir as happy and prosperous under that rule. It is unlikely that crops have failed and that depression has made its people discontented. All reports point to the contrary, while it must be said in favour of the Saudi régime that its hand has always been understood to lie lightly on the people of Asir. Whether the Saudi treatment of the Idrisi himself has been as politic now seems more than doubtful. When Fuad Bey Hamaz handed me his memorandum on the 16th November, he made a rather laboured point of informing me that the six points of disagreement which the Idrisi alleged to have arisen between himself and Ibn Saud's Governor had originated in lacunæ in the latter's instructions which he had tactlessly sought himself to fill. As these points of complaint included lack of due respect to the Idrisi, non-payment of his allowances, surveillance of his visitors, omission of his name from the Friday prayer and prevention from flying his flag, there is reason to disbelieve Fuad Bey's statement. My impression is that of late there has been a deliberate policy to undermine the Idrisi's status. My conjecture is that it dated from the proclamation of the unity of Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies as "Saudi Arabia," from the thousand and one petitions for which the Idrisi was a noticeable abstainer; and so with the Asiri tribesmen. One of the objects of this change of title was no doubt to consolidate the Province or Protectorate of Asir as a part and parcel of the United Saudi Kingdom. It is very possible that the Idrisi and his subjects saw this and abstained from all participation from a feeling of resentment. A general tightening up of Saudi control would be the natural result.

4. Whatever the background of revolt, there seems little doubt that the Dabbagh conspiracy, which has a hand in it, only began to make headway in Asir in about September last, having either completely failed to make headway earlier in the year, or having been forestalled and thrown out of gear by the untimely opening of the Ibn Rifada show. I lean to the former view, supposing that had they made any headway they might well have expedited their programme during the two months for which Ibn Rifada lasted, but that internal conditions in Asir

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



were not sufficiently favourable then. However that may be, it is clear from the various sources of information that the Dabbagh branch of the Hejazi Liberal party has had a considerable hand in the present revolt. It may have been the prime mover, but it is more likely only to have supplied opportune assistants who were in a position to introduce a certain directive force, a few arms and a little money (though it is said that Asir has no need of arms), the promise of much more and encouragement to look for moral support and perhaps future freedom from the Amir Abdullah; whether or not his name was taken in vain there is no present means of judging. But it is to be noted that the Imam Yahya has, so far, either had nothing to do with this revolt or has hidden his tracks very cleverly. I suspect, the latter.

5. Turning to the attached papers, which are chiefly interesting for the light they throw on Saudi methods and mentality, one finds that in the "Introduction," pp. 1 and 2, the writer (who may be Sheikh Yussuf Yasin) is at pains to convince that any revolt against Ibn Saud is a revolt against Islam and the Arabs, but he was premature in stating that the Idrisi had already come to his due end of "destruction and annihilation." In the "Beginning of the Affair," pp. 3 and 4, he stresses *ad nauseam* Ibn Saud's magnificent patience, which might, however, from the evidence here given, be more properly qualified as criminal negligence, a point to which I will recur later. Passing over for the purposes of this despatch the writer's account of the "Conspirators' Objects and Plan," pp. 4 to 6, we find at the bottom of p. 6 what was apparently the Saudi Governor's first note of warning of trouble in Asir in a telegram to Ibn Saud dated the 26th September. He makes here the only unfriendly reference to the Imam Yahya which is made throughout the exchanges of telegrams which now follow, reporting that he was said to be mobilising troops to send either against Jizan or the Beni Hasan (one of his own tribes). (But the Imam seems to have been always mobilising troops these past three years; to have kept people guessing.) The Governor is also suspicious of a change of heart in the Idrisi, "since before the Ibn Rifada rebellion," but this last may be an editorial interpellation; the whole series of telegrams shows, to my mind, signs of having been heavily edited for publicity. Ibn Saud's reply of the 29th September, for instance, on p. 7, is much too good to be true. Down to "so I ask you to be kind and gentle to the Idrisi" was almost certainly written *ex post facto*, but the final "If he has evil intention, God will cause him to be defeated, while if what is said is false, it is in the nature of most rumour" rings true.

6. For a month after this exchange of warning and precept there seems to have been no further cause for alarm, so far as can be judged from the one-sided evidence here given, but on the 27th October began a rapid exchange of telegrams, pp. 8 to 13, comprising increasingly serious reports from Saudi officials at Jizan, which end on the 5th November with the words "we have enough water for some days and upon God we rely," when they were besieged, and uniformly placid replies from Ibn Saud, of which that of the 1st November is typical: "Accept the Idrisi's apologies and show him the greatest respect. Facts must become known. Be very careful to show him respect and regard." (On the 6th Jizan capitulated to the Idrisi). It is difficult to understand Ibn Saud's attitude, unless it was due to extreme caution bred of fear that any warlike preparation on his part might bring the Imam openly into the field against him. His telegrams as published show him to have been pacifist to a degree which allowed the initial stages of revolt to develop unchecked. If they are apocryphal, as seems probable, the fact remains that he appears to have taken no action to forestall the trouble so clearly foreseen and reported by his officials. He had very few troops in Asir, it is true. About the 25th October his armoured car detachment, which had been stationed in Asir since the Jabal Arwa trouble of last year, had actually returned to Mecca. If as much attention was not paid as prominence has been given to conspiratorial activities in Asir, Ibn Saud must be accounted either as a very negligent commander or as fearful of rousing the Imam or as inviting revolt for ulterior purposes of his own.

7. Before leaving the telegrams on pp. 7 to 13, two exchanged between Ibn Saud and the Idrisi may be noted. The latter's, of the 28th October, is brief and asks why his nephew, Ali, had left Mecca. Ibn Saud's long reply of the 29th October explains that Ali is a danger to his uncle and that therefore Ibn Saud was keeping him with him as one of his own sons and had taken him to Riyadh.

8. It was not until the 5th November, the day Jizan was attacked, that the mission, comprising Sheikh Hamad Suleiman, Under-Secretary of Finance, and Khalid Bey Al Qarqani, a Tripolitan exile, who is anti-Italian and has long had friendly relations with the Idrisi, set out from Jedda to investigate the Idrisi's complaints, although it seems probable from internal evidence that these complaints had been made to Ibn Saud some time previously. It was not until the 6th November, the day Jizan fell, that the first reinforcements left for the south, by car by way of Jedda and the coast road. It is a bad track and some 450 miles to Jizan. At the same time Shereef Khalid-bin-Luwey set out from Turaba for Abha, accompanied by a nephew of Ibn Saud, his sister's son, Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid, and collecting tribal contingents under their war standards on his way to an estimated total of about 5,000 camelmen. He apparently did not reach Abha until the 25th November, or even later. The crow-flight distance is 200 miles. About the 25th November a similar force left Riyadh under the Amir Khalid-bin-Muhammad, eldest son of Ibn Saud's elder brother. From the 6th November to the end of the month some 2,000 reinforcements continued to flow through Jedda, composed mostly of regular troops from the town garrisons, but with some street-loafer mercenaries too, and accompanied by several hundred lorry-loads of arms and ammunition. Some of the earlier contingents went by dhows and two Government launches, and one of the last by a specially-chartered German ship, which spent ten days for its pains on a reef off Jizan. On the 17th November the coastal corps retook Jizan, also Sabya. On the 23rd, there seems to have been a general counter-attack by the rebels, of the results of which reports are still very contradictory. The revolt, meanwhile, seems to have become widespread and general, and the Saudi columns have made very slow, if any, progress. The last communiqué, dated the 9th December and attached at p. 22, stated that the column "charged with the liquidation of any vestige of insurrection in the coastal region of Asir" was then at full strength and at Jirzan and Sabya; there are, I think, no more regular troops that can be spared, the last contingent of all which passed through Jedda in early December having been composed of tribesmen from Nejd. The communiqué placed Shereef Khalid-bin-Luwey still at Abha and stated that letters had been sent to all the tribes and the Idrisi himself, inviting them to surrender within six days. In spite, therefore, of the tenor of the telegrams exchanged between Ibn Saud and the Idrisi and given on pp. 14 to 17, the latter had consistently been deceiving Ibn Saud, had made his hay while the sun shone, and was still at large. The communiqué made no mention of the force from Riyadh under the Amir Khalid-bin-Muhammad. Such information as I have regarding it is non-official, though reasonably reliable. I am inclined to think that it may be the nucleus of a much larger Nejd force destined to strike at Sana from the east if and when the Imam Yahya shows his hand.

9. The last point to which I would draw attention in this despatch is the curious exchange of telegrams between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya, reproduced on pp. 18 and 19. The Imam's telegram of the 15th November was either very corruptly received or has been rewritten for publication, for its Arabic is poor and ungrammatical and is well below his normal standard. The Imam tells Ibn Saud that the Saudi Governor of Jizan had taken refuge at Midi, whence he had given orders that he should be driven out. The next issue of the *Umm-al-Qura* tries to put things right by explaining that the telegram was corrupt and that what the Imam had really said was that the Idrisi had taken refuge at Midi, and that he (the Imam) had given orders that the Saudi Amir should, if possible, be released; which explanation holds no water, for Jizan was not retaken until two days after the Imam sent his telegram, if its date is correctly given, both it and the Saudi Amir being still in the Idrisi's hands. Be that as it may, the Imam goes on to preach patience to Ibn Saud reminding him that haste is of the devil, and warning him against the "deceits of foreigners," with special mention of the fate of four places which the French now hold, Fez, Tunis, Algiers and Syria, and of one in the Yemen which Aelius Gallus took in the days of Caesar Augustus; so tactful is the old Imam and so careful to avoid direct reference to the English and the modern Italians. If his telegram is a masterpiece, so also is Ibn Saud's reply, sent after the retaking of Jizan. He equally tactfully reminds the Imam that it was the Idrisi who, in the first instance, sought his, Ibn Saud's, protection, that Asir, in fact, is a Saudi protectorate, and that his concentration of forces is purely precautionary, for use against just such foreign



interference, in fact, as that to which his brother had referred. It cannot be seriously thought that these two rulers really fear a British or Italian landing. They use this fantasy as a comely veil to their rival skirmishes for position. It may be taken for granted that they are watching each other very carefully. A false move on either side might lead to war.

10. Copies of this despatch and its enclosure are being sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, the Chief Commissioner at Aden, and the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops, to the last-named of whom I am also sending paraphrased copies of my telegrams to you, No. 214 of the 25th November and No. 220 of the 1st December. I will deal in my immediately following despatch with the part played by the Dabbagh conspirators in this affair, as disclosed in pp. 4 to 6 and 19 to 21 of the enclosed papers.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 82/82/25]

No. 3.

*Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 4, 1933.)*

(No. 485.)

Sir,

*Jedda, December 20, 1932.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 346 of the 13th October regarding a consignment of Turkish rifles to Ibn Saud, I have the honour to report that the two Turkish officers have now arrived here. They are in mufti, and have been described by my Turkish colleague as journalists. I am not yet in a position to say whether they accompanied the consignment of arms and mitrailleuses.

2. I learn that they have expressed surprise that only ten or fifteen students are to form the military and aeronautical mission to Angora. They seem to have expected fifty. I gather that the Turkish Government will meet all expenses except the cost of the journey.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 361/2/25]

No. 4.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 18, 1933.)*

(No. 487.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his minute of the 26th instant respecting a conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza on the subject of the rebellion in Asir.

*Jedda, December 29, 1932.*

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Minute by Sir A. Ryan.*

FUAD BEY HAMZA called this morning for the first time since my return. After *politesse* of some length, I asked about the news from Asir. He said that all was well north of a line inland from Madhaya, a small port some 25 kilom. south of Jizan. It had been necessary to administer punishment to the Njua tribe (presumably the Naj'u described in *Handbook of Arabia*, I, 441), some hundreds of whom had been killed. I understood Fuad to be confirming what Hafiz Wahba had told me on the 23rd December, namely, that the troops had reached Sabya after fighting. These are the troops of Khalid-bin-Luwey's column, but Fuad said that Khalid himself had died (of illness, he said) on the march from Abha. Fuad said that the country from the above line southward to the frontier had still to be pacified owing to the uncertain activities of the

Masariha and other tribes in the Abu Aris region. Hasan-al-Idrisi was with the Masariha. On my mentioning Ibn Musa'ad, he said that he was still at Abha. He was to be appointed Governor-General of the whole area and would be replaced in the Governorate of Hail, which was at present held by an acting man.

2. Fuad said that he had never attached any importance to the Asir rebellion, which would simply end in the death of several hundred tribesmen and the widowhood of as many women, but he wished to speak of another aspect which might be of more interest to me, viz., the attitude of the Italians, with whom His Majesty's Government had an understanding about Arabia. He said that on Wednesday, the 21st December last, an Italian sloop, the name of which he could not give, had put in at Jizan without previous notice of any kind. After some hesitation over the establishment of contact in those conditions, the local Governor had seen the commander and had pointed out to him the impropriety of the visit. On this the sloop left on Thursday afternoon, but only to go into other territorial waters, those of the Farsan islands, and thence to a small island off Madhaya, where it spent the night. Next day, Friday, the 23rd, she visited Madhaya twice at an interval of some hours. The Saudi Government regarded their proceedings as a gross breach of international practice and had taken the matter up strongly with the Italian Minister here, who was in communication with Rome. Signor de Peppo had expressed the view that the proceedings of the sloop had not taken place under authority from his Government. If this proved to be the case, it would diminish without destroying the importance of the affair. Fuad said that he had the King's instructions to communicate the facts to me. I said I would note them and convey the communication to His Majesty's Government, but could not comment on the action of friendly foreign authorities.

3. Fuad Bey spoke at some length of other external activities behind the Asir affair and, replying to a question by me, said that they were an important factor in it. He did not openly accuse the Italians of complicity, but what he said was obviously directed against them to a large extent. He spoke, *inter alia*, of the rôle of Seyyid Marghani-al-Idrisi, who had been an Italian agent in the past, had helped the Saudi Government in framing up the treaty with Asir in 1926, and had subsequently reverted to his rôle of Italian agent. He spoke in the same connexion of the Ad Dabbagh machinations, and mentioned various people whose names are familiar to us, including that of Abdurrauf-as-Sabban, who had attended a meeting of the principal conspirators at Amman last May, and Muhammad Amin-ash-Shanqiti, who he told me was a man of Moorish origin, formerly resident at Mecca.

4. I told Fuad Bey that I had been concerned about the activities of the Ad Dabbaghs since early in the year, when Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had first spoken to me about the proceedings of Husein-ad-Dabbagh. At that time it was only a question of publications, and I had made reservations regarding the invocation by Sheikh Yusuf of article 2 of the Treaty of Jedda, but had taken the matter up with Aden. It had been discovered that the Ad Dabbaghs were in fact engaged in subversive schemes and, as he already knew, action had been taken to eliminate them from Aden. I understood also, I said, though I could make no official communication, that Abdurrauf-as-Sabban, who seemed to have been in communication with the conspirators, had been dismissed from his post in Transjordan. Having just come from London, I said, I wished to assure Fuad Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the King that there was no change in the policy of His Majesty's Government, which was to prevent, as far as they were concerned, any use of their territory as a base of hostile activities. I mentioned, as a further instance, that I had taken advantage of my recent visit to the Sudan to assure myself that the conspirators were not making use of that country. I repeated that Fuad Bey would not expect me to offer my comments on anything he had said about the Italians. As for myself, my principal interest in the matter was a desire that nothing should stand in the way of the object that he and I had at heart, namely, the establishment of a sounder position between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. I was anxious that the situation should not be clouded by an "atmosphere of suspicion," stressing this phrase as meaning that I was not prepared to endorse the Saudi view that there were grounds for more than suspicion, but that the mere existence of such an atmosphere was detrimental to the purpose which His Majesty's Government were pursuing steadfastly, even though recent events might complicate matters.

[9177]



5. Fuad Bey said he had arranged to return to Mecca in the afternoon, but hoped to return to Jedda early in Ramadan. I said that I was glad to have had a general discussion with him, but that I had not yet had time to study all my files, and that I also wished to consult His Majesty's Government on one or two points. It would suit me very well, I said, to continue our conversation any time after the 1st January.

A. R.

December 26, 1932.

[E 760/233/25]

No. 5.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 8.)*

(No. 16.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his note to His Royal Highness the Saudi Arab Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the 11th January, 1933, respecting mutual recognition between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia.

Jedda, January 11, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 5.

*Sir A. Ryan to the Saudi Arab Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(After compliments.)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, January 11, 1933.

WITH reference to the memorandum which his Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs was good enough to communicate to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in his letter of the 12th Jumada II, 1351 (the 13th October, 1932), and to my recent conversations with his Excellency, I have now the honour to communicate to your Royal Highness the following statement of the views and suggestions of my Government regarding the proposed settlement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Amirate of Transjordan:—

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have learnt with satisfaction of the readiness of His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to adopt their suggestion that His Majesty and the Amir of the State of Transjordan should mutually recognise each other, as a preliminary to the general settlement which it is hoped to bring about between the two countries. They particularly appreciate the terms in which this readiness has been expressed. They suggest that the most appropriate procedure would be that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia and the Chief Minister of the Transjordan Government should address notes to His Majesty's representative at Jedda and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan respectively, requesting them to notify His Majesty's Government of the decision of each ruler and his Government to recognise the other, with an intimation that the recognition will take effect automatically on receipt of confirmation from His Majesty's Government that a similar note has been received from the other side. If this procedure be accepted, His Majesty's Government would propose to communicate simultaneously to each of the two Governments an authenticated copy of the note received from the other. The date of this communication would be fixed beforehand in agreement with them and the recognition would take effect as from that date.

His Majesty's Government have received with equal satisfaction the assurance of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz that he is prepared to enter into treaty negotiations with the Government of Transjordan as soon as mutual recognition has taken place. With regard to the condition attached to this assurance, they desire to state that, under article 5 of the agreement of the 20th February, 1928, between the United Kingdom and Transjordan, His Highness the Amir undertook to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty in all matters affecting the foreign relations of Transjordan. Having

regard to this article and their special position in regard to Transjordan, His Majesty's Government consider themselves responsible for ensuring the fulfilment by the Amir and his Government of international obligations contracted by them. They regard it as natural in the circumstances that they should take part in the negotiations for a treaty settlement between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan and when that settlement is effected they will be prepared to take any necessary steps, in accordance with the principle laid down in the preceding sentence, to secure respect for its provisions on the part of Transjordan.

His Majesty's Government trust that the foregoing statement will dissipate any doubt which may exist in the mind of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz regarding the future effect of the settlement at which it is hoped to arrive. They will be prepared, if necessary, to confirm the statement in an exchange of notes between the Government of Saudi Arabia and themselves simultaneously with the conclusion of the proposed agreement between the latter and the Government of Transjordan. They suggest that, if His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and his Government are in agreement with their proposals, the question of mutual recognition should be disposed of forthwith on the lines indicated in paragraph 1 of this memorandum and that arrangements should then be made with the least possible delay to proceed with the further negotiations.

In conveying the foregoing statement to your Royal Highness, I have the honour to express the strong hope that it will meet the views of His Majesty the King and his Government. I shall not fail to communicate their reply to my Government with the least possible delay after it is received.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 763/763/25]

No. 6.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 8.)*

(No. 20.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit a confidential report on the heads of foreign missions at Jedda.

Jedda, January 13, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 6.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Jedda.*

(Sections marked \* are partly based on previous reports, revised up to date.)

*Egypt.*

\*HAFIZ AMER BEY has been Egyptian consul since March 1931, but was absent from Jedda from September 1931 until June 1932, and again from early November 1932 until the end of the year. He lacks previous diplomatic or consular experience, having been formerly an advocate at Tantah, his home town, and having later held minor judicial posts in Egypt. He is said to owe his position to the protection of Emin Yehia Pasha, brother of the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He speaks English imperfectly and French very sketchily. Up to last August he was by way of being very frank and friendly with the British Legation, and indulged at every turn in fulsome compliments, especially in intercourse with my wife and lady visitors. His frankness was chiefly shown in a rather tactless inquisitiveness, and I have had reason to doubt the sincerity of his friendliness. He is an ardent Moslem, strict in observance. Soon after he came here he formed a very poor opinion of the Wahhabi régime, and does not conceal his dislike of it.



He is repaid by suspicion, which, in June 1932, was pushed to the length of a definite accusation of complicity in the plots behind the then rebellion in the Northern Hejaz. There is no evidence, as far as I am aware, in support of this accusation. Nevertheless, Hafiz Bey's sympathies are certainly with the enemies of Ibn Saud. He is hardly the man for the difficult task of promoting a rapprochement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Hafiz Bey has a family in Egypt and sometimes speaks of bringing his wife to Jedda, but he has not done so up to the present.

#### France.

\*M. Roger Maigret holds the position of permanent Chargé d'Affaires, but the French Government have shown unwillingness to make his post more than a consulate, despite the conclusion of a general treaty with Ibn Saud in November 1931. He is a man of perhaps 60, and has had a long career in the French Near East service. He was employed in Morocco for many years prior to 1921, and appears to have had only a moderate reputation there. He was subsequently consul-general in Iraq. He is intelligent and witty, has a considerable knowledge of Arab countries, and boasts in his lighter moments of an equal knowledge of the Parisian underworld, as a result of having cultivated *apaches* in his conscript days. When I first knew him he was always very ready to talk about Morocco, which we both knew, but was more reticent about affairs nearer to us, notwithstanding professions of friendship which were sometimes almost "smarmy." I found him rather more communicative in 1932, but we met rarely during my short stays here, as M. Maigret seldom leaves his house except to leave Jedda, and eschews social intercourse almost completely. His health is poor and he was much taken up with an aged mother until her death last August. He does not appear to carry much weight with Saudi officials, whom he found inconceivably tiresome when negotiating his treaty. He is understood to have a considerable book knowledge of English, and has translated Mr. Philby's "Arabia" into French.

\*M. Maigret appears to be permanently separated from a Spanish or half-Spanish wife, who has never been in Jedda.

#### Germany.

\*M. Heinrich de Haas has done business in Jedda since the autumn of 1930. He became honorary German consul for the Hejaz in March 1931, following on the ratification of a treaty between the Reich and Ibn Saud. He is a man of about 39, and is the son of the late Dr. Walter de Haas, who spent most of his life in Australia, and subsequently held a post in the Berlin Foreign Office. M. de Haas has business interests in Constantinople and elsewhere as well as in Jedda. He has absented himself frequently from his post for business and family reasons. When here he is a pleasant addition to the small European society, and maintains very friendly relations with the British Legation. Having been born and brought up in Australia, he speaks English excellently, and has also a good knowledge of French. He is understood to have found it difficult to do satisfactory business and would probably welcome any favourable opportunity of leaving for good. He is unmarried.

#### Iraq.

The post of Chargé d'Affaires is at present vacant. Dr. Naji-al-Asil, who took it up as the first incumbent in February 1932, had previously had close Hashimite associations, having, *inter alia*, served King Hussein as a sort of diplomatic representative in Europe. He was recalled to Bagdad in June and was shortly afterwards superseded, apparently owing to a desire on the part of the Iraqi Government to appoint some one less disagreeable to Ibn Saud. Reshid Bey, the Iraqi consul-general at Beirut, was appointed to succeed him, but did not proceed, and was eventually appointed Minister of Defence in Naji Bey Shaukat's Cabinet. The Legation has been run by subordinates since Dr. Naji left, and is at present in charge of Nasir Bey Al Gaylani, who seems to be an amiable and intelligent young man. He speaks passable French, but the Iraqi Legation makes a point of writing in Arabic to other foreign missions.

#### Italy.

The Commendatore Ottavio de Peppo was appointed Italian Minister in Jedda, shortly after the ratification of the treaty concluded between Italy and Saudi Arabia. He arrived on the 25th September and presented his letters two days later to the Amir Feisal in the King's absence. He was born in 1887, entered the Italian consular service in 1912, and was transferred to the diplomatic service in 1923, since when he has had posts in South America and at Madrid. His only previous experience in the East has been a short tenure of the Italian consulate at Port Said, and he has no knowledge of oriental languages. In these circumstances he finds Jedda disconcerting, all the more so as he appears to like the gaiety of Western centres and his resources in the evening are limited by defective eyesight. He has already expressed the view that his mission here is to create a Legation, and that when that is accomplished he will leave. His landlord is helping him by building, to Italian requirements, a house of some consequence close to the rather poor building in which the Italian consulate was previously housed. For the rest, M. de Peppo makes a favourable impression on a short acquaintance, that of an alert official, with a strong sense of humour, but hampered by nerves and a feeling of being *dépaysé*. He is cordial in his relations with this Legation, and emphasises the friendship between our two countries. He speaks French well and can get on in English. He is unmarried.

#### Netherlands.

\*M. C. Adriaanse, who succeeded M. van der Meulen as Chargé d'Affaires in 1931, is, like him, a member of the Dutch East Indian civil service. He is large, loose-limbed and a good fellow. He does not speak English as well as his predecessor, but has quite an adequate command of it. He has made a serious study of classical Arabic at the feet of Professor Snouck Hurgronje, and acted as general secretary to the Orientalists' Conference at Leiden. He can get on in the spoken language. Although far from brilliant, he makes a very good colleague and maintains the traditional good relations between the British and Dutch missions in Jedda.

\*M. Adriaanse has a wife and family in Holland, but has lived a consistently bachelor life in this country.

#### Persia.

\*Persia is still represented by a permanent Chargé d'Affaires in the person of M. Habibullah (or Habibollah Khan) Hoveida, who formerly bore the title of Ain-ul-Mulk. He is an elderly Bahai, and, when at home, lives in Syria in preference to Persia. I have revised my former rather unfavourable opinion of him, chiefly because of his disarming good nature and apparently genuine friendliness. There is so little to do at the Persian Legation that he has no opportunity of displaying his more serious qualities, if he possesses them. He thinks he has a way with local royalty, but counts for little in official life. He is a good linguist, having a competent knowledge of English, French, Turkish and Arabic. He absents himself a great deal from Jedda and his chief ambition is to get a healthier and pleasanter post. When here, he is an agreeable if somewhat laughable member of local diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic society, which he enlivens from time to time by taking photographs of us after dinner by artificial light.

M. Hoveida seems to be devoted to his wife and family, but leaves them always in Syria.

#### Soviet Russia.

\*M. Nezir (or Nezir Bey) Turakoulov is the doyen of the Diplomatic Body. He is a round-headed Moslem from Turkestan and has distinctly Tartar features. His age is 38. He seems intelligent and has a considerable aptitude for languages, having acquired a good working knowledge of Arabic, greatly improved his French and started on English, since he came to Jedda about three years ago. We converse a good deal in Turkish, the language in which he is most at his ease. We are quite good friends but meet comparatively rarely, as M. Turakoulov goes little into European society. In the summer of 1932 he appeared to avoid me on purpose, possibly owing to the complications of the then situation. When we do



see each other, we never approach any kind of political subject, but exchange *politesses* and simple stories. In this sort of talk M. Turakoulov displays a lively sense of humour. I think that he is genuinely more interested in commercial and economic subjects than in politics, and is content to devote himself to the uphill task of marketing Russian goods (he did an important deal in petroleum products in 1931, but is still whistling for the money), and securing the removal of the restrictions still imposed by the Saudi Government, in principle at least, on direct trade with Russia. He presents no appearance of wishing to make a splash, but after my departure in September 1932, he came out of his shell again and even gave a diplomatic dinner. I used to think him a good Moslem, but have modified this opinion. He, nevertheless, poses as a believer, is attentive to local personages and affects Arab head-dress.

M. Turakoulov has only once taken leave since he came to Jedda. He is married to a non-Moslem Russian lady from Samara, who has been little in Jedda, but returned late in 1932. I have not yet met her, but she is described to me as a plump peroxide blonde, able to speak French and easy in conversation. She has some sort of medical qualifications and runs a dispensary in Jedda.

#### Turkey.

Djélal Bey was recently appointed Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in succession to Lutfullah Bey, who died at sea on his return voyage to Jedda last August. The new chargé only arrived on the 18th December, and it is too soon to judge of his qualities. He was formerly in the Turkish army and saw service in the Yemen, where he seems to have acquired a good knowledge of Arabic. His French is elementary. He has been in the consular service for some years and came here from Cyprus, where he served for a short time, after having been employed in Syria, I think at Damascus. He makes a favourable first impression.

Djélal Bey brought with him his wife, a lady of Constantinople, shy, attractive and well turned out in the modern Turkish style. A month of Jedda has, however, been enough for her, and she is returning almost immediately to Turkey with her son, a student at Galata Seray.

[E 663/31/25]

No. 7.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 31. Secret.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 8, 1933.*

I TRANSMIT to you herein, for your information and guidance, a copy of a despatch which has been addressed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan regarding the main line of policy followed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in regard to Arabian affairs, with special reference to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Transjordan.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 7.

*Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wauchope.*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Downing Street, February 1, 1933.*

RECENT events in Saudi Arabia, more particularly the Ibn Rifada incursion and the revolt in Asir, have suggested the desirability of reviewing the position generally, and it seems convenient to take this opportunity of restating the main lines of the policy which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are pursuing in regard to Arabian affairs, with special reference to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Transjordan.

2. Briefly, this policy may be described as the maintenance of the *status quo*; and His Majesty's Government have thus to follow two distinct lines of action:—

- (a) Support of the régime of Ibn Saud as King of Saudi Arabia, and
- (b) Support of the Hashimite régime in Iraq and Transjordan.

3. In both cases international relations are involved; and it may be useful first to recapitulate the more important instruments which govern the position.

#### Saudi Arabia.

His Majesty the King has recognised Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies (now known as Saudi Arabia) by the treaty signed at Jedda on the 20th May, 1927, and the relations established by that treaty involve certain mutual obligations, notably, by article 2, each of the high contracting parties undertakes to maintain good relations with the other and to endeavour by all the means at his disposal to prevent his territories being used as a base for unlawful activities directed against peace and tranquillity in the territories of the other party.

#### Iraq.

The relations between His Majesty's Government and Iraq will be governed until 1957 or longer by the treaty of the 30th June, 1930, which came into force upon the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations as an independent State in October 1932. The high contracting parties undertake that, without prejudice to obligations under the Covenant and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, in the event of either of them becoming engaged in war, the other will immediately come to his aid. The assistance which His Majesty's Government are to render to Iraq does not extend to the maintenance of internal order, but it is recognised that the protection of the essential communications of His Majesty's Government is in the common interests of both parties. In matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests the high contracting parties agree to full and frank consultation. His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, and his successors, are to enjoy precedence in relation to the representatives of other Powers. Iraq undertakes that when in need of the services of foreign officials she will normally engage British subjects, and that for the purpose of military instruction only British subjects will be engaged.

#### Transjordan.

The relations between His Majesty's Government and the Amir are determined by the agreement made between His Majesty the King and His Highness in February 1928, the ratifications of which were exchanged on the 31st October, 1929. Full responsibility is accepted by His Majesty, as mandatory for Transjordan; and by article 5 of the agreement, the Amir agrees to be guided by the advice of His Majesty in all matters concerning foreign relations of Transjordan as well as in all matters affecting the international and financial obligations and interests of His Majesty in respect of Transjordan.

4. The direct relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq are governed by various instruments, notably, the Muhammara Convention of the 5th May, 1922; the Bahra Agreement of the 1st November, 1925; and the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" and the Extradition Treaty of 1931.

The Hadda Agreement of the 2nd November, 1925, defines the frontier between Nejd and Transjordan, and makes provision for the settlement of certain questions connected with the frontier, with a view to promoting friendly relations between the two countries.

No definite agreement has been reached with the Government of Saudi Arabia as to the definition of the frontier between Hejaz and Transjordan, but, by the exchange of notes appended to the Treaty of Jedda, King Ibn Saud has expressed his willingness to maintain the *status quo* in the Ma'an-Aqaba district, and not to interfere in its administration until favourable circumstances will permit a final settlement of the question.

5. In conformity with the general policy of His Majesty's Government, a further stage will have been reached in the process of establishing these international relations on a regular basis when effect has been given to the proposed



mutual recognition between Ibn Saud as King of Saudi Arabia, and Abdullah as Amir of the State of Transjordan, which, it is contemplated, will be followed by the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between the two countries.

6. Turning now to another aspect of the matter, the following are the chief reasons which have influenced His Majesty's Government in giving their support to the maintenance of Ibn Saud's régime in Saudi Arabia:—

- (a) Having regard to the great concern to His Majesty's Government of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, to their mandatory responsibility for Transjordan and their special interests in Iraq, Koweit and Bahrein, it has been recognised that it is of great advantage to His Majesty's Government that the main area of the Arabian Peninsula should be under a more or less ordered government, with which they can maintain normal diplomatic relations, and of importance that those relations should be of a friendly character.
- (b) Only by the establishment of such an ordered government in Arabia can the safety and good treatment of Moslem pilgrims, many of whom are British subjects, or under British protection, be ensured.
- (c) Were relations between His Majesty's Government and King Ibn Saud not of a friendly character, he might well exert himself to absorb Koweit, interfere in the affairs of Bahrein, and even attempt to obtain an influence over the Trucial Sheikdoms. There have been occasional indications that some at least of the Trucial Sheikhs would not be unresponsive.
- (d) His Majesty's Government would view with concern the establishment of Soviet influence in Arabia. King Ibn Saud has shown himself to be of the same view, and for this reason merits support. When recently His Majesty's Government were unable to comply with King Ibn Saud's request for a loan, he informed them that he might be obliged, though most reluctantly, to accept Soviet offers of financial assistance. Were the relations between His Majesty's Government and him to deteriorate, he might be readier to accept the advances of the Soviet Government.

7. As regards the support given to the Hashimite family in Iraq and Transjordan, His Majesty's Government have been influenced by the following considerations:—

- (a) His Majesty's Government recognise that they remain under special obligations to the Hashimites arising from the part played by the latter in the war against Turkey.
- (b) King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah have shown themselves to be well-disposed to His Majesty's Government. It is not necessary to enter into detail, but two recent cases in which the latter has, by his co-operation, materially assisted His Majesty's Government are the Druse rebellion and the disturbances in Palestine in 1929.
- (c) His Majesty's Government have maintained their support of the Hashimites for many years, and there is nothing which in their view suggests the desirability of any change in a policy to which they are deeply committed. On the contrary, there are special relations with Iraq, arising out of the Treaty of Alliance, which involve continued support; while in the case of Transjordan, His Majesty's Government have a special responsibility, as the mandatory Power, to support the régime which has been set up in that country under their direct protection.
- (d) Even if His Majesty's Government had grounds for serious dissatisfaction, there is no obvious alternative to the Hashimites as rulers in Iraq or Transjordan.

8. The possibility is recognised that the kingdom of Ibn Saud may break up on his death, but it would not be to the advantage of His Majesty's Government to do anything to hasten its disruption. On the contrary, it is to their interest to do all that they can to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia and to support Ibn Saud as ruler of a united kingdom. Nevertheless, account must be taken of the mutual animosity between Ibn Saud and the Hashimite family

resulting from past events, which cannot be expected entirely to disappear even as a result of the establishment of relations on the basis of mutual recognition and treaties of friendship. The possibility of the continuance of disputes and of conflicting interests must be accepted, and the full reconciliation of the two complementary aspects of the policy of His Majesty's Government presents a problem, the solution of which is not without difficulty. Support of Ibn Saud's régime in Saudi Arabia cannot be given at the expense of support of the Hashimite rulers in their own territories, and His Majesty's Government must take full account of the repercussions likely to be produced in territories over which they exercise mandatory responsibility or towards which they stand in special relations.

9. Despite, however, the existence of these difficulties, no question has arisen, nor does the question now arise, of choosing as between Ibn Saud and the Hashimite family, or of subordinating the interests of one to the other. If events should, unhappily, lead to that, a new situation would be created in which the whole position would have to be carefully reviewed. It is not suggested that there is likelihood of His Majesty's Government being faced with such a dilemma. Latterly, however, some anxiety has been caused in respect of relations between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia, owing to the evidence of widespread and continuous intrigues against the Saudi régime which are believed to have been conducted, in part at least, within Transjordan itself. It is the fact that the Amir has conformed all his official acts to the requests made to him in connexion with the situation created by these intrigues. But there are many indications that he knew of these intrigues even supposing that he did not encourage them, and it seems not unlikely that other persons have actively engaged in the conspiracy, and have made use of the Amir or of his name, either with or without his acquiescence, for the furtherance of subversive activities against Ibn Saud. In consequence, a difficult, and perhaps even serious, situation has threatened to develop.

10. Much has been done already, at your instance, by the authorities in Transjordan and Palestine to prevent those territories from being used as a base for improper activities against the Saudi régime. Effective co-operation in Transjordan played an important part in the frustration of the Ibn Rifada revolt. This has been followed by the expulsion of an important section of the disaffected Beni Atiya, and by the exclusion from both Palestine and Transjordan of various suspects. Moreover, it is to be hoped that the mutual recognition of the Amir Abdullah and King Ibn Saud and the proposed treaty will materially improve matters. The fact remains, however, that the existence of anti-Saudi intrigue is contrary to the wishes and the interests of His Majesty's Government; and, further, having regard to their treaty obligations, and in particular those embodied in article 2 of the Treaty of Jedda, the credit of His Majesty's Government will be at stake if such intrigues are conducted in territory for which they are responsible. In view of the past history of Saudi Arabia, and having regard to Arab mentality, it is recognised that it is hardly to be hoped that intrigue against the Saudi régime in territories under Hashimite rule or influence can be completely stopped; but His Majesty's Government consider it a definite obligation to take all measures possible to restrict this kind of activity within limits which will not constitute a threat to the stability of the Saudi régime or expose His Majesty's Government to charges of indifference, if not of actual toleration. It is, of course, a corollary of this policy that Ibn Saud should be required to maintain a correct attitude towards his Hashimite neighbours.

11. I should be glad if, taking the foregoing considerations into account, you will review the position, with special reference to Transjordan, in the light of all the information available, and report what further steps can, in your opinion, be taken (1) for restricting anti-Saudi intrigue, and, in so far as it may be impossible to prevent it, at least for neutralising its effect; and (2) generally for promoting the establishment of better relations between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia.

I have, &c.

P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.



[E 898/233/25]

No. 8.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 32.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the Saudi Arab Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 22nd January, 1933, respecting treaty negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan.

*Jedda, January 24, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 8.

*Saudi Arab Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan.*

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  
Mecca, January 22, 1933.*

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of the 11th January, 1933, on the subject of the settlement proposed between the Government of His Majesty and Transjordan and to inform your Excellency as follows:—

*First:* The Government of the Saudi Arab Kingdom see no objection to the recognition of the Amirate (*sic*, in the Arabic, exact transliteration being Amāra) of the Shereef Abdullah over the Wilāya (?=vilayet) of Transjordan, and this is (due to) their desire to ensure peace among the Arab countries (Aqtār) and to prevent mischief-makers from stirring up discord between the two territories (Bilādayn), and also (to) their reliance on the promise which the British Government have given on their own behalf in their latest note, to the effect that all undertakings entered into by the said Shereef with their (the Saudi Arab Government's) territory would be under the supervision and guarantee (dhamāna) of the British Government.

*Secondly:* The Government of His Majesty think it necessary that the two parties should see the official text of the formula by which mutual recognition will be accomplished, and they would like to draw attention to the fact that the recognition by Transjordan should be explicitly that of the Saudi Arab Kingdom comprising the Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies.

*Thirdly:* In view of the confidence which the Government of His Majesty have in the British Government, they agree to their proposal as to the conclusion of a treaty between them (the Saudi Government) and Transjordan, subject to the guarantee (dhamāna) of the British Government of the fulfilment of the undertakings of Transjordan (implemented) by (their) taking part in the negotiations, on the one hand, and by the exchange of official notes on the other, as has been explained in the above-mentioned British note.

*Fourthly:* The Government of His Majesty also consider that the exchange of recognition officially between the two Governments should be accompanied by an exchange of telegrams, from the Shereef Abdullah to His Majesty the King and His Majesty's reply thereto.

*Fifthly:* As regards the manner of communicating the recognition, the Government of His Majesty will communicate the necessary text to the British Plenipotentiary at Jedda and will receive through his intermediary the Transjordan text.

With highest respects,  
FEISAL.

[E 902/902/25]

No. 9.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 38. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, January 31, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for November and December 1932. This report has been compiled by Mr. Hope Gill, who was in charge of the Legation during nearly the whole of the period under review. I have made no material alterations in the report as drafted by him.

2. It has been found in practice that the system of preparing these reports at intervals of two months has not produced the advantages which were anticipated when it was introduced at the beginning of 1931. The labour involved in compiling them from the mass of material which accumulates in a post of varied activities has been heavy, and there has been a tendency to over-systematise the reports in an effort to make them comprehensive. There has consequently been frequent delay in issuing the reports, and I think that they have become too unwieldy for the purposes of some of the recipients, while others are already familiar from current correspondence with the subjects which interest them.

3. Having discussed the matter with your Department while on leave, I propose to return to the system of monthly reports and to make them shorter by dealing only with the salient events of each month in a form resembling a news-letter rather than a systematic account of everything that has happened. I understand that this will meet your views, and I trust that it will not diminish the value of the reports to other recipients.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure as usual to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, Bushire, Koweit, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea sloops, and to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan. I am sending copies also to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Fleet, Malta, at his request and to the Political Agent, Bahrein, at the request of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

(Confidential.)

Enclosure in No. 9.

*Jedda Report for November and December, 1932.*

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(Confidential.)

*Ibn Saud.*

#### I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

334. THE King continued in Nejd during November and December. Very little news of him filtered out. He seems to have spent his time in and about his feudal castle, which is the sum total of Riyadh, receiving tribesmen and occasionally hunting in the neighbourhood. It is thought that the absence of his chauffeur, Siddiq, on motor-bargaining business in Egypt, kept him very much at home until mid-December, for he has a marked antipathy to being driven by anyone other than this graceless Indian, whom, for reasons known to himself, he trusts.

335. Special favour seems to have been shown by Ibn Saud during these two months to leaders of the Ajman and Mutair tribes who paid homage to him at Riyadh. His bounty to them was remarked as exceptional. It served the purpose of encouraging others of these tribes, who had avoided Nejd since the failure of their 1929 rebellion, to consider a return to their former allegiance. Ibn Saud sent out invitations to this end by emissaries to the Mutair in November. His solicitude seems to derive either from gratitude for their behaviour during the Ibn Rifada revolt, when they gave no trouble, or from a desire now to placate them and buy them back; the tribes affect to believe the latter.

336. For the greater part of December Ibn Saud entertained at Riyadh Sheikh Kamil-al-Qassab, Syrian Nationalist and Istiqlal party leader. The Saudi Minister of Finance is believed to have paid a considerable sum to this partisan before he left the country—which he did on the 3rd January—to carry on the good work in Palestine and Syria, also no doubt in the Pan-Arab Congress which may be held in Bagdad. It is of interest to record that a member of the Legation staff remembers seeing Sheikh Kamil begging bounty in Mecca from the Sharif Husain with tears in his eyes and gross flattery; then, disappointed at his meagre dole of Maria Theresa dollars, turning to rend him in the Palestinian press. If he now receives reward from Ibn Saud it is in good gold sovereigns, taken from the Hejaz, withheld from the King's creditors, and used to further his ambitions.

#### *Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

337. The diplomatic diary records but few and brief contacts between Ministry and Legation in the past two months. On the 14th November the Under-Secretary visited Jedda for two days. He asked His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to call on him on the 16th, when current matters were discussed and three Saudi memoranda, on the Asir situation (paragraphs 363-6), the Dabbagh conspiracy (paragraph 351) and Bahrein transit dues (paragraph 362) were presented. On the 20th November the Saudi Minister in London landed at Jedda on "leave," but went straight through to Mecca. He went on to Riyadh on the 2nd December, spent a fortnight with his King, and arrived back in Mecca on the 19th December. Fuad Bey Hamza had, meanwhile, visited Jedda again from the 1st to 4th December, but did not inform or get into touch with the Legation. On the 22nd December the Amir Feisal came to Jedda, accompanied by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and followed the next day by Fuad Bey Hamza. Having received no official intimation of the arrival of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his Under-Secretary, His Majesty's Minister, who had returned from leave

the previous day, confined himself to leaving cards on them on the 24th December at the local "Foreign Office" building. Hafiz Wahba, however, lunched that day at the Legation in response to a previous invitation while at Mecca. Fuad Hamza called on His Majesty's Minister on Boxing Day to discuss Asir and connected matters, entertained him and Mr. Hope Gill to lunch in the "Foreign Office" to meet the Amir Feisal, and left with the latter and Hafiz Wahba for Mecca on the same afternoon. Hafiz Wahba was met with again at a picnic luncheon tabled in his honour before forty guests at Wadi Fatima, a palm-grove 15 miles from Mecca, by the Indian vice-consul, a friend of long standing. On the 30th December this sole Saudi Minister Plenipotentiary sailed again for London by way of Egypt, land of his birth.

#### *Finance.*

338. In paragraph 290 of the last Jedda report it was suggested, not very hopefully, that the Saudi "Debts Chest" might, after all, have something in it. November, however, confirmed the ruling pessimism as to its contents, when the Government issued an obscure memorandum, in which they sought to explain what endeavours they had made to meet their creditors and why it was that they had failed. They claimed, nevertheless, to have issued 14 million Amiri piastres' worth of drafts on Customs. In the "Debts Chest," they said, they had enough cash to pay 5 per cent. interest on the remainder of their debts; that is to say, the bulk. This memorandum was circulated to all the Government's creditors in Jedda, whom it convinced of the Government's dishonesty. It was sent out a few days before the return to his post of the Government's financial adviser. M. van Leeuwen had not been consulted in any way in its preparation, and was not even told of it officially nor given a copy when he returned. The same circular was sent to the British Legation with a brief intimation that it would apply to the debts due to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, a cavalier proceeding considering the past history of their claims in respect of arms supplied to Ibn Saud by the Government of India in 1929 and the cost of the MacDonnell enquiry.

339. The Cairo *Ahram's* Jaffa correspondent was reported in the *Egyptian Gazette* of the 28th December as having stated that, among the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi's financial schemes, was the opening of an Hejazi-Palestinian bank with a capital of a million pounds, to which he would contribute half, Ibn Saud a fifth, from a loan which Abbas Hilmi would make to him, and the United Kingdom, French and Italian Governments a tenth apiece. It was also suggested that, in order to further one of his political ambitions—namely, to secure for himself a throne in Syria, or a throne in Palestine, or the Caliphate—in the Hejaz, the ex-Khedive was ready to render further financial assistance to Ibn Saud, and thereby purchase his support.

340. An error and an omission vitiated the summary of Saudi external indebtedness given in paragraph 290 of the last report. As far as can now be ascertained, this indebtedness stood at the end of December approximately as follows:—

Creditor.	£ Gold.	Service.
The Poles ... ..	50,000	1930 arms.
Government of India ... ..	30,000	1929 arms.
The Soviets ... ..	30,000	1931 oil.
The Qusaibis ... ..	25,000	Loans, &c.
	(at least)	
Mr. Philby ... ..	20,000	Fords, machinery, &c.
"Shell" ... ..	15,000	1931 oil, stolen.
*"Standard Oil" ... ..	15,000	Ditto, partly stolen.
*"Marconi's" ... ..	15,000	Wireless stations.
	(at least)	
*German firms ... ..	10,000	Telephones, &c.
The "Dutch Bank" ... ..	5,000	Loans.
The "E.T.C." ... ..	2,500	Current account.
His Majesty's Government	1,700	MacDonnell investigation.

219,200 (at least)

The bills for items marked "\*" which fell due in November, were not then met and have not yet been replaced by any new arrangement. Possibly they also,



in the Saudi Government's view, are covered by the circular described in paragraph 338.

#### *Economics.*

341. A proposal has been made to Ibn Saud by some leading Nawabs and other wealthy men of Hyderabad State to start, at their own expense and by sending experts from India, a cotton-spinning and weaving industry in the Hejaz. They hope by this means to counteract some of the helpless poverty which so shocked them when they were on pilgrimage last spring. The scheme owes much to the initiative and advice of the Indian vice-consul, and he was entrusted with the delivery, on the 17th December, of the promoters' letter to Ibn Saud through the hand of the Minister of Finance. If the scheme can be made to show profit to either of these last two, its political objections may, perhaps, be outweighed.

342. A railway scheme is reported in paragraph 346.

#### *Legislation.*

343. The "Regulation respecting the Ministry of Finance" completed publication in the local press. A "Regulation governing Motor-car Drivers" was similarly published in November. It enacts, amongst other necessary rules, that, "if camels are dismayed at the voice of the horn, the driver must stop the voice of the horn and the motor until they have cleared from the way before him." A "Decree concerning the Departure of Debtors," a busy instrument, was also published in November. On the 25th November, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed the Saudi Arab Government that, in view of the local "Coastal Fisheries Regulation of July 1932," in which Saudi Arab territorial waters were defined as extending 4 miles from shore, His Majesty's Government must reserve all their rights in international law in respect of waters outside the 3-mile limit.

#### *Nationality Law.*

344. Having discovered by their summer census (see paragraph 237) who in the Hejaz claimed foreign nationality, the Saudi Government set a committee to work in Mecca in late October and early November to summon those people and demand documentary proof of their nationality. Since the committee was reported to be holding on to such passports as were presented and giving those who had none only fifteen days in which to get them, failing which, they were told, they must either adopt Hejazi nationality or quit the country within three months, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires enquired of the Saudi Government as to the true nature of the committee's powers. Whereupon the matter was referred to Riyadh and Mr. Hope Gill was assured by Fuad Bey Hamza, on the 16th November, that as far as he knew the report was incorrect. Be that as it may, the committee has not resumed work.

#### *Waqfs.*

345. The "Auqaf-al-Haramayn" Association pursued in November, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Legation, the matter of a valuable Waqf bequest, which is said to be immobilised in Rangoon.

#### *Communications.*

346. An Indian doctor from Madras, named Jeelani, who, while on pilgrimage earlier in the year, became imbued with ideas of the need for and commercial possibilities of a railway from Jedda to Mecca, returned in December with a cut-and-dried scheme raised by a firm of Madras engineers on the basis of a 1917 sketch-map, which omitted Mecca, 1920 pilgrimage figures, and contemporary Indian costs of labour and construction. The doctor seeks a concession from Ibn Saud to build and run this railway, and is ready to give the latter a share in the profits. The latter is holding out for a share in the gross receipts instead. When he gets the concession, Dr. Jeelani will look for the capital, to the tune of 40 lakhs (£300,000). He is already a very old man.

#### *Locusts.*

347. The friendly arrangement for the reporting of swarms, mentioned in paragraph 296 of the last report, bore sterile fruit once in November. The information was so meagre as to be valueless, nor could more be extracted.

### II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS.

#### *Raiding.*

##### *Transjordan.*

348. Only one raid was reported, made on the 6th November by Beni Atiya from over the border on the Transjordan Howeytat, camped eastward of Bayir. In reply to the Legation's representations, the Saudi Government stated that the raiders had been arrested and that the camels would be returned to Captain Glubb's representative on demand. It is supposed that all went well.

#### *Beni Atiya.*

349. After a preliminary scare had died down, raised by a report that Ibn Saud's Ikhwan—a name to conjure with in the tribelands—were waiting across the frontier to eat up the Beni Atiya as soon as they emerged into the Hejaz, the eviction of the majority of this troublesome tribe from Transjordan was carried out with precision and success by the desert police. It was completed by the 20th November, when 110 tents had crossed into Saudi Arabia. Ibn Farhan, the leader of the rebel contingent of this tribe, which had gone to join Ibn Rifada, was caught on the Transjordan side of the frontier on the 18th November and was condemned to a year's imprisonment.

#### *Hashimite Intrigue.*

350. On the 8th November the Amir Abdullah began what was at first intended to be a tour of his Transjordan corridor, made with the supposed but unavowed intention of meeting with Nuri-ash-Sha'lan, paramount chief of the Ruwalla. He was to be accompanied by the tribal sheikhs of Transjordan, among them Selim-abu-Dumeyk, of the Beni Atiya. Observers in Transjordan foresaw, rightly or wrongly, an alliance between Transjordan tribes and the Ruwalla against Ibn Saud. The tour, however, degenerated into a "shooting trip to Asraq," which the Amir suddenly left on the 15th November for Bagdad, to visit his sick brother Ali. He returned on the 24th November direct to Amman, having apparently not been accompanied in the first instance by Abu Dumeyk, nor having met in the end with Nuri Shalan.

351. On the 16th November the Saudi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs handed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires a lengthy memorandum of the previous day describing ramifications of the anti-Saudi plot which has come to be known as the Dabbagh conspiracy, from the name of its most obvious members. The memorandum connected them with the Amir Abdullah and others of the shereefs in Transjordan. Fuad Hamza supported the accusation, which is no new one, with a bulky file of what he described as intercepted correspondence, from which he drew at apparent random five specimens for Mr. Hope Gill's perusal. The memorandum itself concluded with an appeal to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as allies and friends to prevent territories under their control from being used as bases for anti-Saudi activity.

352. In reporting the gist of this memorandum by telegraph to His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires stated that the particular specimen documents were not very convincing, but he expressed the view that neither the probability that the Saudi case was a good one, nor the possibility that the conspirators would cause more active trouble, could rightly be ignored. He enquired whether the Saudi Government might be informed in reply of the steps already taken at Aden to deny use of that centre to the conspirators, and be furthermore assured of the authorities' continued surveillance there and extended surveillance in the Hadhramaut. Mr. Hope Gill also asked whether there was any information which could be added regarding measures taken in Transjordan to incapacitate the plotters there, having in mind the evidence accumulated in British hands against the Amir Abdullah's immediate entourage, if not against the Amir himself, as well as against minor and outlying native officials in Transjordan, and having no knowledge of anything having been done since the Ibn



Rifada revolt ended either to investigate and punish complicity in Transjordan or to guard against similar abuse of British-controlled territory in the future.

353. On the 23rd November, upon receipt of telegraphic confirmation from Aden that the rising in Asir (which is reported in paragraphs 363 to 366 below) was being fomented by the Dabbaghs, and in view of the importance given in the intercepted plans of these conspirators to simultaneous risings in north and south, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires made telegraphic enquiry of the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan whether there was any danger of the conspirators' associates in these countries trying to foment another revolt in the Northern Hejaz. General Wauchope replied that, although there were no indications of any such attempt, it could not be said that there was no possibility of associates in Transjordan communicating with their friends in the Hejaz; watch, however, was being kept. His Majesty's Government had meanwhile informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, on the 25th November, that, as regards the Saudi memorandum of the 15th November, it might be preferable not to answer, but that, as regards possible action against anti-Saudi conspirators in Transjordan, the High Commissioner was being requested to expedite his views.

#### *Saudi Reaction.*

354. On the 25th November, however, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had had cause to telegraph home the gist of a circumstantial local report received from a confidential source, to the effect that a letter from the Amir Abdullah to one of the Dabbagh fraternity had been captured by the Saudi forces in Asir, and that this had decided Ibn Saud to concentrate forces of his Ikhwan near the Transjordan border, preparatory to demanding of His Majesty's Government the Amir Abdullah's dismissal. On the 27th November His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires received a second Saudi memorandum, dated the 26th. It was briefer and more incisive in tone than the first and bore signs of having emanated from Ibn Saud himself at Riyadh. It referred to reports from the northern frontier and news from southbound travellers into Nejd, which pointed to unusual activity on the part of the Shereef Abdullah (*cf.* paragraph 350). It repeated that participation by the shereefs and their associates in the rebellion of Ibn Rifada was established. It recalled the indignation aroused in Nejd by Transjordan intrigue and encouragement of Ibn Rifada's attempt, and also the difficulty which the Saudi Government had then had in restraining their tribesmen from attacking Transjordan. It ended by pointing out the danger of the tribes of Nejd getting finally out of hand if decisive action were not taken in Transjordan to put an end to anti-Saudi activities.

355. In telegraphing the substance of this memorandum to His Majesty's Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires observed that something fairly serious must have occurred to cause Ibn Saud to threaten His Majesty's Government with the uncontrollability of his Ikhwan. He attributed it to a combination of bad news from Asir, disquieting news from the Transjordan frontier and the absence of evidence of any effective measures taken in Transjordan itself, which had determined Ibn Saud to take his own measures to forestall yet another vicarious aggression by the Amir Abdullah. Mr. Hope Gill expressed the view that if Ikhwan were, in fact, being moved northward, no mere words would restore Ibn Saud's confidence in His Majesty's Government to the point of making him check the movement. Once it developed, His Majesty's Government could only resist it. He submitted the advisability, before it developed, of taking radical action in Transjordan, at least against the Shereef Shakir, who seemed richly to deserve it, if the Shereef Abdullah himself could not, in the interests of major policy, be punished with dismissal. He finally recorded the conviction that in the long run His Majesty's Government must choose between the Amir Abdullah and Ibn Saud.

#### *British Intervention.*

356. A serious view of the situation was taken in London. Jerusalem was informed on the 3rd December that the continuance of the position, in which His Majesty's Government were unable to deny the accusation of hostile activities made by Ibn Saud against the Amir Abdullah and his associates, was embarrassing and ignominious. Unless radical steps were taken in the near

future to remedy this position, prejudice, not only to relations with Ibn Saud, but to British interests throughout the Middle East were to be foreseen. The High Commissioner was asked to consider the possibility of really strong representations to the Amir and of immediate drastic action against conspirators in Transjordan, especially those in the Amir's entourage, the Amir Shakir in particular. If this were done, there would then be material for reply to Ibn Saud.

357. General Wauchope interviewed the Amir Abdullah on the 7th December. The latter's reply ended with the statement that he had already promised not to work against Ibn Saud, and he would keep his promise. It appears that he had already dismissed in October one member of his entourage, namely, Abdurrauf-as-Sabban, who was to be relegated to Bagdad. Action has been taken in Transjordan to curb the activities of certain other conspirators from outside, but the principal persons in the Amir's entourage who have been accused of anti-Saudi activities remained in office at the end of December. His Majesty's Government were anxiously considering the whole matter. In the meantime no formal reply has been returned to the Saudi memoranda of the 15th and 26th November. The Ikhwan movement has not yet assumed sufficient proportion to cause local anxiety, if, indeed, it has ever started, which is indeterminable, though reports which at one time reached Transjordan from Jauf alleged the arrival there of Ikhwan with many standards. Some fire there probably was.

358. On the 28th December, after taking stock of the situation on his return from leave, His Majesty's Minister informed His Majesty's Government that he did not consider an official reply to the Saudi memoranda to be urgent, provided he were given authority to discuss their contents with the Saudi Under-Secretary. He stressed the desirability of securing mutual recognition of their status between Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah.

#### *Mutual Recognition.*

359. The draft of a note to the Saudi Arab Government on the subject of this mutual recognition and of the treaty negotiations which should follow, it was prepared in London in November, and sent to the High Commissioner for Transjordan on the 24th for his observations or concurrence.

#### *Iraq.*

360. The Iraqi-Nejdi frontier seems to have been quiet, for no echoes have been heard.

#### *Koweit and Bahrein.*

##### *Survey of Koweit Neutral Zone.*

361. Instructions were received at Jedda in December to notify the Saudi Arab Government that a ground and air survey of the Koweit neutral zone would be undertaken in January. To effect this purpose His Majesty's Minister awaited the occasion of personal contact with the Saudi Under-Secretary as offering the best method of approach.

##### *Bahrein Transit Dues.*

362. On the 16th November the Saudi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs handed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires a memorandum entitled "in respect of improper treatment accorded by the Bahrein Customs Administration to a shipment of cargo for Uqair." The incident arose from the necessity imposed upon a British ship, apparently by the Bahrein authorities, of unloading all its cargo, including that consigned to Bahrein, on the Hasa Coast. It was utilised by the Saudi Arab Government to raise the whole dormant question of customs duties and transit dues as between Bahrein and the mainland. The memorandum was being considered in December.

##### *Asir Revolt.*

##### *Asir and the Yemen.*

363. A full-scale rebellion broke out in the Idrisi Province of Asir in the early days of November, and gave considerable concern to the Saudi Government



for two months. Its origins are still obscure. They are thought to lie primarily in the resentment of the Idrisi family and Asiri tribesmen against the final incorporation of their country in that of Saudi Arabia, which the renaming of the Kingdom in September had implied and which was manifestly one of its objects. Contributory causes seem to have been (1) serious friction between the Saudi Governor of the province and Seyyid Hasan-al-Idrisi, its nominal ruler, friction which the Saudi Government have been at some pains to define as personal, but which probably owed much to their policy; (2) advances and promises of support to the Idrisi made by the Dabbagh fraternity, the active southern-Red Sea members of the anti-Saudi "Hizb-al-Ahrar-al-Hijazi" or Hejaz Liberal party; while (3) there was no doubt a certain degree of encouragement from the Yemen, although the astute Imam himself has maintained a studiously correct attitude throughout, graced by frequent expressions of Arab sympathy and brotherly advice, dispensed to Ibn Saud by telegraph. Yet, although the Imam Yahya and Ibn Saud furthermore exchanged identic views, also by telegraph, on the untrustworthiness of foreigners and their territorial designs, they have watched each other like cat and dog. During the course of the rebellion, one of the Imam's sons lay at the head of a large concentration of Yemeni troops on the northern Yemeni frontier.

364. Jizan was the rebel's first objective. It fell to the Idrisi on the 6th November, after only two days' siege, and the Saudi Governor became his prisoner. Asir was negligently held, the Saudi garrisons being small and unsupported; other centres fell at once to the rebels. On the 17th November, however, Saudi reinforcements, hurried from the Hejaz, retook Jizan. Reinforcements to the number of about 2,500 passed southward from Jedda, both by sea in sanbuqs and a chartered German steamer, and by land in all the lorries which could be mustered. They formed a coastal expeditionary force which, by about the end of December and after what seems to have been considerable fighting, subdued the whole coastal region as far south as the Yemeni border. The Idrisi himself and his remaining adherents were apparently driven into a pocket in the highlands backing on the Yemen. Meanwhile, a second expeditionary force under the Saudi Amir of Khurma, Khalid-bin-Luway, known for his sacking of Hashimite Taif, had set out southward from that region, gathering tribal contingents of camelmen on the way until it was some 5,000 strong. It reached Abha in northern Asir about the 25th November, and after some fighting moved on southward to Sabya. Khalid-bin-Luway died on the way of illness, said the official communiqué. He was replaced by his son Saad, while Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid, Governor of Hail and cousin of the King, was designated Governor-General of the province with headquarters at Abha. A third force, composed of Nejdi Ikhwan under the Amir Khalid-bin-Muhammad, nephew of Ibn Saud, was reported to have set out from Riyadh for Asir and to have started operating there at about the same time as Khalid-bin-Luway's force, but it has since disappeared from view. It seems possible that it is lying in reserve in case trouble eventuates with the Yemen.

365. By early January the Saudi Government seemed to have most of the situation in hand again. Seyyid Hasan-al-Idrisi was in his retreat in the Asir highlands, and had not responded to the Saudi invitation to surrender and receive pardon. The Saudi Government claimed that the majority of his tribesmen, however, had submitted within the period of grace allowed.

366. Ibn Saud sent an envoy to the Imam Yahya in December. The person chosen, one Muhammad-bin-Dhawi, is a subordinate employee in the King's divan at Riyadh, and seems to be of little personal importance.

### III.—FOREIGN RELATIONS.

#### International.

367. The Saudi Government announced in the local press in November that they had been invited to take part in the World Economic Conference in London. It is not yet known whether they have accepted the invitation, which was not, in any case, conveyed through the British Legation.

#### Great Britain.

368. Relations were neither close nor disturbed to any unusual extent. The Transjordan and Asir situations caused a certain activity, described in

Chapter II. The question of emergency landing grounds for aircraft on the Hasa coast was carried a stage forward, as recorded in Chapter IV. Money claims were in no way advanced, save only by the signing of another and perhaps final agreement in November by the Ministry of Finance with the local agents of "Egyptian Shell" to pay for the oil stolen by the Saudi Government in 1931.

369. His Majesty's Minister returned from leave of absence on the 21st December, but was unable to do any business of importance with the Saudi Government before the new year.

#### Italy.

370. The new Italian Minister displayed great interest in the course of events in Asir, and was in heavy telegraphic correspondence with Rome throughout. Italo-Saudi relations were ruffled by an unannounced and unwelcome visit paid by an Italian naval vessel to the Asiri coast in December, while the revolt was in full swing (see paragraph 383).

#### The Netherlands.

371. M. Adriaanse, Chargé d'Affaires, returned from leave on the 20th November, bearing yet another letter from Queen Wilhelmina, which he is to deliver personally to the Imam Yahya. This correspondence is beginning to embarrass him. (It may here be noted that, in paragraph 129 of the printed version of the April report, "from Queen Wilhelmina" was a misprint for the original words, "for Queen Wilhelmina.")

#### Turkey.

372. A new Chargé d'Affaires, Djélal Bey, arrived on the 18th December, but without credentials. He was, nevertheless, received by the Amir Feisal on the 23rd December. He was preceded on the 4th December by the two Turkish artillery officers mentioned in paragraph 315 of the last report, disguised for some obscure reason, and quite ineffectually, as journalists. Their visit is further recorded in paragraph 380.

#### Persia.

373. M. Hoveida also returned from leave on the 18th December, and once again shouldered the task of being Chargé d'Affaires.

#### Iraq.

374. Despite the correctness of the relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the readiness shown last summer in high Saudi circles (see paragraph 269) to acclaim King Feisal as a good neighbour and a sterling Arab, there were indications in November that the King of Iraq, while more prudent than his brother Abdullah, may continue to be equally hostile to the continuance of Ibn Saud's rule in the Hejaz.

375. The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires elect having been enrolled in the new Cabinet as Minister of Defence, and none being yet named to Jedda in his stead, the previous Chargé d'Affaires' first secretary, Nasir Bey-el-Gaylani, returned to Jedda on the 6th November as Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*. One of his first duties was to attempt to safeguard the immovable properties left by the Hashimites in the Hejaz from what appears to be the Saudi decision to confiscate them in punishment of the Sharif Abdullah.

#### Egypt.

376. Hafiz Amer Bey, consul, left Jedda on the 10th November, on what he described as short leave to see his family, but remained absent during the remainder of the year.

#### Saudi Arab Air Force.

### IV.—AIR MATTERS.

377. The air mission to Angora has not yet materialised (see paragraph 380).

#### Emergency Landing Grounds.

378. The Air Council's desiderata were received in November for communication to the Saudi Arab Government. They concerned British military aircraft



only, and comprised the provision of three emergency landing grounds and seaplane anchorages on the Hasa coast for the use of service aircraft whenever needed, the selection and preparation of the sites in consultation with experts of the Royal Air Force, their maintenance in proper condition by the local authorities under expert advice, their quarterly inspection by Royal Air Force officers, permission for service aircraft to fly along and over the coast-line, but not inland, at any time, with a view to familiarising pilots with the terrain, permission also for relief machines to use the grounds and anchorages, and, finally, the conclusion of an agreement embodying these desiderata, valid for five years, and terminable by either Government at six months' notice thereafter. Prior to addressing the Saudi Government on these lines, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires raised certain points for His Majesty's Government's consideration in connexion with civilian aircraft, particularly those of Imperial Airways flying the Far East route. It was not thought necessary to make provision for the former, while, as regards the latter, the Air Ministry considered the likelihood of four-engined aircraft, which are flown under a policy of avoiding undue risk, having to land on the Hasa coast as extremely remote. Their desiderata, confined to service aircraft, were therefore conveyed to the Saudi Government in a note dated the 13th December, which added that, in the improbable event of any Imperial Airways machine having to make a forced landing, His Majesty's Government relied on the humane Saudi Arab Government to secure its safety.

#### *Aerial Trespass.*

379. On the 5th December the Saudi Government protested against the flight of a British aeroplane over Jubail on the Hasa coast on the 27th November. It was eventually established that an Imperial Airways machine, obliged to fly by night, had lost its way and flown over Jubail to get bearings. Regret has been expressed to the Saudi Arab Government, who have been informed that Imperial Airways were being warned scrupulously to avoid flying over Saudi territory.

#### V.—MILITARY MATTERS.

##### *Military Mission.*

380. The arrival of the two Turkish military officers foreshadowed in paragraph 315 of the last report has been noted in paragraph 372. It is not yet definitely known whether delivery of the 100 rifles and two mitrailleuses was made at the same time. The Saudi military and air mission to Angora for instructional purposes has not yet been finally formed. It is learned that the two Turkish artillerymen, besides expressing disappointment at the lack of facilities given them to inspect the old Ottoman pieces in the Hejaz, also expressed surprise that the mission would consist of only ten to fifteen students. They seem to have expected fifty. It is believed that the Turkish Government are, furthermore, prepared to meet all expenses, other than the cost of the journey; nevertheless, there seems to be a hitch somewhere, for the mission is materialising unaccountably slowly. It may be because of an uneasy feeling that Wahhabi youth will be corrupted in Allahless Turkey.

##### *General.*

381. Measures to crush the revolt in Asir and a supposed concentration of Ikhwan northward in the direction of Transjordan have been reported in chapter II.

#### VI.—NAVAL MATTERS.

##### *British.*

382. No visits were paid by His Majesty's ships to Saudi ports during November and December. On the 17th November, H.M.S. *Hastings* (Captain C. S. Sandford) altered programme to visit Kamaran to get a somewhat closer view of the troubles in Asir, but to avoid the Farsan Islands which lie off the Asiri coast.

##### *Foreign.*

383. The Italian navy was less tactful. Either on instructions from Rome or Asmara, or on the commander's initiative, one of the coastguard vessels stationed in Eritrean waters visited Jizan on the 21st December without the formality of previous warning and in the middle of the Asir revolt. After

causing some local stir and being in effect warned off by the local Saudi officials, the vessel proceeded to Farsan and thence down the coast to another Asiri "port," Madhaya. Mecca was indignant and registered strong protests with the Italian representative in Jedda. M. de Peppo explained that, as the Saudi Government themselves had left everyone so much in the dark about the true course of events in Asir, the Italian authorities had had to probe matters for themselves, in the interests of their trading community in Eritrea, which was heavily hit by the unrest in Asir. The Italian Government are said to have admitted a breach in the international practice governing naval visits, but they assured the Saudi Government of the Italian Government's entirely friendly feelings. Anyhow, the explanations offered sufficed to end the incident.

#### VII.—PILGRIMAGE.

##### *Indian.*

384. During November the Legation was required to supply the Government of India with material for reply to a number of questions asked in the Legislative Assembly regarding conditions of the approaching pilgrimage to Mecca. The Government of India published on the 26th November the tentative estimate of the cost of this pilgrimage prepared by the Legation. There has so far been no sign of a repetition of last season's controversy as to costs (see paragraph 95), the nearest approach being some slightly misleading press statements made in India by Jamal Pasha-al-Ghazzi, who styled himself Saudi Minister for War until called to order by the Saudi Government. He has now let the Indian press know that he is a private individual, but in reality he and Ismail Ghuznavi, the agitator, are paid propagandists of the Saudi Government. The former is also receiving Rs. 500 (£37 10s.) a month from Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., who hold an effectual monopoly of the Indian pilgrim trade, to boost the pilgrimage for them.

#### VIII.—SLAVERY.

##### *Manumissions.*

385. One Sudani male slave, who had taken refuge in October, and one Sudani male and two Sudani female slaves, who took refuge in November and December, were freed and repatriated during this period. Two Abyssinian male slaves took refuge at the end of December.

##### *Enslavement of Pilgrims.*

386. The suspected case reported in paragraph 332 was, after investigation by the Saudi Government, found to be not proven. The Legation referred the results of the enquiry to Lagos for such check thereon as might be possible.

#### IX.—MISCELLANEOUS.

##### *Deportations.*

389. Mirza Suleiman Ahmed (paragraph 109) was at length permitted to return after an expiation of nearly a year in exile. A Nigerian, employed for long years jointly by the Legation and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, albeit in one of the meanest of tasks, was sentenced by the Sharia Court in November to deportation for distilling alcoholic liquor. In view of his joint allegiance he could not be afforded Legation protection, but he was enabled to leave in the guise of a free man and with some hope of return.

##### *Staff.*

390. His Majesty's Minister returned from leave on the 21st December. Mr. Gamble left Jedda on the 31st December on transfer to Tehran.



## Appendix.

## METEOROLOGICAL RECORD.

## British Legation, Jedda. Office Readings.

1932.	Humidity.	Rain.	Temperature.			
			Highest Maximum Reading. F.	Average by Day. F.	Minimum at Night. F.	Lowest Minimum Reading. F.
January ..	69.5	..	82	76.4	70.1	62
February ..	66.5	..	80	75.6	68.8	61
March ..	76.5	..	85	79.6	72.2	68
April ..	72.3	..	85	81.8	75.1	68
May ..	67.9	..	88	84.5	77.5	72
June ..	77	..	91	87.5	80.3	74
July ..	63	..	94	90.7	85.1	78
August ..	66.2	1 inch	96	92.2	86.1	81
September ..	69.3	..	92	89.5	81.4	78
October ..	69.5	..	90	86.4	80	78
November ..	60.8	1 1/2 inch	87	83.8	77.8	76
December ..	62.3	1/2 inch	82	78.1	71.5	63

Wind was about 90 per cent. constant during daylight, variable in force, dropping generally to zero at night; prevailing quarter—N.W. (i.e., off Red Sea).

[E 1155/902/25]

No. 10.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 46.)  
Sir,

Jedda, February 9, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for January, prepared in accordance with the new arrangements described in my despatch No. 38 of the 31st January.

2. Copies of the report have been sent to the posts shown in the distribution list given at the end of the report. I propose, unless you intimate any objection, not to reproduce this standing list each month, but to note any alterations in the covering despatches and to append a full list only to the first report for each year.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 10.

(Confidential.)

Jedda Report for January 1933.

(First of new monthly series.)

## I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

JANUARY coincided almost exactly with the fast of Ramadan and the ensuing festival—times of slackness. Ibn Saud remained at Riyadh. The anniversary of his accession was celebrated on the 8th January, but only in Jedda, where his son, the Viceroy, held receptions and presided at a dinner at which the members of the Diplomatic Body were the principal guests. Fuad Bey Hamza did not attend. He paid three short visits to Jedda and had long conversations with Sir Andrew Ryan on the 5th and 9th January. After that personal diplomatic discussion languished rather, but Fuad Bey dined at the Legation on the 13th January to meet Sir George Buchanan and the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, and gave a return dinner next evening.

2. There was no improvement in the financial situation. On the 15th January Abdul Hamid Bey Shadid, an emissary of the ex-Khedive, arrived in Jedda. It was understood that he would follow up negotiations begun last May regarding a scheme which turns on the creation of a National Bank with privilege of issues, financial assistance to the Saudi Government and economic concessions to be given to the ex-Khedive.

3. The Saudi forces at Sabya and Jizan, having swept down the coast nearly to the Yemen frontier at the end of December, occupied Abu Arish and other places in the interior in the first days of January. The Government claimed that the rebellion was effectively at an end, though it was admitted that certain tribal elements were still in revolt in the mountains adjoining the Yemen and that the Idrisi had escaped. It is probable that the position in the highlands was less rosy than the Saudi authorities represented it to be, but the situation there remained obscure during the rest of the month. The King's relative, Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid, formerly Governor of Hail, has assumed the command at Jizan. The earlier history of the revolt is given in the report for November–December 1932, paragraphs 363 ff.

## II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS IN ARABIA.

4. On the 11th January Sir Andrew Ryan conveyed, in a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the definite proposals of His Majesty's Government regarding the procedure for mutual recognition between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia and subsequent negotiations for a bilateral treaty, for the execution of which by Transjordan His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be expressly responsible. The Saudi Government's reply of the 22nd January was reasonably satisfactory, but not altogether precise except on the one point that Ibn Saud's assent was inspired entirely by reliance on the guarantee of His Majesty's Government. British apprehensions regarding a reported concentration of Ikhwan near the frontier were allayed early in the month. Ibn Saud admitted that he had taken certain measures earlier owing to rumours of possible incursions from Transjordan, but stated, with apparent truth, that there was no longer any sort of concentration. Mutual assurances of non-aggressive intentions were exchanged.

5. Full information was received from the Iraqi Legation during the month regarding the negotiations for a motor route for pilgrims from Nejef to Medina. The Iraqi and Saudi Governments have agreed in principle on the *tracé* and all other points except one, i.e., whether there should be permanent buildings to house administrative services on the frontier post. The Iraqi Government are keen on this. The Saudis strongly oppose it and think that tents would do. Even when the agreement is complete, an elaborate survey will be necessary. There is no prospect of the route being opened this year. Incidentally, Indian interests have, of late, busied themselves a good deal with the idea of overland motor transport from India to the Hejaz via Iraq.

6. The situation on the Asir–Yemen frontier threatened to complicate relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam, owing to the proximity of Saudi forces and rebels to the frontier and the presence of Yemeni forces south of Midi. The relations of the two rulers remained correct, and continued to be represented as cordial, throughout January. The representative sent by Ibn Saud direct from Riyadh to Sana some weeks ago left Sana early in January and was said to be the bearer of a new draft treaty.

## III.—RELATIONS WITH POWERS OUTSIDE ARABIA.

7. Relations between the Saudi and British Governments remained friendly. They turned principally on Transjordan affairs, including the embarrassing question of the alleged complicity of members of the Amir Abdullah's entourage in plots against Ibn Saud. Although the measures taken in various directions under the auspices of His Majesty's Government to restrict the activities of members of the Dabbagh conspiracy were strengthened, it is more difficult to deal with persons in the Amir's service who are accused by the Saudi Government, like his cousin, the Amir Shakir, and his chamberlain, Hamid Pasha-al-Wadi.



8. The incident between the Saudi and Italian Governments over the proceedings of an Italian sloop in Asir waters towards the end of December was closed at the beginning of January by Ibn Saud's acceptance of explanations and perhaps semi-apologies tendered by the Italian Government.

#### IV.—MISCELLANEOUS.

9. H.M.S. *Hastings*, Captain Sandford, Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, visited Jedda from the 13th to the 15th January. She brought and took away Sir George Buchanan, the principal medical officer of the Ministry of Health. He stayed as a private guest at the Legation, but the Saudi authorities were very ready to show him attention. They did not venture to exhibit their local hospital, but the Director-General of Public Health conducted Sir George personally to see the water installation at the Waziriya Wells, 10 miles from Jedda, where there is an American windmill, erected by Mr. Twitchell, and a small experimental garden; to the private house of a Javanese sheikh of pilgrims, which was got up as a sample of accommodation for pilgrims; and to the quarantine islands outside Jedda.

10. The pilgrimage is still expected to be poor. One ship from India arrived on the 11th January bringing 1,561 pilgrims, of whom 175 were Indian, the remainder mostly Afghan.

11. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves was as follows:—  
On hand at the beginning of the month: Two males.  
Took refuge in January: Nil.  
Manumitted and repatriated: Two males (to Abyssinia).  
Locally manumitted: Nil.  
On hand at the end of the month: Nil.

12. *Distribution List.*—Copies sent to—

The High Commissioner, Cairo.  
The Governor-General, Khartum.  
The Commissioner, Port Sudan.  
His Majesty's Minister, Addis Ababa.  
The Governor, Lagos (2).  
The High Commissioner, Jerusalem (2).  
His Majesty's Consul-General, Beirut.  
His Majesty's Consul, Damascus.  
His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad (2).  
His Majesty's Consul, Basra.  
The Political Agent, Koweit.  
The Political Agent, Bahrein.  
The Political Resident, Bushire.  
The Chief Commissioner, Aden.  
The Viceroy, New Delhi.  
The Governor, Singapore.  
The High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur.  
The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station.  
The Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops.  
The Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Trans-jordan.

[E 1198/256/91]

No. 11.

*Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister to the Resident at Aden.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, March 3.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Downing Street, February 25, 1933.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 147 of the 3rd August, 1932, regarding the status of the Hadramaut, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government concur in your recommendation that the Aden Protectorate should henceforward be definitely regarded as including the Hadramaut, and as extending eastwards to the western limits of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.

2. The Aden Protectorate is a geographical expression, which is not, so far as is known, defined in any single document, and it includes the territories, not precisely demarcated, of the chiefs and rulers with whom His Majesty's Government are in treaty relations. These chiefs and rulers were enumerated in article 4 of the draft treaty submitted to the Imam of the Yemen in 1929, and among them appear (a) the Kaiti Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, and through him the Kathiri Sultans; and (b) the (Mahri) Sultan of Kishn and Socotra. It seems clear, therefore, in practice, as including the area generally known as the Hadramaut, and that no overt action will be required in order to implement the formal decision now taken.

3. If, however, it should be considered that any steps are required to implement the decision, it is desired that they should be taken in as unobtrusive a manner as possible, in order not to give rise to an erroneous impression that His Majesty's Government are adopting a forward policy in Southern Arabia and are tightening their hold over this area.

4. I will await your reply to this despatch, more particularly on the question raised at the end of paragraph 2, before asking the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to arrange for the issue of the necessary revised instructions to consular officers.

5. Copies of a memorandum regarding the Hadramaut, which has been prepared in the Foreign Office, are enclosed for record.<sup>(1)</sup>

I have, &c.

P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

<sup>(1)</sup> Part XXXI, No. 80.

[E 1488/1225/25]

No. 12.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 66.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 28, 1933.*

IN his telegram No. 2, Saving, of the 24th February, Mr. Hope Gill reported briefly on an alleged commercial understanding arrived at between the Saudi Government and the Soviet during my recent absence from Jedda. So much secrecy has been observed regarding the negotiations, that I can add little at present to the telegraphic report as regards the actual facts. The following particulars are, however, worth recording:—

2. There were two main factors in the position between Ibn Saud and Soviet Russia last year, as follows:—

- (a) The Russians had supplied in the latter part of 1931 benzine and petroleum to the value of some £30,000 and had received no payment.
- (b) It was understood in the spring and early summer of 1932 that the Russian Minister was endeavouring to negotiate a general agreement with the Soviet Government which at that time seemed to turn on the possibility of the Soviet accommodating Ibn Saud with goods rather than money, in return for a removal of the embargo on direct Russian imports into the Hejaz, which, though it had become to some extent ineffective, still greatly hampered Russian trade. I would refer more particularly to the correspondence ending with my printed despatch No. 255 of the 20th June last.

3. The negotiations conducted by M. Turacoulov last year seem to have produced no result. He brought off the deal reported by Mr. Hope Gill, using as a lever the claim at (a) in the previous paragraph. It is affirmed that the Soviet Minister has secured a partial or total removal of the embargo, in return for an arrangement whereby the old debt to his Government will be met by a partial or total remission of the customs duty on the new goods to be imported. What is not clear is whether what is contemplated is a permanent removal of the embargo or only its removal to the extent of allowing the importation of a quantity of goods such that the agreed remission of duty will suffice to pay off the old debt. The new goods are apparently to be sold on the market, but nothing has been revealed as to the selling machinery to be set up. There is a conflict



of information as to whether the Saudi Government have made any preliminary arrangements with their own merchants. According to one account, a deputation of Jedda merchants were consulted during a recent visit to Mecca. According to another version, rather better supported, they were summoned to Mecca in connexion with the proposed national bank, on which I am reporting separately, and were left to discover from their own sources in Jedda how matters stood with the Soviet Legation.

4. Whatever the true facts and the dimension of the deal, it has already created a good deal of excitement in commercial circles here. It is understood that among the goods to be imported from Russia are flour and sugar, the introduction of which into the market will hit trade with other countries, including Australia, which has of late been an important supplier of flour, and India, which has done an important, though latterly declining, general trade with the Hejaz. I hear no definite mention of petroleum products in connexion with the arrangement with Russia. It seems unlikely that they would be excluded, but the Saudi Government may be unwilling to commit themselves or their merchants to bringing more Russian benzine, &c., at present, having regard to their position *vis-à-vis* of Shell and American interests.

5. It is worth noting that the Russian Minister's negotiations last year seemed to be conducted largely with the Minister of Finance, whereas the recent arrangement is said to have been made with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. As you are aware, there is constant antagonism between the Minister of Finance and the two highest personages concerned with foreign affairs, viz., the Amir Feisal and Fuad Bey Hamza. According to secret sources of information, there is some reason to think that the Minister of Finance may attempt to hamper the Russian trade by devious methods, but this can only be a matter of speculation at present.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to his Excellency the Viceroy of India.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1491/234/25]

No. 13.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 69. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, February 28, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 30 of the 21st January relative to the arrival in this country of Abdul Hamid Shedid, an agent of the ex-Khedive of Egypt, I have the honour to state that this gentleman appears to have made considerable progress with his negotiations with the Saudi Government, and is understood to be leaving Jedda to-morrow to report to Abbas Hilmi Pasha.

2. I am credibly informed that an agreement has been reached, *ad referendum*, in the case of the ex-Khedive's representative, and, perhaps, in that of the Saudi negotiators also, for the creation of a national bank here with a capital of £1 million gold. It is stated that the ex-Khedive will provide half this amount, that the Saudi Government will be technically entitled to subscribe £250,000, and that the remainder will be offered for public subscription in the Hejaz. It is suggested that the Saudi Government will not, in fact, subscribe, and that the ex-Khedive has in view another source for the £250,000 which they are entitled to put up. It is further stated that the promoters will lend the Government £200,000. The bank will operate as the State bank, receiving all revenue collected by the Government. It will be authorised to issue notes, but it is not clear that these notes will be brought into compulsory use at the outset.

3. I cannot discover what, if any, economic concessions have been promised to the ex-Khedive. It may be noted in this connexion that the Saudi Government appear to be in negotiation with other interests regarding concessions, notably for the exploitation of oil and gold. In these circumstances I am greatly at a loss to understand where Abbas Hilmi Pasha and his associates hope to make their profit. It has been suggested that, if they can get favourable terms regarding cover for note issue and succeed in bringing the issue into general use (which can hardly be done without making the notes the only legal currency in the near

future), they may hope to draw substantial quantities of gold and silver out of the country. This might be a profitable once-for-all transaction, but it seems inadequate as a basis for permanent business. As for ordinary banking business, I imagine that it will be uphill work to develop it on a profitable scale, even with the support of the Government, in competition with the Netherlands Trading Society and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., both of whom do regular banking and have extensive foreign connexions, as well as with the numerous local firms, who do banking of a sort on their own account as a side-line.

4. The enterprise looks on the face of it so dubious as finance that one is tempted to look for political motives on the part of the ex-Khedive. I confess that here again I am nonplussed. If, as some think, he aspires to the Throne of Syria, I cannot see that Ibn Saud's influence would be of much value to him. If, as others suggest, he aspires to the Caliphate, it would be to my mind impossible for Ibn Saud to associate himself with such a pretension. It is barely conceivable that the ex-Khedive may be counting on the decline of Ibn Saud and on being able to establish a "cinch" on the Hejaz. I enumerate these possibilities or impossibilities merely in order to explore this aspect of the subject as fully as I can. When I was recently in Cairo I found Sir Percy Loraine distinctly sceptical about the political ambitions attributed in various quarters to Abbas Hilmi Pasha.

5. It is said that the promoters hope to rush the project through in time to start business on the 1st April, and to make something out of this year's pilgrimage.

6. I have based the foregoing summary on a mass of more detailed information. As it is mostly derived from sources which I do not wish to compromise, I would ask you to regard the whole of this despatch as highly confidential. If the scheme materialises in the near future, it will have to be made public.

7. I may advert in this connexion to one matter on which I have too little information to make it the subject of a separate report. There has been much gossip of late about the possibility of the Nizam of Hyderabad coming to Ibn Saud's assistance in consideration of his being allowed to recondition the Prophet's Birthplace at Mecca. In my despatch under reference I mentioned the greater readiness of Abdul Hamid Shedid to talk to my French colleague about the Nizam than about his own business. It is conceivable that the ex-Khedive may hope to bring the Nizam into his combine (see the reference to "another source" in paragraph 2 above), but this is a matter of pure speculation. The only facts I can adduce are that there appears to be increasing interest in the Hejaz in Hyderabad circles, and that the interest of the Nizam in the Prophet's Birthplace is fairly well vouched for. There is, however, nothing in these facts in themselves to suggest the Nizam's possible participation in the ex-Khedive's scheme, rather than a separate deal between the Nizam and Ibn Saud.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Cairo and Jerusalem and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

P.S.—Since I drafted the above, it has become doubtful whether Abdul Hamid Shadid will leave to-morrow. This is understood to be due not to any serious hitch, but to delay in receiving final advices from the King, who is still at Riadh.

A. R.

[E 1493/2/25]

No. 14.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 71.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 3, 1933.

WITH reference to Mr. Hope Gill's printed despatch No. 51 of the 15th February and previous correspondence relative to the relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya, I have the honour to forward translations of an article published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 17th February and an official communiqué published on the 24th February.

2. The first of these papers purports to describe the results achieved by the emissary sent by Ibn Saud to the Imam in November. It is pretty vague, but you

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will observe that the Imam is stated to have accepted "four points" stated by Ibn Saud, subject to additions of his own. I am not clear at the moment as to what past negotiations are referred to in the immediately preceding passage in which Sheikh Muhammad-bin-Dileym and Sheikh Madhi-bin-Turki are mentioned. What is more important is the concluding statement that the Imam has asked for the despatch of accredited representatives to negotiate a definite agreement.

3. As Ibn Saud's emissary left Sana very early in January, the letter described in the *Umm-ul-Qura* of the 17th February must have been written some time before the escape of the Idrisi into the Yemen threatened a fresh strain on the relations between the two rulers. I reported by telegraph at the time my conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza on this subject on the 3rd and 9th February. The communiqué of the 24th February, which I now forward, confirms in an amplified form what Fuad Bey told me on the second of these dates. It states *inter alia* that the King has promised amnesty not only to the Idrisi, but to all his fellow-refugees, on condition of their immediate return to Saudi Arabia. It represents the situation in Asir itself as having been completely restored to normal.

4. I have no further information up to date regarding the actual surrender of the Idrisi. It would be unsafe to take it for granted until it is known to have taken place, but it looks as though any serious danger of armed conflict between Ibn Saud and the Imam had been averted for the time being.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden and to the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

*Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura, No. 427 of Shawwal 22, 1351 (February 17, 1933).*

(Translation.)

"ON THE PATH OF ARAB UNITY—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE YEMEN."

IN No. 412 of the *Umm-al-Qura*, of the 5th Rajab, 1351 (the 4th November, 1932), an account was given of the endeavours made by His Majesty the King towards the unification of Arabs, the unity of their nations and reciprocity between their countries.

His Majesty deputed a representative to convey from His Majesty a letter in this respect to his Highness the Imam Yahya Hamiduddin, and we promised our readers that we would publish the results of the negotiations, which we hope may be the beginning of a new era in the course of the Arab unity which is sought.

We have to-day learnt that His Majesty's representative has returned from the Yemen, bringing from his Highness the Imam Yahya Hamiduddin a reply to His Majesty's letter. The following is its text:—

"His Honour the distinguished, the noble King, the exalted possessor of good qualities, Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Feisal, may God protect him and grant him success in the way that pleases and satisfies him!

"Peace, Mercy and the Blessings of God be upon you!

"We have received your kind letter by the hand of your intelligent servant, Muhammad-bin-Dhawi, and it has given us pleasure to hear that you have been enjoying the Blessings of God, health and power. If you enquire about us, we are—praise be to God!—enjoying great and innumerable Blessings bestowed upon us by our Lord.

"We have carefully read and deeply considered every word of your letter and understood its good purpose and object. The opinion it conveys and its comprehensive programme have pleased us. Your suggestion is the intended aim and the only desired end. We have more than once seen your representative, who pleased us by his comprehensiveness and his acquaintance with many facts.

"The serious inclination shown in your kind, friendly letter has become known to us. No one who has a touch of sense or religious belief can deny that by co-operation and collaboration power is strengthened and the ambitions of enemies are weakened. We believe we have already pointed out to you that if those who have imitated the Europeans had not made easy the way for foreigners to conspire against Islam in such manner as they could have never thought of, Islam would have been amply strong and beyond reach. All your feelings which have been actuated by Islamic zeal are exactly the same as ours. We hope that you will believe this to be a fact on our part. Mischievous deceivers have found us unyielding and ungovernable. We have paid no attention to their decorated trifles. Far be it from the truth that those defeated can be met by us with anything but detestation! Although when the late Sheikh Muhammad-bin-Dileym and Sheikh Madhi-bin-Turki and their companions came to us, we found them turning somewhat away from us, yet we revealed to them some primary facts which were the basis of everything. We agree to the four points indicated by you and have added some necessary details."

His Highness has asked His Majesty the King to send authorised delegates, who should be empowered with final particulars regarding the agreement. The time when this may be accomplished is probably very near.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

*Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura, No. 428 of Shawwal 29, 1351 (February 24, 1933).*

(Translation.)

OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUÉ.

THE following official communiqué has been received from the Press Department:—

"After effecting the punitive measures undertaken by Government troops, consisting of people of the valleys, Asir troops and the troops sent from the Hejaz, the situation in the Asir Province has returned to normal. When the Amir Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid went there, he assured the safety of those who sought it and punished those who refused to offer submission, viz., people of Rish, Haqu and Bil Ghazi. All then obeyed and the Sheikhs of Bil Ghazi who were still alive asked for security and have been granted it. All other tribes of the Masariha, Beni Shubeyl and Bil Harth have also offered submission. As regards Hasan-al-Idrisi and Abdul Wahhab-al-Idrisi, who were the cause of the insurrection, they fled to the frontier of his Highness the Imam Yahya. Telegraphic communication has been exchanged between His Majesty the King and his Highness the Imam Yahya on the subject of the returning of all fugitives to the frontier. His Highness has mediated in the matter of granting pardon to all of them, including Hasan. His Majesty, in answer, proclaimed complete and general pardon to all on whose behalf his Highness the Imam had asked for pardon, if they returned to the country at once. The Amir Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid has deputed to Midi, Ibn Shuheyli and Ibn Qadhi as representatives on his behalf, and at the request of his Highness the Imam Yahya, to take over all the fugitives who fled to these parts. People have returned to the farms, the 'Zakat' ('alms') collectors have been sent out to perform their duties, and trade has begun to restore itself gradually to its previous state. The Government express their regret for the event that the devil misled the weakminded and exposed them to the punishment they had to suffer. On the other hand, we thank God for the victory and the success bestowed on his faithful slaves against those who have acted unjustly and oppressively. Orders have been issued to Ibn Musad to carry out such arrangements and organisation in the country as may be necessary and advantageous."



[E 1495/902/25]

No. 15.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 73.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 6, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for February 1933. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 15.

JEDDA REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1933.

Chapter I.—*Internal Affairs.*

(Confidential.)

13. The King remained at Riyadh throughout the month. He is expected to return to Mecca about the middle of March, about three weeks before Pilgrimage Day, which should fall on or about the 4th April.

14. The Amir Feisal visited Jedda from the 7th to the 9th February. Besides receiving Sir Andrew Ryan and Mr. Hope Gill (see paragraph 23), he visited the local hospital, the reconditioning of which was foreshadowed in January, and presented £100 to it.

15. There was marked activity in February in connexion with financial and economic schemes for the betterment of Saudi Arabia. The following were the principal developments—

(a) Abdul Hamid Shedid, the ex-Khedive's agent (paragraph 2), seems to have made considerable progress with negotiations for the creation of a national bank, with a capital of £1 million gold, to be subscribed as to one-half by the ex-Khedive. It is understood that the Saudi Government will have the option of subscribing £250,000, but that, in the almost certain event of their not doing so, the promoters have another source in view. The remaining £250,000 will be offered for subscription in the Hejaz. The bank will serve as State bank, and receive all revenue on deposit. A loan of £200,000 is to be made to the Saudi Government. The bank will have the privilege of issuing notes, but it is not clear that their use will be made compulsory at the outset. It is not known what, if any, economic concessions have been promised to the ex-Khedive and his associates. The financial basis and prospects on which they are working are obscure; the possible political motives of Abbas Hilmi Pasha even more so.

(b) Dr. S. A. K. Jeelani of Madras left for India on the 24th February, after concluding laborious negotiations for a fifty years' concession to build and exploit a railway between Mecca and Jedda. The Government secured very favourable terms, including a 50 per cent. share in gross receipts and a loan of 10 lakhs of rupees, repayable in annual instalments. It seemed probable that Dr. Jeelani had moral support in India, but had still to get the definite financial backing required. The scheme is almost certainly unsound as a practical economic proposition, but may nevertheless find support on religious grounds.

(c) The American, Mr. Twitchell, who conducted extensive surveys for the Saudi Government in 1931-32, returned to Jedda on the 15th February, with a Mr. Hamilton, who represents the Standard Oil Company of California. He no longer serves the Saudi Government, but has interested American concerns in the mineral possibilities of Saudi Arabia, notably oil on the Hasa Coast, and perhaps in the Wejh area, and gold, which has been located at various places, notably near Medina. Standard Oil of California seem to be the likeliest competitors for the oil, although the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have also shown some interest. Mr. Twitchell himself appears to be acting for the parties interested in the gold.

(d) It is understood that Ibn Saud signified approval in January of the textile scheme mentioned in paragraph 341 of last year's reports, provided it were charitable.

(e) There has been vague talk of financial assistance for Ibn Saud from the Nizam of Hyderabad in consideration of the Nizam's being allowed to recondition the Prophet's birthplace at Mecca. Nothing definite is known on this subject.

16. On the 2nd February, Fuad Bey Hamza told Sir Andrew Ryan that the King's cousin, Ibn Musaid, who left Hail some time ago to take charge in Asir, had assumed command at Jizan, but that there was no longer a fighting front. He said that the two principal tribal elements still in revolt, viz., the Masariha and part of the Beni Shubeyl, had surrendered, and that another in the mountains had been reduced. The Idrisi was understood to have crossed the frontier into the Yemen, attended only by a few personal adherents. Although the Saudi claim to have suppressed the rebellion completely may be exaggerated, it is probably true that any serious danger has been averted, unless there should be a later recrudescence. A Saudi communiqué, published on the 24th February, represented the situation in Asir as having been completely stabilised. In the absence of any other material information from Asir during the month, the main subject of interest was the possible repercussions of the Idrisi's escape on relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (see paragraph 22).

Chapter II.—*Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.*

17. His Majesty's Minister left for Jerusalem on the 10th February; arrived there on the 15th February, after a flying visit to Cairo; and returned to Jedda on the 26th February. The object of this journey was to pave the way, in consultation with the High Commissioner, for further discussions with the Saudi Government regarding various aspects of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. After preliminary discussions in Jerusalem, Sir Andrew Ryan proceeded to Amman on the 16th February. He and Colonel Cox lunched that day with the Amir Abdullah, who, in general discussion of a private nature, reaffirmed his willingness to comply in every respect with the wishes of His Majesty's Government regarding his relations with Ibn Saud. The Amir dwelt on certain of the desiderata, which he had expressed when he agreed last autumn to recognise Ibn Saud.

18. The principal results of Sir Andrew Ryan's discussions in Jerusalem and Amman, and of an interview between General Wauchope and the Amir Abdullah, on the 19th February, were as follows:—

(a) Drafts in English and in Arabic, which will be the language of the official texts, were prepared of the communication to be addressed by the Amir's chief Minister to the High Commissioner regarding mutual recognition, and of a telegram to be sent by the Amir to Ibn Saud after the completion of the recognition. The Amir accepted the drafts, and His Majesty's Government approved of them in due course, subject to slight verbal alterations.

(b) It was contemplated, subject to the final approval of His Majesty's Government, that the ensuing negotiations for treaties between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, on the general lines of those concluded in 1931 between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, should if possible be divided into two stages, the first at Jedda in the second half of April, the second at Jerusalem about the middle of June.

(c) Tentative drafts of the proposed treaties were prepared at Amman, for submission to higher authority.

19. Among the other subjects discussed were the nature of the Transjordanian representation in the forthcoming negotiations, a suggestion thrown out by the Saudi Minister in London (in circumstances which left its ultimate origin doubtful) that a personal meeting between Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah might be useful, and the possibility of further measures to restrain anti-Saudi activities in Transjordan and other countries under British control or influence. Preliminary conclusions were reached on these subjects. It is unnecessary to describe them in detail, as, though important, they are subsidiary to the main purpose.

20. It remains to pursue the above matters in suitable order, beginning with mutual recognition, with the Saudi Government.

21. According to an article in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 17th February, Ibn Saud's envoy to the Imam Yahya had then got back with the Imam's reply

[9177]



to a letter which he had delivered on behalf of Ibn Saud. The reply, as reproduced, probably only in part, in the article, is friendly, pious and vague. It, however, intimates acceptance of "four points" stated by the King, subject to details added by the Imam, who is said to have asked Ibn Saud to send authorised delegates to conclude a final agreement.

22. This letter from the Imam must have been written about the beginning of the year. Subsequently, the escape of the Idrisi into the Yemen (see paragraph 16) created a more acute situation. Fuad Bey told Sir Andrew Ryan, on the 2nd February, that there was danger of complications unless the Imam surrendered the Idrisi, as he was bound to do under the treaty concluded in December 1931. Sir Andrew Ryan suggested that, as the Idrisi was stated to have no serious following, the matter should be dealt with as a simple question of extradition, not as a possible cause of conflict. On the 9th February, Fuad Bey said that the King had reached the same conclusion, and that the Imam had now agreed to surrender the Idrisi subject to his being pardoned and well treated, a request to which the King acceded. Secret reports about the same time suggested that the real situation between the King and the Imam was much more strained. Fuad Bey's version was restated in an amplified form (according to which the King had promised amnesty to all the fugitives in the Yemen), in the official Saudi communiqué of the 24th February, but there was no news up to the end of the month of the actual surrender of the rebels.

#### Chapter III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

23. Sir Andrew Ryan had friendly conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza on the 2nd February, mainly about Transjordan questions and the Asir Yemen situation (paragraphs 16 and 22). The Amir Feisal came to Jedda on the 7th February. It was currently, though probably falsely, believed that he had come to see the Minister before his departure for Jerusalem. The Prince received him and Mr. Hope Gill very amiably, but seemed listless.

24. Considerable emotion was caused in the latter part of the month by a report that the Soviet Minister had at last brought off an agreement with the Saudi Government, and secured a partial or total removal of the embargo on direct trade from Russia, using as a lever the claim of the Soviet for payment for some £30,000 worth of benzine and petroleum supplied under a special contract towards the end of 1931. It was understood that the claim would be met by a partial or total remission of duty on goods to be imported from Russia for sale on the Hejazi market. Nothing further could be ascertained up to the end of the month, but it was generally believed that the deal had been completed. If Russian goods come freely into the Hejaz, it will dislocate the trade from other supplying countries, e.g., Australia, which has done a tidy business in flour, and India, which has normally, though of late in a decreasing measure, supplied many Hejazi requirements. The articles most spoken of are flour, sugar and matches. It is doubtful whether Russia can establish a grip of the market for petroleum products, in view of the commitments of the Saudi Government to other interests, including Shell.

25. There is little else worth recording under this head. The Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires left for Sana on the 14th February to deliver a letter from Queen Wilhelmina to the Imam. The French Chargé d'Affaires left unexpectedly, seemingly for Syria, on the 24th February, the reasons being unknown. There was no obvious deterioration of relations between the Saudi Government and Italy, despite the suspicion bred in Ibn Saud's mind by the Italians' affection for the Imam and the tolerance shown to anti-Saudi conspirators in Eritrea.

#### Chapter IV.—Miscellaneous.

26. The French sloop *Diana*, with Vice-Admiral Jubert on board, visited Jedda on the 31st January and left on the 2nd February.

27. Lady Evelyn Cobbold, a rich and well-connected widow of 65, a mighty huntress, and a Moslem since the age of 8, though a pretty lax one, arrived in Jedda on the 26th February to stay with Mr. and Mrs. Philby. She apparently left London with some hope of being received by Ibn Saud, and also with some

idea of visiting Mecca. She is not likely to achieve the former object, but may get to Mecca.

28. The Saudi wireless station at Qunfida has been transferred to Lith, and has been replaced by an installation working on a wave-length of 1,100 metres.

29. The efforts of the Legation to interest the Saudi Government in combating locusts (paragraph 347 of last year's reports) bore further fruit on the 17th February, when an undated but apparently recent report on locusts seen at Wejh was forwarded to the Legation, giving details somewhat on the lines of those asked for and accompanied by two tins of very neatly packed specimens.

30. The principal arrivals of pilgrims in February were as follows:—

3,979 from Bombay and Karachi, of whom 2,638 were British Indians;  
314 from Batavia and Singapore, of whom 101 were British  
Malayans; and

108 from Tangier, all Moors; a total of

4,401 pilgrims.

31. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Nil.

Took refuge in February: 2 males, 1 female.

Manumitted and repatriated: 1 male.

Locally manumitted: Nil.

On hand at the end of the month: 1 male, 1 female.

[E 1736/81/25]

No. 16.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 13, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 68 of February 28, I have the honour to state that the Mecca newspaper *Umm-al-Qura* of the 3rd March published the text of a decree of Ibn Saud, dated the 28th Shawwal, 1351 (the 24th February, 1933), sanctioning an agreement between the Minister of Finance and Dr. Jeelani regarding the concession for the proposed railway between Jedda and Mecca. The *Umm-al-Qura* published also what purported to be a summary of the principal provisions of the agreement. I enclose an abridged version of this.

2. The *Umm-al-Qura* summary presents various peculiarities, which may, or may not, be peculiarities in the concession itself. There is no reference to a "cahier des charges," except in so far as paragraph 12 may be supposed to foreshadow something of the sort later; nor is there any mention of two matters which must have been the subject of agreement, viz., the price of tickets and the division of receipts. No mention is made of the interest on the loan provided for at paragraph 8, which is apparently to be a charge on capital, but the parties may well be in agreement that none shall be paid for reasons of Islamic piety.

3. This report supersedes my previous account of the concession except as regards matters not mentioned in the enclosed summary. I have still to learn whether Dr. Jeelani has made definite arrangements in India. It has been suggested to me that the people described to me as the "Hades Syndicate" are merely those Indian Moslems who adhere to Wahhabi doctrine and call themselves *Ahl-I-Hadith*, to show that they rely only on the Traditions of the Prophet, as opposed to the teaching of the orthodox schools into which Sunni Moslems are divided. I have also again heard it suggested that the Nizam of Hyderabad is behind the railway scheme, but I still believe this to be false.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Department of Overseas Trade and to his Excellency the Viceroy of India.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.



## Enclosure in No. 16.

*Summary of the Published Agreement regarding the Concession granted to Dr. A. K. Jeelani for the Construction of a Railway from Mecca to Jedda.*

1. AN all-Moslem company will be formed to construct the railway.
2. The capital will be 5 million rupees, subject to increase if necessary, and will be divided into 100,000 shares of 50 rupees.
3. The company's headquarters will be in India until the line is in operation; afterwards in the Hejaz.
4. A portion of the shares to be reserved for subscription by the Government and natives of this country.
5. The concession to be for fifty years from the date of its having been granted.
6. The line and the rolling-stock to be good, strong and of modern type.
7. The line will be a single track similar to those in India and will be extended to the quay in Jedda. Cranes to be provided at Mecca and Jedda for handling heavy packages.
8. The company to advance to the Government 1 million rupees in five equal monthly instalments payable from Rajab to Dhu'l-Qâ'da 1352 (i.e., five lunar months beginning the 20th October, 1933). This advance to be repaid by deduction of 5 per cent. from the Government share in the takings.
9. Construction to begin as from Rajab 1352 (begins on the 20th October, 1933). If it has not begun by the end of Dhul-Hijja 1352 (ends on the 15th April, 1934), the Government may either cancel or continue the concession and the company will not be entitled to claim in respect of the advance at 8.
10. The line to be completed and in operation by Rajab 1354 (begins the 29th September, 1935). The allowed time to be extended in the event of failure on the part of the company owing to *force majeure*, but no extension to be granted beyond the end of Dhul-Hijja 1354 (ends the 23rd March, 1936).
11. The Government to provide all necessary land, which will be given free in accordance with the recommendations of a technical committee, if owned by the Government. Land belonging to private persons to be paid for, subject to assessment of its value by a committee of experts in case of dispute.
12. Gauge, *tracé*, sites of buildings, &c., to be settled by a technical committee, whose decisions shall subsequently be agreed by the Government.
13. The company to provide necessary buildings for guards and employees, as well as stations of a modern type.
14. Technical experts and interpreters, if not available in the country, may be brought from abroad, but technical employees shall be engaged in the country, if available, as well as clerks and all labourers. Terms of engagement and promotion to be at the discretion of the company.
15. The Government to prohibit motor transport between Mecca and Jedda from the bringing into operation of the railway until the expiry of the concession, subject to an exemption for Government and private cars and to continuance of the use of motor transport up to the end of the 1354 pilgrimage season, if the line is not completed by Rajab 1354.
16. On the expiry of the concession the line, with all appurtenances, rolling-stock, &c., shall become the property of the Government, all to be handed over in good condition, to be certified by a technical committee.
17. The company to submit to local regulations, and any disputes between it and the Government to be settled by the local courts.
18. A compartment to be reserved for mails in passenger trains both ways.
19. Employees' badges to be approved by Government.
20. Not less than one passenger train to be run each way every twenty-four hours, at times of departure to be agreed with the Government. Further transport to be provided as necessary, especially during pilgrimage season.
21. Arabic to be used for books of company, tickets, &c.
22. Board of company to be composed of members selected by the Government and native shareholders, not more than one of whom shall be an official, and an equal number selected by the other shareholders of the company.
23. All instructions issued by the company regarding management, passenger traffic, goods traffic and engagement of employees to be submitted for sanction of Government.

24. Passenger carriages to be healthy and comfortable and to be subject to Government inspection.

25. The company to provide clearly in its statutes such mode of transfer of shares and dealings in them as will ensure their being held by Moslems only. Preference to be given to natives when shares are for sale. Shares for sale to be offered to natives for fixed period, after which, if offer is not availed of, they may be sold to Moslems abroad.

[E 1741/31/25]

No. 17.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 3.)*

(No. 88.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note to Fuad Bey Hamza, dated the 19th March, respecting measures taken to counteract anti-Saudi activities.

*Jedda, March 19, 1933.*

## Enclosure in No. 17.

*Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza.*

(Personal and Confidential.)

Dear Fuad Bey,

*Jedda, March 19, 1933.*

YOUR Excellency has on many occasions during the last few months made communications to Mr. Hope Gill and myself regarding activities in Transjordan and elsewhere directed against the maintenance of the authority of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz in this country. We have had frequent conversations on the subject, in which I have emphasised two things, viz. :—

- (a) The strong desire of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to repress such activities in territories which they control or in which they can use influence; and
- (b) My personal conviction, which I believe to be shared by my Government, that, so far as Transjordan is concerned, nothing will do so much to discourage such activities as the completion of the negotiations for a general political settlement on which we are now engaged.

As I told you in our last conversation on the subject on the 4th March, I devoted much personal attention to this matter during my recent journey to Cairo, Jerusalem and Amman. I am now authorised to give you a general statement under three heads regarding the action taken :—

1. *Activities of the Dabbagh Family and their Associates.*

The enquiries made by the British authorities regarding the facts brought to their notice at various dates last year left no doubt that a number of persons, mostly of Hejazi origin, were engaged in a conspiracy against the present régime in this country. Immediate action was taken to prevent them from using as a base Aden, the first place in which their activities came to light. When it was discovered that the persons concerned were active elsewhere, further measures were taken to counteract their efforts. These measures culminated in the decision taken in the latter part of last year to exclude from Transjordan and Palestine the following persons, who were regarded as specially dangerous :—

Hussein Abdullah-ad-Dabbagh.  
Tahir-bin-Meo'ad-ad-Dabbagh.  
Othman Arab.  
Abdur-Rauf-as-Sabban.  
Ahmed Abdullah Aishan.  
Abdul Aziz-at-Tayyar.



I may add that, as a result of representations made by my Government, the Egyptian Government have also ordered the exclusion of the above-named persons from their territory, and they have warned other persons, permanently resident in Egypt, of the importance of refraining from undesirable activities.

The enforcement of the exclusion orders mentioned above presented some difficulty at the outset. Further measures have been taken recently to make them completely effective.

2. *Persons in the Employment of His Highness the Amir Abdullah who have been accused by the Saudi Government of Improper Activities.*

At the time of the first enquiries Abdur-Rauf Bey As Sabban held a minor post in the service of the Amir. He was dismissed from this post several months ago and was subsequently dealt with on the lines indicated above. A more difficult problem arose in connexion with two more important persons mentioned in communications from your Government, namely, the Amir Shakir and Hamid Pasha Al Wadi. It is true that their names have been used by the conspirators mentioned above, but my Government and General Wauchope have discovered no proof of their complicity, and have felt unable to request His Highness the Amir Abdullah to dismiss them from his service. To make such a request, without adequate grounds, would have been peculiarly delicate in the case of the Amir Shakir, who is closely related to the Amir Abdullah, and hardly less delicate in the case of the head of the Divan of His Highness. My Government and General Wauchope fully realised, however, that the use made of the names of these two persons had of itself created an undesirable situation. The Amir Shakir has been strongly urged to avoid anything which might compromise him. The question of Hamid Pasha has been solved by his departure from Amman on the 7th March in consequence of his election as a member of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies.

As your Excellency has attached particular importance to the meeting between the Amirs Talal and Shakir with Tahir-ad-Dabbagh and others in Jerusalem on the 15th December, I may explain that the visit of the two Amirs to Jerusalem was a normal one. The Amir Talal informed the British Resident at Amman of it beforehand, and the Amirs stayed at their usual hotel. By an unfortunate coincidence, Tahir-ad-Dabbagh, having evaded the measures taken against him, arrived in Jerusalem about the same time and was received by the Amirs. There is, however, the strongest reason to believe that the latter had no previous knowledge of his movements and that the meeting was in no way prearranged. The intensification of the measures to make the exclusion orders effective renders it unlikely that Tahir-ad-Dabbagh and his associates will secure further access to the Amirs.

3. *The Beni Atiya.*

It was realised at the outset of the Ibn Rifada affair that special precautions were necessary to prevent this tribe from becoming involved. Although one party of them did get across the frontier, it was due to the strenuous action of Captain Glubb, the details of which I have related to you in confidential conversation, that many more did not follow. You are aware of the eventual action taken in regard to the Beni Atiya after it had been ascertained that your Government had no objection to their peaceful return to Saudi Arabia. Their grazing necessities make it impossible to confine them permanently to one or other side of the frontier, but the measures taken in November last were intended quite definitely as a warning that they must not abuse their position when in Transjordan.

Apart from the action taken in regard to the non-settled portion of the tribe as a whole, special measures were taken to deal with certain prominent members of it. On the 23rd August last four of the leaders concerned in the crossing of the frontier were sentenced by the Bedouin Control Board to a year's imprisonment each. Two of these evaded capture, but two others, namely, Muhammad-bin-Farhan and Muhammad-bin-Rashid, were arrested in November and are now serving their terms of imprisonment. Two other chiefs, Sheikh Selim Abu Dumeyk and Sheikh Karayim-bin-Atiya, were considered to be possible sources of danger, and it was decided to remove them to Palestine as a measure of precaution. Karayim had not been located when I last heard, but Selim Abu Dumeyk has been sent to live at Beersheba until further notice.

All the measures in Aden, Transjordan and Palestine have been taken by my Government and their officials in the exercise of their authority in their own province. I have, therefore, summed them up in a personal and confidential communication to your Excellency for the information of His Majesty the King and his Government. I hope that my statement will afford convincing proof that my Government, the High Commissioner and I myself have given the most serious attention to the representations of the Saudi Government and have taken action in every possible direction to deter mischief-makers from impairing the relations between your country and mine. Our efforts will not be relaxed.

Yours sincerely,

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1792/487/25]

No. 18.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.*

(No. 3. Saving.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, March 22, 1933.*

MY letter of 15th March to Mr. Warner.

Negotiations for oil concession in Hasa have been proceeding between Minister of Finance and (1) Standard Oil of California represented by Hamilton, who is in regular employment of the company and Twitchell; (2) Iraq Petroleum Company, represented by Longrigg and Muderris. Understand Minister has been standing out for very large sum down and substantial royalty, and that Americans do not reject principle, but wish to reduce amount considerably. Iraq Petroleum Company representative came prepared to offer only rental for right of prospecting during limited period.

I am doubtful whether either candidate will succeed at present, but Standard Oil of California have the greater chance. Saudi Government now have money in prospect from ex-Khedive's group and perhaps from Indian promoters of Mecca to Jedda railway. They may therefore keep oil concession in reserve, unless they can get very favourable terms.

Rumours reproduced in Bushire telegram No. 2 to Colonial Office are almost certainly false. Holmes is repugnant to Ibn Saud, who is, in any case, on the point of coming to Mecca. Representatives rumoured to have gone to Riyadh are probably those now here.

(Repeated to Government of India and Bushire.)

[E 1906/258/91]

No. 19.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 12.)*

Sir,

*Colonial Office, April 11, 1933.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 3rd March, regarding the status of the Hadramaut, I am directed to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir John Simon, a copy of a despatch from the Resident at Aden, from which it will be seen that he does not consider that any overt action is required in order to implement the decision that the Aden Protectorate shall henceforth be regarded as including the Hadramaut.

2. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister concurs in the view expressed by the Resident, and he will accordingly be glad if steps may now be taken to issue the necessary revised instructions to consular officers.

3. A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

H. R. COWELL.



Enclosure in No. 19.

*Mr. Reilly to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Aden, March 22, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your confidential despatch dated the 25th February, 1933, and to state that I consider that no overt action is required in order to implement the present formal decision taken in regard to the status of the Hadramaut.

I have, &amp;c.

B. P. REILLY, Resident, &amp;c.

[E 2019/1225/25]

No. 20.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 20.)*

(No. 92. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, March 23, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66 of the 28th February last relative to an alleged agreement between the Saudi Government and the Soviet, I have the honour to state that I asked Fuad Bey Hamza on the 18th March whether he could tell me how matters stood. I explained that I felt encouraged to ask him for any information which he could properly give, because the Saudi Mission had taken His Majesty's Government into their confidence in London last May, and because I preferred to get news from him rather than from the bazaars, where various rumours had been circulating. I reminded Fuad Bey that His Majesty's Government had defined their own attitude last year in a way which showed that they did not stand in the way of any agreement between this country and Soviet Russia, and that after my return to Jedda, the King had shown further confidence in His Majesty's Government by sending me a message explaining his position.

2. Fuad Bey said that the Saudi Mission had been approached when in Moscow. The Russians wanted, I understood him to say, three things—a removal of the embargo on trade from Russia to Saudi Arabia, a treaty of friendship and a commercial treaty. They had expressed readiness to accommodate the Saudi Government on terms of short or of long credit. Fuad Bey did not go into details of what these alternatives meant, but I gathered that the Soviet authorities had proposed arrangements (presumably for a loan in the form of goods to be supplied on credit) for a long period of years, and that the Saudi Government were unwilling to commit themselves for more than say three years.

3. Fuad Bey admitted that, following on the Moscow conversations, there had been a renewal of negotiations here, but said that only one thing had been agreed, viz., the removal of the embargo on trade. This removal had not, however, yet become effective, as the Soviet Government had undertaken not to ship goods until the authorities here had had time to organise selling arrangements.

4. Fuad Bey referred back to the petroleum products transaction of 1931. He said that in that year the Soviet Government were already pressing for a removal of the embargo on trade, and that the King, feeling unable at that time to give them satisfaction, had sanctioned the particular transaction to show that his attitude was not due to ill will. Fuad Bey made no mention of any arrangement to pay off the debt in respect of the goods supplied in 1931 by remitting duty on goods to be imported under the recent arrangement.

5. My conversation with Fuad Bey took place at a moment when I was much taken up with matters of more immediate concern to me. I cannot, therefore, reproduce it as accurately as I would wish, but I think I have got the essential facts right in the above summary. He asked me to treat what he was telling me as confidential, and I undertook to do this.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to his Excellency the Viceroy of India.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2172/487/25]

No. 21.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.*

(No. 6. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda (via Cairo), April 11, 1933.*

MY No. 62 regarding movements of Holmes. Holmes arrived 9th April. I gather from very confidential conversation with Philby that position of oil negotiations is more or less as follows:—

1. King has evolved demands even more onerous than those previously propounded by Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was aiming primarily at getting lump sum of £100,000 down and substantial annual payment. New demands are inspired by terms of Iraq concession. Main feature appears to be that Saudi Government now wants not only lump sum down and annual payments, but promise of minimum royalty of £200,000 once commercial exploitation begins.

2. Iraq Petroleum Company representatives are confining themselves for the moment to attempts to ascertain minimum terms which Government will offer. They might rise to payment of lump sum and annual payment much lower than those demanded by Minister of Finance, but not more. Philby shares my views that they are unlikely to do business.

3. Representative of Standard Oil of California returned from Egypt on 9th April. He had offered, before departure, lump sum and annual payment [group undecypherable] to amount far short of demands of Minister of Finance. Principals are not keen on any great increase in offers, and he is so disgusted at latest Saudi proposals that he has refused to entertain them and has also withdrawn his previous offer.

4. King still has a low opinion of Holmes, but accedes to his suggestion of a visit in order to enlarge field of competition. Holmes represents himself as being tied to Standard Oil of California only in respect of concessions already obtained in Persian Gulf and which you doubtless have full particulars. He tells Philby that his immediate purpose is to get comment of Ibn Saud so far as he is most interested with Sheikh Koweit to concession in neutral zones, and that he has a gentleman's agreement with Standard Oil of California not to queer their pitch in Hasa, provided that they leave him free hand in regard to neutral zone.

5. Nevertheless, Holmes has evolved scheme for Hasa principle, which would be to divide whole area into, say, sixteen blocks, which might be taken up sectionally by it and contributing proportionate payments approximating to demands of Minister of Finance. Philby thinks some such scheme might be acceptable to Government, but does not believe Holmes has at present serious backing for it.

I pass on above with reserve as I have not first hand information of value and cannot cross-question anyone concerned. King will probably assume personal direction of negotiations which may enter new stage of activity at any moment.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 2303/222/91]

No. 22.

*The Resident, Aden, to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 2, 1933.)*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Aden, April 12, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to forward for your information a copy of a letter, dated the 11th April, 1933, and of its accompaniments, that I have addressed to the Imam of Sana in accordance with your instructions received on the 25th March, 1933.

I have, &amp;c.

B. R. REILLY.



Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

*The Resident, Aden, to the Imam of Sana.*

(After Compliments.)

Your Highness,

Aden, April 11, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my letter, dated the 15th January, 1933, in which I stated that I would communicate to your Highness the views of His Majesty's Government on your letter dated the 9th Ramadan, 1351 (the 6th January, 1933), as soon as I was informed of them. I have now received the reply of His Majesty's Government, the purport of whose instructions to me is as follows:—

2. His Majesty's Government desire to retain the wording of article 3 of the draft treaty, which was communicated to your Highness in my letter dated the 7th May, 1932, subject to the following modifications, which they are prepared to accept with the object of thereby making the article more acceptable to you:—

3. It has been noted that, in your Highness's letter of the 9th Ramadan, 1351, you have suggested a draft for this article in which the original reference to rights claimed by the two Governments in the regions in question has been omitted. In conformity with your proposal, His Majesty's Government are willing to omit the sentence "It being understood that nothing contained in this article or in other articles of the present treaty is to be taken as meaning that either high contracting party renounces the rights claimed by him in those regions."

4. Secondly, His Majesty's Government are prepared to make the guarantee contained in their draft of the second paragraph of the said article mutual and equally binding on both Governments, instead of only on your Highness as at first proposed, by the adoption of the following wording in place of that sent to you with my letter of the 7th May, 1932:—

"Pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of this treaty, and both high contracting parties undertake that they will prevent by all means at their disposal any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier, and any interference by their subjects or by persons under their protection on their side of that frontier with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier."

5. His Majesty's Government do not wish to insist on either of these modifications; but, if they are acceptable to your Highness, they are willing to adopt them for the purpose of smoothing the path of agreement.

6. For the reasons that I have given to your Highness in the explanatory note to my letter dated the 7th May, 1932, and in my letter dated the 3rd September, 1932, His Majesty's Government cannot consent to the inclusion of any reference to the islands in this treaty. But if the treaty is concluded they will be ready to bear in mind any views that you may wish to put forward with regard to those islands at the southern end of the Red Sea, which are referred to in article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne, if at any time the future status of these islands is under consideration. I hope that this assurance will satisfy your Highness that the conclusion of this treaty will not prejudice the *status quo* of these islands, and will ensure that you will be given an opportunity of representing your views about them if any change is contemplated in the future.

7. I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform your Highness that the present draft represents their final proposals, and that they can make no further concessions towards meeting your views. I am also instructed to inform you that the continuance of these negotiations is definitely contingent on the removal of the restrictions which you have imposed on trade between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate.

8. As this is a final offer on the part of His Majesty's Government, I consider it advisable to retabulate the draft treaty in the form in which they are now prepared to accept it. I enclose the draft with this letter. I hope that your Highness will realise that it embodies a settlement which will regularise the mutual relations of the two Governments in a manner honourable and advantageous to both of them, and that you will decide to agree to it.

9. The alternative will be a failure of the negotiations at a time when they appear to be on the point of success. By long correspondence, by patience, and by mutual concessions, we have reached a general agreement on all essential issues. The friendship that His Majesty's Government offer your Highness is a genuine one. They have no ulterior motives, but sincerely desire the welfare and stability of your kingdom. The time is now favourable for the final completion of this work, and this opportunity should not be lost.

10. I am leaving shortly for England, and expect to return to Aden in October. During my temporary absence Mr. R. S. Champion, political secretary, will take my place as resident. He has been in Aden for several years, and is well acquainted with the course of the negotiations. If your Highness will agree to the terms now proposed and to the removal of the restrictions on trade, without which the treaty cannot be concluded, Mr. Champion, during my absence, or I myself, on my return, will be prepared to visit your Highness at Sana for the completion of the negotiations and the signature of the treaty on the conditions which have been mutually understood and accepted. I trust that this happy termination of our endeavours will not be frustrated.

B. R. REILLY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

*Notes for the Information of His Highness the Imam.*

THE attached draft comprises the final proposals of His Majesty's Government in regard to the treaty.

2. After the despatch of this draft there can be no further negotiations with His Highness until he has agreed to remove the restrictions on overland trade between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate.

3. The draft treaty having been agreed upon, it cannot be signed unless His Highness shall previously have removed all restrictions on overland trade between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, and restored and surrendered all the territories and subjects of the chiefs who are in treaty relations with His Majesty's Government, especially the territories of the Amir of Dhala, in the vicinity of Sana, the territories of the Audhali Sultan at Ad Dhaher, and the subjects of the latter chief and of the Chiefs of Beihan, without damage or detriment to property or person.

Enclosure 3 in No. 22.

*Retabulated Draft Treaty in the Final Form acceptable to His Majesty's Government.*

## PREAMBLE.

HIS Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, on the other part;

Being desirous of entering into a treaty on a basis of friendship and co-operation for their mutual benefit;

Have resolved to conclude this treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

## ARTICLE 1.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, acknowledges the complete and absolute independence of His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, in all affairs of whatsoever kind.



## ARTICLE 2.

There shall always be peace and friendship between the high contracting parties, who undertake to maintain good relations with each other in every respect.

## ARTICLE 3.

The settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the territories of His Majesty the King of the Yemen is deferred pending the conclusion, in whatever way may be agreed upon by both high contracting parties in a spirit of friendship and complete concord, free from any dispute or difference, of the negotiations which shall take place between them before the expiry of the period of the present treaty.

Pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of this treaty, and both high contracting parties undertake that they will prevent by all means at their disposal any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier, and any interference by their subjects or by persons under their protection on their side of that frontier with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier.

## ARTICLE 4.

After the coming into force of the present treaty, the high contracting parties shall, by mutual agreement and concord, enter into such agreements as shall be necessary for the regulation of commercial and economic affairs, based on the principles of general international practice.

## ARTICLE 5.

(1) From the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, the subjects of one high contracting party, who wish to trade in the territories of the other, shall be amenable to the local laws, and shall receive treatment not less favourable than that enjoyed by the subjects of the other high contracting party or the subjects or citizens of any other foreign country.

(2) Similarly, the vessels of one high contracting party, their cargoes and their passengers, shall, in the ports of the territories of the other, receive treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the vessels, their cargoes and their passengers, of any other foreign country.

(3) For the purposes of this article in relation to His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

- (a) The word "territories" shall be deemed to mean the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, India and all His Majesty's Colonies, Protectorates, and all mandated territories in respect of which the mandate is exercised by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom;
- (b) The word "subjects" shall be deemed to mean all subjects of His Majesty, wherever domiciled, all persons under His Majesty's protection, and all companies incorporated in any of His Majesty's territories;
- (c) The word "vessels" shall be deemed to mean all vessels registered in any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

## ARTICLE 6.

This treaty shall be the basis of all subsequent agreements that may be concluded between the high contracting parties, now and in the future, for the purposes of friendship and amity. The high contracting parties undertake not to assist nor to connive at any action directed against the friendship and concord now existing between them.

## ARTICLE 7.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible after signature, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at (Sana). It shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications, and shall thereafter remain in force for a period of forty years.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at (Sana) in English and Arabic, both texts having equal force, this day of

*Colonial Office, May 2, 1933.*

[E 2287/233/25]

No. 23.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 3.)*

(No. 96.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his note to the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 1st April respecting the reciprocal recognition of His Majesty Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah.

*Jedda, April 1, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 23.

*Sir A. Ryan to the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(After compliments.)  
Your Royal Highness,

*Jedda, April 1, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I duly communicated to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan two certified copies of your Royal Highness's note of the 24th Dhu'l Qa'da, 1351 (the 21st March, 1933) relative to the decision of His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and his Government to recognise on a basis of reciprocity his Highness the Amir Abdullah as Amir of Transjordan.

I learn from His Majesty's High Commissioner that one of these certified copies of your Royal Highness's note is being communicated by him to-day to the Government of Transjordan. I enclose a certified copy of the corresponding note addressed by the Chief Minister of Transjordan to the High Commissioner on the 21st March.

It ensues from the texts of the two notes mentioned above that the mutual recognition agreed upon will take effect as from to-day. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will learn with the utmost satisfaction of the completion of the formalities necessary for this purpose, and will regard it as a happy augury for the success of the treaty negotiations which are to take place in the near future. It is a great source of satisfaction to me also, as representative of His Majesty's Government in a country united with mine by close ties of friendship, that the efforts of all concerned, including His Majesty the King, your Royal Highness and his Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, have produced the present results.

I have arranged with General Wauchope and with Fuad Bey, in pursuance of the suggestion contained in paragraph 4 of your Royal Highness's note of the 25th Ramadan, 1351 (the 22nd January, 1933), that simultaneous telegrams in the form already agreed upon shall be exchanged between His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and his Highness the Amir Abdullah, and shall be despatched to-morrow morning, Sunday, the 2nd April, at 10 o'clock Greenwich mean time.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN.



## Annex 1.

*Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Mecca, March 21, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to request your Excellency to be good enough to inform His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that, in view of the desire of His Honourable Majesty My Lord King Abdul Aziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Government of His Majesty, to establish firm friendly relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Amara of Transjordan, (they) have decided to recognise his Highness the Amir Abdullah as Amir over Transjordan.

I wish to make clear to your Excellency that this communication has been made with the knowledge that a communication similar to it will be forwarded to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by the Government of the Amara of Transjordan, and that the recognition will become effective as from the date on which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom deliver simultaneously to each of the two Governments directly concerned a certified copy of the communication which they have received from the other Government.

And deign to receive the highest greetings and respects.

FEISAL,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

## Annex 2.

*Chief Minister, Transjordan Government, to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Amman, March 21, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to request your Excellency to inform His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that my Lord, his Highness the Amir Abdullah Ibn Hussein, the Amir of Transjordan and his Government, being desirous of establishing firm and amicable relations between the Amara of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have decided to recognise His Majesty King Abdul Aziz as King of Saudi Arabia, comprising the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies.

This communication is made on the understanding that a corresponding communication will be addressed to His Majesty's Government by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and that the recognition will take effect from the date on which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom communicates simultaneously to each of the two Governments directly concerned a certified copy of the communication received from the other.

I have, &c.

ABDULLAH SIRAJ,

*Chief Minister, Transjordan Government.*

[E 2291/31/25]

No. 24.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 3.)*

(No. 100. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, April 4, 1933.*

WITH reference to my printed despatch No. 85 of the 19th March, I have the honour to forward a translation of a personal and confidential letter from Fuad Bey Hamza, dated the 29th March, in reply to mine of the 19th March regarding measures taken to counteract anti-Saudi activities. I consider this reply entirely satisfactory and trust that no further difficulty will arise in this connexion in the near future, provided that the Amirs Abdullah and Shakir are careful not to compromise themselves, and that such measures as may be possible are taken to counter the machinations of the Dabbāghs, &c., who will doubtless persist in them where and when they can.

2. I was somewhat puzzled by the obscure passage regarding changed circumstances and differences in outward appearances in Fuad Bey's letter. I asked him orally on the 31st March what the King meant. Fuad Bey said that the King's meaning was that His Majesty had not doubted British friendship for a moment, even at times when there had been appearances of a changed attitude and of strain. I said that, if this were the intention, I was in full accord with the King. I reminded Fuad Bey how often I had tried to get Ibn Saud and his advisers to realise that the disagreements which arose at times did not alter the fundamentally friendly attitude of His Majesty's Government. I added that the Saudi Mission had received confirmation of my assurances at the fountain-head in London last year.

3. The Hashimites having been mentioned in the course of this conversation, I took the opportunity of telling Fuad Bey that it was true that His Majesty's Government supported and befriended the Hashimite rulers in their own domain without prejudice to their desire to see Ibn Saud secure and stable in his. The best proof of this, I said, was their perseverance in efforts to promote a settlement between this country and Transjordan, in the pursuance of which they had separated the questions of recognition and treaty-making, with the express object of not allowing the undeniable difficulties of the latter to delay the solution, now happily arrived at, of the first.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, and to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 24.

*Fuad Bey Hamza to Sir A. Ryan.*

(Translation.)

(Personal and Confidential.)

Dear Sir Andrew,

*Mecca, March 29, 1933.*

I RECEIVED with the greatest pleasure your personal and confidential note of the 19th March, 1933, regarding the measures taken by the British Government against those who have been associated in subversive activities against His Majesty the King. I submitted the contents of your above-mentioned note to His Majesty the King shortly after his return. I am glad to confirm once more that His Majesty, despite changes of circumstance and condition and difference of outward appearance and form, has never for a day doubted the friendship of the British Government, nor has he entertained any doubt of their good intentions towards him, or of their desire for his welfare and for co-operation with him. Such statements as those indicated in your note are a fresh proof of the existence of this mutual desire for co-operation and collaboration between the two Governments. I must express thanks to the British Government and to yourself for the worthy efforts which you have personally exerted to attain this result.

With highest respects, &c.

FUAD HAMZA.

[E 2292/234/25]

No. 25.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 3.)*

(No. 101. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, April 5, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 69 of the 28th February, I have the honour to submit a few further items of information regarding the ex-Khedive's scheme for a national bank in this country.

2. Abdul Hamid Shedid did not get away on the 1st March as he had intended, owing to delay over the forwarding of the King's final decision. There appears to have been no serious hitch, but an eleventh-hour attempt to dissuade

[9177]



Ibn Saud was made by certain merchants, whose spokesman, young Hussein Aweyni, made a fruitless journey to Riyadh. The Dutch Financial Adviser has also shown himself very hostile to the scheme, but I do not think that his opinion counted for anything. It is probable that M. van Leeuwen's dislike of the project is quite honest, but it is possible that it may be accentuated by sympathy with the Netherlands Trading Society.

3. Abdul Hamid Shedid finally left on the 10th March. He gave me to understand after dinner at Mr. Philby's house on the previous evening that his agreement with the Saudi Government was quite definite and that it only remained to organise the bank. He explained that it would not confine itself to the Hejaz—1 million, he said, was too much for this country—but would operate in other Near Eastern countries and would have its headquarters in London, where he himself will be managing director. It is now pretty generally known that Mr. Philby is likely to be the conseiller of the bank in this country, but I would ask you to regard this information as strictly confidential until it reaches you from other sources, as my most definite information was confided to me in a very personal conversation by Mr. Philby himself.

4. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 17th March announced the conclusion of the agreement and promised full particulars as soon as it should have come into force. Nothing further was published up to the 30th March, the date of the last issue I have seen.

5. I know nothing about the latest plans of the promoters of the bank. The delay in Abdul Hamid Shedid's departure destroyed any prospect of rushing the matter through in time to start business here on the 1st April.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2293/902/25]

No. 26.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 3.)*

(No. 102.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 7, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for March 1933.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 26.

*Jedda Report for March 1933.*

#### I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

32. THE King, who had gone into camp at Rawdat-al-Khafs, a place some distance from Riyadh and reported to be delightful, mingled sport with business until mid-March. He returned to Riyadh on or about the 19th March and left on the 21st March. He arrived in Mecca for the pilgrimage on the 27th March, bringing numerous members of his family and other attendants. He gave his annual dinner to notable pilgrims on the evening of the 31st March. Little has been heard of him in Jedda since his return.

33. The Amir Feisal was in Jedda from the 8th to the 11th March. He held no reception, but went to tea with Mr. and Mrs. Philby on the 10th March, where he met a select party consisting principally of Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan, the American concession hunters and their wives, and Lady Evelyn Cobbold. The tea-party was *alafranga*, the Prince most affable to both sexes. Fuad Bey Hamza has kept fairly regularly to his new plan of being at the Jedda branch of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on Saturdays.

34. There have been various developments in connexion with the financial and economic schemes mentioned in the last report (see paragraph 15). They may be summed up as follows:—

(a) The ex-Khedive's agent completed his negotiations early in March and left Jedda on the 10th March, taking with him, it appears, the National Bank Concession, in spite of an eleventh-hour attempt to scotch it on the part of the young Syrian merchant, Hussein Aweyni, who went on behalf of himself and others to Riyadh. Both parties to the concession state that the agreement is definite, but no details have been made public. The particulars given in paragraph 15 (a) are believed to be accurate. The notes are *not* to be forced currency and are to have substantial gold cover. The bank is apparently not to be for the Hejaz only, but will operate in other Near Eastern countries and will have its headquarters in London. It is rumoured in diplomatic circles that Mr. Philby will be the conseiller. The motives of the promoters continue to be obscure. The "Amir" Habib Lutfallah, who obtained a similar concession from King Hussein just eight years ago, had at least the satisfaction of having been made Ambassador in Rome and playing a miscellaneous diplomatic rôle.

(b) The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 3rd March published a summary of the Jeelani concession for the proposed railway between Mecca and Jedda. The forecast in paragraph 15 (b) was not completely accurate. The loan of 10 lacs is to be paid in five monthly instalments, beginning in October 1933, and to be repayable by retention of 5 per cent. of the Government's share of the receipts. The loan will apparently be a charge on the capital of 50 lacs. The construction of the line is to begin in October–November 1933 and to be completed in September 1935, subject to a possible extension of time to a date not later than the 23rd March, 1936, in case of delay due to *force majeure*. The summary gives no particulars of the agreed apportionment of gross receipts or the fares to be charged.

(c) There are now two sets of representatives negotiating for oil rights in Hasa, namely, Messrs. Twitchell and Hamilton, representing Standard Oil of California as before, and Messrs. Longrigg and Muderris, who arrived in Jedda on the 12th March, on behalf of the Iraq Petroleum Company. The Minister of Finance is said to have stood out for £100,000 down and a substantial periodical payment afterwards. Neither candidate has been prepared to accept his terms, but Standard Oil of California are believed to be readier than the Iraq Petroleum Company has so far shown itself to accept the principle of a substantial payment for a pig in a poke rather than a moderate rental in the first instance for prospecting rights only. Mr. Hamilton went to Cairo at short notice on the 23rd March, presumably to consult other parties, including, possibly, Major Holmes and another person connected with the Eastern and General Syndicate, who were about to fly from Koweit to Egypt about the same time. It was reported from Koweit that Major Holmes had been invited by Ibn Saud to come to Jedda, a surprising development, if true, as Major Holmes is known to have been in the King's black books for some years. Messrs. Longrigg and Muderris are playing a patient game, but the former went to Port Sudan for a few days on the 26th March to escape boredom and "to buy a topee."

(d) The scheme hatched by Hyderabad notables to start a textile industry in the Hejaz seems to have made progress at the Indian end. A certain amount of money, variously put at from 5,000 to 15,000 rupees, has been collected, and looms and spinning-wheels are said to have been ordered in India.

(e) Nothing more has been heard of financial help for Saudi Arabia from the Nizam of Hyderabad.

35. The financial and economic developments described above have generated a new feeling of optimism in the Hejaz. Even the Saudi Government have been showing greater readiness to pay out money in respect of minor obligations.



36. There has been no news of further internal commotion in Asir or elsewhere. Notwithstanding this, Ibn Saud has presented an appearance of nervousness, possibly owing to the situation *vis-à-vis* of the Yemen (see paragraph 42 below) and uncertainty as to the strength of his hold on the country as a whole. He may be still suffering from the jolt given him by the Ibn Rifada and Asir rebellions last year, despite his success in repressing them.

## II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS IN ARABIA.

37. Progress was made in March with the arrangements for mutual recognition between Ibn Saud and the Amir of Transjordan. The Transjordanian and Saudi notes to the High Commissioner for Transjordan and His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah respectively were duly written on the 21st March. Though neither followed the exact wording proposed in February, they were similar in substance and were satisfactory. Special arrangements were made to forward certified copies speedily to the Legation and the High Commissioner for transmission to the respective Governments of the other part. All was ready by the 30th March, and it was proposed in Jeddah to make the communications necessary to consummate recognition on the 31st March. Although Wahhabis have no objection to Friday diplomacy, that day of the week was considered unsuitable in Jerusalem, and the communication was postponed at both ends until the 1st April. *Absit omen.*

38. The completion of the recognition procedure paves the way for treaty negotiations. Ibn Saud demurred to the two-stage proposal mentioned in paragraph 18 (b), but it was hoped at the end of March to get him to agree to a second stage at Jerusalem, in the almost certain event of its being impossible to reach agreement during the stay of the Transjordan delegates in Jeddah, which will necessarily be short.

39. On the 19th March, Sir Andrew Ryan sent Fuad Bey a personal and confidential letter containing a systematic statement regarding measures taken by His Majesty's Government to counteract anti-Saudi machinations in countries under their control or influence. Fuad Bey's reply was warmly appreciative.

40. There was no trouble on the Transjordan frontier in March, but the projected meeting between Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz-ibn-Zeyd again did not come off. Some correspondence passed regarding the recent conduct of the Governor of Tabuk in collecting "commission on loot," *i.e.*, retaining a heavy percentage of returnable camels. The Saudi Government sent to the Legation on the 14th February a revised version of an earlier and very cavalier answer to a protest regarding intrusions into Transjordan by Saudi officials and soldiers last autumn. Fuad Bey had asked for the return of the first note in deference to representations as to the unfavourable impression it would create. The revised version, though still unsatisfactory, was a great improvement on the first.

41. The Iraqi representative in Jeddah has not been happy, less apparently because of any really serious trouble between Iraq and Saudi Arabia than because his Government press him to attempt the solution of too many questions simultaneously. The scheme for a motor route for pilgrims between Nejed and Medina makes slow progress. The Iraqi Government are also keen on a settlement of the vexed question of property owned by the Hashimite family in the Hejaz, a subject which may perhaps engage attention during the projected negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan.

42. The arrangements for the surrender of the Idrisi to Ibn Saud (paragraphs 21 and 22 of last report) hung fire throughout the month. There has been much reticence on the subject, but there have been no other overt signs of tension between King and Imam.

## III.—RELATIONS WITH POWERS OUTSIDE ARABIA.

43. Relations between His Majesty's Minister and the Saudi Government, *i.e.*, Fuad Bey Hamza, were sweeter than sugar throughout the month. The main subject of discussion was the Saudi-Transjordan recognition formulae. Ibn Saud has been accommodating to an extent which affords a further indication of the nervousness mentioned in paragraph 36 above. On the 4th March a local policeman entered the Legation offices in circumstances which necessitated a protest on grounds of violation. After an unsuccessful effort to get an adequate

apology from the Governor of Jeddah suitable satisfaction was obtained from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Ibn Saud gave a proof of goodwill in March by authorising the return to Jeddah of a man, partly in the Legation service, who had been deported last year in consequence of a charge of having made an alcoholic beverage.

44. Fuad Bey gave Sir Andrew Ryan on the 18th March a general account of the position between Soviet Russia and Saudi Arabia since 1931. He stated that no general agreements had been reached on the lines described by the Soviets, but admitted that the Saudi Government had removed the embargo on trade from Russia, subject to its not being started pending the elaboration of machinery for the marketing of Russian goods.

45. The Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires (see paragraph 23) returned from Sana in the last days of March. The French Chargé d'Affaires returned rather earlier, stating, not unreasonably, that he had only gone to Syria to have a permanently-damaged eye seen to.

46. The Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs arrived in Jeddah on pilgrimage on the 6th March and went on a day or two later to Medina. He is understood to be on leave and it is not known whether he had brought the instrument of ratification of the Saudi Afghan Treaty of May 1932.

## IV.—MISCELLANEOUS.

47. H.M.S. *Penzance* visited the Farzan Islands on the 22nd-24th March. Owing to a misapprehension in Jeddah as to the instruction of His Majesty's Government, the visit was not notified to the Saudi Government by the Legation, with the result that the local sheikhs and Amir, though very polite, demurred to the visit, as not having been authorised by their superior authorities.

48. Seyyid Ahmed-as-Senusi died at Medina on the 10th March. The disappearance of this once considerable figure attracted little attention.

49. Mr. C. G. Hope Gill, the senior member of the Legation staff, left Jeddah for good on the 15th March, on transfer to Alexandria. He had been here since the 3rd January, 1930, and had acted no less than five terms as His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires. His successor, Mr. A. S. Calvert, is expected in the latter part of April.

50. Lady Evelyn Cobbold (see paragraph 27) has been more successful than was anticipated and a little more successful than she desired, having obtained permission to visit the Holy Cities but having been given to understand that it would be *mal vu* if, being here so close to pilgrimage time, she did not go the whole hog and do the pilgrimage proper, instead of merely making the visit known as Omra. Her success has been attributed less to evidence of piety or even to the Dunmore lineage than to the discovery that her son-in-law, Mr. Hambro, was a director of the Bank of England. Anyhow, she went to Medina on the 20th March and started for Mecca on the 30th March. If Ibn Saud receives her, her cup of blessings will be full to overflowing.

51. Further arrivals of pilgrims in March brought the total number from Indian ports up to about 10,500, of whom some 7,000 are British India subjects. The total of overseas pilgrims may be in the neighbourhood of 24,000. In the absence of the India and Malay pilgrimage officers at Mecca, accurate estimates cannot at the moment be given. There have again been a good many pilgrims of important standing, including one picturesque figure, the Amir of Katsina, a personage of great wealth and consideration in Nigeria. Mecca will not enjoy the presence of the well-known Indian agitator, Ismail Ghuznavi, of Amritsar, to whom the Indian Government refused facilities. He is important at the Saudi end, as being an ardent Wahhabi whom Ibn Saud has used greatly as a sort of unofficial agent in India.

52. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 1 male, 1 female.

Took refuge in March: None.

Manumitted in March and repatriated: 1 male.

Locally manumitted: 1 female.

On hand at the end of the month: None.



[E 2294/233/25]

No. 27.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 3.)*

(No. 103.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jeddah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his note to the Saudi-Arab Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 8th April respecting the mutual recognition by each other of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan.

*Jedda, April 8, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 27.

*Sir A. Ryan to Saudi-Arab Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(After Compliments.)

Your Royal Highness,

*Jedda, April 8, 1933.*

IN my note of the 1st April, I stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would learn with the utmost satisfaction of the completion of the formalities relative to the mutual recognition by each other of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan.

I have now received definite instructions to convey to your Royal Highness an expression of the congratulations of my Government on an event to which they attach great importance. It is their firm hope that this event will have the happiest effects on the relations between this country and Transjordan, which they wish to see established on a permanent basis of friendship and co-operation.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2540/30/25]

No. 28.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 110.)

Sir,

*Jedda, April 13, 1933.*

IN paragraph 32 of the Jeddah report for March, enclosed in my despatch No. 102 of the 7th April, I mentioned that Ibn Saud had given a dinner to notable pilgrims on the evening of the 31st March. As you are aware, this is now a regular feature of each year's pilgrimage season. On the present occasion, the King entertained some hundreds of guests of various nationalities, including several Indians. I understand from my Indian vice-consul that the attention shown both to Shia and to Indian pilgrims has been a feature of this year's pilgrimage. In the case of the Indians the King and the Minister of Finance, who is largely responsible for dispensing such attention, had the advantage of the presence of Jemâl Pasha Ghazzi, who has been conducting since last year an intensive pro-pilgrimage campaign in India and was able to make play with the intimacy he had established there with various participants in this year's Haj.

2. It is the King's custom to speak at great length at these annual banquets. The published version of his address on the present occasion occupied a page and a half of the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 6th April. I enclose a short summary prepared in the Legation.

3. The King preached from his usual text, the need for unity in Islam, but he seems to have restrained almost entirely the tendency which he has sometimes shown in the past to give offence by his utterances regarding people who do not share his views. I understand that the published version of his speech represents the original pretty accurately, although the actual language used in certain passages may have been more emphatic. I have heard only one definite suggestion of any important omission. According to my Persian colleagues the King gave as one of the reasons why he could not aspire to the Caliphate the fact that so many Moslem countries are under alien denomination. He is said to have included

in the number Egypt as being under the thumb of Great Britain. If he really said this, it cannot have been pleasing to all his Egyptian hearers, though it might gratify some of them.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Excellency the Viceroy of India (Foreign and Political Department), to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 28.

*Summary of the Speech delivered by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz-ibn-Saud at the Banquet given on March 31, 1933, at the Royal Palace at Mecca.*

(As published in *Umm-al-Qura*, April 6, 1933.)

THE Arab people, His Majesty said, enjoy one great blessing from God in the teachings of the Prophet, which have descended on them like the fertilising rain on the earth, and have been the means by which they have spread their influence over vast territories. All Moslems were indebted to that great Teacher for the good that they had; and if they would but adhere to the commands of God, as given in the Koran and the sacred writings, they would be successful and united, but if they set aside these commands they would become separated and degraded.

And this, the King went on, is what is happening now; and he drew a picture of the sad condition of the Moslem world in general and the Arab people in particular at the present time. Some people imagine, he said, that the only remedy for this state is for Moslems to adopt European civilisation; but this was not true, for the teachings of the Koran guarantee prosperity, unity and happiness to those who follow them, because they make no differentiation between King and commoner, save in respect of piety alone.

Nor were foreigners alone to blame for all the calamities which had overtaken Islam, for amongst Moslems themselves they found some who were misguided and who were willing to aid them to work against Islam.

"I am the Herald of Islam," the King concluded. He was an Arab Moslem who served Islam and who worked for the spread of Islam and for Moslem unity; and he was prepared to sacrifice himself and his family in the defence of Islam. He did not aim to be a chief on earth; of greatest importance to him was to make God's word supreme, and in pursuit of this he cared for no difficulties. Many had opposed him since he first put forward this aim, but had been vanquished.

What did they want of him? His actions were clear; he followed the Way. It had been said that he claimed to be Khalif over all Islam. He made no such claim. A Khalif must enforce the commands of the Islamic religion over the whole world of Islam, and this was possible in the time of the Khalifât; but was there a man who could so do at the present time? It was clearly impossible and all he himself desired was unity and co-operation among Moslems.

Behind him were more than 400,000 warriors; if he wept they wept; if he rejoiced they rejoiced, and if he commanded they obeyed his commands. These were the Troops of Unity, the brethren of all who obeyed God, ready to fight for God and expecting nothing from it except to satisfy God; and this was the force destined to confirm the Religious Law and Islam throughout the territories over which he ruled.

[E 2397/2397/25]

No. 29.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 113.)

Sir,

*Jedda, April 14, 1933.*

IN paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 23 of the 17th January, I stated that, so far as I could make out, the frontier between Asir and the Yemen appeared to abut on the sea at the mouth of the Wadi Tashar and to run inland in a direction which I proceeded to indicate. On re-reading the relevant papers I



find that I was probably too guarded as regards the terminal on the sea. Although it is quite uncertain whether the frontier has been agreed as regards its whole length and certain that it has not been delimited, the Saudi official communiqué published on the 6th January and forwarded with my printed despatch No. 10 of the 8th January, speaks definitely of the Wadi Tashar, to which the Saudi troops claimed to have advanced, as being the furthest district on the coast. It may therefore be assumed that the mouth of the Wadi in question is the boundary point in the eyes of the Saudi Government and the Government of the Yemen probably take the same view.

2. I think it worth while to draw attention to this point, even though it is unlikely to have escaped you, as it may be important for naval purposes to have a definite indication of the coastal point at which Saudi Arabia ends and the Yemen begins. In this connexion I may add that I now learn privately from the commanding officer of H.M.S. *Penzance* that the Island of Ashik, which I mentioned in paragraph 5 of the enclosure in my despatch No. 104 of the 9th April regarding naval visits to the Farsan Islands, &c., lies off the coast 30 miles south of Jizan, 11 miles north-north-west of Medi and about 2 miles south of the mouth of the Wadi Tashar.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden and to the senior naval officer in the Red Sea sloops.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2401/2401/25]

No. 30.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 118.)

Sir,

*Jedda, April 16, 1933.*

WITH reference to paragraph 32 of the Jedda report enclosed in my despatch No. 102 of the 7th April, I have the honour to state that Ibn Saud arrived in Jedda early yesterday and gave the usual series of formal audiences to the heads of foreign missions in the forenoon. He is staying at a large house which has recently been built by the Minister of Finance about a mile outside the town. It is already rumoured that the so-called "Green Palace" is to be turned into a hotel. Be this as it may, it is interesting to note the tightening of the connexion between His Majesty and Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who spends but little time in Jedda and may have built his new house partly with a view to his master's convenience.

2. I found the King affable, but he did not appear to be in the same good form as when I last saw him at the end of last August; I cannot say that he looked ill, but he gave the impression of suffering from nervous worry. He seemed distraught, and I had to initiate almost every subject of conversation. The nature of the audience required that the topics should be general. We discoursed of our respective states of health, the excellent rains that have fallen in Nejd, the virtues of water and the broader aspects of the recent pilgrimage. The most striking feature of this last part of the conversation was the King's eagerness to assure me of his readiness to entertain suggestions for the betterment of pilgrimage conditions. He repeated this assurance at least twice.

3. Mr. Furlong, who was with me, agrees generally with my impression of the King's physical state. He had not seen His Majesty for nearly two years and would not like to express himself too confidently, but he thought that Ibn Saud presented the appearance of having aged considerably.

4. The King's plans appear to be uncertain. If I should have any conversation with him of an important nature during his stay in Jedda, I will report separately.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, to the honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2541/233/25]

No. 31.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 119.)

Sir,

*Jedda, April 18, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 118 of the 16th April, I have the honour to state that after consulting Fuad Bey Hamza and satisfying myself that it might be useful to have a business conversation with the King before the arrival of the Transjordanian mission, I applied for a further audience and was received by His Majesty on the 17th April.

2. I took the opportunity of presenting Mr. Oppenheim to the King. After he had retired, His Majesty left it to me to start the business conversation. I reviewed at some length the events leading up to the recent recognition of each other by Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah, stressing the evidence they had afforded of the friendship of His Majesty's Government towards the King and his Government. I said that a further stage was now impending. It might be attended by difficulty, one of the reasons being that His Majesty's Government had expressed readiness to accept a definite responsibility for the execution of undertakings entered into by the Amir and Government of Transjordan. This made it necessary that they should not only know the nature of such undertakings, but should assure themselves that they were such that His Majesty's Government could discharge the obligation implied in their guarantee. I asked the King to bear this in mind, when questions were referred to him during the negotiations and to remember that, if at any point His Majesty's Government took up an attitude distasteful to him, it would be due not to lack of friendship, but to a desire to avoid future controversy.

3. Ibn Saud replied, also at some length and with animation, but his statements were not closely reasoned and I observed the same curious appearance of preoccupation as at my formal audience of the 15th April. His main thesis was the familiar one that he expected his friends, the British Government and myself, to see him through and that there need be no difficulties, if they were willing to do so. He described himself more than once as the older friend, meaning that he was an older friend of His Majesty's Government than the Amir Abdullah. He suggested that as the Amir's delegate would have the support of British officials in Transjordan, his own representatives should have mine.

4. I persevered in my attempt to impress on the King the consideration that His Majesty's Government must make certain that they could ensure the execution of any undertakings they endorsed. I pointed out, *à propos* of a reference by the King to Arabs generally, that the Arabs were a large family in which family quarrels occurred and that His Majesty's Government came into their affairs from outside. They desired to do their best for all Arabs, but they stood towards different sections of them in a variety of relationships. They dealt with His Majesty as an independent ruler. They considered the feelings of the Amir Abdullah and his people, but they had authority and responsibility in regard to them. I cited as an illustration a recent incident. The authorities in Transjordan had been trying to round up one Karayim-bin-Atiya, in order to put him out of the way of harming the King. I had just heard that the King had recently entertained this man as his guest. I said I had no objection to this. It was an Arab way of doing things. My point was that if the same man were shown favour by the Amir Abdullah, it would be my duty to deprecate it.

5. The King was voluble in explanation of his attitude towards Karayim, which he put down to the fact that he had been asked, and asked by the Amir Abdullah himself, to be forgiving towards the Beni Atiya. I repeated that I had mentioned the incident only as an example of a case in which he was free to show favour to a late enemy and in the counterpart of which His Majesty's Government would not be free, if they had promised to secure the execution of a treaty article precluding the Amir from showing favour to an enemy of the King. Arab ways, I observed, were not our ways. I mentioned extradition as a subject which might give rise to difficulty unless we were sure that the terms of an extradition treaty were such as could be carried out. I glanced at the difficulty of determining nationality, a question which for obvious reasons I did not wish to discuss in



detail at this stage, and mentioned the case of the Atûn, over whose nationality we had been at loggerheads for eighteen months as an illustration.

6. This conversation is hardly worth reporting. I record it merely to show that, while doing my best to prepare the way for successful negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, I have tried to disabuse the King and his advisers of any idea that treaties, in regard to which His Majesty's Government are to have responsibility, can simply be copied from the text of the treaties with Iraq. My object has been to show that His Majesty's Government must consider their own future responsibility with great care, if the treaties are to breed friendship and not renewed controversy.

7. With regard to what I have said in this and my despatch under reference regarding Ibn Saud's state, I may mention that my Italian colleague told Mr. Furlonge spontaneously that he had found the King *distrain* and disinclined to initiate subjects of conversation, though he had been charmed by his smile. My impression is that the King is suffering from a good deal of nervous strain. He seemed tired and unusually anxious to end the conversation summarised above. It is true that it was rather long and that His Majesty was probably overdue for his mid-morning meal, but I have never known him show quite so much polite anxiety to see me go.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2542/2/25]

No. 32.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 120.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 18, 1933.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 68 of the 17th April, I have the honour to transmit herewith translations of two communiqués about Asir, published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 31st March and the 14th April. You will see by the second that the question of the disposal of Hasan-al-Idrisi has been settled in a manner very favourable to him. When speaking to me on the subject on the 15th April, Fuad Bey expatiated on the King's longanimity and generosity. I admitted the justice of these praises, adding that the King had also shown qualities of statesmanship, of which generosity was a part. This was not insincere, but the fact remains that His Majesty's display of statesmanship on this occasion indicates readiness to go to great lengths to avoid a quarrel with the Imam. It is also possible that he believes, on reflexion, that Hasan-al-Idrisi will be less dangerous as an exile in the Yemen than if he returned under any conditions which left him free to tamper directly with tribes in Asir.

2. Fuad Bey emphasised the point that Asir would not be governed as before, but as "Asir Tihama," meaning that it would become a province under that name. He added, confidentially, that the King's cousin, Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid, would not remain there permanently, as was at one time expected, and that it was intended to make Turki-as-Sdayri, at present Governor of Jauf-Skaka, Governor-General of the whole of Asir, to reside at Abha, with a subordinate Governor at Jizan.

3. The second of the enclosed communiqués expresses the expectation that Abdul Wahhab Idrisi, the brother of Hasan and one of the prime movers in the revolt in Asir, will return with other ex-rebels to Saudi Arabia. I doubt whether this expectation will be fulfilled, but I can hardly suppose that Ibn Saud, having yielded in the case of Hasan, will quarrel with the Imam over Abdul Wahhab, &c. It looks (a) as though the situation in Asir had been stabilised at any rate for the time being, and (b) as though any danger of conflict in the near future between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen had been averted.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden and to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

*Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura of March 31, 1933.*

*Restoration of Situation in the South to its normal State.*

(Translation.)

WE have already published, in previous issues, news about the restoration of the situation in the south to its normal state, and about the high decree issued for a general amnesty to be granted to those who took refuge over the Yemen frontier. We have to add now that the Amir Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid has demobilised all the forces which were under his command. The said forces have returned to Nejd, but the Amir has remained with certain detachments for the purpose of according security to the natives. The persons who participated in this insurrection have returned, expressing their regret for the past.

We have also learnt that His Majesty has issued his command that those persons may be granted their usual subsidies.

Friendly communications are being exchanged between His Majesty the King and His Highness the Imam Yahya about Hasan-al-Idrisi, and the result of these communications will be published by the Government in the near future.

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

*Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura of April 14, 1933.*

*Official Communiqué from the Press Department.*

(Translation.)

THE Government have previously announced that no traces of the insurrection which was fomented by conspirators still remain in the Asir Tihama, may praise be to God. The fugitive tribesmen have returned to their own districts, the situation has been restored to normal and the markets of the tribes have been opened as usual; orders have therefore been issued to the additional military forces to return. The Amir Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid will shortly return to Abha after completion of the contemplated administrative reorganisation.

His Highness the Imam Yahya has approached His Majesty the King with a view to obtaining pardon from him for Seyyid Hasan-al-Idrisi, and His Majesty had agreed to this. His Highness has again approached him to get permission for Seyyid-al-Hasan to choose a place to settle in, according to his wishes. Despite the explicit terms of the treaty concluded between His Majesty the King and His Highness the Imam Yahya, which require that Seyyid-al-Hasan and others should be handed over, His Majesty the King has taken account of the sincere friendship existing between him and His Highness the Imam Yahya, and has desired not to refuse his request, His Highness having given an understanding to His Majesty the King that As Seyyid will behave well and will remain under his supervision and control. Furthermore, in consideration of the rank of the Idrisi's family and the long-standing connexions which have existed between that family and the Saudi family, His Majesty the King has not wished to coerce them, especially as His Majesty by the might of God has no fear of Seyyid or anybody else, whether he stay in his territory or elsewhere. For these reasons His Majesty has accepted the undertakings of His Highness the Imam Yahya, and has given him right to choose whatever place he thinks fit for Hasan Idrisi to settle in.

His Highness the Imam Yahya has asked His Majesty the King to be kind to the family of the Idrisi, as they are in a state of destitution, and to grant them a certain competence. His Majesty has therefore issued orders to pay Seyyid-al-Hasan-al-Idrisi a pension of 2,000 riyals monthly for his livelihood.

It is expected that Seyyid Abdul Wahhab-al-Idrisi and all his companions will submit and return and that none will stay with Al Hasan except his family, in view of the general amnesty which has been granted.



*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 124.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 17, 1933.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 289 of the 16th July, 1931, I have to inform you that the question of the possible entry of Saudi Arabia into the League of Nations has been under further consideration.

2. On the 3rd March the Saudi Arabian Minister referred to this subject in a conversation with Sir L. Oliphant, and requested the views and advice of His Majesty's Government. The following points were raised in the ensuing discussion:—

- (a) The Hejaz had originally come within the wording of article 1 of the Covenant of the League, which runs as follows: "The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this Covenant"; but the name had completely disappeared from the title of Ibn Saud's present dominions, and it therefore seemed that, if at any time Saudi Arabia were to ask for admission to the League, this request would have to come as from a new country. The Minister entirely agreed in this view, and saw no objection to such a procedure.
- (b) The League of Nations requires to be satisfied that an applicant State has established and well-defined frontiers. Sir L. Oliphant referred to the settlement which was reported to have been reached between King Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen as to the Asir-Yemen frontier, but expressed some doubt whether this and the provisional nature of the frontier with Transjordan would be adequate to satisfy the League. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba replied that the Asir-Yemen frontier was not entirely fixed, but the differences were of a very minor character, and he did not anticipate trouble from them.
- (c) Continuance of slavery might be severely criticised at Geneva. The Minister at once appealed to the precedent of Abyssinia, and added that he himself had raised this possible difficulty with King Ibn Saud, who felt that, if his country were a member of the League, the League might help him in the matter of anti-slavery measures.

3. The Minister said that, above all, he wished to avoid a situation in which, when Saudi Arabia had applied for membership of the League, her request should be rejected. He was certain, however, that if His Majesty's Government were to champion the Saudi cause, the candidate whom they supported would be successful. It was explained to him that the result of any application for League membership could never be regarded as certain beforehand, and that His Majesty's Government rarely, if ever, promised their support to a candidate in advance.

4. On the 11th May Sir L. Oliphant received a further visit from Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, who on this occasion stated that, while the Saudi Government did not wish to ask for a definite promise of support from His Majesty's Government, they would be glad to know whether an application by Saudi Arabia for membership of the League of Nations would be favourably viewed by His Majesty's Government. He was again referred to the objections stated in (b) and (c) of the preceding paragraph, and, as he had only raised the question in an entirely informal manner, agreed not to press for an immediate answer.

5. In the light of these two interviews the arguments both in favour of and against the admission of Saudi Arabia into the League have again been considered. Two of the objections which were originally seen to the Saudi candidature and which were set out in paragraphs 3 to 5 of Mr. Arthur Henderson's despatch No. 137 of the 8th April, 1931, still remain valid. Saudi Arabia is a primitively organised State, whose admission to the League might not bring with it an accession of strength, but rather tend, if anything, to weaken the authority of that body. Secondly, in spite of the intentions attributed to King Ibn Saud by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, there seems no reason to anticipate that any serious effort is likely to be made by King Ibn Saud and his Government to put an end to the institution of slavery as part of the social structure of Saudi

Arabia. The Abyssinian precedent is not a safe one to invoke in this connexion, since, apart from the fact that the general attitude of the Abyssinian Government towards the possible abolition of the institution of slavery is probably less unsatisfactory than is likely to be that of the Saudi Government, an application by the Saudi Government for admission to membership of the League is not likely to attract at Geneva the general political support which was responsible for the election of Abyssinia in 1923, and such an application might, indeed, meet with powerful opposition. Finally, a further and serious disadvantage, from the point of view of His Majesty's Government, is that, if the Saudi candidature were successful, this would undoubtedly increase the discontent felt in Egypt against her exclusion from the League pending the negotiation of a treaty settlement with His Majesty's Government.

6. You will appreciate the fact that the argument based on the indefinite character of the Saudi frontiers is not strong, since, unless the Saudi Government were formally and finally to renounce their claims to the Maan-Akaba area—which seems in the highest degree improbable—it would, as you are aware, not be to the interest either of His Majesty's Government or of the Transjordan authorities to accede at this moment to any request from the Saudi Government for the delimitation on the ground of the Hadda frontier between Transjordan and Nejd, or for a more precise definition of the *de facto* frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz. In point of fact, the somewhat doubtful character of certain of the frontiers of Saudi Arabia might not in itself lead to serious difficulties at Geneva. The most important of the undelimited frontiers are those between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. But the fact that the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Iraq was undelimited did not prevent Iraq from being admitted to membership of the League of Nations last October, while the similarly undelimited character of the Hadda frontier, and the purely *de facto* nature of the Maan-Akaba frontier between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, which affects both countries equally, has never, so far as I am aware, been questioned at Geneva in connexion with the administration of Transjordan by His Majesty's Government under the Palestine mandate. Meanwhile, recent reports appear to confirm the Saudi Minister's statement that the frontier between Asir and the Yemen has now been practically agreed upon between King Ibn Saud and the Imam, and that there is no important area in dispute. As regards the south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, by recognising under article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda the special relations between His Majesty's Government and the Arabian rulers of the Persian Gulf, may be regarded as having virtually recognised the boundaries laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1914. In these circumstances, except possibly for the Saudi claim to the Maan-Akaba area of Transjordan, it seems unlikely that serious difficulty would arise at Geneva over the frontiers of Saudi Arabia, and it is undesirable that the question should be raised prematurely. Since, however, the frontier difficulty has on past occasions been mentioned as one of the possible objections to the candidature of Saudi Arabia for membership of the League, there is some danger that the Saudi Government may attempt to obtain a demarcation of the Transjordan frontier by linking up the two questions and by representing His Majesty's Government as refusing to remove one of the principal defects which render Saudi Arabia ineligible for entry into the League. If any move of this kind is made or appears likely to be made, you should refer to me for further instructions.

7. Meanwhile, if the Saudi Government show signs of wishing to press their application, His Majesty's Government will not feel justified in actively discouraging them from doing so. Both Iraq and Persia have undoubtedly strengthened their international position as a result of their membership of the League, and it is not unnatural that Saudi Arabia should wish to follow their example. Provided that the Saudi Government realise the objections which are likely to be raised to their candidature—particularly in connexion with the existence of slavery in their country—and provided that they do not expect His Majesty's Government to sponsor them, there seems to be no strong countervailing reason why they should be deterred from seeking admission. In dealing with any further enquiries on this subject, therefore, excepting those of which the possibility is considered in the previous paragraph, you should adopt an attitude of complete but sympathetic neutrality; and, while giving the Saudi Government any information they may require, you should refrain from anything which might



be taken as a rebuff. At the same time, you should not minimise the obstacles in the way of their candidature, and should do nothing to encourage them to proceed hastily in the matter.

I am, &c.  
JOHN SIMON.

[E 2836/233/25]

No. 34.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 30.)*

(No. 131.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 8, 1933.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 93 of the 5th May, I have the honour to submit a general report on the recent negotiations with a view to a treaty settlement between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. I will endeavour to make this despatch and its enclosures as self contained as possible, avoiding back reference except when it is essential.

2. The mission from Transjordan arrived in Jedda on the 22nd April, accompanied by Mrs. Cox. The party were welcomed with every mark of distinction both on board ship and at the quay, where they were received by Fuad Bey Hamza, the Governor of Jedda, and myself among others. Arrangements had been made to accommodate them as Government guests at the Kandara villa outside the town. If the arrangements there were not perfect at all points from a European point of view this was due to no lack of courtesy or goodwill. The formal dinners given by the Saudi Government, the Governor of Jedda and the Amir Feisal on the evenings of the 22nd to the 24th April were well managed functions. I do not think that the King can be accused of discourtesy in delaying his arrival in Jedda until the conference was nearly at an end, although an earlier arrival might have contributed to a happier result. He perhaps pushed oriental formality to an extreme in making no reference to the object of the mission's visit when he received us on the 3rd May, especially as he confined his personal intercourse with the mission to that single audience.

3. I enclose a diary of the visit of the mission from the 22nd April to the 5th May. Fuad Bey came to tea at the Legation on the 22nd April and we arranged certain points of procedure. As our own drafts were not quite ready, we agreed the more readily to listen at a first formal meeting next day to an exposition by Fuad Bey of points which might arise. He came to the meeting with Sheikh Yussuf Yassin, who acted as his fellow delegate throughout the conference and who, if there was any inequality, seemed to take the leading part on the Saudi side.

4. One of the preliminary arrangements made at the outset was that no attempt should be made to keep agreed minutes of the discussions between the delegations. This was qualified on the 23rd April by an understanding that if any agreement should be reached in the course of debate, which might have permanent importance but would not find a place in eventual texts, they should be embodied in special agreed minutes. No such special minutes were in fact drawn up. Notes of the proceedings were kept for use in this Legation, but Colonel Cox has kindly undertaken to prepare the records for general use of the discussions at the sixteen meetings. These will doubtless reach you through the Colonial Office.

5. Fuad Bey spoke on the 23rd April from a memorandum under eighteen heads, a translation of which I enclose, although it was not put in as being itself a definite statement of the Saudi case. This made it unnecessary to discuss it in detail on our side, but we made it clear that we considered both sub-heads of point 1 to be outside the scope of the conference. We admitted that all the other points were germane to the issues to be discussed, subject to a doubt as to whether some of them were suitable for inclusion in a general settlement, more especially those relating to local frontier practice like points 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15. We suggested that it would be better to discuss, in the first instance, the draft agreements prepared by us and then, if necessary, to return to Fuad Bey's memorandum and see how much of it was covered. The Saudi delegates agreed.

6. The first draft which we were able to put forward was that of an extradition treaty. This followed the English text produced in Amman in February, subject to minor alterations suggested by further study. A general discussion of

our draft on the 24th April made it clear that there would be acute differences of opinion both in regard to the procedure contemplated in it and the definition of extraditable offences.

7. Our draft Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" having been completed in the interval, it was decided to leave the contentious subject of extradition in abeyance and to start discussion of the draft Treaty of Friendship on the 23rd April. This draft was also on the lines of that prepared at Amman in February, subject to modifications resulting from Colonial Office telegram No. 42, Secret, of the 11th April to the High Commissioner and some further minor amendments. The wording and arrangement of this treaty were the subject of very close discussion during the remainder of the conference. We eventually reached almost complete agreement, except as regards article 2, on a text which was collated by experts in Arabic, including Fuad Bey and Taufiq Bey early on the 4th May, before the general meeting that morning.

8. I now turn to the Arbitration Protocol. Before the mission arrived, I had satisfied myself that in our anxiety at Amman in February not to get too far from the Saudi-Iraq texts we had adapted proposals the practical working of which would be very difficult. I therefore prepared, in agreement with Colonel Cox and Taufiq Bey, a revised draft, which still contemplated recourse to arbitration at the option of either party, but which laid down an orderly procedure, including provision for the nomination of the president of the board by a third Power, not specified, in the event of the parties failing to agree on one. The Arabic of this draft was handed to the Saudi delegates on the 30th April.

9. After the draft protocol had been thus put forward, Colonel Cox and I became alive to the danger which might result if each party were given unlimited freedom to bring the other compulsorily to arbitration on any question affecting their relations. It was obviously desirable to avoid any possibility of questions like Maan-Aqaba and frontier delimitation being submitted to arbitration of the kind contemplated and it seemed equally desirable to guard against frivolous or petulant recourse to it under general treaty clauses dealing with the broad principles of collaboration. In a general discussion on the 1st May we led up to a modified proposal, which we reduced to written form next day, that questions under specified articles of the Hadda Agreement and the new Treaty of Friendship should be made arbitrable at the option of either party but that all others should be submitted to arbitration only by special agreement. The Saudi delegates on the 3rd May demurred to the proposal to establish two categories and to our surprise now plumped for arbitration by special agreement in all cases. It appeared to me that, so far as His Majesty's Government were concerned, this would give them all that they required as a safety valve in the event of the Saudi Government persisting in unreasonable complaints that Transjordan had not fulfilled obligations and invoking the guarantee of the mandatory power. Colonel Cox agreed and Taufiq Bey was satisfied. Complete texts of the relevant article of the Treaty of Friendship and the Arbitration Protocol were then agreed upon.

10. Up to the eve of the final discussion on the Arbitration Protocol, the question of how the president of an arbitration board should be appointed, in case of non-agreement, continued to present difficulty. I was unwilling to propose formally that His Majesty's Government should be named as the third Power, as, though obviously suitable, they will always be identified more with one side than with the other. I broached the suggestion privately to Fuad Bey on the 2nd May. As I expected, he demurred to provision in the protocol for nomination by His Majesty's Government. The King, he said, had every confidence in their impartiality, but a public assignment to them of the rôle of nominator would be misconstrued. I suggested that this difficulty might be overcome by a diplomatic understanding, if necessary in semi-official letters only, that in case of need the Saudi Government would accept the mediation of His Majesty's Government. In the event I did not pursue this suggestion. At the formal meeting on the 3rd May Fuad Bey simply proposed that no provision should be made for third-party nomination. As we had already agreed to arbitration by special agreement only, my colleagues and I decided to acquiesce in this. It appeared to us that, if at a future time, the Saudi Government refused reasonable proposals regarding a president, they would put themselves as much in the wrong as if they refused reasonable proposals for the arbitration itself.

11. We had come back to the draft Extradition Treaty on the 2nd May. When we reached article 3 it was obvious that an agreement regarding the



definition of political offences would be impossible. Sheikh Yussuf Yassin was dissatisfied with the list of offences in the text. He was dissatisfied with my explanation that, although the offences would be extraditable if they were ordinary offences committed during an armed rising, the competent court would have to appreciate their character, *e.g.*, attempted killing might be ordinary murder or a rebel act. He not only wished the act of armed rebellion to be extraditable, but suggested that political activities like those of Hussein and Tahir-ad-Dabbagh should be considered extraditable offences also, a suggestion which I said His Majesty's Government would in no circumstances countenance, although it would be their duty and the duty of the Transjordan Government to circumscribe such activities by action in their own spheres.

12. I had on the previous evening told Fuad Bey privately that, in my opinion, it would be far better to abandon the attempt to make an extradition treaty and to concentrate on the provisions in the Treaty of Friendship for dealing with offences on the frontier. Having found Fuad Bey personally amenable, I threw out this suggestion again at the meeting on the 2nd May. The Saudi delegates, after some half-hearted hesitation, accepted it, and we returned in due course to the relevant portion of the draft Treaty of Friendship.

13. We had thus, by the evening of the 3rd May, evolved (a) an almost agreed draft of the Treaty of Friendship, and (b) a completely agreed draft Arbitration Protocol. Progress with the final stages of the discussion of these texts had been so rapid after the King's arrival in Jedda early on the 3rd May that there seemed to be a prospect of getting them signed late on the 4th May or on the morning of the 5th May. The only subject, apart from article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship, which still preoccupied my colleagues and myself was that of having some working arrangement for determining the nationality of tribes; and in regard to this we should have been satisfied with a composition, reserving in some suitable way the rights of Transjordan in regard to disputed tribes. As described in my telegram under reference, I understood from Fuad Bey that the question of Anglo-Saudi accompanying notes could be dealt with separately in a manner agreeable to me.

14. I do not know what produced the change in the Saudi attitude on the night of the 3rd-4th May. They came to the first meeting on the 4th May with a draft communiqué already prepared in anticipation of a suspension of the negotiations; and although they capitulated, after a struggle, over article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship, they obviously intended the suspension to take place, none the less.

15. I enclose translations of the Arabic texts of the two agreements mentioned above, as collated early on the 4th May. I have endeavoured to secure literal accuracy in these translations rather than attempt to reproduce the sense of the Arabic in English legal language. I would ask that they should not be regarded as final until Colonel Cox has had an opportunity of commenting on them. I enclose also a memorandum showing the relationship of the texts as they now stand to the Amman drafts, with brief explanations of the divergences; and the draft note which I offered to write if article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship were deleted. I gave a copy of this latter draft to the Saudi delegates on the 4th May.

16. I will now deal with various side issues which arose during the conference in the following paragraphs:—

#### *Nationality of Tribes.*

17. I enclose a translation of a draft letter prepared on our side in accordance with Captain Glubb's suggestions and communicated to the Saudi delegates on the 3rd May. It followed the lines of a suggestion already approved by His Majesty's Government as regards the Sherarat, but as regards the Beni Atiya we had evolved a new solution which seemed more workable in practice and at the same time rather more likely to be acceptable to Ibn Saud. The memorandum was discussed on the afternoon of the 4th May, when it was clear that there was to be no treaty and when the Saudi delegates felt free to stone-wall our proposals to their hearts' content. They asked that nationality should be established for all time. They made one surprising admission. They were prepared to give up the Atun to Transjordan and to throw in Auda as well, rather than give him the importance of being made an exception; but they claimed all the Sirhan, all the Imran, all the Beni Atiya and all the Sherarat.

A discussion on these lines could produce no definite result. It merely served as an exploration of a subject, which I shall have to pursue further, if you wish me to prepare the way diplomatically for the second stage of the conference. With this possibility in view, I obtained material for further discussions from Colonel Cox and Captain Glubb before they left.

#### *Other Outstanding Points in Fuad Bey's Memorandum of April 23.*

18. It had been agreed at the outset to revert eventually to Fuad Bey's memorandum, if necessary, and see what points had not been covered. As the conference wore on, I conceived the hope that it would not be necessary to go through all of these, but I suggested to my colleagues, partly as a means of meeting Fuad Bey as far as possible and partly in order to dispose of certain minor matters which had arisen in discussion, that we should propose to attach to the Treaty of Friendship a schedule of provisional rules for the guidance of the special frontier officers. We never got further in the conference than agreeing not very definitely with the Saudi delegates that this might be useful. We, however, prepared on our side a set of possible rules, an English draft of which I enclose. Although time did not allow of my discussing the final form fully with Colonel Cox and Captain Glubb, it will serve as a basis of future study.

19. The draft treaties and the documents described in the two preceding paragraphs cover most of the points in Fuad Bey's memorandum, but not the whole of it. The most important left over is probably point (9), dealing with transit through Transjordan, a subject which was discussed to some extent during the conference both at meetings and in private conversation. The Saudi delegates tried hard to tie us up in an undertaking that Saudi officials passing between Syria and Saudi Arabia should be allowed to do so without obtaining the permission of the Transjordan Government. We insisted that such journeys were governed by article 12 of the Hadda Agreement, adding that, if we were asked to consent to a special exemption for Saudi officials going to and from Syria, we could only do so on a basis of reciprocity, and should ask that Transjordanian officials should have a similar right of crossing Saudi territory in case of need, *e.g.*, if the Amir Abdullah had occasion to send a messenger to the Imam of the Yemen. This suggestion rather dashed the enthusiasm of the Saudi delegates. As regards to merchants in transit, we agreed to a clause in the new treaty affirming the continuance in force of article 13. We made it clear, and I explained this more fully to Fuad Bey in conversation, that this merely preserved article 13 of the Hadda Agreement with whatever effects it might be held to produce, a subject as to which difficulty had arisen in the case of certain articles. We expressed readiness to discuss the whole subject of the application of the article at a convenient stage of the conference, but we never got back to it. In this connexion, I threw out to Colonel Cox only that it might suit Transjordan to have in due course a simple form of commercial agreement with Saudi Arabia, covering both trans-frontier trade and transit trade. We had no time to discuss this fully, but I suggest that it should be further considered.

20. The question of Zakat, which is also raised in Fuad Bey's memorandum, point (16), was mentioned during the discussions, but was not closely debated.

#### *Meetings of Special Officers.*

21. In the course of the discussions the Saudi delegates mentioned that the Saudi Government contemplated altering their present arrangement under which a single officer, Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeyd, acts as Captain Glubb's opposite number and to transfer the powers to certain Governors, who, he eventually said, would be the Governors of Tebuk and Qaf. This would affect the working arrangements for meetings, &c., under article 7 of the Treaty of Friendship, and the Saudi delegates proposed to define the arrangements in an annexed letter. This was agreed to in principle, but the draft was never produced. It might perhaps be possible to embody any proposed arrangements in the Schedule of Rules contemplated in paragraph 18 above.

#### *Burying of Outstanding Claims.*

22. It was agreed in correspondence with yourself and the High Commissioner that we might, if a treaty were being signed, propose a mutual



cancellation of claims still outstanding in respect of raids since the 1st August, 1930, subject to our not compromising the position in regard to the nationality of the Atun. These claims were adverted to in the course of earlier discussion, but the time for proposing a general wash-out never arrived.

*Entry into Saudi Arabia of Officers in the Imperial Service in Transjordan.*

23. Fuad Bey asked that the British authorities should undertake to observe the same rules as that laid down for Transjordan officers in article 11 of the Treaty of Friendship. Colonel Cox and I were willing to write a letter outside the treaty texts giving this undertaking, but we did not get to the point at which it would have been necessary to write the letter.

*Anglo-Saudi Exchange of Notes contemplated in Paragraph 4 of my Note to the Saudi Government of January 11.*

24. This subject has become one of great importance, owing to the desirability of not doing anything unnecessarily wounding to the Amir Abdullah's susceptibilities. I need add nothing here, however, to what I said in my telegram under reference.

*Hashimite Properties and the Amir's Right to make the Pilgrimage.*

25. These subjects were, of course, outside the scope of the conference as such. Taufiq Bey Abdul-Huda did some useful work in connexion with them when in Mecca. As regards the Amir Abdullah's interest in the properties, I have described the present position in my telegram No. 7, Saving, of the 5th May. As regards the Amir's right of pilgrimage, Taufiq Bey elicited from Ibn Saud a satisfactory message to the Amir. It was unnecessary for Colonel Cox or me to intervene in any way.

26. I regret that it should have proved impossible to obtain a final result, limited to the essentials indicated in paragraph 13 above, before the mission left. Nevertheless, the progress made was considerable and, if we parted with some disappointment, there was no serious feeling of dissatisfaction on either side. I do not think that the Saudi Government have any intention of going back on what has already been agreed to. I sincerely hope that His Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government will, on their side, be prepared to observe the same attitude in order to reduce the area of work still to be done and to discourage the Saudi Government from reopening settled questions.

27. Fuad Bey Hamza played a useful part in the conference. He was occasionally over-ready to take offence, and I think that he influenced the King in favour of postponement, but in the main he was conciliatory. Sheikh Yussuf Yassin oscillated between his natural tendency to intransigence and hair-splitting and a much more accommodating mood, which, on the whole, prevailed. He probably reflected the King's personal attitude more faithfully than Fuad Bey. If His Majesty had only come to Jedda a day or two sooner, the result might have been more satisfactory.

28. Colonel Cox and I worked in complete accord. Taufiq Bey followed our lead with admiral loyalty, although towards the end he became a little sensitive lest the views of the Amir on his relations with His Majesty's Government should be prejudiced. Captain Glubb's experience and knowledge were of the utmost assistance. I regard his contribution to the recent discussions as the fruit of his work on the frontier, the success of which has done much to create the favourable atmosphere in which it has of late been possible to approach a political settlement. You will allow me to conclude this report with a tribute to my Chancery staff, on whom the work of the conference imposed a great extra strain. I would draw your particular attention to the meritorious work done by Mr. Oppenheim, as British Secretary, and by my chief interpreter, Ismail Effendi, who bore one of the heaviest burdens. Mr. Furlonge has superintended the final retranslation of the treaty texts into English.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 34.

[Diary of Mission's Visit: Not printed.]

Enclosure 2 in No. 34.

*Memorandum by Saudi Delegation, concerning Points to be submitted for Discussion.*

(Translation.)

(1) *Frontiers.*

*Firstly.*—The frontier line between Nejd and Transjordan has been defined, but as regards that between the Hejaz and Transjordan, no agreement has been completed. We have undertaken by the Treaty of Jedda to maintain the *status quo* until the termination of its period of validity.

*Secondly.*—The frontier line has not been delimited on the spot, but is shown on the maps by longitudes and latitudes; as a result of this, disputes have arisen regarding some of these places.

(2) *Co-operation on the Frontier.*

Article 3 of the Hadda Agreement indicated that the avoidance of misunderstanding and the strengthening of bonds of mutual friendship and full co-operation must be secured by the maintenance of constant communication between the British representative at Amman and the Governor of the Wadi Sirhan. This matter of co-operation has been a question of dispute and argument between the two sides. A number of discussions have taken place as to how it may be effected in a manner which will secure the end desired, but no specific result has come of this except (1) that some telegraphic and written communication has recently taken place, and that (2) frontier officials have been appointed from both sides to secure the purpose in view. It is therefore necessary adequately to explain and to reach agreement with the Transjordan delegation on—

(First) The scope of this co-operation.

(Second) The means of effecting it and putting it into force.

(3) *Established Rights of Tribes in both Countries.*

It will be of advantage to the interests of both sides, and will avoid disagreement in respect of the interpretation of the object of article 4 of the Hadda Agreement, if the established rights of the Transjordan tribes in our territories and those of our tribes in Transjordan are specified, whether these rights deal with grazing, settlement or movements. It is also necessary to reach agreement as to the means whereby such rights should be exercised, and to make clear the conditions under which a certain tribe or individual members of it may be deprived permanently or temporarily of the enjoyment of those rights.

(4) *Questions of Nationality.*

The nationality of certain tribes has not yet been determined, although both sides lay claim to them. For instance, the Atun definitely form part of the Beni Atiya, who are our subjects. A number of communications have been made in which the British Government admitted that Auda-al-Atna and his party were our subjects.

(5) *Tribunals in respect of Looted Property.*

In article 6 of the Hadda Agreement was laid down the constitution and powers of a tribunal to deal with looted property. The two sides have tried more than once to get the tribunal held, but no definite result has been come to



consequent on its formation for substantial reasons, of which the most important are the following:—

- (1) Nothing was laid down as to the means by which the tribunal should be invited to meet, and the matter was left for the two Governments to agree upon on each occasion, without mention of the period during which it was necessary to respond to the invitation to hold it, after the application had been forwarded.
- (2) Nothing was specified as to the method of verification of incidents and looted property.
- (3) Nothing was specified as to the method of taking the evidence of witnesses so as to establish the various incidents, as regards either their occurrence, the identity of the criminals, or the quantity of property looted, &c. If, therefore, the two Governments are of the opinion that this tribunal should remain as it is, it will be most necessary to draw up such conditions as will ensure its normal functioning and its ability to investigate the incidents submitted to it.

(6) *Permission to Emigrate.*

The terms of article 7 of the Hadda Agreement have not yet been applied. It is therein stipulated that no tribe may cross from the territory of its own country into the territory of the other Government without having previously obtained permission from the two Governments for this. Article 8 lays down the measures which either Government would take in the event of a tribe migrating into its territories without the consent of the other Government. It is necessary to arrive at an agreement on—

- (1) The manner in which the permission of both Governments can be obtained.
- (2) The reasons for which an application can be refused.
- (3) The method to be followed in dealing with a tribe which has migrated without having obtained the consent of its Government.

It must be understood that this is applicable in the case of tribesmen migrating in groups, but as regards the movement of individuals, whether villagers or tribesmen, this must conform to the travel regulations in force in both countries.

(7) *Interference with Tribes.*

Something was stated in articles 7 and 8 concerning communication with heads of tribes and the enticement of certain tribes to emigrate from one side to the other. It is therefore necessary now to reach agreement regarding—

- (1) The means by which a Government can communicate with a tribe subject to it, when that tribe is within the territory of the other country.
- (2) The means by which a Government can communicate with a tribe not subject to it, but which is found in its territories.
- (3) Enticement of tribes on the part of officials or individuals to leave their country or to rebel against it, &c.

(8) *Extradition of Criminals.*

The Hadda Agreement included no clause in respect of the extradition of criminals; what it laid down concerned the employment (by either Government) of all means except expulsion and the use of force to drive a tribe from its territories in the event of that tribe coming there without the consent of its own Government. As regards criminals, whether they be tribesmen or villagers, there is no special clause regarding them, and it is understood that the Extradition Treaty concluded between us and Iraq will be accepted as a basis of agreement.

(9) *Passage through Transjordan.*

Some difficulties have arisen for our subjects which have prevented them from enjoying freedom to pass through Transjordan during their journeys between Nejd and Syria or Nejd, Palestine and Egypt, and the two Governments undertook by articles 12 and 13 of the Hadda Agreement to notify each other of

every regulation which might be issued in respect of travel and movement, but this condition has not been carried out. The question of transit, either for commerce or for the migration of (its) subjects, is an essential and necessary one for Nejd.

(10) *The Means to be adopted in the case of Raids and Robberies when no Tribunal on the Property looted is held.*

Various individual cases of raiding and robbery might occur which did not require the holding of a tribunal on the loot and the frontier officials might be authorised to settle them. It will therefore be necessary to specify the means to be adopted, in order to arrive at an agreement on the following questions:—

- (1) With whom should communication be made?
- (2) How can it be proved that the incident has actually occurred?
- (3) How can the place in which the incident occurred be established, and how can the person who committed the offence be proved guilty?
- (4) How can it be proved how many (camels) were stolen, how many of them died, and which of them are "Arâif"?

(11) *"Wisaga" (Retaliatory Confiscation).*

Will the two Governments agree to accept the principle of "Wisaga" or not? What is the "Wisaga" for individuals and what "Wisaga" is to be undertaken by officials?

(12) *"Al Araif."*

The manner of dealing with them if they are found with raiders on the two sides.

(13) *Evidence and Witnesses.*

It is necessary to draw up permanent rules for witnesses, their identification and the manner of receiving their evidence in order to establish the various incidents.

(14) *Blood Money.*

The question of blood money must be clearly agreed upon, because it has been the cause of much dispute. The adoption of the tribal system and tribal custom requires that the amounts to be paid should be estimated. The different varieties of blood money which should be agreed upon are:—

- (1) Blood money in general.
- (2) Blood money for a female.
- (3) Blood money for a cousin (son of father's brother).
- (4) Blood money for "al Buq" (one under the charge of another).
- (5) Blood money for the defender.
- (6) Blood money for the aggressor.

(15) *Indemnities.*

In the event of a raid, or robbery, or the destruction, loss or damage of the looted property, an agreement should be concluded upon the amount of indemnity to be paid. It will also be necessary to estimate the loss suffered by the victims and the manner of compensation.

(16) *"The Zakat" (Alms or Tax).*

There exists an explicit agreement regarding the right of each Government to collect Zakat from the subjects of the other Government if they be found within its territories, but it is necessary to come to an agreement upon:—

- (1) How to collect Zakat from those subjects of the Government demanding it who have run away to evade payment.
- (2) How to collect Zakat from the subjects of the other Government if they have run away before paying it.



(17) *The "Khidma" (Commission on Loot)* that can rightfully be demanded.

This has not yet been agreed upon between Glubb and Ibn Zeyd. It is, therefore, advantageous to confine it within specified limits or to agree upon its entire abolishment.

(18) *Agreement upon the Rules governing Hearings.*

We have already mentioned some of the points which should be [? borne in mind] when incidents are being investigated. There are some other questions which are also worthy of consideration.

#### Enclosure 3 in No. 34.

*Draft Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage."—Text of May 4, 1933.*

#### ARTICLE 1.

PERMANENT peace and firm and inviolable friendship shall prevail between the Saudi Arab Kingdom and the Amara of Transjordan.

The two high contracting parties shall undertake to do their utmost to preserve these and to settle in a spirit of peace and friendship all disputes and differences which may arise between them.

#### ARTICLE 2.

(Reserved on the part of the British Transjordan delegation.)

#### ARTICLE 3.

Each of the two high contracting parties undertakes to preserve good relations with the other party, and shall endeavour by every means at his command to prevent the use of his country as a base for unlawful actions or preparations therefor, including raiding, which may be directed against the peace and tranquillity in the country or the other party.

If it appears to either of the two high contracting parties that the dispositions which he has taken may be insufficient to prevent the persons carrying on the unlawful activities referred to in the first paragraph from giving effect to them in the country of the other party, he shall be bound to notify that other party of them and of the measures which he has taken to stand in the way of their being carried on.

#### ARTICLE 4.

The two high contracting parties shall appoint special officials in the zones bordering on the frontier, who shall be responsible for organising general co-operation and for carrying out the measures necessary to ensure the application of the provisions of this treaty. The two Governments shall be bound to notify each other of the names of the persons appointed for this purpose.

These officials or whoever represents them shall have the right to intercommunicate for the purpose of co-operation, or in order to settle the questions which occur from time to time on the frontier or between the tribes. They shall be bound to exchange information immediately about any incidents occurring on the side of either one of them which may affect the maintenance of security on the other side.

#### ARTICLE 5.

Whenever the competent authorities appointed under article 4 learn that preparations are being made in their territories by an armed person or armed persons, with the intention of committing acts of robbery or plunder, or raiding, or any other such unlawful act of a nature to disturb the peace on the frontier between the two countries, those authorities must warn each other.

If it appears that the warning sent to the competent authority will not arrive in time for it to be possible to warn those who will be harmed by the attack,

warning must be given in addition to the nearest officer, and in case it is impossible to reach him, to the tribes threatened. In cases of urgent necessity warning may be given by any official acting on behalf of the competent authority of the party in whose country the preparations are taking place.

#### ARTICLE 6.

If the competent authority of either of the two high contracting parties or any person acting on behalf of such authority, learns of the commission within his territories of any act of robbery or plunder or raiding, or any other unlawful act of a nature to disturb the peace on the frontier between the two countries, he shall have the right to notify the competent authority of the other party of this, and in cases of urgent necessity he shall inform the nearest official of that other party. The person so notified shall take the necessary dispositions for the purpose of returning forthwith all the objects stolen and plundered in their entirety from what is taken in the possession of the aggressors in case they enter the territory in which he is employed.

If the aggressors be Bedouin subjects of the country which they have entered, the necessary measures shall be taken to prosecute them in that country. If they be Bedouin subjects of a third party, they shall be invited to leave the country which they have entered under threat of prosecution if they do not leave it. If they be Bedouin subjects to the other party in whose territory the raid has occurred, then, after the return of the loot found in their possession as mentioned in paragraph 1, their arms shall be confiscated and handed over to their Government, and a quantity of their property sufficient to compensate for the losses and damage which they have occasioned as a result of their raid shall also be confiscated and handed over to their Government. They shall then be warned that they must return to their country of origin, and if they do not do so, shall be prevented from remaining on the frontier and shall be prosecuted for the crimes which they have committed. If, after that, their maintaining quiet and tranquillity is assured, they shall be allowed to remain far from the frontier; if not, they shall be expelled from the country in which they have taken refuge.

#### ARTICLE 7.

In order to carry out the provisions of this treaty and to maintain good relations generally on the frontier between the two countries, the officials appointed in pursuance of the provisions of article 4 of this treaty shall meet once in each six months at least and at more frequent intervals in case of necessity to settle questions relating to the frontier zones and to the tribes settled in those zones.

#### ARTICLE 8.

All decisions taken in mutual agreement on the part of the officials appointed in accordance with article 4 on questions which may arise on the frontier or between the tribes shall be recorded in writing and signed by both officials (might equally be "all the officials") at the time of agreement, and shall become immediately effective of action and executory.

Matters on which the officials are unable to agree shall be referred to the Governments of the two high contracting parties for solution by agreement between them. All decisions taken as a result of such agreement shall be executed by the competent authorities within three months of the date on which the final decision is taken.

The operation of article 6 of the Hadda Agreement shall be annulled during the period of validity of this treaty.

#### ARTICLE 9.

The tribes of the two parties which habitually resort to the two sides of the frontier for grazing or musabala shall have the freedom to move about from place to place in the two countries, unless either of the two Governments should find it necessary to limit this freedom of movement for the betterment of public order or for reasons of economic necessity.



Nothing in this article shall affect the maintenance of the established rights defined in article 4 of the Hadda Agreement; similarly, nothing in this article shall disturb the enjoyment of the rights specified in article 13 of the Hadda Agreement in any respect whatsoever or for any reason whatsoever.

#### ARTICLE 10.

Neither of the two high contracting parties shall be allowed to compel subjects of the other party to join any of his armed forces, either regular or irregular.

Neither of the two high contracting parties shall be allowed to permit the subjects of the other party to be employed in his armed forces as from the date of putting into force of this treaty unless they have previously acquired the nationality of the party wishing to employ them and have notified their readiness to abandon their original nationality if this is stipulated in the nationality regulations of their country of origin, with the knowledge that their original Government is free to carry out against them the measures defined in its laws whenever they enter its territories.

The names of persons naturalised and enlisted after the putting into force of this treaty shall be notified by diplomatic means to the Government of their country of origin.

#### ARTICLE 11.

Each of the two high contracting parties undertakes to prevent any of his officials from crossing the frontier between the two countries without the permission of the other party for any reason whatsoever and by any means whatsoever, except for the crossing of frontier officials and messengers for the purpose of maintaining the co-operation defined in articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this treaty.

#### ARTICLE 12.

Subject to observance of the provisions adduced in the Hadda Agreement regarding the movement of tribes, pilgrims and merchants, the two high contracting parties mutually undertake to refuse sanction to foreigners residing in their countries or proceeding from them, or to subjects of the two high contracting parties, to cross the frontier of the country of the other party for the purpose of travel, exploration, hunting or anything else without having obtained previous permission from the competent authority of the party concerned, and shall discourage their intention of doing so. They shall not be responsible for the safety of these persons if they enter without previous permission.

#### ARTICLE 13.

All differences which may occur between the two high contracting parties regarding the interpretation or execution of the provisions of this treaty or of those of any of the other agreements which concern the relations between the two countries shall be, by agreement between them, referred to arbitration, which shall be conducted according to the protocol appended to this treaty.

#### ARTICLE 14.

This treaty has been drawn up in duplicate in the Arabic language. The two high contracting parties shall be bound to ratify it and to exchange instruments of ratification as soon as possible, and it shall become effective as from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification. It shall be valid for a period of five years from that date. If neither of the two high contracting parties gives notice to the other party six months before the expiry of the five years that he wishes to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force and shall not be deemed to have terminated until after six months from the day on which one of the two parties shall have given notice of termination to the other party.

Enclosure 4 in No. 34.

### *Draft Arbitration Protocol.—Text of May 4, 1933.*

#### ARTICLE 1.

THE arbitration shall be conducted by means of two arbitrators, of whom each of the high contracting parties shall select one, under the presidency of a third person to be appointed in the manner set forth in article 3 of this protocol.

#### ARTICLE 2.

If the two high contracting parties have agreed to refer any difference whatsoever to arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of article 14 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed this day, they shall be bound to draw up a joint memorandum on the matters which it is wished to settle by arbitration. A president of the board of arbitration shall then be appointed in accordance with article 3 of this protocol. A copy of the joint memorandum on the matters which it is wished to settle by arbitration shall be forwarded to him, and each party shall be bound to forward to him within a period of not more than one month from the time of his nomination, a memorandum on the arguments in support of his case. Either of the two high contracting parties shall have the right to forward to the president any other memorandum concerning its case at any time within a period of three months from his nomination. Each party shall be bound to forward to the other party any documents which it may forward to the president.

#### ARTICLE 3.

The president of the arbitration board shall be appointed by agreement between the two parties within two months of the date on which it is agreed to refer the case to arbitration.

#### ARTICLE 4.

The president of the arbitration board shall summon the board to meet at a place which he shall select after consultation with the two high contracting parties and on a date which he shall appoint after similar consultation, provided that the period elapsing between his nomination and that date shall be not less than three months and not more than six months. The arbitration board shall give its decision within three months of the above-mentioned date.

#### ARTICLE 5.

The arbitration board shall be free to decide the procedure to be followed, and the two high contracting parties shall undertake to afford it all possible facilities and assistance which it may demand for the performance of its mission.

#### ARTICLE 6.

Each of the two high contracting parties shall have [omitted: "the right"] to appoint one or more persons to expound his point of view on the questions in dispute before the board of arbitration.

#### ARTICLE 7.

The two high contracting parties shall undertake definitely to accept and to carry out the decisions which the arbitrators may issue on the questions referred to them. The arbitrators may, if the matter necessitates it, take a majority decision.

#### ARTICLE 8.

Each of the two Governments shall pay the salaries and expenses of the arbitrator appointed by it, and one-half of the salary and expenses of the president and clerks and such others as the arbitrators may need to assist them.



## ARTICLE 9.

This protocol shall come into force as from the date of exchange of two copies of it ratified by the two high contracting parties. It shall remain in force during the validity of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" concluded on this date between them. The two high contracting parties shall be bound to extend its validity until the delivery of judgment in any cases which may have been submitted to arbitration under it before the end of the validity of that treaty.

Enclosure 5 in No. 34.

*Memorandum on Draft Agreements as Collated on May 4, 1933.*

N.B.—This memorandum has been drawn up very hurriedly to avoid delay. I hope that I have avoided inaccuracy, but I have confined myself to salient points. The cross-references "Amman —" refer to the drafts prepared in Amman in February, which, though subsequently modified somewhat, were the main basis, except as regards part of the Arbitration Protocol, of the drafts submitted by us to the Saudi delegates.

*Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage."*

*Preamble.*—Not discussed in the conference. The suggestion that, if the treaty were between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan only, Ibn Saud should have precedence in all texts was made in private discussion between Fuad Bey and me. I resisted it strenuously and Fuad Bey finally told me in the same private manner that it would not be insisted on.

*Article 1 (Amman 1).*—No difficulty arose except for an academic doubt as to whether the word "permanent" was appropriate in a treaty of limited duration.

*Article 2 (Amman 2).*—Gave rise to great difficulty owing to the insistence of the Saudi delegates on wholly unacceptable suggestions. It was agreed on the 4th May, after the collated draft had been made, to delete the article on the understanding that the question of Saudi representation in Transjordan would be dealt within a diplomatic note to be addressed by me to the Saudi Government.

*Article 3 (Amman 3).*—Paragraph 2 replaces an addition proposed by the Saudi delegates, who wished to provide for notification to the other party in all cases. Colonel Cox thought that it would be dangerous to contract so wide an obligation. His Majesty's Government finally endorsed the High Commissioner's view that it would make for friendly feeling to accept the addition without qualification, but before we received their latest instructions we had secured acceptance of the clause as it now stands.

*Article 4 (Amman 8).*—The displacement of this and other articles was effected in deference to Fuad Bey's view that this would produce a more systematic arrangement. Various minor alterations were agreed upon, notably that extending the right of intercommunication to persons acting on behalf of the special officers.

*Article 5 (Amman 4).*—The present text was the result of close discussion on points of detail, especially in regard to the action to be taken in cases of urgency.

*Article 6 (Amman 5).*—The present text was the result of close and prolonged discussion. It may require a slight drafting amendment to remove a possible ambiguity due to the position in the Arabic text of the words rendered "within his territories." As regards the substance, paragraph 1 aims at establishing the principle that loot seized in the possession of raiders bringing it across the frontier should be returned at once and in full, leaving the question of trial and punishment to be dealt with in due course. Paragraph 2 deals, as regards the nature of the subsequent action, with three categories of raiders. Although the text of the article as a whole is open to criticism from the standpoint of European legal conceptions, it provides a system which should answer the practical conditions on the frontier. The mode of dealing with aggressors subject to the country in which the raid was committed was proposed as a means of getting away from extradition. The provision regarding subjects of third parties is intended to obviate practical difficulties which might arise, if Transjordan undertook to turn back Syrian or Iraqi subjects into Saudi Arabia. The Saudi

delegates did not finally accept the word "Bedouin," which is necessary for reasons of Transjordan law under which the Bedouin Control Board can try any Bedouins, but not others, for offences wherever committed. They were, however, prepared to let it stand subject to suitable provision being made elsewhere, e.g., in rules for the guidance of the special officers that persons taking part in a Bedouin raid should be presumed Bedouin. It was pointed out that this presumption would need some qualification, but the form of words to be used was not finally settled. See 7 in the preliminary draft schedule of rules for special officers, showing how we on our side thought the matter might be dealt with.

*Article 7 (Amman 9)* presented no difficulty in principle, but the Saudi delegates explained that their Government intended to confer the duties of special officers on two Governors in place of the present Inspector of Bedouin (Ibn Zeyd), and expressed a wish to define in a letter the arrangements for meetings. This was agreed to in principle, but the letter was not drafted.

*Article 8 (Amman 10)* was the subject of much discussion, but in its final form it calls for little comment. We made it clear on our side that although we did not insist on an express mention of arbitral decisions in paragraph 2, we regarded it as covering any decisions which might be arrived at in diplomatic discussion or as the result of any arbitration necessitated by the failure of such discussion. We pressed for paragraph 3 in order to remove any possible doubt regarding the already implied supersession of article 6 of Hadda.

*Article 9 (Amman 6).*—We felt on our side that this article did not hang together very well but we preferred to overlook minor discrepancies. In agreeing to the cross-reference to article 13 of Hadda, we explained that we regarded it merely as an affirmation of the validity of that article, without prejudice to the many doubtful points in regard to its interpretation, which we expressed readiness to discuss at another stage, if necessary.

*Article 10 (Amman 7).*—"Armed" was substituted for "military" in paragraph 1 in order to give the clause its proper extension. We deleted the words "in order to aid in the suppression of rebellion," &c., as being an irrational qualification of a restriction obviously intended to be general. Paragraphs 2 and 3 are a compromise evolved to counter an insistent Saudi proposal to debar either side from enlisting subjects of the other. We contested hotly this attempt to alter the whole purpose of the original article. We ourselves suggested, with some hesitation and only for the sake of agreement, the solution embodied in paragraphs 2 and 3. As they now stand they differ only very slightly from a draft prepared by us to meet the Saudi delegates as far as possible.

*Article 11 (Amman 11)* presented little difficulty. We contested an attempt to impart into it a provision that Saudi officers might cross Transjordan without permission on their way to and from Syria, and maintained that this subject, if discussed, must be discussed separately. Colonel Cox and I agreed to write a letter making the principle of the article applicable to officers in British service in Transjordan.

*Article 12 (Amman 12).*—The words "refuse sanction" emerged after much discussion of the Saudi contention that travellers should be prevented from crossing the frontier. We were ready to agree to anything in reason, but we pointed out that an undertaking to prevent all travellers from proceeding could not be carried out in practice, and was open to other objections of a legal nature.

*Amman 13* was omitted altogether, as being non-essential, in view of the difficulty of agreeing on a text.

*Article 13 (Amman 14).*—See the covering despatch as regards the circumstances in which this article was given its present form. Although the intention is clear, I consider the final drafting of the article defective, as it omits a phrase which I understood to have been retained, viz., "(differences) . . . which it has not been possible to settle by diplomatic means." I should like to suggest the inclusion of these words, as a correction of what I believe to have been an accidental omission, in the ultimate text.

*Article 14 (Amman 15 and 16).*—Amman 16 was found to be in part repetitive after Amman 15 had been recast in the form directed by His Majesty's Government. Eventually the two Amman articles were merged in the present text, which combines the still essential part of Amman 16 with an adaptation of article 8 of the Treaty of Jeddah on the lines authorised in the telegraphic correspondence.



*Arbitration Protocol.*

*Preamble.*—Not discussed. See above as regards preamble to Treaty of Friendship, &c.

*Article 1* (Amman 1).—Presented no difficulty.

*Articles 2 to 4* replace Amman 2 to 5.—The covering despatch explains the circumstances in which the principle of arbitration by special agreement on each occasion was substituted for that of arbitration at the option of either party; and in which an intervening proposal to provide for the appointment of a president by a third Power in the event of non-agreement between the parties was discarded. The three articles provide for a sequence of proceedings on lines suggested by the British delegates. There is an error of drafting or collation to be corrected in the last sentence of article 2, which was intended to provide for mutual communication of *duplicates* of documents forwarded to the president.

*Article 5* (Amman 6).—"Possible" was inserted at the request of the Saudi delegates and was accepted by us as being reasonable in itself. It can hardly increase materially the danger of such a refusal of facilities as occurred when Mr. MacDonnell was denied access to Nejd. Whatever the wording dangers of this kind must be anticipated, if there is not goodwill on the Saudi side.

*Article 6* (Amman 7).—The Arabic text needs the addition of the "the right" or some equivalent to make it coherent.

*Article 7* (Amman 8).—Presents no difficulty.

*Article 8* (Amman 9).—The Saudi delegates suggested at first that the losing side should pay the salary of the president, &c. They withdrew this suggestion, which presented obvious difficulty, when it was decided to adopt the principle of arbitration by special agreement.

*Article 9* (Amman 10).—The Saudi delegates were a little sticky about the clause for prolongation of validity to enable pending cases to be disposed of, but the collated text to which they agreed seems to provide for this adequately. In any case the matter is of small importance, once it has been established that each arbitration must be preceded by special agreement.

ANDREW RYAN.

Jedda, May 8, 1933.

Enclosure 6 in No. 34.

*Draft British Note on Saudi Representation in Transjordan.*

Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)

IN the course of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed to-day by the representatives of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, it was agreed to reserve the considerations of article 2 of the draft treaty proposed for discussion on the 24th April as being a matter intimately connected with the relations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Saudi Arabia.

In view of the difficulties which have attended every attempt to reconcile the divergence of views relative to this article, my Government authorised me, with the concurrence of His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, to propose that it should be deleted from the treaty and to embody in a diplomatic note to your Royal Highness the following understanding, namely:—

- (a) That the diplomatic representation of the interests of Saudi Arabia in Transjordan shall be exercised by the diplomatic representation of the former country in the United Kingdom; and
- (b) That the consular interests of Saudi Arabia in Transjordan shall be exercised by a consul, whom the Government of Saudi Arabia shall have the right to appoint at Amman on the understanding that, if such a consul is appointed, the Government of Transjordan shall have the right to appoint a consul at Jedda.

Having assured myself that this solution is agreeable to the Government of Saudi Arabia, I have the honour to address this note to your Royal Highness with a request that you may confirm it in your reply to me.

With highest respects,

Enclosure 7 in No. 34.

*Draft Letter regarding Nationality of Tribes.*

THE discussion relative to the treaties signed to-day between His Highness the Amir of the Amara of Transjordan and His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have revealed the necessity for an understanding as to how the nationality of tribes frequenting the country on both sides of the frontier between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia shall be determined.

In view of the difficulty of arriving at a definite settlement of this question at the present time, the negotiators have agreed that the following provisional rules should be observed for a period of three years from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the treaties signed to-day, on the understanding that six months before the expiration of that period, and independently of any other arrangements for the continuance in force or otherwise of the treaties, the high contracting parties will proceed to an exchange of views as to whether the provisional arrangement should be maintained for a further period or whether any modification is necessary.

(a) The following tribes and their sections shall be regarded as being of Transjordan nationality, without prejudice to any alteration in their juridical status which might result from a final settlement of the question of sovereignty over the Maan Aqaba area:—

Huweytat-ash-Shimal (Ibn Jazi), including the Atun, but excluding Auda-al-Atna and his immediate relatives, *i.e.*, sons, brothers and nephews.

Beni Sakhr.

Sirhan.

Isa.

The following sections of the Imran, *viz.*, Humaidat, Rubaiyin and Debur.

(b) The following tribes and their sections shall be regarded as being of Saudi Arab nationality:—

Huweytat-at-Tihama.

Billi.

Juhaina.

Shammar of Nejd.

Imran, with the exception of the three sections named above.

All other tribes whose Diras lie to the south of these.

(c) Any member of the Sherarat concerned in an incident which makes it necessary to determine his nationality shall be deemed to be of the nationality of the country in which he and his family were encamped at the time of the incident, or immediately previous to it in the case of a rapid continuous movement from one territory to the other, *e.g.*, a raid.

(d) The Beni Atiya shall be regarded as being of Saudi nationality in the case of those who entered Saudi Arabia in the last three months of the year 1932 and any others not included in a nominal list of those permanently established in Transjordan, which list will be forwarded to the Saudi Government within two months of the date of this letter.

(e) Any dispute as to the application of these rules shall be discussed in the first instance between the special officers appointed under article 3 (a) of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed to-day. In the event of their failing to agree, the dispute will be dealt with in the manner provided in article 5 (c) of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed to-day.

I have the honour to request that your Royal Highness will confirm the acceptance by your Government of the provisional arrangement set forth above, which I accept on behalf of the Government of Transjordan.

Enclosure 8 in No. 34.

[Translation of Preliminary Draft of Schedule of Rules for Guidance of Frontier Officers: Not printed.]



[E 2839/902/25]

No. 35.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 30.)*

(No. 134.)

Jedda, May 9, 1933.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for April 1933.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 35.

JEDDA REPORT FOR APRIL 1933.

## I.—Internal Affairs.

53. Ibn Saud was in Mecca, busy with the pilgrimage, from the 1st April until early on the 15th April, when he came to Jedda. He stayed until the 20th April at the Khuzam Palace at Nuzla, a mile outside the town. This is a new house just built by Abdullah Suleyman, who already had a bungalow near by, ostensibly for his own use. It is not clear whether he retains rights in it, but it appears to have now definitely become the Royal residence in Jedda. It is a house of some pretension, having at least two fine rooms and a good terrace roof, but in its present hardly completed state it produces the effect of poor workmanship in details. It is in open surroundings commanding a good distant view of the sea and is well placed as regards climate conditions, but it is infested with flies and the approach from the town is bad.

54. The King received the foreign representatives in a series of formal audiences on the morning of his arrival. The subsequent business audiences included one given to Sir Andrew Ryan on the 17th April, when a general discussion took place in connexion with the impending Saudi-Transjordan negotiations. Sir Andrew Ryan, wishing to prepare the King for the probability of a necessary division of the negotiations into two stages, emphasised the difficulty of certain questions which would arise. The King made light of difficulties. He suggested that, as the Transjordan delegates proper would have the backing of a British representative in Transjordan, the Minister in Jedda should back his own delegates.

55. Ibn Saud appeared to be in good health, but he seemed tired and preoccupied during his audiences.

56. The King's speech at his pilgrimage banquet on the 31st March, as reported (it is believed fairly accurately) in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 6th April, abounded in the usual pious texts and exhortations to Islamic unity, but he was more careful than on some previous occasions to avoid language likely to give offence to Moslems of non-Wahhabi convictions. Speaking with reference to the idea that he might aspire to the Caliphate over all Islam, he disclaimed any such pretension on the ground that a Caliph must be able to enforce the commands of the Islamic religion over the whole Islamic world, a thing which no man living at the present time was in a position to do.

57. The Amir Feisal came to Jedda on the 24th April. He received the Transjordan mission that morning and gave a large dinner-party stark with Jedda notables, in their honour that evening. He dined next evening at the British Legation. He took no other overt part in the affairs of the mission and returned to Mecca on the 27th April.

58. There has been a lull in the various activities directed towards economic development. The following summary shows the position during the month in

regard to the projects, &c., mentioned in the two previous reports, paragraphs 15 and 34:—

(a) Nothing more was heard of the progress of the arrangements to give effect to the National Bank concession. All may be well, but the silence of the ex-Khedive's agent has created some little doubt in high Saudi circles.

(b) A still deeper silence has brooded over the Mecca-Jedda railway project.

(c) The negotiations for an oil concession in Hasa had still produced no definite result by the 30th April. The representatives of the Iraq Petroleum Company remained in Jedda throughout the month, but did not seem to make any headway. Mr. Hamilton, of Standard Oil of California, returned from a conference with colleagues in Egypt on the 9th April, and has probably made progress towards an agreement on lines similar to, but not so favourable to the Government as, those for which the Minister of Finance was standing out. Major Holmes, of the Eastern and General Syndicate, arrived in the same steamer as Mr. Hamilton. It appears to be true that he came by invitation of the Saudi Government in the sense that he had himself elicited the invitation and had been given it in the hope of enlarging the field of competition. He left precipitately on the 12th April having seen the Minister of Finance, but not the King. The extensive and peculiar nature of his interests probably proved an embarrassment to him. As a moving spirit in the Eastern and General Syndicate he is a rover in the world of oil, but in Bahrein he is tied to Standard Oil of California and he is co-interested in Koweit with a separate American concern belonging to the Mellon group, viz., the Eastern Gulf Oil Company. He seems to have come to Jedda with only one avowed object, that of getting Ibn Saud's consent, so far as the Saudi Government are concerned, to a concession in the Koweit neutral zone. He had promised Standard Oil of California not to poach on their preserves in Hasa, but would appear to have had ideas of his own, nevertheless, as to how that field might ultimately be partitioned. It seems fairly certain that he left Jedda with two fleas in his ear, one inserted by the Minister of Finance, the other by Mr. Hamilton.

(d) The Hyderabad textile industry scheme has not so far produced visible results at the Hejazi end, nor has anything more been heard of financial help from the Nizam.

59. A communiqué published on the 8th April announced that henceforward motor vehicles of one type only, not specified, would be allowed to be imported into the Hejaz. There is a close connexion between this and a scheme for standardising all motor transport and giving a monopoly of import to a single person or firm. The hottest competitor for this monopoly is Mr. Philby, who by the end of the month thought he had as good as got it. Stripped of various details the plan is that Mr. Philby or his company should import Ford cars only, to be sold to the Government on credit terms, secured on a fixed share in the receipts of the Naqaba, i.e., the existing Government organisation in charge of the arrangements for transporting pilgrims. The monopoly would include a monopoly for the importation of tyres, not confined to one make, and perhaps other accessories. If he gets it Mr. Philby will have to find capital to finance the purchases from the Ford Company, who have become very shy of themselves selling cars on credit in this country.

60. The Saudi Government have at last taken final delivery of the wireless stations supplied by the Marconi Company. The last remaining station, that at Riyadh, was completed some time ago, but the authorities were very dilatory in facing up to an acknowledgment that the company had fulfilled all their obligations.

61. There was no definite news of further trouble in Asir in April, although there were rumours in Jedda and Mecca that the Government were anxious. It seems to be true that further troops were sent to Asir, but these may have merely gone to relieve others. It is intended, following on the arrangement regarding the Idrisi recorded in paragraph 66 below, to organise the part of Asir in which he had his being as an ordinary Saudi province to be called Asir Tihama, with a local Governor under a Governor-General or Viceroy at Abha.

[9177]



62. The Director of Police at Jedda was retransferred to his former post at Rabigh in April, and was replaced by one Khalil Bey, Director of Police at Medina, who had held the post at Jedda two years previously. The removal of the late director may have been partly due to the affair mentioned in paragraph 43 of the last report and certain other grievances of the Legation against him, which had not given rise to official action when they occurred, but were ventilated in connexion with the incident of the 4th March. The new man is known to the Legation and not unfavourably.

### II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

63. The arrangements for the mutual recognition of each other by Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah were completed according to plan on the 1st April. The two rulers exchanged friendly telegrams, as had been arranged, next day. This cleared the road for the initiation of treaty negotiations between the two Governments with the participation of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. A mission from Transjordan arrived in Jedda on the 22nd April. It consisted of Colonel Cox, the British Resident at Amman, who was associated as a British representative with His Majesty's Minister at Jedda; and Taufiq Bey Abdul-Huda, chief secretary to the Transjordan Government as representative of the Amir Abdullah; with Captain Glubb as expert. The mission was received with great distinction. Its members, and Mrs. Cox, were entertained as Government guests at the Kandara villa. Formal negotiations began on the 23rd April and proceeded actively, in a fairly favourable atmosphere during the rest of the month. A summary account of them and of their partial success but temporary failure to produce signed treaty texts will be given in the next report.

64. There was no news of trouble on the Saudi Arabia-Transjordan frontier during April. The only incident worth recording is the arrival at Mecca in the company of the Amir of Tebuk, of one Karayim-bin-Atiya, whom the Transjordan authorities had decided, in the interests of the Saudi Government, to put out of harm's way in Palestine. After successfully playing a double game, this man made his peace with the Saudi authorities and now seems to be in high favour, all the higher because of the yarns he has spun about the inducements held out to him in Transjordan to work against Ibn Saud.

65. The Iraqi representative scored a partial success during April in his negotiations regarding the properties of the Hashimite family in the Hejaz, a subject which interests His Majesty's Government as one affecting the personal interests of the Amir Abdullah, but in which they are unwilling to involve themselves officially. The position was discussed during the conference between Sir Andrew Ryan, Colonel Cox, Taufiq Bey and the Iraqi representative. It was agreed that the former should not intervene for the time being beyond intimating privately to Fuad Bey that he would welcome a settlement and had heard with pleasure that the prospects were good.

66. The question between Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen regarding the disposal of the Idrisi was settled late in March or early in April by the consent of the former to an arrangement that Hasan-al-Idrisi should remain in the Yemen under the Imam's supervision and should receive a pension from the Saudi Government. It was hoped, on the Saudi side, that other refugees, including Hasan's brother, Abdul-Wahhab, would return under amnesty to Saudi Arabia, but this hope is not known to have been fulfilled. The rumours of trouble in Asir, mentioned in paragraph 61, have had their counterpart in rumours of military preparations under sons of the Imam on the Yemeni side. There has been no confirmation of these reports; nor have there been any serious signs of fresh danger to peace between the two Sovereigns. Indeed, in April, Ibn Saud appeared to contemplate the despatch of yet another mission to Sana to discuss outstanding questions.

### III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

67. There is little of interest to record under this heading. The pilgrimage and the predominant importance of the negotiations in regard to relations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan prevented any important subjects other than the latter from being pursued between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government. The French Chargé d'Affaires has been almost invisible, but is said to have taken a strong line on behalf of the lady mentioned in paragraph 72 below.

The Netherlands representative has been kept busy, despite the smallness of this year's pilgrimage from Java, by arrangements for the repatriation of over 2,000 destitutes, who have been accumulating for some time past and are now being sent home at the joint cost of private contributors to a charitable fund and the Government of the Dutch East Indies. The Persian Chargé left Jedda, with his usual joy in terminating his short spells there, on the 25th April. Afghanistan has been in evidence owing to the large percentage of Afghans in a small overseas pilgrimage and the presence among them of several diplomats beside the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs. An Afghan consulate has been established in principle in Jedda, and it was announced on the 14th April that Silahuddin Khan Saljuqi had obtained a Saudi exequatur with effect from the 11th April. This gentleman is also consul at Bombay, and the present intention seems to be merely to detail him for work at Jedda during the pilgrimage season. He arrived on the 16th March and left for India on the 25th April.

### IV.—Miscellaneous.

68. Sir Andrew Ryan cleared up with Fuad Bey on the 1st April the affair of the visit of H.M.S. *Penzance* to the Farsan Islands, which, it proved on a review of previous correspondence, ought either not to have taken place or ought to have been notified to the Saudi Government. The latter seem to be contemplating the adoption of general regulations for the visits of foreign warships to other ports. Meanwhile, the Farsan Islands' affair cast no shadow over the visit of *Penzance* to Jedda from the 1st to 8th April. Several of her Somali ratings made the pilgrimage.

69. The Imperial Airways *Hanno*, one of the large aeroplanes used for the Indian service, made a forced landing near Jubail, after having lost its way in thick weather, on the 31st March and got into difficulties in the sand. It was fortunately possible to inform the Saudi Government without delay and their subsequent remonstrance was comparatively mild, but the incident has drawn attention to the difficulty of avoiding at least occasional flying over and even landings of a kind which they resent as being violations of territory. The local authorities behaved well and helped to extricate the *Hanno* from its predicament without awaiting instructions, so that she reached Bahrein safely on the 1st April.

70. Mr. A. S. Calvert arrived in Jedda on the 22nd April and took up his duties as head of the Chancery of the Legation, in succession to Mr. Hope Gill.

71. Lady Evelyn Cobbold returned from the Mecca pilgrimage on the 7th April, exhausted, and not having met Ibn Saud, but happy in the illusion that she was the first European of her sex to accomplish the pilgrimage. She left for England on the 9th April. A certain relief was perceptible in various quarters, but it was doubtless due to ignorance only that a local paper transformed her name into "the Lady Zeynab Awful Bubble."

72. Lady Evelyn had a potential rival in the person of a Frenchwoman with a singular past in Syria, who had conceived the idea of getting to Mecca and obtaining copy for a book by marrying *ad hoc* a Nejdî sojourner in Syria. The couple were foiled by French authorities in Syria, but were united, it is said, by a Qadhi at Haifa. When they got to Jedda the husband was unable to get permission for the lady to go to Mecca. Shortly afterwards he died in Jedda, in circumstances which convinced the Saudi authorities that she had poisoned him. Meanwhile the lady had contracted an intimacy with the handsome but ne'er-do-well son of the French Chargé d'Affaires. This young man has been wafted away, but at the end of the month the lady was still in durance pending a decision as to whether she should be put to death or merely deported.

73. The following table shows the estimated number of pilgrims from overseas, the only countries sending more than 1,000 being shown separately:—

Indians (British India) ...	7,040
Dutch East Indies ...	2,415
French North Africa ...	1,284
Egypt ...	1,621
Afghanistan ...	2,403
Bokhara ...	1,204
Others ...	4,059
Total ...	20,026



74. Thus the overseas pilgrimage, despite the increase in certain contingents like those from Afghanistan and Bokhara, justified the gloomiest anticipations. It is not known how many overland pilgrims went to swell the grand total at Arafat, but it is doubtful whether they brought it up to more than 40,000. There were comparatively few from the Yemen, which has sent numerous pilgrims in recent years.

75. The climatic conditions were good and the sanitary state of the pilgrimage was excellent. The Saudi authorities had no difficulty in declaring it clean. The Legation was satisfied after making its own enquiries that this declaration could be accepted and that south-bound ships need not be required to call at Kamaran. Special precautions were, however, taken to ensure as far as possible that all pilgrims embarked had been vaccinated for small-pox within a reasonable past period. The Alexandria Quarantine Board also declared the pilgrimage clean on the 17th April after the first examination of pilgrims returning northward at Tor.

76. The regatta for pilgrimage ships held annually during the pilgrimage season took place on the 6th April. It was successful, but the number of the entries for some of the events was small.

77. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves in April was as follows:—

On hand at beginning of the month: None.  
Took refuge in April: Four males.  
Manumitted in April and repatriated: None.  
Locally manumitted: None.  
On hand at the end of the month: Four males.

[E 2844/487/25]

No. 36.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 31.)*

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, May 30, 1933.

MY telegram No. 65.

The Iraq Petroleum Company representative left here suddenly for London 24th May. Hasa Concession has been secured by the Standard Oil Company, California, through their local representative. The agreement confirming this concession will not be published until it has been ratified by both sides.

[E 3133/234/25]

No. 37.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 14.)*

(No. 147.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 20, 1933.

SINCE I wrote my despatch No. 331 of the 2nd August last incidental reference only has been made in reports from this Legation to M. van Leeuwen, the Dutch expert who entered the service of the Saudi Government in April 1932 as financial adviser. I have now to record his final departure from Jedda on the 18th May.

2. M. van Leeuwen returned from sick leave in or about October last. This leave interrupted what was to have been a year of continuous service, to be followed by a period of leave on full pay before his contract finally expired. I believe it was agreed that he should draw no salary for the period of his absence last year, and should make up for the time lost by serving for an additional three months at the end of the year originally contemplated.

3. Unfortunately M. van Leeuwen's health has continued to be precarious. He has had several bouts of illness during the spring, and this has been the immediate cause of his leaving for good. It must be attributed in part, however, to the hopelessness of his position in the Administration here. I do not think that he has at any time been allowed to do more than write academic reports, and it has been increasingly evident of late that he could play no effective rôle in a department dominated by the personality and methods of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman.

4. Things were not improved by M. van Leeuwen's condemnation of the National Bank scheme projected by the ex-Khediye and his associates. By the time this was launched he had lost patience to such an extent that he abandoned his previous attitude of discretion and expressed his adverse opinion to outsiders like myself. Saudi circles were very ready to think that his hostility to the scheme was due to apprehension lest it should damage the position of the Netherlands Trading Society, which is, as you know, the only organised bank here and in which he was formerly employed. The suspicion may have been increased by the fact that, for reasons of health, he had gone to stay indefinitely with the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires.

5. It was to be foreseen that no adviser could reorganise the finances of this country in a year, least of all in a year so inauspicious as one beginning in April 1932, when they were already in a desperate condition and the whole world as well was in a mess. It is, however, lamentable that M. van Leeuwen, of whose capacity I cannot judge, but who was an honest and industrious man, should not have had a chance of doing anything at all. He had no axe to grind, and I do not think that the Netherlands authorities made any attempt to use him for their own purposes. The Dutch Chargé d'Affaires has assured me that since he presented M. van Leeuwen to the King he has scrupulously refrained from meddling in his affairs, and has not seen his reports. I believe this to be true, and I shall be all the sorrier for M. Adriaanse if, as is possible, he has to concern himself with the final settlement of account between the Saudi Government and their late adviser.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3297/2514/25]

No. 38.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 21.)*

(No. 155.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 23, 1933.

IN my telegram No. 95 of the 13th May I had the honour to inform you of the publication of an official communiqué relative to the designation of Ibn Saud's eldest surviving son as heir to the Saudi Throne, a step which was decided on in principle, when Ibn Saud's dominions were declared to be a single kingdom, but which has evidently needed much preparation in various quarters.

2. The procedure followed has turned primarily and essentially on the acceptance of an oath of fealty in a form known as Baya. This oath was drawn up on the 11th May and subscribed to in the first instance by the Amir Feisal as President of the Council, certain religious dignitaries, the members of the Council of Ministers and the members of the Legislative Council. I enclose a translation of the material part of this document,<sup>(1)</sup> following on a pious exordium. It was presented to the King who approved of it. The communiqué, issued the same day and published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 12th May, intimated that the necessary further ceremonial would take place on the 15th May. An elaborate programme of the ceremonial was drawn up and circulated.

3. The ceremonies in Mecca on the 15th May were staged impressively in all respects, except for the absence of Hamlet. The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia sat in Riyadh, while his brother Feisal received the Baya on his behalf. At 8 A.M. the latter repaired to the Great Mosque, where, surrounded by high personages and delegations from Medina, Jedda and Taif, he attended the preliminary prayers. A salute in honour of the King was fired, and the Amir proceeded to receive the general Baya in an adjoining hall by shaking hands with each of a numerous concourse of people. After this he held a reception at the headquarters of the Government to receive congratulations, the offerers of which were regaled with refreshing drinks. After the afternoon prayer congratulations were offered to the King. The Amir Feisal gave a banquet in the evening. On the 17th May he and a number of princes, including his younger uncles, two of his brothers, a cousin and three of his nephews left for Riyadh to convey the Baya to the Amir Saud and to offer their own homage. They were accompanied by a delegation composed of three members of the Legislative Council.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

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4. On the same day, the 15th May, the local Governors in the Hejazi towns received the Baya of the leading inhabitants in a manner similar to that observed by the Amir Feisal at Mecca. There would appear to have been no corresponding ceremonial in Nejd pending the arrival of the Amir Feisal. The whole procedure presents peculiarities, which probably represent the resultant of conflicting principles. It has been very expressly linked up with the decree of the 18th September, 1932, which, when declaring the union of Saudi Arabia, provided *inter alia* that the existing Council of Ministers, acting with other persons at the discretion of the President, should prepare a rule of succession to the throne to be submitted for the King's assent. The only documentary Baya so far would appear to be that signed on the 11th May by the members of the Council of Ministers and others. This was duly submitted on the same day to the King and it might be thought that his approval completed the designation of the Amir Saud as heir. It was obviously thought either politic or necessary, however, to obtain the acceptance of the nomination by a much wider circle on the 15th May. Even now it would appear that strictly speaking only the people of the Hejaz have publicly sworn or endorsed the Baya. On the 13th May the King sent a long telegram to the Amir Saud, full of pious exhortations, to which the Amir replied next day with equal piety and at even greater length. Both King and heir are all for Islam in this correspondence, but its most interesting feature, in the present connexion, is a passage near the end of the King's telegram, echoed in the Amir's reply. It was, "People will perform the Baya to you in the Hejaz on Monday. Your brother Feisal will accept the Baya on your behalf. He as well as the members of the family will go to your side to convey to you the Baya of the people of the Hejaz, and in order to perform the Baya with you on their own behalf."

5. All these proceedings and others of a minor nature which I have not mentioned doubtless kept statesmen in Mecca very busy. It was not until the 18th May that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs addressed a communication to the foreign representatives, which took the form of a third person note, forwarding the text of the first communiqué. Before I had got off the congratulations authorised in your telegram No. 62 of the 16th May, I received a further communication, a translation<sup>(1)</sup> of which I enclose, together with a copy of my reply.<sup>(2)</sup> It may be of interest to add that the Soviet Minister was present at the ceremonies in Mecca; and that my Dutch colleague, who rushed in with congratulations on seeing the first communiqué in the press, received a reply in which the Amir Saud spoke of his desire to devote himself to the interests of Moslems and Arabs, but said nothing about foreign relations.

6. I have dealt somewhat minutely with certain legal aspects of the designation of the heir apparent, not only because of their constitutional interest, but also because there is a political side to the anxiety shown to commit the people of the Hejaz to acceptance of the measure, independently of the steps which have certainly been taken in Nejd to ensure the consent of theologians there and tribal chiefs. Much erudition might be expended on the historical traditions which have been followed. I will not trouble you with any long disquisition on a subject for which my knowledge does not suffice, but it may be of interest to add short notes on three questions, viz.:—

- (a) Whether it is in accordance with the strictest Islamic doctrine that a ruler should designate his heir during his lifetime;
- (b) whether an heir, if selected, can properly receive Baya before the rulership falls vacant; and
- (c) whether Baya is in its essence a religious act or even an act appropriate only to a successor to the Caliphate or Imamate of Islam.

7. As regards (a), I understand that there is ample precedent for the designation of a future heir, even though it be admitted that in pure theory his accession must be ratified by some form of election or acceptance when it takes place. Indeed, as you are aware, many Moslem dynasties have been and are carried on in accordance with rules difficult to distinguish from rules of succession of the kind common in Europe. I cannot resist the comment that, so far as I know, the first well-authenticated designation of an heir, or at any rate of a relative as heir, was when the Caliph Muawiya, that Muawiya who lifted his hand against the Hashimites, provided for the succession of his son Yazid.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

8. As regards (b), I believe that there are precedents for this also. I think Mr. Philby told me, before he left, that there had been at least one in the history of the House of Saud. However alien to our own conceptions it may be that fealty should be sworn to one who remains a subject, this procedure has an undoubted significance for Moslems, as the oath is binding from the moment it is taken and entails strong sanctions, which may be summed up by saying that any subsequent violation makes the violator an outlaw and the shedding of his blood lawful.

9. As regards (c), there is no doubt that, however much Islamic countries may have adopted in practice European ideas of State organisation and sovereignty, there is always an underlying theory that temporal power is in principle the concomitant of a religious position. It is already suggested that in the present case Ibn Saud aims at perpetuating a religious position, which in Nejd counts for more than his kingship, and which is comparable to, though not described as, a Caliphate. As against this, you will note that the present Baya has express reference to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Even the Imam of the Wahhabis has to adapt himself to practical conditions, and what Ibn Saud has done has been to endeavour to consolidate his régime in that kingdom, perhaps with an eye on its possible extension to all Arabs, but hardly to all Islam. He has not, you will observe, gone to the length of establishing a general rule of succession. He has merely provided for the first succession after his death, or, it might be, abdication.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

P.S.—I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Cairo, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire and to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden.

A. Y.

[E 3298/1492/25]

No. 39.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 156.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 26, 1933.

I AM reporting in a separate despatch on the commercial position in regard to the wireless installation supplied to the Saudi Government by the Marconi Company in 1931-32. As there has been some confusion in earlier reports, ending with Mr. Hope Gill's printed despatch No. 70 of the 3rd March, as to the distribution of the wireless stations now in operation in this country, I take the opportunity of giving an up-to-date statement. The previous confusion has been due to departures from the plan made in 1931 and to a certain amount of transference of the older sets which were already in existence when the Marconi contract was concluded. Even now it is difficult to obtain exact information on all points, but I believe the list given in the following paragraph to be as accurate as possible subject to the observations in the subsequent paragraphs. It is based on the Saudi Government's list enclosed in Mr. Hope Gill's despatch No. 70 of the 3rd March, on a list which appeared almost simultaneously in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 24th February and on information from other sources.

2. The following is my consolidated list:—

*New Marconi Stations—*

- 6 kilowatt: Mecca and Riyadh.
- $\frac{1}{2}$  kilowatt, fixed: Buraida, Hail, Hasa (Hofuf), Jedda, Jubail, Qaf (Qariyat), Qatif and Tabuk.
- $\frac{1}{2}$  kilowatt, mobile: Uqayr, Dawadmi, Taif and one set to accompany the King.

*Other stations*, provided with old Telefunken sets, available for telegraphy only, with the exception of one old Marconi set:—

- Abha, Al-Ula, (?) Dhaba, Jizan, Lith, Medina, Qunfida, Rabigh,
- (?) Sabya, Skaka (Jauf), Wejh and Yanbu.

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3. The above list accounts for all the sets provided for in the Marconi contract, with the exception of one  $\frac{1}{2}$  kilowatt fixed set. Mr. Philby tells me that this was erected at Riyadh before the large station was built and that it is still there.

4. Mr. Philby also states that the set at Uqayr has been dismantled from its lorry and thereby converted into a fixed set. The station at Dawadmi takes the place of that which was contemplated at Shaara. Dawadmi is, according to the *Handbook of Arabia*, 409 miles from Mecca on the road to Riyadh and 15 miles beyond Shaara.

5. In the list of older sets, I have marked Dhaba and Sabya as doubtful. The former is included in the list enclosed in Mr. Hope Gill's despatch No. 70 of the 3rd March, but not in the list published at the same time in the *Umm-al-Qura*. The former list makes no mention of Sabya, but it is included in the *Umm-al-Qura* list.

6. The *Umm-al-Qura* list shows Lith as having a station available both for telegraphy and telephony. This is probably the one old Marconi set, as Lith is known to have been supplied from Qunfida, which was formerly credited with a set of this type. There is, however, some obscurity as to the rearrangement since 1930 of the pre-existing stations.

7. Mr. Philby tells me that the station at Jizan was put out of action during the rebellion in Asir last winter. He speaks of it as requiring a new engine, but my own impression is that it must have been already repaired, as Jizan is a crucial point.

8. I have no information as to the whereabouts of the two portable sets (Marconi) which were presented to Ibn Saud by Sir Francis Humphrys on behalf of His Majesty's Government in April 1931.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Palestine, to the Governor-General of the Sudan, Khartoum, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire and to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3303/233/25]

No. 40.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 21.)*

(No. 161.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 30, 1933.

IN my despatch No. 131 of the 8th May, I furnished a general report on the progress made in connexion with the treaty negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan up to the 5th May, the day of the departure of the Transjordan mission. It will be useful now to supplement this by sending you a shorter but comprehensive account of my conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza since that date.

2. I enclose copies of two memoranda<sup>(1)</sup> showing the principal points that emerged from my meetings with Fuad Bey on the 13th, 20th and 27th May. The second of these memoranda is not necessarily in final form, as, owing to the technical and delicate character of some of the matters discussed, I thought it as well to ask Fuad Bey whether he concurred in my record of our conversation of the 27th May. If it should require substantial alteration I will inform you and the Acting High Commissioner by telegraph, but I do not think this will be necessary.

3. You will see that considerable progress has been made towards an understanding of principle on various points which have been considered in connexion with the treaty settlement. I still do not know what other points Fuad Bey may have to raise (see paragraphs 18 ff. of my despatch No. 131 of the 8th May), but his general attitude encourages me to hope that they will give no great trouble. Indeed, if we were nearer a complete solution of the thorny question of tribal nationality, I would be fairly confident of our being able to go to Jerusalem in the second half of July with an assured prospect of seeing the treaty, &c., signed.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

4. I enclose a translation of the draft letter regarding arrangements for meetings of special officers, which Fuad Bey handed to me on the 27th May. I propose to discuss this draft with him at our next meeting.

5. As regards the proposed schedule of rules for special officers to be attached to the treaty, you will see that three outstanding points are "wisaa," claims in connexion with past raids, and "dia." As His Majesty's Government themselves deprecated the principle of "wisaa," better known to them as retaliatory confiscation, a couple of years ago, I presume that this will present little difficulty. Fuad Bey freely admitted that no live-stock which had changed hands in the period covered by Mr. MacDonnell's award could be deemed as Araif. I think he will accept the same principle if, when the treaty is signed, it is agreed to cancel all claims in respect of raids from the 1st August, 1930, up to date. I hinted to Fuad Bey that we had in mind some attempt to dispose of these claims, but I did not go into details. As regards "dia," I can form no opinion on the acceptability of Fuad Bey's proposal in connexion therewith.

6. I propose to address to the Acting High Commissioner a separate despatch regarding the operation of article 13 of the Hadda Agreement, but you will see from the record of my meeting with Fuad Bey of the 27th May that we have eliminated this subject from the framework of the text now contemplated.

7. I enclose a draft note regarding the crossing of the Saudi frontier by officers in the British service in Transjordan. I sent this draft to Fuad Bey on the 28th May. I have not yet had his views upon it.

8. I trust that His Majesty's Government will feel able to agree to the reservation attached by Ibn Saud to his acceptance of the principle that the British note guaranteeing the fulfilment of their treaty obligations by the Amir and Government of Transjordan shall not be published as part of the treaty settlement. I consider that the King has behaved handsomely in not holding His Majesty's Government to publication, and I doubt whether the contingency in which he says he would be free to publish it is very likely to arise.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosures to the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan, Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 40.

*Proposed Draft Letter annexed to the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage" between the Saudi Arab Kingdom and Transjordan.*

(Translation.)

WITH reference to article 4 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage," which we have signed to-day, I have the honour to inform you of the following:—

*Firstly:* The special officials nominated by the Government of His Majesty the King at present for the purpose of organising the general co-operation in the zones neighbouring the frontiers between our respective countries are:—

- (a) Amir of Tabuk in cases relating to the area of the two Amaras of Tabuk and Dheba.
- (b) Amir of Qarayyat in cases relating to the area of Wadi Sirhan.
- (c) Or any other official properly authorised by the two above-mentioned Amirs.

*Secondly:* The above-mentioned officials will be in a position to make use of the two wireless stations of Tabuk and Qarayyat in sending and receiving the wireless messages which may be necessary to exchange between them and the official or officials who will be authorised by your Government to perform the reciprocal undertakings.

*Thirdly:* The meeting provided for in article 7 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage" will be held at each time in the place to be agreed upon between the officials concerned. My Government see no objection to the first meeting being held at Qarayyat-al-Melh.

*Fourthly:* It is not necessary that both of the two Amirs of Tabuk and Qarayyat should attend every meeting, and either of them can act on behalf of the other for settlement of cases relating to him.



I shall be grateful if you will be good enough to inform me that you have taken note of the above-mentioned, and to furnish me with the names of the officials and the wireless stations appointed by your Government for the same purposes.

Mecca, May 27, 1933.

Enclosure 2 in No. 40.

*Proposed Draft of Note to be addressed by His Majesty's High Commissioner or by Sir Andrew Ryan to the Saudi Plenipotentiary on the date of Signature of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon Voisinage" between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan.*

Your Excellency,  
(After compliments.)

WITH reference to article (11) of the Treaty of Friendship signed this day between His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, I have the honour to state, under instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, that they agree that the rule laid down in that article shall apply equally to officers in Transjordan in the employment of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

[E 3385/1332/91]

No. 41.

*Treaty of Friendship between the Government of the Yemen and the Government of the Netherlands.—(Communicated by His Majesty's Legation, The Hague, June 14, 1933; Received in Foreign Office, June 24.)*

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the King of the Yemen, Imam Yahya-bin-al-Imam Mohammad-bin-Yahya Hamid-ed-Din, and Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, being desirous of establishing ties of friendship between their Governments and to base their mutual relations on the foundation of the general international usages, have resolved to conclude a treaty of friendship, and have for this purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of the Yemen:

M. Qadi Mohammed Raghib-bin-Efiq.

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands:

M. C. Adriaanse, Her Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

Who in mutual agreement have drawn up the following articles:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

There shall prevail inviolable peace and pure friendship between the Kingdom of the Yemen and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as also between the subjects of the two parties.

#### ARTICLE 2.

The two high contracting parties shall establish diplomatic and consular relations between each other at the time which they shall appoint to that end.

The diplomatic and consular representatives of the one party shall then enjoy in the territory of the other party a treatment on the footing of the relevant principles in force internationally.

#### ARTICLE 3.

The subjects of each of the two high contracting parties who desire to carry on trade in the territory of the other party shall be subject to the local ordinances and laws, and shall in every respect enjoy the same treatment as the subjects of the most favoured nation.

The ships of each of the two contracting parties and their cargoes shall also, in the ports of the other party, enjoy in every respect the same treatment as the ships of the most favoured nation and their cargoes.

#### ARTICLE 4.

The produce of the soil and the industrial products of the one contracting party shall, on importation into the territory of the other party, be treated as regards import duties and all incidental charges and the manner of imposition like those of the most favoured nation.

Similarly, when produce of the soil and industrial products are exported from the territory of the one contracting party with as their destination the territory of the other party, these goods shall be treated, as regards export duties and all incidental charges and the manner of imposition, like produce of the soil and industrial products destined for the most favoured third country.

#### ARTICLE 5.

This treaty has been drawn up in the Arabic and Dutch languages.

In case of doubt regarding the interpretation of any provision of the present treaty, both parties shall use the Arabic text of the present treaty exclusively.

As those parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands which are situated outside Europe have laws and ordinances which on certain points deviate from those in force for the Realm in Europe, it has been agreed between the two contracting parties that the present treaty shall, as regards the Kingdom of the Netherlands, only apply to that part of the kingdom which is situated in Europe.

The ratification and the exchange of the acts of ratification shall take place as soon as possible.

The present treaty shall enter into force immediately after the exchange of the acts of ratification.

It has been concluded for the period of five years counting from the date on which the acts of ratification shall have been exchanged.

If one of the two contracting parties wishes to terminate the operation of the treaty after the aforesaid period, it shall give notice thereof to the other party six months before the expiration of that period. If this has not been done, the treaty shall continue to have effect after such expiration, namely, until the termination of six months after one of the contracting parties has given to the other contracting party notice of its wish that the treaty shall cease to have effect.

In witness whereof the present treaty has been signed by the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries of the two parties, and they have affixed their seals thereunto.

Done at San A'Yemen, the 15th Zighadeh, 1351, corresponding to the 12th March, 1933.

[E 3469/902/25]

No. 42.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 28.)*

(No. 169.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 5, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for May 1933.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.



Enclosure in No. 42.

*Jedda Report for May 1933.*

I.—*Internal Affairs.*

78. Ibn Saud spent the month in Mecca. He came to Jedda on the 3rd May for two days and the intervening night, and received the Transjordan mission on the morning of his arrival.

79. The Amir Feisal remained in Mecca until the 17th May, when he left with other princes, &c., for Riyadh (see paragraph 81). He returned to Mecca on the 28th May. Fuad Bey Hamza returned to Mecca on the day of the Transjordan mission's departure, but has since adhered faithfully to his rule of attending the Jedda branch of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs once a week. The Iraqi jurist Muwaffaq-al-Alusi, who entered Ibn Saud's service last November, was appointed legal adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, quarrelled with Fuad Bey, and became counsellor to the King at Riyadh, left apparently for good in May.

80. The most important event of the month was the designation of the King's eldest surviving son as Heir Apparent to the throne. This has clearly required much preparation in the royal family, tribal circles and other *milieus*, since the date of the decree of the 18th September, 1932, which unified the kingdom and provided, *inter alia*, for arrangements to be made for the succession. The procedure followed would appear to be the resultant of much study of historical precedents and perhaps of some conflict of principles. Its essential feature was the swearing of a baya or oath of fealty, which assumed definite form on the 11th May, when the oath, in documentary form, was signed by the Amir Feisal as President of the Council, the members of that Council and certain other dignitaries, religious and civil. It received the King's assent the same day, and was confirmed by the people of the Hejaz on the 15th May, when the Amir Feisal and local Governors received the baya of all and sundry persons of any notability. The Heir Apparent himself was not present at Mecca.

81. On the 17th May the Amir Feisal, with a number of junior princes and certain other delegates, left for Riyadh to deliver the documents containing the Hejazi baya and take part in a further ceremonial there. This took place on the 22nd May, and was generally similar to that in Mecca a week before. It was noted as of special importance that the Amir Muhammad, the King's slightly elder or somewhat younger brother, was the first to perform the baya. Among the others present were the head of the Araif branch of the family and the Amirs of the House of Rashid. The only important royalty not present was the King's second brother, the Amir Abdullah, who, however, wrote a loyal letter excusing himself on the ground that the King had ordered him to stay behind. The ceremonial included the reading of a letter from the King to his heir amplifying the injunctions and advice which he had already addressed to him by telegraph.

82. Nothing further was heard in Jedda during May of the progress of the National Bank and Mecca-Jedda Railway schemes. The battle for the Hasa petroleum concession ended in the last week of the month. The representatives of the Iraq Petroleum Company left Jedda at a moment's notice on the 24th May. On the 29th May Mr. Hamilton, the representative of the Standard Oil Company of California, signed an agreement with the Minister of Finance, subject to ratification by both sides. No definite information is available regarding the text, which is not to be published until after ratification, but it is stated that the company have agreed to pay a lump sum of £50,000 gold at the outset, a tidy price for rights the value of which is admitted to be still entirely problematical.

83. Mr. Philby, acting expressly on behalf of Sharqieh (Limited), secured, early in the month, the contract foreshadowed in paragraph 59 of the last report. He left on the 18th May for Egypt and England, to make financial and other arrangements. The first part of a summary of the contract published on the 26th May confirms generally the forecast in the last report. The contract is for ten years. As the published summary had not been completed by the 31st May, further particulars are reserved for the next report.

84. A communiqué published on the 12th May regarding this agreement modified the communiqué mentioned in paragraph 59 of the last report to the extent of authorising the importation by individuals of cars of any make for their private use, but a clause in the agreement with Sharqieh prohibits their being plied for hire.

85. The Saudi Government brought into force, on the 4th May, a new customs tariff, which was published on the following day. Its most notable feature is the introduction of specific duties per unit on a large range of staple commodities, including food-stuffs, piece-goods, sugar and petroleum products. *Ad valorem* duties, at rates which, in nearly all cases, show a heavy increase, are retained for a limited number of commodities, the most important of which are motor vehicles, perfumes, silk, raw and manufactured cotton and metal goods. Various small surtaxes levied previously have been suppressed. It is difficult, in a market so ill-equipped and so inarticulate, to judge of the effect of the new tariff as a whole, but such estimates as can be made point to an increase, in most cases heavy, practically all along the line. This may be offset to some small extent by the advantage of having to pay duties of known amount in most cases instead of having them assessed on the results of ignorant and perhaps dishonest valuation.

86. Although the financial situation of the Saudi Government continues to be precarious, money appears to be available to meet current obligations, as opposed to the old debts, payment of which was postponed for a year last November. The Directorate-General of Posts and Telegraphs performed, early in May, the *tour de force* of remitting to the Eastern Telegraph Company a sum more than sufficient to cover the balance due on cable account at the end of April. Backwardness in effecting the contractual monthly settlement has hitherto been a constant cause of complaint. Official salaries are being paid as to one-third in cash and one-third in commodity, the remaining third being apparently held over.

87. The Dutch financial adviser, whom the Saudi Government engaged for one year early in 1932, left Jedda for good on the 18th May, having accomplished nothing during his two sojourns in the Hejaz and having greatly suffered in health. There is no room for a European financial adviser in a country the finances of which are run on his own lines by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman.

88. There has been no known change in the situation in Asir since paragraph 61 of the last report was written. Two officials of some importance were despatched to that province late in May on a tour of inspection of customs, &c. One of these, Sayyid Hashim, is known as a confidential agent of the King for certain purposes, and it is suggested that the real object of his mission is to assess the state of tribal feeling. Ibn Musaid, Governor of Hail, who was sent to Asir during the rebellion and remained to reorganise the country, has reached Bisha on his return journey, having it is said, completed his task.

II.—*Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.*

89. The negotiations for a treaty settlement between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan (see paragraph 63 of the last report) were pursued actively in Jedda from the 23rd April to the 4th May inclusive. The main basis of discussion was three drafts of a Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage," an Arbitration Protocol and an Extradition Treaty modelled with necessary alterations on the similar agreements concluded between Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1931. It was realised that certain other matters would have to be provided for in ancillary texts, notably the question of a working arrangement for the determination of tribal nationality, arrangements of detail for the collaboration of frontier officers and the notes to be exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government in fulfilment of the promise given by the former to accept responsibility for the performance of obligations entered into by the Amir Abdullah and his Government.

90. It became evident in the course of the negotiations that it would be impossible to negotiate an Extradition Treaty containing the safeguards considered essential by His Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government in regard to political offences and judicial procedure. The Saudi delegates eventually agreed to postpone such a treaty indefinitely. This cleared the way



for the practical completion of the draft Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" and a draft Arbitration Protocol. Ibn Saud appeared anxious that these instruments should be signed before the Transjordan mission left. So much progress was made on the 3rd May, after his arrival in Jedda that morning, that it looked in the evening as though this might be accomplished. By next morning, however, the Saudi Government had decided to go slow, and it was agreed to postpone the proceedings, in accordance with the agreement reached in the earlier diplomatic discussions that if the conference could not reach a final result in Jedda it should be resumed later in Jerusalem. The mission left on the 5th May.

91. The atmosphere of the conference was excellent. The Saudi delegates mastered successfully on the whole their natural tendency towards meticulousness over minor details. They used various devices to try and emphasise the inferior status which they attribute to the Amir Abdullah, but yielded to firm resistance on the other side to anything in the nature of a formal recognition of inequality between the parties. Since the departure of the mission friendly conversations have taken place between His Majesty's Minister and Fuad Bey with a view to so reducing the number of contentious questions still outstanding as to ensure the success of the second stage of the negotiations, which it has been agreed to hold in the latter part of July, if possible. This should be feasible, subject to an agreement of some sort, which may have to reserve a small number of specially difficult cases, in regard to tribal nationality. The greatest difficulty arises over the Sirhan tribe, who have long been settled in Transjordan, but have certain rights of property in the Wadi Sirhan and frequent a part of it for winter grazing. Their grazing rights have recently been interfered with by the Governor of Qaf, and their rights of property may be endangered if a settlement cannot be reached.

92. No raids were reported from the frontier during May. The Saudi Government complained of the killing of a man earlier in the year by a Transjordanian police patrol. The incident was already known to the Legation, which returned an immediate interim reply to the effect that the man had lost his life after attacking the patrol in a ravine.

93. Relations between Iraq and Saudia Arabia appear to be normal. The question of Hashimite properties (paragraph 65 of last report) is not so advanced as the acting Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires seemed to hope in April. This and the failure of the Saudi Government to send a representative to Bagdad were among the more important Iraqi grievances set forth in the Bagdad *Saut-al-Iraq* of the 19th April, and reproduced with a conciliatory rejoinder in the Mecca *Umm-al-Qura* of the 15th May. Rushaid Pasha, who was appointed Saudi Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Bagdad in 1931, but never proceeded, has now been made Saudi consul in Damascus. A new appointment to Bagdad was made in May, the person chosen being Ibrahim-bin-Muammer, who has held the posts of head of Divan to the King and the Amir Saud. It was announced in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 26th May that representatives of Saudi Arabia and Iraq were to meet at Jauf to discuss various outstanding frontier incidents.

94. The agreement between the Saudi and Iraqi Governments regarding the motor-route from Nejef to Medina (see paragraph 5 of the January report) is said to have been completed, but details are not yet available.

95. Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen continue to play their diplomatic game, despite all rumours of tension and frontier trouble. Nothing further was heard in May about Hasan-al-Idrisi, nor of the final arrangements in regard to his more important brother, Abdul-Wahhab (paragraph 66 of last report). The latest news in May was that Ibn Saud had sent three officials from Jizan to Sana to negotiate a Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage." The members of the mission are Khalid-al-Qarqani and Hamad Suleiman, who were sent to Asir in November to patch up a settlement there, but arrived too late, and Turki-al-Madhi, Inspector-General in Asir. The official announcement in the *Umm-al-Qura* was accompanied by an unofficial explanation, in reply to Yemeni criticism, of why the Saudi Government had published the letter mentioned in paragraph 21 of the report for February, and how they had come, owing to mutilation in telegraphic transmission, to omit a passage in which the Imam apparently made his consent to new negotiations conditional on their including a settlement of the frontier. This may give rise to difficulty, as the Saudi view is that the frontier has already been settled in principle and that only some sort of delimitation is needed, whereas the Imam may have pretensions to slices of Asir.

96. After full consideration of the difficulties which have been created by attempts to escape payment of transit dues at Bahrein on goods for Saudi Arabia and which culminated in the affair mentioned in paragraph 362 of the report for November-December, His Majesty's Government decided to take up the position that the concession made to Ibn Saud in 1920 was unilateral and terminable, but that, as Bahrein and the mainland had a common interest in the trade, the situation might usefully be reviewed in the light of changed conditions at a meeting between Saudi and Bahrein representatives to be held at Bahrein with the participation of the British political agent. It was suggested that the delegates of this meeting should prepare terms of agreement *ad referendum*. The views of His Majesty's Government were set forth in a note addressed by His Majesty's Minister to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th May. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on the 21st May. The Saudi Government did not contest the statement that the concession of 1920 was unilateral and terminable, but said that the incident of last November had caused them to arrange for direct transport to Ras Tanura, where port facilities had been arranged. They added that they did not wish to limit the freedom of Bahrein as regards transit dues, provided that those charged on goods for Saudi Arabia were not higher than those on goods for other destinations. This reply necessitates a further study of the whole question.

97. The contest in Jedda for the Hasa petroleum concession and the incursion of Major Holmes in April (paragraph 57 (c) of the last report) have helped to bring into prominence the possibility of secret direct negotiations between the Sheikh of Koweit and Ibn Saud in regard to oil and possibly other matters. It is known that the sheikh received messages in February through a confidential agent of Ibn Saud, and he made two mysterious journeys into Nejd soon after with a party which included Major Holmes's Arab Jackal. It is suggested that he met some high personage, possibly Ibn Saud himself. The speculations which this has suggested to the Political Agent are of great interest, but it would be premature to pursue the subject in this report. In the meantime there has been no relaxation of the Saudi embargo on trade with Koweit, and Ibn Saud has emphasised his adverse attitude by again allowing the Mutair tribe to obtain supplies in Iraq.

### III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

98. There is even less to record than there was last month. The Saudi Government have accepted an invitation to attend the World Economic Conference and have appointed their Minister in London to represent them. The foreign missions in Jedda have not been as a whole very active. The British Legation has been mainly busy with Transjordan affairs and the winding-up of the pilgrimage. The Soviet Minister has been trying to put his trade arrangement (see paragraph 23 of the report for February) on a firmer basis. The Acting Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires has always something on hand (see paragraphs 93 and 94 above). The Netherlands Legation has nearly finished repatriating its destitutes and the Chargé went on leave on the 18th May. The Italian Minister and the Turkish Chargé were aching to follow him on the 2nd June.

99. Yet another European Power has awoken to interest in Saudi Arabia. It was announced on the 19th May that the Czechoslovakian consul in Jerusalem had forwarded papers through the Saudi consul in Damascus and had been accepted as consul for Jedda.

### IV.—Miscellaneous.

100. The Italian cruiser *Libia* called at Jedda on the 6th May on her way to Italy from the Far East and left on the 8th May. There appears to be no reason to attach political significance to this visit, but the presence of so large a warship in the roads of Jedda is unusual, and the suggestion that she came to this port by arrangement with the Saudi Government to take water and supplies is singular. There were no spectacular demonstrations.

101. The Frenchwoman mentioned in paragraph 72 of the last report languished in a police cell throughout the month, sustained with victuals and Vichy water from the French consulate. It is understood that the police enquiry was terminated and that she would be put on trial before the Qadhi. The Saudi authorities are thought to be embarrassed between jealousy of their sovereign



rights and fear lest the condemnation on a murder charge of a European woman however much a Nejd by marriage, should outrage foreign opinion. The affair will almost certainly end in the woman's deportation. If she were condemned, the execution of a woman would be repugnant to Moslem ideas, and it is by no means universally believed that she did, in fact, poison her husband. A way out may be afforded by the application of a theory, which would be convenient on the present occasion, however distressing it may be for persons in the married state, that in Moslem law there can be no conviction for such an offence unless two persons have witnessed the administration of the poison; and, adds Mr. Philby, two persons who knew it to be poison.

102. Captain H. C. Armstrong, the author of *Grey Wolf*, was on his way to Jedda on the 31st May, by appointment with Ibn Saud, to collect material for an account of His Majesty. It was doubtful whether the King would consent to this project, and he drew the line at allowing his would-be biographer to stalk him to Riyadh, but the Saudi passion for propaganda seems to have triumphed over any fears that Fuad Bey Hamza's perusal of *Grey Wolf* may have inspired. It is not known whether measures have been taken to guard against a strong and modern handling of the King's love affairs.

103. Jedda grows very hot and sticky, and there was a considerable exodus of foreigners in May.

104. The disposal of this year's pilgrimage was almost complete by the end of May. The total number embarked for India up to the 31st May was 9,791; for Malaya, about 102. There have been the usual troubles in connexion with destitutes. One hundred and ninety-nine Indian pilgrims of this kind were shipped on the 23rd May, and there was reason to fear that a good many more would come forward. A small but vociferous band of thirty-one destitute Palestinians and Transjordanians proved a considerable nuisance, but were well in the way of final disposal at the end of the month. The repatriation of other destitute British pilgrims presented less difficulty this year.

105. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves in May was as follows:—

On hand at beginning of month: 3 males.  
Took refuge in May: 4 males.  
Manumitted in May and repatriated: 1 male.  
Locally manumitted: Nil.  
On hand at the end of the month: 6 males.

In two cases the local authorities brought up accusations of theft by the late owners. This always creates difficulty as the charges may be true and cannot be ignored, but they may sometimes be trumped up to impede the action of the Legation. The question of the disposal of slaves who have to be repatriated and are not clearly repatriable to the Sudan continues to create occasional difficulty.

[E 3472/2514/25]

No. 43.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 172.)  
Sir,

Jedda, June 5, 1933.

SINCE I wrote my despatch No. 155 of the 23rd May, the local press has published a mass of further articles, &c., regarding the designation of the Amir Saud as heir apparent. The Amir Feisal's party arrived at Riyadh on the 21st May, and there was a banquet that evening. The ceremonial of the Baya was fixed for next day. The heir apparent had on his right his uncle Muhammad, the King's eldest brother, who was already in Riyadh. With him were numerous other princes, including Saud-bin-Abdul-Aziz, the head of the Araif branch of the Royal family, and the Amirs of the House of Fashid. On the other side were the religious and civil dignitaries. The preliminaries included the reading of the King's telegram to his heir and a further letter brought by the mission from Mecca. There followed addresses in prose and verse, culminating in a speech by the Amir Muhammad, who was the first to perform the Baya by shaking hands. He was followed by a string of religious and princely personages. The Amir Saud expressed his thanks and proceeded to receive the Baya of the general company. No express mention is made of the presence of tribal sheikhs. I need

not trouble you with particulars of the subsequent banquets given by the Amir Muhammad and others. The delegates from Mecca left Riyadh on the 24th May and got back to Mecca on the 28th May.

2. In describing these preceedings, the *Umm-al-Qura* emphasises the importance of the rôle played by the King's brother Muhammad, and the fact that he was the first to perform the Baya. Incidentally, it describes him, contrary to the general opinion that he is slightly older than Ibn Saud, as being two years younger. The paper adds that it is disclosing no secret in saying that the Amir Muhammad had a considerable hand in the designation of the heir.

3. I may observe in this connexion that the only leading member of the Royal family, other than the King, who was not present at the ceremonial at Riyadh, was the King's second brother, the Amir Abdullah. The *Umm-al-Qura* publishes a most loyal letter from this prince to the Amir Saud. He excuses his non-attendance on the ground that the King had denied him permission to go, as he had wished to do, and explicitly tenders the Baya by letter. His absence is, nevertheless, somewhat curious. Both the Amir Muhammad and the Amir Abdullah, who is several years younger, have been credited in the past with ambitious natures, and there was a time when Muhammad was thought to be critical of the King, if only on religious grounds. It is worth noting that in a recent conversation with me about the designation of the heir apparent, Mr. Philby said that Muhammad was a man of no political ambition and was wrapped up in religion, but hinted that the ambition of Abdullah was something which had to be reckoned with. I stress these facts because they may be important if Ibn Saud should vacate the throne in any near future.

4. Had Polonius been a Wahhabi, he could not have improved on the King's letter to the heir apparent, except by shortening it. The published version is far too long to reproduce, but I cull the following points from the mass of injunctions, texts, &c., contained in it:—

- (a) The King pays a tribute to the people of the Hejaz, of whose sincerity and loyalty he was sure, but whose expression of it excelled his expectations.
- (b) Of the people of Nejd, His Majesty says that he has written to them, granting their request in regard to the succession.
- (c) His Majesty reminds the prince that the Al Saud have attained their position not by their own might, but by the grace of God, who bestowed it because of their belief in the Tawhid, i.e., His unity.
- (d) He enjoins resoluteness on his heir and reminds him of the causes of the decay of the Abbasids, who made friends with their enemies and held aloof from their friends, only to find themselves in the latter end attacked by the one and abandoned by the other.
- (e) He inculcates respect for the aged of all classes, warning his son not to neglect them or to turn them away for minor faults, not affecting religion or the sovereign power.
- (f) There should, says the King, lapsing into unconscious imitation of Cromwell, be a garrison in every place, composed of tried and trusty men, and they should be treated justly in accordance with the Sharia.
- (g) His Majesty enjoins respect for the Ulema, who are like stars adorning the sky, guiding the travellers and warning devils away; but he draws a somewhat pointed distinction between those Ulema who shine both in knowledge and council and those who have knowledge only and whose opinions are not necessarily to be followed.
- (h) The King enjoins the closest attention to foreign affairs and the policies and intentions of other Governments. He emphasises the fact that the relations of States are based on exchange of benefits and interdependence of interests. The policy of each foreign country should be studied in order to determine its attitude towards that of which it will be the prince's task to promote the welfare and to undertake the defence against enemies. News of the intentions of other countries must be carefully sifted and not judged with reference to selfish desires. "Beware," says His Majesty, "of statements made to you in the apparent form of advice, while inwardly something else is meant." The prince's policy towards other Governments should be based, both outwardly and inwardly, on friendship and peace. The King reminds his heir of his duties towards all Moslems and Arabs.



5. The Amir Saud's reply to this long epistle is commendably short and presents no special features of interest.

6. In its general commentary on the doings of the two great Mondays in Mecca and Riyadh, the *Umm-al-Qura* emphasises the evils of dissension in Islam in the past. It quotes the late Syed Ameer Ali's references to the time when four rival leaders flew their standards at Arafat, and draws a further moral from a three-cornered contest for the Caliphate in the time of the Abbasids. It is the duty of the Arabs, the writer says, to do their utmost to avoid disputes and mistakes. He commends the decision of the King in regard to the succession, which was taken with these considerations in view.

7. The designation of the heir apparent is being celebrated, according to the last *Umm-al-Qura*, by the issue of special postage stamps. They are not yet on sale.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Jerusalem, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

## CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

[E 6256/15/89]

No. 44.

*Sir John Simon to Mr. Atherton.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 4, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have had under their consideration the memorandum which Mr. Cox left at the Foreign Office on the 12th September in regard to the agreement of the 31st October, 1931, between His Majesty's Government and the French Government concerning the frontiers of Syria and the Jebel Druze on the one hand and Transjordan on the other.

2. The view of the United States Government appears, from that memorandum, to be that the frontier settlement incorporated in the Anglo-French Agreement of the 31st October, 1931, involved on the part of Transjordan a change in the previously existing frontier and, consequently, a cession of some territory previously within Transjordan, as well as the acquisition of territory not previously part of Transjordan; that an alteration in the area of the mandated territory is to be deemed to be a modification of the terms of the mandate, and thus to come within the provisions of article 7 of the Anglo-United States Convention of the 3rd December, 1924; and that it is, consequently, legally inapplicable to the United States and its nationals until the United States Government shall have assented thereto.

3. His Majesty's Government note with appreciation from Mr. Cox's letter of the 12th September that the United States Government have no desire to be obstructive in the matter of the new frontier between Syria and Transjordan and will probably have no occasion to raise objections to the frontier settlement when officially informed of its nature.

4. His Majesty's Government, for their part, do not propose to embark on a discussion of the views contained in the memorandum of the 12th September, since, without prejudice to the question whether this step is legally necessary, they are fully prepared to invite the United States Government to consent to the modified frontier and, indeed, they desire to take this occasion to do so.

5. The frontier between the British and French mandated territories in the Middle East was laid down in the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, a convention concluded before the date of the mandate for Palestine. For various reasons it proved impossible to delimit or adopt in practice the line between Syria and Transjordan as therein defined. In 1931, however, His Majesty's Government and the French Government agreed, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, upon a modified line to be delimited upon the ground by a commission such as is provided for in article 2 of the 1920 convention. This agreement was embodied in a protocol, signed by the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and by the High Commissioner for Iraq, who had been entrusted by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with the conduct of these negotiations, on the 31st October, 1931. This protocol was in due course submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by His Majesty's Government and the French Government. The slight modifications which the protocol introduced into the frontier, as laid down in the 1920 convention, were, in the words of the *rapporteur* to the Council of the League of Nations, "inspired by the desire not to disturb the populations in the exercise of their rights and customs, to increase security by facilitating administration, and to ensure, in the present and in the future, the security of the vital communications between Iraq and Transjordan towards the Mediterranean." The agreement was approved by the Council of the League on the 30th January last, as one which the Council had "every reason to believe to be in the interests of the populations under mandate."

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6. Copies of the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920,<sup>(1)</sup> and of the protocol of the 31st October, 1931,<sup>(2)</sup> to which reference has been made above, are enclosed herein.

I have, &c.  
JOHN SIMON.

(1) Cmd. 1195.

(2) Part XXIX, No. 77, Annex A to Enclosure 2.

[E 162/120/89]

No. 45.

*Vice-Consul Napier to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 9, 1933.)*

(No. 80.)

Sir,

*Damascus, December 15, 1932.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, in view of misleading reports and rumours regarding M. Ponsot's activities at Geneva, the local press published, on the 13th instant, an official communiqué setting forth the correct version of the High Commissioner's declarations to the Mandates Commission, and I enclose herewith an extract therefrom, which relates specifically to the Syrian Republic.

2. To those who had fondly believed that the signing of a treaty, followed immediately by the formal admission of Syria to the League of Nations, was to be a matter of a few months, this announcement naturally came as a great disappointment. This has found expression in several meetings of secondary electors in the various constituencies of Damascus manifesting their dissatisfaction with the attitude and activities of their own nominees to Parliament. The latter are therefore finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile their latest policy with the exigencies of those who elected them.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

A. N. W. NAPIER.

Enclosure in No. 45.

*Extract from Official Communiqué.*

*L'Activité du Haut-Commissaire à Genève.*

En ce qui concerne la Syrie, M. Ponsot, après avoir rendu compte à la commission de la mise en vigueur du statut organique, des conditions actuelles de fonctionnement des institutions parlementaires à Damas et de l'impression résultant de ses premiers contacts avec un Gouvernement syrien en état de responsabilité constitutionnelle, a marqué l'intention du Gouvernement français de favoriser, par la conclusion d'un traité, l'évolution de la Syrie vers l'indépendance et la souveraineté au sein de la Société des Nations, conformément aux prévisions de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et compte tenu du rapport de la commission au Conseil sur les conditions générales à prévoir avant qu'il puisse être mis fin au régime de mandat dans un pays placé sous ce régime.

En conclusion de cet exposé, M. Ponsot a fait part à la commission de son projet d'aborder, dès son retour à Damas, la double tâche de définir dès maintenant par voie de traité la situation telle qu'elle se présentera au terme du mandat et de préciser dans le même temps le programme et la progression des institutions actuelles dans les divers domaines où la collaboration active et confiante du Gouvernement syrien et de la Puissance mandataire est encore nécessaire pour réaliser, soit dans le plan intérieur, soit dans le plan international, les conditions générales requises au terme du rapport susvisé.

[E 296/296/89]

No. 46.

*Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 16.)*

(No. 62.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 13, 1933.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 53 of the 11th January, relative to the representations made by the United States Government to His Majesty's Government regarding the recently concluded Syria-Transjordan Frontier Agreement, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the French Government's reply to the similar representations addressed to them, which has been communicated to me privately by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

TYRRELL.

Enclosure in No. 46.

*French Government to the United States Embassy (Paris).*

PAR une note du 1<sup>er</sup> septembre dernier, l'Ambassade des Etats-Unis a bien voulu exposer au Ministère des Affaires étrangères les raisons pour lesquelles son Gouvernement estime nécessaire que l'Accord franco-britannique du 31 octobre 1931 concernant la Délimitation de la Frontière entre la Syrie et le Djebel Druze d'une part, et la Transjordanie d'autre part, soit soumis à son agrément.

En réponse à cette communication, le Ministère a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Ambassade que le Gouvernement français note avec satisfaction que la détermination de la frontière entre la Syrie et le Djebel Druze d'une part, la Transjordanie de l'autre, telle qu'elle résulte de l'accord précité, ne soulèvera probablement pas d'objections de la part du Gouvernement américain.

Le Gouvernement de la République ne voit pas d'inconvénients à demander au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'agréer ce tracé d'une frontière qui n'avait jamais été jusqu'alors abordée, sans toutefois préjuger en rien par cette demande la question juridique de savoir s'il s'agit en l'espèce d'une modification des termes du mandat qui devrait recevoir l'assentiment préalable des Etats-Unis, selon l'article 6 de la convention du 4 avril 1924, pour pouvoir être opposable au Gouvernement et aux citoyens américains.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères joint à la présente note :

1. Copies certifiées conformes de la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre 1920 et du Protocole du 31 octobre 1931;<sup>(1)</sup>

2. Les exemplaires certifiés conformes des cinq cartes annexées au protocole précité.<sup>(2)</sup>

(1) Not printed.

(2) Not reproduced.

[E 705/120/89]

No. 47.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 4.)*

(No. 9.)

Sir,

*Beirut, January 25, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, as part of the programme of reforms and economies in the Lebanese Administration, which is now being carried out by M. Charles Debbas, a number of inspectors-general, in two grades, with monthly salaries of £S. 170 and £S. 163, respectively, have been created. The existing Directorate of Economic Services has been suppressed. This branch will henceforth be attached to the Directorate of Agriculture, but in charge of an inspector-general (second grade). The Land Department ("Services fonciers") also ceases to exist as a separate directorate. It remains attached to the Finance Directorate under an inspector-general. Henceforth, closer supervision and control of the inspectors of the Finance Directorate will be achieved by placing them in charge of a special inspector-general.

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2. The theory that in future there will be only seven directorates, viz., Interior, Finance, Public Health, Justice, Public Works, Education and Agriculture, seems a likely one. Rumour has it that when the promised reform of the Constitution takes place there will be only one Minister, known, perhaps, as Administrative Director. It seems not unreasonable to believe that in a minute State like the Lebanon, its head, with an assistant and a number of departmental chiefs, could comfortably administer the country, without any need of the costly paraphernalia of Parliament and Cabinet imposed by M. de Jouvenel. However that may be, reforms are presumably in preparation. M. Ponsot, who returned on the 6th January, is still here, and is not expected to leave for Damascus until the beginning of February.

I have, &c.  
H. E. SATOW.

[E 1144/842/89]

No. 48.

*Consul Monck-Mason to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 28, 1933.)*

(No. 54. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Aleppo, December 20, 1932.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 47 of the 10th November, I have the honour to report that I recently made a tour by motor car of nine days' duration in the easterly part of this consular district, places visited being Deir-ez-Zor, Bessireh, Salameh, Hassetché, Kameshlié, Derik, Ain Diwar and Ras-el-Ain. I was accompanied, as in November 1929, by my clerk, Mr. Nasri Dallal.

2. The first 100 kilom. of road, that is, for 10 kilom. past Neskéné, are now metalled and in first-class condition. The road then goes over undulating hills for about 15 kilom., and on this stretch the track has been much improved—in places it is now a "piste cylindrée," and the worst horrors of this part have been mitigated by bridges and culverts. In the plain on the other side of the hills, from Dibsi to Abou Hérera for 25 kilom., the track has been completely made, elevated above the clayey soil of the flat; all culverts, &c., being completed; it has as yet received no ballast, for lack of funds. It may be noted that this stretch in the plain is the worst in rainy weather. From Abou Hérera the track over the desert (28 kilom.) until Caracol Hammam, the nature of the track remains practically unchanged since 1929, and it is, perhaps, still too early to reckon on being able to travel on this section in rainy weather. It may be said, however, that even the worst part of the road between Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor is passable forty-eight hours after rain, and light (Ford) cars can and do get through within twenty-four hours. From a point a little to the other side of Caracol Hammam to Rakka, the track, formerly rather bumpy, has been flattened out, while between Rakka and Deir-ez-Zor, 140 kilom., the road is metalled, though the surface is far from being as good as, and is narrower than, the first 100 kilom. out of Aleppo.

3. I gather that there is no present intention of proceeding further with the metalling of the track and, except during the rains, the time taken for the journey has now been lowered almost to a minimum, being now reduced from seven and a half hours to about six. The 350 kilom. have been done in five and a half hours. The safety of the road, from a driver's point of view, has been increased by the liberal provision of signposts warning against sudden turnings and abrupt changes of level, but there is no means of communication on the way, except for a telephone at Deir Hafir, 55 kilom. from Aleppo, where one may speak with Aleppo, and the wireless telegraph station at Rakka, to reach which 10 kilom. of track have to be traversed, and the Euphrates crossed by ferry.

4. The amenities of Deir-ez-Zor are more numerous than in 1929. For this various factors are responsible. The building of the bridge over the Euphrates brought into temporary residence at Deir-ez-Zor a number of foreign engineers, technicians and artisans with cultural needs which the desert town was unaccustomed to supply, and there is no doubt that it has done the natives good to rub shoulders with civilisation not of the military kind, though the irreducible xenophobia of the Bedouin become sedentary is hard to eradicate. The new bridge has brought a great increase of traffic to Deir-ez-Zor, but, so far from this proving an advantage to the town, Deir-ez-Zor has lost ground at the

expense of Hassetché and Kameshlich. The service of this bridge, which is so narrow as to permit of one-way traffic only, is not well organised. Tests have proved the bridge able to carry a vastly greater amount of traffic than it does at present, and it is confidently expected that it can withstand any flood.

5. Roads in the town are better, and its approaches are no longer either unusually dusty (or muddy) or full of holes. A scheme for a boulevard along the banks of the Euphrates, where there are many cafés, was under consideration during my visit, and has since then been carried into execution. An enterprising Armenian runs a daily motor-bus service between Deir-ez-Zor and Kameshlich at rates to suit the pocket of the natives. There is a silent cinema, the electric current for which lights also a number of cafés on the river bank. The electric lighting of the town will shortly be put up to adjudication. The American medical mission has moved from a native house in the main street to new buildings, which include excellent living quarters and a handsome clinic; a hospital is going up. The school founded in 1930 by the Capuchin monks (the monastery was built on land given by the municipality) has made little or no headway and is regarded with hostile feelings. Nuns of the same order have recently made their appearance and are building a convent.

6. There is little building going on, and the lack of a good hotel is as much felt as ever, while the single restaurant which existed in 1929 has disappeared.

7. Colonel Goudouneix, who was sent as assistant delegate to Deir-ez-Zor on the 21st October, 1931, at his own request, was formerly at the presidency of the French Republic at Paris. He is an able man of charming personality, who works in complete agreement with the mutessarif, Bahig Bey-el-Khatib (appointed in June 1932, he is an ex-Minister of Finance), who is an energetic Moslem of about 42 years of age, educated in France and francophile, and liked by both the Moslem and the Christian elements. This collaboration has already resulted in credits being allowed for (a) asphaltting of roads in the vicinity of the town; (b) drainage works; (c) a town electric lighting scheme; (d) plantation of trees on the banks of the Euphrates.

8. Colonel Goudouneix is sociable, which his predecessor, General Callais, was not. Though his house is quite unsuitable for the representative of France, he has done much to make it habitable, having installed a modern bathroom and made as good a garden as circumstances permit. The ban on the residence at Deir-ez-Zor of the wives of French officers and soldiers has been raised. There is no reason why it should ever have existed, since the town is not unhealthy, in spite of the torrid heat, and there is an excellent American doctor. With Dr. Hudson, who is practically the sole representative of civilian social life, the delegate is on excellent terms, whereas General Callais would have nothing to do with him (or anyone else). Colonel Goudouneix realises that it is only the Christians, in the long run, who can exercise a really civilising influence on the native. The Christians have, however, diminished in numbers since 1929.

9. Colonel Goudouneix is conscious of the fact that he is badly staffed administratively. He took little pains to conceal his contempt for his civil assistant, M. Trenga—who I understand is not a man of very savoury reputation—while M. Delmas, at the head of the Public Security Department, was, until not very long ago, a waiter in a Beirut restaurant. M. Trenga has now left, as has Commandant Müller, Bedouin Control Officer, who, though possessing an encyclopaedic knowledge of the Bedu, was acquiring too much power. As regards the Deir-ez-Zor Special Services Officers, whom I desired to visit, Colonel Goudouneix told me that they were "pas intéressants." Be that as it may, I was given to understand by other informants that the population found it easier to deal with the assistant delegate than with these arrogant young men.

10. Since the 15th October, 1930, the State Bank ("Banque de Syrie et du Grand-Liban") have established an agency at Deir-ez-Zor at the request of the Syrian Government and the French military authorities. The Turkish gold pound and silver medjidieh are still current in the Euphrates districts, but Syrian paper is slowly gaining ground, as even the most ignorant are beginning to realise that it is backed by the French currency.

11. On the whole Deir-ez-Zor seems to have suffered less than many parts of Syria from the financial crisis, though the sheep, cattle, wool and butter season has been nothing less than disastrous. The reason for this is that the Moslem merchant of Deir-ez-Zor is conservative and no speculator. The scourge of the country is still usury, the usual rate of interest charged being about 30 per cent.



The Syrian Agricultural Bank helps by advancing money to the peasants at 7 per cent., but in the nature of things credits so provided are very small.

12. The creation, on the 9th September, 1930, of the new Sanjak of the Jezireh has not resulted, as was expected, in the appointment of a new assistant delegate. Conditions are hardly ripe for this, and the seat of the Government of the new sanjak is still at Deir-ez-Zor.

13. The shortest route between Deir-ez-Zor and Hassetché is still across the desert for 100 kilom., the last 50 kilom. following the River Khabour. The track is as bad as ever, though warning posts have now made it less dangerous. I understand that it would be an easy matter to straighten the line between Hassetché and the river, gaining half an hour and avoiding a very bad piece of track. The whole of this section is bare, except for one tent village near the Khabour.

#### *Hassetché.*

14. This little township has developed greatly since 1929. The mutessarif is Nessib Bey El Ayoubi, a Damascene, who does not like the French, though he conciliates them. He enjoys little authority, as the inhabitants, predominantly Christian, are in the habit of appealing to the French political officer. There is a Court of First Instance, with appeal to Deir-ez-Zor. Whereas in 1929 the post was commanded by a captain and the political officer was a lieutenant, there are now a colonel and a captain, both being well lodged in new European houses. There is also a fine Government building.

15. The town, which has a population of 6,000, predominantly Christian, but not by any means Armenian, is well planned, and there is a sufficiency of schools and churches; it is progressing rapidly. A large experimental garden, producing all the native vegetables in abundance, in charge of an Assyrian sergeant in the Syrian Legion, has shown what can be done by irrigation. Christians are encouraged to join the Syrian Legion by the grant of a plot of land and materials for house building. Indeed, a prominent feature of the town is the large quarter set apart for soldiers' dwellings, built with mud and plastered on the inside, some of which are quite comparable to European peasants' houses. Hassetché cannot now be considered unhealthy, though here, as elsewhere in the Jezireh, French officers' and soldiers' wives are not allowed to reside. (There is, however, no ban on foreign women in general.) An indication of progress is the steadily increasing use of bicycles there (and also at Kameshlié), though it seems strange that a chemist who started business a year ago has been obliged to shut up shop for lack of custom.

16. Hassetché possesses a wireless telegraph station, and two military aeroplanes are stationed here.

17. The town is destined to play a much more important part in the progress of the Jezireh as communications improve. There has been a slight drain of Christians from Deir-ez-Zor and Kameshlié, and there is no sign at Hassetché of the apathy prevalent at Deir-ez-Zor. A number of schemes are spoken of, though some of them at least will have to wait for their execution until funds are more plentiful. The revenues of the sanjak are far from sufficing for the real needs of a town which hardly existed a few years ago and still lacks much. In 1931 the Treasury at Damascus granted £S. 300,000 for expenses connected with government.

18. Among these schemes are: (a) A town water supply; (b) an electric lighting supply, power to be obtained by harnessing the River Khabour; and (c), not least, the establishment of new "pistes" in two directions, towards Rakka and Demir Kapu. It is true that the latter scheme exists at present chiefly in the mind of the political officer, but it has everything to recommend it, and would cost little. The distance between Rakka and Hassetché by a track running south of the Abdul Aziz Mountains could be covered in three hours by car, and I understand that there are wells close to the track, the whole stretch of which would be uninhabited. The track to Demir Kapu, via Tell Brack, is already used by political officers, but cannot at present be recommended, being entirely unmarked. The two new tracks would bring Aleppo within seven and a half hours' running time of Hassetché (allowing half an hour for the ferry across the Euphrates at Rakka), since practically at all times the desert can be crossed at a speed of 40 or 50 miles an hour. Mosul would actually be within a long summer-day's drive of Aleppo.

19. Immigration into the Sanjak of the Jezireh is welcomed by the French, especially of Christians. No questions are asked of refugees from Turkey, who are usually wholly destitute. Such immigrants are, however, allowed no share in the government of the sanjak, and are yet unrepresented in the local offices. French hospitality has even been extended to the prominent Kurdish ex-brigand, Hajo-bin-Hajo, who was responsible three years ago for the massacre of ten French soldiers near Kubur-el-Bid. He is now resident at Hassetché, and on excellent terms with the French, who pay him a monthly stipend. He is held responsible for the behaviour of Kurdish immigrants from Turkey.

#### *Kameshlié.*

20. Kameshlié has since 1929 risen to be a town of 15,000 inhabitants, mostly Christians. The acting kaimakam of the Caza of Kameshlié is a Christian named Latif Ghanimeh, who is liked, and whom the French are doing their best to have appointed to the post. The streets are well laid out, and there are some good shops and native cafés. Last year there sprung up a hotel in reinforced concrete, which is clean and comfortable. Electric lighting has been installed, though the power does not seem to be considerable. As there is no stone in the neighbourhood, most of the buildings are built of mud bricks, the house and offices of the political officer being no exception. The municipality is of stone, and there is a Protestant church of the same material. Special facilities are granted to those who bring stone from a distance for building purposes.

21. Trade in Kameshlié is stagnant, owing to the financial situation and the measures taken in Turkey to suppress contraband, which, however, has augmented considerably since May last (see my despatch No. 17 of the 6th May, 1932). Nevertheless, the town presents an animated appearance, as the mart for the products of a fertile zone, in which the French state more than fifty new settlements have been made within the last five years. The delimitation of the frontier has, of course, done much for the development of the Jezireh area, by providing greater security, for the whole district is now effectively occupied by French and Syrian troops. Relations with the Turks over the border are good, but perhaps a shade less cordial than formerly, though the French have made a number of concessions. Public security is good, and the "rezzou" has become a thing of the past; but the country is not yet so safe as to permit of travelling at night. No progress at all has been made with the extension into Iraq of the Bagdad Railway.

22. Two new creations since 1930 are Derik and Ain Diwar (Endivar on maps), in the "Duck's Bill," reached by a completely new "piste," which turns north-east a few miles the other side of Demir Kapu, passing through Mustaphaouieh, where there is a small post. Derik (Berik on the maps) is before all a fortified post, under the command of a major; while Ain Diwar, which counts already more than 1,500 inhabitants, is becoming a flourishing trading centre. It is absorbing the trade of Jezireh-ibn-Omar, which lies in Turkey at about 4 miles' distance. The prevalent impression that Jezireh was ever, in recent times at least, a flourishing town may here be corrected, for it had not even the importance of Nissibin, and it is now quickly subsiding to the position of a small village, as Nissibin had already done three years ago. Ain Diwar is in a commanding position high over the Tigris, and makes a perfect frontier post.

23. The area situated in the Duck's Bill is nearly as fertile as the land between Kameshlié and Kubur-el-Bid, while the climate is much healthier, the ground being higher and more reminiscent of hill country. There are several streams with a good flow of water all the year, which could be used for irrigation.

24. There is no present intention of making the roads in the Northern Jezireh, though a recently imported American track-making machine is being used to improve existing communications. Bridges have been made here and there at fords impassable after heavy rain, and the state of the Mosul-Kameshlié track cannot be complained of, on the whole.

#### *Ras-el-Ain.*

25. The track from Hassetché to Ras-el-Ain follows the River Khabour, through land that is mostly desert. There are a number of Bedouin tent villages, which I was told were permanent, on the other bank of the river, and here and



there a little irrigated cultivation on the side of the road, but nothing like a settlement appeared until one reached Taloula, a Circassian village, 14 kilom. south of Ras-el-Ain, and close to a fine new metal bridge over the river. This village is a surprising instance of what may be done even in the desert, for the houses, though built of mud, were very clean both outside and in, picked out with liberal coats of freshly renewed whitewash. The interiors were well furnished, and adorned with embroideries covering walls and divans, and the whole dwelling gave an indescribable impression of being civilised. I learnt that the Circassians do not farm themselves, but hire the Bedouins to work for them. Certainly neither the men nor the women of the village looked toil-stained.

25A. Ras-el-Ain has made some progress. The vast marshes and sheets of water lying to the south of the town have been made healthy by draining, and also by the plantation of thousands of willow trees. The latter have to be protected from the natives by soldiers. There is a large flour mill worked by a Ruston Proctor engine.

#### Salahieh.

26. The track between Deir-ez-Zor and Salahieh must be one of the worst in Syria, running over hummocky ground as far as Meyadin, and for most of the rest of the way through stony desert. The last 10 miles are made, but the surface is not good. The only settlement on the way is the big village of Meyadin on the Euphrates, where there is considerable cultivation and might be more; there are a few Christians—which denotes that the village is of some importance. Salahieh at 96 kilom. from Deir-ez-Zor, is nothing more than a poor village, situated on the other bank of the Euphrates. It is here that the ruins of Doura Europos are being excavated. The road to Abu-Kemal is said to be rather better than that between Meyadin and Deir-ez-Zor.

27. Public works to be executed in 1933 (if funds permit) are (a) improvement of the track between Deir-ez-Zor and Meyadin, 70 kilom.; (b) Government House and municipality at Meyadin; (c) the same at Abu-Kemal; and (d) a hospital at Abu-Kemal.

28. Bessireh (Bu Saira) is a dirty village at the confluence of the Euphrates and the Khabour, where there is a fine bridge over the latter river. The place is of no importance other than military; extensive manoeuvres were taking place on the northern bank of the Khabour.

29. While I endorse the opinion I expressed in 1929 of the sincere cordiality of French political officers and officials in the Jezireh, and take this opportunity of recording once again my appreciation of their courtesy and lavish hospitality, I yet cannot help thinking that it is not possible wholly to eradicate suspicion of the motives of a British consul undertaking a tour in the Jezireh. I hardly doubt that all had received instructions to watch my movements carefully and prevent me from going far unaccompanied. The political officer at Hassetché, who spoke to me very openly of service conditions, admitted in a moment of candour that his interpreter invited to a meal all clerks or secretaries accompanying personages travelling in the district—automatically. There were two concrete instances of solicitude on my behalf. At Salahieh a military aeroplane circled low over the ruins and then disappeared, while on the return journey a fast military car shot out of Meskené, overtook my car and barred the road. The officer in charge apologised profusely on recognising my flag, and returned forthwith to Meskené.

30. The general impression I received from my journey is that the French are taking pains to develop the Jezireh. Communications have improved, the amenities increased, and security of life and property enhanced. Security is, of course, nothing like absolute; political officers go armed, and, except between Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor and between Deir-ez-Zor and Salahieh, I was always accompanied by an armed guard. Cars are occasionally held up—but this might happen in any Eastern country. The political officers chosen to represent France at Hassetché, Ras-el-Ain, Kameshlié and Ain Diwar seem to be thoroughly efficient, though housed, except at Hassetché, in squalor, with sanitary conditions of the most rudimentary kind. It is only a matter of surprise that such good men should be so ignorant of any of the languages of the country, and so completely in the hands of interpreters. Captain Favriau, who was formerly political officer at Kirikhan, in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, has picked up a

little Turkish, and is learning Arabic, but apart from him none of those with whom I came in contact knew more than a few words of Arabic.

31. I am sending copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 1540/120/89]

No. 49.

Consul-General Sir H. E. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Beirut, March 15, 1933.

STIMULATED doubtless by the declaration published, after the Nationalist "Congress" held at Aleppo on the 17th February, by Hashem Bey-el-Atassi, Deputy from Homs, to the effect that without "unity" there can be no negotiations for a treaty, a meeting of Alaouite notables was recently held at Lattakia to emphasise their wish to remain outside Syria and at the same time to voice various demands. The four following demands were put forward:—

- (1) That their administrative independence under the French should be assured.
- (2) That their representative council should have wider powers, the present system under which heads of departments are responsible to the French Governor, who in his turn is responsible to the High Commissioner, being maintained.
- (3) That posts in the Administration should be allotted to the different communities on the basis of their numerical importance.
- (4) That proselytising in the Alaouite mountains should cease.

2. At about the same time Shiah notables assembled at Sidon and put forward certain claims. Actually two meetings were held, one organised by Nejib Bey Fadl, Nejib Bey Osseiran and a lawyer named Tamer, which was well attended, and a sort of opposition meeting under the auspices of Yussuf Bey-el-Zein. Both meetings are reported to have expressed the wish to remain in the Lebanon. The larger meeting put forward certain demands as follows:—

- (1) That the Shiah community should be recognised as such and have an official head.
- (2) That Shiahs should be given more public appointments on the basis of their numerical importance.
- (3) That more roads should be made, that schools should be opened in all villages, and that agriculture should be developed.
- (4) That certain taxes should be reduced or abolished.

3. Both gatherings seem to have been spontaneous, or as nearly spontaneous as such things can be in a country of this kind. In any case, although doubtless not disagreeable to the French, they were not held at their suggestion or instigation. Their demands seem to be sufficient evidence of this, as they touch on many matters of purely local interest apart from the question of possible inclusion in a united Syria.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 1655/1655/89]

No. 50.

Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Beirut, March 17, 1933.

OF late there has been marked evidence of growing uneasiness as to the economic future of this country in general and of Beirut in particular. It has by now been generally realised that the world crisis could not and has not left unaffected the Lebanon and its capital.



2. The most spectacular manifestation of discontent has taken the form of a strike of motor-vehicle drivers, which is now in its twelfth day. The drivers, of whom there are admittedly far too many, complain of many things, in some cases without due cause, but they seem in general to enjoy public sympathy, and all the more because they have, on the whole, behaved well. Their main grievances are (a) the heavy taxation to which they are subjected, and from which, seeing that the chief item is a tax on petrol, they cannot escape; and (b) the privileges granted to two French companies, of which one, the Compagnie Auto-Routière du Levant, is their direct competitor in road transportation, and the other, the D.H.P. Railway Company, receives a kilometric guarantee, under which, owing partly at least to road competition, it has to claim increasingly heavy amounts from public funds. The Auto-Routière Company receives various exemptions from taxation, which, seeing that its main services are inside Syria, undoubtedly give it an advantage which to many seems unfair. The Association of Motor Car Importers which includes, besides the actual importers, dealers in tyres and accessories and owners of garages and repair shops has naturally taken sides on behalf of the drivers. To increase sales the importers, owing to keen competition, have had to sell on easy credit terms. They are thus partly responsible for the admittedly excessive number of cars now in the country. The association issued a manifesto urging a reduction of import duty on the articles in which its members are interested, the abolition of the special privileges enjoyed by the Auto-Routière Company, and the cancellation of the agreement made in 1925 with the railway company. As the result of this a meeting has just been held at the Grand Sérail, during part of which M. Ponsot himself was present. At this it was, according to a press report, stated that the question of duty on cars would be examined as part of the general question of customs duties. Further information as to tyres was asked for to enable the question of duty on them to be studied. It was also stated that the privileges of the Auto-Routière would cease, but that the convention with the D.H.P. Company could not be altered. It was at the meeting decided to suggest to the High Commissioner—

- (a) The appointment of a Transport Commission comprising official and non-official members, including a representative of the railway company, to propose reasonable transport rates.
- (b) The temporary cessation of the issue of new driving licences.
- (c) To ration the registration of public vehicles used for passenger transport.
- (d) The limitation of the weights carried by lorries to those intended by the manufacturers.

3. After the drivers had been on strike for a week or so the shopkeepers and retail dealers were induced to show their sympathy by closing their places of business for the best part of forty-eight hours. That all of them closed willingly is, of course, unlikely, but undoubtedly they, like all others here, are keenly interested in any agitation for the reduction of import duties, which are generally considered to be excessive.

4. The chambers of commerce in Syria and the Lebanon have been busily engaged in discussing this question, which their members consider to be of vital importance. It is proposed that within the next week the Chambers shall hold at Beirut a congress, at which they will be able to give united expression to their views.

5. The Syndicate of Lebanese Industrialists has also taken a hand in the game, and has addressed to M. Ponsot a long petition, in which it demands the duty-free admission of all material intended for industry, of all raw materials and of factory machinery, the reduction of duties on semi-manufactured articles, various exemptions from taxation and so on. It urges that duties should, much more generally than is at present the case, be on a specific basis, and that it should be consulted by the authorities more frequently than in the past.

6. The Beirut Merchants' Association has also expressed its views. A deputation representing it was received both at the Grand Sérail by the Director of Economic Affairs, on behalf of M. Ponsot, and by the Lebanese President. It appears to have emphasised specially the harm done to local trade by the differences between the Palestinian and Syrian rates of duty. M. Reclus remarked, after seeing the memorial presented, that if all the claims therein made were granted the budget of the "services of joint interest" would be wrecked. The leader of the deputation replied that this would be better than wrecking the

trade of the whole country, and that the budget could be re-adapted to meet present critical conditions.

7. At Tripoli traders showed their sympathy with the attitude of Beirut by closing their shops for one day, while both at Aleppo and at Damascus there seem to be indications that the motor-drivers are prepared, if necessary, to go on strike.

8. The foregoing will have sufficed to show that there is general and widespread discontent. This is in view of conditions, local and international, perfectly natural. The general opinion seems to be that the main cause of all the trouble is the high rate of customs duty, but it is not as simple as all that. The duties are high, but they can be collected and do provide revenue. It is from the customs receipts that the "fund of joint interests" derives the major part of its revenues. These receipts have of late necessarily decreased, while the calls made upon the fund, among which is the guarantee payable to the railway company, have to be met, e.g., maintenance of the locally recruited defence force and payment of interest on the local share of the Ottoman Public Debt. As regards the latter item, according to an official communiqué, the position is unexpectedly favourable. Owing to purchases at low rates, two-thirds of the capital of a debt, which was to have been extinguished in eighty-six years, has been paid off. Nevertheless, all the demands made and remedies suggested centre round a reduction of the import duties. In some cases the interests concerned are opposed. Local industry would like to see, if not an increase of duty on manufactured articles, exemptions and reductions under various other headings. The railway company would presumably like to see, through increases of duties or taxation, the cost of motor transportation raised so that it would be delivered from serious road competition. It may well be that, even with a reduction of expenditure, the High Commissioner would, if he conceded only some of the demands now made, find it impossible to obtain the money needed for essential expenditure. One newspaper, which seems to realise this, has suggested that in the exceptional circumstances the French Government might be ready to grant a loan of 80 or 100 million francs. It admits that the moment is an exceptionally unfavourable one, but, on the other hand, France has made other loans to countries in which she should have a less direct interest than she has in Syria and the Lebanon.

9. M. Ponsot, who was to have left for Damascus early in the week, is still here presumably in connexion with these difficult problems which he has to try and solve. It seems clear that the agitation has, at any rate, succeeded in concentrating his attention on the question of customs duties.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 1778/120/89]

No. 51.

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 482.)

Sir,

Paris, March 31, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to report that in the course of a debate upon the estimates for overseas defence which took place in the Chamber yesterday M. Daladier, President of the Council of Ministers, made a noteworthy speech in reply to a Socialist motion that the French mandate for Syria should be terminated. M. Sixte-Quenin, who was the principal Socialist speaker, had pointed out that Great Britain had terminated her mandate over Iraq, and urged that it was the duty of France from every point of view to do the same. He had claimed that the sacrifices, particularly in the monetary sphere, which France was being called upon to make in Syria were out of all proportion to the beneficial results which were being obtained.

2. M. Daladier, in his reply, said that France's mission in Syria was to bring the country to the point where political independence could be accorded to her, and it was that sole consideration which was shaping French policy in Syrian affairs. The situation differed entirely from that which obtained in the neighbouring country of Iraq. England had been able to grant independence to the latter on account of the homogeneity of the population, who had evolved in



the course of centuries what might be called a collective conscience. In Syria, however, there existed an extensive variety, almost a mosaic it might be termed, of races and religions. Religious disputes always had a more serious aspect in Eastern than in Western countries, and religious difficulties in this case marched hand in hand with economic and ethnical difficulties, all of which increased the task which faced the Administration.

3. M. Daladier recalled that in October 1932 M. Ponsot, the High Commissioner, had been instructed to begin negotiations at Damascus for the signature of a Franco-Syrian Treaty of Alliance, an indispensable preliminary to the admission of the new State into the League of Nations. The budget for Syria was certainly no light one, but he would observe that it had decreased by 34 millions since 1932 and by 68 millions since the year before that. To reduce it still further would be to run the risk of allowing serious internecine warfare to break out. If that happened, then either another Power would be forced to interfere, perhaps with no ultimate advantage to Syrian liberty or, alternatively, a large and costly expeditionary force would have to be sent from France. The Government were determined not to do anything in Syria to compromise the beneficial results which had already been obtained.

4. M. Daladier concluded by pointing out that France had scrupulously observed the engagements upon which she had entered with the League of Nations. Syria would as soon as possible take her seat at Geneva with her sister nations, but it was essential, particularly in the interests of the numerous units which made up the Syrian population, that the treaty of alliance should be signed first.

I have, &c.  
TYRRELL.

[E 2092/120/89]

No. 52.

*Consul Mackereth to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 24.)*

(No. 17. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Damascus, March 31, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a political report for this post covering the period the 1st January to the 31st March, 1933.

2. In adopting the practice of submitting a quarterly summary I have been influenced by the impending change, on Iraqi lines, in the political status of Syria.

3. Although it is unlikely that the Syrian Republic will be able to enter the League of Nations for a year or more, nevertheless there appears little doubt that it will enjoy an increasing autonomy from the time the treaty now under discussion is signed. Thereafter its relationships with other independent and semi-independent Arab States will acquire a wider interest, and the need for closer observation of minor incidents seems thus already to have become necessary. It is hoped, then, that a quarterly chronicle of political events, with circulation to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Amman and Jedda, may prove of value.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 52.

*Damascus Quarterly Report, January 1 to March 31, 1933.*

THE first normal working session of the Syrian Parliament ended on the 24th January, when it adjourned to the 9th March. It did not, however, reassemble on the last-named date on account of internal dissension arising out of pourparlers preliminary to the negotiations for a treaty between the Syrians and the French. This matter will be dealt with later. The standard of parliamentary procedure was astonishingly high and in dignity did not compare unfavourably with its Parisian prototype.

2. The Francophile press condemned the Deputies for granting a general amnesty to the prisoners incarcerated for political offences under the previous direct French rule. Such pardon could, of course, only be extended to those persons who were in gaols maintained by the Syrians. The prisoners convicted by French courts-martial are still detained, a matter which has given rise to some violent expressions of opinion by members enjoying the sanctuary of the parliamentary building.

3. After heated discussion, an apparently well-drawn-up budget for the coming year was passed. In this matter the Syrian Deputies showed that aptitude for finance for which their race is noted. The Government was authorised to contract a loan of £Sy. 500,000 (100,000 fr.) to be used in aid of agriculture. It is badly needed.

4. On the 14th March a decree of the President was issued deferring the reopening of Parliament until the 22nd April. The reason for the delay is thought to be for the purpose of being able to present at the reassembling of Parliament an agreed basis for a Franco-Syrian treaty. By the 14th March the various divergencies between the views of the French and the Syrian Governments had not been removed. It is hoped that all will be clear by the 22nd April.

#### *The Franco-Syrian Treaty.*

5. After many hesitations, which are natural in view of the difficulties that the French partition of the territory under their mandate has created for them, the High Commissioner on his return from Geneva in January intimated to the President of the Syrian Republic that he was prepared to discuss modalities for a treaty with the Syrian Government.

6. On the 10th January the President informed journalists, as he left the High Commissioner's residence, that "the intentions of the High Commissioner are excellent, and everything points to the fact that we are on the road to the realisation of our national hopes and that an agreement in the near future between Syria and France will satisfy both sides." The Minister of Finance, Jamil Bey Mardam Bey, a thorough-going but discreet Nationalist, informed the press that the "attitude of M. Ponsot points to an early realisation of all our national claims and, above all, the integral independence of Syria." It may be doubted in this whether the French High Commissioner and the Syrian Minister of Finance had in mind the same geographical area in the word "Syria." According to *El Kabas* of the 26th March, Fares Bey-el-Khoury, a leading Nationalist, informed the press that M. Ponsot had promised that the Syrians would be granted rights no less comprehensive than those accorded to Iraq by England.

7. All seemed to be going along very nicely until the *Orient* on the 3rd February published the statements made by the High Commissioner before the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in December. M. Ponsot's skilful hedging in face of the rather pointed interrogations of the Marquis Theodoli and M. van Rees gave an opportunity to the extreme Nationalists to read into M. Ponsot's words meanings which he possibly intended to convey but did not clearly express, namely, that the French had no intention of giving to Syria more than they could conveniently avoid doing, and, furthermore, that they were in no hurry. At this news, feelings among those Syrians interested in the politics of their country ran high. For a time the cry of unity or nothing was everywhere heard, and meetings and manifestos were the order of the day. Astute counsels of the more experienced politicians eventually obtained the respect of the masses, and it became generally agreed that it might be wiser not to refuse too abruptly the proffered half-loaf.

8. It was hoped that the Moslem brethren of the Jebel Druse and the Alaouites would clamour to come within the Syrian fold, but the French intelligence service, so the Syrians allege, got there first, and a gathering of Druses and another of Alaouites declared they had no wish to be governed by the Damascenes nor to be federated with them.

9. Up to the end of the quarter no formal negotiations have been begun, but informal conversations between members of the Syrian Government and of the High Commission have proceeded steadily with breaks to allow consultation with Paris. The ground is being prepared for positive discussions later.

10. It has been suggested in some newspapers that the rather close questioning of M. Ponsot by the Marquis Theodoli was prompted by an Italian



desire to embarrass the French or to create a claim for hush-money. In point of fact, however, it may be thought more likely that the Marquis, who is related to a prominent family in the Lebanon owning extensive property in Syria and also in Palestine, was personally interested in the ultimate fate of Syria and the Lebanon.

11. The quarter closed with an ill-concealed squabble between the President of the Syrian Republic and the Nationalist leader and Minister of Finance, Jamil Bey Mardam Bey, as to which of them should act as negotiator on the Syrian side with M. Ponsot, who returned to Damascus on the 28th March. It is believed that the High Commissioner will endeavour to restrict negotiations to two negotiators, himself and the President. The rub is that, although President Abed enjoys a measure of frowzy approval, he is not, although undoubtedly clever, generally popular.

12. On the 6th January a momentous decision was taken by the Syrian Minister of the Interior through the Mufti. The "Yo-yo" was forbidden within the State of Syria. Its exasperating motion was held responsible for the continued lack of rain. Let it be noted that three days after the Minister's edict rain fell, and the doubting Thomases were dismayed by the vindication of his Excellency's meteorological prescience.

13. The absurd dispute over the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate ended by the convenient death on the 11th January of one of the disputants, Arsenios Haddad, and Alexandros III was unanimously elected sole Patriarch.

14. The meeting which is said to have been arranged between the President of the Turkish Republic and the Shah of Persia was discussed in the Damascus press on the 6th February at some length. Conjectures have been many concerning this meeting. Those interested are inclined to ask themselves whether it may not mark the beginning of a Turco-Persian alliance which might grow into a definite menace to the independence of a future Arab confederation.

15. On the 14th February Nuri Sha'lan, chief of the Ruwalla, paid a visit to the King of Iraq in Bagdad. No political importance is attached to this visit, as Nuri is ageing very rapidly and is thought to have lost his former prestige.

16. On the 17th February the Arabic newspaper the *Arz* was suspended for inciting public opinion against the Government.

17. On the 24th February the French High Commissioner visited the Iraq Petroleum Company's workshops at Homs.

18. The Damascus flour millers went on strike on the 8th March, and are still out, as a protest against the reduction of customs duty on imported flour.

19. On the same day the annual ceremony of commemoration of the coronation in Damascus of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria was held in a local cinema, King Feisal's flag was hoisted and his portrait displayed. Ardent speeches were made on the subject of Arab unity. No untoward incident occurred.

20. On the 10th March a demonstration was made in the Omayyad Mosque in favour of Syrian unity.

21. On the 22nd March a French military aeroplane crashed while doing night exercises near Palmyra. The pilot was killed and the observer seriously injured.

#### *Relations with Iraq.*

22. Nothing to report.

#### *Relations with Palestine.*

23. The efforts, which have recently been redoubled, of the Arab leaders of the anti-Zionist movement to obtain the co-operation of their fellow-Moslems in Syria have so far met with no more than voluble lip-service in the Arab press. The fact is that the Syrians have at the moment only one object in view, and that is to be rid of the French. When this is done no doubt they will turn a readier ear to the wails of their Palestine co-religionists.

24. A pleasing episode took place on the 19th February, when a football team from the English section of the Palestine police played the champion team of Syria at Damascus. The Englishmen won by three goals to one. The game was played in the best spirit, and the sporting attitude of the team from Palestine was highly appreciated by a large crowd of spectators.

#### *Relations with Transjordan.*

25. No incidents occurred during the quarter. The Christian press made considerable copy out of the alleged pardoning of a Transjordan national who had been convicted by the Haifa courts of the murder of a Lebanese.

26. Some discussion in the Arab press centred round the visit to Jerusalem by His Majesty's Minister in Jedda in February. It was suggested that Sir Andrew Ryan's object was to endeavour to effect a rapprochement between Ibn Saud and the Emir Abdullah.

27. The Emir's friends in Damascus appear to think that he is in a stronger position *vis-à-vis* Ibn Saud than he has ever been in before, and he is reported to consider the Saudian monarch as nearing his end. This is based on a view widely held amongst the Arabs that Ibn Saud was unable to consummate his latest marriage with a youthful virgin. This for an Arab is held to be a lamentable state and an immediate precursor to man's last.

28. In view of a possible conflict with Ibn Saud, Abdullah is wooing Nuri Sha'lan in case his support may be needed later on.

#### *Agriculture.*

29. During the whole of the period under review peasants from the country districts have been migrating to the city in considerable numbers and beggars are increasing alarmingly. This follows the most serious drought the country has had within living memory, which has produced an almost complete lack of fodder. Taxation in previous years was so heavy that the peasants found themselves without reserves.

#### *Trade.*

30. Trade was almost entirely stagnant. Owing to high prices and lower customs duties in the neighbouring countries, considerable smuggling activity has been evident, particularly from Palestine and Transjordan. The cotton piece-goods merchants of Damascus held a meeting in February and called upon the Government to institute more vigilant patrolling of the frontiers.

#### *Public Security.*

31. The poverty of the country districts has no doubt been the cause of a growing lack of public security, and there has been a most regrettable increase in highway robbery. In one case a car containing French officers was stopped on the Damascus-Beirut road by armed bandits and the occupants were robbed. Only ten days later six motor cars were held up on the Damascus-Homs road by other robbers and some thirty travellers were relieved of their possessions and outer clothing.

#### *Notable Visitors.*

32. Abdelkader Rashid Bey, Foreign Minister in Iraq, was in Damascus on the 1st February and was met by several Nationalist Ministers. On the 5th February Atif Riza, Turkish consul in Aleppo, arrived to negotiate, successfully, he said, with the Syrian authorities an agreement whereby the administration of Turkish estates should come under the jurisdiction of the civil courts instead of the Sharia, in view of Turkey's abolition of Sharia courts. On the 24th February four Turkish Deputies, Ferid Bey, Hazem Bey, Rafat Bey and Mislak Bey arrived and were met by leading members of the Syrian Nationalist party. Prince Mohsen-el-Amin, son of Abbas Hilmi Pasha, made a prolonged visit to Damascus after his father had left Bagdad. He was in constant touch with Damascus members of the Islamic Congress. Other visitors included Mr. Addison, British Minister in Prague, and Sir Henry Fowler.

33. About 380 British tourists paid short visits to Damascus during the quarter.

*Damascus, March 31, 1933.*

G. M.



*Consul Mackereth to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 24.)*

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Damascus, March 31, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you an interesting memorandum, with its enclosure, which Mr. Williamson-Napier has drawn up, reviewing the period of the French mandate from the commencement of the occupation to the declaration made by M. Ponsot at Geneva in December last, when he announced the intention of the French Government to proceed with negotiations for a treaty providing for the eventual autonomy of Syria.

2. Mr. Williamson-Napier's survey sets out with clarity the evolution of French and Syrian ideas about the termination of the mandatory system in this country, and at the present time it is of particular value by providing a background drawn in what I think suitable perspective in relation to which future events may be seen in just proportion.

3. It is difficult to contest the general conclusion arrived at in the final paragraph of the memorandum. It may, however, be thought that it has been just that insistence of the French plan upon what they consider their traditional right in these parts as the sole protectors of Christendom that has all along made their relations with the Mahometan population of Syria so difficult. It has left them open to the charge of hypocrisy, creating an atmosphere of mistrust unfavourable to the present negotiations.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 53.

*Memorandum respecting the French Mandate in Syria.*

AS a new chapter is about to open in the history of the French mandate in Syria (as distinct from the Lebanon and the other areas of French mandated territory in the Levant)—the negotiation of a treaty—this would appear an opportune occasion for reviewing the general situation of this country as it presents itself to-day, in the aspects which are likely to have a bearing on the future.

2. As a basis for the present memorandum a purely objective summary of recent history, derived from the archives at this post and from official publications, is attached.

3. The Syrians claiming complete independence, it may be of interest to examine in broad outline the achievements and general policy of the French in the domain of local administration, with special reference to the difficulties likely to confront the Syrians themselves if and when the reins of government are transferred to their unfettered control.

4. The High Commissioner is represented in the Syrian Republic by a delegate at Damascus. This official—sometimes a diplomat, more often a Colonial administrator—is entirely responsible for local administration, and in this capacity supervises and controls—to a far greater extent than was our policy in Egypt or Iraq—the activities of the French advisers who are attached to the various Syrian Government Departments. Whatever accusations may have been levelled against these advisers, they appear to be, on the whole, an efficient body of men sincerely devoted to the interests of their Syrian employers and chafing under the control of their own compatriots.

5. Since the suspension of Capitulations, Mixed Courts have been established to hear causes in which a foreign national or interest is involved. These courts function well, and there is a tendency on the part of Syrian nationals to include a foreigner in their partnerships with a view to taking advantage of this form of jurisdiction. The judicial system is still incomplete and fails to conform with article 6 of the Syrian mandate in regard to the rights of foreigners in the administration of the laws of inheritance. Palestinians, Iraqis and Transjordanians are not entitled to Mixed Courts jurisdiction.

6. The main source of revenue is customs dues, which, for the whole of the mandated territory, are pooled in a common fund administered by a central administration, under the immediate supervision of the High Commissioner and known as the "Compte de gestion des services d'intérêt commun." Receipts are distributed on a quota basis to the Lebanon, Syria, the Gebel Druse, &c. The co-efficient is calculated on estimates of consumption of imported products, the *per capita* importation of the Lebanese being obviously higher than that of a nomad Bedouin. Contributions to common expenditure, *e.g.*, the share of the mandated territory as a whole to the Ottoman public debt, are proportionate to receipts. Such is the system in broad outline. The quotas are subject to revision, and, needless to say, give occasion to invidious comparison. There are various forms of direct taxation and municipal dues, adapted from the old Ottoman régime. The Tobacco Monopoly was abandoned in favour of indirect taxation. The local currency is linked with the French franc, but the Turkish gold pound is frequently used as a basis for commercial transactions.

7. Syria has at last begun to feel the full effects of the general depression. Great difficulty is experienced in collecting the taxes, and the number and salaries of Government officials have been considerably reduced in order to balance the budget. It is thought that the limit in this direction has now been reached and that future economies will have to be effected in Public Works and similar undertakings. There will doubtless be difficulties in grappling with the unemployment problem. Not the least disquieting feature in the financial situation is not only the complete cessation of remittances from abroad, but also the return of impoverished emigrants claiming hospitality from relatives whom they previously supported. The whole economic fabric of the country has thus been considerably shaken, and the full results have not yet been felt.

8. Syria is an agricultural country, but the margin of produce available for export never having been a large one, the fall in world prices has not affected the situation as much as in some other countries. On the other hand, two successive years of drought have been disastrous. Attempts have recently been made to establish the local manufacture of certain commodities previously imported, but commerce, generally, is at a standstill. The laying down of the pipe-line from Mosul is absorbing a certain amount of labour, but has not added materially to the prosperity of the country.

9. In the matter of public education the French have taken the greatest interest, and the propagation of the French language, initiated long before the war by religious institutions, has been vigorously pursued by the lay administration. The high schools for medicine and law are believed to be excellent. Nearly 200 young Syrians are completing their studies in France, where they are placed under the supervision of an inspector. It remains to be seen whether it will be possible to absorb these highly-educated young men and how they will react to unemployment.

10. The public health services appear well organised, and there is now an ample supply of good drinking-water. The police are no more inept than in most countries.

11. The nomad (Bedouin) tribes are subject to a special régime in regard to administration of justice, taxation, customs, and penetration into foreign territory. The latter has rendered necessary special agreements with Turkey, Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, and a close co-operation should exist between the various officials of the countries concerned in the settlement of tribal disputes and cognate matters. Minor friction between rival tribes and between the latter and the sedentary population appear to have been less acute of recent years. On the other hand, the diminishing demand for camels, followed by an increase in sheep production, together with the recent droughts, and consequent shortage of pasturage, are likely to render the encroachments of the tribes on cultivated territory a menace which may prove difficult to handle, in spite of determined and praiseworthy efforts on the part of the French Administration to improve the water supply in the desert. The traditional antagonism between the two most important tribes—the Ruwalla and the Sbaa—shows no signs of abating. The Bedouins have their own representatives in Parliament. Their very serious contribution to national prosperity (exports), coupled with their existence as a permanent source of potential trouble, have continued to constitute a problem requiring constant vigilance on the part of the mandatory authority.



12. In regard to foreign affairs, the delimitation of the frontiers between Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Turkey has made good progress, and will shortly be completed. There are customs conventions in force between Syria and the neighbouring States according special treatments to goods of local manufacture. The pilgrimage traffic and inter-tribal movements are governed by a recent "convention d'amitié et bon-voisinage" between the Saudi Arabia and Syria. The overland desert route between Iraq and Syria is subject to certain restrictions, mutually agreed upon by the two countries concerned. Extradition of fugitive offenders is also provided for. The harbouring of political refugees by certain States bordering on Syria was a source of considerable friction during the disorders of 1925 and 1926, and bred an atmosphere of suspicion and mutual antipathy between certain officials of the mandatory Powers concerned. This feeling has, fortunately, at long last, been dissipated. A frequent interchange of visits between "opposite numbers" cannot fail to have beneficial results.

13. To a much greater extent than in Iraq and Palestine, the maintenance of order and security is entrusted to the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the annual cost of which is no less than 300 million francs. Nevertheless, great strides have been made in the organisation of a locally-recruited army, of which, however, 50 per cent. of the officers are French. This proportion is gradually being adjusted, as native officers become available from the local School of Instruction. There are practically no French rank and file in the French army of occupation, this material consisting of Senegalese, North Africans and Indo-Chinese. The general "tone" amongst the officers is by no means brilliant. Jealousy and petty dissensions, based on class-prejudice, are the order of the day. There is no love lost between officers and civilian officials, and this atmosphere does not add to the social amenities of life in Syria. Nor does it pass unnoticed by the Syrians themselves. The air force, though strong in numbers, is stated to be poorly equipped. At present the "Syrian" army is not regarded as capable of coping single-handed with the requirements of the situation. At some future date, the price of French-bought security will doubtless form the subject of painful negotiations.

14. Such appears to be the situation in regard to purely domestic affairs. There are certain questions of major policy which have a wider implication.

15. The greatest problem which confronts the French—and which is also of immediate British interest—is the question of Syrian unity. It has two distinct and inextricable aspects, political and economic. As it must inevitably play a leading part in the ultimate destiny of the whole Near East, it appears to deserve particular comment.

16. The eviction of King Feisal from Damascus was the first blow to the idea of "Arab Empire." The reshuffling of the territories under French occupation (not mandate) was a logical sequel which in itself strengthened the case for watertight compartments—Iraq, Palestine. But whereas Iraq and Palestine are economic propositions, the geographical expression "Syria" is not. On the other hand, were the French, at this stage of economic depression in the Greater Lebanon, to return the seceded territories to Syria, there would not only be an outcry from the Maronites who invited the French to act as their protector, but the reduced area of the Lebanon would be incapable of independent economic existence. It would either become a colossal burden, or, against the wills of the inhabitants, absorbed into Syria. In either event, the mandate would end in disastrous failure, and the prestige of all mandatory Powers might well be impaired.

17. M. Ponsot, in his declarations at Geneva, by no means excluded the possibilities of ultimate "unity." The results of the elections, and the general trend of public thought since then, would appear to justify the view expressed in paragraph 11 of Damascus despatch No. 84 of the 3rd November 1931, that a large mass of the population would welcome a treaty on the basis of the present Syria, and be content to await the outcome of future events.

18. The question of a general amnesty to political offenders—one of the Nationalists' claims which enjoys popular support—may well lead to minor demonstrations, but is capable of adjustment. The economic depression, and the growing numbers of semi-educated "effendis" who cannot be absorbed in public service or liberal professions may also be the source of future tribulation.

19. There appears to be no reason to exaggerate the importance of the grievances and misgivings of the so-called minorities, a favourite hobby-horse of

the Christian journalist. With the present improved means of communication—wireless, battleships, roads, aeroplanes—a repetition of the massacres of 1860 is not likely to occur. The electoral law seems adequate to present requirements.

20. In attempting to reach any sort of conclusion, it may be of importance to consider certain characteristics of the local population. The tourist, in his contacts with hotel servants (the flotsam and jetsam of Syria), is frequently misled as to the standard of intelligence of the average Syrian. A parrot-like aptitude for foreign languages—so common in the Nubian Berbereen of Egypt—is more often than not the sign of a completely vacuous brain. In Egypt there are many striking examples of Syrian brain, initiative and enterprise, whilst in South America their activities, tending in possibly less reputable directions, have been crowned with prosperity. In Syria itself, Greeks, Jews, Armenians and the like—for whom Egypt is an El Dorado—find it practically impossible to compete with local talent. Remarkably astute in commercial transactions, their peculiar ability for trimming their sails according to the wind, is amply illustrated by the elastic attitude displayed by their political leaders in their dealings with the French. Even the "die-hards" are not intractable. These very characteristics, however, render the Syrians an extremely difficult proposition as parties to negotiation. The part played by religious communities is not nearly so complex or important in Syria as it is in the Lebanon.

21. Looking back on the principal stages through which the country has been laboriously led to the possession of an elected Parliament, a representative Government with a presentable President; comparing the chaos which existed in 1925 and 1926 with the state of affairs to-day; but, above all, in measuring the process of evolution which has taken place in the minds of the leaders of public thought, one is led to the conviction that wholesale condemnation of the French administration and policy in this country is not entirely justified. And in forming an opinion of their achievements, we must not forget that, as the traditional champions of Christianity in this part of the world, the French have been obstructed by a formidable barrier of Moslem antagonism.

*Damascus, March 30, 1933.*

A. N. W. NAPIER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 53.

THE FRENCH MANDATE IN SYRIA.

*Summary of Events from the End of the War till February 1933.*

UNDER the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, France was authorised, on the successful termination of hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, to assume control of the coastal area of Syria and Cilicia, and to protect an Arab State in the interior. This agreement was confirmed and carried into effect in October 1919.

2. In March 1920 Emir Feisal, who had contributed to the Allied cause, proclaimed himself "King of Syria" at Damascus. The French Government, alarmed at the growing extent of the Emir's domination, called on him to recognise their rights in respect to this ex-enemy territory. The ultimatum being disregarded, General Gouraud, the High Commissioner, was obliged to take military action. Feisal's army was routed on the 21st July, and General Gouraud entered Damascus and installed a Government.

3. In August 1920 General Gouraud issued a series of decrees subdividing the territory under French control (not mandate) into separate administrative areas. In creating the Greater Lebanon, the original Syria was deprived of wide strips of fertile territory—a bone of contention which has not ceased to be the basis of Syria's claim to "Unity." Hakki Bey El-Azm was appointed Governor of the State of Damascus.

4. The mandate to France for Syria and the Lebanon was promulgated by the League of Nations in July 1922, but did not come into force till September 1923. Meanwhile, General Weygand had arrived as High Commissioner, and a Federal Council of the three Governorates of Aleppo, Damascus and Latakia (Alaouites) was established under the presidency of Soubhi Bey Barakat, each



district having an elected "Representative Council." In Damascus the elections were boycotted by the Nationalists.

5. A petition from the Representative Council of Lattakie resulted in the latter territory being excluded from the Federation, and led in January 1925 to the creation of the "State of Syria," comprising Aleppo, Damascus and the Sanjak of Alexandretta. The latter retained a form of administrative independence, and the Governorate of Lattakie achieved a form of autonomy, depending on Beirut. The first President of the State of Syria was Soubhi Bey Barakat. He was appointed by the High Commissioner, General Sarrail, who had arrived in November 1924.

6. The new President formed a Cabinet consisting of elements not antagonistic to French authority (*e.g.*, Ata Bey Ayoubi), but the "Representative Council" (for the State of Syria) elected in March, with the participation of the Nationalists (the President was Badi Bey Mouayyad), uttered a violent protest against the "defective" unity and the compulsory confirmation of presidential decrees by the High Commissioner.

7. The general unrest which had been simmering throughout 1924 in the form of mild demonstration finally came to a head with the revolt of the Druses, who threatened to carry with them the rest of Syria by penetrating into the city of Damascus in October 1925. Strong measures were undoubtedly necessary, and the bombardment of Damascus under the orders of General Sarrail eliminated the danger of a wholesale insurrection and massacre, but did not put an end to a series of sporadic, but serious, risings, which lasted until the end of 1926. The French were severely criticised for acerbating the minds of the Moslem majority by employing Armenian (and other Christian) mercenaries for suppressing the rebellion on the same lines as the "Black and Tans" were used in Ireland. Justifiable, no doubt, in the light of major considerations, it is a chapter in the recent history of Syria which will not lightly be forgotten, and calculated to foster the traditional prejudice of the Moslems against the French in this part of the Levant.

8. When, towards the end of 1925, Soubhi Bey was obliged to resign the presidency owing to the lack of public support, he was careful to recapitulate, in view of future eventualities, the grievances which had previously been expressed by the Representative Council. The country was then placed under the direct Government of a French Administrator (M. Pierre Aylpe).

9. When M. de Jouvenal left France on his appointment as High Commissioner in November 1925, he was doubtless imbued with ideas of extreme Liberalism, and appeared to make a sincere attempt to conciliate the extremists. In a speech at Damascus he referred to the future prosperity of the "united states of Syria and the Lebanon." A new President was appointed for the State of Syria in the person of Damad Ahmad Nami Bey, who, however, utterly failed to maintain discipline in a Cabinet which contained several Nationalists. The state of general unrest (including an attempt to take the Lebanon by force) was such that de Jouvenal soon realised that events were too strong for him, and in October 1926 he was succeeded by M. Henri Ponsot.

10. The first year of his office M. Ponsot, who was no novice in Near Eastern politics, wisely devoted to studying the complex problem which confronted him. French troops, released by the termination of the Riff campaign, having gained the upper hand of the rebellion, the resignation of the Damad in February 1928 opened a new era. The time was now ripe for elections to be held for the "Constituent Assembly"—the first plank in the structure of the mandate. Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, nominally a Nationalist (but with pro-French sympathies), was appointed Prime Minister. The post of President was left vacant. In spite of the Nationalists' allegations of tampering, the Nationalists gained a sweeping victory at the elections. Sheikh Taj was confirmed as Prime Minister, and the "Constituent Assembly" addressed itself to its appointed task, namely, that of hammering out a "Constitution." A great deal of discussion and speculation took place on the rival merits of a "monarchy" and a republic. The name of Emir Zaid was freely canvassed (amongst others) as a likely candidate for the "throne," but the Nationalists were definitely in favour of a "President."

11. The draft Constitution produced by the Assembly proved unacceptable to the French Government, being incompatible with the terms of the mandate and international agreements. Exception was taken to the following six

articles: (1) Unity; (2) National army; (3) power of President to conclude treaties; (4) to receive Ambassadors; (5) to grant pardons; and (6) to declare martial law. The Assembly was invited to revise their draft accordingly, and, on their refusal to comply, was adjourned for three months, in the hope that wiser counsels would prevail.

12. The Assembly, having failed to come to terms, was finally adjourned *sine die* in February 1929, the Sheikh Taj Administration remaining in power. In August there were slight demonstrations in sympathy with the anti-Zionist movement in Palestine, but the country remained remarkably quiet.

13. In April 1930 Hashem Bey Atassi published a manifesto throwing the blame of failure to endow the country with a Constitution on M. Ponsot. The latter, in the following month, promulgated the Constitution drawn up by the Assembly, with the addition of a qualifying clause (article 116) vesting certain powers of veto in the French Government, in conformity with the latter's obligations to the League of Nations.

14. In a decree published the same date dissolving the "Constituent Assembly," M. Ponsot pointed out that that assembly, in drawing up the Constitution, had completed their labours and complied with that part of the mandate which lays down that the views of the authorities and the population should be consulted in regard to the form of Government.

15. Towards the beginning of 1931, interviews published in the local press with Hashem Bey Atassi and Jamil Mardam Bey (at one time a super-Nationalist) suggested that the Nationalists, recognising that article 116 of the Constitution was merely a temporary safeguard pending the evolution of the mandate, were prepared to participate in parliamentary elections, as a first step to the negotiation of a treaty. But, whilst the serious leaders of "nationalism" appeared to be gaining in wisdom and discretion, a new class of agitator—persons who had nothing to lose, but everything to gain, from disorder and violence—namely, the "student-effendis," found expression for their patriotism in their dissatisfaction with the price of electric tram fares, and the usurpation of the Hejaz Railway Station by a French-owned railway. They were sponsored by Emir Said Jazairly, an unbalanced megalomaniac, completely discredited by reasonable people.

16. For the first time on record, a group of Nationalists (including the type of "condottiere," such as Fakhri Baroudi) travelled to Beirut to welcome M. Ponsot on his arrival in November. Within a few days the latter accepted the resignation of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din, and assumed the functions of Chief of State. The air was cleared for the forthcoming parliamentary elections. A Syrian Secretary-General was appointed to administer the country with the aid of four Ministers of the previous Government. M. Ponsot declared that it was necessary, in order to conclude a treaty, to negotiate with a representative Government, in conformity with the Constitution, and held himself personally responsible for "fair" elections.

17. Just prior to the elections, skirmishes between hired "bravos" and the police were organised by certain Nationalists in order to raise a flagging "patriotism"; and, by convincing oratory, the mind of "the man in the street" was poisoned, in advance, that the electoral proceedings would be faked from beginning to end.

18. This form of "mass-suggestion" was bound to take effect on an ignorant populace; and it was not surprising that certain allegations of "tampering" against one or two Syrian officials ended in scenes of disorder and bloodshed at the polls. The elections in Damascus were suspended, but on the same day, at Aleppo, the Liberal Constitutionals (or Moderates) swept the board. The allegations of "tampering" have never been proved, and the matter was allowed to drop by the Commission of Enquiry set up by the new Parliament.

19. In spite of loose talk of a boycott by the Nationalists, the fresh elections at Damascus took place in March and April 1932, and resulted in the return of six Nationalists and three Moderates.

20. In June 1932 Parliament was formally opened, and its composition was as follows:—

Nationalists	...	...	...	...	17
Moderates	...	...	...	...	23
Liberal Constitutionals (Moderates from Aleppo and the north)	...	...	...	...	29



Soubhi Bey Barakat was elected President of the Chamber, and Mohamed Ali Bey El-Abed President of the Republic. Hakki Bey El-Azm assumed the functions of Prime Minister, assisted by a Government of three Ministers, two of whom, including Jamil Marden Bey, are Nationalists.

21. On the return of M. Ponsot in October 1932, it became obvious that he and the French Government were anxious to negotiate a treaty with the representative Government in power; and, at his appearance before the Permanent Mandates Commission in December, the French policy in regard to Syria (as distinct from the Lebanon, and the other semi-autonomous "Governments") was quite clearly defined; first a treaty, and then a period of evolution, pending entry into the League of Nations. The question of the future unification of Syria would not be a matter for immediate consideration.

22. M. Ponsot's specific declarations at Geneva called forth a manifesto from Hashem Bey Atassi that the Nationalists would refuse to negotiate any treaty, which was not based on Syrian unity. Other influential members of the party, such as Fares Bey Khouri (who, in the past, has been exiled for the cause), expressed their opinion that the treaty, in itself, would be an excellent foundation for their further aspirations. On the other hand, telegrams were despatched to Geneva by delegations from the Alaouites and the Gebel Druse disclaiming the alleged aspirations of these districts for union with Syria.

A. N. W. NAPIER.

[E 2376/664/89]

No. 54.

*Consul Cowan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 5.)*

(No. 18.)

Sir,

*Aleppo, April 27, 1933.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 2 of the 14th January, enclosing a copy of the Turco-French Railway Agreement, I have the honour to report that the section of the Bagdad Railway from Adana to Fevzi Pasha was formally handed over to the Turkish authorities on the 25th April. No steps have so far been taken regarding the remaining sections in Turkish territory, which under the agreement are to be administered by a Franco-Turkish company, but it is understood that a French railway official is at present at Ankara with a view to settling this question.

2. The Bozanti-Alep-Nissibin et Prolongements are very anxious to extend their line from Tell Zivan to the Iraq frontier, and a few weeks ago a strong rumour was current here that this undertaking had actually been sanctioned by the French High Commissioner. For financial reasons, however, the immediate realisation of this scheme appears improbable.

3. The railway company have, however, another scheme in contemplation, which is much more likely to be carried out. This is the institution of a service of motor transport in vehicles owned by the company from Tell Zivan, the present railhead, to Mosul and Kirkuk. If this project is executed through bills of lading will then be given by the railway to the two places named from Alexandretta and Aleppo. This scheme would greatly strengthen the claims of Alexandretta to become the transit port for goods destined for Iraq and Northern Persia, though at present everything points to this position being granted to Beirut.

4. I enclose a table which I have obtained from the Bozanti-Alep-Nissibin et Prolongements showing the transport rates for goods from Alexandretta and Aleppo to Tell Zivan, and the estimated rates by motor from Tell Zivan to Mosul and Kirkuk.<sup>(1)</sup>

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Ankara and Bagdad and His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

N. PATRICK COWAN.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 2352/664/89]

No. 55.

*Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 5.)*

(No. 149.)

Sir,

*Angora, April 28, 1933.*

WITH reference to the last sentence of the *Déclaration commune* transmitted with Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 372 of the 12th November, 1932, relating to the Franco-Turkish agreement on the future of the portion of the Bagdad Railway lying between Bozanti and Nissibin, I have the honour to report that the Adana-Fevzi Pasha section of the railway was transferred to the Turkish State Railways Administration at midnight on the 26th instant in accordance with the terms of the above agreement.

2. According to the semi-official *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, of the 1,190 kilom. of line between Konya and Nissibin which constitute the Bagdad Railway, 980 are in Turkish territory; of these 980 kilom., 511 are now controlled by the Turkish State Railways Administration, while the remaining 469 kilom. are to be exploited by the Turkish company, to be formed with French, and possibly also Turkish, capital, provided for in article 1 of the Franco-Turkish agreement of the 27th October, 1932 (Enclosure No. 2 in my despatch No. 372 of the 12th November, 1932).

3. The *Hakimiyeti Milliye* adds that 11 locomotives, 8 coaches, 2 vans and 120 wagons have been handed over to the Turkish State Railways Administration at the same time as the control of the Adana-Fevzi Pasha section.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 2508/120/89]

No. 56.

*Mr. Cowan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 13.)*

(No. 19.)

Sir,

*Aleppo, May 2, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 30th April the leader of the Aleppo Nationalists, Ibrahim Bey Hanano, returned to Aleppo from Damascus. His partisans in Aleppo seized the occasion to stage an imposing demonstration, partly no doubt in order to honour Hanano, but more particularly to impress the strength of Nationalist feeling and of French unpopularity on his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine and Herr Reuben, said to be a German delegate from the League of Nations. Unfortunately for the demonstrators both these gentlemen had left Aleppo before the demonstration began.

2. In the afternoon about a hundred cars and three char-à-bancs conveyed the wealthier Nationalists to Ourem-es-Soughra, a village about 10 miles outside Aleppo, while a large crowd proceeded to the Cazkhaneh, a little further out, at the junction of the Damascus and Alexandretta roads. All these people were unarmed. Suddenly a detachment of Spahis with a few tanks and armoured cars appeared at the cross-roads and began to hustle the mob, who became panic-stricken and resisted. Thereupon the troops fired and the crowd fled, but the road was blocked by the cars which had come out from town and confusion ensued. In the course of the firing and subsequent confusion two people are reported to have been killed and about twenty injured. The troops then searched the waiting cars for arms, but found none, but the occupants of the cars were forced to alight and return to Aleppo on foot, while the cars were driven back by another route. Hanano's car was the only one which was not interfered with.

3. Meanwhile, measures had been taken to prevent rioting in the town, but the Aleppo police are far from efficient in such matters and crowds had assembled in the principal streets. In one place stones were thrown at the police and one constable, who was hard pressed, fired his revolver in the air. This was taken by the supporting troops as a signal for their intervention, and they and the police charged the crowd, who immediately dispersed. So far as I can ascertain there were no casualties.



4. The general impression in the town seems to be that the military and the police rather lost their heads and gave undeserved importance to an episode which, properly handled, would have passed off quietly. There is certainly something to be said for this point of view, but it must be remembered that with an unreliable police force the demonstration might easily have developed into a serious riot, which would have entailed severe measures of repression. Faced with the alternative of being blamed either for excessive severity or laxity, the French authorities chose the former. Had they chosen the second alternative the demonstration would almost certainly have had very serious consequences as popular excitement increased.

5. The general effect of the events described on the local Nationalist party has been to discourage them. Many of the leaders believe that no course is now open to them but to appeal to the League of Nations. They are not, however, united in this opinion, and it is felt that cleavages will soon appear in the party, which will render it ineffective for political action. Meanwhile, the leading Nationalists are conferring among themselves, but their conferences are not expected to lead to anything. It is significant of the discouragement felt that no leading Nationalist has so far ventured to intervene on behalf of the numerous persons arrested in connexion with this affair.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and the acting consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

N. PATRICK COWAN

[E 2718/120/89]

No. 57.

*Acting Consul Todd to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 24.)*

(No. 28.)

Sir,

*Damascus, May 2, 1933.*

WITH reference to Colonel Mackereth's despatch No. 26 of the 24th April, 1933, regarding the political situation, I have the honour to inform you that the Chamber duly reassembled on the 27th April in spite of rumours alleging that no further session would be held until October.

2. The shops were again closed all day, but there were on this occasion no public demonstrations owing to the very thorough measures adopted by the authorities, which effectually prevented the hot-heads from causing trouble. The Nationalist Deputies again abstained from attendance, but nevertheless the Chamber mustered forty-four Deputies out of a total of sixty-nine. The Deputy from Aleppo, Chaker Bey Chabani, a Constitutional Liberal and member of the French party, made a speech condemning the absence of the Deputies in question. He reminded his audience that, according to the rules of the Chamber, Deputies wishing to absent themselves from its sittings for any period up to eight days must obtain the previous consent of the President of the Chamber; if for more than eight days, then the previous permission of the Chamber as a whole must be obtained. It follows, therefore, continued Chaker Bey Chabani, that a Deputy who deliberately absents himself should be punished by not being allowed to collect the monthly salary from the Chamber payable to all Deputies, and which amounts to £Syr. 100 per month (equivalent, at present exchange rate of 430 Syrian piastres to the £1 sterling, to over £23 sterling). Consequently, he felt it to be his duty to bring in a motion demanding the suspension of the salary of any Deputy wilfully absenting himself from the Chamber and thus neglecting to perform his public duties. This motion was, however, adjourned on the proposal of M. Djanji and Ghaleb Brahim, the Chamber evidently finding it inconvenient to adopt such a measure at the present time.

3. The President of the Council then demanded a further adjournment of the Chamber until the 8th May to enable the Ministry to be reconstructed, as the resignation of the two Ministers had only been accepted definitely by the President of the Republic two days before. The adjournment was voted unanimously.

4. Before the Chamber dispersed the President of the Chamber pointed out that in spite of the abstentions of certain Deputies the Chamber could still muster two thirds of its total number. This statement is significant, as two thirds is the

quorum required by article 102 of the Constitution to enable any amendments to be made in the Constitution itself.

5. A solution to the present ministerial crisis is proving more difficult to overcome than was originally expected. Conversations have taken place between the President of the Republic (Mohamed Ali Bey El-Abed), the President of the Chamber (Soubhi Bey Barakat) and the President of the Council (Hakki Bey El-Azm) on the one hand, and both the High Commissioner at Beirut and his delegate in Damascus on the other. Nothing has transpired as to the nature or result of these conversations and no names of possible candidates for the vacant posts have appeared in the press. Negotiations with the French authorities are still proceeding, and a solution is expected by the time Parliament reassembles.

I have, &c.

FRANK H. TODD

[E 2719/120/89]

No. 58.

*Acting Consul Todd to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 24.)*

(No. 29.)

Sir,

*Damascus, May 4, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 28 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to inform you that the Cabinet was reconstituted yesterday under the presidency of Hakki Bey-el-Azm.

2. The composition of the new Ministry is as follows:—

Hakki Bey-el-Azm: President of the Council and Minister of Interior.

Chaker Bey Chabani: Finance.

Yahia Bey Adali: Agriculture and Commerce.

Sheikh Suleiman Joukhadar: Justice.

Selim Bey Jambart: Public Works and Education.

3. It appears that Nassouh Bey-el-Boukhari accepted, and at the last moment refused, the post of Minister of Public Instruction. He was formerly Minister of Agriculture under Damad in 1926-27. The reason for his refusal is not clear. He asked in vain for the Ministry of Finance. He was also influenced in his decision by statements in the Nationalist press urging him not to sever his family's long connexion with the Nationalist cause by his joining the new Cabinet.

4. The new Cabinet is composed entirely of moderate elements without Nationalist participation. A separate Ministry has been created, i.e., the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. Its members are all Deputies with the exception of Suleiman-el-Joukhadar. Chaker Bey Chabani comes in as Minister of Finance in place of Jamil Mardam Bey. The former is a Constitutional Liberal and Deputy for Aleppo. The new Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Yahia Bey Adali, is the Deputy for Antioche, a Liberal, and, incidentally the oldest Deputy in the present Parliament. Suleiman-el-Joukhadar is not a Deputy, and his acceptance of the post of Minister of Justice, in place of the Nationalist Mazhar Pasha, represents his first incursion into the political arena. He is a member of the Reform party, and was defeated at the elections of 1932. He was formerly president of Court of Cassation. Selim Jambart, a moderate of Aleppo, was also Minister of Public Works in the late Cabinet. It was rumoured at the time of the resignation of Jamil Mardam Bey and Mazhar Pasha Rislani that he had also sent in his resignation, but this report proved to be unfounded. He thus becomes Minister of Public Works and Education.

5. It is not yet known whether the Nationalist Deputies will attend the next session of the Chamber on the 8th May.

6. The formation of the new Cabinet has met with a good deal of hostile criticism on the part of Nationalist elements here, and various delegations waited on the President of the Republic yesterday to urge him to abstain from forming a Government until formal assurances had been obtained from the French authorities on the subject of Syrian unity.



7. The present Government does not represent the feeling of the majority of the population, and it is feared that it will negotiate a treaty with the French involving the sacrifice of the principle of unity.

8. The bazaars were closed yesterday afternoon as a protest against the formation of a pro-French Cabinet, as soon as its composition became known.

9. This solution of the ministerial crisis is probably the best that could be found in the circumstances, but in view of the non-co-operation of the Nationalists and even of their active hostility to the new Government, only the future can show whether the Cabinet will be able to withstand the attacks of the Nationalists when the Chamber meets.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

FRANK H. TODD.

[E 2716/120/89]

No. 59.

*Consul-General Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 24.)*

(No. 41.)

Sir,

*Beirut, May 4, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Ruppel, the German delegate on the Permanent Mandates Commission, recently came up from Palestine to pay a short visit to Syria and the Lebanon. He is regarded here as a rather unsympathetic critic of French mandatory methods and his visit was apparently not very welcome, especially as it was made at a time when renewed trouble is being experienced with the extreme Syrian Nationalists by reason of their insistence that the question of "Syrian Unity," that is the immediate inclusion in the State of Syria of the Government of Latakia and of the Jebel Druse, must be settled as they wish before any discussion of the treaty which is to be the beginning of the end of the mandate can be possible. At such a time, the visit of the German delegate might well have proved an encouragement to the extremists and have led them to accentuate their manifestations of dissatisfaction. The presence of an eye-witness who would go back to Geneva with a first-hand account of the signs of trouble he had seen might seem to offer too good a chance to be missed. The German consul in Beirut is a free critic of French methods, and he went with M. Ruppel to Damascus. I happened to meet him on his return when he remarked rather gloatingly, as it seemed to me, that his compatriot had been able to see for himself how "contented" the Syrians were with present conditions. I replied that the Nationalists would presumably never be content so long as there was any foreign control, whatever the nationality of the foreigner, and the conversation changed. M. Ruppel was, I believe, in Damascus when the shops were closed in protest, and there was considerable evidence of armed force. Although the local press has stated that he went about taking photographs and had interviews with Nationalist leaders, the German consul categorically denies this. He emphasises that M. Ruppel came here as a tourist, having, as a director of the company, had the advantage of a free passage on a ship of the Woermann Line.

2. M. Ponsot mentioned the visit to me in the course of a conversation which I had with him while waiting for Sir Arthur Wauchope at the Residency on the morning after his arrival. He told me that M. Ruppel had asked him if he could go to Damascus, and that he had replied that, there being nothing to conceal, he was entirely free to do as he wished in the matter. M. Ponsot spoke as if the visit of M. Ruppel was, in his opinion, neither particularly well timed nor tactful.

3. The French High Commissioner in the course of the conversation also referred to the "Syrian Unity" question. He said that he had told the Nationalists that he was not prepared to share his responsibilities. While the mandate lasted the responsibility was his, and when it was terminated it would be for the independent Syrian Government to settle their own difficulties. He did not intend to place under the Syrian Government the Alawites and the Druses, who at present seemed sincerely to dislike the idea. It was for the Syrian Government,

when it had really found its feet and when a suitable time came—for example, when the treaty was on the point of being made or soon after it had been concluded—to persuade the others that it was in their interest to throw in their lots with it. There might be trouble and in that case who was going to settle it? He would not, and he did not believe that the Damascus politicians could. So long as he was responsible he had to decide what was best.

4. On the following day M. Ponsot met with an accident which obliged him to take to his bed, where it is said he may have to remain for some weeks. Although it was at first rumoured that he was suffering from phlebitis, apparently the trouble is only a badly sprained ankle. However that may be, he is for a time more or less out of action, although he has installed an office in his bedroom and is carrying on as best he can. At the same time, to judge from reports in the Beirut press, the settlement of the Ministerial crisis caused by the withdrawal of the two Nationalist Ministers in the circumstances described in Damascus despatch No. 26 of the 24th April is taking longer than might have been hoped. It is in these circumstances not surprising that suggestions are appearing in the press that the treaty negotiations will have to be postponed until after M. Ponsot's return from Geneva and Paris.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 2809/296/89]

No. 60.

*Mr. Bingham to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 30.)*

*United States Embassy,*

*London, May 27, 1933.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your note of the 4th January, 1933, in reply to the Embassy's memorandum dated the 12th September, 1932, and to state that the Department of State has authorised me to inform you that the Government of the United States assents to the alteration in the frontiers between Syria and the Jebel Druse on the one hand and Transjordan on the other, as set forth in the Anglo-French Agreement concluded on the 31st October, 1931.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

RAY ATHERTON.

[E 2851/120/89]

No. 61.

*Acting Consul Todd to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 31.)*

(No. 30.)

Sir,

*Damascus, May 10, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 28 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to inform you that I was present at the resumed sitting of the Chamber on the 8th instant.

2. As on the previous occasion, the shops were closed as a protest against the present constitution of the Cabinet. A good many of the shopkeepers wished to keep their shops open, but were compelled by groups of students and agitators, who threatened them with violence, to put up their shutters. A few shops did actually remain open until noon, but afterwards were compelled to fall into line with the rest. The streets leading to the Parliament building were heavily guarded by gendarmes and police equipped with revolvers and batons. Furthermore, machine guns had been placed at various strategic points in the town and on the roofs of certain buildings. These extensive precautions against disorder had a sobering effect on the extremists and there was complete calm throughout the day.



3. The Nationalist Deputies once again refrained from attending the sitting, but even so there were forty-four Deputies present—all supporters of the present Cabinet.

4. The President of the Council, Hakki Bey El Azm, read the ministerial declaration, which in essence stated the determination of the Government to maintain order and public safety. This was an essential prerequisite for the realisation of the country's national aspirations in the political, economic and social sphere. Their efforts would be directed towards obtaining guarantees for their independence and sovereignty, and the abolition of the mandate through the signature of a treaty with the French defining the future relations between France and Syria. The Government would carry on the present negotiations with the chief object of realising Syrian unity.

5. The proposed legislative programme of the Government included measures of economy to balance the budget, help for the peasants and the trading community, judicial reform for the improvement of the administration of justice, greater educational facilities, decentralisation of the administrative system, special consideration for the rights of minorities, &c.

6. The House was asked to vote on these proposals, and after certain explanations had been given by Chaker Bey Chabani (Minister of Finance), a vote of confidence in the Government was passed with only one abstention.

7. The sitting was thereupon adjourned until the 11th, having lasted forty-five minutes.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

FRANK H. TODD.

[E 3195/2689/89]

No. 62.

*Acting Consul Todd to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 16.)*

(No. 35.)

Sir,

*Damascus, June 7, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that various political groups in Damascus have taken advantage of the opportunity offered by the passage of King Feisal of Iraq through Amman on the 5th-9th instant, to present him with a petition praying him to intercede with the French Government in the question of Syrian unity.

2. I transmit herewith the original text (1) of this petition, together with a translation. Various journalists and representatives of the above-mentioned groups, including a representative of the political deportees, have proceeded to Amman to present this petition, which contains many thousands of signatures, personally to His Majesty. The Nationalist party was, however, not represented, although there was a rumour that Hashem Bey El Atassi, the Nationalist leader at Homs, would be there. In spite of their decision not to be represented as a party, Jamil Bey, Mardam Bey and Mazhar Pasha Raslan, Nationalist Deputies, have gone in a private capacity.

3. This action of the Nationalist party in thus dissociating itself from the rest of the country as represented by the other political groups, has caused a good deal of commotion in political circles, and is liable to embitter their already strained relations with the other parties.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

FRANK H. TODD.

(1) Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 62.

*Petition.*

(Translation.)

The nation request His Majesty King Feisal to intervene for the solution of the Syrian problem.

His Majesty the Hashimite King Feisal the First,

THE Arab-Syrian nation, which fought and made great sacrifices for the purpose of obtaining its national unity and complete sovereignty, and to which the Allies gave pledges for the realisation of Syrian national aspirations, look to His Majesty the Hashimite, on the occasion of his visit to Europe, and beseech him humbly to look into the Syrian problem, while this land of ours is passing through such a critical period, and thus convince the French Government that the Syrian demands are just and that they should be granted.

The Syrian negotiator was unable to make the voice of this country heard, and to persuade the French that they should abandon the old policy, which so far has caused this land social and economic suffering, and has broken the bonds between the people who are exposed to such a severe economic crisis. Thus, the resources of wealth were cut off and poverty and confusion prevailed in all parts of this land.

The Syrians, however, hope that through the wide influence of His Majesty the great Arab King and through his perfect knowledge of the political stages which Syria has had to pass through, and through the sympathy he cherishes for the attainment of Syrian national aspirations, he will succeed in intervening for them.

Therefore, we the undersigned, who represent all the denominations of the Syrian population, both in the interior and in the coastal regions, irrespective of their religious creeds and political views, hereby submit this petition to His Hashimite Majesty, begging him to intervene with the French Government for the solution of their problem, the attainment of absolute unity and complete independence for this land.

The nation offer their sincere gratitude and abiding thanks to His Majesty, and pray Almighty God to bring his activities to a successful end and protect him with his helping hand.



## CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 7/7/93]

No. 63.

SIXTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Extract from Final Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting (Public) held on December 15, 1932, at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, January 2, 1933.)*

3188. *Iraq: Petitions from the Assyrian Community* (continuation).

NOURI PASHA ES SAID, representative of Iraq, came to the Council table.

M. Benes, speaking as *rapporteur*, stated that the committee constituted in virtue of the Council resolution of the 5th December to study the question of the petitions from the Assyrian community in Iraq had held five meetings.

Availing itself of the powers the Council had conferred on it, it had first obtained additional explanations from M. Orts, *rapporteur* of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

Nouri Pasha Es Said, representative of the Kingdom of Iraq, had also been invited to attend the committee's meetings. After a thorough discussion, during which the committee had made every effort to take into account the Iraqi Government's point of view, a draft resolution had been prepared for submission to the Council and had been accepted by the representative of Iraq.

One passage in the draft resolution seemed to M. Benes to require some explanation. He had in mind the reference to the Iraqi Government's intention to obtain the assistance of a foreign expert. To prevent any misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that, in referring to the services of that expert for a "limited period," the Iraqi Government simply desired to say—as Nouri Pasha Es Said had explained to the committee—that the expert would not hold permanent office; his services would end when the work in question had been completed.

The committee was convinced that the draft resolution M. Benes had the honour to submit to the Council would permit of a settlement of the question in accordance with the concern which had prompted the Permanent Mandates Commission's opinion, namely, that the Assyrian community should be settled in such a way as to obviate its being scattered among populations of other races.

The *rapporteur* was sure that, should negotiations with foreign Governments prove necessary, the Council would not refuse to assist the Iraqi Government.

M. Benes desired, in conclusion, to thank the representatives of France, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom, as well as the representative of Iraq, for the valuable assistance given to the *rapporteur* in the study of this legacy from the Administration of Iraq under the mandates system. He desired further to express his gratitude and that of his colleagues to M. Orts, *rapporteur* of the Mandates Commission, for his valuable contribution to the committee's work. He was sure he was interpreting the unanimous feelings of those who had dealt with this question in wishing the Iraqi Government success in its efforts to bring about a settlement satisfactory to all concerned.

In this spirit the *rapporteur* presented to the Council the following draft resolution<sup>(1)</sup> :—

"The Council,

"In conformity with the proposal submitted by the committee charged by its decision of the 5th December, 1932, to prepare a draft resolution regarding the question of the Assyrian community of Iraq in the light of the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the 14th November, 1932;

<sup>(1)</sup> Document C. 837, 1932, VI.

"Adopts the view of the Permanent Mandates Commission that the demand of the Assyrians for administrative autonomy within Iraq cannot be accepted;

"Notes with satisfaction the declaration of the representative of Iraq of the intention of the Iraqi Government to select from outside Iraq a foreign expert to assist it for a limited period in the settlement of all landless inhabitants of Iraq, including Assyrians, and in the carrying out of its scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq under suitable conditions and, so far as may be possible, in homogeneous units, it being understood that the existing rights of the present population shall not be prejudiced;

"Feels confident that, if these measures do not provide a complete solution of the problem and there remain Assyrians unwilling or unable to settle in Iraq, the Iraqi Government will take all such measures as may be possible to facilitate the settlement of the said Assyrians elsewhere;

"Requests the Iraqi Government to be so good as to keep it informed in due course of the result of the foregoing measures."

Nouri Pasha Es Said, representative of Iraq, expressed his gratitude to the Council committee for the consideration and kindness shown to him during its deliberations and for the opportunity afforded him to explain the views of his Government and the situation in Iraq.

He accepted the draft resolution and assured the Council that the Iraqi Government would do its utmost to discharge the obligation which the resolution placed upon it. His Government deeply sympathised with the Assyrians in the hardships and sufferings they had undergone in the past, and, for reasons of humanity if for none other, would do all that lay in its power to provide for them. He was confident that the measures which the Iraqi Government would take would satisfy the majority of the Assyrians, who would find in Iraq a new home and renewed prosperity.

Mr. Cadogan thought that the committee of the Council was to be congratulated on producing an eminently practical and constructive text; practical because it took into account the difficulties which undoubtedly existed, and constructive because it would—he confidently hoped—prove to be a valuable contribution to the solution of this difficult problem. There would seem to be no reason why the Assyrians should not find in Iraq the prosperity, security and contentment which everyone wished for them. But their future lay largely in their own hands; it must be to their own interest to abandon impracticable ideals, to face up to the facts and, following the advice given by the Permanent Mandates Commission last year, to become good and loyal citizens of the Iraqi State. The Iraqi Government would, he felt sure, treat the Assyrians generously and well; by so doing it would not only gain a new and valuable source of strength to its country, but, what was more important, it would have established the good faith of Iraq before the nations of the world.

The President congratulated the *rapporteur* and his colleagues on the committee on having produced an arrangement which everyone hoped would lead to a very satisfactory solution of the problem. All the members of the Council would have noted with much satisfaction the declaration of the Iraqi representative. He would add that the Council would appreciate it if the Iraqi Government could see its way to make reports from time to time in connexion with this problem.

The draft resolution was adopted.



[E 343/175/93]

No. 64.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 9.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 5, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1181 of the 29th December last, I have the honour to transmit herewith an amended text of the Treaty of Friendship between Iraq and Afghanistan, together with copies of the notes exchanged at the time of signature by the Iraqi Minister and the Afghan Ambassador at Tehran.

2. These texts were recently communicated to me by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, and show, *inter alia*, that the treaty was signed on the 20th December, and not on the 25th December as previously reported.

3. By the notes exchanged, the perpetual precedence of His Majesty's Ambassadors in Iraq is expressly recognised.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 64.

*Traité d'Amitié entre l'Irak et l'Afghanistan.*

SA Majesté le Roi d'Irak et Sa Majesté le Roi d'Afghanistan, désireux d'établir des liens d'amitié et de bonne entente entre leurs pays respectifs, ont désigné à cet effet pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Irak :

Son Excellence M. Tawfik Bey Al Swaidi, Ministre plénipotentiaire et Envoyé extraordinaire d'Irak en Perse (Téhéran);

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Afghanistan :

Son Excellence Sardar Chir Ahmad Khan, Ambassadeur d'Afghanistan en Perse (Téhéran);

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus sur ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Les hautes parties contractantes se reconnaissent mutuellement leurs indépendances et se déclarent résolues à entretenir une paix constante et une amitié perpétuelle entre leurs royaumes respectifs.

## ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir leurs relations diplomatiques et consulaires sur la base du droit commun international.

Elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de chacune d'elles recevront, sur le territoire de l'autre, le traitement consacré par les principes et la pratique du droit commun international.

## ARTICLE 3.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échangés aussitôt que possible à Téhéran.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait en double en français à Téhéran, le 20 décembre 1932.

TAWFIK-AL-SWAIDI.  
CHIR AHMAD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 64.

*Iraqi Minister to Afghan Ambassador.*

M. l'Ambassadeur.

*Téhéran, le 20 décembre 1932.*

AU moment où nous apposons nos signatures au présent Traité d'Amitié entre nos pays respectifs, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence, par ordre de mon Gouvernement, ce qui suit :

Il sera entendu que l'application du paragraphe 2 de l'article 2 du présent traité s'effectuera d'une façon conforme aux promesses contenues dans l'acte déclaratif daté du 30 juin 1930 faisant partie du Traité d'Alliance anglo-irakienne signé à la même date, étant donnée la disposition de mon Gouvernement à accorder à tous les Ambassadeurs du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique accrédités auprès de la Cour de Sa Majesté irakienne le privilège de la précedence envers les représentants diplomatiques d'autres pays en Irak.

Par conséquent, je prie votre Excellence de prendre note de ce fait et de bien vouloir m'en aviser.

Veuillez, &amp;c.

Le Ministre d'Irak,

TAWFIK-AL-SWAIDI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 64.

*Afghan Ambassador to Iraqi Minister.*

M. le Ministre,

*Téhéran, le 20 décembre 1932.*

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser à votre Excellence réception de sa lettre datée le 20 décembre courant, concernant l'application du paragraphe 2 de l'article 2 du présent Traité d'Amitié, conformément aux promesses données par le Gouvernement royal d'Irak au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique en vue d'accorder à tous ses Ambassadeurs accrédités auprès de la Cour de Sa Majesté irakienne le privilège de la précedence envers tous les représentants diplomatiques des autres pays en Irak.

Par conséquent, je m'empresse de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que j'ai déjà pris note de ce fait conformément à votre désir.

Veuillez, &amp;c.

L'Ambassadeur d'Afghanistan,

CHIR AHMAD.

[E 344/344/93]

No. 65.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 10.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 5, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a circular letter which I am addressing to all the British advisers and other British officials in the service of the Iraqi Government in accordance with paragraph 9 of your despatch No. 687 of the 8th December, 1932. I have shown this letter to His Majesty King Feisal.

2. I am fully conscious that it is in the interests both of His Majesty's Government and the advisers themselves that all action should be avoided which would give foreign Governments grounds for suspicion that His Majesty's Government are, in spite of the change in the status of this country, endeavouring to control its administration or to interfere unduly in its internal affairs. For this reason I entirely agree that there should be nothing in the nature of a written understanding between myself and the Iraqi Government or the advisers.

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3. As regards the proposals made in paragraphs 6 to 8 of your despatch, I agree that it will be advisable to concentrate the source of my information and the channel of enquiry in the person of the British adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in regard to matters concerning the internal security of Iraq and the treatment of minorities.

4. There are other questions, however, affecting the finances of Iraq, the oilfields, the railways, the Port of Basra, and the Shatt-al-Arab, on which it is clearly advisable that I should continue to receive up-to-date information. Such information is not at the disposal of the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, but can be supplied to me privately by the other British advisers in the service of the Iraqi Government. Since my return to Bagdad, I have freely availed myself of this assistance, without which it would be difficult for me adequately to safeguard the special interests of His Majesty's Government in these important questions.

5. You will have observed from paragraph 16 of my despatch No. 1093, Confidential, of 17th November last, that King Feisal has already expressed his desire that the British advisers should continue to keep me aware privately of any important developments. Since that despatch was written the Iraqi Prime Minister has privately expressed to me his agreement with King Feisal's wishes.

I am of opinion that a reasonable degree of liaison can be maintained in the normal course of my social relations with the advisers without arousing the resentment of my diplomatic colleagues, and I feel confident that you will approve of the action I have taken in the matter.

6. In the circumstances, I assume that it is unnecessary for me to approach King Feisal and the Iraqi Prime Minister again in connexion with this matter.

7. On relinquishing this post, I will, as you suggest, express to the Iraqi Government a confident hope in writing that my successor will be accorded the same facilities and courtesies as those given to me, and will ask for their authority to inform my successor in this sense. This communication will then be the only one in writing dealing with the subject of the relations between the advisers and this Embassy.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 65.

*Circular to British Officials in Iraqi Government Service.*

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 1933.*

I AM directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to address you as follows:—

2. With the establishment of Iraq as a fully independent State and the consequent entry into force of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq, which was signed on the 30th June, 1930, the special relation which had existed between His Majesty's Government since April 1920 has come to an end, and, consequently, the special responsibilities towards His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq, which were defined in the letter addressed on first appointment to British officials in the service of the Iraqi Government and in the subsequent letter of 1930, have also terminated.

3. The Secretary of State desires me to express to you the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the successful culmination of the policy which has been steadily pursued in Iraq during the past twelve years, and their high appreciation of the manner in which the duties of the British officials in the service of the Iraqi Government have been performed throughout that period.

I am, &c.

[E 457/7/93]

No. 66.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 24.)*

(No. 32.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 12, 1933.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 697 of the 15th December, I have the honour to report that the Mar Shimun arrived in Bagdad on the 4th January in compliance with an invitation which, I understand, he received from Nuri Pasha, to confer with the Iraqi Government before returning to his residence in the north. On the 5th January I invited him to luncheon, and subsequently had a conversation with him which lasted over two hours, and at which the Air Officer Commanding, the Brigadier Commanding the Levies, and Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes were present.

2. I informed his Beatitude that, now that the League had reached a final decision with regard to the Assyrians, I hoped that he would give his fellow-countrymen a lead as to the policy they should adopt in the future. They had the choice of two alternatives. The first was to settle down in Iraq and make the best of what the Iraqi Government were prepared to offer them, in conformity with the recent resolution of the Council of the League. I said that, apart from land settlement, I had reason to hope that a certain number of discharged levies might eventually be enlisted in the Iraqi army or police, if the general attitude of the Assyrians was shown to be satisfactory. The other alternative which he had mentioned to me was for the Assyrians to attempt to find a home elsewhere. I sincerely hoped that his Beatitude would select the former course, as I was sure that the Iraqi Government was determined to do their best to satisfy all reasonable requirements.

3. The Mar Shimun replied that he was disappointed with the decision of the League and that he had published his protest at Geneva. He said he wanted a single homogeneous settlement for his people in Iraq, which the Permanent Mandates Commission believed to be possible, and added that he had hoped that a Nansen Commissioner would arrange a settlement on the lines of the Armenian settlement in North Syria. He said there was plenty of land in Kurdistan, hinting that room could be found by the displacement of Kurds. I made it quite clear to him that such a solution was out of the question.

4. I then enquired whether he had explored the second alternative, namely, that of leaving Iraq and finding a home elsewhere. His Beatitude replied that he would like to return to Hakkari. I agreed that this would be a good solution for the settlement of surplus Assyrians for whom suitable land could not be found in Iraq, but pointed out to him that there were many serious difficulties to be overcome, and that the kidnapping by the Assyrians of the Turkish Vali some years ago was not an encouraging precedent.

5. I suggested that the best course open to the Assyrians was to settle down in this country and co-operate with the Iraqi Government in making their citizenship a success. In doing this they would enjoy the sympathy of His Majesty's Embassy and of public opinion abroad. The Mar Shimun replied that His Majesty's representatives in Bagdad had afforded very little help in the past, and could in the future do nothing more than any other foreign mission. He added that he felt it his duty to report to the Assyrians everything that had happened at Geneva, and leave it to them to decide what course they would adopt. He hinted that some 2,600 unemployed and landless Assyrian families might be driven to desperate measures to obtain the necessities of life.

6. Air Vice-Marshal Burnett then raised the question of the future of the Assyrians in the levies. He stated that, although the arrangement for the settlement of the so-called "strike" had lapsed on the 15th December, he had, out of courtesy to the Mar Shimun, refrained from taking any action to reduce the number of the Assyrians in the levies until his Beatitude's return from Geneva. He wished to make it quite clear that, in accordance with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, it was necessary that the levies should be reorganised as an Air Defence Force, and about 400 Assyrians would have to be discharged by the 1st April. Moreover, his confidence in the Assyrians had been so shaken by what had occurred in June 1932 that no levy would be re-engaged unless he took an oath to abstain from politics and the discussion of tribal affairs. The Air Officer Commanding pointed out that, as a military commander in charge of a

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defence force, he had nothing to do with politics, and insisted on complete military discipline, and that he would not tolerate the interference of any outside authority. Furthermore, on the formation in the spring of the new Air Defence Force, all ranks would be required to take an additional oath of allegiance to King Feisal. On these conditions alone would he re-enlist the levies, and the Mar Shimun must make up his mind within a few days as to what advice he would give to the Assyrians. The Air Officer Commanding added that he would be sorry to lose their services, but that he could brook no further delay in the carrying out of his arrangements for discharges and re-enlistments. After some discussion, it was arranged that the Mar Shimun should have an opportunity of consulting with certain Assyrian maliks, and the 17th January was given to him as the latest date by which he was to make up his mind whether he was prepared to recommend the new conditions of service. I enclose copies of two letters which the Air Officer Commanding has addressed to the Mar Shimun on this subject, dated the 4th January and the 6th January. Air Vice-Marshal Burnett personally handed the letter of the 4th January to the Mar Shimun at this interview.

7. I concluded the conversation with a final appeal to the Patriarch to consider most carefully the grave responsibility which rested upon him. The action that he was about to take would have the greatest significance for the future of his people. I urged him to rise to the occasion and take the only course which I felt to be in the real interests of his people, and to refrain from choosing an alternative which might have the effect of driving his flock once more into the wilderness.

8. Since this interview took place the Mar Shimun, at my suggestion, has been received by King Feisal and the Prime Minister, and I learn that he informed them both that he had decided to recommend his people to accept the decision of the League in a proper spirit, and to resolve to settle down quietly as loyal citizens of Iraq.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

*Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command, to the Mar Shimun.*

Beatitude,

*Hinai, January 4, 1933.*

TO-DAY I hope to have the opportunity of discussing with you the future of the Assyrians in the Iraq levies.

Most of the points we can deal with verbally, and I intend to explain to you why it is absolutely necessary that all the personnel of the levies, from now henceforward, shall refrain from taking part in political activity during their service.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding about this in the future, I feel it is desirable that all serving personnel now in the levies, and those enrolled in the future, should make a definite promise to this effect.

I therefore attach, for your information, a copy of the promise which all men in the levies will be required to make.

Furthermore, I would remind you that very shortly, as the result of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, which has now come into effect, the Iraq levies will be converted into the Air Defence Force. As this force is regarded as part of the Iraqi forces, it will be necessary for all personnel in it, when the change takes place, to promise allegiance to King Feisal and his successors, and that they will conform with Iraq military law as administered by their British officers.

It is only under the above terms, the first to be applied immediately and the second when the Air Defence Force is actually formed, that any man can continue to serve under British officers in Iraq. I hope that you will see your way to explain these requirements and the reasons for them to the Assyrians, whose services for many reasons I should be most reluctant to lose.

I remain, &c.

C. S. BURNETT, A.O.C.

*Conditions of Service in Iraq Levies.*

*Abstention from Political Activity.*

All personnel in the Iraq levies or in the future Air Defence Force, whether Assyrians, Arabs or Kurds, whether at present serving, are re-engaged or newly-recruited, will be required to make the following promise:—

"I swear that I, whilst a soldier in the Iraq levies (or Air Defence Force), will not take part, by talking, attending meetings or signing papers, in any matters concerning the tribal affairs of my people or others, either inside or outside of Iraq."

Furthermore, no Assyrian, whilst serving henceforth in the levies or Air Defence Force, will be allowed at the same time to hold a position as tribal leader.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

*Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command, to the Mar Shimun.*

Beatitude,

*Hinai, January 6, 1933.*

AS I have already explained to you at our meeting at the Embassy on the 5th January, it is necessary that I should know within a definite period whether or not you and your people agree to a settlement with regard to the service of Assyrians in the levies under the new conditions, the principal of which is the oath, of which I gave you a copy, and which all officers and men will be required to take.

You agreed that you would be able to give me the necessary decision by the 17th January.

I must therefore be informed of the decision by midnight the 17th January, 1933, in order that, in the event of your not agreeing to the conditions, I can arrange the orderly disbandment of the Assyrian levies as agreed before your departure for Geneva, and to enable me to make other arrangements to complete the levy force under my command.

Yours sincerely,

C. S. BURNETT.

[E 598/7/93]

No. 67.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 39.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 19, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32 of the 12th January, with which I enclosed copies of the letters addressed by the Air Officer Commanding to the Mar Shimun on the subject of the future service of the Assyrians in the levies and in the Air Defence Force, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the reply which Mar Shimun has made to the Air Officer Commanding.

2. You will note that the Patriarch has given instructions to all Assyrian officers and men to accept the new conditions which the Air Officer Commanding has laid down.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 67.

*Mar Shimun to the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq.*

*Mosul, January 16, 1933.*

REFERENCE your letters dated the 4th and 6th January, 1933.

I held a conference of the representative Assyrian officers now serving in the levies at 5.15 P.M. to-day, in the course of which I gave them my strong advice, in view of the present circumstances and all what has happened, to continue their

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services according to the new conditions. They readily accepted my advice and I therefore instructed them to pass this message to all officers and men in their respective units on their return to their stations.

I trust that this ultimate loyalty will remain as a living testimony in the eyes of His Majesty's Government of the most loyal and faithful service hitherto rendered to it by the Assyrians, and I and my people hope that that Government will one day recompensate this service in a manner deserved to it.

ESHAI SHIMUN,  
*By the Grace of God,  
Catholicos Patriarch of the East.*

[E 733/733/93]

No. 68.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 7.)*(No. 55.)  
Sir,*Bagdad, January 25, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that towards the end of December reports were received from Mosul in the Ministry of the Interior, which indicated that a number of the subordinate leaders of Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan, including his brother, Muhammad Sadiq, had appeared on the frontier and were organising armed bands. On the 22nd December one of these bands was engaged by the police near Mergasur (Shirwan nahiyah), and one bandit was killed.

2. From the latest news which has reached me it appears that with the exception of Sheikh Ahmad himself, the Turks have now released all the men who surrendered to them last summer, when Sheikh Ahmad was finally defeated, and that a considerable number of them are now living in villages near the frontier and under no control.

3. The Iraqi Government have protested to the Turkish Government and have undertaken to pardon all concerned, with the exception of one man, Khalil Khushawi (against whom there is a charge for a brutal murder), if the Turks will hand them over in custody at Zakho or Kani Rash.

4. It is to be hoped that the Turkish Government will agree to this proposal; otherwise, although they can at present do little harm, the country being under deep snow, they are likely to become in the spring a serious embarrassment to the local authorities in the recently occupied Barzan district.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 741/249/65]

No. 69.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 7.)*(No. 65.)  
Sir,*Bagdad, January 26, 1933.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 263 of the 19th December last, I have the honour to inform you that the Secretary of State for Air arrived at Bagdad on the 19th January as my guest, having flown from Egypt in a Royal Air Force "Victoria" aircraft.

2. On the morning of the 20th January, I accompanied Lord Londonderry on official visits to King Feisal and King Ali and cards were exchanged with three Cabinet Ministers. In the afternoon he inspected air headquarters and the Royal Air Force General Hospital. My guests at dinner, in the evening, included King Feisal, the Chief of the General Staff of the Iraqi Army and the Senior Iraqi Officer in the Royal Iraqi Air Force.

3. Lord Londonderry left for Mosul by air, early on the morning of the 21st January, accompanied by Air Vice-Marshal Burnett. He spent two nights as the guest of No. 30 Squadron, Royal Air Force, and during his stay in the Mosul area was able to meet the leading British civilians and the local notables,

including the Mar Shimun. On the 23rd January he made an extensive flight over the Barzan area and lunched with the officers of the 2nd Battalion, Iraq Levies, at Sulaimani.

4. It had been Lord Londonderry's intention to fly to Basra on the 24th January. He was unable to do so, however, owing to bad weather and the visit was consequently postponed until the 25th January. The programme for the 26th January includes an inspection of the Iraqi Air Force at Hinaidi, and a visit to the new civil aerodrome at Bagdad. At dinner, at the Embassy, the Secretary of State will meet a number of prominent Iraqi statesmen and officials.

5. The Secretary of State proposes to leave Bagdad for London by air on the 27th January. His visit has created an excellent impression on King Feisal and the Iraqi Government.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 968/502/93]

No. 70.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 20.)*(No. 75.)  
Sir,*Bagdad, February 9, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the report<sup>(1)</sup> by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt on the Barzan operations of 1932, to which Sir Hubert Young referred in his despatch No. 995 of the 12th October, 1932. Although more than seven months have elapsed since the termination of these difficult operations, they were conducted during a period when I was His Majesty's High Commissioner and Commander-in-chief in Iraq, and perhaps a few observations from me will not be out of place.

2. In paragraph 4 of my confidential despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated the 20th January, 1932, I stated that it was my confident hope that, with the co-operation of the Royal Air Force, the territory over which the Sheikh of Barzan then held oppressive sway would be brought under the administration of the Iraqi Government during the course of the summer of 1932 and thus complete the pacification of the northern areas of Iraq. This hope was happily fulfilled and great credit is due to the Iraqi army, which proved its adaptability in its first experience of serious fighting in mountainous country, and especially to Major-General Rowan-Robinson and the officers of the British military mission, who were responsible both for the preparation and the carrying out of the plan of operations and for the successful manner in which the object was achieved.

3. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that the operations could not have been brought to a successful conclusion, at any rate within the space of a few months, without the notable assistance which was given by the Royal Air Force in the execution of the general plan. In one action, in particular, the prompt and very gallant participation by No. 30 Squadron of the Royal Air Force undoubtedly saved the Iraqi troops from a disaster of the first magnitude and, later, the timely support rendered by No. 55 and No. 70 (Bombing) Squadrons of the Royal Air Force not only had the effect of restoring the shattered moral of the Iraqi regiments, but was responsible for their refitting and revictualling after they had lost nearly the whole of their transport. The conduct of the campaign by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt was a masterly piece of work.

I also desire to bring to your notice the clever rescue by my oriental secretary, Captain V. Holt, of the two airmen of the Royal Air Force who fell into the hands of Sheikh Ahmad after their machine had crashed. This could not have been successfully performed without a high degree of tact and courage and knowledge of the country.

4. Since the object and nature of these operations has been misrepresented by certain persons in England, I will refer briefly to the problem with which the Iraqi Government were faced. Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan was the last of the autocratic tribal leaders in Kurdistan, who, in spite of receiving fair and

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



honourable offers of settlement, resolutely declined to agree to his country being brought under the control of the Central Government at Bagdad and carried fire and sword throughout the northern areas. He paid no taxes and observed no laws, and his rule had reached a stage of savagery and oppression which could no longer be tolerated by any self-respecting Government. The great majority of the Kurds despised him for his cowardice and hated him for his ferocity and injustice. Apart from a band of 500 fanatical adherents who battered on his predatory rule, he had few friends in Kurdistan, and the Kurds, as a whole, are thankful to be rid of him. It is a matter for satisfaction that the turbulent areas over which he held sway have been brought under the regular administration of the Iraqi Government a few months before the termination of the British mandate. Had it been otherwise, the Iraqi Government would not have been given a fair start in Kurdistan, since I do not believe that it would have been possible to root out this nest of robbers and murderers, except as a result of prolonged operations at a cost which Iraq could not afford, without the intensive bombing operations so successfully carried out by the Royal Air Force.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 862/862/93]

No. 71.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 13.)*

(No. 84.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 2, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi arrived in Bagdad on the 18th January, having travelled overland via Amman in a large Leyland six-wheeler, which I understand he had had specially built for the journey at a cost of £4,000.

2. He was received on arrival as the guest of King Feisal and was accommodated in His Majesty's country villa at Harthiyah.

On the second day of his visit he dined at the Embassy, where he met the Secretary of State for Air, who was my guest at that time. He was at pains to express to me his great admiration for everything British and stressed the point that he had selected a British car for his journey and had travelled across the Mediterranean in the *Empress of Britain*. He spoke contemptuously of the inability of the French to produce a good six-wheeler or to build a luxury liner which was reasonably proof against fire, and said that he hoped that the Quai d'Orsay in dealing with Syria would adopt the same statesmanlike policy as His Majesty's Government had followed in Iraq.

3. On the 22nd January he visited the Holy Cities of Karbala and Najaf, and four days later he left Bagdad to travel via Kirkuk and Mosul to Nisibin, where he took the train to Constantinople.

4. King Feisal has told me in confidence that he was quite unable to discover the intention of the ex-Khedive's visit. He had sounded him thoroughly, endeavouring to draw him on Syrian, Palestinian and Egyptian politics, but had obtained no result. He ridiculed reports that Abbas Hilmi aspired to the Caliphate or to the throne of Palestine or Syria, and said that he could only conclude that the ex-Khedive hoped, through a show of friendship for himself, to demonstrate his goodwill towards His Majesty's Government and thereby inspire more confidence in official circles in England.

5. So far as my information goes, it appears that Abbas Hilmi behaved correctly throughout his visit and did nothing to confirm the extravagant rumours regarding his plans which have appeared in the Palestinian and Syrian press. He seems clever enough, however, to cover up any objectionable activities that he may have indulged in during his stay in Bagdad.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 863/347/65]

No. 72.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 13.)*

(No. 85.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 2, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1164 of the 21st December last, I have the honour to inform you that, during an audience which I had with King Feisal yesterday, he adverted again to the subject of the Arab congress. His Majesty informed me that an organising committee would soon be set up, and would publish a preliminary agenda for the work of the congress, which would probably meet early in April in Bagdad. Its aim would be to consider how the political objectives of the Arabs could be achieved through closer cultural, social and economic union.

2. I repeated my previous warnings as to the danger of the deliberations of the congress increasing the difficulties in the way of the solution of the problem of Arab aspirations in Syria and Palestine, and emphasised that any violent criticism of either British or French policy in these two countries could do incalculable harm to Arab interests, besides seriously embarrassing the Iraqi Government and King Feisal himself. His Majesty said that he fully appreciated the force of my arguments, and, while he could not, of course, give any binding assurances as to what might be said at the congress, he was confident that those who would take part would discuss Arab problems in a calm and statesmanlike manner, and would seek by constructive proposals to facilitate the solution of the difficulties which confronted Great Britain and France in their relations with the Arabs. For his part, he was convinced that the realisation of the aspirations of the Arabs was dependent on the maintenance of close friendly relations with His Majesty's Government, and he was full of hope that the congress would come to the same conclusion.

3. I then enquired what countries would be likely to send delegates to the congress. His Majesty said that he expected representatives of the Arabs in Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan to take part. It was unlikely that Egypt would be represented owing to the split in the Wafd, but delegates from Saudi Arabia might possibly participate. The organisers had sent a representative to Mecca to approach King Ibn Saud in the matter, and he had been informed that there would be no objection to delegates from the Hejaz or Nejd attending, provided that nothing would be said at the congress to harm King Ibn Saud's interests.

I closed the conversation with the remark that, in any event, I relied on His Majesty to take whatever action might be necessary to ensure that the congress would steer clear of the dangers to which I had drawn his attention.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Tehran, Jerusalem, Istanbul, Beirut and Jeddah.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 864/864/93]

No. 73.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 13.)*

(No. 86.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 2, 1933.*

I HAD a long talk yesterday with King Feisal on the subject of devoting the considerable oil royalties, which are now being paid annually into the Iraqi Treasury, to the service of the best interests of the country.

2. On a previous occasion I had pointed out to His Majesty that Persia had little or nothing to show for the £11 million which she had drawn from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as royalties in recent years. I hoped that the Iraqi Government would not make the mistake of merging their royalties in the general revenue account, as I felt that such a manner of dealing with them would inevitably lead to wasteful expenditure and extravagance. I suggested that the royalties should be paid into a separate account and earmarked for schemes best calculated to facilitate the development of the country's resources.



I particularly instanced railways and irrigation works, and I suggested that a programme of works of this nature should be carefully drawn up and examined by the strongest committee available in the country, with a view to arriving at an estimate of Iraq's requirements for some years to come. A general scheme should be evolved which would not be the sport of party politics, but would be carried through by successive Governments. I said that if such a programme was formed it would be much easier to discuss with a financial house in London the various questions affecting the loan which I understood the Iraqi Government would attempt to raise on the London market.

3. King Feisal said that he entirely agreed that the oil royalties should be kept separate from the general revenue account. He proposed to form a strong committee to draw up a list of urgent public works with their approximate cost. He felt that it was no use going into the market for a small loan, and he proposed that the Iraqi Government should estimate their requirements for the next ten years and earmark the whole of the oil royalties for the service of a loan of a comprehensive amount. He said that he had been impressed by my arguments as to the political, as well as the economical, necessity of an early extension of the railway from Kirkuk to Arbil and Mosul. He also felt that it was high time that the Tigris at Bagdad should be spanned by a modern steel railway bridge and one or two road bridges. He proposed that the cost of constructing the Iraq section of the Bagdad-Haifa Railway shall be included in the general programme, as well as important irrigation works, such as the Habbaniyah Escape and the Abu Gharaib and Gharraf Barrage schemes. He said that he hoped to take with him to London next summer one or two experts, who could discuss the details of the loan. In the meantime he would be very grateful if I could prepare the way for the London discussions by indicating the approximate nature of the Iraqi Government's requirements and the terms which they were prepared to offer. His Majesty explained that the total amount of the loan might extend to £10 or £15 million, and he would personally be prepared to set aside the whole of the receipts from oil royalties, which, at a conservative estimate, might be put at £600,000 a year, to be used in the service of the loan for interest and sinking fund. He realised the difficulties of the British Treasury at the present time, and understood that the embargo on foreign loans had not yet been raised. He would be prepared, however, to guarantee that all contracts for the public works programme should be granted to British firms, if the loan which he had in mind could be arranged on satisfactory terms.

4. His Majesty explained that a loan of £3 or £4 million would be of no practical use to the Iraqi Government, as they were able to finance works to this amount out of their current oil revenues. For instance, he said, the Iraqi Government had received during the month of January the sum of about £700,000 (actually the net amount, after deduction of the 10 per cent. payment to Turkey, is, I believe, about £660,000), and the amount available this time next year would be increased to £1½ million. The sums which would fall due to be paid on the works in contemplation (excluding railways) would not exceed these annual receipts.

5. I informed King Feisal that I would report our conversation to you, and would do my best to prepare the way for further discussions in London next summer.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 970/341/93]

No. 74.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 20.)*

(No. 88.)

Sir,

Bagdad, February 8, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith my report on the heads of foreign missions in Bagdad.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 74.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Bagdad.**United States of America.*

## MINISTERS.

MR. PAUL KNABENSHUE was appointed Minister Resident of the United States of America in November 1932. He has seen long service in the Near East, having been for many years consul-general in Cairo and later in Jerusalem, where he and his Irish wife were very popular, and had a reputation for entertaining wisely and well.

This is Mr. Knabenshue's first diplomatic post. He is evidently uncomfortable in his present Legation, and is busy planning a new spacious building in Bagdad West.

*Germany.*

Dr. Fritz Grobba came to Bagdad in March 1932 as Chargé d'Affaires, and was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary on his return from leave in December last.

I first met Herr Grobba in Kabul in 1924, where he showed himself to be friendly towards British policy. He has had long experience of the Middle East, and served with the Turkish armies in Palestine during the war. He is an able and well-informed man, who is likely to work actively to further the interests of the steadily growing German colony in Bagdad.

He speaks accurate though somewhat laboured English. His wife speaks and writes English as though it were her native tongue.

*Persia.*

Mirza Saiyid Baqir Khan Kazemi (Muhazzib-al-Daulah) was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary at Bagdad in September 1932. He has previously served in Washington and Herat and in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Tehran. For a short time in 1931 he was acting Minister for Roads and Communications.

He is an energetic and hardworking man, who, acting no doubt under the Shah's orders, has shown himself to be over zealous in matters affecting the Perso-Iraqi frontier. He speaks English, learnt during his five years' service in Washington. His wife is occasionally to be seen in mixed society.

*Turkey.*

Tahir Lutfi Bey has been Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary since 1930.

He is an agreeable but somewhat slow-witted Turk of the old school, whose previous service has been passed chiefly in the Balkans. He enjoys excellent relations with the Iraqi Government. His wife, who is a pleasant and intelligent woman, is very popular in English society.

## CHARGES D'AFFAIRES.

*France.*

M. Paul Lépassier was appointed French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad on the 30th June, 1930. Much below the average height, he is handicapped by his insignificant appearance, and his extreme nervousness and excitability have made him something of a figure of fun among his colleagues.

Before coming to Bagdad, M. Lépassier was secretary to the High Commissioner of Syria for five years, and professes to hold strong views on what he describes as mismanagement of Syrian affairs by the French High Commission. He tells me that he is convinced that the only satisfactory solution of the Syrian problem is for the French Government to follow our example in Iraq, but he laments to me in private that the Quai d'Orsay is generally overruled by the military party in Paris.



Italy.

Cav. Uff. Mario Porta was appointed Chargé d'Affaires in November 1932. He has already seen service in Bogotá and Addis Ababa, but is none the less depressed by living conditions in Bagdad.

Cav. Porta is a dapper little man and speaks excellent English. His bearing towards this Embassy has always been friendly and correct, but I suspect an inferiority complex. He complained to me at his first visit that he ought to have been allowed to deliver his letters of credence to King Faisal in person.

He has set himself assiduously to study the politics of the Arabic world, and confidently hopes to be able to increase Italian prestige in the Middle East. Like his predecessor, he feels that England and France have divided the plums between them, and he is anxious that Italy should get her share.

He has an English wife.

[E 1123/105/93]

No. 75.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 27.)*

(No. 114.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 16, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 21 of the 11th February, I have the honour to offer the following observations on the general election which concluded on the 8th February with the final polling for Deputies in all constituencies.

2. The progress of the somewhat lengthy procedure of first and second degree elections, which has to be carried out under the existing law, aroused remarkably little public interest. The press confined itself in the main to expressing pious hopes that able and honest men would be returned, and the political parties showed little activity. The general secretary of the Nationalist party, Jafar Chalabi-abu-Timman, repeating his tactics at the last election in 1930, made an abortive attempt to persuade the Executive Committee of the party to declare a boycott of the elections, but this was the only ripple which disturbed the placid surface of the electoral waters. The party of National Brotherhood, of which Yasin Pasha is the leading figure, made no pronouncement of policy, and Nuri Pasha's 'Ahd party maintained a similarly cryptic silence.

3. In the final polling the candidates nominated by the Government were everywhere successful, but this does not necessarily mean that the new Chamber will give constant support to the present Cabinet. It seems that the men now elected have all been carefully chosen by the King, and it is as King's men and not party men that they have secured their seats. I anticipate, therefore, that the new Chamber will only support the present Cabinet for so long as they continue to enjoy the King's favour and that, when this favour is withdrawn, the Deputies will readily give their support to another Cabinet of the King's choice.

4. Yasin Pasha and a number of his friends, such as Ali Jaudat, Jamil Madfai and Muhammad Zaki, have been returned and it seems clear that he could both form a Cabinet and find a majority in the Chamber, if the King should call upon him to do so. The fact that the election was not conducted on the usual party lines is probably explained by the King's desire to have a so-called National Parliament, and by the promises which he lavishly gave for the nomination of the principal leaders and publicists of the various political parties. The net result is that the King has secured the election of a Parliament on which he can ring any Cabinet changes he pleases without a dissolution or inconvenience to himself.

5. I do not think, however, that His Majesty intends at present to dismiss Naji Beg Shauket and his colleagues, though it is impossible to be certain that events may not occur to change his mind. King Feisal may still have leanings towards Yasin Pasha as a Prime Minister, but I do not think that His Majesty would invite him to form a Cabinet, if he felt that this was likely to jeopardise his relations with His Majesty's Government. Nor do I believe that Yasin Pasha would accept the premiership unless he was confident of obtaining a sufficiently free hand to carry out the main principles of his own programme, which have hitherto aimed at a drastic revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

6. Thirty-two of the Deputies in the last Chamber have been re-elected, but although Nuri Pasha's newspaper claims that this is a mark of popular approval of the work of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet, I do not myself think that these Deputies have this time returned as Nuri's supporters. Of his Cabinet, only one has been re-elected, Jamal Baban, the Minister for Justice, with whom he quarrelled last year over the affair of the anonymous letters.

Three members of the Executive Committee of the Nationalist party have been elected, including Abdul Ghafur-al-Badri, the editor of the *Istiqal* newspaper; the previous knowledge of their nomination was no doubt the reason for the refusal to boycott the elections to which I have referred above.

Other Deputies whose election is noteworthy are Hamid-al-Wadi, brother of the present Minister of Justice, and until recently aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, in whose anti-Ibn Saud plottings he played a prominent part; Salim Hassan, the Christian editor of the old-established moderate newspaper, *Al Alam Arabi*, and Sheikh Khamis-al-Dhari, of the Zoba tribe, son of the late Sheikh Dhari, who murdered Colonel Leachman in 1920.

There is little change in the tribal representatives, except in Diwaniyah, where a somewhat undesirable element has been introduced.

7. It now seems certain that when King Feisal visited the Diwaniyah and Karbala liwas last November his chief object was to endeavour to obtain the support of the Ulema and the tribal sheikhs for conscription. The Ulema are said to have refused to take sides in a political question, but, in return for undertakings touching their personal and material interests, the King succeeded in obtaining from a number of tribal leaders a promise that they would not oppose the introduction of a system of compulsory service in the army. Among these were several men including Abdul Wahid-al-Haj, Sikkar, of the powerful Fatlah tribe, Muhammad-al-Abtan, of the Khazal, and Ajja-al-Dalli, whose past record is by no means satisfactory. These three have now become Deputies for the Diwaniyah liwa, evidently on a pro-conscription coupon.

8. I have little doubt that the King hopes to see a National Service Bill introduced into Parliament during the next session, and there is a danger that he may believe that the support of these sheikhs means that its application to the Euphrates area will excite no opposition.

9. I do not yet know precisely what form the proposed National Service Law will take, but I fear that if the Government do not exercise great caution in applying conscription to the tribes, particularly to those on the Euphrates and to the Kurds, future events are likely to prove that His Majesty is mistaken in believing that the tribesmen's deep-rooted dislike of military service can be overcome by winning over a few of the sheikhs.

10. Parliament is expected to meet early in March and to sit for three months. I will address you separately on the subject of conscription, when I have ascertained further particulars of the King's plans, and I shall not fail to impress on His Majesty the necessity for proceeding very slowly and for avoiding a conflict with the tribes on this important issue.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1326/653/93]

No. 76.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 13.)*

(No. 142.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 1, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during a conversation which I had with King Feisal on the 27th February, His Majesty informed me that Signor Mussolini had instructed the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad to sound him as to whether he would be prepared to pay a State visit to the King of Italy after his visit to London this summer.

2. King Feisal informed me that such a visit would be most inconvenient, and said that if he were to accept the invitation he would certainly receive a further invitation from the President of the German Reich to visit Berlin (this assumption has been confirmed by my German colleague in a recent conversation with me). King Feisal said that his own wish was to pay only one State visit



this year to His Majesty King George, and, after spending two or three weeks in England, to undergo a cure in Switzerland for a few weeks before returning to Bagdad. He felt that a processional tour of Europe would not only be politically undesirable, but would make him appear somewhat ridiculous. He asked me whether I thought that he could excuse himself without discourtesy from accepting an invitation to pay an official visit to Rome, and said that he would be prepared, if the King of Italy so wished it, to see His Majesty privately in Italy on his way back to Bagdad.

3. I said that, while I preferred not to give His Majesty any advice on such a delicate matter, I thought that the reply which he proposed to make to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad would not involve him in any discourtesy towards the King of Italy, who had not sent a personal invitation, but had only caused enquiries to be made whether the visit would be agreeable. I felt sure that the King of Italy and the Italian Government would understand that it was difficult for him to fit in an official visit to Rome this year, in view of his other engagements and his desire to return to Bagdad in the early autumn.

4. I understand from the Court Chamberlain, who visited me this afternoon, that the Italian Chargé d'Affaires has been informed that King Feisal would be happy to pay an official visit to Rome next summer, but regrets that he cannot conveniently do so this year. Tahsin Beg Qadri informed me that if an official visit to Rome was arranged after King Feisal's stay in Switzerland, it would involve His Majesty in considerable additional expense, as he would have to maintain a much larger staff in Europe between the two official visits.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1469/347/65]

No. 77.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 143.)

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 30 of the 25th February, I have the honour to report that at a recent audience which I had with King Feisal His Majesty confirmed the undertaking which he had given me privately, while I was on a shooting trip with him at Amara, that the Arab Congress would be postponed, at any rate, until the autumn, and I enclose a translation of a cutting from the Arabic newspaper the *Tariq*, which shows that the news of the postponement has been received locally with considerable regret.

2. His Majesty informed me that he had carefully thought over the warnings which I had given him that the holding of the congress in Bagdad might have the effect of antagonising his neighbours, and said that he was most anxious to avoid doing anything which might cause annoyance or embarrassment to His Majesty's Government. He asked me, however, to acquaint him with the general attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the ideal of Arab unity which he had so much at heart. Was it the same attitude as that which had been explained to him in 1921, or had we changed our views since then? For himself, he could only say that he had always attempted to follow in the Middle East the policy which he believed to have the approval of His Majesty's Government.

3. I thanked His Majesty for listening to my advice, and said that opportunities would no doubt occur during his visit to England and the Continent next summer for considering this problem from a wider point of view than that which had been presented to him locally by Palestinian and Syrian extremists. I recognised, however, that His Majesty had consistently entertained the ambition of furthering the unity of Arab peoples, particularly in their cultural and economic development. The danger I foresaw was that the attention of the congress would almost exclusively be directed towards the realisation of the political unity of the Arabs at a time when the discussion of such a question could hardly fail to excite the suspicions of his neighbours. I felt that His Majesty could best serve the Arab cause by concentrating his energies on the

development of his own country's resources and institutions, so that the Government of an independent and enlightened Iraq might serve as a model and an encouragement to other Arab countries.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Tehran, Jerusalem, Istanbul, Jedda and Beirut.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 77.

*Extract from the Tariq of March 6, 1933.*

ARAB CONFERENCE POSTPONED.

(Translation.)

WE learn with deep regret that the Arab Conference, which it had been decided to hold in Bagdad next month, has been postponed for next autumn. It is hoped that the reasons for this postponement are not such as will affect the great hopes cherished by the advocates of independence for the Arabian countries.

[E 1327/105/93]

No. 78.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 13.)*

(No. 145.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 2, 1933.*

AT an audience which I had with King Feisal on the 27th February, His Majesty again referred to his dissatisfaction with some of the members of the present Cabinet, and developed the views which I have already brought to your notice in my telegram No. 32 of the 27th February. He explained that, while the Ministers were all men of excellent character, and had, since they had been in office, done their best to discharge their difficult functions, he felt bound to recognise that both individually and collectively they had not shown themselves really competent to deal with the many important problems with which the Government was at present confronted. They had come into office at a time when, for a variety of reasons, it had not been possible to call upon others with more experience who had previously shown greater efficiency and ability. Circumstances had now happily changed. The results of the elections had given complete satisfaction to all parties and groups, personal differences between public men had been settled, and better and more capable men would now be willing to take office if invited to do so. The Prime Minister had himself confessed that he felt that his Cabinet was weak, and had consulted His Majesty as to the steps which could be taken to strengthen it. What were my views? Much work lay ahead in which I was closely interested; did I not think that it would be done better if some more experienced Ministers were introduced into the Cabinet?

2. I said that I assumed that His Majesty had in mind to bring into the Cabinet members of the Opposition who were believed to be hostile to the policy followed not only by the present Government but by the Government of Nuri Pasha. It seemed to me that what the country required above all things was a rest from political strife and leisure to pursue a sound economic policy for its internal development. I reminded His Majesty that his previous efforts to eradicate criticism by giving office to Opposition leaders had led to disastrous results. These mixed Cabinets had been torn by internal jealousies, and had never succeeded in producing any constructive programme for the benefit of the country. I feared that it was inevitable that a similar fate would overtake any so-called national Cabinet which might be formed at the present time, unless His Majesty was able to hold it together by his own unaided efforts. I could not conceive, for instance, that harmonious relations would long continue between Nuri Pasha and Yasin Pasha, or between either of them and the present Prime Minister, without some powerful overriding influence being continuously at work to bind them together. Moreover, the Opposition leaders had announced their uncompromising hostility to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, and were determined,

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so far as could be deduced from their public utterances, to agitate for the drastic amendment of its terms. I warned the King not to attempt such a dangerous experiment, unless he was assured of the genuine willingness of the political leaders to work together without jealousy to promote their country's interests and to observe loyally their treaty and other contractual obligations.

3. King Feisal agreed that the time for political agitation was definitely past. He said that the opposition of Yasin Pasha and his friends towards the treaty of 1930 had been based entirely on their personal hostility to Nuri Pasha. That hostility was now a thing of the past, and neither they, nor any other responsible Iraqi, wished to alter the terms of the existing alliance with Great Britain. He said that, when Parliament assembled on the 8th March, the Prime Minister would make a statement on the Government's policy, and if, after this, Yasin Pasha or anyone else joined the Cabinet, it would be clear that they accepted the Prime Minister's programme. I need have no misgiving whatever concerning the treaty. As regards the possibility of friction among the members of a national Cabinet, His Majesty agreed that this was a real danger, against which he would have to take every precaution. The political leaders, however, had all placed themselves unreservedly in his hands, and had solemnly undertaken to be guided by his wishes. He felt convinced that the present political situation was singularly favourable to the formation of a national Cabinet of all the talents, and he believed that, having regard to the special economic problems which remained to be tackled, such a Government would be in the best interests of the country. He did not, however, consider the matter to be of immediate urgency, and he would seek a further opportunity for consulting me before taking any active steps.

4. I thanked His Majesty for having spoken to me with such frankness about the position of the Government, and assured him that I should always welcome an opportunity for exchanging views on these important matters. His Majesty would appreciate that I was not concerned with the personnel of the Cabinet so much as with the policy that it would be likely to adopt towards those questions in which my Government were particularly interested, and that, as a friend who had worked for the independence of Iraq, I was particularly anxious that the future record of the Government should be marked by sound constructive achievements.

5. I said that the fate of Syria, in which His Majesty expressed so lively an interest, might well depend to a large extent on the success of the experiment in self-government which was now being carried out in Iraq.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1477/105/93]

No. 79.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 157.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 9, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 114 of the 16th February reporting the conclusion of the general election, I have the honour to inform you that the new Parliament was opened by King Feisal on the 8th March.

2. The Speech from the Throne followed in the main the usual models and I enclose a cutting from the *Iraq Times* which contains a translation of the Arabic text. One point has, however, been omitted. After referring to Iraq's satisfactory relations with foreign countries and with her neighbours, His Majesty went on to say that the Government were giving close attention to all that might conduce to the strengthening of the brotherly relations joining Iraq to other Arab countries.

3. In both the Chamber and the Senate the old presidents were re-elected, and after other routine business had been concluded both Houses adjourned until the 11th March.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 79.

*Extract from the Iraq Times of March 9, 1933.*

THE new Iraq Parliament was formally opened yesterday morning by His Majesty King Feisal, amidst scenes of great enthusiasm.

The galleries of the Chamber of Deputies were crowded. There was a large attendance of Iraqi and British military officers and civilian officials. The British Ambassador and all other members of the diplomatic and consular corps attended the ceremony.

The scene inside the Chamber was picturesque. Some of the Deputies looked extremely modern in well-cut morning dress, but many more were attired in Arab or Kurdish costume. The hats worn were extremely varied: they ranged from sidaras to agals and kaffiyahs, from the green and white turbans of the mullahs and sayids to the tall hats of the latest arrivals from London and the continent.

His Majesty arrived at the Chamber at 10 o'clock, accompanied by the Amir Ghazi and an entourage of Court officials. At the entrance of Parliament House he was met by the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet. The guard of honour gave the salute, and the Iraq army band played the national anthem.

The Master of Ceremonies, Tahsin Qadri Beg, formally announced the arrival of His Majesty to the Senators and Deputies.

#### *The King's Speech.*

King Feisal then went to the President's chair and delivered his Speech from the Throne, of which the following is a translation:—

"In the name of Almighty God we open this session of Parliament and wish you happy results from your deliberations.

"The new era which has come upon the country, as a result of our admission into the League of Nations and our attainment of complete independence, has increased your responsibilities, and you must ever bear this in mind.

"A new Cabinet was formed, and elections were then held to ascertain the wishes of the people as regards the statement of policy which was issued by the new Government. The result was that the nation gave the members assembled here its confidence, and we hope that you will prove worthy of the nation's trust.

"Gentlemen, it is a source of great satisfaction to us to be able to say that our relations with foreign countries—and especially with those who are our neighbours—are very cordial. Our Government is doing its best to strengthen the ties of friendship with them.

"We have welcomed with the greatest pleasure the invitation extended to us by His Majesty King George to visit His Majesty next summer. This invitation, which is the result of the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between our two countries, is another proof of the bonds of friendship which unite us.

"Although our relations with Persia are very cordial, they have been formally set forth only in a temporary treaty which was concluded on the 11th August, 1929, and subsequently prolonged for a further period of six months. As both nations wish to have a more permanent form of treaty, negotiations are expected to begin shortly between our diplomatic representatives for the conclusion of a treaty, which is really essential to the interests of both nations. We have complete confidence that the negotiations will result in a satisfactory agreement and complete understanding between us.

"The new status attained by our country when it became independent made it necessary that we should increase our diplomatic representation abroad, and our Government is doing its best to effect such an increase so far as its financial resources permit.

"The economic crisis which is being experienced throughout the world has affected our country, but fortunately we are not suffering so severely as others. We are glad to be able to say that there are signs of an improvement in the near future. The Government is trying to submit to Parliament a balanced budget.

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"You all know the law for the five-year construction plan, which was passed in 1931. Among the important schemes included in this plan was the Habbaniyah escape, the tenders for which are now being examined. It is also intended to carry out the Gharraf scheme. The Government now intends to revise the five-year law with a view to including in the programme some important projects such as the Nagara, the Qizil Robat, and the Ishaki schemes.

"One of the most important questions which will be studied by the Government is the strengthening of the army. I have no doubt that you will give this question your serious attention when it is submitted to you.

"The Government is doing its best to improve the state of education, administration, and justice throughout the land, and we hope that you will give Ministers all the assistance in your power to forward these important ends. We are confident that you will examine such problems with wisdom and foresight. In conclusion, we wish that all your endeavours will be crowned with success."

At the close of the Speech from the Throne there was loud applause, and His Majesty then left the Chamber accompanied by the Amir Ghazi and the Court officials. The Senators left the Chamber to hold their own meeting. The Deputies were then called upon to take the oath.

The election of the President of the new Chamber followed. Of eight-four Deputies who attended the session, seventy-two voted for his Excellency Jamil Beg Al Midfai (the previous President), who was thereupon declared re-elected. Salman Beg Barrak was re-elected Vice-President.

The Chamber of Deputies then adjourned until Saturday.

[E 1608/733/93]

No. 80.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 158.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 11, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55 of the 25th January, 1933, I have the honour to inform you that Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, two brothers of Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan, are now estimated to have gathered together about 300 followers in villages close to the frontier to the south of the Govanda Plateau (about 25 miles north-west of Barzan village).

2. In response to the representations which have been renewed by the Iraqi Minister at Angora, the Turkish Government have intimated their willingness to hand over all the Barzani leaders, but it does not appear that they have at present the means to give effect to this undertaking, as they have no troops in the area where the bulk of these men and their subordinates have concentrated.

3. Although the wintry weather in the mountains still restricts their activities, the Barzanis have recently had several skirmishes with the police in Iraq, and I fear that unless the Turks can be persuaded to surrender them, or to remove them from the frontier, they will, in the spring and summer, become a serious menace to the peace of the newly-occupied districts.

4. I have accordingly advised King Feisal to send for the Turkish Minister and to urge him to press his Government to take early action to hand over the Barzan leaders to the Iraqi authorities without further delay.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1724/105/93]

No. 81.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 3.)*

(No. 181.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 22, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 50 of the 20th March, I have the honour to report the following further developments in the political situation in Iraq.

2. On the morning of the 17th March the Bagdad press published reports of a debate in the Chamber on the reply to the Speech from the Throne, which had taken place on the previous day. From these I observed that Yasin Pasha and others had made speeches in which they had urged the Government to endeavour to obtain a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930. I enclose a summary<sup>(1)</sup> of the debate, compiled from newspaper reports, from which it will be seen that the treaty was criticised as unjust and oppressive by reason of the immense burden of debt which it laid on the shoulders of Iraq, and the foreign forces and advisers which it imposed on the country.

3. Knowing the King's intention to form a new Cabinet and to appoint Yasin Pasha as Minister for Finance, I felt it necessary to warn him of the significance which would naturally be attached to such a change after this debate. I therefore sought and obtained an immediate audience with His Majesty. The following paragraphs summarise the main features of our conversation, which lasted for more than three hours:—

4. I opened my remarks by recalling that in the several previous discussions which we had recently had on the subject of His Majesty's wish to form a new Cabinet he had met my misgivings regarding the inclusion of Yasin Pasha by assuring me that the latter's hostility to the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 had arisen solely from his personal differences with Nuri Pasha, and was not inspired by any real objection to the principles or provisions of the treaty *per se*. His Majesty had asked me to believe that these personal differences were a thing of the past and that no one in public life had now the least desire to alter the bases on which Anglo-Iraqi relations had been established by the treaty.

5. It had come, therefore, as a great surprise to me to see that, in the debate on the Speech from the Throne, Yasin Pasha and several of his associates had pressed the Government to seek an opportunity to amend the treaty, which they had frankly described as oppressive and unjust and inconsistent with Iraq's independence. I added that I felt it necessary to warn His Majesty that if, after such a debate, Naji Beg's Cabinet were to resign and a new Cabinet were formed including Yasin Pasha, and others known to be largely under his influence, the conclusion which would naturally and logically be drawn by His Majesty's Government and by the outside world was that the change of Government indicated a change of policy towards Great Britain.

6. The King began his reply by suggesting that the reports which I had seen of what Yasin Pasha had said in the Chamber the previous day were possibly not altogether correct, and he produced a copy of the daily newspaper, the *Ikha-al-Watani*, in which the report of Yasin's speech omitted all mention of a demand for the amendment of the treaty, and suggested that as this paper was the official organ of the party of which Yasin Pasha was the leader, its version of his speech should be accepted as authentic. I demonstrated the weakness of this argument by showing the King that Yasin Pasha's strictures on the treaty had been published in all other newspapers, two of whose editors were themselves Deputies and had been present during the debate. Moreover, the Prime Minister, who had spoken after Yasin Pasha, had defended the attitude of his Government towards the treaty, and it would have been unnecessary for him to have done so if Yasin Pasha had not attacked him on this point. King Feisal then abandoned the suggestion that Yasin Pasha had been misreported, and went on to say that whatever his exact words might have been he was still speaking as a member of the Opposition, and it was well understood in Iraq that no politician was obliged to apply, when in office, the principles which he had advocated when in Opposition. If Yasin Pasha came into the new Cabinet he would discard his hostility to the treaty like an old coat. He had given the most solemn undertakings to work in

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



harmony with his new colleagues, and if he broke his word he would be discredited and would have to go. At all events he would only be one amongst eight, and would have to conform to the wishes of the Prime Minister and the other Ministers. Moreover, foreign relations would be in the hands of Nuri Pasha, the very man who had concluded the treaty of 1930. Surely this fact was sufficient to demonstrate that the new Government, in all that concerned Iraq's relations with His Majesty's Government and with other foreign countries, would follow the same policy as that of the Governments of Nuri Pasha and Naji Shaukat.

7. His Majesty referred to my remark that the resignation of the Prime Minister following on the recent debate in the Chamber and the coming into office of a new Cabinet, composed largely of men who persisted in their opposition to the 1930 treaty, could not fail to create perplexity in British official circles. He asked me to convey to my Government the most emphatic assurance that these strange happenings implied no change whatsoever in policy towards Great Britain, and he begged me to emphasise that no importance should be attached to the opinions voiced by Yasin Pasha and others in regard to the treaty, since in Iraq men always changed their views when they came into office and assumed real responsibility.

8. At this stage the King suggested that Nuri Pasha should join us, as he would be the man with whom I should have to deal when the new Cabinet was formed. Nuri Pasha then came in and remained with us for the rest of the interview. Prompted by the King he supported His Majesty's view that what Yasin Pasha said before he became a Minister was of no consequence, but admitted that if he were to criticise the treaty while in office it would be a different matter. I said that though these arguments had a superficial plausibility, they were at bottom entirely specious and, moreover, presented a picture of public life in Iraq which was both ridiculous and degrading. Was I to report to my Government that Iraq's public men, men who had held the highest positions in the State, made speeches on solemn occasions in which they voiced opinions which they knew to be false and meaningless? Was I to say that the Iraqi Parliament was just a sham, a place where time and money was wasted by a handful of men, who, while masquerading as statesmen, neither meant what they said nor said what they believed? If words were treated as lightly as this in Iraq, what value could be given to those solemn assurances and promises to which His Majesty attached so much importance? His Majesty had done me the honour to consult me about his plans for reorganising the Cabinet, and I had warned him of two dangers. One was that of damaging his good relations with Great Britain, and the other that of embarrassing the smooth working of the Government of his country by endeavouring to combine in the Cabinet elements which were essentially hostile and antipathetic to each other. In thus warning him I was not in the least concerned with personalities, but solely with the policy of the Iraqi Government, and subsequent events had only served to strengthen my feeling of the reality of the dangers to which I had alluded. Although I was ready to admit that His Majesty knew far more than I of the way in which the political game was played in Iraq, I could assure him that to any European observer the picture which he had drawn of the antics of Iraqi politicians could only appear humiliating and absurd.

9. The King hereupon threw himself into an emotional mood and bewailed the fate which had made him King of such a "distressful" country as Iraq, where he had alternatively to suffer the buffets of the people on one side and of the representative of His Majesty's Government on the other. Could I not trust him to act for the best? He had decided on the course which he was following only after the most profound and careful consideration. He was worn out and overworked, and he wanted to see if men could not be got together who would be able to relieve him of part of his insupportable burden of work and responsibility. He wanted to see if the men of the country really could govern themselves. For the last few years the Government had been a dictatorship of three, Nuri, Rustam Haidar and himself. This could not be continued indefinitely, and he had decided to carry out the experiment of forming a Government of the best men available and to test their fitness to administer the country. I had criticised his plans, but he still believed them to be sound, and he could do no more than renew the assurances which he had already given. I calmed His Majesty to some extent with soothing words of appreciation of all that he had achieved during the past twelve years, but I added that, much as I

regretted it, I felt obliged to repeat the warnings which I had already given regarding the step which he proposed to take, and I recalled the unhappy results which had followed a previous experiment of the same kind, when, in 1929, Yasin Pasha, at His Majesty's instance, had been introduced into Abdul Muhsin Beg's Cabinet.

10. I could not hide from him the fact that, whatever private assurances were given to me, His Majesty's Government and, moreover, the British public, who followed events in Iraq closely through the press, would certainly consider that, in the circumstances attending its formation, the new Cabinet would come into office not to continue, but to change, the policy of the two preceding Cabinets in regard to Iraq's relations with Great Britain. This conclusion could only be modified through a clear and unequivocal statement by the new Cabinet that they intended to stand by the treaty and implement its provisions. Would the new Cabinet, I asked, make such a statement? The King left the answer of this question to Nuri Pasha, who said that, as the Cabinet had not yet been formed officially, no programme had yet been drawn up. When they took office they would necessarily meet together for that purpose, and he would do his utmost to obtain the inclusion of an affirmation of the Government's intention to respect all Iraq's treaties with foreign Governments. I said that he had heard the assurances which the King had given that the change of Government meant no change of policy towards Great Britain. There seemed to me, therefore, to be no reason why the new Government should not make it perfectly clear in their programme that they intended to carry on their relations with Great Britain both in the spirit and the letter of the treaty, and I sincerely hoped that, in their own interests, they would do so.

11. I took my leave after a parting appeal to His Majesty not to allow us to be dragged back into the old fruitless political bickering, but to set politics aside and concentrate on administrative efficiency and the economic development of the country.

12. On the 19th March, Naji Beg Shaukat and his colleagues resigned, and on the next day Royal iradés were issued appointing the following Cabinet:—

Prime Minister: Rashid Ali Beg Al Gilani.  
Minister for Finance: Yasin Pasha Al Hashimi.  
Minister for Foreign Affairs: Nuri Pasha Al Said.  
Minister for Economics and Communications: Rustam Beg Haidar.  
Minister for Interior: Hikmat Beg Sulaiman.  
Minister of Defence: Jallal Beg Baban.  
Minister of Justice: Muhammad Zaki Beg.  
Minister of Education: Saiyid Muhammad Mahdi.

Of these, Yasin Pasha, Saiyid Muhammad Mahdi, Muhammad Zaki Beg and Hikmat Beg Sulaiman are members of the party of National Brotherhood, which has frequently declared its policy to be to work for the amendment of the treaty of 1930, though Hikmat Sulaiman was formerly a staunch supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg, and I doubt whether he is really deeply attached to Yasin Pasha or his principles. Nuri Pasha and Rustam Beg are likely to work together, and the Prime Minister, though once a member of Yasin Pasha's party, is now evidently a King's man, and will be guided by the Palace. Naji Shaukat, who had not realised up to the last moment that he was to be sacrificed for Rashid Ali, and who had resigned mainly with the idea of having his own Cabinet strengthened, feels that he has been tricked, and has refused to accept any office.

13. King Feisal dined with me privately on the 19th, and renewed his assurances about the loyalty of the new Cabinet towards their obligations under the 1930 treaty. On the following morning His Majesty wrote me a personal letter, a translation of which is enclosed, together with my reply.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.



Enclosure 1 in No. 81.

*King Feisal to Sir F. Humphrys.—(Received March 20, 1933.)*

(Translation.)  
(Personal and Secret.)  
Dear Sir Francis,

IN my talks with you during the last few days I have found you unhappy as to the doubts which might be aroused in political circles and in the press in England by the change in the Cabinet, as you feared that the change would be regarded as introducing an alteration of some kind in the policy of the Iraqi Government towards the treaty on which the present friendly relations between the two countries are based.

For this reason I confirm what I have already told you orally, that this change, consisting of the introduction of persons from the Opposition to positions of responsibility, will not only not prejudice our friendly relations, but will close our ranks and concentrate our endeavours towards the strengthening of our friendly relations, which are centred on the Treaty of Alliance, and will make all elements co-operate to gain our objective, which is the moral and economic development of the country and the strengthening of our friendship with our ally, Great Britain. This will be proved to you in deed in all the declarations and acts of the Cabinet in the shortest possible time.

Your friend,  
FEISAL

Enclosure 2 in No. 81.

*Sir F. Humphrys to King Feisal.*

(Secret and Personal.)  
Your Majesty,

March 21, 1933.

I AM most grateful for the secret and personal letter which I received from your Majesty yesterday, and for the assurances which your Majesty renewed therein that the new Cabinet which has been formed would continue to work for the strengthening of the existing friendship between Iraq and Great Britain on the basis of the Treaty of Alliance, 1930.

Your Majesty was kind enough to assure me that the goodwill of the new Cabinet towards Great Britain would, at the earliest opportunity, be made clear in their acts as well as in their words.

I deeply appreciate this reaffirmation of what your Majesty has often been good enough to tell me in our private talks, and I sincerely trust that, in negotiating with them the several important questions touching the implementation of the Treaty of Alliance which are still outstanding, I shall find ample evidence of the spirit of friendly co-operation with which your Majesty is confident your new Ministers are inspired.

I remain, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1853/105/93]

No. 82.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 10.)*

(No. 207.)  
Sir,

Bagdad, March 25, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 181 of the 22nd March, I have the honour to enclose herewith a record of a conversation which I had three days ago with Yasin Pasha Al Hashimi, during which he sought to explain to me his position in the new Cabinet and his attitude towards several of the principal questions with which he and his colleagues will be called upon to deal.

2. I have the impression that, so far as he revealed his opinions to me, he spoke honestly and frankly, and I feel that our talk has done much to clear the air.

His views on the general provisions of the Treaty of 1930 are intelligent and understandable and his doubts regarding the practical merits of the Railway Corporation scheme are, I know, shared to some degree in many quarters under no suspicion of Anglophobia.

3. Whatever may have been the words which he used in the debate on the Speech from the Throne, I am disposed to believe that he told me the truth about his intentions. He has criticised the treaty itself, and still more, the extravagant terms in which Nuri Pasha's supporters have described it as the charter of Iraq's independence, and now, while he is willing to make the most that he can for Iraq out of the treaty, he will not publicly disavow the standpoint which he took up in opposition, that it merely marks a stage on the road towards his country's emancipation from foreign control. Moreover, he distrusts the King, and is suspicious of His Majesty's motives for bringing him back to office. Yasin has seen more than one man with a promising public career discredited and ruined because he had left his friends and broken with his principles for the sake of fickle Palace favour, and he has no intention of going the same way himself. He must, therefore, maintain his reputation and hold together his political supporters, so that, if necessary, he may safely withdraw from office to the Opposition without loss of influence or prestige.

4. I had experience of Yasin Pasha as a member of the Cabinet in 1929-30, when he was Minister of Finance in Naji Suwaidi's Administration. On that occasion he dominated the Cabinet and, by his insistence on making too drastic reductions in the numbers of the British advisory staff, he was responsible for Naji Suwaidi's downfall. Shortly before my arrival in Bagdad he had, in the opinion of my predecessor, goaded a former Prime Minister, Abdul Muhsin Beg, into suicide, by urging him to adopt a programme framed on extreme Nationalist lines. I am inclined to think, however, that two and a half years in opposition have mellowed his views, and that he is not ungrateful to His Majesty's Government for their successful sponsoring of Iraq's candidature for membership of the League of Nations in 1932. I believe that his main objection to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 is to be found in the fact that it was negotiated by the King and his intimate advisers, Nuri and Jafar Pasha and Rustum Haidar, without his assistance. While I do not doubt that he will continue to dominate the Cabinet and will obstinately stand out for what he feels to be Iraq's rights, his spontaneous avowal of his intention to consult me privately if things go wrong is a hopeful sign that he has moderated his extremist views. The main difficulty that I foresee, and this apprehension is shared by Yasin as well as by Nuri, is whether the new Cabinet, which is composed of men of independent character and opposite views, will be able to keep their peace with the King and avoid quarrelling among themselves.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 82.

*Record of a Conversation between Sir F. Humphrys and Yasin Pasha.*

YASIN PASHA, who is Minister of Finance in the new Cabinet, asked if I would receive him on the 22nd March, and we conversed for about two hours.

He said that he wished to dispel certain misapprehensions which had arisen regarding the speeches which he had made in the Chamber of Deputies on the 16th March, when he attacked Nuri Shaukat, the late Prime Minister, on the subject of the treaty. He said that he had been incorrectly reported in some of the Bagdad newspapers. It was true that he had criticised adversely the Financial Agreement signed by Nuri Pasha and myself in London in August 1930, which had been ratified with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. This did not mean, however, that he had any intention of agitating for the revision of the Financial Agreement, as he realised that his acceptance of office in the new Government implied agreement with the policy of his colleagues. On my asking what this policy was, he declined to define it in advance of the statement which he said would be shortly made by the Prime Minister. He said that he quite



realised that the Treaty of 1930 and its annexures, after its ratification by the Parliaments of our two countries, had become an international bond which must be honourably observed by both parties, but he hoped that, if he remained in office, he would have the opportunity later to approach me, directly or indirectly, with a view to the revision of the stipulations in the agreement which concerned the Iraq railways in particular. He admitted that the present arrangement could not be altered except by mutual consent, but he hoped that my Government would show generosity in a matter on which Iraqis of all shades of opinion held very strong views.

I reminded him that the agreement on the subject of railways was based on the recommendations of Sir Hilton Young, who was one of the foremost experts of our time and had visited Iraq twice during recent years for the purpose of giving advice on financial questions. The scheme which had been laid down in that agreement involved the creation of a statutory board, whose operations would be subject to the provisions of a Railway Corporation Law, which was to be passed by agreement between our two Governments. Until that law was passed and the scheme recommended by Sir Hilton Young had been tried, it was clearly unreasonable to discuss any other arrangement. If, however, the scheme failed after being given a fair trial, it would be incumbent on our two Governments to devise something else. I assured him that it was the genuine desire of my Government to hand over eventually to the Iraq Government an efficient railway system, which was not over capitalised and which they could run for themselves with a minimum of foreign assistance as soon as Iraqis had been trained for the purpose. I felt sure that he would admit that the interests of his country demanded that the management of the railways should be in experienced hands throughout.

We next discussed briefly the Port of Basra, in regard to the management of which Yasin Pasha had no serious objections to urge.

I then asked him whether he had really said in Parliament that the existence of Royal Air Force units in Iraq was inconsistent with the country's independence. Yasin replied somewhat evasively that he had always held the view that the Treaty of 1930 did not confer complete independence on Iraq. He would not urge that complete independence was possible or even beneficial in the present circumstances, but it annoyed him to hear Iraqi statesmen—such as the late Prime Minister—affirm in public that Iraq was now completely independent. After I had explained to him, on the lines of my evidence before the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva, the reasons why the location of Royal Air Force units in Iraq was necessary in order to make possible the discharge of Great Britain's obligations under the alliance, I asked him straight out whether he preferred a treaty of alliance with us or an ordinary treaty of friendship. Yasin stated emphatically that a treaty of alliance was necessary for Iraq until she was strong enough to defend herself without foreign assistance. It would take many years for her to bring her army up to the required standard and, in the meantime, he would prefer an alliance with Great Britain to one with any other Power. He said that Great Britain's record in Iraq had been immeasurably more generous than any other Great Power would have accomplished, and that he himself, and his friends, were prepared to work in the closest co-operation with Great Britain for the further development of their country's interests.

Knowing that Yasin Pasha had been closely associated with the idea of the Pan-Arab Congress, I warned him that it would be the duty of Iraqi statesmen in the years that lay ahead to turn their gaze inwards and to work for the regeneration of Iraq, rather than to mix themselves up in the affairs of their neighbours. I felt that the best way of assisting their brothers in Syria was to make a success of the experiment of self-government in Iraq, whereas agitating against the French would only do harm. Yasin agreed that the new Cabinet should interest itself primarily with internal development, but he added bitterly that, however good a model Iraq might prove for Syria, he was convinced that the French Government had no intention whatever of pursuing a liberal policy in that country.

I concluded the interview by repeating that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty must remain the basis of the relations between Great Britain and Iraq, and that I earnestly hoped that the new Cabinet, composed as it was of elements hitherto antagonistic, would make up their minds to work together without jealousy for the good of their country. Yasin thanked me for receiving him in such a friendly

spirit and gave me his promise that he would work on the lines that I had indicated. He added, however, that he had taken office with great reluctance and was doubtful whether a Cabinet of strong-minded men belonging to different parties would be able to work harmoniously together for long. He said that he would ask to see me again privately, if things appeared to him to be going wrong.

[E 1855/105/93]

No. 83.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 10.)*

(No. 209.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 30, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 181 of the 22nd March, I have the honour to enclose herewith the full text of the programme of the new Cabinet and a summary of the debate thereon which took place in the Chamber on the 27th March.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. The programme contains no direct reference to the treaty of 1930, but the first item is clearly an attempt to produce a formula which can, as required, be held either to be a pledge to honour the treaty or an undertaking to satisfy the so-called national aspiration for greater freedom from British influence. When King Feisal, in the presence of his Minister for Foreign Affairs, first discussed with me the programme in draft, it contained a reference to the question of the amendment of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 which I held to be objectionable and damaging to Iraq's reputation abroad. I was able to persuade the King that, in order to establish the credit of the new State in foreign countries, it would be necessary to create the impression abroad that Iraq was determined to honour her international obligations, and I finally prevailed upon him to omit any direct suggestion that the new Cabinet would work for the amendment of the treaty. I reminded His Majesty that it was largely on the strength of this treaty, which had been in force for less than six months, that Iraq had been admitted to membership of the League, and that it must continue to form the basis of Anglo-Iraqi relations.

3. The remaining political features of the programme call for little comment, but it may be noted that, instead of the ambiguous phrases regarding the strengthening of the country's forces which have hitherto been employed by most Cabinets, conscription is this time openly included in the Government's programme. I have repeated my warnings that so unpopular a measure can only be carried through successfully if it is introduced gradually and with the utmost caution.

4. I am dealing with the chief economic and commercial features of the programme in a separate despatch, and I need only add that even the present Cabinet of all talents is unlikely to give effect to more than a small proportion of this long list of proposals, even if it remains in office for several years.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 83.

*Programme of the New Cabinet.*

THE most important objects which the Cabinet will seek in the administration of State affairs are:—

(1) To strengthen the relations of friendship and amity with all foreign States; to respect international pledges; and to endeavour to realise the national aspirations and strengthen the structure of the State.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



(2) To see into the uplifting of the nation and the improvement of its moral and social conditions by—

- (a) Revising the "exceptional laws" with a view to affording a greater opportunity for the exercise of constitutional liberties and facilitating the carrying out of national and educational work by parties and societies.
- (b) Protecting the people against social diseases, waste and extravagance, and the exercise of a strict control on matters affecting public morals.
- (c) Giving first place to expert knowledge and qualifications in the distribution of State appointments, and proceeding on the basis of the exercise of full powers and responsibility by Iraqi officials in accordance with the requirements of recent developments.
- (d) Endeavouring to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis, by the improvement of products, and the reduction of the cost of production by the reduction of certain taxes and dues; attempting the reduction of the cost of transport and handling of goods and the affording of exportation facilities; and expediting the establishment of an agricultural bank for the extension of assistance to cultivators by the advancing of money to them and by providing them with implements and machinery on suitable terms. Establishing State lotteries in Iraq for the benefit of educational and health undertakings. (The Arabic wording of this clause suggests that foreign lotteries will be banned in Iraq.)
- (e) Enacting a law for the administration of villages and settlements, having for principal aims the encouragement of work, the extension of preliminary aid, and the planning of residential quarters on sound sanitary principles. Amending the Tribal Regulations, and expediting the enactment of the Cultivators' Obligations Law.

The Cabinet will also lend attention to the following matters:—

- (a) The making of a general census of the population, and the establishing of the necessary temporary and permanent organisations for the purpose, and the completion of legislation relating to labour and workmen.
- (b) The improvement of health conditions in the country by increasing the number of dispensaries and medical officers in the provinces, and the gradual draining of swamps surrounding cities, towns and villages; the effective combating of epidemic diseases, and the establishment of sanatoriums in suitable localities.
- (c) Expediting the execution of development projects, and the exploitation of natural resources; the encouragement of local industries and their products; the protection of the country's wealth; the making of economies in public expenditure; the strengthening of the establishment of the Finance Inspectorate; and expedition of the land settlement operations.
- (d) The strengthening of confidence and trust in the judicature by expanding the establishments of public prosecution and judicial inspection, reorganising judicial investigation on bases calculated better to ensure the enforcement of laws, reorganising the affairs of legal practice and those of the service of judicial statistics and the departments of execution; and the improvement of laws by making them fit for the needs of the country and recent developments. The reduction of court and tapu fees.
- (e) The strengthening of the army by the introduction of the system of "national service" [? conscription] and the expansion of the "industrial establishments of the army" [? military workshops and factories].
- (f) Raising the standard of education in secondary and high schools; extending primary instruction; seeing into the improving of technical schools and the increase of scientific and technical efficiency by an increase of the members of student missions; the opening of village schools and the [? re-] opening of the Schools of Engineering and Agriculture; the combating of illiteracy; and the strengthening of the boy-scout organisations by the expansion of its establishments.

- (g) The reorganisation of the Department of Agriculture; the establishment of agricultural (experimental) farms with due regard to the vital needs of the State; the undertaking of experiments with a view to establishing agricultural industries to be dependent on locally available products; the lending of attention to the question of live-stock breeding and the improvement of species, and to afforestation and horticulture; the improvement of tobacco and date products; the rendering of practical advice in (experimental) fields and farms; watching the progress of the cultivation of newly-introduced crops on such farms; and the combating of plant diseases.
- (h) Reorganisation and improvement of the Department of Awqaf and its affairs and resources.

[E 2004/733/93]

No. 84.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 220.)  
Sir,

*Bagdad, April 6, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 158 of the 11th March, I have the honour to inform you that during the course of a talk which I had with the new Prime Minister, Rashid Ali Beg, when he called on me a few days ago, I spoke to him about the disquieting situation in the north, where the two brothers of Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan and their followers are still threatening the peace and order of the area brought under control after the conclusion of the Barzan operations last year.

2. I suggested that the Turkish Government should be urged either to remove these men from the frontier villages where they now are or to hand them over to Iraq, if they accepted the Iraqi Government's conditions, adding that the failure of the Turks to deal with these fugitives was clearly a breach of article 6 of the Treaty of Angora.

3. Rashid Ali fully agreed with my remarks, and said that the Cabinet had only the day before approved of a stiff note which the Minister for Foreign Affairs was sending to the Turkish Minister at Bagdad, protesting against the continued presence of these insurgent Barzanis in villages only a few miles from the Iraqi frontier. The Iraqi Minister at Angora had also been instructed to make similar representations to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has given me privately a copy of his note and I enclose a translation. It should, I think, have included a reference to the Treaty of Angora.

4. The Prime Minister also told me that he had noticed during the last few months a change in the attitude of the Turks towards Iraq. Formerly they had shown readiness to co-operate in maintaining order on the frontier, but now they shut their eyes to what went on and evaded requests for combined action against disturbers of the peace.

5. He attributed this change of attitude to a growing jealousy of Iraq's rapid progress and development and a fear of the strength which she was likely to acquire in the future as the centre or leader of an Arab confederation which might menace Turkey's southern frontier. A further indication of this change could, he thought, be seen in the marked improvement which had taken place in Franco-Turkish relations in regard to Syria. He felt certain that this had been based on a mutual understanding that any movement tending towards the union of Iraq with Syria should be discouraged.

6. Since the Treaty of Angora was concluded, Turco-Iraq relations have been so very satisfactory that I am disposed to think that the Prime Minister may be unduly suspicious, but the Turks have certainly failed to discharge their obligations as a friendly neighbour in regard to these Barzani fugitives.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.



Enclosure in No. 84.

*Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Turkish Minister, Bagdad.*

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

April 3, 1933.

YOU will recall that at our meeting on Wednesday, the 22nd March last, I approached your Excellency on the question of the Barzanis who sought refuge last year in the territories of the Turkish Republic, and whose extradition was asked for by the Iraqi Government under the provisions of the agreement for the extradition of offenders concluded between the two Governments. The Turkish Government, however, refused at the time to surrender these men on the ground that they were deemed by them to be political offenders, and they (the Turkish Government) took upon themselves responsibility for watching them and preventing their return to their homes without the assent of the Iraqi Government. Your Excellency will also recall that I related to you what had passed between myself and Turkish statesmen at Ankara when I had the honour of meeting them in 1930 and 1931, and when the Ministers of the Turkish Republic had suspicions about certain activities which were likely to encourage the Kurdish movement along the frontiers between the two countries. On that occasion I pointed out to these honourable statesmen that the policy of the Iraqi Government, a policy from which they would not deviate, was in complete accord with that of the Turkish Republic and aimed at affording no opportunity for any Kurdish movement likely to lead to the disturbance of peace and security in the districts close to the frontier. Among various requests made from me at the time was one to the effect that the Iraqi Government should undertake operations for the suppression of all the lawless activities which were going on in the Barzan district, which some Kurds, subjects of the Turkish Republic, had taken as a recess from which to set out on activities detrimental to peace and security. The Iraqi Government duly honoured all the pledges they had given to the Turkish Republic, having undertaken military operations by which they reduced the headquarters of these lawless elements, established a civilised administration where chaos had reigned, and, after suffering enormous losses in life and money, succeeded completely in the establishment of security throughout the district in question, and the Sheikh of Barzan, together with a small party of his followers, fled away and sought refuge with the authorities of the Turkish Republic.

While the Iraqi Government were hoping that peace would reign in those districts and tranquillity would return into the minds of the peaceful population on the frontiers of the two countries, the Barzan refugees, who had fled from the face of justice into neighbouring Turkish territory, started of late to roam about along the Iraqi frontier, gathering about them bands of lawless elements, and thus became a danger threatening frontier peace, and took to committing lawless acts of a nature inconsistent with what had been decided upon between the two Governments. When conditions became unsupportable, this Ministry asked your Excellency, particularly in its last letter, No. 2398 of the 23rd March, 1933, to intervene before the honourable Government of the Turkish Republic with a view to their taking certain urgent radical measures for the purpose of putting an end to the continuous lawless activities on the frontier, including the arrest and disarming of the leading brigands, whose names with full particulars were given in the Ministry's note, and their removal from the frontier so that they should no longer constitute a cause of anxiety for Iraq.

The reply of the Turkish Government, communicated to me in your Excellency's letter No. 84 of the 2nd March, 1933, and from which I learn that (1) orders have been issued for the removal of Sheikh Sadiq, brother of Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan, to a distant place away from the frontier, and (2) necessary steps have been taken on the frontier, is gratefully reassuring. I, however, beg leave to "assure" [sic] your Excellency that I do not find that the aforesaid reply affords realisation of the request previously made by the Iraqi Government and stated in detail in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Ministry's letter, No. 2398, and which my Government deem to be a fundamental measure for the consolidation of peace on the frontiers of the two States.

As I now feel convinced, M. le Ministre, that a continuance of the violation of peace and disturbance of security by this band of rebel brigands will inevitably lead to more extensive harm being done to the interests of both parties, and as

the Iraqi Government are unable to accept any responsibility for future developments in these lawless activities and the possibility of their assuming a national character [? the character of a Kurdish racial movement], I beg your Excellency to be so good as to invite the attention of the Central Government to this important point, hoping to receive from your Excellency an early and favourable reply, and that drastic measures will be taken in hand for the handling and solution of this problem.

Accept, &amp;c.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

[E 2133/7/93]

No. 85.

*Mr. Hoare to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 25.)*

(No. 165.)

Sir,

*Tehran, April 8, 1933.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 7th April to Sir Francis Humphrys (of which a copy was sent to Mr. Rendel) on the subject of the agreement supposed to have been reached between the Persian Government and Captain Rassam for the settlement of Assyrians in Persia, I have the honour to report that the following information has been supplied to me by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. The Persian Government have consented to raise the ban previously imposed by them upon the entry of Assyrians into Persia in large numbers; and they have furthermore consented to provide land in parts of the country where land is available for such Assyrians as care to come. This land will be distributed in such a way that the number of Assyrians settled in any one place shall never be very large. The Assyrians must furthermore undertake to become Persian subjects and to abstain from all forms of politics.

3. The Persian Government had, however, made it perfectly clear to Captain Rassam that they in no sense extended any invitation to the Assyrians to settle in Persia. If the latter chose to come they would not be turned back and such provision as was possible would be made for them; but it was for the Assyrians to make their own arrangements with the Iraq Government and obtain the latter's permission for their departure and, if the Iraq Government disapproved, the Persian Government would have nothing to do with the scheme.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad (No 28).

I have, &amp;c.

R. H. HOARE.

[E 2108/27/93]

No. 86.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 25.)*

(No. 240.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, April 12, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the new Iraqi Government air-port at Bagdad was officially opened by His Majesty King Feisal on the 5th April. The Minister of Economics and Communications invited to the ceremony about 400 guests, including all members of the Corps diplomatique. According to the programme, His Majesty was to have arrived in his own Puss Moth aeroplane, accompanied by an escort of six machines of the Royal Iraqi Air Force. Unfortunately, a dust-storm made flying impossible and he was unable to do so. After a speech by his Excellency Rustam Beg Haidar, giving a short history of the development of aviation in Iraq, His Majesty opened the main door of the air-port offices with a golden key and made a thorough inspection of the building.

2. The new air-port is conveniently situated on the western edge of the city, near the Bagdad-Basra railway station, and in the angle formed by the main roads to Damascus and Mosul. It is about five minutes' journey by car from the hotels and the business centre. The aerodrome is of ample dimensions, roughly



a mile square, and may be approached from the air without fear of obstruction of any kind. It is flat and stoneless, and fully protected by dykes from flood. It is not likely to be rendered unfit for use by wet weather, except in the unusual event of very heavy and continuous rain. In this respect it is considered better than the "Bagdad West" aerodrome which it replaces.

3. The air-port offices are housed in a spacious building at the entrance to the aerodrome, designed by the Government architect (Mr. H. C. Mason), in collaboration with the Director of Civil Aviation (Mr. D. W. Cumbley). The booking offices of the aviation companies operating in Iraq are grouped round a large central reception hall. In one wing of the ground floor there is a restaurant, and hotel accommodation for use of passengers as well as the crews of aeroplanes. The other wing of the ground floor contains Government offices for the passport, customs and health services. Postal and telegraphic facilities are also provided. The offices of the air-port management are on the first floor, and include a wireless station, and a lighting control for night traffic. There is an up-to-date wind-recording apparatus.

4. The Posts and Telegraphs have centralised their wireless receiving apparatus in the air-port, leaving the transmitters in their main offices in the city. By separating the transmitting from the receiving plant in this manner, they are able to work in both directions at the same time and staff is economised. The receivers in the air-port are controlled from the main telegraph office for purposes of ordinary commercial traffic, and from the air-port for purposes of traffic with aircraft. The wireless installation is all of United Kingdom manufacture, being supplied for the most part by Messrs. Marconi (Limited), and is of the latest design. It includes a wireless direction-finder for the use of aircraft.

5. The aerodrome is well adapted for night flying; and the Neon location beacon-light on the roof of the air-port offices will be visible, on a clear night, from a distance of about 60 miles. A "Shadow-Bar" landing flood-light, and illuminated landing and boundary lights, are to be installed within the next six months.

6. Only one hangar has yet been installed, that purchased from the Air Ministry and formerly used by Imperial Airways, but it is proposed to organise, in co-operation with the aviation companies, further hangar accommodation. Fuel storage at the air-port has been arranged by the Rafidain Oil Company.

7. From the 5th April use of the Imperial Airways "Bagdad West" aerodrome was discontinued; and all commercial and private aeroplanes must land at the new air-port.

8. The Iraqi Government have thus brought into commission a public aerodrome at Bagdad laid out on the most modern and efficient lines, and the greatest credit is due to all who have contributed towards this achievement.

9. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 2250/105/93]

No. 87.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 1.)*

(No. 249.)  
Sir,

*Bagdad, April 20, 1933.*

YOU are aware from my despatch No. 209 of the 30th March last that, according to the published programme of the new Cabinet, consideration is to be given to the question of strengthening the armed forces of Iraq by the introduction of a system of National Service.

2. As I regard this matter as one of primary importance, both in regard to the internal administration of Iraq and in relation to the Alliance, I have been at some pains to ascertain the intentions of the Iraqi Government. I find that in July 1931, at the time when it was first being mooted, the Inspector-General of the Iraqi army, Major-General Rowan-Robinson, drew up a tentative scheme for the formation of a National Service army in anticipation of a possible demand for assistance by the Ministry of Defence.

3. Major-General Rowan-Robinson found that his predecessor had already put forward two schemes, but had advised the Iraqi Government that it would

be militarily unsound to introduce National Service until the various martial elements in Iraq had become amenable to the control of the Central Government and the country could be considered as being on a sound administrative footing.

4. The first of General Loch's schemes envisaged a corps of two divisions with corps troops, costing in its first year 161 lakhs (£1,208,000) and in its tenth and succeeding years 140 lakhs (£1,050,000). The second provided for an army of one division, costing in its first year 151 lakhs and in its tenth and succeeding years 116 lakhs. The position in 1931 was that the second scheme had found favour with the Prime Minister, but as the military budget had been considerably reduced it was thought unlikely that it would be possible to vote the sum necessary for putting the scheme into operation.

5. Major-General Rowan-Robinson therefore proposed for consideration two fresh schemes: The first provided for the ultimate formation in ten years of a corps consisting of two divisions with corps troops, while the second envisaged the formation of a single division, plus six garrison battalions at the end of six years. The general plan of the first scheme was to retain six of the existing nine battalions and so to organise these battalions that on mobilisation they could be expanded to brigades of three battalions; each company, plus a machine-gun platoon, being capable of expansion to a battalion and each platoon to a company.

6. The second of his schemes was similar to the first, except that instead of a battalion expanding to a brigade, three of the existing six battalions should belong to a covering force. This force would not be capable of expansion, but on the outbreak of war they would take up their covering dispositions and would form part of a division on mobilisation. The three other battalions would each expand to two battalions and between them would furnish two brigade headquarters.

7. In November 1932 the Minister of Defence informed Major-General Rowan-Robinson that the Council of Ministers were again seriously considering the introduction of National Service and asked for his advice. He therefore handed his scheme to the Minister and explained that as, since it had been drawn up, the Iraqi army had increased from nine to twelve battalions, the National army should, in his opinion, contain eight battalions instead of the six suggested in his scheme, while divisions should contain twelve battalions instead of the nine proposed.

8. I had intended to send Major-General Rowan-Robinson's proposals in full, but I now learn that the Council of Ministers have evolved a more costly scheme of their own which, presumably, will form the basis of their future deliberations. I will endeavour to ascertain the nature of their proposals as soon as possible.

9. I have not ceased to warn King Feisal and several of the Ministers in the new Cabinet that they must proceed with the greatest caution in the introduction of a measure which is likely to prove very unpopular, especially with the Kurds and the tribes of the middle Euphrates.

10. I understand privately that the National Service Bill will not be drafted at the earliest before the next session of Parliament begins in November next, and that a necessary preliminary will be the taking of a new census.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 2830/733/93]

No. 88.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 30.)*

(No. 307.)  
Sir,

*Bagdad, May 18, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 220 of the 6th April last, I have the honour to report the following further developments in the situation in the Barzan area:—

2. During April Muhammad Sadiq and his brother, Mulla Mustafa, and their followers remained in Turkish villages close to the Iraqi frontier to the south of the Govanda Plateau. From time to time, according to their usual practice, they sent parties over the border to raid villages and obtain supplies. A force of

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Turkish troops, reported to be about 100 rifles strong, arrived in the area early in the month, but took no action against the Barzanis.

3. On the 11th May a police patrol proceeding through the deep gorge of the Gelli Suli, situated at the south-eastern extremity of the Chia-i-Shirin mountain range, encountered a force of about fifty Barzanis and a skirmish followed in which two constables were wounded and an armed messenger was killed. Police reinforcements sent from Shirwan-i-Mazin to the Gelli Suli also met with opposition from another party of Barzanis under Mulla Mustafa and lost one inspector and two constables killed. Other reinforcements sent from Barzan succeeded in reaching the police engaged in the Gelli Suli and the Barzanis were driven off in the direction of the Chia-i-Shirin.

4. From the reports received in Bagdad it is evident that Mulla Mustafa and Muhammad Sadiq, with several subordinate leaders, have now crossed over into Iraq with a considerable force of armed men; estimates of their numbers vary from thirty to 300.

5. They appear to have established themselves in their old mountain fastness, the Chia-i-Shirin, and I fear that it will prove difficult to dislodge them.

6. For the present the Iraqi Government propose to deal with the situation with police, but infantry are being sent to Morgasur and Shirwan-i-Mazin to garrison the posts and to release the police for active pursuit of the insurgents. Police reinforcements are also being drafted into the disturbed area, and the Iraqi Air Force have been warned to prepare to undertake reconnaissance duties and to co-operate with the police when on the move.

7. Nuri Pasha tells me that he has telegraphed to the Iraqi Minister at Angora instructing him to remind the Turkish Government of their treaty obligations and to press them to co-operate more effectively in closing the frontier to the rebel tribesmen.

8. General Rowan-Robinson, who has recently inspected the Iraqi troops on the northern frontier, reports unfavourably on their efficiency, and the police are, of course, not trained for regular mountain warfare against a strong tribal enemy. I understand, however, that special police recruited from local Kurds will be employed in future in these outlying posts.

9. King Feisal asked me this morning for my advice as to the best means of impressing on the Turks the necessity for collaboration in dealing with these outlaws. I suggested that His Majesty should write a personal letter to Mustafa Kemal giving a brief outline of the history of the operations against Sheikh Ahmad and his followers, and recalling that two years ago, when on a visit to Angora, he had been approached by the Ghazi with a special request to deal drastically with the Sheikh of Barzan, whose active hostilities were proving very embarrassing to Turkey. His Majesty felt sure that he had only to bring the existing state of affairs to the Ghazi's notice to ensure his whole-hearted co-operation in putting a finishing touch to the good work performed last summer. The King promised that he would write as I had suggested and instruct his brother, who is the Iraqi Minister at Angora, to deliver it at a personal audience.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 2832/209/93]

No. 89.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 30.)*

(No. 310.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 18, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, two statements showing the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Iraqi Government for the current financial year, as set out in the budget estimates submitted to the Iraqi Parliament, where they are now under examination. The statements include figures showing how the estimates compare with the actual and estimated expenditure of the past three years. A copy of the draft Budget Law is also attached. The Government expenditure during the current financial year is for the present being financed by monthly supply allotments.

2. The estimated revenue and expenditure is as follows:—

	Iraqi dinars.
Revenue ... ..	3,747,000
Expenditure ... ..	3,746,970
Surplus ... ..	30

3. The estimates have been prepared on the same lines as those of previous years. The policy of educational expansion, sponsored by the present Minister of Finance, is reflected in the further increase in the allotments for the Ministry of Education, which have shown a steady annual increase, and now absorb 9.6 per cent. of the total revenues. The growth of the Iraqi Air Force has increased the cost of the Ministry of Defence to £826,670, or 22 per cent. of the total revenues. The expenditure of the police shows a small reduction, but the total anticipated expenditure on the two services for Defence and Security take up 36 per cent. of the national revenue, omitting the Iraq Petroleum Company payment. The amelioration in the climatic and economic conditions affecting agriculture and an anticipated improvement in the administration of the istihlak taxation, have encouraged the Minister to budget for an increase in revenue from agricultural and natural produce. A substantial increase in the receipts from Customs and Excise is also provided. This is anticipated because the receipts for the past financial year were £50,000 in excess of estimates, an improvement in trade is looked for, and preventive measures against evasion of duty are to be tightened up. The advance royalties and dead rent payments due from the Iraq Petroleum Company are again omitted from the revenue estimates, in accordance with the policy of segregating such revenues for development and works of a capital nature, but the annual payment due during the year from the British Oil Development Company of £140,000 is being taken into general revenues. Similar action was taken as a special and emergent measure during the past financial year to meet the cost of the Barzan operations, and its repetition as a matter of routine has not met with general approval.

4. The estimates of the Port of Basra Administration are included in the law, and are as follows:—

	Iraqi dinars.
Revenue ... ..	253,200
Expenditure ... ..	246,500
Surplus ... ..	6,700

Full provision is made in the estimates for payment of the amount due to His Majesty's Government towards the liquidation of the capital debt of the port. A separate report on these estimates will be forwarded as soon as full particulars are available.

5. The estimates of the Iraq railways are as follows:—

	Iraqi dinars.
Revenue ... ..	497,250
Expenditure ... ..	494,920
Surplus ... ..	2,330

The estimates include substantial provision for renewals and betterments to a total of £72,696. A detailed report on the railway estimates will also be prepared as soon as full details are available.

6. No English copies of the detailed estimates of the Iraqi Government are available, but I will endeavour to obtain copies, for transmission to you, after they are passed by the Parliament.

7. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.



## Enclosure 1 in No. 89.

## (1) Summary of Expenditure by Chapters.

Chapter.	Ministries and Departments.	Expenditure, 1930.	Expenditure, 1931.	Original Allotments, 1932.	Revised Allotments, 1932.	Allotments, 1933.
		Dinars.	Dinars.	Dinars.	Dinars.	Dinars.
I	Public Debts and Pensions ..	233,690	293,781	228,350	263,850	236,065
II	Civil List of His Majesty the King ..	64,514	58,148	59,227	58,927	60,41
III	Parliament ..	51,513	54,283	43,360	39,910	67,102
IV	Comptroller and Auditor-General ..	8,749	8,014	9,390	9,390	9,715
V	Council of Ministers ..	10,185	14,240	10,692	18,192	25,210
VI	Ministry for Foreign Affairs ..	16,762	24,570	26,536	35,486	42,804
VII	Ministry of Finance ..	258,634	246,339	253,328	265,728	268,433
VII-A	Customs and Excise ..	167,082	164,937	167,974	170,124	174,250
VIII	Ministry of Interior ..	254,576	272,859	285,395	296,316	296,255
VIII-A	Iraq Police ..	592,282	548,115	547,349	545,499	534,355
VIII-B	Health Service ..	194,910	190,161	188,373	185,302	194,315
IX	Ministry of Defence ..	782,024	745,289	769,263	834,513	826,670
X	Ministry of Justice ..	101,827	100,402	105,543	106,123	119,169
X-A	Tapu Department ..	35,177	28,504	29,823	29,293	32,300
XI	Ministry of Education ..	276,402	282,195	314,378	312,378	358,145
XII	Ministry of Economics and Communications ..	47,541	51,030	58,146	65,563	62,925
XII-A	Department of Agriculture and Veterinary ..	79,264	67,052	70,194	66,759	75,092
XII-B	Public Works Department ..	229,665	148,639	125,472	135,710	113,820
XII-C	Posts and Telegraphs ..	191,988	180,925	174,522	171,522	165,780
XII-D	Irrigation Department ..	158,576	96,050	104,128	99,128	90,150
	Total ..	3,755,361	3,575,535	3,571,443	3,709,713	3,746,970

## (2) Summary of Receipts by Chapters.

Chapter.		Receipts, 1930.	Receipts, 1931.	Original Estimates, 1932.	Revised Estimates, 1932.	Estimates, 1933.
		Dinars.	Dinars.	Dinars.	Dinars.	Dinars.
I	Taxation on Agricultural and Natural Produce, Animals and Rents of Government Properties ..	780,230	626,309	666,375	666,375	683,000
II	Property, Income and Stamp Taxes ..	266,427	312,316	360,000	560,000	332,000
III	Miscellaneous Revenues ..	181,238	199,422	210,975	323,475	294,335
IV	Customs and Excise ..	1,764,400	1,858,056	1,875,000	1,875,000	1,987,500
V	Posts and Telegraphs ..	214,389	202,887	204,375	204,375	184,000
VI	Other Government Services and Institutions ..	277,556	250,833	262,083	262,083	266,165
	Total ..	3,484,260	3,449,823	3,578,808	3,691,308	3,747,000

## Enclosure 2 in No. 89.

## Draft General Budget Law for the Financial Year 1933.

ARTICLE 1.—Sums amounting to 3,746,970 dinars are voted for meeting the expenses of the State for the financial year 1933, which commences on the 1st April, 1933, and ends on the 31st March, 1934, as set forth in Statement "A" attached to this law.

Art. 2.—The revenues and receipts of the State for the financial year 1933 are estimated at 3,747,000 dinars, as set forth in Statement "B" attached to this law.

Art. 3.—The receipts of the Port Administration for the financial year 1933 are estimated at 253,200 dinars, as set forth in Statement "C" attached to this law.

Art. 4.—246,500 dinars are voted for the expenses of the Port Administration for the financial year 1933, as set forth in Statement "D" attached to this law.

Art. 5.—The receipts from bar dues (Schedule Q of Port Dues) for the financial year 1933 are estimated at 194,140 dinars, as set forth in Statement "E" attached to this law.

Art. 6.—192,540 dinars are voted to meet the cost of continuing the dredging operations during the financial year 1933, as set forth in Schedule "F" attached to this law.

Art. 7.—The revenues of the Railway Administration for the financial year 1933 are estimated at 497,250 dinars, as set forth in Schedule "G" attached to this law.

Art. 8.—494,920 dinars are voted for the expenses of the Railway Administration for the financial year 1933, as set forth in Schedule "H" attached to this law.

Art. 9.—The receipts of the Iraqi Currency Board for the financial year 1933 are estimated at 55,000 dinars, as set forth in Schedule "I" attached to this law.

Art. 10.—6,150 dinars are voted for the expenses of the Iraqi Currency Board for the financial year 1933, as set forth in Schedule "J" attached to this law.

Art. 11.—The sums voted for expenditure provide only for the disbursements which will be made during the financial year. Similarly, the estimated revenues relate only to the receipts which are expected to be collected during the financial year.

Art. 12.—Dues and taxes will be collected in accordance with existing procedure. The imposition or collection of new taxes or dues is not admissible, neither is it admissible to increase the rate of existing dues and taxes, except by special law.

Art. 13.—The transfer of provision from one vote to another is not admissible except by special law.

Art. 14.—The Minister of Finance is authorised to transfer provision from one article to another within the same vote.

Art. 15.—All Government receipts and expenditure must be recorded in the accounts, i.e., receipts should not be appropriated for the purpose of meeting expenditure without recording the latter in the accounts.

Art. 16.—Amounts donated by persons or institutions for a definite undertaking, the acceptance of which is agreed to by the Government, will be received in cash and entered in the Government accounts as a receipt. Such funds will be allotted to special expenditure votes, and will be spent only for the undertaking for which they are specifically contributed. The Minister of Finance is authorised to increase the provisions of votes in proportion to the expenditure incurred against the donations made.

Art. 17.—The Minister of Finance is empowered to authorise the Ministries concerned to place orders or conclude contracts for sums not exceeding the total of 80,000 dinars against the provisions for the financial year 1934, and he may make advances to the extent of not more than 20 per cent. of the value of such orders or contracts, provided that interest shall be charged thereon at a rate to be fixed by the Minister of Finance.

Art. 18.—The Minister of Finance may borrow amounts, the total of which may not exceed 150,000 dinars, by the issue of Treasury notes or by other means.

Art. 19.—The Minister of Finance shall have power to make quarterly payments of pensions which do not exceed 500 fils per mensem in any one instance.

Art. 20.—The salaries and allowances received by State officials and employees, other than those bound by contracts, shall be reduced by 5 per cent.

(a) The term "salaries" shall mean the salaries of Ministers, officials, employees, and officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, whose salaries are charged against the general budget, and mudawara charitable allowances.

(b) The term "allowances" shall mean special service allowances and all allowances paid under various titles on account of special work undertaken, except allowances mentioned in the Travelling Allowance Regulations.

(c) This reduction shall not include the salaries of policemen and police sergeants, or the first 30 dirhams of the pay of jailers and qolchis.



Art. 21.—Pension salaries and gratuities provided for in the Civil and Military Pension Laws Nos. 12 and 10 of 1930 shall be reduced by 5 per cent. Pension salaries and gratuities not exceeding 3 dinars and 750 fils per mensem shall, however, be excepted from this reduction.

Art. 22.—The Minister of Finance may extinguish the remaining balance of the Amlak Mazbuta Allowances by the payment to the beneficiaries of a lump sum equivalent to seven annual allotments.

Art. 23.—The Minister of Finance may pay the salaries and allowances due to Iraqi diplomatic and consular officials and employees in foreign countries the exchange value of whose currencies has risen as against the pound sterling by the conversion (of the said salaries and allowances) into the currency of the country concerned at a rate to be fixed by him from time to time, having regard to the extent of the rise in the exchange value of the currency concerned, but provided that the resulting increase shall not exceed 15 per cent. of the salaries and allowances concerned at the time of payment.

Art. 24.—This law shall come into force from the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 25.—The Ministers of our State are charged with the execution of this law, each in so far as concerns him.

[E 2849/7/93]

No. 90.

## LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Iraq: Settlement of the Assyrian Community in Iraq.*

*Note by the Secretary-General.—(Received in Foreign Office, May 31, 1933.)*

THE Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council for information a letter dated the 14th May, 1933, from his Excellency Noury Pasha Al Said, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Iraq, in which, referring to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, he supplies certain particulars with regard to the measures taken by the Iraqi Government with a view to the settlement of the Assyrian community in Iraq.

*Geneva, May 22, 1933.*

To the Secretary-General,

*Bagdad, May 14, 1933.*

You will recollect that during the course of their 69th session the Council of the League of Nations, in a resolution passed on the 15th December last, took note of a declaration made by the representatives of Iraq of the intention of the Iraqi Government to undertake certain measures for the further settlement of the Assyrian community, and requested the Iraqi Government to keep them informed in due course of the result of these measures.

Owing to the impossibility of carrying out any settlement operations during the winter months, the Iraqi Government are not yet able to make a detailed report on this matter, but it has been thought desirable that I should communicate to you the following information concerning the action which has been taken in this regard since the Council resolution was passed.

One of the most important features of the Iraqi Government proposals was the appointment of an expert from outside Iraq to assist them in the settlement of all landless inhabitants of the country, including Assyrians. Some difficulty has been experienced in finding a man having the varied qualifications necessary for this work, and who was free to take up the appointment.

The Government of Iraq spent some time in correspondence with Mr. M. S. Macdonnell, who possessed the qualifications necessary to undertake the work, and actually asked him through the Royal Iraq Legation at London to accept the appointment and to proceed at once to Iraq. But unfortunately, owing to considerations of health, Mr. Macdonnell could not accept the offer and start work during the summer. The Government, taking into consideration the fact that the winter season in the north of Iraq is unsuitable for such work, and

wishing to settle this problem as soon as possible, at once engaged Major Douglas Thomson who, I hope, will be able to leave for Iraq in order to begin his work in a few days' time.

In the meanwhile, the local authorities in the Mosul Liwa (where the proposed Assyrian settlement work is to be carried out) have organised a special settlement committee to draw up lists of those without land and to study the needs of others whose present lands are insufficient or for other reasons unsatisfactory, and to try to settle them all within the actually available lands. This committee is being assisted by an advisory board of Assyrians chosen from the chief tribes or sections of the community. Applications for settlement have been invited from all those in need of land, and substantial remissions of revenue have been promised for a long period to those settled under the new schemes.

They have been also promised that if they would fulfil all the requirements now applicable to all lessees of Government land in Iraq they would acquire the right to maintain the necessary title to keep and to use the land.

In the budget which will shortly be laid before Parliament the Government are including a vote of a considerable sum of money for settlement work, a large proportion of which will be devoted to helping the unsettled Assyrians. Work will begin in the very near future in Dichtazi district.

Later in the year, after the expert has been able to study the problem and to give effect to the Iraqi Government's proposals, full details of the progress which has been made will be supplied to you for the information of the Council. In the meanwhile, I should be glad if you would take such steps as you may consider proper to bring the contents of this letter to the notice of the League authorities concerned.

NOURY SAID,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

[E 2952/7/93]

No. 91.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 6.)*

(No. 325.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 24, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a state of tension as between Arabs and Assyrians has recently developed in Mosul town.

2. On several occasions about the middle of the month, the house of the Iraqi brigade-major was stoned, usually at night and sometimes in the early morning. This house is situated close to the residences of the Mar Shimun and of Assyrian officers of the Levy Company at Mosul. Bekar Sidqi, the Iraqi General Officer Commanding, Mosul, complained to the Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, that the Assyrians were responsible, and that on the 16th May Assyrian soldiers had mounted guard over the Iraq army parade ground and on the house of the Mar Shimun. The stone-throwing was investigated by no less than forty uniformed Iraqi police, who were unable to obtain any evidence whatever. The Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, after careful enquiry into the subjects of complaint, could discover nothing in justification. As a precautionary measure, however, he confined the Royal Air Force and the levies to barracks.

3. In the meanwhile the Iraqi general seems to have lost his head. Without consulting the civil authorities, he withdrew all the Iraqi officers and their families from the quarter of the town where the stone-throwing had occurred, and declared a state of emergency, putting into operation the first phase of the Mosul defence scheme. This involved the issue of ball cartridge to the Iraqi troops and the fortification of the ammunition magazines. These measures naturally excited much comment among the townspeople, and wild rumours were circulated as to the plots and dangers which had made them necessary. Bekar Sidqi also flatly refused to accept the assurances of the British liaison officers that the Assyrian levies had nothing to do with the affair.

4. The Air Officer Commanding, to whom these events were reported by his officers in Mosul, explained the situation to Sir Francis Humphrys on the eve of his Excellency's departure, and on the 20th May he flew to Mosul to make personal enquiries. He returned the same afternoon and immediately discussed the situation with me.

[9177]



5. He informed me that in consequence of the ill-judged and, in his opinion, quite unnecessary action of the Iraqi general, the trivial events which had occurred had been made to assume an importance quite out of proportion to their real significance, and that as a result a state of dangerous tension existed in Mosul. He had interviewed both the civil and the military authorities in the town, and had urged an early return to normal conditions. He said he could not indefinitely keep all the Assyrian levies confined to barracks, and for his part he would guarantee their good behaviour if they were permitted to visit their families in the town. He had asked that the General Officer Commanding Iraqi troops would for his part undertake that the levy men would not be in any danger of being assaulted by the Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqi general would not give this undertaking, and apparently held to his opinion that the Assyrians were intent on committing subversive acts against the Arab troops.

6. The Air Officer Commanding accordingly considered that the situation would not improve so long as Bekar Sidqi remained in command at Mosul, and in the interests of Imperial troops requested me to arrange for an early audience with the King in order that prompt action might be taken to ease the situation.

7. His Majesty was able to receive us at 7 o'clock the same evening (the 19th May), and we discussed the matter at some length. King Feisal was of opinion that the General Officer Commanding, Mosul, had mishandled the situation, and he promised that the chief of the General Staff, Taha Pasha-al-Hashimi, should be sent to that town at once to take charge of the situation and to enquire into the conduct of Bekar Sidqi Beg. The King also decided that Sabih Beg-al-Najib, the Director-General of Police, should be sent to Mosul to take over the police. He also spoke of inviting the Mar Shimun to come to Bagdad for a few days, ostensibly to discuss the drafting of a Community Law for the Assyrians, but in reality to give an undertaking not to interfere in politics. This has been confirmed by a report which I have subsequently received from His Majesty's consul in Mosul.

8. The main object of our visit, namely, the drawing of His Majesty's personal attention to the affair, having thus been attained, we then withdrew. Two days later I had occasion to be received by the King to discuss other matters. His Majesty informed me that he had had time to make a full investigation, with the result that while he undoubtedly would have approved certain steps taken by Bekar Sidqi, he was very angry with him for refusing to accept the word of the British liaison officers, and for that offence, if for nothing else, he would be removed. He had also decided to transfer the civil Governor. He had further directed that the Ministers of Defence and of the Interior should proceed to Mosul in the course of the next few days and give some entertainment of reconciliation. The Air Officer Commanding has also informed me that the state of emergency has been raised and the resultant tension considerably eased.

9. It is not possible just now to discover the real cause of the trouble. It seems certain that the levies had nothing to do with it. The Air Officer Commanding tells me that he found the Mar Shimun in a state bordering on panic. While there is no evidence against him, it is always possible that he may have been indirectly playing with fire. King Feisal has the usual obsession that the French are behind it all. But so far as we can ascertain at present, it would not surprise us to hear that there was a lady in a case, which has been magnified out of all proportion by the panic-stricken conduct of the Iraqi commander.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 2953/733/93]

No. 92.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 6.)*

(No. 326.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 24, 1933.*

WITH reference to Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 307 of the 18th May, I have the honour to report that the unrest in the Barzan area still continues, and further sporadic attacks have been made on the Iraqi police forces, whose moral is none too high.

2. In General Rowan-Robinson's estimate, the strength of the rebels who are under the leadership of Mulla Mustafa and Ullu Beg varies between 200 and 600, according to the successes which they may achieve. General Rowan-Robinson has after considerable delay at last succeeded in obtaining the consent of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence to carry out his scheme for coping with this unrest. According to present arrangements, the force, which is to be called "Surbaz," will consist of three battalions, the 4th, 5th and 9th, with machine guns and wireless sections, and a detachment (1 squadron) of Iraqi aircraft for reconnaissance and bombing duties. Force headquarters are at Diana, and it is the intention that a network of strong points at the various police posts be occupied each by one company with a machine-gun platoon, and that in co-operation with the Iraqi Air Force the garrisons of these posts should converge upon and deal with the insurgents as and when reported. The general considers it to be essential that the Iraqi Government should act with promptitude, as otherwise the rebels may succeed in terrorising the whole of the north-eastern area, especially in view of the poor quality of the police.

3. The region at present affected corresponds on the somewhat inaccurate 1:1,000,000 International Map to the area enclosed by the Turkish frontier, the Yahudi Chai, Rudbar-i-Zai and Rudbar-i-Barasgin. One battalion has reached Murgasuri, one is marching from Diana for that destination, and one is at Billa, near Zibar.

4. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 2954/653/93]

No. 93.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 6.)*

(No. 327.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 24, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the anniversary of King Feisal's birthday, which falls on the 20th May, was celebrated this year with an unusual number of official ceremonies.

2. The King began the day with a review of the Bagdad garrison. The six new "Dragon" aeroplanes made their first public appearance. The turn-out of all units was smart. The superior physique of the rank and file, as compared with the officers, was noteworthy.

3. After the review came the ceremony of the unveiling of the King's statue by the Prime Minister, which was attended by a large gathering, including the Diplomatic Corps, Ministers, senior officials, and notables of Bagdad. This statue, the work of Signor Pietro Canonica, has been set up near the Maude Bridge, on the right bank of the river, in the intersection of two new boulevards, which have recently been laid out by the municipality. It is of bronze, double life size, and portrays King Feisal in Arab dress, mounted on a traditionally graceful Arab horse.

4. In the evening, a second statue, that of the Prime Minister, Abdul Muhsin Beg-al-Sadun, who committed suicide in 1929, was unveiled near the south gate. This ceremony was followed by the opening of a new public garden, the creation of the present energetic Mayor of Bagdad, who has done much to improve the amenities of this otherwise sordid capital.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.



*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Communicated by Department of Overseas Trade, June 9).*

(Overseas Trade No. (A) 16.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 24, 1933.*

WITH reference to Bagdad Economic Report, paragraphs ending with No. 169 of report No. 6 for the month of June 1932, I have the honour to inform you that M. Maurice B. H. Rotival, of 11 bis, Avenue Victor Hugo, Paris, the French architect and town-planning expert, recently returned to Bagdad for a short visit in connexion with his projects.

2. It was in the summer of 1931, during the visit of His Majesty King Feisal to Paris, that M. Rotival first secured His Majesty's interest in his plans for a new Bagdad on the right bank of the Tigris. M. Rotival was encouraged by His Majesty to develop them, and in November 1931 he came to Bagdad to do so.

3. These plans included a Royal palace, and last year M. Rotival was commissioned by His Majesty King Feisal to prepare, quite apart from the main town-planning scheme, architectural designs for a new palace and a Royal villa on the right bank. The designing of the villa was subsequently taken out of his hands, on due payment, and construction was undertaken by the Public Works Department of the Iraqi Government under the supervision of the Government architect. The designing of the palace was, however, left with M. Rotival, and the primary object of his present visit to Bagdad is finally to hand over the designs. Whether His Majesty the King will eventually decide to make use of M. Rotival's plans is uncertain. In any case, they have now been completed, and presumably will have to be paid for. The sum due under the contract is apparently about £3,000.

4. As regards the town-planning scheme, a board was set up by the Iraqi Government in the spring of 1932 to discuss the project with M. Rotival. The latter's original proposal was for the construction of an official quarter on the lines of "New Delhi"; but the board wished to go much further than this, and appear, in effect, to have contemplated transference of the entire city from the left to the right bank of the river. The cost of such a scheme would certainly not be less than £5 million. It involves moving the railway station and realigning the permanent way. Its development is also closely related to the proposals for new bridges across the river. The following programme was eventually arranged last year between the board and M. Rotival: he was allowed a period of one year, ending the 16th June, 1933, known as the first stage, to form a syndicate in Europe to take over and elaborate his proposals. The syndicate were then to be allowed a further period of one year, ending the 16th June, 1934, known as the second stage, to carry out at their own expense a comprehensive survey, to prepare detailed plans, and to negotiate with the Government the manner of their execution. Agreement having been reached, the third stage would begin. An Iraqi limited liability company would be formed and granted a concession. The necessary legislation would be enacted. I understand that M. Rotival has now given notice to the Iraqi Government that he has duly completed the first stage of the programme by the registration in London on the 1st May, 1933, of a company called the "New Bagdad Town Planning and Development Syndicate (Limited)," with a capital of £10,000; and that this company will shortly be ready to start a comprehensive survey in accordance with the second stage of the programme.

5. M. Rotival has informed the commercial secretary to the Embassy that the appointment of a board of directors awaits only the approval of the Iraqi Government, and that the following are associated, amongst others, in the new company:—

Mr. J. G. B. Stone, Chairman of the Bagdad Light and Power Company (Limited).  
The Bagdad Light and Power Company (Limited).  
The Société anonyme d'Entreprise générale de Travaux ("Engetra" of Belgium).  
The Ottoman Bank (M. J. de Neufville).  
The Solvay group (Swiss).

As regards the first three of these, a reference is invited to the commercial secretary's despatch No. O.T. (B) 95, dated the 24th May, forwarding the prospectus recently issued by the Belgian-owned Bagdad Light and Power Company. That the controlling interest in the company will be British is not apparent from the names given above; but M. Rotival intimates that the managing director of the company will probably be British and that its capital will be half British, a quarter Belgian and a quarter French, unless proposals for Iraqi participation to the extent of 10 per cent. now under consideration are carried through. In that case, part of the Belgian and French share will probably be allotted for public issue in Iraq. Dr. Muhammad Haider, a cousin of the Minister of Economics and Communications, and one of the cement concessionnaires (see the commercial secretary's despatch No. O.T. (B) 23, dated the 15th February) is likely to be appointed to represent the company in Bagdad. He is a Syrian.

6. How far the Iraqi Government or the Bagdad Municipality have committed themselves to the town-planning scheme is uncertain; and the "New Bagdad Town Planning and Development Company (Limited)" may well find themselves left at the end of the second stage of the programme with no purchaser for the costly plans which they are to prepare. However, there is no doubt that the scheme is attractive to the King and to Iraqi officials generally; and that, provided the necessary capital can be raised, they would like to proceed with it. The British advisers, on the other hand, are inclined to be sceptical. I will report future developments as they occur.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 13.)*

(No. 329.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 24, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in continuation of paragraph 4 of Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 310 of the 18th May, two statements giving details of the budget estimates of the port of Basra for the current financial year in the form in which they have been sent forward to Parliament.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. The estimates allow for an improvement in revenue consequent upon increased traffic owing to the continued import of materials for pipe-line construction and the possibility of increased grain export. The additional revenue is offset by heavier expenditure on repairs and maintenance of buildings and gear. The estimates contain a new section showing the receipts and expenditure of the central power house at Basra which, as Sir Francis Humphrys reported in his despatch No. 113 of the 16th February last, was purchased by the Port Directorate with effect from the 1st January, 1933. The figures, which are necessarily tentative at this stage, allow for a small profit. Apart from these points the estimates are on the normal lines.

3. A surplus of 6,700 I.D. is provided after full allowance has been made for depreciation of capital assets and for payment of the eleventh instalment of the port capital debt due to His Majesty's Government. The operations of the port during the past financial year have resulted in a further substantial surplus and justify the anticipations of the Port Director for the current year, as revealed in these estimates.

4. The estimates for the Fao Bar dredging scheme allow for a revenue of 194,140 I.D., and expenditure of 192,540 I.D., showing a nominal surplus of 1,600 I.D. Included in the expenditure is a sum of £10,000 for interest on the money borrowed from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and a sum of £50,000 to be utilised in partial repayment of the capital debt, which on the 1st April, 1933, was £87,000 only. It is probable that during the year a final payment will be made to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in liquidation of all the liabilities of the Iraqi Government on account of the Fao Bar dredging scheme.

5. The present policy of the Iraqi Government regarding the bar dredging service is uncertain, as the Minister of Finance is displaying marked reluctance

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



to send forward for ratification by Parliament the revised Bar Dredging Agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was signed by the representatives of both the company and the Government in June last. There are indications that he desires to extract a concession from the company in the matter of the price of oil products in Iraq in return for ratification, and that, if this fails, the Government may assume liability for the maintenance of the dredged channel under the old agreement and utilise the revenues from the dredging due for their own purposes. Sir Francis Humphrys has on several occasions urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the King to ratify the new agreement in their own interests, and it is possible that wiser counsels may prevail.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 3082/733/93]

No. 96.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 13.)*

(No. 342.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 31, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 326 of the 24th May, I have the honour to report that during the course of the past week the "Surbaz" force continued its march into the disaffected area. I am also informed by the inspector-general of police that the rebels have temporarily withdrawn into Turkish territory on the Govanda plateau, with the result that the Iraqi punitive expedition, after leaving one company at Shirwan-a-Mazin, a platoon at Raizan, a battalion less one company at Murgasur, and a battalion less one platoon at Billeh, are returning to Diana to await any further developments in the situation.

2. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 3084/7/93]

No. 97.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 13.)*

(No. 344.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 31, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 325 of the 24th May, the situation in Mosul appears to be returning to normal in spite of the fact that on the one hand the transfers of the Military Commander and of the Civil Governor have not yet been effected, and on the other hand the activities of certain Assyrian agitators are causing some anxiety. This morning the King repeated his intention of removing Bekr Sidqi, the General Officer Commanding, this time not so much for his attitude towards the British liaison officer as for certain scandals connected with his private life.

2. The Mar Shimun, by invitation of the Government, arrived in Bagdad a few days ago, and was this morning handed a communication from the Minister of the Interior which was drafted by Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. I enclose a copy. My comments must be deferred until the next bag.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure in No. 97.

*Minister of Interior to Mar Shimun.*

(After compliments.)

DURING my recent visit to Mosul, I explained to you the attitude of the Government with regard to your personal position, and I now wish to confirm in writing what you have already heard verbally.

The Government is willing to recognise you officially as the spiritual head of the Assyrian community, and to promise that you will at all times receive the respect due to you as the holder of that position. As you have already been told by the Mutessarif of Mosul, it is anxious to enlist your help in preparing a community law on the lines of those already in force in the case of other communities. In order that your spiritual dignity should be properly maintained, it has under consideration the creation of a source of income to assist you in permanent manner, and it does not intend to curtail the monthly allowance which is at present paid to you until such time as it is satisfied that you have ample provision from other sources.

I must, however, make it clear that the Government cannot agree to delegate to you any temporal authority. Your position will be the same as that of the other spiritual heads of communities in Iraq; in all matters of administration the members of the Assyrian community must conform to the laws, regulations and manner of procedure which applies to all other Iraqis.

I need not assure your Beatitude how sincerely anxious the Government is to do everything possible to see the Assyrian community happy and contented and loyal subjects of His Majesty the King. It has declared its policy fully to the League of Nations at Geneva, which intimated its approval.

Amongst other things, in accordance with an agreement reached there last autumn, it is obtaining the services of a foreign expert to advise in the important matter of land settlement. This expert, Major Thomson, is expected to arrive in Mosul at the end of this month. His work will be of the greatest importance to the Assyrian community, and I trust that he will receive the fullest assistance from all those who have the welfare of the community at heart. I have noticed with regret that your Beatitude has up to the present adopted an unhelpful and, according to some reports, even an obstructive, attitude in this very important matter, and I am therefore compelled to ask you to give me a written assurance that you will do nothing to make the task of Major Thomson and the Government more difficult.

If there are any points which I have not made clear in this letter, I shall be glad if you will bring them to my notice. The recognition of your position as described above is conditional on your acceptance of it and on your giving a solemn promise that you will in all ways and at all times act as a loyal subject of His Majesty the King. I shall be obliged if you will do this in a written reply to this letter.

[E 3234/7/93]

No. 98.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 19.)*

(No. 358.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 7, 1933.*

WITH reference to the second paragraph of my despatch No. 344 of the 31st May, the Mar Shimun on that date addressed a letter to His Majesty King Feisal, of which I enclose a copy. You will observe that, while this letter is mainly a criticism of the Iraqi authorities in Mosul, his Beatitude concludes with a protestation of loyalty and an offer of his "utmost services" to make the Assyrians "a contented, loyal and helpful subject people within your Majesty's dominion."



2. Such hopes as might have been raised by this letter were subsequently disappointed by the nature of his reply to the communication from the Ministry of the Interior, transmitted to you in my despatch under reference. I enclose a copy, together with copies of Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's covering letter of the 6th June, and of his note to the Minister of the Interior, in which Sir Kinahan endeavours to make the best of the Mar Shimun's retort to the Minister. Indeed, Sir Kinahan informs me that on receipt of the Mar Shimun's reply, a special meeting of the Cabinet was called, in which the question of legal proceedings against the Mar Shimun was seriously considered. Sir Kinahan was fortunately successful in dissuading the Cabinet from taking action so ill-advised as to make a martyr of the Assyrian Patriarch.

3. Major Douglas Thomson has now arrived in Bagdad. He called on the Mar Shimun. While he is naturally disappointed with the present turn of events, he nevertheless informs me that the Mar Shimun has promised—

- (i) To furnish him with a written statement specifying the precise nature of his grievances against the Iraqi Government; and
- (ii) Notwithstanding his refusal to collaborate with the Settlement Committee, to appoint representatives to keep Major Thomson informed of the wishes of the Assyrians, or rather of that section of the Assyrian nation who particularly identify themselves with the Mar Shimun.

4. Major Thomson is due to leave for Mosul on the 7th June in order to commence his work.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 98.

*Mar Shimun to King Feisal.*

Your Majesty,

*Mosul, May 31, 1933.*

I HUMBLY request leave to give your Majesty my opinion in the following lines about the present policy of the Mosul authorities, as I see it, to settle the Assyrian question.

Knowing that a word from your Majesty at this hour to your Majesty's advisers could change this policy, and thus bring the affairs of the Assyrians to a successful issue,

I was ordered by the Mutessarif of Mosul with great urgency to proceed to Bagdad immediately in response of an invitation from the Minister of Interior, to discuss with him and Major D. B. Thomson, the foreign expert for the new Assyrian settlement scheme, the Assyrian affairs.

On the sixth day after my arrival in Bagdad, and after many attempts, I was granted an interview with his Excellency the Minister of Interior.

In the meantime I have word from Mosul that the authorities there are still continuing with their old policy with regard to the Assyrian question. If this is the case, it is inconsistent with the purpose of my invitation to Bagdad as explained to me.

I very much regret to have to bring it to your Majesty's notice that during my interview with his Excellency the Interior Minister, I was informed of the unfavourable attitude of the present Government towards me personally.

If I did not participate with the present policy adopted by Mosul authorities the reason has been that that policy was entirely unconstructive.

I do feel most confident that the present policy which has now for some time been carried on by the Mosul Liwa authorities only, as I presume, and which has already proved a failure, is not consistent with the noble spirit of your Majesty, which has more than once been most graciously expressed to me by your Majesty personally.

I take the advantage of your noble spirit and fatherly kindness to assure myself that your Majesty's desire is to make the Assyrian people a contented, loyal and helpful subject people within your Majesty's dominion, and to attain

this end I am ready, as I always have been, to offer my utmost services to your Majesty.

Hoping at this late hour that some constructive scheme can be arranged, which will enable my people and myself to prove to your Majesty's person our loyalty and gratitude,

I remain, &c.

MAR SHIMUN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 98.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

My dear Forbes,

*Bagdad, June 6, 1933.*

REFERENCE my P.S. No. 476, dated the 31st May, 1933.

I forward a copy of a letter from Mar Shimun to the Minister, dated the 3rd June, in reply to his letter dated the 28th May, 1933.

The Minister considered this letter extremely unsatisfactory and was in favour of taking immediate action against Mar Shimun, but in the end agreed to allow me to see him first. I saw him this morning, and send you a copy of my note to the Minister in which the result of our conversation is recorded. I am sending a copy also to Mar Shimun, and asking him to confirm that it correctly represents what passed between us. As you will see, his assurances were quite satisfactory.

There still remains the question of his letter to the Minister. I did my best to persuade him to withdraw it, but without success.

I have advised the Minister to see him to-morrow, and I have hopes that he will withdraw it of his own accord if the Minister explains to him that he has completely misunderstood the object of the letter of the 28th May.

I am sending copies of this to the Air Officer Commanding, Colonel Prescott, and Colonel Stafford.

Yours, &c.

K. CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure 3 in No. 98.

*Mar Shimun to Minister of the Interior.*

Dear Minister,

*Mosul, June 3, 1933.*

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 28th May, 1933, and I am, with due respects, replying to its essential points as follows:—

1. With regard to my interview with your Excellency on the 12th April, 1933, at Mosul, may I request your Excellency's recollection to the conversation which then took place? Your Excellency said that a new co-operative policy with regard to the Assyrian settlement scheme would be introduced by you, and that the orders would be issued to the mutessarif by you to that effect, and that he would also be asked to consult me on all matters affecting the Assyrians.

2. The Community Law mentioned in your Excellency's letter, however useful factor it may be, at this stage of affairs would appear to be an immatured measure, owing to the fact that such a law is necessarily applicable to a settled community. Moreover, in order to formulate this law time would be required to consult with the canons of the Church.

3. With regard to the term "temporal power" alluded to by your Excellency when you say "the Government cannot agree to transfer to you any temporal power," I would be glad to know how this term is interpreted by you.

4. Although I do not desire to dwell on this point in length I think it is necessary for me to try and elucidate the term "spiritual and temporal" power united together in this special case of the Patriarch Catholicos of the "East."



since it seems to me that your Excellency and the Government have taken a grave view of it. This patriarchal authority is a great historical and traditional usage of the Assyrian people and Church, and it has been one of the established and most important customs. The temporal power has not been assumed by me, but it has descended to me from centuries past as a legalised delegation of the people to the Patriarch. It was not only tolerated but also officially recognised in past by the old Sassanite Kings, Islamic Caliphs, Mogul Khans and Ottoman Sultans. No proof of any misuse of this power as far as any King or Government, whose subjects the Assyrian people have been, can be traced in history, whilst on the other hand, besides being in no way preventive to the application of the law of the country, it has proved to be the best method of dealing with a people living under the circumstances as the Assyrians are.

Under the above circumstances I very much regret to say that it is impossible for me to comply with your order, viz., to sign the written promise outlined by your Excellency, since such an action would only mean that I am willingly withdrawing myself from the duty to my people; the duty which, as mentioned above, is a legal delegation of the people to me and it is only to them to take it away. In this connexion I would further like to point out that I am very much surprised by the step your Excellency has proposed to take, more so under the present circumstances, since such an action is only applicable in case of a rebel. This being so, may I ask your Excellency whether my honour and the honour of my people has not been insulted?

I fail to trace any precedent to this action of your Excellency unless I am to blame because I most candidly have represented the case of my Assyrian people in a legal manner before the late mandatory Power, the League of Nations and His Majesty's Government with a view of securing a solution to it which I believe it is in the interests of all concerned.

5. With regard to the allegation that I have hitherto adopted an unfavourable and rather obstructive attitude towards the Assyrian settlement scheme. This point was also verbally raised by your Excellency during my interview with you on the 31st May, when I more than once asked for facts of this allegation. This is more discouraging to me when I think of my incessant endeavours in persuading my Assyrian people to settle and become a useful element in this country as also they have been hitherto.

I close this my letter with offering my respects to your Excellency and with apology for having to write it in a foreign language as at present I have not a suitable writer in Arabic at my disposal.

If there are any points which your Excellency wishes to learn from me I shall be only too glad to answer them, as I propose to leave Bagdad on Monday evening, the 4th June.

I remain, &c.  
ESHAI SHIMUN,  
*By the Grace of God Catholicos  
Patriarch of the East.*

Enclosure 4 in No. 98.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Minister of the Interior.*

His Excellency the Minister of Interior.

I SAW his Beatitude Mar Shimun this morning and discussed with him his letter of the 3rd June to your Excellency. I pointed out to him that certain passages in his letter were liable to misconstruction and said that I wished to clear up the misunderstanding which would inevitably arise.

The result of our discussion was as follows:—

1. It became clear to me that his Beatitude feels that he has been misrepresented by ill-wishers, and that the assurances which he was asked to give implied a slur on his loyalty and honour which is not justified. This feeling undoubtedly influenced him when replying to your Excellency.

2. His Beatitude expressed his gratitude and thanks to your Excellency for your kindness in saying that the Government has under consideration the creation of a source of income to assist him in a permanent manner. He places the needs of his community above his own and considers that if the intention is to allocate lands to himself personally or in the name of the community, such allocation should be made during the course of the settlement and with due regard to the needs of individuals.

3. As regards his personal position, his Beatitude fully recognises that in all matters of administration the members of the Assyrian community must conform to the laws, regulations and manner of procedure which applies to all other Iraqis. He has always advised the Assyrians in this sense and will continue doing so. His aim is always to make the Assyrians loyal and law-abiding citizens. He considers, however, that the local officials have not been carrying out a wise policy and he fears that the Assyrians may get out of control. He cited a number of cases in which he thought injustice had been shown.

The Assyrians have always been in the habit of coming to their Patriarch with their troubles and he feels that it is his duty to represent their grievances to Government. He stated that he had nothing to add to this.

4. His Beatitude denied the reports that he has worked against land settlement; on the contrary, he considers it vital for the Assyrians, is most anxious to see it brought about and will not do anything to make the task of Major Thomson and the Government more difficult. He does not, however, consider that the committee which has been appointed is truly representative of the community and fears that the settlement on its present lines will be a failure.

He considers—

- (a) That the first action to take is to ascertain the number to be settled immediately and in the future.
- (b) That land registration should be carried out as soon as possible.
- (c) That those who are now in privately-owned lands and for whom Government lands can be found should be given a title in due course after they have moved. They should not take precedence over Assyrians who have no lands and who apply for settlement on Government lands.
- (d) That the question of financial assistance to settlers should be considered. I said that this could not be considered now and that I could not say whether Major Thomson would make any recommendations in this regard.

5. His Beatitude feels aggrieved that his loyalty to His Majesty the King should have been called in question, as he has frequently in the past both in action and in writing given expression of it.

K. CORNWALLIS, *Adviser.*

Bagdad, June 6, 1933.

[E 3247/209/93]

No. 99.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 19.)*

(No. 362.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 7, 1933.

IN continuation of Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 310 of the 18th May last, regarding the budget estimates of the Iraqi Government for the current financial year, I have the honour to transmit herewith a cutting from the *Iraq Times* of Monday, the 5th June, reporting the speech made by the Minister of Finance when introducing the estimates to the Chamber of Deputies, and the comments of the spokesman of the Opposition. The Minister's speech gives a general outline of the financial policy of the Government.(')

(') Not printed.

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2. In the light of his remarks, the following further details of the estimates and of the financial position of the Government may be of interest:—

3. The estimates provide for payment of an amount of 63,500 I.D. on account of the final instalment of the residual amount of Iraq's share of the Ottoman public debt. When this payment is made Iraq will have no public debt, either internal or external, and no floating debt, all their expenditure being at present financed from their own resources.

4. The actual receipts from income tax are still disappointing, and although the revenue from this source for the financial years 1931 and 1932 was estimated at 150,000 I.D. for each year, the actual receipts did not exceed 120,000 I.D. in either year. The lower sum of 120,000 I.D. is therefore included in the estimates for the current year.

5. A new item of receipt appears in the shape of the Government's share of the profits of the Bagdad Light and Power Company, which is assessed at 6,000 I.D. This allows for a payment by the company on account of the Government share of the profits in previous years. The receipts which are expected to accrue to the Government from concessionaires, other than the Iraq Petroleum Company royalties, are as follows:—

	I.D.
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Khanagin) ...	20,000
Tax Commutation (Iraq Petroleum Company) ...	12,500
British Oil Development Company ...	140,625
Inspection fees ...	4,085
Bagdad Light and Power Company ...	6,000

6. A new item of expenditure of 6,000 I.D. is provided under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on account of Iraq's contribution towards the expenses of the League of Nations.

7. Expenditure of a sum of 10,000 I.D. is anticipated on the refund of istihlak fees levied on "exempted lands," and a special new heading has been inserted in the estimates. The object of the provision is not certain, but it is unlikely that it reveals any intention to refund the istihlak taxes collected on the exempted properties of the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah, although a procedure for doing so is thereby provided.

8. The Ministry of Justice is to receive an extra allotment of 13,000 I.D. to provide for a much-needed expansion in the cadre of judges and the strengthening of the Public Prosecution Department and the Execution Department.

9. The establishments of the Agricultural and Veterinary Departments have been reorganised and amalgamated into one Department under the control of a Director-General. Provision is made for the establishment of Government farms in the northern and southern districts at a cost of 8,000 I.D., implying a revival of interest in what has for long been the "Cinderella" of Iraqi Government Departments.

10. A calculation shows that 58 per cent. of the total Government expenditure is required for the salaries of officials, and if to this is added the cost of pensions, the Civil List and Parliament, the aggregate total expenditure on salaries amounts to 66 per cent. of the total estimates, which compares with 63 per cent. in the previous year and 66 per cent. in the year before that. Allowances and services absorb 7 per cent. of the estimates and the cost of stores and equipment of all kinds takes up 13 per cent.

11. The Government have postponed a decision upon the vexed question of conscription by making it dependent upon the results of a general census, and for this purpose the Census Department, whose operations ended in complete failure three years ago, is to be revived. A sum of 4,000 I.D. has been allowed for this purpose.

12. It has now been ascertained that the past financial year ended with a surplus of approximately 150,000 I.D. The surplus will be applied in reduction of the accumulated deficits of the preceding years, which stood at 759,000 I.D. on the 1st April, 1932, after charging off against revenue the loans granted to the Iraqi railways, totalling 344,000 I.D., and omitting the receipts derived from the oil royalties allocated for capital works. The nominal accumulated deficit on the 1st April, 1933, is therefore, roughly, 609,000 I.D. This is covered by

the funds available from underspending on the capital works programme. During the financial years 1931 and 1932, the amount allocated for expenditure from oil revenues on capital works totalled 1,393,000 I.D., whereas the expenditure was 506,000 I.D. only, thus leaving available a sum of 887,000 I.D. to finance the deficit on normal expenditure. The cash on hand on the 1st April, 1933, was 488,000 I.D.

13. The capital works programme for the current financial year has not yet been approved, and the general question of financing the major projects which the Government have in mind has been left over for further consideration until the return of the Iraqi Economic delegation, which has been authorised to discuss the question in England. A sum of 170,000 I.D. has been allotted for expenditure during the current year upon the completion of works begun in earlier years.

14. The distribution of the capital works expenditure during the financial years 1931 and 1932 was as follows:—

	I.D.
(a) Buildings ...	106,000
(b) New roads, bridges and telegraph lines ...	253,000
(c) Irrigation works ...	108,000
(d) Subsidies ...	39,000
Total ...	506,000

The following buildings are included under heading (a):—

	I.D.
School buildings ...	12,000
Mosul Jail ...	22,000
Bagdad West Aerodrome ...	15,000
London Legation ...	12,000
King Feisal's villa at Harthiyah ...	15,000
Government offices and police posts in various localities ...	30,000

Heading (b) includes an item of 37,000 I.D. for the Mosul bridge. The expenditure on the construction of irrigation works is not commensurate with the budget allotments, mainly owing to the fact that the policy to govern the construction of major irrigation projects has not yet been determined. The subsidies comprise 12,000 I.D. for the encouragement of native industries, 22,000 I.D. to the City of Bagdad for road improvements, the effect of which is pleasingly reflected in the improved appearance of the city, and 5,000 I.D. to the Awqaf Department, which is in financial difficulties, to meet the cost of repairs to the Holy Shrines.

15. The slighting references to the foreign specialist who was specially engaged for six months (to carry out work that could not have been satisfactorily completed in less than twelve months) arise out of the deputation of Mr. D. S. McGregor, C.B.E., in 1927. The results of his appointment were not altogether happy. They are described in Sir Henry Dobbs's secret despatch "C" of the 15th September, 1928, to the Colonial Office.

16. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.  
G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 3291/7/93]

No. 100.

Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 379.)  
Sir,

Bagdad, June 14, 1933.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 358 of the 7th June, as you are already aware from my telegrams Nos. 123 and 122, relations between the Iraqi Government and the Mar Shimun have taken an unfortunate turn for the worse.

2. On the 8th June the Minister of the Interior sent for the Mar Shimun. Hikmet Beg failed to obtain the withdrawal of the Assyrian Patriarch's letter

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of the 3rd June, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch under reference. The Mar Shimun said he must consult his people first, and announced his intention of leaving for Mosul on the following day. The Minister's personal pride has been so hurt by the difference in language between the Mar Shimun's letter to the King and his communication to the Minister, that he, unfortunately, did not during the interview make use of Sir Kinahan's conciliatory note, to which I referred in my despatch No. 358. Moreover, his Excellency once more expressed the intention of dealing with the Mar Shimun under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, or of bringing him before a magistrate, with a view to obtaining surety for his good behaviour. In deprecating this proposed course of action, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis suggested that, in view of the Mar Shimun's letter to the King and of his conversations with Sir Kinahan himself, there did not appear to be a strong case in law, while the political repercussions would be deplorable. The way out of the deadlock was not legal action, but a formula satisfactory to both sides.

3. It was to the search for such a formula that Sir Kinahan directed his efforts during the next few days. After much coming and going with the Minister of the Interior on the one hand, and the Mar Shimun—always impatient to be off to Mosul—on the other, Sir Kinahan produced a draft exchange of letters, copy of which I enclose. After great difficulty he succeeded in persuading Hikmet Beg to accept this draft, but not so the Mar Shimun, who still refused to withdraw from the position taken up in his letter of the 3rd June.

4. It was at this stage that Sir Kinahan requested my intervention. For me the immediate problem was to endeavour to prevent the Iraqi Government, on the eve of Major Thomson's settlement enquiry, of which so much is expected, from committing the elementary folly of arresting or otherwise making a martyr of the leader of the Assyrian people. As the police might arrive at any moment and the Mar Shimun might try to board the first train for the north, prompt and unhesitating action was required. While I quite realise that it is no part of the duty of His Majesty's representative to intervene without authority in the general relations of the Iraqi Government with their Assyrian minority, it is obvious that foolish and ill-considered action against the person of the Mar Shimun, taken by the present unworthy and incompetent Rump in the absence of the King and of three of the most responsible Ministers, might well let His Majesty's Government in for embarrassing complications, not only in Iraq but in the United Kingdom and at Geneva as well.

5. I accordingly sought an interview with the Prime Minister, who is acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. As he does not speak English well, an interpreter from the Ministry was present. I informed him that it had come to my knowledge that the Iraqi Government intended taking proceedings against the Mar Shimun, and while I was not there to be his defender, I asked his Excellency as Prime Minister of Iraq, to think very carefully over the action which his Government contemplated. I put before him certain points which I requested him to note.

6. He accordingly took pencil and paper, and I developed the following lines of argument:—

- (i) The mistake of making a martyr of the Mar Shimun.
- (ii) Which would nip in the bud all Major Thomson's settlement work, and damage the credit the Iraqi Government had already gained for invoking his services.
- (iii) The likelihood of an Assyrian outbreak in the north.
- (iv) How would the Iraqi Government contemplate such a trouble simultaneously with Barzan?
- (v) The unfortunate repercussion on (a) the League, and (b) the United Kingdom, where there was an influential body of opinion who sympathised with the Assyrians.
- (vi) The possibility that an internal crisis would be precipitated of such a nature as to involve the immediate recall of King Feisal. Did he wish the Royal visit to be a fiasco?
- (vii) Had he considered the possible effect of an Assyrian outbreak on the Shiah of Kerbela and Nejef, who, it was well known, were showing signs of unrest (see also my despatch No. 357 of the 7th June on the Abdul Rassaq case)?

(viii) The certainty of forming a united anti-Iraqi front amongst all the Assyrians, many of whom were now contented with their lot.

(ix) After all, the Mar Shimun's letter to the King of the 31st May met the Iraqi Government's requirements.

7. His Excellency replied that it was true that the Iraqi Government was considering the question of taking legal proceedings against the Mar Shimun, and that, moreover, as he had failed to give satisfaction to the Minister of the Interior, they intended to prevent him from returning to Mosul until Major Thomson had completed his work. The Iraqi Government, he contended, were treating the Assyrians better than any other minority; they were also being put to great expense over the settlement problem, and they were convinced that the Mar Shimun would undo all Major Thomson's work. He said he would give careful consideration to my remarks, and that no action had yet been taken against the Mar Shimun.

8. I then sent for the Mar Shimun. I had previously invited him privately to luncheon, where I had purposely refrained from talking business. He came to me, therefore, quite at his ease, and not in a defensive and consequently argumentative mood. I asked him quietly to tell me from the beginning what all the trouble was about. To cut a long story short, his version was that—

- (i) He was offended at being invited to Bagdad under suspicion of being connected with the recent Mosul stone-throwing incident, and kept waiting for five or six days (my despatch No. 325).
- (ii) Despite his loyal letter to the King, he had from the Minister of the Interior received what he considered to be an insulting communication, together with a still more insulting enclosure, a declaration of loyalty to be signed by him. It has transpired that this declaration was inserted by special order of the King without the knowledge or consent of Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, who considers that this was a serious mistake. I enclose a copy.
- (iii) He would not make a "blanket" renunciation of temporal power. From his people he received it, they alone could take it from him.
- (iv) He had a standing grievance against the Iraqi Government, and especially the officials in the Mosul district, for petty injustice and hindrances to the Assyrians. He particularly complained of the neglect of the Iraqi Government to give title to the Assyrians (about 450 families) who had been settled on the land for the number of years which legally entitled them thereto. He bitterly resented the Iraqi Government's support of Malik Khoshaba, who, he said, was not a true representative of the Assyrians.

9. With regard to points (i) and (ii), I told him that the proposed exchange of letters was intended to supersede the previous correspondence, and pointed out that the Minister of the Interior's present draft contained no expressions humiliating to the Mar Shimun. Indeed, His Beatitude ought to regard it as a considerable climb-down from the original letter which enclosed the declaration so repugnant to him.

10. With regard to point (iii), after further questioning, he stated to me that all the "temporal" power he wanted was the right to be consulted on matters affecting the Assyrian people. He did not ask for a Swiss Guard or a Vatican City. It transpired in the conversation that about two months ago the Iraqi Government had stopped his allowance of 300 rupees a month. He said he did not complain of that. Incidentally, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis was not aware of this until I told him recently. While there can be no question of granting him temporal power, given goodwill on both sides, it should not be difficult to find a formula providing for informal consultation on matters affecting the Assyrians. The Iraqi Government, I understand, treats on these lines with those religious chiefs in whom it has confidence.

11. His principal grievance is undoubtedly connected with the chronic friction with the local authorities in settlement matters. I told the Mar Shimun that Major Thomson was here specially to investigate those questions, and it was to him that he should submit his grievances and, moreover, waste no time in complying with the major's request to appoint nominees to represent his views.



12. I then took him, sentence by sentence, over the proposed draft from the Minister of the Interior. He had, indeed, no constructive criticism to offer nor definite objection to make. I put it to him once again that, were he to break with the Iraqi Government, quite apart from any steps that might be taken against him personally, he would, by refusing to accept this letter, definitely declare his opposition to the Government and jeopardise the whole of Major Thomson's work. He would thus place himself in the wrong and forfeit much sympathy in the eyes of the world.

13. He has, I think, an inkling that the Iraqi Government wish to detain him in Bagdad, but, in view of his stubborn nature and tendency to see red, I judged that the time had not yet come to inform him of the more unpleasant fate in store for him if he persisted in his present attitude.

14. I think that my representations had some effect, for Sir Kinahan Cornwallis has just informed me that the Mar Shimun has reconsidered the position and submitted to him a new draft of a letter to be addressed by the Minister of the Interior to him, which, except for certain references to temporal power and to instructions to the Iraqi authorities in Mosul, may be acceptable to Hikmet Beg. Indeed, were the Mar Shimun treating with a British authority, there would, I am sure, be no difficulty in settling the points outstanding. But whenever His Beatitude is in personal contact with an Iraqi, oyster-like he closes down and the wave of stubbornness surges back. That is the difficulty. Further report must be deferred till the departure of the next bag or mail. It is, nevertheless, satisfactory to be able to conclude this despatch on a note of greater confidence and brighter hope.

15. A copy of this despatch is being sent by air mail the 16th June, original by bag.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 100.

*Draft Letter to the Mar Shimun from the Minister of the Interior.*

I HAVE received your letter of the 3rd instant and, as I have informed you verbally, I consider it so ambiguous that I cannot take it as reply to my letter of the 28th May.

2. I have, however, read your letter of the 31st May, 1933, to His Majesty the King. I have also read a note by the adviser, dated the 7th instant, recording the result of a conversation with you and your reply of the 8th June to him. I have also had a discussion with you on the 8th June.

3. I take note from the above—

(a) You fully recognise that in all matters of administration Assyrians must conform to the laws, regulations and manner of procedure which applies to all other Iraqis. You have always advised them in this sense, and will continue doing so; your aim is always to make the Assyrians loyal and law-abiding citizens.

(b) You consider that land settlement is vital for the Assyrians. You are most anxious to see it brought about, and you assure me that you will not do anything to make the task of Major Thomson and the Government more difficult.

4. But as regards your personal position, I confirm to you what I explained in my letter dated the 28th May, 1933, namely, that it will resemble that of the spiritual heads of the other communities in Iraq, and the Government cannot delegate to you any temporal power. But, as you are aware, it is the right of every Iraqi to petition the Government on any subject, and spiritual heads of communities have always been accustomed to bring to its notice the needs and grievances of their people. Therefore, if you have any complaints at any time I am ready to cause enquiries to be made.

I notice that you have complained of the policy which you say is being adopted in Mosul. The policy of Government is perfectly clear. It is to treat the Assyrians with fairness and justice like all other Iraqis, to make them loyal and contented subjects of His Majesty the King, and to effect their permanent settlement in a manner which will lead to this end. Unfortunately, up to the present certain sections of the Assyrians have held aloof from Government, and they have only themselves to blame if they are looked upon with suspicion. I wish, however, to put an end to this state of things, and I sincerely hope that all Assyrians will show their loyalty by co-operating fully with Major Thomson and by giving him all the assistance for which he asks. If this is done, I have no doubt there will be a rapid, and I hope permanent, improvement in the situation.

I shall be obliged if you will acknowledge this letter.

Enclosure 2 in No. 100.

*Draft Letter from the Mar Shimun to the Minister of the Interior.*

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your memorandum of

I thank your Excellency for your statement of the policy of the Government, and I for my part will advise any Assyrians who may come to me to give any assistance to Major Thomson for which he may ask.

With renewed assurances of my loyalty to His Majesty the King and his Government.

I remain, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 100.

*Copy of the Declaration attached to the Letter dated May 28, 1933, from the Minister of the Interior to the Mar Shimun.*

"I, MAR SHIMUN, have read your Excellency's letter of the 28th May, 1933, and have accepted everything that it contains; that is, I undertake that I will not do anything which will make the task of the Government and Major Thomson more difficult in what concerns the settlement, and that I will always and in every way be a faithful subject of His Majesty the King."

[E 3436/7/93]

No. 101.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 27.)*

(No. 396.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 22, 1933.

I WILL now resume the narrative of the present Assyrian crisis.

2. In the last paragraph of my despatch No. 379 of the 14th June I stated that the Mar Shimun had submitted to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis a redraft of the Minister of the Interior's letter to him couched in terms which would be acceptable to his Beatitude. For convenience of reference I enclose, set out in parallel columns, the draft to which the Minister of the Interior has very reluctantly agreed and the draft desired by the Mar Shimun (enclosure No. 1). It will be observed that the Mar Shimun, in paragraph 3 (a), wishes to add a sentence

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referring to the League and to homogeneous settlement, subjects rather delicate in present circumstances.

3. In paragraph 3 (b) the positive is substituted for the negative. The Mar Shimun objects to the implication that he has been obstructive.

4. In paragraph 4 the crucial question of temporal power is raised. The Mar Shimun has cut out the reiteration of the Government's refusal to delegate temporal power and inserted an assurance covering the "traditional and established customs" of "your," i.e., his Assyrian, people. The Mar Shimun has constantly avoided giving a definition of temporal power and has always neglected to specify what are those traditional and established customs. One of the rights which he makes no secret of claiming, and which the Iraqi Government equally deny, is the privilege of appointing in certain cases tribal chiefs ("maliks") and sectional headmen.

5. The rest of paragraph 4 is redrafted in such a manner as to throw the blame on to the local authorities in Mosul. Here, no doubt, the Mar Shimun is, to a certain extent, right. But he has also omitted the reference to those Assyrians who are opposing the Government.

6. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis having proceeded on leave, Mr. C. J. Edmonds, the Acting Adviser to the Interior, informed the Mar Shimun that his version of the draft was quite unacceptable to the Iraqi Government. Mr. Edmonds tried the device of diverting the correspondence from such controversial subjects as temporal power and culpability of officials, and drafted a letter for the Mar Shimun to address to the Minister of the Interior in general terms, in which he disclaimed any intention of demanding rights or privileges inconsistent with the law of Iraq, adding the hope that he would be free to bring any needs or grievances to the notice of the Government and that any representations which he might make would receive due consideration (enclosure No. 2). The Mar Shimun at first took no objection to this eminently moderate and reasonable draft, promised that he would think it over and return next day. On the following day, the 16th June, his attitude had completely changed. Not only did he refuse it, but he even had neglected to bring the paper with him. He informed Mr. Edmonds that it was a trap and a trap, that his people were becoming restless with his prolonged stay in Bagdad, and that he wished to return to Mosul as soon as possible.

7. In the meanwhile the Minister of the Interior had been further considering the Mar Shimun's counter-draft (enclosure No. 1, right-hand column). He was very indignant. He informed the acting adviser that, as the Mar Shimun would not send a satisfactory answer, he ought to be prosecuted. The British Embassy had prevented his being sent to the courts, therefore the only course open to him was to resign, and he would probably carry the rest of the Cabinet with him. He had also decided that his draft to the Mar Shimun should issue, for him to take or leave. This was done on the 18th June (enclosure No. 1, left-hand column).

8. The Cabinet had, in the meanwhile, met and decided that Hikmet Beg's resignation should stand over till after the State visit to London, when the whole Cabinet would place their resignations in the hands of the King, who would be asked to return to Iraq forthwith.

9. On the following day the Regent sent for me. The Prime Minister, an interpreter and another official were present. As reported in my telegram No. 130, the Prime Minister informed me that, inasmuch as the Mar Shimun had been invited to come to Bagdad on the advice of the British Adviser to the Interior, had not accepted a letter from the Minister of the Interior drafted by Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, had also by his recent conduct rendered himself liable to criminal proceedings, which proceedings had been stayed by my action as representative of Great Britain, the ally of Iraq, the Minister of the Interior had no alternative but to resign, and the rest of the Cabinet desired to follow suit. His Royal Highness wished to know my opinion on the matter.

10. There then ensued a conversation lasting wellnigh three hours, a summary of which was sent in my telegram No. 130 of the 19th June. I feel I may have done myself an injustice in that telegram by not adding to the four points on which I summed up that lengthy interview:—

- (i) An exhortation to consult King Feisal first, on which the Prime Minister would not commit himself, and

- (ii) A further exhortation to leave the Mar Shimun alone and get on with the job of settlement. The more comfortably the Assyrians were installed and settled in their holdings, the less likely were they to risk their all for some subtle formula of temporal power for the Patriarch. As for his Beatitude, give him a subsidy suitable to his position, and if he did not behave himself it could always be cut down without the "scandale" of putting him in the dock.

11. Both the Regent and the Prime Minister asked me whether I could not do something to induce the Mar Shimun to make amends to the offended dignity of the Minister of the Interior, in which case the resignations might be reconsidered. It was, of course, understood that the Mar Shimun would be allowed to return to Mosul unmolested. I said I would try. After three interviews, I succeeded in persuading him to agree to a letter (enclosure No. 4) dictated by me, which begins on a note of respect to the Minister and ends on one of loyalty to Iraq. It issued, but it was too late.

12. The Cabinet were evidently out for blood. While I was in the middle of this despatch my writing was interrupted by a telephone message from Mr. Edmonds to the effect that his Minister had changed his mind and intended after all to prosecute the Mar Shimun. The police would take action that same afternoon. I immediately went to the Prime Minister, intending, if necessary, to see the Regent as well. I asked him what he meant by this, and told him to ring up the Minister of the Interior to confirm whether this was true. It was. A Cabinet Council was about to meet to consider the matter. I told him to keep his hands off the Mar Shimun. He knows our point of view perfectly well. He replied that he would, provided I induced the Mar Shimun to agree to the Minister of the Interior's letter, which, he reminded me again, was drafted by Sir Kinahan Cornwallis! This Government conveniently ignore the fact that their British advisory staff do not introduce their nationality into their work. I said that, while I could not promise to comply with his request, I would ask the Mar Shimun not to leave Bagdad for the present. I subsequently heard that, in view of this interview, the Cabinet had decided to suspend action for the present.

13. I accordingly sent to you my telegram No. 135, Immediate, suggesting that King Feisal be moved to issue peremptory orders to allow the Mar Shimun to return to Mosul unmolested, and asking whether you approved the idea of my intervention in the correspondence between the Mar Shimun and the Minister of the Interior. This is a prospect which I frankly dread, for a reason given in the last paragraph of this despatch summing up the situation. I also sent for the Mar Shimun and warned him to stay here for the present. He very reluctantly agreed, saying his people were becoming restive at his continued absence from Mosul. This may be so, but in present circumstances it is obviously better that he should be here in Bagdad within my reach and in contact with headquarters, rather than in Mosul at the mercy of some foolish and panic-stricken Governor or Police Director.

14. To sum up. The more I think over this Assyrian problem, the more the conviction is growing on me that neither the present Iraqi Government nor the Mar Shimun really want a settlement. The Iraqis for religious, racial and economic reasons, the Mar Shimun because he sees he is to be squeezed out. I am sure the Minister of the Interior is determined either to resign or to arrest the Mar Shimun, and the Mar Shimun himself is spoiling for a fight in which he would figure as a martyr. How then are we to inspire the Iraqis with a will to settle the Assyrian question and how to rid ourselves of this turbulent Patriarch? This is a problem which will not wait, but which must form the subject of another despatch.

15. A copy of this despatch is being sent by air mail on the 23rd June. Original by bag.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.



## Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

*Draft from Minister of Interior to Mar Shimun as desired by Minister of Interior and eventually sent on June 18, 1933.*

I HAVE received your letter of the 3rd instant and as I have informed you verbally, I consider it so ambiguous that I cannot take it as reply to my letter of the 28th May.

2. I have, however, read your letter of the 31st May, 1933, to His Majesty the King. I have also read a note by the adviser, dated the 7th instant, recording the result of a conversation with you and your reply of the 8th June to him. I have also had a discussion with you on the 8th June.

3. I take note from the above—

(a) You fully recognise that in all matters of administration, Assyrians must conform to the laws, regulations and manner of procedure which applies to all other Iraqis. You have always advised them in this sense and will continue doing so; your aim is always to make the Assyrians loyal and law abiding citizens.

(b) You consider that land settlement is vital for the Assyrians. You are most anxious to see it brought about and you assure me that you will not do anything to make the task of Major Thomson and the Government more difficult.

4. But as regards your personal position I confirm to you what I explained in my letter dated the 28th May, 1933, namely, that it will resemble that of the spiritual heads of the other communities in Iraq, and the Government cannot delegate to you any temporal power. But, as you are aware, it is the right of every Iraqi to petition the Government on any subject, and spiritual heads of communities have always been accustomed to bring to its notice the needs and grievances of their people. Therefore if you have any complaints at any time I am ready to cause enquiries to be made.

*Draft from Minister of Interior to Mar Shimun as desired by the Mar Shimun.*

(The same.)

... loyal and law abiding citizens. On the other hand, the Government fully realise that the Assyrians, unlike other communities, are refugees and homeless and the idea behind the League of Nations by a homogeneous settlement is to substitute their homelands and make them contented subjects.

(b) You consider that land settlement is vital for the Assyrians. You are anxious to see it brought about and you assure me that you will do everything possible to make the task of Major Thomson's and the Government's easier.

4. But as regards your personal position I confirm to you that it will resemble that of spiritual heads of other communities in Iraq and that the traditional and established customs of your Assyrian people will be privileged to remain. You will have the right to petition His Majesty the King or his Government regarding the needs and grievances of your people.

I notice you have complained of the policy which you say is being adopted in Mosul. I will issue instructions to the mutessarif of Mosul liwa to conform to the Government's policy and the contents of this letter, and I hope

I notice that you have complained of the policy which you say is being adopted in Mosul. The policy of Government is perfectly clear. It is to treat the Assyrians with fairness and justice like all other Iraqis; to make them loyal and contented subjects of His Majesty the King and to effect their permanent settlement in a manner which will lead to this end. Unfortunately, up to the present, certain sections of the Assyrians have held aloof from Government and they have only themselves to blame if they are looked upon with suspicion. I wish, however, to put an end to this state of things and I sincerely hope that all Assyrians will show their loyalty by co-operating fully with Major Thomson and by giving him all the assistance for which he asks. If this is done, I have no doubt that there will be a rapid, and I hope permanent, improvement in the situation.

I shall be obliged if you will acknowledge this letter.

you will make known to Major Thomson your proposals for settling the Assyrians.

The policy of the Government is perfectly clear. It is to treat the Assyrians with fairness and justice like all other Iraqis, to make them loyal and contented subjects of His Majesty the King and to effect the permanent settlement in a manner that will lead to this end.

I therefore sincerely hope that you will advise all the Assyrians to show their loyalty by co-operating fully with Major Thomson and by giving him all the assistance for which he asks. If this is done I have no doubt that there will be a rapid, and I hope permanent, improvement in the situation.

I shall be obliged if you will acknowledge this letter.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

*Draft by Assistant Adviser, Ministry of Interior, for Letter from Mar Shimun to Minister of Interior, June 15, 1933.*

(Not acceptable to Mar Shimun.)

I HAVE now been in Bagdad and am anxious to return to Mosul not later than . . . I should be grateful if you would kindly fix a time for me to call to see you before I leave.

2. From my interview with your Excellency and various conversations with Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, I have gathered that certain passages of my letter of . . . have conveyed an impression different from the impression I wished to convey.

3. I do not claim for myself or the Assyrian people any rights or privileges inconsistent with the constitutional and other laws of Iraq.

4. But as Patriarch I feel that it is my duty, in accordance with ancient practice, to be free at all times to bring the needs and grievances of my people to the notice of His Majesty the King and the Government, and trust that any representations I may have to make may always receive the consideration which, coming from one in my position, they deserve.

5. I also request that the Government will preserve, with as little change as possible, the ancient customs of the Assyrian people, as in the case of the other tribal populations of Iraq.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 101.

*Draft Mar Shimun to the Minister of the Interior, June 19, 1933.*

(Rejected by the Minister.)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 18th June, 1933.<sup>(1)</sup>

I understand from my conversations with Mr. Edmonds that the references to history in my letter of the 3rd June, 1933, have created an impression different

<sup>(1)</sup> See enclosure No. 1.



from that which I wished to convey. I was not, of course, claiming temporal power in the sense of temporal power delegated to me by the Governments named, but was referring to the traditional customs of the Assyrians, which I desire to see maintained.

If your Excellency agrees to this, will you kindly instruct the authorities concerned.

As regards the work of Major Thomson, I am, of course, anxious to see it crowned with success, and will do my best to co-operate if the work of settlement is carried out in a manner which, in my opinion, promises satisfactory results.

My ideas on this subject are set forth in my correspondence with Sir Kinahan Cornwallis.

With assurances, &c.  
MAR SHIMUN.

Enclosure 4 in No. 101.

*Draft Letter of Farewell which Mar Shimun, on June 20, 1933, Promised Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Address to the Minister of the Interior.*

Your Excellency,

AS arranged with you this morning, I return to Mosul to-morrow, the 21st June, but I do not wish to leave Bagdad without expressing once more to your Excellency my appreciation of your courtesy in receiving me and of the patient hearing which you have given to me.

While, unfortunately, there are several points on which we have not yet reached an understanding, I nevertheless wish to assure your Excellency that I shall do all in my power to encourage the Assyrian people to live in peace and harmony with their fellow subjects in Iraq.

Yours, &c.  
MAR SHIMUN.

#### CHAPTER IV.—GENERAL.

[E 347/347/65]

No. 102.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 17. Secret.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 5, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to offer the following observations on your secret despatch No. 586 of the 3rd November, 1932, on the subject of King Feisal's ambition to see established a confederation of Arab States under Hashimite influence.

2. The outline of King Feisal's aims and hopes described in your despatch as having been given by Nuri Pasha to a member of the staff of the Colonial Office reflects, I think, very truly the picture of the future which the King bears in his mind.

3. There can be no doubt that he still hopes and works for the close federation under the rule of his House of all the Arab territories in Asia, and it seems that his intention is to endeavour to bring about first the union of Syria and Iraq. Whether this is to be done by uniting them under his own rule or by placing another member of his family on the Syrian Throne, and then bringing the two countries into close alliance, I do not think he has yet decided, though certainly the first alternative would find greater favour with him. His objective is fixed, but the means whereby it is to be attained are likely to be adapted to the tendencies of current events.

4. He has never ceased to nurse his Syrian supporters carefully nor to maintain close touch with the Nationalist elements in Damascus. During the early months of 1932 sections of the Arabic press in both Syria and Iraq constantly published articles in which the accession of the Amir Abdullah, King Ali or King Feisal to the Syrian Throne was discussed, but after the Syrian elections and the opening of the first Syrian Parliament this form of propaganda decreased. The King's dream of ruling the Arab world (preferably from Damascus) was not, however, disturbed by these events or by the failure of the monarchist candidates in the Syrian elections, and he has continued patiently and cautiously to work for the ultimate realisation of his ambitions.

5. The Arab Congress idea, to which I have referred in my confidential despatch B of the 27th July to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and my secret despatch No. 1164 of the 21st December, 1932, to you, offered a new opportunity for furthering his ends which he was not slow to seize. His plan is that the congress should bring about unity among the Arabs by substituting the pursuit of a clearly-defined common aim for the present chaos of conflicting views which divides them even among themselves. This aim is to be, I gather, first, the freeing of Syria from French mandatory control, which King Feisal regards as being the only serious obstacle to the union of the two countries. As regards Palestine, His Majesty has expressed to me his personal opinion that a country so closely connected with the three principal religions of the world should enjoy conciliatory treatment of an exceptional kind under the aegis of Great Britain.

6. His Majesty also professes to believe that by gathering together a number of representative Arab leaders in Bagdad he will be able, by demonstration, to convince them of the reality of the independence which Iraq has achieved and thereby to wean many of them, especially the Palestinians, from their present suspicion of British policy in regard to the Arabs. By the same means, I have no doubt, he hopes to whet the appetite of the Syrians, and by giving them a glimpse of their reward to encourage them to carry on the struggle with the French.

7. For the present, I judge that the Arab Congress scheme occupies his mind to the exclusion of more direct methods of gaining his ends, but I have no doubt that he is prepared at any moment to employ less circuitous means if a favourable opportunity should occur. It should not be overlooked that, while King Feisal's brothers, King Ali and the Amir Abdullah, both share His Majesty's aspirations for the future of the Arabs, they are exceedingly jealous of his success and distrustful and suspicious of his personal ambitions. For this reason I anticipate that their intrigues, especially those of the Amir Abdullah,



are likely to interfere very considerably in the smooth working of His Majesty's plans.

8. The reported intention of Abbas Hilmi to pay a visit to Bagdad after Ramzan is a further complication, as the ex-Khedive has a long purse and is almost venerated for his skill in political intrigue.

9. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Tehran, Jerusalem, Istanbul, Jedda and Beirut.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 3119/347/65]

No. 103.

*Attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Question of Arab Unity.*

THE phrase "Arab unity" is an extremely vague one, which has been used in many different senses.

2. It is generally most in evidence on such occasions as Arab or Moslem congresses, and was freely bandied about during the Moslem Congress at Jerusalem in the autumn of 1931. On such occasions it is generally used extremely loosely as a popular rallying cry against either "Western imperialism" or the Zionist movement; but in actual fact it seldom amounts to much more than a rather undigested idea of co-operation between Arabic-speaking people in matters of education and propaganda, and possibly also in such politico-religious questions as that of the Hejaz Railway, the future of the Holy Places, &c. Arab unity in this sense is something rather akin to pan-Arabism, and appears to have no more practical significance than the rather shadowy pan-Islamic movement of which so much was heard some twenty years ago.

3. From the political and practical point of view, "Arab unity" should mean the union, either in a single State or in a confederation of autonomous States, of all former Ottoman territories, south of present-day Turkey, which have a predominantly Arab population. This would limit the application of the idea to the north-western half of Arabia, *i.e.*, to the Arabic-speaking territories north-west of a line drawn from the middle of the Persian Gulf to the southern end of the Red Sea. It is, in fact, only to this area that the idea can be regarded as properly applicable, and it is therefore mainly from this point of view that the question is discussed in the present memorandum. But attempts may well be made to extend the idea of Arab unity to the Persian Gulf States and to Southern and South-Eastern Arabia generally. It is thus not possible to consider the problem without touching on its possible relation to these areas also.

4. The idea of Arab unity, as applied to the former Ottoman territories, *i.e.*, to the Arabic-speaking areas north-west of the line mentioned in the preceding paragraph, was the ultimate aim of the Arab revolt during the war, and was the ideal for which the Hashimites, under Hussein and Colonel Lawrence, strove during the war and armistice periods. There is no doubt that the remaining members of the Hashimite family—Feisal, Ali and Abdullah—have never abandoned this dream, although subsequent developments have rendered it impracticable.

5. The most important of these subsequent developments, from the purely Arabian point of view, has been the rise to power of Ibn Saud, and his conquest of the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula, including the former Kingdom of the Hejaz. The dynastic rivalry between the Hashimites and the Saudis renders it almost inconceivable that there could be any close or organic combination between the territories respectively ruled by them. It is true that King Feisal of Iraq has come to terms with King Ibn Saud and is now in friendly relations with Saudi Arabia, and that we are working hard—with at last a fair hope of success—to secure a similar rapprochement between Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. But the rivalry between the two family systems is still a basic factor in the situation, and unless one group were virtually to disappear, there seems no prospect whatever of any effective combination of the territories at present ruled by Ibn Saud (*i.e.*, the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula, including the former Kingdom of the Hejaz) with those at present ruled by the Hashimites (*i.e.*, the independent Kingdom of Iraq and the mandated

territory of Transjordan). While the Arabs are themselves divided into these two camps, any talk of Arab political unity in the wider sense must be illusory.

6. It would, moreover, be impossible in present circumstances for His Majesty's Government to support either of these groups against the other, since they are bound by special obligations to each. Apart from the support which the Hashimites gave to the Allied cause during the Great War, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah have in the past shown themselves to be well disposed towards His Majesty's Government. It is not necessary to enter into details, but two cases in which the Amir Abdullah, by his co-operation, materially assisted His Majesty's Government are those of the Druse rebellion of 1925 and of the Palestine disturbances of 1929. Moreover, His Majesty's Government have a special responsibility to support the Amir Abdullah's régime, which has been set up in Transjordan under their direct protection as mandatory. His Majesty's Government are no less closely bound to King Feisal of Iraq by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government are also bound by special ties to King Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia. They have maintained friendly and, indeed, cordial relations with Ibn Saud ever since the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda in 1927. King Ibn Saud has not only continued and developed these friendly relations, but has proved himself one of the very few rulers capable of establishing and maintaining a stable and ordered Government in Arabia. Further, it is important for His Majesty's Government, with their great Moslem interests in India and elsewhere, to remain on friendly terms with the ruler of the Holy Places of Islam. In these circumstances the policy of His Majesty's Government is to hold the balance evenly between the Hashimites on the one hand and the Saudis on the other, and, while doing all in their power to promote friendly relations between the two, to refrain from any action which might lead to the predominance in Arabia of either House at the expense of the other.

7. Apart from this major difficulty, there are also other elements in Arabia proper which are unlikely to be capable of combination in any unified system. The most important of these are the independent Kingdom of the Yemen, whose ruler (the Imam Yahia) is short-sighted and quarrelsome, and on uncertain terms both with Ibn Saud and King Feisal, though he ostensibly has treaties of friendship with both, and the various minor Arabian rulers, such as the Sheikhs of Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial Coast, who are extremely jealous of each other and of their own independence, and have never shown any sign of capacity for political co-operation. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and the Aden Protectorate need not for the moment be considered in this connexion. On the other hand, if the protagonists of the political idea of "Arab unity" were ever to succeed in translating their ideal into practice, it is probable that they would exercise strong pressure on the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf and of Southern Arabia, and on the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, to join in furthering their aim. Such sheikhdoms as Koweit and Bahrein are in close touch with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, both commercially and politically. Moreover, all these States, including Muscat, maintain a link with Saudi Arabia through the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which is attended by many members of their ruling families. The pilgrimage offers exceptional opportunities not only for religious and cultural, but also for political, propaganda; and if Mecca were at any time to become a political centre of a united Arabia, or of a great Arabian confederation, it is possible that the political ideal for which it would stand might exercise a considerable attraction over the Arab rulers of the South Arabian and the Persian Gulf States, and stimulate them to a greater desire to co-operate with the leading States of Western and Northern Arabia, at any rate from the negative point of view of combating Western political and cultural influence in the Middle East.

8. As regards the minor Arab States of the Persian Gulf, an important consideration is the fact that, save in the case of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman (where, however, we exercise a dominating influence), the foreign relations of the rulers concerned are by treaty exclusively conducted by His Majesty's Government, and that His Majesty's Government are bound by a series of treaties to give these States varying degrees of protection against foreign aggression and to assist them to maintain their independence. Apart from these treaty obligations, it is a basic principle of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Middle East that these States should not be absorbed by any of their powerful



neighbours, but should remain as far as possible separate units under effective British control. The development of inter-imperial air communications, both civil and military, has in the last few years given this well-established principle a new importance. In the case of Koweit, both King Feisal of Iraq and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia have at various times shown signs of wishing to acquire a hold over this territory, which would be a useful acquisition to either. Both on treaty grounds, however, and on grounds of imperial policy, it is important to us that Koweit should not be absorbed by either Saudi Arabia or Iraq. Similarly, as regards Bahrein, apart from our treaty obligations to protect the Sheikh against aggression, it would be definitely against British interests that the islands should be absorbed by either Saudi Arabia or Persia. King Ibn Saud has already, by article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, specifically recognised the special relations of His Majesty's Government with the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and is not likely, therefore, to seek to annex Bahrein. Meanwhile, it is one of our main objects in our negotiations with Persia to obtain a similar recognition by Persia of our special relations with Bahrein, &c., and the abandonment of the antiquated Persian claims both to Bahrein and to certain other Arab islands in the Gulf. In these circumstances it would clearly be impossible for His Majesty's Government to acquiesce in the incorporation of any of the smaller independent Arab States, whether in the Persian Gulf or in Southern Arabia, in a wider Arabian political combination.

9. Meanwhile, in the north and west, any project for Arab unity in any practical sense of the term must come into conflict with the mandatory system in the French Levant States and in Palestine, with all that that system implies. The French, even if they were prepared to agree on certain conditions to the emancipation of the State of Syria proper, have made it clear that they have no intention of relinquishing their hold on the predominantly Christian State of the Lebanon, or, for the present at any rate, on the curious non-Arab enclave of the Jebel Druse. His Majesty's Government are equally precluded from allowing Palestine to be absorbed in any way in any kind of predominantly Arab union, if only in view of their deep commitment to the policy of the Jewish national home, quite apart from their obligations to the other non-Arab or non-Moslem communities and interests in Palestine proper.

10. From the point of view of practical politics, therefore, the question of Arab unity resolves itself into the possibility of some kind of combination between Iraq, Transjordan and the State of Syria.

11. As regards Transjordan (the union or combination of which with Iraq would at first sight seem easiest, since Transjordan is at present a purely Arab State, and since its ruler is the brother of King Feisal), an initial difficulty is presented by the fact that Transjordan is covered by the mandate for Palestine, of which it technically forms an integral part. It would therefore be necessary, before any effective combination between Transjordan and Iraq could be brought about, that His Majesty's Government should arrange for the release of Transjordan from the mandate. Transjordan does not, however, at present fulfil any of the conditions which have been laid down by the League of Nations as justifying the release of a territory from the mandatory régime. Even if Transjordan did to some extent fulfil these conditions, a factor which might militate against her liberation from the mandate is the possibility that there may at no distant date be a Jewish settlement in Transjordan. While there can be no question of extending to Transjordan the articles of the Palestine mandate which relate to the establishment of the Jewish national home, the existence of a Jewish minority in Transjordan would certainly increase the difficulties in the way of bringing the mandatory régime in that territory to an end.

12. As regards the State of Syria, there is no doubt that the French are seriously contemplating the possibility of its emancipation, and that King Feisal of Iraq, and Arab nationalists generally both in Iraq and in Syria itself, are considering the possibility of a union of Syria and Iraq, perhaps under the rulership of a single individual. There are, however, various grave difficulties and objections to such a project.

13. In the first place, the French are unlikely to release their hold on Syria completely. Even if Syria were to be released from the mandate, it is probable that the mandate would be replaced by a Franco-Syrian Treaty of Alliance on the lines of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The position would then be that the Syrian portion of the new State, or confederation, whether it took the form of a

republic or of a monarchy, would be bound to France, and would remain under predominantly French political and cultural influence, while the Iraqi portion would be bound to this country under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and would remain under predominantly British influence. This might well lead to a situation of international rivalry which would produce serious international complications.

14. Again, Syria is at present in a higher state of development than Iraq. Although its people are perhaps less virile, its towns are larger and more flourishing, and its culture and civilisation are more advanced. In any case, it is a far more agreeable country to live in. It is probable, therefore, that Iraqis would be increasingly attracted to the Syrian towns of Damascus and Aleppo, and thus, perhaps, also to the even more definitely French district of the Lebanon or town of Beirut, and that Syrian—and thus French—influence would tend to establish itself increasingly in Iraq proper. The capital of the new State might even be moved to Damascus, which is an infinitely pleasanter town than Bagdad, and as a result Franco-Syrian influence might spread eastwards until the whole character of Iraq and of the political relationship between His Majesty's Government and that country might be transformed. It is clear that the immediate interests of His Majesty's Government, particularly in regard to the safety of inter-imperial communications, which have been so carefully protected by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, would suffer serious injury as the result of such a development.

15. The questions dealt with in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 above were considered by the Ministerial Middle East Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 17th November, 1931, and the relevant conclusions then reached ran as follows:—

- (1) That the outcome most likely to be to the advantage of His Majesty's Government would be the constitution of Syria as a republic with a Syrian as President.
- (2) That for a single individual to hold the crowns both of Syria and Iraq would be most undesirable, and would, in any case, be likely to prove unworkable.
- (3) That any attempt by King Feisal to transfer his crown from Iraq to Syria would be contrary to British interests.

16. Even were all these immediate dynastic and political obstacles to be surmounted, it is very doubtful whether real Arab unity could ever be achieved, even between the major States, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, &c., if only for purely geographical reasons. In actual fact, notwithstanding its apparent homogeneity and compactness, there is no geographical unity in Arabia. The northern countries, such as Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan, all differ widely from each other in configuration, soil, climate and general character. Southern Arabia, although it appears to possess a certain unity from a first glance at the map, can really more accurately be described as an archipelago of human settlements in a sea of desert, inhabited by tribes who are driven by the exigencies of desert life into becoming, as it were, land pirates ceaselessly preying on each other. Any idea of unity or confederation based on the ordinary European conceptions which such words suggest is quite inapplicable to an area of this kind.

17. But from the point of view of general international co-operation and understanding, of cultural development, and of economic prosperity, His Majesty's Government can naturally only view with sympathy any movement which tends to bring the peoples of the Arabian countries into closer and more friendly relations with each other, provided that it is not incompatible with their special treaty relations and responsibilities towards certain of the States concerned. They have, indeed, always done whatever has been possible to this end. The improvement in the last few years of relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has been mainly due to the efforts of His Majesty's Government, who brought about the reconciliation between King Feisal and King Ibn Saud on board H.M.S. *Lupin* in February 1930. His Majesty's Government are now actively engaged in trying to bring about a similar improvement in relations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, and hope that these may lead to the conclusion of a treaty settlement, including treaties of friendship and *bon voisinage*, between King Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah, corresponding to the treaty settlement



concluded between Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1931. His Majesty's Government have, moreover, always sought to further the close co-operation of the Arab countries in economic matters, and have succeeded in securing for Iraq and Trans-jordan, by suitable provisions in the relevant instruments, the right to accord specially favourable tariff treatment to neighbouring Arab States, notwithstanding their most-favoured-nation obligations to other countries.

18. If—as appears likely—the question of the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the problem of Arab unity is raised in the course of King Feisal's impending visit to this country, it is submitted that it should be explained to His Majesty that the general attitude of His Majesty's Government will be one of friendly sympathy towards any constructive proposals for peaceful economic co-operation and for the development of close and friendly cultural relations among the leading States of Arabia; King Feisal could be left to explain in greater detail exactly what he has in mind; but, since it is not possible for His Majesty's Government, for the reasons explained above, and especially in paragraphs 6, 8, 9, and 15, to support any policy designed to bring about the *political unification* of Arabia, it seems desirable that any suitable opportunity should be taken to discourage King Feisal emphatically from identifying himself with, or committing himself to, such a project. Such discouragement might, for instance, take the form of advising His Majesty, as Sir Francis Humphrys has already done, that he can best serve the Arab cause by concentrating his energies on the peaceful development of his own country's resources and institutions, so that the Government of Iraq may serve as a model and a source of encouragement to other Arab States.

G. W. RENDEL.

Foreign Office,  
June 13, 1933.

[E 3243/210/65]

No. 104.

Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 356.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 7, 1933.

WITH reference to despatch No. 18 of the 27th April last, addressed to you by His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, regarding the proposals of the railway authorities in Syria to institute a transport service for freight from rail-head at Nisibin to Mosul and Kirkuk, I have the honour to report the recent visit to Bagdad of M. Paul A. Blanquet, a French railway engineer, who carried a letter of introduction from the Beirut office of the Damas-Hama et Prolongements Railway describing him as their Director of Central Administration in Paris. The address given on his visiting card was "52, Rue de la Bienfaisance, Paris," and the designation "Ingénieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées (H.C.), Directeur de la Régie générale de Chemins de fer et Travaux publics."

2. M. Blanquet was received by His Majesty the King and met a number of officials of the Iraqi Government. He gave it to be understood that he has been placed in virtual control of transport interests in Syria, including the railways, ports and road services, with a view to absorb and develop trans-desert traffic, especially the transit traffic with Persia. Both the Beirut-Damascus-Bagdad-Khannaqin-Tehran route and the Alexandretta-Nisibin-Mosul-Rowanduz-Tabriz routes are to be exploited by this combination, which aims at a virtual monopoly of freight. The Nisibin railway line is to be extended to Mosul at the earliest opportunity. It appears that the prime movers in the scheme are the Damas-Hama et Prolongements Railway Company, and the Auto-Routière du Levant Motor Transport Company, and that they have the full support of the authorities in Syria, who have granted franchise for their motor vehicles and accessories. Dr. Muhammad Haider, a cousin of Rustam Beg Haider, the Minister of Economics and Communications, is in Bagdad working on their behalf. They propose in the first instance to use 10-ton Diesel lorries on the trans-desert crossing.

3. In the course of two interviews with M. Blanquet, Colonel Tainsh, the Director of the Iraqi Railways, made clear that the Iraqi Railways look forward to the construction of a railway between Bagdad and Haifa. He also warned

M. Blanquet that the Iraqi Railways were themselves interested in the development of road communications, and were supporting their "canvassing agent," Haim Effendi Nathaniel, in his motor-transport ventures. Colonel Tainsh argued, with special reference to the Rowanduz route, that Iraq was justified in taking precautions to ensure that transport facilities within her territory were developed to her best advantage.

4. On his side, M. Blanquet referred to pre-war French interests in Iraq and pointed out that France could not permit, without a struggle, the development of Iraqi trade via Haifa along a virtually British corridor. He intimated, incidentally, that the Quai d'Orsay would shortly take up the claims of the pre-war Bagdad Railway Company in connexion with the Bagdad-Sammarah line (see your despatch No. 24 of the 11th January last). As regards the Rowanduz road, he stated that it was the French and British, in co-operation, who induced the Persian Government to change their attitude towards the Soviet, and that the French would expect to participate in the resulting benefits.

5. M. Blanquet also discussed his projects with Haim Effendi Nathaniel in the course of a dinner-party at the French Legation. This discussion appears to have become somewhat acrimonious. According to Haim Effendi, M. Blanquet finally demanded whether he was prepared to co-operate or not, and he definitely refused, declaring that he intended to do his best to protect the trade and traders of Iraq.

6. This is by no means the first time that Haim Effendi has been approached by railway and other transport interests in Syria contemplating development of Iraqi routes; for they realise that, in view of his virtual control of the transport business in Iraq, his co-operation is an important factor of success. Haim Effendi previously consulted Colonel Tainsh on the subject, asking, in particular, whether the decision to construct the Bagdad-Haifa Railway is to be taken this year. If so, he is prepared to continue development of the road route, Bagdad-Amman-Haifa, provided he is given facilities by the Iraqi and Palestine Governments equivalent to those obtainable from the Syrian Government. It will be remembered (see paragraph 120 (ii) of Bagdad Economic Report No. 4 for the month of April 1932) that Haim Effendi was encouraged last year by the Director of Railways to develop that route and to divert traffic to Haifa in order that trade and traffic connexions should be established between Bagdad and Haifa by the time the Bagdad-Haifa railway came to completion.

7. As regards official assistance in the development of the Amman route, an informal conference is about to be held in Palestine between the authorities of the Palestine Government and an Iraqi delegation consisting of Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, the Minister of Finance, Mr. A. G. H. Sievwright, the British Director of Customs and Excise in the Iraqi Government, and the Iraqi Director of Commerce and Economics. It is hoped that one result of the discussions will be the notification by the Iraqi Government of the Amman route as a transit route for purposes of the Transit Trade Law of 1924. In the absence of such notification, goods consigned by this route to and from Persia in transit to Iraq do not benefit by the special customs facilities accorded to goods in transit, and are liable to full Iraqi import duties instead of the transit dues of one-tenth per cent. *ad valorem*. Accordingly, the Amman route is not yet being used for goods in transit Iraq.

8. For this reason, Haim Effendi's present motor service via Amman is operated principally on account of the mails, and he is therefore somewhat alarmed to learn that United Kingdom and continental mails to Iraq may be diverted to the Simplon-Orient and Taurus Express route via Damascus. Motor convoys are allowed to leave Damascus for the desert crossing to Bagdad only on two days in the week when the road is patrolled by police. One of these days is Friday, and mails sent by the Simplon-Orient and Taurus Express do not reach Damascus until Saturdays. It has been suggested to the Iraqi authorities that the road should be patrolled on Saturday in future, instead of Fridays, in order to ensure connexion for the mails. Mails from London could then be sent via Damascus to Bagdad and in six and a half days, compared with existing timings by Haim Effendi's Amman service of nine days via Port Said and eight days via Brindisi.

9. If the decision to build the Haifa-Bagdad Railway is not taken this year, Haim Effendi fears that competition on the Damascus-Bagdad and the Nisibin-Mosul roads will be so successful that subsequent diversion of traffic to



Haifa will not be possible. His position is thus becoming increasingly difficult. He has to visit Syria frequently in the course of his business, where he is inundated with demands for co-operation in the exploitation of the Beirut-Bagdad and Alexandretta-Mosul-Tabriz routes. The authorities in Syria are fully alive to the danger to the commerce of Beirut which the development of Haifa involves; and are ready to give substantial concessions to transporters in a position to help them to retain traffic for Beirut. Haim Effendi fears that he will be unable to remain aloof much longer, for he has considerable capital locked up in trans-desert transport which he naturally desires to use to the best advantage to himself.

10. Colonel Tainsh is inclined to agree with Haim Effendi that, if heavy traffic is allowed to develop under French and Syrian auspices on the Beirut-Damascus-Bagdad and Alexandretta-Nisibin-Mosul routes, it will have a very detrimental effect on the prospects of the Haifa-Bagdad Railway. The Iraqi railways have to consider their own position, which is, in some respects, similar to that of Haim Effendi. If a decision to build the Haifa-Bagdad Railway is not taken in the near future, they may be compelled to co-operate with Syrian railway and road interests in order to ensure that these are not developed to the detriment of the Iraqi railways. These interests may even be in a position to preclude the Iraqi railways from taking part in the anticipated revival through the medium of the desert motor routes of the Iraqi transit trade with Persia.

11. An inter-departmental meeting was recently called by the Minister of Economics and Communications to discuss transport questions. I attach a note regarding the proceedings supplied by Colonel Tainsh. It was proposed that a permanent Board of Transportation should be set up to advise the Government on such matters.

12. I have sent copies of this despatch to Jerusalem, Tehran, Beirut and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Note.

RUSTAM BEG HAIDAR, Minister of Economics and Communications, called a meeting of representatives of the Departments interested in trade and transport of Iraq, held on the 2nd June, 1933, in the Ministry.

Rustam Beg Haidar presided.

Present:

Ministry of Economics and Communications—

H. H. Wheatley, Esq.

E. B. Morgan, Esq.

Amin Zaki Beg.

Ministry of Finance—

E. Gascoigne Hogg, Esq.

L. M. Swan, Esq.

Customs—

H. M. Monk, Esq.

Railways—

Lieut.-Colonel J. Ramsay Tainsh.

The Minister opened by saying that he had only been Minister of Economics and Communications for two months, and in that short period it had been borne upon him that the transportation of this country is of vital importance to it and that all the adjacent countries had already taken action in developing their transport and trade by every means in their power. In this development they did not consider the internal needs of their respective countries only, but were endeavouring by special means and rates to get a footing in the countries of their neighbours.

As an example of how this affected Iraq, he instanced the attempt now being made by a powerful company composed of the Auto-Routière, a Syrian road motor company associated with the Damas-Hama et Prolongements and the Bozanti-Alep-Nissibine et Prolongements Railway systems, to capture the trade between Syria and Persia by establishing a trade route between Alexandretta and Tabriz via the Rowanduz Road and stated that this must be considered and dealt with at once.

The proposals of this company involved using the roads of Iraq by subsidised transport from the eastern frontier of Syria to the western frontier of Persia as a bridge on which at present there are no tolls. The Government require advice on this particular case at once.

He then went on to say that there are many other transport and trade problems that require investigation and action, and that there should be formed a permanent board to investigate and report to Government on all such matters. He said that the Bagdad-Haifa route was another instance of a route about which full investigation should be made and action taken at once. The route should be made a transit route, and it should be encouraged to the fullest extent.

About this route he had been informed that a company was willing to set up a Road Organisation that would carry goods between Bagdad and Haifa and *vice versa* at the rate of 1/125 I.D. per ton, and if the road was improved this rate would be reduced to 1 dinar per ton. He did not know if these rates would be possible, but the Government required advice about the matter.

In the discussions that followed it appeared that there was general agreement that the problems were urgent, and the idea of subsidising Iraq motor services as fully as they are subsidised in adjacent countries was freely mentioned as a policy to be adopted.

Mr. Wheatley drew attention to the great cost that would be entailed in defining and maintaining a road across the desert, and mentioned how the intense traffic of the Iraq Petroleum Company had cut the surface of the roads the company's vehicles used.

The meeting recommended that a permanent Board of Transportation be set up at once to consider and report to Government all special problems, and to deal as early as possible with the one in connexion with the Rowanduz Road.

Mr. Monk, Acting Director of Customs, asked that a ruling about this transit route be given as soon as possible, because he had applications from the Auto-Routière of Syria and from a company in Mosul for registration as transporters to use it.

There seems to be some hope that this board may be set up shortly. It is six years since I asked for it, and pointed out that the Government's lack of interest in the trade and transport of its country was losing, and would lose, vast sums of money.

Mr. Haim Nathaniel, my agent, has spent the best part of the last ten days in having talks with merchants, discussions with Ministers and with the secretary to His Majesty King Feisal, and has had several interviews with His Majesty himself about this matter of transport and utilisation of Iraq's finance. He has certainly done a great deal of good.

He reports to me that His Majesty agreed to give an interview to M. Blanquet, but that he refused to discuss the matter of an extension of the railway from Tel Ziouane to Mosul, as that was a matter for his Foreign Minister to deal with in the right quarter. Mr. Haim also reports that on the night of the 3rd June, His Majesty summoned his Cabinet, and discussed with them the urgency of dealing with problems of transport and the danger of not doing so, and specially mentioned the Bagdad-Haifa route as one to be encouraged to the fullest extent.

Bagdad, June 5, 1933.

J. R. T.



[E 3504/210/65]

No. 105.

*Mr. Cowan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 30.)*

(No. 31.)

Sir,

*Aleppo, June 21, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during the past week-end I visited Alexandretta and, among other matters, discussed with Mr. Vice-Consul Catoni the question of Alexandretta becoming a free port for Northern Persia and Iraq.

2. A commission is now sitting at Beirut to decide the question of a free port, and Mr. Catoni's son is a member representing the Port of Alexandretta. The question naturally falls into two parts: (1) The relative claims of Haifa and a Syrian port; and (2) the claims of the three Syrian ports of Beirut, Tripoli and Alexandretta. As regards the first part, there seems to be no reason why Haifa should not share the trade with a Syrian port, as they would naturally tap different regions. On the question of the claims of the Syrian ports among themselves, the choice would seem to lie between Beirut and Alexandretta, and the only objection to Alexandretta would seem to be its proximity to the Turkish frontier. This is, however, a very serious objection. From every other point of view Alexandretta would appear to be the best port on the coast for the Iraq and North Persian transit trade.

3. So far as the Persian trade is concerned the question arises as to whether it is sufficiently great to justify the trouble and expense of creating and maintaining a free port. The Syrian railway authorities have estimated this trade at 50,000 tons a year for the Rowanduz-Mosul-Alexandretta line. This estimate seems to me optimistic. The route in question would only draw on the resources of the Persian provinces of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, and it is doubtful if these provinces could export goods which would sell in Europe, to the amount estimated. The principal exports would be carpets, which are already becoming a drag on the market, tobacco, gum tragacanth and oak galls. It is true that Azerbaijan produces a large quantity of dried fruit, which normally is exported to Russia, but it is so badly dried and packed that it would not find a market in European countries.

4. Meanwhile, Persia does not seem to be in a hurry to express an opinion as to which port she would prefer. It is believed that the Persian delegate, who recently visited Syria to study the question, privately assured each of the competing ports that he would support its claims. Mr. Catoni and I are of the opinion that, while Persia would find it convenient to enjoy the advantages of a free port on the Mediterranean, she is not really anxious about the matter, but is using the negotiations with the Syrian Government as a lever to get more favourable terms for Persian trade from the Soviet Government, an art in which the Persians are experts. If the Persian Government are successful in this policy the bulk of the Azerbaijan trade will continue to go to Russia, irrespective of the question of a free port on the Mediterranean.

5. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations may be, the Syrian railway authorities are doing everything in their power to develop the route from North Persia, as reported in my despatch No. 18 of the 27th April, and as Alexandretta is for them the most convenient port, it is possible that they may use their influence in its favour.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus and to the British vice-consul at Alexandretta.

I have, &amp;c.

N. PATRICK COWAN.



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**CONFIDENTIAL**

(14518)

## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

# EASTERN AFFAIRS

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXXIII.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 3609/2401/25]

No. 1.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 182. Secret.)

Sir,

*Jedda, June 14, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 119 of the 18th April, I have the honour to state that Ibn Saud again came to Jedda early on the 10th June, in anticipation of an early departure for Riyadh. He gave his usual series of formal audiences to heads of foreign missions that morning, beginning with me, as the Soviet Minister was in Mecca. His Majesty appeared to be in good form and was as affable as usual. I presented Mr. Calvert.

2. Following on general conversation of the usual anodyne character, the King observed that the autumn was his busy time in Nejd, as it was there that the leading people flocked about him, each expecting the personal attention of the Sovereign. He went on to say that within a year or two his son Saud might be trained enough to relieve him of this burden. I took the opportunity of congratulating His Majesty in person on the action he had so wisely taken to provide for the future of the throne. The King, in thanking me, stressed the fact that he had not taken the initiative, but yielded to the appeals of his people.

3. The King's remark about the Amir Saud derives some significance from a report which reached me on the 3rd June in a form too uncertain to be worth reporting at the time, that the King was contemplating abdication and was only waiting for the return of the mission he had sent to the Yemen. Without wishing to exaggerate the probability of such an event at some not too distant date, I think that it should be borne in mind as a possibility. To an European, it may seem unlikely that a man of 53 with Ibn Saud's past should contemplate such a step at the height of his achievement. I am not sure, however, that it would be alien to his character to retire in favour of the son, whom he has so spectacularly installed as Heir Apparent, hoping perhaps to guide the steps of his successor during the remainder of his own life. It is nearly three years since Fuad Bey spoke to me of the King's desire to reduce his burden of responsibility, and "to reign rather than to rule." This forecast proved false, but there have been faint indications of a slow movement in that direction. Ibn Saud has tended to lead a somewhat easier life than of old. He has left more in the hands of his advisers, though he still controls them all in major matters. He has accepted now constitutional forms, which, though they appear to us rather illusory at present, are not wholly unreal. Last year he made new secretarial arrangements at Riyadh, which involved the transfer to the Amir Saud of his own chief secretary, Ibrahim-ibn-Muammar, who has now gone as Chargé d'Affaires to Bagdad.

4. I collect these indications for two reasons. Slight as they are, they lend support to the idea that Ibn Saud may end his active career, or at any rate his



public career, by abdication rather than by death. Secondly, and this is of more interest to His Majesty's Government, such an intention would help to explain the rather marked tendency which Ibn Saud has shown during the past year to seek to compose various differences which might militate against the success of a new ruler; to disarm hostility among his own subjects; and to reduce the possibilities of quarrel with neighbouring countries like Iraq, Transjordan, the Yemen, and perhaps even Koweit.

5. I sought a further audience with the King on the 11th June to discuss business. I will report what passed separately in connexion with the subjects I raised, in so far as it may be necessary to record it. The King broached no subject of his own.

6. Ibn Saud returned to Mecca late on the 12th June. During his short stay, His Majesty gave a great deal of time to Captain H. C. Armstrong, who is writing his biography and whom he consented, as a result of correspondence through the Saudi Minister in London, to receive in Jedda. Captain Armstrong arrived on the 7th June. He had a general conversation with the King on the 10th June and had four further audiences on the 11th and 12th June of an average duration of some two hours each. The King has been most forthcoming, and both parties appear to be exceedingly pleased with each other. I have avoided any appearance of promoting Captain Armstrong's enterprise, but he is staying with my wife and me on the strength of old friendship.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Viceroy of India (Foreign and Political Department), His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Cairo, the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, and to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3612/2/25]

No. 2.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 186.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 18, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 120 of the 18th April, relative to the situation in Asir, I have the honour to state that the *Umm-al-Qura* recently announced the arrival of the Amir Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid, after completing the organisation of Asir Tihama, or Tihamat Asir, as it appears now to be called for choice. According to a later report he reached Mecca on the 13th June.

2. The *Umm-al-Qura* devoted a good deal of space to Asir in its numbers of the 9th and 16th June. The article in the issue of the 9th June is worth summarising. The writer reproaches the foreign press with confusion of language in speaking of the theatre of the recent revolt as Asir. He distinguishes between what has hitherto been officially called the Idrisi territory, i.e., Tihamat Asir (so named on the analogy of other tihamas or coastal regions) and what he calls either Asir *tout court* or Asir-as-Surat. The latter name is unfamiliar to me, but "Surat" occurs, apparently as a place name, in another recent article in the same paper, which touched on the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and which I have brought to your notice in a separate despatch.

3. The writer explains that Tihamat Asir corresponds to what was known in Turkish times as the districts of Sabya, Jizan and Abu Arish. He defines it as being bounded on the north by the districts of Qunfida, Birk, Muhail and Rijal-al-Ma (a tribal name, as you know), on the east by Asir-as-Surat or Asir and on the south by the districts of Medi and Haradh; and as having a coastal extension from Qahma to Musim, near the Wadi Ta'shar (cf. my despatch No. 113 of the 14th April). After enumerating the principal localities in the area and the tribes inhabiting it, he refers to the past existence of the two Amirates of Abu Arish and Sabya, the eviction of the Sherif of Abu Arish by Muhammad-al-Idrisi, the eventual appointment of the latter by the Turks as Kaïmakam of Sabya, Jizan and Abu Arish and the later disputes which ended in the triumph of the late Idrisi Hasan over his nephew Ali, who was given asylum by Ibn Saud.

4. All this leads up to a brief account of the relations between Ibn Saud and Hasan-al-Idrisi since 1926 culminating in revolt which the Government repressed "without great trouble and without taking strong military measures." The writer refers to knavish suggestions that certain persons may be trying to stir up a further movement. There is no sign, he says, of anything of the sort, as is proved by the return of Ibn Musaid, the demobilisation of the Saudi forces, the organisation of a new Administration and the appointment of Amirs. He goes on to say that Tihamat Asir, comprising the three districts already named, is to be governed by an Amir, assisted by a council consisting of the officer commanding troops, the Amir in charge of finance, the Qadhi and seven notables. The Saudi Amir at Abha will have a right of supervision.

5. The *Umm-al-Qura* article of the 16th June is historical and may be intended to be followed by others. It is based mainly on the relevant portion of a general work recently published by Fuad Bey Hamza in Arabic, under the title, "The Heart of the Arabian Peninsula." It deals at some length with the obscure history of the Sherifs of Abu Arish and the old rivalries between the Turks, the Imams of the Yemen and the Saudis for ascendancy in that area. The article is of no contemporary interest, except in so far as it tends to support the distinction which the Saudi Government are anxious to enforce between Asir proper and Tihamat Asir. As you are aware, that distinction seems to have received recent expression in the agreement reached in 1920 between the then Idrisi and Ibn Saud, which has never been published. Put in a nutshell, the Saudi thesis is, I think, that Ibn Saud has a prescriptive historical right to Asir proper but rules the Tihama by virtue of arrangements with lawful rulers, the Idrisis, whose elimination has been justified by the revolt of Hasan-al-Idrisi, after he had voluntarily delegated his rights to the King. It will be necessary to bear this thesis in mind in following further negotiations between Ibn Saud and the Imam regarding their frontiers. Both rulers have pretensions in Nejran and Beni Yem area and there have of late been various rumours, unsubstantial, but not lightly to be rejected, of armed activity in that remote region.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden, and to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea sloops.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3745/3745/25]

No. 3.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 187.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 19, 1933.

WITH reference to your circular of the 31st March last, I have the honour to submit a report on personalities in Sa'udi Arabia. It is the first report of the kind since this post became a Legation, as I found it impossible for various reasons to take action on earlier circulars on the subject.

2. You will appreciate the difficulties of compiling such a report in a country like this. Their very nature has made it desirable to err on the side of comprehensiveness, in order to collect in a single document information derived from very scattered sources. I have included persons like provincial governors, of whom very little is known, but who occupy key positions, many of the aliens who crowd the Sa'udi stage, and a certain number of expatriates who have been busy in the wings. In some cases, where relationships are interesting or important, I have dealt with family groups. This gives a confusing appearance to the rather formidable index, but I think that it will contribute to the utility of the report.

3. The report owes much to the researches of Mr. Hope Gill during his stay here, and to the personal knowledge of the Indian vice-consul and certain other members of my staff.

[9941]

B 2



4. The typing of this report has been delayed by pressure of more urgent work. The report contains information up to the end of April 1933, with a small number of additions based on important information received in May. I propose to furnish the lists of amendments, &c., called for in your circular despatch under reference early in 1934, but I would ask to be allowed to postpone this until I have been able to obtain suggestions from the British authorities in the surrounding countries, to whom copies of the report will doubtless be circulated in print. I am already greatly indebted to those authorities for information gleaned from their general intelligence summaries, &c.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 3.

*Personalities in Sa'udi Arabia.*

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*Note on Titles, &c.*

1. *Sherif*.—Said to apply strictly in Arabia to persons recognised as being in the direct male descent from Hasan, the son of the Caliph Ali. There is, however, much confusion as to the exact meaning of this and the following term.

2. *Seyyid*.—Said to apply in Arabia, though much abused in some other countries, only to persons recognised as being in the male descent from Huseyn, the son of 'Ali.

3. *Amir*.—Given as a title to all princes of the blood and describes the office of practically all provincial governors.

4. *Sheykh*.—Applied very widely, but not indiscriminately, not only to tribal personages, but to townsmen of consequence, especially, perhaps, though not exclusively, to those in official positions, e.g., Sheykh Yusuf Yasin.

5. *Bey*.—Still used, sometimes in preference to Sheykh, by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheykh" with age or desert life, e.g., Fuad Bey Hamza.

6. *Hajji*.—Convenient, in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to, e.g., Hajji Yusuf Zeinal.

7. *Effendi*.—Still applied to persons hardly entitled to be called Sheykh or anything equally honorific, e.g., Muhammad Effendi 'Ali Ridha.

8. *Ibn, &c.*—Means, like its variant, Bin, "son of," or by extension, "descendant of." Replaced sometimes by the article "al," which it is not always easy to distinguish from "âl," meaning "of the house of." All four forms are illustrated by the name of the King, "Abdul-'Aziz ibn (son of) 'Abdurrahman al (son of) Faysal al (of the house of) Sa'ud," and the abbreviated names ibn Sa'ud or bin Sa'ud. The use of the patronymic "Ibn So and So" is so common as often to make a man's personal name difficult to trace.

9. *Abu*.—Means "father." Used in combination with the name of an actual son or the name of an object to form a familiar name or nickname, which sometimes becomes an accredited surname. Thus, Captain Glubb is known in the desert as "Abu Hunaik," or the father of the Little Jaw. Similar names are sometimes formed from other terms of relationship.

10. *Composition of Names*.—The most normal formation is to build from a person's own name by adding that of his father and sometimes names of remoter ancestors and/or a family name. It is not uncommon to omit at least the first Ibn and place the father's name immediately after that of the person described, e.g., Abdullah Ibrahim al-Fadhl. It cannot be assumed, however, that the second of two unseparated names is that of the father, especially if the first be Muhammad, which is often little more than a prefix.

11. The following index gives, except in two cases, the first name of all living Arabs mentioned otherwise than incidentally in the report, but where Muhammad appears to be no more than a prefix it is reduced to M. and ignored for purposes of alphabetical order. Secondary entries have been made in many,

but not in all, cases, where a patronymic or a family name seems likely to help to trace particular individuals:—

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### 1. Royal Family.

(1) 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn 'Abdur-Rahmán al-Faysal al Sa'úd.—King of Sa'údi Arabia, commonly known as Ibn Sa'úd.

Born probably in 1880. Accompanied father on flight from Riyádh upon its occupation by Ibn Rashid in 1891. Grew up under tutelage of Sheykh

Mubarak of Kuwait, who gave asylum to family. Seized opportunity in course of local warfare in Eastern Arabia to deliver surprise attack on Riyádh in January 1902 with very small force and retook it. Became recognised head of the family although his father 'Abdurrahmán survived until 1928. Extended his authority gradually over whole of Nejd and Qasim and in 1914 took the coastal province of Hasa from the Turks, who then made an agreement with him. Entered into treaty relations with His Majesty's Government through the Government of India in 1915. Took Háil in 1921 and finally destroyed power of Beni Rashid. Next fought King Huseyn, an old enemy. Took Mecca in 1924 and completed conquest of Hejaz by compelling abdication at end of 1925 of Huseyn's son and successor 'Ali. Acquired suzerainty over 'Asir in 1926. Converted position into one of practical sovereignty in 1930 and recently reduced 'Asir to status of ordinary province, following on repression of a rebellion there. Has thus become ruler of territory, seaboard of which extend from just south of 'Aqaba to just north of Medi in Yemen and from Kuwait neutral zone to north of Qatar Peninsula.

Ibn Sa'ud has measured his titles by his acquisitions. He became in 1902 Amír of Nejd and Imám of the Wahhábis; in 1921 Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies; in January 1926 King of the Hejaz; in 1927 King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies; and finally in September 1932 King of the Kingdom of Sa'údi Arabia, defined as a single and united State, comprising his existing dominions, though without express mention of 'Asir.

The hero of this spectacular aggrandisement is a man of fine presence, some 6 foot 3 inches in height and handsome except for a blotch across the left eye due to neglected leucoma. He combines a strong character with courage, much native shrewdness and a charm which, though now a little stereotyped, is still attractive. He is feared rather than loved by his subjects on all of whom except those of the Shi'a persuasion he imposes at least the forms of Wahhábism. His own Wahhábism is sincere, but tempered by a readiness to compromise when his temporal position requires innovations contrary to the prejudice of extremists or sometimes even to the original principles of his sect. On his own ground he is an efficient ruler and a hard one, a Napoleon of the desert, but too much of the desert to cope quite successfully with the problems with which his conquest of the Hejaz and his attainment of an international position have confronted him. In diplomacy he is normally fairly honest, but difficult. He is as well disposed towards foreigners as is compatible with his fundamental belief that Islam is all in all. His relations with Great Britain have been mainly friendly, but he is a friend who expects much for love. He has tried a strong constitution very high by living hard and by innumerable marriages. It was reckoned some years ago that he had already had over 200 wives, though never more than the permitted four at a time. He is thought to find the natural decline in his powers in this direction disconcerting, but seems otherwise a hale man, except for digestive troubles and the effects of nervous strain.

Was made a G.C.I.E. in 1920, but does not now greatly prize an honour which he considers too reminiscent of a past connexion with the Government of India only and in some sense vassalish.

The King's eldest son Turkí died in 1919, leaving issue. The following is a list of the King's immediate relatives, many of whom also have issue. Philby's *Arabia* is probably the best authority on the Sa'ud family as a whole, but does not claim to be absolutely accurate.

### Sons. All Amirs.

(2) Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz.—Born of a lady of Sa'údi stock. Probably not more than 32, if as much. Has for some years been Viceroy of Nejd and seldom leaves it, though he went to consult an oculist in Egypt shortly after the "Mahmal incident" of 1926. Was last in the Hejaz in 1930. Said to have had some schooling from Dr. 'Abdullah Damlúji and Sheykh Háfiz Wahba, but to be in the main untutored. Resembles his father in physique and appearance. Also suffers from eye trouble, but has inherited Ibn Sa'ud's "magnetic smile." May in other respects be a chip of the old block, but has had little opportunity of displaying his quality to Europeans. Is strongly Islamic and may be more fanatical than his father.

Sa'ud is sometimes inaccurately described as Heir Apparent. A report in February 1928 that he had been declared to be Ibn Sa'ud's destined successor was



not confirmed. When the Kingdom was unified in 1932 it was announced that a rule of succession would be established. It is reported that Ibn Sa'ūd has since designated Sa'ūd as his successor and has obtained the assent of the family, perhaps also of a wider circle; but no public announcement has been made.

P.S.—Sa'ūd's designation as Heir to the Throne was formally announced on the 11th May, 1933.

(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. Born of a lady of the family of 'Abdul-Wahhāb in or about 1905. Educated partly by Sheykh Hāfiz Wahba. Reported intelligent and has at least had more opportunity than his brothers of cultivating his intelligence and powers of observation as he has lived mostly of late years in the comparatively civilised surroundings of Mecca and has travelled in Europe; in 1919, when he was in England; in 1926 when he visited England, France, Holland and perhaps other countries; and in 1932 when he headed the Sa'ūdi mission which visited London and many other capitals. In physique a much feebler version of his father and elder brother owing to excessive delight in the harem from his youth upwards; possibly also to the use of alcohol and possibly to a tubercular tendency, though neither is proved. Very listless and rather nervous in European company, but can rise to an occasion, as he showed in 1932 by playing his part in London, albeit that of a figurehead, with a good deal of distinction. His decorum is not known to have broken down until he reached Kuwait, where his indulgence in night-life scandalised the Sheykh and his subjects. Is supposed to have succumbed much to Syrian influences, though he seems to have got tired of Fuad Hamza during their grand tour and there have been recent signs of diminished intimacy between them. Believed not to see eye to eye with his father and joined in the onslaught by Fuad, Philby and others on Ibn Sa'ūd's principal henchman 'Abdullah Suleymān in October 1931. Although 'Abdullah Suleymān had the best of this in the end, the King has continued to treat Faysal with consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including an honorary G.B.E.

(4) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Aged about 21. Headed the Sa'ūdi forces which entered Medina in 1925. Was made acting Viceroy when the Amīr Faysal went abroad in 1932, but got beyond himself and was replaced by his brother Khālid. Met Faysal at Kuwait on his return and shared in the bout of dissipation there.

(5) *Khālid ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Aged about 18. Acted as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see (4) above).

(6) to (18). Children of 16 and less. The names and order of age are not quite certain. The following is an approximately correct list in alphabetical order, from various sources: 'Abdullah, 'Abdul-Muhsin, 'Abdur-Rahmān, Bandar, Fahad, Mansūr, Mash'al, Musā'id, Mutayyib, Nāsir, Sa'd, Sultān, Talāl. Two of them, Mash'al and Sultān, are said to be adopted sons, of the family of the Beni Rashid (*q.v.*).

*Brothers.* All Amīrs.

(19) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahmān*.—Said to be a little older than the King and to be a hard and stubborn man on whom Ibn Sa'ūd keeps a tight rein. Reported in 1926–27 to be a fanatical Wahhābi, married to a daughter of Ibn Bujād (*q.v.*); to be in sympathy with the extremists, whose opposition to Ibn Sa'ūd was then growing; and to have left Mecca in anger. Was, nevertheless, in charge at Riyādh in autumn of 1926, and was said to have got increased powers there. Now seldom heard of except on the occasion of journeys between Mecca and Riyādh. Might play a rôle in the event of his surviving the King, though said to have acquiesced in proposal in 1932 to make Sa'ūd heir. Has several sons, one of whom is married to a daughter of the King.

(20) *'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahmān*.—Aged about 40. Described as neat and spruce in appearance and as ambitious in character, so that King keeps him also well in hand. Seems to like ships, as he visited H.M.S. *Emerald* by special request in 1926 and H.M.S. *Clematis* with King's younger sons in 1928.

(21) and (22) *Ahmed and Musā'id*.—Younger lads of under 20, the children of the old age of 'Abdurrahmān ibn Faysal.

*'Arāif Branch.* Also Amīrs.

Certain of the King's cousins are dealt with in separate notices, but a general mention may be made of the 'Arāif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Sa'ūd ibn Faysal, an elder brother of the King's father and a former ruler at Riyādh. Their generic name of 'Arāif is one applied to raided camels, subsequently "recognised," as the root implies, and recovered by their owners. It seems to have been given to them because they had remained in the hands of the Beni Rashid, but escaped to Ibn Sa'ūd in the course of battle in 1904. Some of them rebelled against him in 1910, but the present members of the family form portion of the King's posse of satellite princes. Although inconspicuous, they might produce a claimant, by right of senior descent, to the throne. Various names are given in the *Almanach de Gotha* and Philby's *Arabia*. The most important of these princes, who bear individually the surname of al-'Arafa, would appear to be—

(23) *Sa'ūd ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ūd ibn Faysal*.—Married the King's sister Nūra. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ūd's entourage. Probably the same Sa'ūd al-'Arafa who was described in a recent report from Kuwait as being, according to a reliable informant, a friend of the 'Ajman tribe and secretly hostile to Ibn Sa'ūd.

2. *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Ibrahim*.

Governor of Medina. Little is known of this official except that he is believed to come from Hāil and is of considerable age. Has the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor.

3. *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mu'ammār*.

Governor of Jedda. A young man of apparently not more than 30. Comes of a former ruling family, probably of part of Qasim, but was brought up principally at Riyādh. Was Governor of Yanbu' for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed to Jedda in August 1932, with the title of Amīr, on the death of Hajjī 'Abdullah 'Ali Riza, a leading local merchant who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Huseyn's time. Ibn Mu'ammār seems likely to be a successful governor. He is good-looking and pleasant, but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. He is keen on riding and other forms of sport, and promised to try his hand at polo on receiving from Mr. Hope Gill a parting gift of sticks and balls in return for a dog's-head walking stick. Seems reasonably intelligent for a young man of his upbringing. Not related to Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammār (*q.v.*).

4. *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Musā'id*.

Second cousin to the King. Governor of Hāil since 1925 or earlier. Said by the Sheykh of Kuwait in March 1932 to be only 40, but to have aged greatly owing to worry. Was much in evidence in 1929 as one of the King's right-hand men at the time of the Akhwan rebellion. Came into prominence in February 1930, when, apparently without the King's authority, he conducted a raid on the scale of a punitive expedition, which it was, in fact, intended to be, into Transjordan. Disavowed by the King at the time, but maintained in his governorate. Was in November 1932 put at the head of the principal force despatched to reduce the 'Asīr rebels, and proceeded from Riyādh to 'Abhā and Jizān, where he assumed supreme command of the forces in 'Asīr. Said then to be intended for the Governorate-General of the whole 'Asīr area, but now unlikely to remain longer than may be necessary to clean up and reorganise it. A man for occasions requiring drastic action.

5. *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Shuheyli*.

Governor of Tebūk in or about 1929. Probably, despite a discrepancy of name, the same ibn Shuheyli of al-'Arīdh in Nejd who took over that governorate in 1926. Later Governor of Turāba. Appointed Governor of Taif in September 1932. Commanded the troops sent from Taif in connexion with the repression of the revolt in 'Asīr in November–December 1932, and has since been concerned in the arrangements which it was hoped would end in the surrender of Hasan al-Idrīsī to Ibn Sa'ūd.



## 6. 'Abdul-'Aziz (ibn Hamūd) ibn Zayd.

Inspector of Beduin in Transjordan frontier area. Probably about 40. Comes of a Hāil family said to be related to the Beni Rashīd. Said to have been educated in Constantinople. Sent to 'Ammān in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Sa'ūdī delegates an abortive conference at Ma'an in September. Was one of the two Sa'ūdī delegates on tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jedda. Sent to 'Ammān in August 1930 as Sa'ūdī agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Beduin in the frontier region in January 1931, and has since the 3rd June, 1931, held meetings at long intervals with Captain Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but will take no responsibility without reference to the King.

## 7. 'Abdul-Karīm ibn Rummān.

Governor of Teima. Little information is available about this man, whose family is not mentioned in the 1917 volume on personalities in Arabia. Seems to be important more as a town Sheykh than as a person having necessarily much influence with Beduin, according to a statement made by the Sheykh of Kuwait in 1932. Said to have maintained the quasi-independence of the Teima oasis even against Ibn Sa'ūd. Came into some prominence at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932, when he appealed to the Amīr 'Abdullah, with whom he appears to have been in correspondence previously, for assistance against the danger of attack by the Akhwān mobilised to repress the rebellion. Reported to be still defiant in January 1933, when he disobeyed the King's order to return certain land to a man who had appealed to the King, and imprisoned the man instead, possibly, it was suggested, because he thought the man likely to murder him with the Royal approbation.

## 8. 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid.

A leading figure among the Wāhhābi Ulema. Comes from Hāil. Qādhi of Mecca after its occupation by Ibn Sa'ūd, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925-26) as a "bent and wizened little man." Appointed Grand Qādhi of the Hejaz in January 1926. Was instrumental in May 1926 in obtaining a *fatwa* from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wāhhābi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Nejdī delegates at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of 'Abdullah ibn Hasan (see 16 (1)), bent on purging the place of iniquity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hāil. Was thought at that time to favour the extremists of the Akhwān movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932.

## 9. 'Abdullah ibn Jilāwi.

Governor of Hasa. A first cousin of the King's late father. About the same age as the King, whom he has served consistently since he helped him to recapture Riyādh in 1902. Bore a part in the wars subsequent to that event. Stated by Philby to have been appointed Governor-General of Qasim in 1908, but has been employed in Hasa for several years past. Said to have been instrumental in 1927 in arresting temporarily the rising discontent of the Wāhhābi extremists, Faysal ad-Dawish, &c., in Nejd. Has the reputation of being a strong and severe Governor. Corresponds with the Sheykh of Bahrain and seems to keep in touch with some of the Trucial Sheykh.

## 10. 'Abdullah Kāzim.

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. About 50 or a little more. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Sa'ūdī Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33.

## 11. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqīl.

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928, when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wejh by Hamid ibn Rifāda. Probably identical with the ibn 'Aqīl who was mentioned in May 1931 as a possible candidate for the governorship of Tebūk, but was not appointed. 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqīl commanded the Akhwān mobilised in June 1932 to repress the further rebellion of Hamid ibn Rifāda.

## 12. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhīl.

Vice-President of the Legislative Council. Probably rather over 50. Principal member of the Fadhl family *q.v.* Was formerly a merchant in Jedda. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jedda. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence. Played no particular rôle subsequently (and was so little valued for brain-power as to be known as "the Sheep") until ex-King 'Ali sent him on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ūd at Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Sa'ūd and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Attached to the King's son, Muhammad, as adviser when the young 'Amīr occupied Medina later in 1925. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Obtained about the same period, in partnership with Indians settled in Mecca, a contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better as purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ūd by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of 'Abdullah Suleymān by cornering benzine, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or waggly course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation; still somewhat of a sheep; but wears his recent dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhl.

## 13. 'Abdullah an-Nafisi.

Important as being Ibn Sa'ūd's agent at Kuwait, where he is established as a merchant and once did a large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and less active. Seems sensible.

## 14. 'Abdullah Suleymān al-Bassām.

A Nejdī, presumably a member of the Bassām family of 'Aneyza, described in Philby's "Arabia" as having been formerly staunch adherents of Ibn Rashīd. Appointed Inspector-General of Customs in 1930. Was said then to be a penniless man of no character who had lived for two years as the guest of his namesake the Minister of Finance. Now said to be on very bad terms with the latter. Another al-Bassām was mentioned in October 1932 as the consignee of goods shipped from India to Uqair.

## 15. 'Abdullah ibn Suleymān al-Hamdān.

Minister of Finance. Aged about 46. Of plebeian 'Aneyza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally, it is said, as a coffee-boy. Spent ten years as clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd some twenty years ago. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qusaibis to replace his brother, who had died, as a clerk in the King's Diwān. Rose to be head of the Diwān. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1928, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jedda. Has since been the most powerful of the King's advisers. His position was strongly assailed in October 1931 by a cabal, which included the Amīr Faysal, Fuad Hamza, 'Abdullah al-Fadhīl (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr. Philby.



Was sent for a time to lend a hand with the Tawil mission in Hasa, but had his place kept warm for him and returned to it. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of Finance to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, thus obtaining the title of Wazir, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Faysal. Continues to be supreme in the financial administration and has his finger in many other pies, being in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quarter-Master-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves and pilgrimage-organiser. Probably entirely faithful to the King, whose needs he supplies at the expense of others having demands on the Treasury. A man of rather mean appearance, but emphatically a "live wire." Ready and energetic in conversation and full of ideas about development. Detested by Fuad Hamza and not loved by many. Has for some time been very friendly with the Indian vice-consul, and has of late been at pains to cultivate relations with His Majesty's Minister. Has enriched himself and has built a pretentious house outside Jedda, which the King made use of in April 1933. Has provided posts for two relatives, viz., his brother Hamad (*q.v.*) and Muhammad, Director of the condensers at Jedda.

#### 16. *Abdul-Wahhâb, Descendants of.*

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhâbism:—

(1) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan*.—Is one of the leading Wahhâbi Ulema in Mecca. Played a rôle in 1926, with 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid (*q.v.*), in the Wahhâbi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Akhwân extremists. Signed the pronouncement of the Ulama in favour of Jihâd at the time of the Ibn Rifâda rebellion in 1932. Now Grand Qadhi. Proud and fanatical.

(2) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Azîz ibn Sheykh*, nicknamed as-Sahâbi, formerly Governor of Taif, transferred to Riyâdh in 1932 as Assistant to the Amir Sa'ûd.

(3) *'Abdul-Latif Family*.—Four sons and a probable grandson of a descendant named 'Abdul-Latif were among the ten signatories of the declaration of Jihad referred to under (1). No. (2) and the mother of the Amir Faysal (*q.v.*) also probably belong to this connexion.

#### 17. *'Abdul-Wahhâb, Seyyid.*

A man of 50 or over. Holds the post of Nâib-al-Harâm at Mecca. Was formerly Deputy for 'Asir in the Ottoman Parliament, but has never been there. Of no apparent political importance, but a familiar figure in high circles. A jolly little pock-marked man, whose deserved reputation as a raconteur is set off by his appearance.

#### 18. *'Abdul-Wahhâb Abû Malha.*

A personage of consequence in 'Asir, possibly of the Sheykhly family of Malha near Sabya, although this cannot be affirmed. Was described in 1927 as Director of Finance in 'Asir, and was in that year one of four delegates sent by Ibn Sa'ûd to negotiate with the Imâm Yahya. Probably still has the title of Director of Finance and commanded the Sa'ûdi forces which entered Sabya in November 1932.

#### 19. *'Abdur-raûf as-Sabbân.*

Born in the Hejaz forty to forty-five years ago. Grandson of an immigrant from Egypt. Educated in the Hejaz and in Egypt. Associated with his father, Hasan, and others in what was in 1917 the principal hide and skin business in Jedda and Mecca. Impressed the Hejazis at that time by his knowledge and European manners. Was made Director of Education in Jedda, but was dismissed and reverted to trade in cotton goods and skins. Edited in 1925 the anti-Sa'ûdi paper *Al-Umma* in Cairo with the help of one of the Dabbâghs. Given a post by the Amir 'Abdullah as manager of his estates in Transjordan in or before 1931. Was an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrâr al Hijâzi, and was concerned in 1932 in the press propaganda and financial arrangements of the outside promoters of movements against Ibn Sa'ûd. Seems to have gone at least once to Eritrea in this connexion. Was dismissed by the Amir 'Abdullah in the autumn of 1932 as a result of these political activities, but went on with them. Now excluded from

Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, and has retired to Bagdad. Seems to be one of the most energetic of Ibn Sa'ûd's Hejazi enemies abroad, and may be expected to continue his efforts, wherever he is.

#### 20. *Ahmed 'Abdullah 'Ayshân.*

Stated to have brought money from Transjordan to Aden in April 1932 for Huseyn ad-Dabbâgh. Presumably a member of the Mecca family, two members of which were mentioned in 1917, one as a wealthy merchant, the other, a young man of 20 named "'Abdullah ibn 'Ashân" (perhaps identical with the subject of this notice), who associated with King Huseyn's sons and was specially intimate with the Amir 'Abdullah. 'Abdullah 'Ayshân is one of the persons now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan on account of other anti-Sa'ûdi activities.

#### 21. *Ahmed Sa'id al-Kurdi.*

Director of Police in Jedda. Presumably of Kurdish origin, perhaps distilled through Syria. Was previously Director of Police at Rabigh and gave offence to the Legation by trying to commandeer a car which was taking the Nawab of Bahawalpur to Medina. Was transferred to Jedda in 1932 and confirmed in the post early in 1933. Is said to have stated that he would know how to put the fear of God into the inhabitants of Jedda. Is believed to be anti-foreign, but has not yet put the fear of God, further than it already exists, into the European community. Seems to be supported by persons in high quarters, including probably Mehdi Bey (*q.v.*), and, not improbably, the Amir Faysal and Fuad Bey Hamza. A man to watch but not to judge too hastily. Rides a horse, a thing now unusual in Jedda, and looks well on it.

#### 22. *'Alî al 'Amâri.*

Of Nejdî origin, but settled in the Hejaz before Ibn Sa'ûd conquered it. Probably about 50. Formerly a merchant. Became Director of Customs in Jedda in 1926 and, later, Inspector-General of Customs. Feathered his nest and put a good deal of money into building a house, which he presented or sold to the King, but for which, if the latter is the case, he has never been paid. This is the house called the "Green Palace" outside Jedda. Appointed member of an Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930 and Assistant Governor of Jedda early in 1931. Exercised some authority in this post, but does not appear to count for much nowadays. Probably a rascal, but cheery even now that he has gone poor again.

#### 23. *'Alî Ridha Family* (or Reza as they spell it themselves in English).

A rich merchant family in Jedda, of Persian origin. Have very important business connexions in India and elsewhere, and are agents for the Turner Morrison Line, which has a monopoly of transporting pilgrims from India by sea. The best known members of the family were Zeynal 'Alî Ridha, who died some years ago, his son Qâsim, formerly a M.P. in Turkey and a man of parts, and 'Abdullah 'Alî Ridha, who combined business with the post of Governor of Jedda from King Huseyn's time until he died in 1932. The principal members of the family now in Jedda are:—

(1) *Yusuf ibn Zeynal 'Alî Ridha*, a pleasant man of 45 or 50, who has been much in India; and

(2) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah 'Alî Ridha*, a bullet-headed but agreeable lad of little more than 20.

Other members of the family are met with elsewhere. The family has Syrian family connexions, 'Abdullah having married a Syrian or Syro-Persian lady, and his son Mohammad having married last year the daughter of a well-known but decayed Syrian merchant in Jedda, Sadiq al Khoja. The latter is also connected with Huseyn Awayni (*q.v.*).

#### 24. *'Alî Taha.*

Assistant Governor of Jedda since 1928, and, in addition, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since early in 1932. A Hejazi of about 40. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy, with a mouthful of gold teeth. Speaks Turkish well. Well meaning, and not without intelligence, but frightened of his own shadow.



Completely ineffective, except on the rarest possible occasions, in connexion with foreign affairs. Normally serves as no more than a transmitter of messages to and from Mecca.

#### 25. *M. Amin Shanqiti.*

Said to be a recent import from Shanqit, somewhere in North-West Africa. At one time resided in Mecca, and became later a member of the Idrisi's Council, apparently with the sanction of Ibn Sa'ud. Was a signatory in this capacity of the decision which signed 'Asir away to Ibn Sa'ud in October 1930. Latterly concerned in anti-Sa'udi activities in connexion with 'Asir. Came to notice in that connexion in July 1932, when it was reported that he had returned to 'Ammân from Damascus, whither he had gone on the Amir 'Abdullah's business and to be a bone of contention between the Amir and his Government. Seems to have been back in 'Asir at the time of the rebellion of November-December 1932.

#### 26. *M. Amin Tamimi.*

A Palestinian from Hebron, son of an official at Tulkaram. Came to the Hejaz in 1927. Had known Fuad Hamza in Palestine, and was employed by him in the Sa'udi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Attached to Sheykh 'Abdul-'Aziz Ibn Zeyd for the purpose of the MacDonnell enquiry, and left with him in August 1930. Fell out with his chief, and was accused *inter alia* of selling a cypher. Returned separately to the Hejaz and was re-employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Was probably still protected by Fuad Hamza, but left the Ministry in or about May 1931, and served for a short time with Sharqieh (Limited) in Jedda. Was by then very much under a cloud, and, according to his own story, had to use a ruse to get away on the 6th August, 1931. He had been accused of some irregularity in accounts, and may already have been under suspicion of stealing documents. Tried later to sell certain copies of British secret papers to the Embassy in Constantinople. Surrendered these voluntarily to the Residency at Cairo in June 1932, but may still possess Sa'udi documents. A very nasty young man, unlikely to return to Sa'udi Arabia, but worth mentioning because of his approaches to British authorities elsewhere. Was mentioned by the Amir 'Abdullah to General Wauchope, on the 6th September, 1932, as one of a number of important and dangerous members of the Independence party in Palestine, against whom precautions should be taken.

#### 27. *'Aqil Family of Mecca.*

It is difficult to place various bearers of the name of 'Aqil, who may or may not be related to the Muhammad ibn 'Aqil, mentioned in 1917 as a respectable Mecca merchant, whose grandfather, a learned and holy man, had prophesied that the English would take Mecca. A person of the same name, one of a Hadhrami family deported from Mokalla in 1928, died at Aden in 1931, leaving sons, of whom one, viz. :—

(1) *'Isa ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil* was secretary to the Imâm's son, Ahmed.

More definitely connected with Mecca are the following :—

(2) *Amin ibn Ishâq ibn 'Aqil*, said to be son of a sister of Huseyn ad-Dabbâgh. Arrested at Mecca in June-July 1932 and deported to Riyâdh.

(3) *'Abbâs 'Aqil*, one of the conspirators against Ibn Sa'ud, said to have come on pilgrimage with two other conspirators and to have gone later to Mokalla to buy cartridges at Bir Ali.

The last-named may be identical with—

(4) *'Aqil 'Abbâs Bardaghash*, mentioned in reports from Aden as a Meccan, or, according to others, an 'Asiri, associated with the Dabbâghs.

#### 28. *Ba-Jubayr Family.*

An important merchant family among the numerous Hadhramis settled in Jedda. The most important present member of it, Ahmed Ba-Jubayr, was suspected in 1932 of complicity in the ad-Dabbâgh plot, and was arrested and deported to Riyâdh in June-July, but was subsequently allowed to return. As he had apparently been born in the Hadhramaut, it became a question whether the Legation should intervene, but his relatives themselves very sensibly preferred that it should not.

#### 29. *Ba-Nâjâ Family.*

A merchant family of humble Hadhrami origin, long settled in the Hejaz. They have considerable property in Egypt, and are still wealthy. The principal members are the following :—

(1) *'Abdur-Rahmân*, the patriarch. Probably over 70, and lives a retired life, but is still going strong as a man of business.

(3) *Ahmed*, son of (1), had quarrelled with him before 1917. Was King Huseyn's Minister of Finance in that year, and was ridiculed for his airs, besides being condemned for his private vices. Returned to Egypt, but returned to the Hejaz in 1932.

(3) *M. Sâlih Ba-Nâjâ*, another son.

(4) *Sufyân Ba-Nâjâ*, a slave of the family, but now sole manager of the property. He was treasurer to (2) whilst he was Minister. Is a Jedda notable; lives a quiet life and is respected, though he is a slave.

All these are well-known in Jedda, where (4) is concerned in a motor transport concern. The family appear to enjoy considerable favour under the present régime.

#### 30. *Ba-Sâhî Family of 'Asir.*

The principal member of this Hadhrami family, Muhammad Yahya, played an important rôle in 'Asir at the time of the Great War. They would appear to be still people of consequence there, as three of them were concerned in the arrangements for the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ud in October 1930, viz. :—

(1) *Muhammad Yahya 'Awadh Ba-Sâhî*.—A member of the Legislative Council which signed the decision. Probably the same as the person named above. Seems to have tried to dissuade the Idrisi from revolting in October 1932.

(2) *'Abdul-Qâdir ibn Muhammad ibn 'Awadh Ba-Sâhî*, also a member of the Legislative Council. Seems to have helped to get the Idrisi to fall in with the plans of the Dabbâgh conspirators in 1932.

(3) *Muhammad 'Abdullah Ba-Sâhî*.—One of the Idrisi mission sent to Mecca to complete the arrangements for annexation in 1930.

#### 31. *Bujâd (or Humayd) Family.*

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghutghut section of the 'Ateyba tribe. A confusing effect is produced by the use in past reports of the names Sultân ibn Bujâd, ibn Humayd ibn Bujâd and ibn Bujâd *tout court*, but they would appear all to apply to one and the same man. This is assumed in what follows regarding :—

(1) *Sultân ibn Humayd ibn Bujâd*.—Once one of Ibn Sa'ud's stalwarts and one of the commanders of his troops when they took Mecca in 1924. Had a daughter married to the King's brother Muhammad. Noted early in 1927 as one of the extremists who were then inclining against the King. Became reconciled with him later, but finally stood in with Ibn Sa'ud's opponents in the Nejd rebellion of 1929 and was accounted second only to Faysal ad-Dawish in importance. Was one of the earlier leaders to fall into the King's hands and was imprisoned at Riyâdh in the spring of that year. Appears to be still in close confinement, as no record has been found of the death of Sultân ibn Bujâd, the best known of the names cited above, and "ibn Humayd" was mentioned in a recent report as one of the prisoners who were receiving more lenient treatment than before, though, unlike the others, he was still not allowed to see his womenfolk. May still prove important, as he had a strong hold on his tribesmen, some of whom have been reported sullen over his imprisonment.

(2) *Nâif ibn Faysal ibn Humayd*.—A pretender to the chieftainship of the 'Ateyba, but moved to 'Iraq in 1924, having been ousted by No. (1). Played with the idea of recovering his position in June 1929 and sent a minor relative, 'Obeyd, to spy out the land, but was apparently dissuaded by King Faysal from going ahead. Mentioned in 1932 as being still a refugee in 'Iraq and as a possible aspirant to the hand of Mazyûna, sister of Faysal ad-Dawish, but the engagement or marriage was denied.



32. *Dabbāgh Family.*

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (*i.e.*, some North-West Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifāda and the preparations for the retarded revolt in 'Asir. The family is numerous. Certain members of it still reside in the Hejaz, including two who were arrested and deported to Riyādh in June-July 1932, viz. :—

- (1) *Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdullah* and
- (2) *'Isa ibn 'Abdullah*.

More important are the following persons abroad :—

(3) *Huseyn ibn 'Abdullah*, brother of the above. Migrated to Mokalla in or about 1926. Has since done school-mastering in South-West Arabia and has been an active intriguer against Ibn Sa'ūd. Went to India in 1927 to enlist support for the Hizb-al-Ahrār al Hijāzi and their National Pact. Sought, and probably enlisted, the support of Shauqat Ali, who, with his brother, had been violently at loggerheads with Ibn Sa'ūd at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Went to Egypt and perhaps to Transjordan in 1929. Said to have attended Moslem Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931, when persons concerned in Hizb-al-Ahrār seem to have devised a pendant organisation called Jami'at ad Dif'a lil Hijāz. Was using Aden as base early in 1932, but left in summer owing to adverse attitude of British authorities and seems to have since worked mainly in Eritrea. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan.

(4) *M. 'Alī ibn 'Abdullah*, another brother. Less conspicuous, but also very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in 'Asir. Reported drowned at Jizān, but report was contradicted later.

(5) *M. Tāhīr ibn Mas'ūd*, uncle of the above. Born in 1890. Had some employment under King Huseyn. Obtained British-protected passport at Cairo in 1926 on strength of alleged subjection to Sultan of Mokalla. Author of letter from Lahej to Amīr Shākir of the 20th February, 1932, which fell into hands of Sa'ūdi Government and revealed plans of conspirators. Seems to have gone further east, as he arrived at Aden from Singapore early in June 1932. Has since been very mobile, visiting Eritrea, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan and 'Iraq. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Was understood in January 1933 to be heading back to Massawa, and perhaps thence to Aden and the Hadhramaut.

Other members of the family need not be enumerated, but they all seem to hang together and to have *attaches* with Hashimites. One, Mas'ūd, a hanger-on at 'Ammān, was closely concerned in the Ibn Rifāda affair and was killed with Ibn Rifāda. The family also have *attaches* with the Idrisis, although there is nothing to explain one mention of (3) above as Huseyn bin 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh al-Idrisi.

33. *Dawish Family.*

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best-known member, Faysal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider, as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyādh in October 1931. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded as more than an ordinary sheykh—a kingly man and a king maker. This gives importance to his sons, two of whom have figured in recent reports from Kuwait.

(1) *Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Still a young man. Said to be looked to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire, but to be himself very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ūd as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Majesty."

(2) *Al-Humaydi ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Visited Ibn Sa'ūd at Riyādh in the autumn of 1932, when the King was making efforts to reconcile the ex-rebel Mutayr and 'Ajmān, still hostile to him, and was well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The political agent at Kuwait, who had befriended them when Faysal was surrendered to Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1930, was visited by various of them on several occasions in 1932. They included Faysal's mother, who hid bitter hatred of the King beneath copious praises;

a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Sheykh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied, and a cousin, still a woman of considerable charm and humour, who had been married to Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, to a deceased son of Faysal ad-Dawish and, lastly, as prize of war, to Ibn Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdullah.

34. *Dehlavi Family.*

An Indian family long settled in Mecca. Wahhābis by faith. Still British, but allowed to own real property, and so much identified with the Hejaz that two members of it sat as representatives in the National Conference of June 1931. They were—

(1) *'Abdullah Dehlavi*, elder brother (about 57 years old); under Sherifian régime was member of various committees; is a trusted adviser of Ibn Sa'ūd, whom he has supported from beginning. Together with (2) is prime mover in the 'Ain Zubeyda Committee.

(2) *Obeidullah Dehlavi*, younger brother—aged about 53. Chiefly concerned in management of the family Motor Transport Company "El-Nijah." He is an intimate friend of Sheykh 'Abdullah Suleymān, and like his brother is a trusted adviser of the King. Both brothers interest themselves privately in affairs of the Sa'ūdi Government, but are not office seekers.

35. *Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family.*

Nejdīs of 'Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original 'Abdullah had at least five sons, all now deceased, with one possible exception. Each of these had issue. Members of the first and second generations after the original 'Abdullah were concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation, enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Sa'ūd, until 1930. Family differences and bad trade led to the collapse of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India absconded to the Hejaz, where a third tried to dissociate himself from the partnership. The affairs of the family have for some years been the subject of very complicated litigation and have engaged the attention of various British authorities for reasons too long to recapitulate. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz, and several members of it have been given employment by Ibn Sa'ūd. Apart from 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, who is the subject of a separate notice, the following deserve mention :—

(1) *Muhammad*, son of the 'Abdullah just mentioned. In business in Jedda and does a tidy trade in benzine, &c.

(2) *Ibrāhīm ibn Abdurrahmān*.—One of the two who absconded from India in 1930. Appointed a member of the Legislative Council in October 1930. Became later a secretary to the Amīr Faysal. Was called on to resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, by Amīr Faysal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged in trade in an unimportant way; but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amīr Faysal.

(3) *Muhammad ibn Abdurrahmān ibn 'Abdullah*.—Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India in 1930, but resided in Jedda and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin.

(4) *'Abdullah ibn Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdullah*.—Private secretary to the Amīr Faysal in 1926. Afterwards one of the partners who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Holland, under scheme which did not materialise for having a Legation there with the Sa'ūdi Minister in London as Minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931, as a result of the cabal against 'Abdullah Suleymān.

(5) *Ibrāhīm ibn Suleymān*.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Rais-i-Diwān of the Amīr Faysal. Is an important official and enjoys Amīr Faysal's complete confidence.

36. *Fahad ibn Zu'ayr.*

Late Governor of 'Asir. Was head of the mission sent to 'Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Sa'ūd. Was later appointed Amīr, though probably not the first to hold the post. Reported to Ibn Sa'ūd with increasing urgency in the autumn of



1932 that the Idrisi was getting beyond himself. The Idrisi, professing complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a commission to investigate. Before it could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone into open revolt and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizân. Little else is known about him, except that, wherever he now is, he seems to have been superseded.

### 37. Farhan ibn Mashhûr.

A chief belonging to the Syrian Ruwalla tribe, and hardly within the scope of this report. Nevertheless, deserves inclusion because of the important rôle he has played in regard to Sa'ûdi Arabia. Quarrelled with his own paramount chief in 1926, severed his connexion with Syria and embraced Wahhâbism. Was concerned in raids from Nejd into Iraq and Transjordan in and before 1929. Took a leading part in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ûd that year, in association more particularly with the 'Ajman. Described at that time by the Political Agent at Kuwait, who saw him personally, as a tall man of about 40, speaking Nejdî Arabic, with an occasional break into Damascus patois. Escaped into Iraq on the collapse of the rebellion and became the subject of an acrimonious controversy, owing to Ibn Sa'ûd's contention that not only the Iraq Government but His Majesty's Government were bound by definite undertakings to surrender him. Arrangements were finally made for him to be shephered circuitously from Iraq to Jedda, but he broke away in Syria and has since remained there. His Majesty's Government maintained their consistent theory that they had no responsibility and Ibn Sa'ûd grudgingly allowed the controversy to be laid during Nuri Pasha's treaty-making visit to the Hejaz in April 1931. Ibn Mashhûr has since kept quiet, but he is a man of energy and likely to reappear some day. His natural *attaches* are still probably with the Hashimites and Nuri Sha'alan, although his adventures have clouded his relations with both in the recent past.

### 38. Fawzân as-Sabîq.

Sa'ûdi agent in Egypt. Aged about 45. Belongs by origin to the 'Uqeyl, the guild, as it were, of recognised caravan-guides. Educated in a Turkish school at 'Ammân. Is by profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Sa'ûd's agent in Damascus prior to 1924. Moved in that year to Cairo, where he occupies a similar position, not officially recognised in any way, although he does passport work, &c. Is described by Mr. Smart as a devout Moslem, plain, slow, courteous and old-fashioned; politically rather innocent, but possessed of a certain native shrewdness.

### 39. Fuad Bey Hamza.

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. A Druze from the Lebanon, born about 1900. Educated in Turkish schools in Syria, the Teachers' Training College, Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Jerusalem as teacher in English and remained until 1926. Studied simultaneously at the Law School, got a Certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 and qualified in five subjects, including Constitutional History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine, but was mixed up in politics and the Druze insurrectionary movement. May have feared arrest, although he was not, in fact, in danger of it. Left for Egypt on the 2nd December, 1926. Apparently was to go to India on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin, then acting for Dr. 'Abdullah Danlûji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928, when Dr. Danlûji left on a mission, never to return. Had probably worked earlier to undermine Danlûji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amir Faysal became titular Minister with Fuad as Under-Secretary, but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on the Council of Ministers when the latter was constituted early in 1932. Prefers to call himself in English Deputy Minister. Visited Europe for the first time as a member of the Sa'ûdi Mission

under the Amir Faysal in the spring of 1932 and did all the real business. Was made an honorary K.B.E. during the visit to London.

Fuad Hamza is alert, intelligent, well informed on matters pertaining to his work and industrious. Speaks English well and Turkish, but is hampered by lack of more than elementary French. Equally devoted to his own ambitions and to the cause of Arab nationalism, serving Ibn Sa'ûd as its exponent, though inclined sometimes to despair of the system of which he has made himself part. Keeps in touch with other Nationalists in Palestine, and probably Syria. Is used by the King as his instrument for foreign affairs, and makes the most of his position, but probably does not enjoy Ibn Sa'ûd's full confidence, so that his power varies. Very hostile to 'Abdullah Suleymân and took part in the unsuccessful drive against him in 1931. Conforms to Wahhâbism without conviction. Would like to see Sa'ûdi Arabia, a name of which he was one of the authors, develop on modern, more or less constitutional lines. Likes drafting laws. Would go to great lengths for the causes he has at heart, but is seldom, if ever, dishonest in diplomacy. Rather bumptious and sometimes difficult to deal with, but responds to personal handling. Sometimes spoken of as anti-British, sometimes even as pro-Soviet; probably wrongly, except in so far as his attitude towards foreign Powers is determined by Arab nationalism. May have put by a modest amount of money, although the only traceable record of anything approaching corruption is an allegation in 1929 that he bought large stocks of tobacco before promulgating a decree imposing new duties.

Taufiq Hamza, Fuad's brother, serves under him in the Ministry, but does not merit a separate notice. Speaks French.

### 40. Gâbil Family (more correctly Qâbil, but they use the other spelling).

Important merchants in Jedda of African slave origin. Take their name from an extinct Jedda family, one of whom owned the father, later a freedman. The firms consists of the two following brothers:—

(1) *Suleymân Amân Gâbil*.—Aged about 60. Worked up an important business connexion with Medina, India, &c., in his early days. Paid President of the Municipality in Turkish times, and held the same post under King Huseyn. Had at that time a poor reputation for honesty. Took a leading part in the movement by notables of Jedda and Mecca to compel King Huseyn's abdication in October 1924. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of the delegates sent to negotiate about the Eastern Telegraph Company cable and was more helpful than his colleague, 'Abdullah Kâzim (q.v.). Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. A Vicar of Bray under three successive régimes, but can be outspoken, as when he displeased the King by his frank criticism of fiscal policy at the "National Conference" of June 1931. Described in 1928 as "a lively and entertaining host." Still pleasant to meet and apt to be met in Royal circles. Speaks moderate Turkish.

(2) *'Abdul-Qâdir Amân Gâbil*, several years younger than Suleymân, in whose wake he follows at a distance.

### 41. Hâfiz (Hâfidh) Wahba.

Sa'ûdi Minister in London. An Egyptian born probably between 1885 and 1890. Educated at Al-Azhar. Mixed up in Nationalist and pan-Islamic politics in early manhood and was closely associated with 'Abdul-'Aziz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Later started a school at Kuwait and passed thence into Ibn Sa'ûd's service. Became tutor to the Amir Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in 1919. Was one of Ibn Sa'ûd's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well. Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations during the ensuing years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Sa'ûd's views and fears regarding Italian policy in the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and Hashimite sovereignty in neighbouring countries to the Residency at Cairo early in 1928. During all this period waged a ding-dong struggle against the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was occulted towards the end of 1926, but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the



Amir Faysal. Thought to have indisposed the Amir by his masterfulness as a tutor and his disregard as Assistant Viceroy for the Amir's position. Relegated in July 1928 to the post of Director-General of Education. Went to London in 1929 to represent Ibn Sa'ud at the International Postal Congress. While there was selected for the post of Minister in London, but did not take up the post for over a year, during which interval he went on a sort of undefined mission to Kuwait and was also employed much about the King's person, though he appeared on the whole to have lost ground to the Syrians. Has during his tenure of the Legation in London represented his country on international occasions, at Geneva and elsewhere, and has only once been back in Sa'udi Arabia. Was designated in 1931 to be Minister at The Hague, but the arrangements have never materialised for reasons of economy.

Hafiz Wahba has sown his political wild oats. His anti-British sentiments are supposed to have undergone a change in or before 1928, when he was reported as being accustomed to say that, as regards Egypt, he would always be against Great Britain, but, as a servant of Ibn Sa'ud, believed the King's interest to lie in friendly relations with His Majesty's Government. He has certainly shown himself well-disposed in London, and has on occasion been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Sa'ud on the lecture platform and in society. Neither taciturn nor talkative, he appeals by his sense of humour and looks anything but a Wahhabi (except that he abstains from alcohol and tobacco) at the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy. Likes the theatre too. Speaks moderate English, but is not fluent. A useful servant to the King, whose respect he commands, but not probably his entire confidence.

#### 42. *Hamad Suleymân.*

Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Suleymân, *q.v.*, and has worked under him. Acted for him as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hasa towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary when 'Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khalid-al-Qarqani to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt, but have since been standing by in 'Asir.

#### 43. *Hamdi Bey.*

Director-General of Military Organisation. Perhaps 40 to 45. Believed to be an Iraqi Kurd and to have risen to non-commissioned rank in the Turkish army. Was a colonel in the army of King Huseyn, but passed to the service of Ibn Sa'ud and was officer commanding troops at Yanbu' before 1928. Became Officer Commanding in Jedda in that year. Appointed Director-General of Military Organisation in 1931 in succession to Faudhi Bey Kawokji. Presents all the appearance of a man who might be good in a rough and tumble; none of having the education necessary to create anything serious out of the embryo regular army, as Faudhi Bey might have done had he not lost favour. Hamdi seems to be a man of indifferent character, with a gift for intrigue, which he displayed in connexion with the vicissitudes of the British Staff of the Hejaz Air Force in 1931-32. Acts on occasion as A.D.C. to the King, attending him on his visits to Jedda and being sent to meet sloops, &c.

#### 44. *Hamud al-Bagawi.*

Officer in charge on the Kuwait frontier, with headquarters at Jariya. Appointed to this post in August 1932. Fourth person to hold it since 1930. A man of very evil reputation, described as having been chiefly responsible for all the raiding and killing in Kuwait territory eight or nine years ago. Known in Kuwait as the "butcher" of 'Abdullah ibn Jilûwi, Governor of Hasa, and apparently chosen for his present post to tighten up the embargo on trade between Kuwait and Nejd, responsibility for which had been transferred to ibn Jilûwi.

#### 45. *Hamud ibn Ibrahim.*

Appointed Governor of Yanbu' in August 1931. Known only from the announcement of this.

#### 46. *Hamza al Ghauth al Madani.*

Understood to be consul-general designate for Java. A Hejazi of Medina, aged over 40. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Huseyn paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Huseyn after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Faisal's régime there, even after King Huseyn had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen valuables from the Prophet's Tomb. Was in Ibn Sa'ud's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Sa'udi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the Palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed consulate-general at Batavia, to the creation of which the Netherlands Government agreed, but which has never been opened, probably owing to financial difficulties. Filled in time as a member of the Legislative Council, whence he was transferred to the Amir Sa'ud's Diwân in September 1932. Came in King's train to Mecca in March 1933. Much of a palace man evidently.

#### 47. *Hashim Daghestani, called Sayyid Hashim.*

A Hejazi, aged perhaps 50 or more, descended from a family of Mutawwifs who derived their name from the fact that they looked after the pilgrims from Daghestan. This was a lucrative business in the good old days, and Sayyid Hashim was formerly well off. He seems to have lost a great deal during the war between Ibn Sa'ud and King 'Ali, and has also lost heavily by being loaded up with now worthless roubles. Was formerly employed in the Awqaf Department, apparently in King Huseyn's time. Appointed "Chief Revenue Officer" under the new régime in January 1926, and was later local Director of Finance in Jedda. Ejected from this post and appointed a member of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. Has since been employed in various financial connexions and hunts in couples with Sheykh 'Abdullah Suleymân, but his real importance lies in the fact that he is said to have an independent position as a sort of personal secret service agent of the King, and to correspond with the latter, when His Majesty is in Nejd, about persons and things in the Hejaz. Is on intimate terms with the Indian vice-consul, to whom he sometimes supplies information. This connexion was of some value during the early stages of the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

#### 48. *Hithlayn Family.*

People of importance in the 'Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydân ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year. The following other members of the family deserve mention:—

(1) *Nâif ibn Hithlayn* (nicknamed Abû 'l Kilâb).—Succeeded Dhaydân and carried on the revolt, but surrendered in January 1930 to the British authorities in Kuwait, and was in due course handed over to Ibn Sa'ud. Has since been a State prisoner at Riyâdh, closely confined.

(2) *Hâzim ibn Hithlayn* also took an active part in the revolt, and was one of two leaders who in July 1929 visited Kuwait in the hope of enlisting support. Was fighting together with Nâif in October. Eventual fate unknown.

(3) *Khalid ibn Muhammad ibn Hithlayn*, described as a "debonair and handsome young warrior." Is one of the Mutayr and 'Ajman Sheykhs living in Iraq under King Faisal's protection. Visited Kuwait in 1932 at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair, apparently to size up the chances of new anti-Sa'udi action.

#### 49. *Huseyn al 'Awayni.*

A young Syrian merchant established in Jedda. An enterprising fellow, who derives some importance from being a friend of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin



and having connexions in Manchester; notably with another Syrian, 'Abdul-Ghāni Ydlibi, the naturalised British head of a small company there. This association was close early in 1932, when Ydlibi visited Jedda in order to work up business and with great ideas of getting concessions of all sorts. They claimed to have important support in Lancashire, and specifically that of the Calico Printers' Association (Limited). It was understood in 1932 that 'Awayni was leaving Jedda for good, but he returned. His last important appearance was in February or March 1933, when he went to Riyādh on behalf of certain merchants to try and dissuade the King from proceeding with the concession to the ex-Khedive's group for the creation of a National Bank. A man likely to have ups and downs of fortune, in dealing with whom commercially great care should be used.

#### 50. *M. Huseyn Nasif.*

A well-known Hejazi of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Aged about 50 or more. Inherited much property from his father, 'Omar Nasif, who was a notable personage in Turkish times, as well as the agency in Jedda of the Sherifs of the 'Abadilah branch. Occupies the largest house in Jedda and was once very prosperous, but is now probably less so. Was said in 1917 to have lost favour with King Huseyn, who had previously been accustomed to stay with him when in Jedda. Was said also to be desirous of British naturalisation at that time. Described as having been a Wahhābi by conviction, even before the Sa'ūdi invasion. Deported to 'Aqaba during King 'Ali's short reign. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was given the privilege of putting Ibn Sa'ūd up during the years following the fall of Jedda, but has not done so since the King acquired the "Green Palace." Has not held office, as was expected, under the Sa'ūdi régime, perhaps owing to doubt as to his trustworthiness. Rather a dark horse nowadays and may both dislike and be disliked by the régime, but keeps quiet. Said to be a good Arabic scholar and possesses what passes in Jedda for a remarkable library. An aldermanic figure.

#### 51. *Ibrahīm ibn Mu'ammār.*

Head of the Amīr Sa'ūd's diwān, or secretariat, at Riyādh. Was formerly a well-known propagandist and press correspondent for Arabic papers and seems to have spent some years in Egypt and India. Probably identical with the "Muammār Bey" mentioned in the Jedda report for February 1926 as having been Nejdi representative in Egypt and having just been appointed "head of the Foreign Political Intelligence Department and chief adviser to the King." Would appear to have become head of the King's diwān soon after, probably in July 1926. Little known in European circles, but probably important in Ibn Sa'ūd's entourage. Was transferred in September 1932 to the diwān of the Amīr Sa'ūd. This transfer, if effective, need not be regarded as relegation to an inferior post, as it may quite well have been part of a plan to equip the Amīr for his probable rôle of successor to the throne. (See 1 (2).) Ibrahīm ibn Mu'ammār was described by the Indian vice-consul in 1928 as a good-hearted and pro-British man. Selected in May 1933 for post of Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad in place of Rusheyd Pasha (*q.v.*).

#### 52. *'Id Rawwāf.*


Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, formerly Sa'ūdi consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jauf to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus, but 'Id's father maintained close connexion with Ibn Sa'ūd and was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. 'Id was also a camel merchant before being appointed to his Damascus post in 1929 in succession to his brother Yasin. Had then only had primary education, but was stated last year to be busily improving on it. Was considered by His Majesty's present consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian nationalist circles, without apparently carrying

much weight, the idea of an Arab Empire with Ibn Sa'ūd as a suitable ruler for it. The brother Yasin Rawwāf, whom he succeeded, is said to have become Governor of Medina in 1929-30. He was appointed second assistant to the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September 1930, but has faded out of Sa'ūdi official life and now lives at Damascus.

P.S.—'Id Rawwāf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Rusheyd Pasha (*q.v.*) in May 1933 and appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

#### 53. *Idrisi Family.*

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi, a native of Fez, who became a notable religious teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in 'Asir, where he acquired land and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisis supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abū 'Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son 'Ali. The branch of the family most identified with 'Asir is descended from these two, as appears from the following table, which is not necessarily complete or accurate as regards order of birth:—



The numbered members of this branch deserve further notice.

(1) This Muhammad was a notable man in his day. Born in 1876. Studied in Egypt and at Kufra. Organised opposition to the Turks in 'Asir in and after 1904. Made treaties with His Majesty's Government through the Resident at Aden in 1915 and 1917. Came to terms with Ibn Sa'ūd in 1920, when he ceded to him any rights he might have in the country about 'Abhā.

(2) Displaced (3) in 1926, after complicated events. Accepted in that year the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ūd by a treaty signed at Mecca. Accepted in October 1931 the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ūd, retaining a simulacrum only of quasi-sovereign rights. Joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ūd in November 1932, and on its collapse in due course took refuge in Yemen. After strenuous efforts to obtain his surrender, Ibn Sa'ūd agreed recently that he should remain in the Yemen under the Imām's supervision, and accorded him a pension. Appears to be a man of weak character, very amenable to influence. Was described some years ago as "monkish."


(3) Succeeded his father in 1923. Was upheld by the Masāriha and other tribes in 1924 against an attempt to displace him by his cousin Mustafa. No. (6), who established himself temporarily at Hodeyda, then an Idrisi possession. 'Ali, in turn, lost Hodeyda to the Imām in 1925, and was displaced by (2) in 1926. Returned to Mecca in August 1926, and seems to have lived mostly there until he was suddenly arrested and deported to Riyādh in the summer of 1932, under suspicion, apparently, of intending a *coup* in 'Asir. Recently attempted to escape. Was foiled, but did not die, as was rumoured.

(4) And (5) were very active in organising and conducting the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

The original Ahmed has a numerous posterity through another son, variously called 'Abdul-Al or 'Abdul-Mutāl. His descendants have been principally associated with Dongola, where his tomb is a place of pilgrimage, and with Egypt.



The following table shows only those of the branch who have come to notice in connexion with Arabia in recent years :—



(6) Was a trusted British agent during the Great War. Later played a rôle in opposition to his cousin 'Ali, No. (3). Died in Egypt in 1930.

(7) One of the 'Asir delegation which came to Mecca in October 1930 to complete the arrangements for the absorption of 'Asir into Ibn Sa'ûd's dominions. Concerned in the rebellion of November-December 1932, and left with No. (9) for Massawa after it collapsed.

(8) Has been politically active for many years. Works normally, it is alleged, in the Italian interest, but played an apparently pro-Sa'ûdi rôle in 1926-27, at the time of and after the establishment of Ibn Sa'ûd's suzerainty over 'Asir. Visited Mecca at least three times from September 1926 to September 1927. Was thought perhaps to aspire himself to the post of ruler of 'Asir. Visited His Majesty's agent and consul in Jedda on the 15th September, 1927. Mr. Stonehewer Bird described him at that time as being the King's unofficial adviser in regard to 'Asir and Yemen. He found him a man of intelligence and broad views—pro-Sa'ûdi, but not pro-Wahhâbi. Accused by the Sa'ûdi Government in 1932 of again serving Italian interests, and of being concerned in the political plot behind the 'Asir revolt.

(9) Much concerned in the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932. Was at Jizân at the crucial time, and attempted by a letter and a visit to Kamaran to get His Majesty's Government to recognise what he represented as the restoration of Idrisi rule. Withdrew early in 1933 to Massawa, with his relative M. Al-'Arabi, No. (7).

All members of the family have the title of Seyyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senûsis, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by intermarriage at various times. The Idrisis have also a connexion with the Mirghani family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

#### 54. *Ismail Ghuznavi.*

Of Amritsar in India. This Indian Wahhâbi has played an important anti-British political rôle in India since 1919. No full account of him would be appropriate in this report, but he deserves mention in it because of his frequent visits of long duration to the Hejaz. Was a delegate of the Indian Ahl-al-Hadith, the Indian equivalent of Wahhâbis, at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was concerned in the arrangements for creating the Dar-al-Kiswa, or Holy Carpet Factory, in Mecca, and apparently incurred the King's displeasure in connexion with purchases for it in 1929. Now has close relations with Ibn Sa'ûd, whom he serves as an unofficial agent in India, principally for purposes connected with the stimulation of the pilgrimage, but also, perhaps, the encouragement of Wahhâbism. Notwithstanding his record in India, he has of late been useful to the Legation in Jedda, having established relations with the Indian vice-consul, to whom he was formerly hostile, and shown readiness to help in adjusting the difficulties of Indian pilgrims. In March 1933 the Indian Government refused his permission to come to the Hejaz, considering that the general danger of his activities must outweigh other considerations. The man is apparently devoted in an anti-British spirit to the cause of Islam, which he identifies with Ibn Sa'ûd; but his political activities may also have a Bolshevik aspect.

#### 55. *Jemâl Pasha Ghâzi (Ghazzi).*

A man of about 50. Of Syrian origin, but born at Gaza in Palestine; hence his surname. Graduated in the Turkish Staff College. Said to have been a member of a Turkish Military Mission lent to the Sultan of Morocco in 1910, to have seen service later in Gallipoli and to have been A.D.C. to Enver Pasha, to whom he claims to have been attached up to shortly before the armistice. Went to Basra after the armistice to manage the property of his wife, the daughter of a rich landowner there. Visited India more than once from Basra. Fell out with his wife and applied to Mustafa Kemal Pasha for employment, which was refused, possibly because of his past association with the C.U.P. Entered the service of Ibn Sa'ûd and commanded the artillery during the siege of Jedda. Went to 'Asir in 1926 and was reported late in that year to be running Hasan al-Idrisi in company with Ahmed es-Senûsi and Mustafa al-Idrisi. Was reported in 1927 to be an Italian agent, trying to undermine Ibn Sa'ûd's position in 'Asir. Re-employed later in the Hejaz. Was serving in the Amir Faysal's household early in 1931 as a sort of chamberlain, and was then scandalously spoken of as M. le Procureur. Accompanied the Turkish Prince Ahmed Tewhid to India, with the permission of Ibn Sa'ûd, in May 1931. Travelled a good deal afterwards, posing as Minister of War in the Sa'ûdi Government. He appeared in Jerusalem in November 1931 and played an ambiguous part in connexion with the then impending Moslem Congress. Whether he eventually attended it or not is not known in Jedda. Returned to India in June 1932 and continued alone the propaganda in favour of the pilgrimage which he and Prince Ahmed Tewhid had initiated in 1931. In a secret report from India of February 1933, he is stated to have expressed in one quarter the intention of enlisting Indian Moslem interest in Ibn Sa'ûd's claim to 'Aqaba. Returned to the Hejaz for the 1933 pilgrimage.

Jemâl Pasha is presentable though unpleasantly fulsome. He speaks French, some English and probably other European languages. He is almost certainly a man of loose and untrustworthy character. His recent activities in India give him a certain importance. He is doubtless rewarded for his propaganda in favour of the pilgrimage, but should not be regarded as a responsible agent of Ibn Sa'ûd for any other purpose. He is a mere hanger-on.

#### 56. *Khâlid Al-Hakim.*

A Syrian or Palestinian, said to have served as an engineer officer in the Turkish army. Has been mentioned several times since 1926 as an intermediary for the purchase of arms, &c., by Ibn Sa'ûd in Europe, acting apparently as a merchant, though he has also been in the King's official employment. His dealings in respect of arms appear to have been with German firms, perhaps with Italy and with Poland, where Ibn Sa'ûd placed a very large order in 1930. Reported in August 1927 to have been dismissed, from what post is not clear, but accompanied Dr. Damluji in July 1928 to take part in the still-born conference at Haifa on the Hejaz Railway. Last heard of as being in Haifa in the Sa'ûdi interest in connexion with the proceedings of the Preparatory Committee of the proposed Arab Congress. Appears to be in with Kâmil al Qassab and other exponents of the idea that Ibn Sa'ûd should dominate the congress, even if it is held in Bagdad. Brother of Hasan Bey Al-Hakim, director of the Arab Bank at Jaffa.

#### 57. *Khâlid Al Qarqani.*

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the Senûsi, fought the Italians and retired into exile in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to Abdur-Rahmân 'Azzâm Bey, formerly a desert fighter in the Senûsi cause, now a member of the Egyptian Chamber. Al Qarqani was brought to Ibn Sa'ûd's notice, it is said, by Sheykh Hâfiz Wahba, and came to the Hejaz in 1930. Was appointed in September 1930 First Assistant to the Viceroy, but apparently soon vacated the post and went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German consul, de Haas. Was re-employed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. Was sent with Hamad Suleymân (q.v.) to 'Asir in November 1932 to investigate the dispute between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ûd's Governor. This mission could not be accomplished by the two delegates, who are still standing by in 'Asir. Khâlid al Qarqani is spoken of as a man of character and an honest one.



58. *Khatib Family.*

Understood to be a Mecca family. Three of them became prominent in 1932 in connexion with the activities of the political organisations behind attempts to undermine Ibn Sa'ūd; viz., the Hizb al Ahrār al Hijāzi and the Jami'at al Dif'al lil Hijaz. Actively connected with the organisation are—

(1) 'Abdul Hamid al Khatib, and

(2) 'Abdul Malik al Khatib—

who appear to be permanently settled in Egypt and to have property there. (2) may possibly be identical with a man of the same name who was described in 1917 as a Javanese of Mecca, well educated, who had been correspondent of the *Mokattam* and had influence with King Huseyn. A third person, viz.—

(3) *Huseyn Ali al-Khatib*—

lived at Lahej in 1932 and seems to have squandered in riotous living at Aden, &c., money given him by Huseyn ad-Dabbāgh for the purposes of the plot against Ibn Sa'ūd.

It is understood that Fuad al Khatib, formerly Foreign Secretary to King Huseyn and now secretary to the Amir 'Abdullah, is not related to this family.

59. *Lāmi Family.*

A Sheykhly family of the Jiblān section of the Mutayr tribe. Concerned in the Nejd rebellion of 1929. Not apparently of great consequence, but worth mentioning, because Jāsir ibn Lāmi was one of the Akhwān leaders who surrendered to the British authorities in Kuwait in January 1930, and was in due course handed over to Ibn Sa'ūd. He has since been a State prisoner at Riyādh, and is one of those who were recently reported to be receiving more lenient treatment than before.

60. *Lāri Family.*

Persian Bahais long settled in Jedda.

(1) *Muhammad 'Ali Lāri*, the head of the family, is a charming old gentleman, now close on 70, probably. Was the principal carpet merchant in Jedda and rich, having an important connexion with Egypt. Health now impaired, but is still in business and highly considered. Has in the past acted as Persian consul, as did his father before him. Reads poetry and likes to commune with nature.

(2) *Ahmed*, son of the preceding, is in the business in Jedda. Was in charge of Persian affairs in his father's absence in 1925, and was reported to have come much under the influence of the then Soviet representative, *Hakimov*. Urged Ibn Sa'ūd at that time, according to Ibn Sa'ūd himself, to join in a great Eastern Union against the imperialistic Powers, with Persia and Afghanistan in it and Russia supporting.

(1) has two other sons in the business, one in Jedda, one in Egypt. Unless there was a mistake in the name, one of these would appear to have been the "Persian trading consul" mentioned in a Jedda despatch of the 22nd November, 1927, as the would-be buyer of goods which arrived in Jedda in the Russian steamship *Tomp* at that time and were denied clearance from customs after having been landed.

61. *Luwey Family.*

Enjoy the title of Sherif. People of importance in the 'Ateyba tribe, chiefly because of the considerable rôle played by Khālid ibn Mansūr ibn Luwey, who died, apparently of illness, on the march from 'Abhā to Sabya to repress rebellion in 'Asir in December 1932. He had broken with the Hashimites, it was said, owing to a quarrel with the Amir 'Abdullah, who had slapped him on the mouth with a shoe. He had gone over to Ibn Sa'ūd some years before 1924, and was one of the leaders of the forces which occupied Mecca in 1924. Although supposed at a later date to be in sympathy with the extremist Wahhābis in Nejd, he continued faithful to the King and was apt to be called on for military service in times of special emergency. The present head of the family is his eldest son,

(1) *Sa'ad ibn Luwey*, who, immediately on Khālid's death, was appointed to succeed him in his command and as Amir of Khurma.

(2) and (3) *Huseyn* and *Zāmil*.

It was stated at the time of Khālid's death that he had left three minor sons in addition to the above.

62. *Mahmūd Hamdi Hamūde.*

Director-General of Public Health. A Syrian of Damascus, born about 1882. Studied in Beirut and Constantinople. Spent in all sixteen or seventeen years in latter place. Served in Turkish army during and up to end of war, after which he settled in Syria. Held post in some hospital there under the French and was professor of rhino-laryngology at Damascus. Left Syria, apparently for political reasons, and joined Ibn Sa'ūd in Nejd early in or before 1925. Appointed to his present post in January 1926 and represented Ibn Sa'ūd, as King of the Hejaz, at the International Sanitary Conference of 1926. Seemed likely to be eliminated in August 1927 with other Syrians and was said to have resigned but to have been kept on pending an audit of accounts. Evidently weathered this storm. Was Sa'ūdi representative at meeting of International Health Office in autumn of 1932, following on accession of Sa'ūdi Arabia to Rome Convention. Speaks good Turkish and moderate French. Probably has reasonable medical attainments, but gives no impression of real capacity as Director-General of Public Health.

63. *Mahmūd Shalhūb.*

Director of Finance in Jedda. Comes of a Mecca family, one of whom was described in 1917 as controlling the distribution of Zemzem water, a very lucrative job. Mahmūd, who must be over 50, was employed in Turkish times as a Government clerk in Mecca, and was later chief clerk in Huseyn's financial department. Continued to be employed in Mecca under the new régime and was appointed to his present post in 1930. A decent seeming man, but plays no important rôle in a domain in which 'Abdullah Suleymān is supreme.

64. *Mehdi Bey.*

Director-General of Police with headquarters in Mecca. Said to be an 'Iraqi, formerly employed as an officer in the Turkish army, then in King Huseyn's. What little is known about him to the Legation is unfavourable. He appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to wield considerable authority, not always deferring even to the Viceroy. This account of him is given with reserve.

65. *Ibn Mubārak.*

A man of this name would appear to be Governor at Burayda, but is only known to the Legation from a reference to him in a letter from Ibn Sa'ūd to the Sheykh of Kuwait of the 30th December, 1931. The post is important, as it is the administrative capital of Qasim, not including, however, 'Aneyza, which has its own Governor, probably hereditary, and depends directly on the King.

65a. *Ibn Mubārak.*

Governor of Dhaba. Little known to the Legation, which cannot even trace his first name, but worth mentioning because of the importance of his post in relation to Egypt and Transjordan, and because he was one of the leaders of the forces, with advanced base at Dhaba, employed against Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Is possibly a tribal personage rather than an administrative Governor, and may be of the family of Huseyn ibn Mubārak of the Harb tribe, who was a power at Rabigh at the time of the Arab revolt.

66. *Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan.*

An actively anti-British Indian, who, like Ismail Ghuznavi, cannot appropriately be dealt with at length in this report, but has resided much in Mecca, and has been associated more particularly with the Holy Carpet factory or Dar-ul-Kiswa, a rallying-place for Indian sedition-mongers.

67. *Muhammad ibn Sultān.*

Commander of Ibn Sa'ūd's camelry in the Hejaz. As such, played an important part in the suppression of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932. Was also a powerful and much-feared element in the machinery set up to Wahhābise public morals in Mecca until its rigours were relaxed.

68. *Muhammad at-Tawīl.*

A native of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Got a small post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be Director of Customs in Jedda under King Huseyn.



Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejazi notables to compel Huseyn's abdication and the accession of King 'Ali in October 1924. Remained in theory Director of Customs only, but wielded great influence under 'Ali, and was described as being "practically dictator" in November 1925, after his triumph in a dispute with Ahmed Saqqāf, the Prime Minister, who decided to leave. Promised at that time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny of "certain economies" which he had effected while Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of Jedda, but returned in 1927 or early in 1928 and started a motor transport business. Was said in 1928 to have been president of the Hizb-al-Ahrār al-Hijāzi, but made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd after an absence at Riyādh, which was described in February 1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official employment, and was perhaps considered unsuitable for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in September 1930 placed at the head of a commission to study and reorganise the financial and economic situation in Hasa. Has remained since then in this employment, despite rumours of assassination or flight. Appears to have tightened up regulations and trodden on Qusaibi corns in the process, but not to have made the Hasa customs as paying as he hoped. A capable and well-reputed man, liked by the authorities at Bahrain.

69. *Muhsin al-Firm.*

Principal chieftain of the Eastern Harb tribe in Nejd. Mentioned early in 1929 in connexion with raids alleged to be in preparation against 'Iraq. Does not seem to have joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ūd later that year, and has since been at enmity with the Mutayr owing to his having fallen upon them during the revolt and made off with camels of theirs. Said in 1932 to have refused to lead his tribesmen against Ibn Rifāda, owing to resentment at the holding up of a caravan of his by Ibn Sa'ūd's officials some time before.

70. *Mustafa Badruddin.*

Director of Customs in Jedda. A North African or of North African origin. Probably between 40 and 50. Was given a small post in the Jedda custom-house some years ago, and later became Director of Customs at Yanbu'. Transferred to Jedda in the same capacity in 1930. A man of little ability, but was reported not long ago to be disconcertingly honest. If so, he has not seriously infected the custom-house as a whole with this malady.

71. *Mutlaq as-Sār.*

An important Mutayr leader closely associated with the late Faysal ad-Dawish and one of the sheykhs concerned in the Akhwān rebellion of 1929 who are now living under King Faysal's protection in 'Iraq. Visited Kuwait in December 1932 and February 1933. Appeared to the Political Agent to be in close touch with the Mutayr tribe, and may be watching for an opportunity of promoting or taking advantage of Ibn Sa'ūd's downfall.

72. *Muwaffaq al Alūsi.*

Born about 1895. Comes of a Bagdad family noted for erudition. Studied at the Sorbonne and became a professor in the Law School at Bagdad in 1926. Became Director in the 'Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1928, but resigned in 1930, owing to a quarrel with the then Minister, Dr. 'Abdullah Damlūji. Came to the Hejaz in April 1931 as a secretary in Nuri Pasha's Mission to negotiate treaties with Sa'ūdi Arabia. Went on to San'a with Taha Pasha Hashimi to negotiate with the Imām. Seems to have broken later with Nuri Pasha and came to the Hejaz in the autumn of 1932. Was appointed Legal Adviser to the Sa'ūdi Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1932. Quarrelled in January 1933 with Fuad Hamza, the immediate dispute having arisen, it was said, over the *placement* at a dinner given by Fuad to Sir G. Buchanan and Sir Andrew Ryan. Was anyhow transferred to the post of counsellor to the King in that month, joined him at Riyādh and returned with him to Mecca in March 1933, so he seems able to hold his own. A well-spoken man of good presence and refined appearance, evidently quarrelsome, however, and in any case perhaps too European by training and outlook to remain long in the Sa'ūdi service.

P.S.—He left in May 1933 and is unlikely to return.

73. *Neshmī.*

Formerly Amir of Jauf. Said to be a Nejdi; to have been originally a maker of native foot-gear; to have been in Medina while the Hashimites still held it; and to have escaped to the Sa'ūdi side, where his knowledge of the situation in Medina was so useful that he was given a command. He appears to have been employed at Tebūk and perhaps at Yanbu' in the ensuing years. He became notorious in February 1930 for a large-scale raid into Transjordan similar to that of 'Abdul-'Azīz ibn Musā'id (*q.v.*) about the same time. He was apparently at the time already Governor of Jauf, a post from which the King dismissed him about the end of the year, not, it was explained, because the man was bad, but because the King desired to eliminate causes of quarrel with His Majesty's Government. The Amir Neshmī, as he is commonly called, remained in the Northern Hejaz and has appeared to play a certain rôle, but it is not clear that he has ever been re-employed officially. Has been little heard of recently and may have gone elsewhere.

74. *Obeidullah, Maulvi.*

An Indian permanently established in Mecca. Has had a lurid past in India, having been at one time closely connected with the Bolsheviks and been involved in the Silk Letter conspiracy, &c. Was mentioned in March 1927 as a man who was attracting modest notice in Mecca as a lecturer on the traditions of the Prophet, and as belonging to the class of migratory agitators "whose flight is Kabul, Moscow, Berlin and Constantinople." Appears now to carry much weight as a religious teacher and is much frequented by Indians. Probably uses his influence in a definitely anti-British spirit, but has not come to notice latterly as a direct participant in conspiracies in India.

75. *Othmān 'Arab.*

A Hejazi, whose past connexion with the Hejaz is not known to the Legation. Came to notice in 1932 as one of those concerned in the Dabbāgh conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ūd. Was described as a man of 50 to 55, fairly wealthy, normally resident in Egypt, but in the habit in 1931-32 of visiting Jerusalem and holding telephone conversations with the Amir 'Abdullah and Abdur-Rauf Sabbān. Was supposed to be an intermediary between the Hejazi conspirators in Egypt and the Amir. Was certainly concerned in the anti-Sa'ūdi plot and is now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan.

76. *Philby, H. St.-J. B., C.I.E.,* since 1917.

Born in Ceylon 1885. Educated at Westminster and Trinity, Cambridge. Passed for Indian Civil Service in 1907 and had normal career in India from 1908 to 1915, when he was detached for service in 'Iraq. Sent on mission to Central Arabia in 1917-18, visited Ibn Sa'ūd and crossed Arabia Peninsula from 'Uqayr to Jedda. Employed in Ministry of Interior in 'Iraq in 1920-21 and as British representative in Transjordan from 1921 to 1924, when he fell out with His Majesty's Government and tendered a welcome resignation from that post. Retired on a pension from the Indian Civil Service in 1925, but had already embarked on the recent career which entitles him to a place in this report. Came to Jedda in November 1924, shortly after the accession of King 'Ali, by whose father, Huseyn, he had been decorated in 1923. Was said, in 1924, to believe that republicanism was the nostrum for the Arab world. Was regarded on his arrival in Jedda as having necessarily been sent on a mission by His Majesty's Government, so much so that they officially denied it. Was one of the would-be peacemakers between 'Ali and Ibn Sa'ūd in the last two months of 1924, but was repulsed by Ibn Sa'ūd. Appeared at one moment in 1925 to hover towards the Hashimites, but had long believed in the star of Ibn Sa'ūd, whom he visited near Mecca towards the end of the year and for whom he plumped finally, if indeed he had ever really hesitated, after the fall of Jedda. Has since devoted himself to the King's cause in the press, in his books and in every other way. Resided principally in Jedda until 1930. Was prime mover, though not principal shareholder, in Sharqieh (Limited), whose business he directs in the Hejaz. Embraced Islam in August 1930 and has since spent much time in Mecca, but was away from the Hejaz during most of 1932, when he effected an enterprising journey across the Rub'a-al-Khālī and then spent some months in England.



Mr. Philby has been variously judged and his influence in Arabian affairs variously estimated. He was for some time in and after 1924 a thorn in the side of British authorities and was described in 1925 as clinging tenaciously to his religion, "a simple dualism in which the spirit of darkness is represented by His Majesty's Government." Need now no longer be regarded as anti-British, except that he would still sympathise with Ibn Sa'ūd in any quarrel with His Majesty's Government, and will still rail on occasion against the British Empire as a system. He would as soon sell British goods as Standard oil or Ford cars and he got Ibn Sa'ūd's wireless contract for Marconi's in 1931. His influence with the King has been exaggerated by some into a legend, while many still believe him to be a British political agent. He has much access to the King and the King values his advice on certain occasions, but he presents no appearance of being in Ibn Sa'ūd's confidence on major political occasions. He is still one of the King's greatest foreign admirers, but in the last two years has conceived doubts of Sa'ūdi administration, especially that part of it for which 'Abdullah Suleymān is responsible and doubts even of the King's capacity to direct his own machine.

#### 77. Qattān Family.

(1) *Yusuf ibn Salīm Qattān*, said to have been originally a servant in a coffee-shop in Mecca and afterwards of the original Qattān family whose name he took. Became a guide for Javanese pilgrims. Rose to be president of the Mecca municipality under the Turks, but was still so uneducated that he was said to be unable to tell "the letter Alif from a telegraph pole." Became Minister of Public Works under King Huseyn. Was said in 1930 to be full of schemes connected with the pilgrimage and the advancement of his son No. (2) below. Has also come to notice as one of the agents concerned with the properties of the Sherifian family.

(2) *'Abbās Qattān*, an ambitious young man of 30 odd, who was himself president of the municipality in Mecca in 1930 and still occupies that post. He is the right-hand man of Sheykh 'Abdullah Suleymān, Minister of Finance, and is chief organiser of the hotels recently opened at Mecca, Jedda and Medina.

#### 78. Qusaibi Family.

An important merchant family in the Persian Gulf. The Legation is indebted to the Political Agent in Bahrain for an account of them, which was drawn up in June 1931, and of which the following is a summary:—

Said to be descended from a butcher of Riyādh. Composed of the five brothers mentioned below; children of the same mother by two brothers, Hasan and Ibrahim, who married her successively; partners in business and property; engaged in trade between Bahrain their headquarters, Hasa and Nejd. Accounted, despite their acquisition of wealth, extremely plebeian and disqualified by Arab custom from intermarriage with women of better birth.

(1) *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Hasan*, simple and wise; the mainstay of the firm; reputed pious; respected by Ibn Sa'ūd.

(2) *Abdur-Rahmān ibn Hasan*, more enlightened and a wonderful fellow for pearl dealing. Possessed of some knowledge of French and English and accustomed to go to Paris on pearl business. Sensible but conceited.

(3) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan*, intelligent and sharp, but of mean and low character and meddlesome. Inclined to be boastful and disliked by Ibn Sa'ūd.

(4) *Hasan ibn Ibrahim*, very foolish and gruff and as low a character as (3). Hot tempered.

(5) *Sa'ad ibn Ibrahim*, permanently resident in Hasa. Not personally known to Captain Prior. Said to be a good "mixer," but similar in character to (3) and (4).

When the above information was supplied in 1931 the Qusaibis had great influence owing to their position as agents of Ibn Sa'ūd in Bahrain and buyers of his requirements for Nejd, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had lent money. Their most distinguished debtor was the King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000, and who, although about half of this had been paid off by June 1931, still owed them the balance. Abdurrahmān was given in the latter year a roving commission to try and raise

the wind for the Sa'ūdi Government in Europe, but failed completely. The relations of the Qusaibis with the King no longer seem to be as close as formerly. They resented the reforms introduced by Muhammad at-Tawil (*q.v.*). They were driven by bad business to press the King for money. He has of late employed other persons to buy for him, but he is not known to have deprived the Qusaibis of their general agency for him at Bahrain.

#### 79. Rashid Family.

Former rulers of Hail. Little is known of the remnants of this family once so powerful and later so fallen, even before its final collapse, that it was "accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of domestic murders." It deserves attention, however, because of the possibility of its reappearance on the scene, *e.g.*, if the Shammar tribes from which it sprang should go against Ibn Sa'ūd. It is understood that, after the fall of Hail, the King pursued a policy of absorption, not of annihilation and that many persons belonging to the Beni Rashid, or connected with them, passed into his entourage. Two lads who are being brought up with his younger children and are included in the list of his sons are said to be the children of a Rashid lady, whom Ibn Sa'ūd married after their birth. Their names are—

(1) *Sultān* and

(2) *Mish'al*—

the latter of which corresponds with that of an infant child of the last ruling ibn Rashid, as given in the 1917 volume of Personalities in Arabia. Two other persons have come to notice, who are said to be related to the Beni Rashid, viz.—

(3) *Mansūr ibn 'Asaf*, who is said to have been taken into Ibn Sa'ūd's service and to have served for a term as Governor of Tebūk; and his brother—

(4) *Nāsir ibn 'Asaf*, who also served Ibn Sa'ūd, but was reported to have deserted into Transjordan in 1931.

It is regrettable that the information regarding the remnants of the Beni Rashid is so meagre.

#### 80. Rifāda Family.

Chiefs of the Billi tribe, with an urban establishment at Wejh. The most notable recent member of the family, Suleymān Afnān, played a not inconsiderable rôle during the Great War, but was killed in a raid in 1916 and left two sons, Ibrahim and Ahmed. His brother Salim, who had died earlier, left a son, Hamid. The cousins in this generation were at enmity. Hamid made a bid for the Sheykhship on his uncle's death. He was one of several Hejazi Sheykhhs who approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He came into greater prominence in 1928, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a *coup* at Wejh, hoping to dislodge his cousin Ibrahim, who was Governor there and head of the tribe. After a further period of exile he came into still greater prominence in 1932 by invading the Hejaz at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his sons were killed, but there may be survivors of this branch. At the outset of the revolt Ibrahim visited the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He continues to reside at Wejh, though it is not known whether he is still Governor. The family have attachés with a section of the Billi established in Egypt.

#### 81. Rushdi Malhas.

Editor of the *Umm-al-Qura*, the more important of the two weekly newspapers published at Mecca and the unofficial organ of the Sa'ūdi Government. A Palestinian from Nablus, of whom little else is known to the Legation.

#### 82. Rusheyd Pasha.

Consul in Syria, stationed at Damascus. Aged well over 50. A native of Hail, said to be related to the Beni Rashid and to 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Zeyd (*q.v.*). Was semi-official representative of Ibn Rashid in Constantinople before the Great War. Said to have promoted Turkish efforts to curb the rise of Ibn Sa'ūd at that time. Was attached during the Great War to Jemāl Pasha in Syria, and was employed in Damascus, where he showed bitter hostility to the Hashimites.



Retired to Constantinople after the fall of Damascus. Eventually made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd and returned to Sa'ūdi Arabia. Was selected in 1931 to be the first Sa'ūdi Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Bagdad, but has never proceeded, possibly because of difficulties over finance, aggravated by hostility on the part of 'Abdullah Suleymān. Showed signs about the end of 1932 of intending to leave for Bagdad overland, but is still in the Hejaz.

P.S.—Appointed consul at Damascus, instead of Bagdad, in May 1933, and left Jedda for his post on the 24th May.

### 83. *Sadiq* (or *Siddiq*).

The King's chauffeur. An Indian or of Indian origin. Born in the Bombay Presidency; is about 36 years old; came with Ibn Sa'ūd from Riyādh in 1925; had been in his service since about 1924. He was probably introduced to King by either the Qusaibis or al-Fadhls. Worthy of mention in this strange country, not only because he is said to be the only chauffeur the King will trust, but because he has been concerned in buying transactions, which have carried him at least once as far as London. Quite a clever fellow and said to have amassed some £20,000. Was recently reported to contemplate the creation of a canning industry at Wejh. Probably holds the speed record for Arabia, as he did the journey by car between Riyādh and Mecca in thirty-one hours a year or two ago, and is said to have reduced this recently to twenty odd. Some feat for a distance of about 600 miles over Arabian "roads."

### 84. *Salih ibn 'Abdul-Wahid*.

Governor of Qāf. Transferred from the Governorship of Al-'Ala to his present post in 1931. A man of no great standing, but of some importance as being the Sa'ūdi Governor nearest to the Transjordan frontier and not a nice neighbour by all accounts. Probably identical with man of the same name whose appointment as Ibn Sa'ūd's representative with the Idrisi was announced in June 1927 and who played an important rôle in the Idrisi's entourage, *e.g.*, at the time of the negotiations regarding the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands.

### 85. *Salih Ibn Abu Bakr Shata*.

Aged about 45 to 50. Comes of a learned family in Mecca, where he was born. Much employed on committees for Waqfs, grain distribution, &c., under the Hashimite régime. Fled to Jedda after the Sa'ūdi capture of Taif. Was one of the Hejazi notables who compelled the abdication of King Huseyn in October 1924 and rallied in due course to Ibn Sa'ūd. Became one of two assistants to the Amir Faysal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation, but, if the rumour was true, the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Faysal was given the Ministry of the Interior, as well as others, Salih Shata was made his chief assistant in that Ministry and is still the administrative head of it.

### 86. *Sdayri Family*.

Take their name from the district of Sdayr in Nejd. Are related to Ibn Sa'ūd through the fact that his mother was a Sdayri. He has, moreover, taken two wives from the family. Three members of the family have come to notice in recent years, *viz.* :—

(1) *'Abdullah as-Sdayri*, Governor of Tebūk since about the beginning of 1931.

(2) *Turki as-Sdayri*, appointed at the same time Governor of Jauf or Skaka to which the seat of government was transferred shortly before or after. Has just been chosen as Governor-General of 'Asir to reside at 'Abhā and will be succeeded at Skaka by—

(3) *'Abdul-'Aziz as-Sdayri*, Governor designate of Jauf-Skaka.

Little is known of No. (3), but (1) and (2) have been men of might in their setting.

### 87. *Sha'ibi Family*.

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that the right to keep the key also dates from that early period. According to one story, there was a blot on the escutcheon in the 19th century, when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a slave. The late Keeper's physical appearance suggested that this might be true, but there is no proof of it. Another branch of the family, claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tunis, but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

(1) *Muhammad ash-Sha'ibi*, an elderly man, probably the nephew of the late Keeper, who died in January last and whom this relative was appointed to succeed.

The following two persons, who have come to notice in connexion with the activities of expatriated Hejazis against Ibn Sa'ūd, are not improbably members of one or other branch of this family :—

(2) *M. Huseyn Sha'iba*.—Accompanied Huseyn ad-Dabbāgh (*q.v.*) on his visit to India in 1927.

(3) *Hasan Sha'iba*.—Mentioned in reports from Aden as a Hejazi, who was in 1932 intimate with Huseyn ad-Dabbāgh, and had been a school-master at Terim in Hadhramaut before coming from Mokalla to Aden in March 1932. If of sufficient age, he may possibly be identical with the man of the same name, who was a member for Mecca of the Turkish Parliament for some years, fled from Constantinople to Mecca in 1916, and at first supported but afterwards turned against King Huseyn.

### 88. *Sherifian Family*.

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Huseyn. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of 'Ali, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from Hasan, the elder son of 'Ali, and whole clans known collectively as Ashraf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abū Numey, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 16th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, *viz.* :—

The Dhāwī Zeyd,

The Abadila, a particular branch of whom are the Dhāwī 'Aun, and

The Dhāwī Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhāwī Zeyd and Dhāwī 'Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was 'Abdul-Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhāwī 'Aun, of whom came the late King Huseyn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Sa'ūdi Arabia, their connexion with the Hejaz is so close as to justify this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who have come to notice in recent years :—

#### (A) *Dhāwī Zeyd*.

(1) *'Ali Haydar*.—Now elderly. Formerly resided in Constantinople. Worked in with the Young Turks and was at one time Minister of Auqaf. Appointed Grand Sherif to supersede King Huseyn in or about 1917, but was naturally unable to assume the post effectively. Sought early in 1926 for British support in obtaining post of Regent or Governor of Hejaz under Ibn Sa'ūd. Moved later that year to Beirut, where he still resides. Has several sons, the eldest of whom Abdul-Mejīd is married to a daughter of his namesake, the



ex-Caliph, and showed signs of political ambition after the Armistice. One of 'Ali Haydar's wives and the mother of two of his younger sons is of British birth. Yet another son studied at St. Andrew's and had the distinction of acting as best man at the marriage of a Scotch divine at St. Giles' Cathedral. Civilised people, important to keep in mind, though of no obvious political importance at present.

(2) *Ja'far*, brother of the above. Also lived in Constantinople. If alive, may be identical with the elderly Sherif 'Ali Ja'far who lived at Lahej in 1932 and was described as a descendant of 'Abdul-Mutallib.

(3) *Sharaf 'Adnân Pasha al Ghâlib as-Zeyd*.—Formerly frequented both Constantinople and the Hejaz. Spoken of in 1925 as a possible ruler of the Hejaz, if Ibn Sa'ûd won the war. Elected president of the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, and was later the vehicle of Ibn Sa'ûd's refusal to hold another owing to attitude of the 'Ali brothers. Represented Ibn Sa'ûd in 1927 at conference at Jizân to deal with the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands. Described in 1928 as "grizzled and doddering." Still resides in Mecca, but apparently a back number.

(4) *Sharaf Ridha*, usually called Sherif Sharaf *tout court*.—Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Sa'ûd in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council.

(5) *Khâlid*.—A nephew of the 'Ali Ja'far mentioned at (2). Implicated in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ûd in 1932 and was active in and around Aden.

(B) *Dhâwî 'Aun*.

(6) *'Ali ibn 'Abdullah*.—Formerly Grand Sherif. Dismissed by the Turks in 1907. Resides in Egypt. Described in June 1932 as an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrâr al Hijâzi.

(7) *'Ali ibn Huseyn*.—Ex-King of the Hejaz. Succeeded King Huseyn on his abdication in October 1924, but was compelled to abandon untenable position in Jedda in December 1925. Resides mostly at Bagdad.

(8) *Faisal ibn Huseyn*.—King of 'Iraq.

(9) *'Abdullah ibn Huseyn*.—Amir of Transjordan.

(10) *Zeyd ibn Huseyn*.—Iraqi Minister at Angora. Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well-known Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, and has property interests quite distinct from those of his brothers.

All these, except perhaps (10), have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Nâsir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(C) *Dhâwî Barakat*.

(11) *Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin*.—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the service of Ibn Sa'ûd and became Amir-al-Arbân, or Director of Tribes. Appointed President of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. Recently returned to Mecca from Egypt, but his present official status is not known, as the inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) *Apparently of the Abadila stock though not of the Dhâwî 'Aun*.

(12) *Shâkir ibn Zeyd ibn Fawwâz*.—Formerly Governor of Taif, a post which seems to have been hereditary in his family. President of the Beduin Control Board in Transjordan and intimately associated with the Amir 'Abdullah, with whom he has thrown in his lot. A tenacious enemy of Ibn Sa'ûd and much less of a play-boy than his master.

(13) *Hamûd ibn Zeyd*, brother of the preceding.—Lives quietly at Taif.

(14) *Sharaf ibn Râjih*, a cousin of (12) and (13).—Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Bagdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Bagdad as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tâhir ad-Dabbâgh in February 1932, in a letter which fell into the hands of the Sa'ûdi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ûd.

(E) *Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila*.

(15) *'Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Mansûr*.—A younger member of a family, two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the Harb tribe. This 'Ali has only come to notice as having been one of the persons

arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932.

(16) *'Ali ibn Huseyn al Harithi*.—One of the Sherifs of Muda'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Damascus. Described by Colonel Lawrence as having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resettled in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932.

(17) *Muhammad Mohanna*.—One of the Jedda family, one member of which was Chief of the Controlling Department in 1917, and was then described as a "bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother, still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jedda and sent to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair.

(18) and (19) *M. 'Ali and Muhammad al-Bedeywi* (a corruption of Bedawi). Members of a family distantly related to King Huseyn and formerly important in the Juheyra tribe and in the coast towns of the Northern Hejaz. Despite the similarity of name, they would appear to be two distinct, though closely related, persons. Both were mixed up in the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932. M. 'Ali became an object of attention in Transjordan and was more or less arrested in July to the displeasure of the 'Amir. Muhammad seems to have been in trade at Suez and Dhaba and was concerned in attempts to get supplies by sea to Ibn Rifâda. It was probably he who was reported killed in the defeat of the rebels.

89. *Suleymân Shefq Pasha Kemaly*.

A former Turkish officer, now over 60. Rose to high military and administrative rank in the Turkish service. Served the Turks as Governor of 'Asir and Vali of Basra before the war. Was one of Damad Ferid Pasha's Ministers of War during armistice period. Left Turkey later in consequence of his anti-Kemalist associations and fetched up in Jedda in February 1926. Employed later in that year by Ibn Sa'ûd and promised to be important among his advisers. Expounded views about future of oil, &c., near Wejh and in the Farsan Islands to acting British agent in August 1926. Became apparently Inspector-General of Government Departments, but met with opposition and was put in charge of roads in 1928. Was responsible for heavy expenditure with little result on portion of the Mecca-Jedda road. Appears to be now no more than a pensioner of Ibn Sa'ûd and lives mostly at Taif. A back number. Brother to, but not known to be specially intimate with the once well-known Turkish diplomat Ghalib Kemaly, who was stated in 1927 to be vice-president of the Russo-Turkish company, with headquarters at Moscow, which shipped the *Tomp* cargo to Jedda.

90. *Suwayt Family*.

Leaders in the Dhâfir tribe. Two members of it have figured in recent reports from Kuwait, viz.—

(1) *Ja'dân*, a disgruntled man, hovering between allegiance to King Faisal or to Ibn Sa'ûd and too proud to come to terms with either; and

(2) *'Ajemi*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ûd.

91. *M. Taufiq Bey Shertf*.

Syrian ex-officer in Turkish army, of remoter Yemeni origin. At one time secretary to Ahmed as-Senûsi. Later head of the divan of the 'Amir Faysal at Mecca. Figured as an 'Asiri delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926, and was appointed Secretary-General after an election hotly contested by the 'Ali brothers, who complained that 'Asir was not, in fact, represented and that Ibn Sa'ûd was packing the congress. Went to India later in that month to combat the 'Ali brothers and make propaganda for Ibn Sa'ûd. Floated in and out of the Hejaz in subsequent years and had hopes of great preferment with a mandate to reorganise the administration. Had very variable relations with Ibn Sa'ûd during this period. Finally broke with him so acutely that in June 1931 he decamped secretly in a pilgrim ship bound for India. The Sa'ûdi authorities accused him at that time of being concerned in a plot for circulating forged rupees on a large scale, but did not pursue the charge, which may have been



trumped up. He later published violent attacks on the Sa'ûdi Administration. Has since ranged about in India and countries beyond the land frontier. Engages in trade as well as political adventure. Intelligent and active, but volatile; a superior type of adventurer, who might again make his peace with Ibn Sa'ûd and play a rôle in this country. Closely associated in the past with Mahmûd Nedim, former Turkish Vali of the Yemen, who seems to have gone to earth in Constantinople in his old age, after a long and curious post-war career; and with Ismail Ghuznavi (q.v.). May still be in touch with the latter, despite his breach with Ibn Sa'ûd.

#### 92. *Abu Tuqayqa Family.*

Formerly chiefs of the Tihâma, mainly Hejazi, section of the Huweytât tribe, with an urban connexion at Dhaba. Rafî'a, their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafî'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1924 as one of several Hejazi sheykhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhâbis. He appears to have been Governor of Dhaba in 1927, but in that year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ûd," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifâda in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five more were reported by the Sa'ûdi commander to have been slain after Ibn Rifâda's defeat. Among the survivors was, however—

(1) *Muhammad ibn [?] Abdurrahîm ibn Alwân ibn Rafî'a*, who was regarded as co-leader with Ibn Rifâda. He escaped, and after many vicissitudes left 'Aqaba for Egypt early in October 1932. May be the person against whom an exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later, but whose name is given as Muhammad bin Ahmed.

Another probable survivor is—

(2) *Mahmûd ibn Ahmed ibn Rafî'a*, who ratted on Ibn Rifâda early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ûd.

Although the above summary cannot be verified at all points, it is inserted in view of the obvious tenacity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ûd, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up again.

#### 93. *Turki ibn Madhi.*

Was in 1932 Inspector-General of 'Asir and was associated with Fahad ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ûd realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person mis-named at the time 'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mahdi, who, with Abdul-Wahhâb Abu Malha and two chiefs of Asiri tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imâm Yahya in June 1927. Took part in further negotiations with the Imâm early in 1928. Would therefore appear to be one of Ibn Sa'ûd's experts in 'Asir and Yemen affairs, but no further information regarding him is at present available.

#### 94. *Weis, Leopold, alias M. Asadullah "Vyce."*

An Austrian convert to Islam. Born at Lemberg in 1900. Record a little obscured by confusion at one time between him and a German aviator of the same name. Appears to have embraced Islam with numerous Germans in or before 1926, under the auspices of Dr. Jabbar Khair, who introduced him to Ibn Sa'ûd. Came to Mecca apparently in 1926, and spent most of his time in the Hejaz, including a long sojourn in Medina, until he left in 1932 for India, intending to go ultimately to China. By profession a journalist. Suspected of Communist attaches; so much so that Dr. Jabbar Khair himself came later to the conclusion that his converts were Communists turned Moslem to be able to penetrate Moslem communities. Speaks Arabic and fair English. Married several Arab girls, one of whom is now with him in India, where he is said to be on a lecturing tour.

#### 95. *Yahya an Nasrî.*

Principal quarantine doctor at Jedda. A Syrian, like most doctors, now employed by the Sa'ûdi Government. Probably about 40. Studied in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the Legation. Speaks Turkish and French.

#### 96. *Yusuf Yasin.*

Probably born about 1898. A Syrian from Latakia, said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Faisal at 'Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah at 'Amman, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the 'Amir that according to his own account he broke with Huseyn in consequence. Joined Ibn Sa'ûd in due course. Came to Mecca in 1924-25 and started the *Umm-al-Qura* newspaper. Figured as a Nejdî delegate at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Remained editor of the *Umm-al-Qura* for some years, but was also official Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of Dr. 'Abdullah Damlûji in 1926 and 1927. Reported in 1928 to have worked to undermine influence both of Damlûji, who resigned that year, and of Hâfiz Wahba (q.v.). Employed in various negotiations and again acted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Fuad Hamza early in 1931, and for the 'Amir Faysal and Fuad as well in 1932, but has for some years been principally important as a personal secretary to the King, who made him head of the political section of his diwân in 1930, and whom he always accompanies. Was notorious for his obstructiveness during the Clayton negotiations, and is naturally obstinate and hair-splitting in discussion, but can on occasion be amiable and even conciliatory. Takes his cue, in fact, from the King himself, to whom he appears to be genuinely devoted, and who probably trusts him as much as any of his near advisers except 'Abdullah Suleymân. Is probably a more convinced Wahhâbi than most of the King's alien entourage and is also a strong Arab nationalist, with fewer ulterior motives than Fuad Hamza, having a simpler character and less European knowledge. Has the eyes of a fanatic. Works very hard. Though a very useful factotum to the King, is rather a butt in high circles. A facile and sometimes intemperate writer, still responsible for contributions to the *Umm-al-Qura*. Speaks only Arabic well, but can manage a little English.

#### 97. *Zawâwî Family.*

A Mecca family, worth mentioning because one of them, viz., *Yusuf 'Alî az-Zawâwî* appears to have been concerned at Cairo in 1932 in plots against Ibn Sa'ûd; and because this or another Zawâwî may have been in reality the person who went to France in the summer to buy arms for the conspirators. The man who went to buy the arms was first described as being Muhammad Pasha az-Zawî [sic], and was afterwards identified at Aden as being Hamid Pasha al-Wâdî, then head of the Amir 'Abdullah's diwân. It is difficult to reconcile this with what is known of Hamid Pasha al-Wâdî's movements about that time. Anyhow, whoever went to buy the arms, whether Zâwî, Zawâwî or Wâdî, was associated with another person 'Abdul-Qâdir Hamad ba-Hamid, and the names may have got mixed up.

[E 3613/1795/25]

No. 4.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 188.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 20, 1933.

IN my telegram No. 7, Saying, of the 5th May, I gave a summary of the then position in regard to the claims of the Amir 'Abdullah and other members of the Hashimite family in respect of properties in the Hejaz. You will also have received various other recent papers bearing on the subject, viz., two letters, dated

[9941]

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the 20th April and the 12th May, exchanged between Sir F. Humphrys and myself, copies of which were sent to Mr. Rendel and to Jerusalem, the secret despatch addressed by the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Colonial Office on the 25th May, and my despatch No. 157 of the 26th May.

2. I mentioned the subject to Fuad Bey Hamza in the course of one of our recent conversations regarding the Transjordan negotiations, on the lines foreshadowed in my telegram No. 7, Saving, of the 5th May. I have also carried out my intention of keeping in touch with the Iraqi representative here. I now enclose a translation of a note addressed to the latter by the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which Nasir Bey was good enough to communicate to me on the 17th June. You will see by it that the Saudi Government have expressed readiness to relax, although apparently without removing, their control of the properties, and have tendered a payment in respect of moneys due to three of the co-proprietors, viz., King Ali, the Amir Abdullah and King Feisal.

3. The Iraqi representative is satisfied with the progress he has made. He is now, I understand, taking steps to have the powers of attorney held by his secretary legalised by the Saudi authorities. He states that one of these powers was given by the Amir Abdullah, but I gather that certain other members of the family, e.g., Sherif Ali Pasha, the former Grand Sherif, now living in Egypt, have taken their own action independently of that of the sons of King Hussein.

4. I do not propose to take any further action with the Saudi Government at present. It may still be hoped that, so far as the Amir Abdullah is concerned, the situation will be consolidated when the present treaty negotiations have been concluded, and when the Amir and Ibn Saud have met, if the meeting takes place. I have throughout avoided anything calculated to involve His Majesty's Government officially in the matter, making it plain to the Iraqi representative that they are unwilling to be so involved, and confining myself with Fuad Bey to an intimation that we should all welcome a settlement.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Fuad Hamza to Acting Chargé d'Affaires.*

(Translation.)

The Hon. Acting Chargé d'Affaires, *Mecca, Safar 21, 1352 (June 15, 1933).*

WITH reference to your correspondence ending with your letter dated the 19th Nisan, 1933, regarding certain property or shares of Waqf belonging to His Majesty the King Feisal and his brothers in this country, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of His Majesty the King have issued orders for releasing the exceptional measures which were taken, with a view to supervising the action of those who were in charge of the administration of the property or shares in question, and it has become possible to any legal attorney, authorised in the proper way, to apply to the authorities concerned, so as to receive their income or to take charge of their management.

The Government have made up an account with the person who is charged with the management of this property and Waqf up to the 6th Safar, 1352 (the 31st May, 1933), and made a general liquidation of the previous accounts, from which it appeared that the amount due by the Government up to that date is £G. 546 and 36 Saudi piastres, distributed as hereunder:—

	£G.	Piastres.
Sherif Ali-bin-al-Huseyn ... ..	182	12
Sherif Abdullah-bin-al-Huseyn... ..	182	12
Sherif Feisal-bin-al-Huseyn (His Majesty the King of Iraq)... ..	182	12
	546	36

I am glad to communicate this information to you, and to forward you herewith the above-mentioned sum amounting to £G. 546 and 36 piastres, and shall be grateful if you will be good enough to remit the same to the persons concerned and furnish me with the necessary receipt.

With highest respects,  
FUAD HAMZA.

[E 3960/1795/25]

No. 5.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 198.)

*Jedda, June 30, 1933.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 188 of the 20th June, relative to Hashimite properties in the Hejaz, I have the honour to state that Nasir Bey Al Gaylani called on me on the 29th June, and left with me copies of two papers, viz., (a) a rescript from the King to the Amir Feisal, as President of the Council of Ministers, and (b) a letter from the Amir, as Minister of the Interior, to the agent of one branch of the Hashimite family. I enclose translations of these papers. Nasir Bey regarded them as eminently satisfactory, and on the face of them they appear to restore very completely the rights of all the Ashraf with one exception. This is the Sherif Khalid-bin-Sadiq, who would appear to be the Sherif Khalid implicated last year in the Ad Dabbagh conspiracy.

2. I consider that the only course now to adopt is to let the interested parties judge by experience whether the decision of the Saudi Government is as favourable as it appears to be on the surface. I have no reason to doubt this, as I believe Ibn Saud to have been genuinely desirous of making a *beau geste*, but there is just a possibility that subordinates may show themselves less well-disposed. In any case very definite progress has been made, and I give great credit to the Iraqi representative for his handling of the business.

3. Nasir Bey seemed doubtful about the position as regards the Amir Zeyd, King Hussein's youngest son, who, as you know, has certain interests independent of those of the rest of the family, derived from his Turkish mother. He agreed with my view that he could well afford to await developments in this connexion. In any case, this is a matter of even less concern to His Majesty's Government than the claims of the elder brothers.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

*Ibn Saud to Amir Feisal.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

*June 6, 1933.*

IN accordance with the representations submitted to us by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, we give orders for the removal of restrictions on the properties of the Ashraf with the exception of the properties of the Sherif Khalid-bin-Sadiq, and for the restoration of the position to what it was before the recent measures, and to issue instructions to this effect to the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs and to the Sharia Court, and that the Ashraf may (be allowed to) manage their affairs with their agent as they like.

May God the Almighty grant you success.



Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

*Amir Feisal to Muhammad Ali Adam.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

ENCLOSED herewith a copy of the command of His Majesty the King of the 6th June, issued in respect of the removal of restrictions on the Ashrâfs' properties, with the exception of the property of the Sherif Khâlid-bin-Sâdiq, which was communicated to us by the high authority on the 10th June for putting it into force. Written on the 19th June, for your information and reliance upon it accordingly.

FEISAL,  
Minister of Interior.

[E 3963/902/25]

No. 6.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 201.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 3, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for June 1933.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 6.

*Jedda Report, June 1933.*

#### I.—Internal Affairs.

106. THE King came from Mecca to Jedda on the 10th June and returned on the 12th June. He held the usual formal reception, and on the 11th June gave Sir Andrew Ryan a business audience at which the main subject of discussion was the Transjordan frontier negotiations (see paragraph 117 below). His Majesty received his intending biographer, Captain F. H. C. Armstrong, no less than five times and discoursed to him freely for over ten hours in all, not only of war, &c., but of love, also of the many errors into which other writers, including Messrs. Philby and Ameen Rihani, had fallen. Fuad Bey Hamza acted a good deal as interpreter and as sub-inspirer, but the most notable feature of the varying company at the interviews was the frequent presence of Ibn Saud's brother, Abdullah, on whose memory he seemed to rely for much. The King left Mecca for Riyadh on the 21st June and arrived on the 25th June. He will probably spend the rest of the year in Nejd.

107. The excitement over the appointment of an Heir Apparent has died away, but may be responsible for a report from one source early in June that Ibn Saud contemplated abdication in the Amir's favour. The King himself spoke to Sir Andrew Ryan on the 10th June of his hope of being able to delegate work, *e.g.*, in regard to Bedouin affairs, to the Amir a year or two hence.

108. The Amir Feisal attracted no attention during the month until he went into summer residence at Taif on the 25th June. Fuad Bey Hamza attended three times at the Jedda branch of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Sheikh Yussuf Yassin returned from leave in Syria on the 25th June, much pleased with the attention he had been shown in Jerusalem, and went straight to Mecca, *en route* for Riyadh to join his master.

109. There were no further developments in connexion with the economic schemes mentioned in paragraph 82 of the last report. Some regard the National Bank scheme as already dead. The oil negotiations in regard to Hasa seem to have stimulated interest in other oil possibilities. On the 4th June Fuad Bey brought a confidential message to Sir Andrew Ryan from the King to the effect

that he had been approached by Italian interests, working through a representative in Cairo, regarding the possibility of a concession for Asir and the Farsan Islands. The King intimated that, now as always, he preferred to do business with the British, and asked whether any British group was likely to be interested in this proposition. He was doubtless thinking back to the time when Shell started operations through a subsidiary in the Farsans, but abandoned them in circumstances now only of historical interest.

110. The further instalment of the *Umm-al-Qura* account of the agreement with Mr. Philby's company (see paragraph 83 of the last report) threw little further light on it. The Government undertake that during the term of the agreement, which is to be ten years, all cars imported for their use and that of authorised transport concerns, except cars for their special use and heavy lorries, shall be Fords. Sharqieh (Limited) are to have the first refusal of orders for cars for special Government use and for lorries on terms equal to those offered by other vendors. Although private persons may import cars of any make, it is provided in this contract that they shall not ply for hire. The company get a monopoly of all import of tyres and other accessories. They undertake to provide service stations at Mecca, Jedda, Medina, Riyadh and other places to be agreed upon. Conditions are laid down for the fixation of prices of tyres, &c., but not, in the published summary, of those of the actual cars. The margin over factory prices allowed in the case of the former appears very small to cover overhead expenses, depreciation and profit. All goods supplied to the Government and the transport companies are to be charged to an account payable out of 50 per cent. of the receipts of the Naqaba or Government organisation in control of transport. It is considered doubtful whether the contract is a feasible business proposition, and there is no news up to date of Mr. Philby's success in his efforts to obtain financial backing. He has gone on from Egypt to England.

111. There has been a revival of interest in the scheme for supplying Jedda with water from Waziriya (see paragraph 167 of the report for May-June 1932). The Government have enlisted the expert, though not apparently, the financial assistance of the capable Ain Zubeyda Committee in Mecca. A leading member of this committee, a highly respectable Indian of Mecca, claims to have discovered an underground stream of fresh water much superior to the brackish well-water raised by Mr. Twitchell's windmill. In the latter half of June a gang of over 100 labourers from Mecca were employed on the underground works.

112. A regulation prescribing additions to the two schedules of goods subject to specific duties and the goods subject to increased *ad valorem* duties (see paragraph 84 of the last report) was published on the 23rd June.

113. There was no visible change in the financial situation in June.

114. The internal situation continued to be peaceful, as far as could be judged. Ibn Musaid, Governor of Hail and cousin to the King, who had been in charge of the operations in Asir, arrived in Mecca on the 13th June and left for Hail on the 24th June. It is claimed that he had not only repressed the rebellion, but had reorganised the Administration. The appointment of new Governors at Abha, to which place Turki-as-Sdayri, a relative on the maternal side of Ibn Saud has been transferred from Jauf, and at Jizan was announced on the 23rd June. The *Umm-al-Qura* has published much about the present and past of Asir, insisting on the thesis that the theatre of the rebellion was not Asir proper but the districts of Sabya, Jizan and Abu Arish, which are more correctly called Tihamat Asir, the littoral region as opposed to the inland region of Asir proper or Asir Surat. Tihamat Asir, the former territory of the Idrisi, now becomes a province to be ruled by the Governor at Jizan assisted by a council under the general supervision of the Governor at Abha. Although all seems so stable in Asir, a feeling of misgiving persists in many quarters. It was intensified in June by reports that quite important forces were again being sent thither both by land and by sea. A launch, which the Government bought some years ago through Mr. Philby, and which was long thought to be useless, was put into working order some little time ago and has been running to and from Jizan. It is hard to judge whether the forces sent are reinforcements with a view to possible fighting, replacements of casualties and cases of disease or reliefs. It is possible that the despatch of troops is a result of the alleged tension in the hinterland (see paragraph 121 below).

115. Before leaving for Riyadh the King approved of several other appointments to provincial governorates, notably in the region near the Transjordan



frontier, where there has been a considerable redistribution of posts. He also conferred a title equivalent to that of Poet Laureate on Ahmed Ibrahim-al-Ghazzawi, the Secretary of the Legislative Council and a well-known versifier and publicist. No mention was made of a salary, much less a butt of sack, to inspire his further efforts. Pegasus treads on air, unaided by such stimulants, in Arabia.

116. An amendment to the existing regulations on firearms was published on the 2nd June. It was not as a whole important, but it provided that licences to carry arms should not be issued to foreigners except on production of a certificate from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A regulation on the practice of medicine, pharmacy, &c., by private persons was published on the 8th June. It is not illiberal in conception, but it is too soon to judge of its practical effects, if it should have any.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

117. Sir Andrew Ryan's conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza regarding the projected Saudi-Transjordan settlement (see paragraph 91 of the last report) were continued on the 4th and 20th June with satisfactory results. The question of a working agreement on tribal nationality still presents difficulty, especially as regards the Sirhan tribe. When Sir Andrew Ryan outlined the state of the negotiations to Ibn Saud on the 11th June, His Majesty made light of all obstacles and dismissed the question of the Sirhan as one which could easily be disposed of by a comparison of evidence. It was clear on the 20th June that Fuad Bey's cue was to get on with the final settlement at almost any cost. He and Sir Andrew Ryan agreed that so little remained for discussion except matters of drafting that the second stage of the formal negotiations might safely be proceeded with, and it was decided in principle to suggest a meeting of delegates in Jerusalem on the 24th July. His Majesty's Government and the High Commissioner have since concurred in this proposal. In the last days of June Sir Andrew Ryan prepared from copious evidence adduced in Amman a memorandum justifying on historical and other grounds the Transjordan claim to the Sirhan tribe. At the end of the month two or three incidental matters were under consideration, the most important being a suggestion that the actual signature of the texts to be agreed in Jerusalem might take place at Amman.

118. On the 10th June the Saudi Government produced another complaint similar to that mentioned in paragraph 92 of the last report regarding the alleged killing of two persons by men of the Arab Legion on the 15th May. Sir Andrew Ryan replied that in his opinion it could be assumed that any report of unprovoked killing was unfounded, and asked for various particulars.

119. The principal development as between Iraq and Saudi Arabia during the month was what appears to be a satisfactory settlement of the question of Hashimite properties. A rescript addressed by Ibn Saud to the Amir Feisal orders the removal of the restrictions previously imposed on the properties of all Ashraf, with the exception of the Sherif Khalid, who was implicated in anti-Saudi conspiracies last year.

120. The statement in paragraph 94 of the last report relative to the conclusion of an agreement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia regarding the proposed motor-route from Nejef to Medina was premature. The Iraq Government completed the necessary surveys on their side some time ago, but the Saudi Government have not yet notified the completion of similar surveys on their side.

121. The Saudi mission to San'a had made little or no progress when last heard of owing apparently to the further illness of the Imam. There have been definite rumours of Yemeni military activity in Najran. Fuad Bey told Sir Andrew Ryan on the 20th June that there was no official confirmation of these reports, but that if they were true a serious situation would arise. He defined the Saudi contention as being that the frontier settlement which, in their view, was reached by the mission that went to San'a in 1927, gave Najran to Ibn Saud and left the bulk of the Beni Yam country which Fuad Bey identified with the geographical area of Jauf to the Imam (see paragraph 93 of the last report, and paragraph 114 above).

122. On the 4th June Fuad Bey told Sir Andrew Ryan that Ibn Saud had written a letter to the Sheikh of Koweit making a proposal which, if agreed to, could subsequently be made official, for the adjustment of their commercial

relations. Reports from Koweit show that this letter reached the sheikh on the 16th June and proved to be very obscure. The proposal appeared to be that, if the sheikh would levy the same import duties as those charged in Hasa ports, Ibn Saud would allow the caravans from Koweit to enter Nejd on payment only of a moderate tax to the same amount as one formerly levied by the tribal sheikhs in Ibn Rashid's time. The sheikh considered the proposal unacceptable, but His Majesty's Government have suggested that it is worth exploring. No attempt can be made in Jedda to appreciate its true character, but two points are worth noting, viz., (a) the King appears to have suggested to the sheikh that they should settle the matter by a direct deal and not through the British, who could not be trusted; and (b) the reference to Hasa ports suggests that Ibn Saud persists in his hope of developing one or more ports on that coast and cutting out Bahrein. (Cf. paragraph 96 of the last report, the subject of which remains in the same position, so far as the Legation is concerned.)

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

123. Anglo-Saudi relations continued to be eminently friendly under the influence of the strong desire of both sides to let nothing cloud the prospects of a settlement of the Transjordan question. Other questions were discussed in Sir Andrew Ryan's conversations with the King and Fuad Bey, but without insistence on either side. Apart from those adverted to elsewhere, the most important was that of landing grounds for aircraft on the Hasa coast (see paragraph 378 of the report for November-December), which formed the subject of a most unsatisfactory counter-memorandum handed by Fuad Bey to Sir Andrew Ryan on the 20th June. This awaits elucidation and discussion. Just before the end of the month anxiety was caused by reports that pressure was being brought to bear on British subjects and British-protected persons from Africa to adopt Saudi nationality and/or to enlist in the army under pain of expulsion. Sir Andrew Ryan wrote a cautionary note on the subject to the Amir Feisal on the 30th June.

124. Nothing important is known of the proceedings of other foreign representatives in June, except as regards the Iraqi success over Hashimite properties (see paragraph 119). The Soviet Minister was again much in Mecca. The French Chargé was more of a hermit than ever, although he did appear at the King's birthday party at the British Legation. The corps continues to disintegrate as summer advances. The Italian Minister and the Turkish Chargé left according to plan. The former left in charge M. Tonci, an old colleague of the writer in Morocco. He is very impressive in the Fascist vein, but has so far had no spectacular opportunity of showing what he could do if the hair of a single Italian were touched by Saudi Arabs. The Egyptian consul also went on leave, leaving things very much as they have been for a long time past between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The new Czechoslovak consul is favourably described in a letter from Jerusalem, which shows *inter alia* that he is also consul for Iraq and that he may visit Jedda in the autumn.

125. Enquiries by the Saudi Minister in London led the Foreign Office to address to the Legation on the 17th May an important restatement of the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the possible entry of Saudi Arabia into the League of Nations. The general conclusion from a fresh review of pros and cons was that, if the Saudi Government should again approach the Legation, its attitude should be one of complete but sympathetic neutrality; readiness to help with information; and avoidance of any language tending to minimise obstacles or to encourage the Saudi Government to proceed hastily. As a matter of fact, the Saudi Government have not pursued this question in Jedda for nearly two years (see paragraph 49 of the report for July and August 1931).

## IV.—Miscellaneous.

126. The reception at the Legation on the 3rd June in honour of the King's birthday was attended by over 110 persons, a very varied collection of British subjects, members of foreign missions and local notables.

127. The Frenchwoman mentioned in paragraph 101 of the last report was released on acquittal about the 28th June, and has since been a guest in the French



consulate pending a departure which it is hoped will end a peculiarly foolish and squalid story.

128. Some attention was aroused by the execution in Mecca on or about the 8th June of three persons for robbery with murder. Torture was said to have been used, and it is alleged that a fourth man died under the lash. It was not usual to inflict capital punishment in Mecca under the Turkish and Hashimite régimes. The Wahhabi view appears to be the better the place, the better the work of justice.

129. Captain F. H. C. Armstrong fell seriously ill in Jedda just after the series of audiences mentioned in paragraph 106 above. He was embarked for Port Sudan under medical advice and under the care of Mr. Twitchell on the 18th June. He is making a good but slow recovery in hospital at Port Sudan.

130. There are some indications of an inclination on the part of the Saudi Government to buy British. Early in the month they were reported to be enquiring about aircraft hangars at about £800 apiece, and about shower-baths possibly for pilgrim sanitation. Fuad Bey also mentioned to Sir Andrew Ryan on the 20th June a proposal to buy 3 million rounds of Lee-Enfield cartridges through Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited).

131. The organisers in India of the proposed Eastern Olympic Games have made various efforts to interest Saudi Arabian sportsmen in their project through official channels. On the 6th June the Legation forwarded through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a letter addressed by the Maharaja of Patiala to Ibn Saud on the subject.

132. Pilgrimage work during the month consisted principally of winding up odds and ends and preparing the annual pilgrimage report. The Indian vice-consul left for Istanbul on long leave on the 14th June.

133. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves in June was as follows:—

	Males.
On hand at beginning of month ...	6
Took refuge in June ...	2
Manumitted in June and repatriated ...	7
Locally manumitted ...	Nil
On hand at end of month ...	1

The Legation has taken up with the Saudi Government a case of the alleged resale into slavery not far from Jedda of a young man and a young woman whose father, now at Kamaran, declares that he and they were manumitted by their owner some years ago. Another case of the alleged sale of an ostensible wife by an Abyssinian pilgrim is under consideration, but the evidence is probably too weak to justify action.

[E 4010/759/25]

No. 6A.

*Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda, to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, July 20, 1933.*

SIR A. RYAN'S despatch No. 193 of 23rd June.

I received the call this evening of Minister of Finance charged with important message from Ibn Saud for His Majesty's Government regarding situation with Yemen over Asir. He left with me a long confidential note from Minister for Foreign Affairs, to which allusion is made below.

Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman stated that negotiations at Sanaa finally commenced 17th July, but excessive demands of Imam delegate for restitution of Idrisi territory led to immediate rupture, though not to withdrawal of Saudi delegation. Ibn Saud, disquieted for some time by hostility of Imam forces against local tribes in Nejran, has utmost distrust of Imam, whom this message and note accuses of bad faith and wilful provocation.

Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, whilst alluding to Idrisi activities, strongly hinted at "outside influence" at work, and stated that arms and supplies had recently been landed "from abroad" on Yemen coast. The note is less ambiguous

and claims that arms, &c., must have been sent by Italians, as they come from Eritrean ports, or by certain hostile Arab princes.

Ibn Saud asserted his desire for friendly relations, but will meet force with force. Saudi troops have already assembled and are being held in readiness, but Abdullah Suleiman represents the King as loath to loose them on Imam without first having sought advice of His Majesty's Government, in view of friendly relations, &c. The note characterises the situation as critical, and repeats request for advice. I undertook to transmit this communication and your reply as soon as received. Abdullah Suleiman was ready to remain at Jedda until reply received, and by a certain nervousness of demeanour conveyed to me the impression, reinforced by urgent method of conveying this message, of anxiety with which this situation must be regarded by Ibn Saud.

(Repeated to Aden, No. 150, Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, No. 151.)

[E 4010/759/25]

No. 7.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Graham (Rome).*

(No. 181.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1933.*

JEDDA telegram No. 140 of 20th July and Mr. Murray's telegram No. 212 of 6th September, 1931: Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.

Saudi Arabian Minister here, under instructions, has represented that King Ibn Saud regards the situation with utmost anxiety. Former Idrisi ruler of Asir, who is refugee in Yemen territory, is believed to be collecting forces and munitions with active assistance of Imam, with a view to invasion of Asir. Imam apparently opened recent negotiations with Saudi delegates at Sanaa by claiming whole of Asir, which he would certainly take over himself in the event of success on the part of the Idrisi against Ibn Saud.

Ibn Saud strongly suspects Italian authorities in Eritrea of supplying, or at least allowing others to supply, arms and munitions not only to Imam but to Idrisi, and that they are encouraging projected attack on Asir for their own ends. He states that if incursion takes place open hostilities with the Yemen will become inevitable.

His Majesty's Government have strongly urged counsels of moderation on Saudi Government and pointed out great importance of making every effort to avoid outbreak of hostilities with Imam, even if threatened incursion should occur, in which case there seems no reason why it should not be treated as purely local rebellion not necessarily involving active hostilities with the Yemen.

Meanwhile His Majesty's Government attach serious importance to bringing about improvement in situation, and trust that, in accordance with conclusions 1 and 2 of Rome conversations of 1927, Italian Government will equally urge counsels of moderation on the Imam, and take all possible steps to prevent either the Imam or the Idrisi from receiving any assistance or encouragement of any kind from territory under Italian control.

Please approach Italian Government immediately on above lines, communicating to them as much of foregoing information as you may consider suitable, and report result, repeating it to Jedda.

(Addressed to Rome, No. 181. Repeated to Jedda, No. 93, for personal information only.)

[E 4010/759/25]

No. 8.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Calvert (Jedda).*

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1933.*

YOUR telegram No. 140 of 20th July: Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.

You should inform Saudi Government that His Majesty's Government are approaching Italian Government and requesting them to urge counsels of moderation on the Imam and to make every effort to ensure that neither Imam



nor Idrisi obtain any assistance or encouragement from territory under Italian control.

Meanwhile you should strongly urge counsels of moderation on Saudi Government, pointing out dangers to which outbreak of hostilities with the Yemen would inevitably lead, and expressing hope that even if threatened incursion by Idrisi should materialise Ibn Saud would be able to deal with it as internal revolt not involving international hostilities.

We must await Italian reply. But you should explain that, if it were unfavourable, yet in event of outbreak of hostilities His Majesty's Government could not give Ibn Saud material support. Loan to which Saudi Minister alluded is impossible, while supply of arms from Government sources would be no less impossible. Moreover, his last indebtedness remains unsettled.

But in saying this you should add that were he to find means of acquiring arms from private sources there could obviously be no objection on the part of His Majesty's Government.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 94. Repeated to Rome, No. 188.)

[E 4107/759/25]

No. 9.

*Sir R. Graham to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 189.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 26, 1933.*

YOUR telegram No. 181 and Jedda telegram No. 140.

Italian Government to-day assured me that they would take action in the sense required.

Signor Suvich added that, according to Italian information, Imam had no wish to pick a quarrel with Ibn Saud.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 4072/759/25]

No. 10.

*Sir John Simon to Mr. Calvert (Jedda).*

(No. 196. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1933.*

THE Minister of Saudi Arabia, at an interview at this Department on the 21st July, made representations regarding a possible outbreak of hostilities between King Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen, on the same lines as those made to you by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance and reported in your telegram No. 140 of the 20th July.

2. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba explained that King Ibn Saud had come to the conclusion that a conflict between himself and the Imam was inevitable. The Imam had opened the negotiations with the Saudi delegation recently sent to Sanaa by demanding the whole of Asir, not for the Idrisi, but for himself. King Ibn Saud was also convinced that the Imam and Italian sources were supplying the Idrisi with arms and munitions preparatory to an attack on Asir, which would be supported by Yemeni troops. The Imam's plan in that event, according to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, would be to take over Asir from the Idrisi, in the event of the Idrisi's attempt being successful. An attack by the Idrisi on Asir would thus involve hostilities between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and in that case King Ibn Saud was determined that it should be in a fight to a finish.

3. In these circumstances, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba had been instructed by King Ibn Saud to ascertain what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government. He realised that there could be no question of His Majesty's Government involving themselves in hostilities with the Imam; but King Ibn Saud was anxious to know how far he could count on the moral support of His Majesty's Government, and whether it would be possible for them to give him assistance by means, for example, of a loan or of the supply of arms on favourable terms. In return, King Ibn Saud would be prepared to treat all British interests, both in Saudi Arabia and in the Yemen, if he should conquer it, with the greatest generosity. Though he did not say so in so many words, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba appeared

desirous of implying that King Ibn Saud might, in addition to giving His Majesty's Government satisfaction over British interests generally, be willing to offer special concessions.

4. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba also enquired whether anything could be done to prevent the Imam and the Idrisi securing arms from Italian sources and to discourage the Italian Government from giving them support in other directions.

5. The Minister was informed that the whole situation which he envisaged appeared still quite hypothetical. The Imam was old and was reported to be ill; his country was known to be impoverished; it seemed *prima facie* unlikely that he would embark at this moment on so hazardous an adventure as a war with Saudi Arabia. Apart from this, much would depend on the circumstances in which such a conflict broke out. It might be that the Imam was trying to goad King Ibn Saud into initiating hostilities, and it would be obviously a grave mistake for King Ibn Saud to fall in with such a manoeuvre. It appeared highly important that King Ibn Saud should exercise great patience and should do all possible to avoid hostilities.

6. So far as Italy was concerned, the Italian Government and Italian private manufacturers were legally entitled to sell arms and munitions to the Imam. It was indeed well known that they had been doing so for some years. It was doubtful whether the Italian Government had any considerable influence over the Imam, and whether their intervention, if they did intervene, would greatly affect the situation for better or for worse. It seemed therefore a mistake to exaggerate the importance of rumours of Italian assistance to the Imam or to the Idrisi.

7. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba was informed, in reply to his enquiry as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government that it did not appear possible for them to give King Ibn Saud any material support which would be of use to him, without themselves becoming involved in hostilities with the Imam, which (as the Minister himself recognised) was out of the question. Moreover, if King Ibn Saud desired His Majesty's Government to exercise their influence with the Italian Government to induce them to observe an attitude of neutrality, it was clear that His Majesty's Government must themselves remain strictly neutral.

8. Throughout the interview every opportunity was taken to urge counsels of moderation upon the Minister. It was also suggested to him that an incursion by the Idrisi into Asir, even supported by Yemeni troops, could well be treated by King Ibn Saud as a rebellion in his own territory and thus as an internal matter, and that actual hostilities with the Imam might by this means be avoided.

9. At the conclusion of the interview, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba was assured that, while the situation seemed too hypothetical to make it possible for His Majesty's Government to make any definite pronouncement as to their attitude, the whole question would be most carefully considered and instructions would be sent to you as soon as possible regarding the reply which you should make to the Emir Feisal's memorandum and to Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's representations. Subsequently, I addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome my telegram No. 181 of the 24th July, which was repeated to you under No. 93, and instructions as to your reply to the Saudi Government were embodied in my telegram No. 94 of the 26th July.

10. On the 25th July, the Saudi Arabian Minister again called at this Department. He said that he had reported to King Ibn Saud by telegram the result of his previous interview, and had now received a reply from His Majesty, disclaiming any intention of taking aggressive action against the Imam and containing instructions to convey to me the following supplementary information.

11. As His Majesty's Government were aware, an agreement had been reached between King Ibn Saud and the Imam in the winter of 1931-32 regarding their common frontier, under which His Majesty had abandoned to the Imam the Jebel Arwa and all the territory to the south of it, retaining the area known as Nejran and all the territory to the north of it in Saudi Arabia. Somewhat later, a further Saudi mission had been sent to the Yemen to negotiate a general treaty settlement. The Imam, on an unconvincing plea of illness, had kept the mission waiting for thirty-five days without receiving it. Meanwhile, the Asir rebellion had broken out, and the Imam began a gradual occupation of Nejran. This Saudi mission had achieved nothing; but, after the suppression of the Asir rebellion, King Ibn Saud had agreed with the Imam to pardon the rebel leaders and to allow the Idrisi to remain as a refugee in the northern Yemen on the



condition that the Imam undertook to prevent his intriguing against Saudi Arabia. A third Saudi mission had then been sent to the Yemen to try to reach a general settlement. It was then that the Imam put forward a demand for "all the Idrisi's dominions." This claim was no doubt purposely vague, but King Ibn Saud interpreted it as a demand for the whole of Asir.

12. There were now two danger points. The first was in the coastal area, where the Idrisi was collecting supporters in Yemeni territory, whence he might at any moment make an incursion into Asir; Sheikh Hafiz Wahba did not, however, seem to regard this danger as seriously as on the previous occasion. The other danger-point was inland in Nejran; the greater part of Nejran was now occupied by the Imam's forces.

13. King Ibn Saud regarded Nejran as having been definitely allotted to Saudi Arabia by the frontier arrangement of 1931-32, even though this arrangement was not a formal treaty. He was now receiving appeals from the people of Nejran, who were suffering from the Yemeni occupation and definitely objected to Zeidi rule. King Ibn Saud could not ignore these appeals, and, unless he took action, Yemeni aggression was likely to continue. He therefore felt that he must "defend" Nejran and turn out the Yemeni troops. It was preparatory to taking such action that he desired to know the views and attitude of His Majesty's Government.

14. This latest information communicated by the Saudi Minister appears to put the matter in a somewhat new light. The frontier arrangement of 1931-32 was apparently a vague one, and it is not clear, either from the information supplied by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba or from that given to Sir Andrew Ryan by Fuad Bey Hamza and reported in Sir Andrew's despatches Nos. 168 and 193 of the 5th June and the 23rd June respectively, that King Ibn Saud's claim that Nejran is definitely to be considered as Saudi territory can necessarily be accepted as indisputable. It is to be observed that no reference to a settlement on this point is contained in the official Saudi proclamation regarding the results of the negotiations of 1931, a translation of which was enclosed in Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 486 of the 19th December, 1931. Nor does it appear, from the information at my disposal, that Nejran had in fact been in the effective occupation either of King Ibn Saud or of the Imam in recent years. It is, therefore, not absolutely clear that King Ibn Saud, in contemplating the ejection of the Yemeni troops from Nejran, can in fact be considered to be defending what is indisputably his own territory in the same way as would be the case if it were a question of resisting a Yemeni or Idrisi incursion into territory in his effective occupation. It may, indeed, be that it would be more correct to regard such action by King Ibn Saud as an attempt to occupy territory, the ownership of which has hitherto been doubtful. Without further information, however, as to the status and recent history of Nejran it is somewhat difficult to express an opinion on this point.

15. Before taking his leave, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba reverted to the enquiries which he had made at the interview recorded in the earlier part of this despatch, as to the assistance which His Majesty's Government might be able to give to King Ibn Saud. He explained that His Majesty had in mind an understanding between himself and His Majesty's Government—which should, however, be kept strictly secret—by which His Majesty's Government would promise him their moral support and he, on his side, should guarantee all British interests in the Yemen should he prove successful against the Imam. In reply to this statement, the Minister was informed that the arrangement proposed would be something very like an alliance between the two countries. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba replied that King Ibn Saud did not expect armed assistance from His Majesty's Government, but only desired material help in two directions, namely, a loan and the supply of arms.

16. The Minister was informed that, as he was aware, the question of a loan to the Saudi Government was most carefully and sympathetically examined last year, when the matter was raised here by the Saudi mission headed by the Emir Feisal, and that it had then been found impossible to accede to the Saudi Government's request. The position in this matter was unchanged. As regards the supply of arms, there was no reason, as Sheikh Hafiz Wahba knew, why the Saudi Government should not buy arms from the manufacturers whenever and wherever they wished. It appeared, however, that King Ibn Saud was in fact suggesting that His Majesty's Government should arrange the supply to him of

arms on especially favourable terms (to this the Minister agreed); this suggestion appeared to amount in fact to a request for financial facilities in a different form, and the reply of His Majesty's Government could only be the same as that which they had been obliged to make to the Saudi Government's request for a loan.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 4190/759/25]

No. 11.

*M. Zada to Mr. Rendel.—(Received July 29.)*

*Royal Legation of Saudi Arabia,  
London, July 28, 1933.*

Dear Mr. Rendel,

JUST a note to give you the desired information.

1. On the 7th Rajab, 1346 (1927), when our representatives (Ibn Mady and Ibn Duleim) met those of Imam Yehya in Sanaa, our representatives proposed that the eastern frontiers be settled thus: Najran and northwards to belong to King Abdul Aziz, and Wayla and southwards to belong to the Imam; and that the southern frontier of Assir from inland to the sea was to remain as it was. In the meeting held on the 9th Rajab, the Imam's representatives accepted this settlement, except where it related to the Idrissi territory.

2. In a letter from Imam Yehya to King Abdul Aziz in Rabi Thani 1350 (1930-31), in which the Imam claimed Jebel Aro, he based his claim on the agreement reached with Ibn Mady and Ibn Duleim regarding the frontiers.

3. In his cable of the 18th Shawwal, 1351 (1933), to King Abdul Aziz, the Imam asked that there should be no interference with the Yam, again basing his request on the agreement made with Ibn Mady and Ibn Duleim.

4. The people of Najran have been the subjects of King Abdul Aziz for some time. They were also the subjects of his ancestors and still hold the documents they granted to them. These documents have been submitted to King Abdul Aziz, and confirmed by him. Indeed, as late as Ramadan 1351 (January 1933) the people of Najran sent a deputation to Ibn Musaid in Abha reaffirming their submission and renewing their assurances of loyalty.

5. The people of Najran never had any connexion with Imam Yehya or any dealings with him until his recent occupation of their land.

I may add that His Majesty King Abdul Aziz has just received a cable from his delegation at Sanaa saying that Imam Yehya still insists on being given the Idrissi territory, and that it is their firm belief that he, Imam Yehya, is bent on aggression.

Such being the case, King Abdul Aziz awaits the opinion of the British Government.

Yours sincerely,

MAHMOOD R. ZADA.

[E 4072/759/25]

No. 12.

*Sir John Simon to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1933.*

I HAVE considered the representations, which you made in your interviews here on the 21st and 25th July, regarding a possible outbreak of hostilities between your Government and that of the Yemen, and your requests for information as to the probable attitude of His Majesty's Government in that event.

2. I am not altogether clear as to the circumstances which have led King Abdul Aziz to fear, as I understand to be the case, that such hostilities are imminent and that the prospect of finding means to avoid them is not favourable. His Majesty's Government, anxious as they must always be to see peace preserved in Arabia, would deplore such hostilities, and they welcome the assurances which you have given that King Abdul Aziz is determined to do his utmost to avoid war with the Yemen, and they earnestly trust that his efforts to do so may be successful.

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3. As you are aware, I have already suggested to the Italian Government that they should urge counsels of moderation on the Imam of the Yemen and should take all possible measures to secure that no kind of assistance or encouragement is given to the Imam or to the Idrisi from Italian territory of a nature to increase the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities. I have pleasure in informing you that the Italian Government have now assured me that they will take action in the sense which I had suggested to them. They add that, according to their information, the Imam Yahya has no wish to embark upon a quarrel with King Abdul Aziz.

4. I understand that King Abdul Aziz desires to learn whether, in the event of his finding it necessary to defend his territories against incursion by the Idrisi or by Yemeni troops, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to assist him, either by means of a loan or by supplying him with arms and munitions on especially favourable terms. You are aware that, in response to the request made by the delegation headed by His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, which was sent to this country by King Abdul Aziz last year, His Majesty's Government then considered carefully and sympathetically whether they could give His Majesty any form of financial assistance and that this was unfortunately found to be impossible. The circumstances in this regard remain, I regret to say, unaltered, and His Majesty's Government are therefore unable to accede to the requests of King Abdul Aziz which you have laid before me. It is scarcely necessary for me to add, however, that, should the Saudi Arabian Government arrange to be furnished with arms or munitions by private manufacturers in this country, His Majesty's Government would put no obstacle in the way.

5. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah reported to me on the 20th July that representations in regard to this matter had been made to him by the Saudi Government in a generally similar sense to those which you have made here, and I have instructed Mr. Calvert to convey to your Government a reply on the lines of this note.

I have, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 4430/222/91]

No. 13.

*The Acting Resident at Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—  
(Received in Foreign Office, August 8.)*

(Secret.)  
Sir,

*The Residency,  
Aden, July 12, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to Lieutenant-Colonel Reilly's Secret despatch No. 83 of the 12th April, 1933, and to enclose herewith translations of a letter dated the 20th June, 1933, from the Imam, and of a draft treaty and a secret appendix that were attached thereto.

2. The Imam "completely and wholly accepts" His Majesty's Government's draft of the treaty, and states that he will comply with the terms of Colonel Reilly's letter of the 11th April, 1933, and of the note (or "admonitory document") annexed thereto; he then characteristically submits a new draft that embodies three major modifications and ten minor amendments of His Majesty's Government's final terms, and concludes his letter with a sentence that means that he has no present intention of removing the restrictions on overland trade between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate until the treaty has been signed.

3. The three major modifications referred to are as follows:—

- (i) In article 3 the words "of the territories of His Majesty the King of the Yemen" have been omitted, presumably with the object of avoiding any commitment that would imply the limitation of the Imam's territories by "the frontier."

The last clause of the same article reads, "... and any interference by their subjects or from their side of that frontier, &c., ..."; and I take it that the omission of the words "by persons under their protection" is similarly a veiled rejection of our position in the Protectorate.

- (ii) In article 5 (1) the Imam has reverted to the text of his draft of September 1930 by rewording, "... and shall receive equal treatment to that enjoyed by the subjects of a most favoured Power." He has, nevertheless, retained the suggestion of national treatment in the words "shall be amenable to the local laws and judgments" (cf. paragraph 3 of Colonel Reilly's Secret despatch No. 157 of the 17th August, 1932).

- (iii) Drawing (as he says) an inference from paragraph 6 of Colonel Reilly's letter of the 11th April, the Imam has put forward a new secret article, complementary to article 3, in which he seeks to bind His Majesty's Government to formal (if covert) recognition of his reversionary interests in the islands of the Yemen, to the definite furtherance of those interests, and to abstention from connivance in the violation of his "fundamental rights" in that respect.

4. The ten minor amendments referred to are as follows:—

- (i) Article 1. The Imam desires the additions of the words "and His Government" after the words "India" and "Yemen" respectively. I conceive that he fears the impermanence of human affairs, and especially of his own, and hopes by these means to secure the treaty from the accidents of political change.
- (ii) Article 4. The Imam, in an obscure comment based on a play upon words, argues that international practice is inferior to the international principles by which it is governed; and he deletes the former word.
- (iii) Article 5 (1). For reasons not explained, the words "From the date of the coming into force of the present treaty" are omitted from the Imam's draft.
- (iv) For the words "... subjects of the one high contracting party ...," the Imam proposes "... subjects of each of the high contracting parties ..."
- (v) To the words "... local laws" the Imam adds "and judgments."
- (vi) Article 5 (2). As in (iv) above.
- (vii) The Imam omits the words "and passengers" for the reason that, in his view, foreign passengers in a British vessel could (according to His Majesty's Government's draft) claim equal treatment with British subjects in a Yemeni port.
- (viii) The words "of the territories" are omitted in the Imam's draft, on the somewhat obscure grounds that "coasts which have no territories have no ports." This argument is so unintelligible that its intention is far to seek; and I am inclined to think that the Imam hesitates to accept here a possible implication that the Protectorate is British territory, i.e., that Aden is a port of the (British) Protectorate.
- (ix) Article 5 (3). The Imam omits the whole of this clause of definition, for the ostensible reason that "the interpretation of the meaning of the texts of articles in treaties is unusual." Here again I presume that the Imam's motive is the rejection of any reference in the treaty to our protective obligations and position in the Protectorate.
- (x) Article 7. The Imam, while accepting the conclusion of the treaty in bilingual texts, insists that the Arabic text shall be the basis for subsequent interpretation of any of its clauses.

5. My appreciation of the Imam's present attitude is that, preoccupied by events in Najran and by negotiations with the Saudi mission at Sanaa in that connexion, worried by Italian demands for a financial settlement, and harassed by his own ill-health and the uncertainties of the succession, he has taken the line of utmost caution and has subjected His Majesty's Government's draft of the treaty to the very closest search to discover the remotest potentialities of danger to his interests. That he has carried this policy to an extreme, in the present instance, may indicate the existence of influences at Sanaa, both foreign and local, that are hostile to the treaty and are working on the suspicions of a sick and aged man.



6. However that may be, the fact is that there is little in the Imam's present communication to indicate that he has made any real advance towards reconciliation. On the contrary, and in spite of the very explicit statement of the finality of His Majesty's Government's conditions, conveyed to him in Colonel Reilly's letter of the 11th April, 1933, he seems almost to have gone out of his way to throw up new obstacles to a settlement; and he has refused to relax his determination to continue to enforce the restrictions on overland trade, pending signature of the treaty.

7. In these circumstances it seems clear that no good purpose can be served by a continuance of inconclusive bargaining, and, in accordance with the sense of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 10 of the 25th March, 1933, I would propose to inform the Imam that, in view of his refusal to remove the overland trade restrictions until the treaty is signed, I have been instructed to suspend further correspondence and negotiations with him in regard to the treaty.

8. I am recommending to you in a separate despatch the desirability for armed intervention to restore to the Audhali Sultan that part of his territory (Adh Dhahir) which is occupied by the Imam, and to effect the release of Audhali hostages now in Zeidi hands. In confining the reasons for the suspension of treaty negotiations solely to the Imam's refusal to remove the trade restrictions, I have in mind the consideration that any adverse criticism, to the effect that the treaty will have been pressed on the Imam by threat of force, may be adequately met by the clear separation of the two issues; for while the suspension of negotiations for the establishment of friendly relations is justified by the Imam's persistence in an unfriendly act in the form of the trade embargo, the deliverance of the territories and tribes of the Audhali Sultan (which His Majesty's Government are bound by treaty to protect) from eight years of armed and oppressive Zeidi domination, is in itself an act of justice, which is overdue, and which will become opportune on the breakdown (for other reasons) of the treaty negotiations with the Imam.

9. If these Audhali operations are approved, their successful conclusion may be expected to impress the Imam with the fact that His Majesty's Government are determined to safeguard their legitimate interests in the Aden Protectorate; and it may facilitate a solution of the embargo problem. Otherwise, it is probable that the suspension of the treaty negotiations will result in a prolonged deadlock, to the detriment of British prestige in south-west Arabia generally, and to the prejudice of peace and material prosperity in the Aden Protectorate particularly.

10. I therefore request that these considerations may have your favourable attention and that I may receive your instructions at an early date in regard to my communication of the decision of His Majesty's Government to the Imam. In the meantime I have not replied to the Imam's letter.

I have, &c.

R. S. CHAMPION.

Enclosure in No. 13.

In the Name of God the Merciful and Compassionate.

(Seal of the Imam.)

To Lieutenant-Colonel B. R. Reilly,  
Resident, Aden.

(After Compliments.)

WE beg to acknowledge with pleasure your esteemed letter No. C/206 dated the 16th April, 1933 (the 16th Dhul Hijja, 1351), which we have carefully perused and considered. We understand from the present situation that His Majesty's Government are reluctant to grant us our demands by reason of some wrong impression they may be entertaining towards us. We have been making repeated insistence on some points only in order to secure certain particular demands which we considered to be very essential for us. His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, have not been able to check themselves from suspicions and doubts that the object of our persistence is the intention on our part to take some action prejudicial to the aims and important interests of His Majesty's Government, after the conclusion of the treaty.

We wish to give you now a further assurance that the history of our Government is free from the stigma of treachery and the breaking of engagements and promises. It is, thanks to God, completely and wholly innocent of this. We most confidently assert that we are the one nation which has not violated its engagements, neither during this régime nor throughout all the time of its existence in the world, although we are utterly poor and weak. The pages of history are seen by all. After the conclusion of the treaty and the establishment of friendly relations, we are prepared to maintain all its direct and indirect objects. We will never act against one who is in treaty and friendly relations with us. We boast of our sincerity, in the beginning and in the end, and we deem it desirable to submit this preamble in confirmation, although it is not necessary to do so. We consider that the submission of these representations to His Majesty's Government now, before the commencement of the treaty that is to be concluded, will serve a useful purpose. Having made this essential preface there is something which we feel bound to say. We tender and express our thankfulness to our honourable correspondent, Colonel Reilly, for his goodwill, skill, zeal and intelligence, of which we are certain from beginning to end, and for his continued praiseworthy deeds. It is the nature of the Yemenis to regard or esteem one who maintains friendship towards them and to express their undoubted thankfulness to one loyal to them.

Colonel Reilly! Firstly, the draft treaty that you have sent on this occasion has been completely and wholly accepted.

Secondly, it has been decided by us to comply with your esteemed letter, together with the contents of the admonitory document annexed thereto.

Thirdly, we hasten to explain to your Excellency that it is our intention utterly to prevent every obstruction and contravention, by the Grace of God.

Fourthly, we therefore request your Excellency kindly to complete the means for the signing of the treaty.

We have, however, made an addition only of the words "and his Government," in article 1 of the treaty, as it is absolutely necessary for both contracting parties.

In the important article 3 we consider the sentence "of the territories of His Majesty the King of the Yemen" to be superfluous and unnecessary, because this treaty that is being concluded basically concerns the territories of the Yemen, and the text of the treaty has no concern with other than the Yemen and Great Britain.

We also consider that there is no necessity for the inclusion of the phrase "or by persons under their protection" in the said article, because the undertaking by each of the two parties to prevent transgression by any person of those on his side is complete and guaranteed.

Article 4 is accepted, with the exception of the word "practice," which we consider unnecessary; for there is no "custom" in international law but the "practice" of the said law implies its fundamental and exclusive principle.

We have been compelled to omit the word "passengers" in article 5, because "passengers" naturally include different kinds and origins of people and comprise subjects of various nations. It is obvious that all passengers in general cannot be considered to be British subjects, for surely there may be among the passengers some of the subjects of other Governments, while in fact the treaty concerns the British Government. We have no intention to make a pact in respect of all Powers in general. Passengers are subject to certain particular regulations and are not normally to be included in such a pact.

We have also omitted the word "territories" from the said article, because the coasts which have no "territories" have no "ports." We have made the form of the article to coincide with the form adopted between Powers in such a matter.

Moreover, we do not conceive that there is any necessity at all for interpreting the meaning of the words and expressions used in article 5 (3), in sub-sections (a), (b) and (c); for the interpretation of the meaning of the texts of articles in treaties is unusual. We accept the said meanings as they stand, and we do not conceive that they can bear any meaning other than that mentioned and explained by your Excellency.

This is all what we have done. We have no doubt that your Excellency will receive these explanations favourably because they completely conform with right principles and the science of eloquence.



Meanwhile, in addition to this, we have made, in a separate document, a secret appendix to the treaty agreed upon; and this we have compiled from the inferences and implications of the important reference explained in paragraph 6 of your esteemed letter. We undertake on the part of the Yemen not to disclose or publish this secret appendix in any way or manner, or by any means. This secret appendix will convince and serve as an assurance to us, and will be the absolute cause of our reaching permanent agreement with full confidence in His Majesty's Government in every respect.

We are certain that His Majesty's Government will, after the conclusion of the treaty, find us to be most friendly and sincere to them, and the ill intentions and evil objects of those who were the cause of mistrust will be proved; and there will be repentance for what happened, by the Grace of God.

In the circumstances explained we anxiously await your Excellency's return to your high post from England in October next, in sound health, and bearing these demands. We shall be extremely grateful if you will hasten your coming to us to complete and sign the treaty. By the mere (or immediately on) signing of the treaty, the restrictions will be removed and the boundaries adjusted as desired by you, in a fit and proper way.

In conclusion we request you to accept our best compliments.

Dated the 25th Safar, 1933.

= the 20th June, 1933.

#### DRAFT TREATY.

(Submitted by the Imam.)

#### PREAMBLE.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and

His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, on the other part.

Being desirous of entering into a treaty on a basis of friendship and co-operation for their mutual benefit,

Have resolved to conclude this treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and his Government acknowledge the complete and absolute independence of His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, and his Government in all affairs of whatsoever kind.

#### ARTICLE 2.

There shall always be peace and friendship between the high contracting parties, who undertake to maintain good relations with each other in every respect.

#### ARTICLE 3.

The settlement of the question of the southern frontier is deferred pending the conclusion in whatever way may be agreed upon by both high contracting parties in a spirit of friendship and complete concord, free from any dispute or

difference, of the negotiations which shall take place between them before the expiry of the period of the present treaty.

Pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of this treaty, and both high contracting parties undertake that they will prevent by all means at their disposal any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier, and any interference by their subjects or from their side of that frontier with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier.

#### ARTICLE 4.

After the coming into force of the present treaty, the high contracting parties shall by mutual agreement and concord enter into such agreements as shall be necessary for the regulation of commercial and economic affairs, based on general international principles.

#### ARTICLE 5.

The subjects of each of the high contracting parties who wish to trade in the territories of the other, shall be amenable to the local laws and judgments and shall receive equal treatment to that enjoyed by the subjects of a most favoured Power.

Similarly the vessels of each of the contracting parties and their cargoes shall in the ports of the other receive similar treatment to that enjoyed by the vessels and cargoes of a most favoured Power.

#### ARTICLE 6.

This treaty shall be the basis of all subsequent agreements that may be concluded between the high contracting parties now and in the future for the purposes of friendship and amity. The high contracting parties undertake not to assist nor to connive at any action directed against the friendship and concord now existing between them.

#### ARTICLE 7.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible after signature and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Sanaa. It shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications and shall thereafter remain in force for a period of forty years.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Sanaa in English and Arabic, and should doubt arise as to the interpretation of any of these articles, both parties shall rely upon the Arabic text.

#### SECRET APPENDIX.

This is a secret article supplementary to the original article 3 of the treaty dated \_\_\_\_\_ concluded between the Government of Great Britain and the Government of the Yemen.

As was declared in this article 3, the two high contracting Governments undertake to enter into negotiations regarding the territories under discussion within the forty years which is the period of this treaty, in a most friendly and honourable spirit: they agree to solve and dispose of the case between them, and not to open a way or possibility for any dispute, difference, or hostility between them.

And whereas there are certain of the islands of the Yemen which must undoubtedly revert to the Yemen, and which, nevertheless, have not hitherto been surrendered and restored to their source since the end of the Great War, His Majesty's Government engage to maintain and safeguard the said reversion and not to assist in the creation of any violation of the fundamental and natural rights (of the Yemen) in this respect.



*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 10.)*

(Unnumbered.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1933.*

WITH reference to your unnumbered despatch of the 20th July, which I duly received at Jerusalem with the enclosed full power to enable me to perform certain acts in connexion with the recent Transjordan-Saudi negotiations, I have the honour to submit a general report on the second stage of those negotiations, which were resumed at Jerusalem on the 24th July and ended on the 27th July. Before we separated, the Acting Political Resident in Transjordan and I agreed that, in view of the nature of the proceedings, it was unnecessary to make a formal record of each meeting. We arranged that I should prepare the present report, leaving it to Mr. Kirkbride, in conjunction with the authorities at Jerusalem, to collect the various texts in due course for submission by the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office. The only texts attached to this despatch are copies of the notes which I myself signed.

2. Fuad Bey Hamza and I arrived at Yamallah and Jerusalem respectively on the 23rd July. Fuad Bey was the only Saudi plenipotentiary and was unattended by a secretary. The other participants in the negotiations were Mr. Kirkbride, Taufiq Bey Abul Huda, now Acting Chief Minister of Transjordan, Captain Glubb and an interpreter from Amman.

3. I saw the High Commissioner on the evening of the 23rd July. He consented to open the proceedings formally the next day, but preferred to leave it to Mr. Kirkbride and myself to conduct the actual discussions on the British side. His Excellency was good enough to allow us a very complete discretion, subject to strong insistence on the necessity for a satisfactory settlement of the question of the Sirhan tribe.

4. After the High Commissioner had opened the first meeting on the 24th July, it was agreed that the only material points for discussion were:—

- (a) Tribal nationality, with special reference to the difficulties connected with the Sirhan, the Beni Atiya, the Imran and the Sherarat; and
- (b) The rules to be inserted in the schedule to the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" regarding Wisaqa (retaliatory confiscation) and Dia (blood money), as well as the subsidiary point which Fuad Bey had raised with me in Jedda regarding an addition to the rule on Araif (camels recaptured by or on behalf of original owners from previous captors) in order to bar Araif claims in respect of past raids.

5. The only serious difficulty was that created by the Saudi claim to regard the Sirhan as Saudi nationals. At the first meeting Fuad Bey was very insistent on this claim. There was no difficulty on our side in conceding one of his points, namely, that descendants of the original Sirhan still settled in the Wadi Sirhan must be regarded as being Saudi and admitting that the question at issue related only to the nomadic Sirhan. Fuad Bey relaxed to the extent of admitting that most of the latter were Transjordanian, but he attempted to establish an analogy between the Sirhan and the Beni Atiya and he proposed to propound a reserved list of nomadic Sirhan in the same way that we had propounded a reserved list of Beni Atiya during the interval between the two stages of the conference. We asked what members of the nomadic Sirhan he wished to reserve and on what grounds. Fuad Bey promised to reply at the next meeting. As regards the Imran, he expressed readiness to give up the Debur section to Transjordan. Otherwise, this first discussion on tribal nationality was inconclusive, as both sides preferred to be non-committal.

6. We were more fortunate as regards Wisaqa and Dia. We agreed to accept the Saudi view that there should be no confiscation of live-stock on either side of the frontier in order to enforce the restitution of animals believed to be unlawfully held on the other, and to adopt an amended rule establishing this principle. Fuad Bey agreed that Dia should be payable in camels at a normal rate of ten females of stated age, subject to provisions that no Dia should be payable in respect of the death of a person guilty of aggression and that the standard rate might be varied in accordance with tribal custom, when the

claimants and the defendants agreed on a different rate. The point about Araif was left in suspense.

7. In the afternoon the British and Transjordan delegates met. We agreed to abandon the Transjordan claim to the Humaidat section of the Imran, thus leaving only one section in dispute. It was decided that the best tactical course would now be, subject to any statement by Fuad Bey, to isolate the case of the Sirhan by stating our position clearly in regard to the other disputed tribes.

8. At the second formal meeting on the morning of the 25th July, Fuad Bey read a statement regarding the Sirhan. It expounded the general views of the Saudi Government and ended with an intimation that they would be prepared to produce their reserved list in due course, but in the meantime claimed five persons and their families as well as two better-known sheikhs and their "groups." Taufiq Bey replied on lines which were perhaps too wild and too legalistic. I followed with a strong statement. I said that, although my rôle was that of mediator, I could not urge the Transjordan Government to give way, as they had produced arguments based on evidence, which I had myself reviewed dispassionately, whereas Fuad Bey had produced a statement of alleged facts unsupported by a shred of evidence. I stated that the case of the Sirhan could not be dealt with by a mere reservation like the cases of other disputed tribes, because of the menace to their established rights in Wadi Sirhan. I declared our views regarding the other disputed tribes and said that, if the conference were to break down on the single question of the Sirhan, I should place on record a statement of the reasons for my attitude. On this Fuad Bey expressed readiness to abandon the two persons with "groups" and to confine his reservation to the first five persons on the Saudi list. This satisfied the Transjordan delegates, and it was arranged that Mr. Kirkbride should fly over to Amman in the afternoon to obtain the Amir's consent. This he obtained before evening.

9. At this same meeting Fuad Bey raised the question of the Ruwalla, a tribe who are in dispute between Saudi Arabia and the French in Syria. He was assured that Transjordan raised no claim to them, but it was decided after some discussion that it would be preferable not to deal with the matter in a note for publication lest it should invite comment, *e.g.*, in French circles. I offered instead to write myself a separate note stating the position. This was agreed to, *ad referendum*, as it was necessary to consult the High Commissioner and the Amir. They both concurred before next morning, subject to an observation by the Amir that he would prefer the assurance to be given with reference to present conditions, so that he should not be tied in the event of any material change in the situation as regards the Ruwalla, *e.g.*, the settlement of any portion of the tribe in Transjordan.

10. These proceedings paved the way for a settlement of the question of tribal nationality by an exchange of notes recording the maximum of agreement possible together with reservations in regard to the now limited number of cases still in dispute. The range of these reservations and the form given to them will appear from the final texts. I need mention here only one other point, namely, that at one moment Fuad Bey suggested that lists of reserved individuals should be discussed in detail after the conclusion of the treaty. He selected from the list of reserved Beni Atiya, as a single example, the name of the notorious Selim Abu Dumeyk, whom he claimed as Saudi. On our side we resisted the proposal that any general discussion of the reserved lists should be undertaken once it had proved impossible to agree on the treaty settlement itself regarding the persons concerned. We pointed out that, as reservations were being made, it would suffice to leave the parties free to invoke them in any concrete case, in which difficulty might arise owing to the disputed nationality of any individual on the lists.

11. In the course of the second meeting on the 25th July, the British and Transjordan delegates put forward a proposal for a reciprocal cancellation of claims in respect of raids from the 1st August, 1930, up to the date of signature of the treaty. It will be remembered that this proposal was approved by His Majesty's Government, with the concurrence of the Amir Abdullah during the first stage of the conference. It seemed advisable to propound it to the Saudi Government at this stage, both in order to bury the claims in question and to facilitate the settlement of the one remaining point connected with the treaty settlement proper, namely, the suggested addition to the rule on Araif. Fuad Bey received the proposal sympathetically, but said that he must refer it to the King.



12. On the afternoon of the 25th July, Fuad Bey lunched with my wife and myself, and we had a long private conversation afterwards. So far as the Transjordan negotiations were concerned, it bore principally on the British notes. Fuad Bey was chiefly worried over the possibility that the British guarantee of the fulfilment of Transjordan obligations might be affected by a revision of the 1928 treaty between Great Britain and Transjordan or by the rumoured possibility that Transjordan might be annexed to Iraq. I reassured him on the former point, and dismissed the latter suggestion as fantastic for reasons which I elaborated in some detail. I encouraged him to question the High Commissioner, with whom he was to dine privately that evening, on these subjects; and I agreed to his suggestion that he should approach the High Commissioner on two other questions not immediately connected with the negotiations, viz., the question whether Saudi Arabia might have a consul at Jerusalem with jurisdiction in Transjordan and whether the High Commissioner could be present at the proposed meeting between the Amir and Ibn Saud. Later in the day, I prepared the High Commissioner for Fuad Bey's questions. By the next morning the High Commissioner had further reassured Fuad Bey as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government in regard to Transjordan, and Fuad Bey had no difficulty in accepting His Majesty's Government's draft note on their responsibility, subject to a formal change in the preamble.

13. It now only remained to give final form to the texts. This was done at three further meetings, on the 26th and 27th July. In the course of these Fuad Bey was given a draft of a revised Transjordan letter regarding nationality, from which we omitted, in deference to the views of the Amir and Taufiq Bey, any reference to the possible effect of a change in the status of the Aqaba Maan area, leaving Fuad Bey to make that point and any other reservations in his counter-draft. No difficulty was experienced in arriving at agreed final drafts in all other cases, with the exception of the proposed exchange of letters on cancellation of claims, which Fuad Bey preferred to reserve pending the receipt of final sanction from Ibn Saud. He and Taufiq Bey agreed in principle to exchange these letters in the course of the following two or three days, in order that it might still be possible to attach them to the treaty. In the meanwhile, a formula was found to complete the rule on Araif in such a way that it would bar Araif claims in respect of any past raids, which might have formed the object of settlement between the Governments concerned, that is to say, raids already buried by the MacDonnell award and, by automatic extension, raids to be buried by the exchange of notes now contemplated.

14. There emerged from these proceedings fifteen documents, a list of which I attach. The delegates proceeded at about 5.30 p.m. on the afternoon of the 27th July to Government House. The High Commissioner there presided at a brief final meeting, at which, after short complimentary speeches had been exchanged, the texts were signed. A short agreed communiqué was issued the same evening to the effect that the treaty, the Protocol on Arbitration and certain ancillary letters had been signed and would be published after the exchange of ratifications. We had had a short discussion at the penultimate meeting as to when and where this exchange should take place. It was agreed to aim at an exchange about two months after the signature of the treaty, but the question of place was left undecided, as Taufiq Bey was unwilling, without further consideration, to commit the Transjordan Government to an exchange at Jedda, which appeared to the other delegates to be the simplest solution. Mr. Kirkbride will pursue this question.

15. I enclose copies of the notes which I signed on behalf of His Majesty's Government and which are not to be published. They include that on the Ruwala tribe, the reasons for which I have explained above. The other three follow the drafts previously prepared, subject to modifications of pure form. I obtained the concurrence of the High Commissioner in the final drafts before signing the notes. Fuad Bey handed me a reply to each note. I left the originals of his replies with the Jerusalem secretariat to be translated and in due course submitted to His Majesty's Government as part of the complete collection of texts.

16. Fuad Bey and I exchanged letters on the 26th and 27th July, communicating to each other our full powers. These were entirely formal, but I enclose, as a matter of interest, a translation of the full power given to Fuad Bey for the purpose of the exchange of Anglo-Saudi notes connected with the main treaty settlement.

17. I need add nothing to what I said in my general report on the first stage of the conference regarding the collaboration between the British and Transjordan delegates, except that Mr. Kirkbride very ably replaced Colonel Cox. We were all greatly indebted to the Jerusalem secretariat, the members of which gave us unstinted assistance throughout, and more especially in the intensive work of reducing the texts to final shape.

18. Despite the clash over the Sirhan, which threatened to be serious, but which ended in a kind of Tweedledum and Tweedledee battle, the atmosphere of the proceedings in Jerusalem was at least as favourable as that of the first stage in Jedda. This was greatly due to the hospitality of the High Commissioner, who gave an official dinner on the 23rd July, and another dinner-party on the 26th July, besides entertaining Fuad Bey privately on the evening of the 25th July. The proceedings were happily rounded off by a visit to Amman, where the Amir Abdullah entertained General Wauchope, the delegates, my wife, and some other guests at luncheon on the 28th July. His Highness showed admirable courtesy. Taufiq Bey drove Fuad Bey over from Jerusalem, and they were met at Suweilah by the Mayor of Amman and another official. The Amir placed Fuad Bey on his left at luncheon, and they engaged in animated conversation during a good part of the meal. Towards its close His Highness made a graceful speech, in which he welcomed the conclusion of the treaty, expressed appreciation of the efforts of those who had promoted it, and referred in cordial terms to Ibn Saud and his family. Fuad Bey, in an apt reply, paid a tribute to the sacrifices which the Hashimites had made for the Arab cause in the past and the further proofs of goodwill shown in connexion with the present treaty by the Amir and his Government. He echoed the Amir's tribute to the High Commissioner and others, including His Majesty's Government, who had combined to produce so happy a result. Before leaving Amman I sent a message to the Amir through his private secretary expressing my personal appreciation of his attitude and of the felicitous tone of his speech.

19. Fuad Bey displayed a thoroughly good spirit during the proceedings in Jerusalem, and I am glad to be able to state that he made a very favourable personal impression on the High Commissioner. He made no attempt to enlarge the area of discussion by reverting to the points mentioned in paragraphs 18-20 of my despatch No. 131 of the 8th May regarding the first stage of the conference. In this connexion, I may state, with reference to paragraph 25 of that despatch, that General Wauchope and I agreed that, in view of recent developments, the question of Hashimite properties in the Hejaz need not be pursued at present; and, with reference to the relevant portion of paragraph 19 and subsequent correspondence, that Mr. Kirkbride and I decided to postpone the questions of article 13 of the Hadda Agreement and the possibility of a simple commercial agreement unless Fuad Bey should mention them, which he did not do.

20. I have adverted incidentally above to two other matters not directly connected with the treaty settlement, namely: (a) The wish of the Saudi Government to have a consul at Jerusalem with jurisdiction in Transjordan, and (b) the proposed meeting between the Amir Abdullah and Ibn Saud. The first of these is a purely Palestinian question and will doubtless be dealt with by the High Commissioner separately. As regards the proposed meeting of rulers, I had a general exchange of views with General Wauchope, and I propose to pursue the matter in personal discussion with your Department in the near future.

21. I will deal separately with one matter which arose during the recent proceedings, namely, the desire expressed by the Amir Abdullah to make presents to my wife and myself on the occasion of our visit to Amman.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Mr. Kirkbride, my colleague during the discussions at Jerusalem. I would suggest that, if you see no objection, further copies should be sent to the High Commissioner and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

P.S.—When drafting this despatch I overlooked one point of some importance, namely, that on the 27th July Fuad Bey manifested distinct anxiety to allay the feeling created by the Saudi attitude in regard to the Sirhan. Taking Mr. Kirkbride aside, he assured him that the action taken by the local



authorities in the Wadi Sirhan to deprive members of the tribe of their rights of property had been unauthorised and would not be repeated. In separate conversation with me the same afternoon Fuad Bey said it was a pity that so much had been made of Sheikh Yussuf Yasin's language about the Sirhan on the 4th May and that Sheikh Yussuf had spoken in jest. I admitted that Sheikh Yussuf had made his remarks during a sort of interlude in a formal meeting, at a moment when neither Fuad Bey nor I were actually present. I added that I myself had not taken the matter very seriously and had tried to attenuate its effect, but that Sheikh Yussuf's language had undoubtedly created a most unfavourable impression and that it had therefore been necessary to emphasise its unfortunate character.

A. R.

## Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

*List of Documents Signed on July 27, 1933.*

- | No. | Document.  |
|-----|--|
| 1.  | Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage." Signed by Taufiq Bey and Fuad Bey.                                   |
| 2.  | Schedule to treaty: Rules for Guidance of Special Officers. See note (b).                                      |
| 3.  | Protocol on arbitration. Signed by Taufiq Bey and Fuad Bey.  |
| 4.  | Transjordan letter on tribal nationality. Signed by Taufiq Bey.  |
| 5.  | Saudi letter on tribal nationality. Signed by Fuad Bey.  |
| 6.  | Saudi letter on meetings of special officers. Signed by Fuad Bey.  |
| 7.  | Transjordan letter on meetings of special officers. Signed by Taufiq Bey.                                      |
| 8.  | British note on responsibility for fulfilment of Transjordan obligations. Signed by Sir A. Ryan.               |
| 9.  | Saudi acknowledgment of No. 8. Signed by Fuad Bey.   |
| 10. | British note on crossing of frontier by British officials in Transjordan. Signed by Sir A. Ryan.               |
| 11. | Saudi acknowledgment of No. 10. Signed by Fuad Bey.  |
| 12. | British note on diplomatic and consular relations between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. Signed by Sir A. Ryan. |
| 13. | Saudi acknowledgment of No. 12. Signed by Fuad Bey.  |
| 14. | British note on Ruwalla tribe. Signed by Sir A. Ryan.  |
| 15. | Saudi acknowledgment of No. 14. Signed by Fuad Bey.  |

## NOTES:—

(a) The official texts of all the above are in Arabic, with the exception of Nos. 8, 10, 12 and 14, the only texts of which are in English.

(b) I am not sure whether the signatories of No. 1 attached separate signatures to No. 2.

(c) It seemed probable on the 27th July that the above documents would be completed by a Transjordan-Saudi exchange of letters on the cancellation of raiding claims up to date (see paragraph 13 of the covering despatch) in time for these letters to be annexed to the treaty. The form of these further letters was agreed *ad referendum*.

A. R.

August 3, 1933.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

*Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza (No. 8 on List).*

Your Excellency,  
(After compliments.)

Jerusalem, July 27, 1933.

IN view of the fact that a Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" and a Protocol on Arbitration have been signed this day by your Excellency and his Excellency Taufiq Bey Abul Huda, as plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, I am authorised by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to state that under article 5 of the agreement of the 28th February, 1928, between His

Britannic Majesty and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, the latter undertook to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty in all matters concerning the foreign relations of Transjordan. I am to add that having regard to this article and to their special position in regard to Transjordan, as defined in the preamble of the said agreement of the 28th February, 1928, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider themselves responsible for the fulfilment by the Amir and Government of Transjordan of the obligations entered into by his Highness the Amir in the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage," the Protocol on Arbitration and the annexed documents which have been signed to-day. It is understood that the assurance hereby given by me on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that they accept this responsibility will become operative as soon as the treaty and protocol in question come into force.

With highest respects,  
ANDREW RYAN.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

*Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza (No. 10 on List).*

Jerusalem, July 27, 1933.

Your Excellency,  
(After compliments.)

WITH reference to article 11 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed this day by your Excellency and his Excellency Taufiq Bey Abdul Huda as plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, I have the honour to state that I am authorised by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to agree on their behalf that the rule laid down in the said article shall apply equally to persons in Transjordan in the employment of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

With highest respects,  
ANDREW RYAN.

## Enclosure 4 in No. 14.

*Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza (No. 12 on List).*

Jerusalem, July 27, 1933.

Your Excellency,  
(After compliments.)

IN the course of the negotiations relative to the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" signed to-day by the plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, it was agreed that the question of diplomatic and consular relations between the two high contracting parties should be dealt with in notes to be exchanged between your Excellency and myself, having regard to the special position of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in regard to the foreign relations of His Highness the Amir.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, acting with the concurrence of His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, have authorised me to come to the following understanding on the subject, namely:—

- That the diplomatic representation of the interests of Saudi Arabia in Transjordan shall be exercised by the diplomatic representative of the former country in the United Kingdom; and
- That the consular interests of Saudi Arabia in Transjordan shall be exercised by a consul, whom the Government of Saudi Arabia shall have the right to appoint at Amman, on the understanding that, if such a consul is appointed, the Government of Transjordan shall have the right to appoint a consul at Jedda.

I shall be grateful if your Excellency will confirm the above understanding on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

With highest respects,  
ANDREW RYAN.



Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

*Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza (No. 14 on List.)*Your Excellency,  
(After compliments.)

Jerusalem, July 27, 1933.

IN the course of the discussions relative to the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" which has been signed this day by your Excellency and his Excellency Taufiq Bey Abul Huda, as plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, you inquired as to the views of the Government of Transjordan regarding the nationality of the Ruwala tribe. Having obtained the necessary information from the authorities concerned, I am in a position to state with the concurrence of His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, that the Government of Transjordan do not in present circumstances regard any section of the Ruwala as being of Transjordanian nationality.

With highest respects,  
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

*Translation of Fuad Bey's Full Power.*

(After compliments.)

WE, by virtue of this document, empower and charge Fuad Bey Hamza, a member of our Council of Ministers and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, to carry out any negotiations which may be necessary with any delegate or delegates of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain in respect of the settlement which it is proposed to conclude between us and His Highness Amir Abdullah, Amir of Transjordan. We further empower him to sign and exchange any documents which it may be necessary to exchange with the said delegate or delegates.

Given at our Palace at the Venerable City of Mecca this 27th day of Safar, 1352 (21st June, 1933).

By Command of His Majesty.

ABDUL AZIZ.

Safar 27, 1352 (June 21, 1933).

FEISAL,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 4540/487/25]

No. 15.

*Memorandum respecting Petroleum in Arabia (as revised by Petroleum Department.—(Received in Foreign Office, August 11, 1933.)*

(A)—Petroleum Prospects of Arabia.

(1) *LITTORAL Region of the Hejaz*.—Petroliferous deposits and seepage have long been known to exist in this area. Interest in it was stimulated by Mr. Twitchell's survey in 1931 in the coastal region north of Jedda, but this area seems to have dropped into the background of late. In a report furnished by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the Petroleum Department in 1932, it was pointed out that the general structure of the Red Sea is known geologically as a "Rift Valley," that is, a sunken valley bounded on either side by rift faults. The prospects of finding oil in commercial quantity are considered to be remote, though not entirely non-existent, and even after a complete survey, "Rift Valley conditions" are such that any test drilling would be very speculative.

(2) *Hasa and Koweit Neutral Zone*.—It has been thought for many years that this region might produce oil. The idea that it may be underlain by rocks of the same geological age as those of the Iraq and Persian oil-fields, and that potential oil structures might exist extending from Koweit to Qatar inclusive, has been encouraged by the striking of oil in quantity in Bahrein in 1932.

(3) *The Farsan Islands and Asir*.—Interest in these islands and/or the mainland of Asir, from the point of view of petroleum potentialities, seems to date from before the Great War. Operations were actually started on one of the islands by the Red Sea Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Shell Group, in 1926 or early in 1927, but drilling operations were subsequently abandoned as unsuccessful. As to Asir, see (D) (2).

(4) *Mokalla*.—In 1928-29 the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company (Shell Group) carried out investigations, and reached the conclusion that the petroleum prospects were quite unfavourable.

(5) *Muscat*.—The Anglo-Persian Oil Company abandoned this area as unfavourable in 1925-26.

(B) *Interested or Potentially Interested Companies.*

(1) *The Iraq Petroleum Company*.—The Turkish Petroleum Company (now the Iraq Petroleum Company) was formed in 1912, when the Deutsche Bank became associated with the National Bank of Turkey and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company (Royal Dutch Shell Group), in order to press certain claims to oil rights in Bagdad and Mosul, including those attached to the Bagdad Railway Concession. The chief rival of the new company at that time was the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which had for some time been in negotiation with the Turkish Government. In 1914 an agreement was entered into providing for the reconstitution of the Turkish Petroleum Company, from which the National Bank of Turkey withdrew, the new participants being the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 50 per cent.; the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company and the Deutsche Bank, 25 per cent. each. This agreement also provided that the three groups should give undertakings not to be interested directly or indirectly in the production of oil in the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia (excluding Egypt, Koweit and the Transferred Territories), except through the Turkish Petroleum Company. This agreement was signed by the British and German Governments, and by the groups concerned. As the Turkish Petroleum Company was then predominantly British, this arrangement had the effect of securing the whole of this area to interests which were predominantly British. After the war American and French interests were admitted into the Iraq Petroleum Company and the arrangement as regards non-competition between the groups composing the Iraq Petroleum Company was confirmed in an agreement between the groups, entered into in 1928. This was a private agreement between the groups with which the British Government was not associated. Under this agreement a line was drawn round Arabia, Palestine and Asia Minor, which excluded the Sultanate of Koweit and the Farsan Islands, but included Bahrein, and an area was thus defined within which the various groups constituting the Iraq Petroleum Company agreed that they would not seek for or obtain oil concessions otherwise than through the Iraq Petroleum Company or its nominee. On the admission of French and American interests the share capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company was distributed as follows:—

	Percentage.
Anglo-Persian Oil Company	23.75
Royal Dutch Shell	23.75
French Group	23.75
American Group <sup>(1)</sup>	23.75
C. S. Gulbenkian	5.00
	100.00

As the Royal Dutch Shell is 60 per cent. Dutch and 40 per cent. British, the British shareholding in the company now only represents about 33½ per cent. The Iraq Petroleum Company is still technically a British company, as in article 32 of its convention with the Government of Iraq the company must be

<sup>(1)</sup> In 1932 the American shareholding in the American group (Near East Development Corporation) was held in the following proportions:—

	Percentage.
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey	41½
Standard Oil Company of New York (now the Socony-Vacuum Company)	41½
Gulf Oil Corporation of Pennsylvania	16½



and remain a British company, registered in Great Britain, and the chairman must at all times be a British subject. But the position is different from a British point of view, from that which formerly obtained when the company was British in fact as well as in name.

Apart from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Burmah Oil Company, there are no really large oil companies which are entirely British, and which could compete with the big groups represented on the Iraq Petroleum Company. The Burmah Oil Company has never been inclined to undertake exploration work outside India. There may, however, be some instances where the Iraq Petroleum Company is not prepared to seek concessions in the reserved area, and where the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, either by itself or in association with one or more of the other groups, may be allowed to acquire concessions.

(2) *British Oil Development Company and Mosul Oil-fields (Limited)*.—On the 20th April, 1932, the Iraq Government granted an oil concession to the British Oil Development Company (Limited) over the western portion of Iraq. The concession is for a period of seventy-five years and covers an area of about 40,000 square miles, comprising all Iraq lands situated west of the River Tigris and north of the thirty-third parallel of latitude. A special law confirming the British Oil Development Concession was passed and published in the *Official Gazette* on the 29th May, 1932. This is reckoned as the date of the commencement of the concession. The company must be and remain a British company registered in Great Britain, and the chairman must be a British subject. There is, however, a large foreign interest in the company. The British Oil Development Company was first registered in 1928 with a nominal capital of £82,500, the original directors being Sir Edward Manville (chairman), Sir Edward Mountain (chairman of the Eagle Star and British Dominions Insurance Company) (Sir E. Mountain subsequently became chairman of the British Oil Development Company), the late Admiral Lord Wester Wemyss, W. R. Brown (representing Lord Inverforth), General Sir A. Mola (Italy), three representatives of the Italian Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli, and E. C. Simmons (solicitor). At some stage, but when it actually occurred is not clear from the information available, German and Franco-Swiss interests were also included.

The capital in 1931 was stated to be held in the following proportions:—

	Percentage.
British	52
Italian	24
German	12
Franco-Swiss	12
	100

In December 1932 a new company was formed, known as "Mosul Oil-fields (Limited)," to acquire the shares in the British Oil Development Company and to carry on its operations. The company had a nominal capital of £1 million in £1 shares. In March 1933 the board of this company was reconstructed, and the Foreign Office was informed by the company that the directorate was as follows:—

Viscount Goschen (*chairman*).

Other British directors (5): Sir Edward Mountain (deputy chairman), the late Admiral Lord Wester Wemyss, Lord Glenconner (director of Hambro's Bank), W. R. Brown (director of British Union Oil Company), and Sir Alwin Dickinson (formerly the representative of the British Government on the British Phosphate Commission) as managing director.

Italian directors (3): Professor Alessandro Martelli, Gr. Uff. Arnaldo Petretti, and Gr. Uff. Vittorio Amoretti (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli).

German directors (2): Herr Thomas Brown and Herr M. Hirschfeld.

French director (1): M. Paul Girod.

Iraq Government director (1): Jafar Pasha-el-Askeri; a total of thirteen.

The company is not known to be at present interested in Saudi Arabia.

(3) *The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (A.P.O.C.)*.—See at (1) above as to A.P.O.C.'s participation in the I.P.C. and the restrictions imposed thereby. The

A.P.O.C. has, however, in addition to its main concession in Persia, which has been confirmed by a revised agreement with the Persian Government, dated the 29th April, 1933, a separate interest also in Iraq, where, through its subsidiary, the Khaniqin Oil Company, it has a concession in the "Transferred Territories" under agreements with the Iraq Government on the 30th August, 1925, and the 24th May, 1926. It also has freedom of action in Koweit, where it is competing for a concession with the Eastern and General Syndicate, representing the Gulf Oil Corporation.

(4) *The Eastern and General Syndicate*.—This is a British company registered in August 1920 with a nominal capital of £125,300. The chairman and managing director is E. W. Janson, and the other directors are F. W. Gamble, H. T. Adams and P. C. Tarbutt. It has, at various times, acquired concessions in Bahrein and Arabia, but has never carried out any really effective work, its sole object being apparently to obtain concessions and traffic in them to other parties. The company at one time approached the Anglo-Persian without success, and in 1927 and 1929 transferred its interests to the Eastern Gulf Oil Corporation of U.S.A. (see under (5) below). Its local representative is Major F. Holmes.

(5) *The Gulf Oil Corporation* is a wholly American concern, working in the Near East through its subsidiary, the Eastern Gulf Oil Company. The Gulf Oil Corporation is a powerful company engaged in producing, transporting, refining and marketing oil throughout the United States, east of the Rocky Mountains. It is also engaged in producing oil in Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, and markets oil extensively in Europe. The principal interest in it is that of the Mellon family, who are said to have come in originally as financiers and to have ended up with an 80 per cent. interest. The Gulf is an independent company, but it is interested with the Socony-Vacuum Company (a recent merger of the Standard Oil Company of New York and Vacuum Oil Company), and S.O., New Jersey, in the I.P.C. It is also interested with the Eastern and General Syndicate in a possible concession in Koweit. In 1927 it obtained an option from the Eastern and General on the Bahrein Concession, which the syndicate had secured in December 1925. Eventually, however, this concession was taken over by the Standard Oil of California, presumably because the Gulf, as a member of the I.P.C., could not hold it. In 1929 it acquired from the Eastern and General Syndicate an option over any rights which the syndicate might possess in Hasa, the neutral zone and Koweit. It could only operate concessions in Hasa and probably also in the neutral zone with the permission of the I.P.C.

(6) *Standard Oil Company of California*.—After the break-up of the Standard Oil Group in 1912, many members of the group became independent, including the above company. This company is one of the largest oil companies in the United States, and is a complete unit, being engaged in producing, refining, transporting and marketing crude oil and refined products. The company is engaged in production in eight States in the United States, and has oil properties in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. The Standard Oil Company of California and the Gulf are independent of each other, although there is a general impression that the various Standard Oil Companies still have some community of interest and are prepared to co-operate in matters of general policy. At times, however, there has been keen competition between them. As pointed out above, the Standard Oil Company of California holds the Bahrein Concession, which it operates through the Bahrein Petroleum Company, a Canadian Corporation. It has also just secured from Ibn Saud an oil concession in Hasa, full particulars of which are not yet available.

#### (C)—Past Concessions affecting Saudi Arabia.

(1) *Northern Hejaz*.—It is possible that certain concessionary rights were granted in Turkish times, but this subject has not been explored in the Legation. There was talk of a concession under the Hashimite régime and Mr. Philby was one of those interested, but there is no evidence of a Hashimite concession having been granted. Any interest of Mr. Philby's is presumably identical with that of Midian (Limited), an inactive but still going concern, closely allied with Sharqieh (Limited).

(2) *Jedda (Hejaz, West Coast of Arabia)*.—Two American engineers (Twitchell and Crane) carried out investigations for oil in 1931. The Petroleum



Department brought the matter to the notice of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, who replied that the geological prospects in this area were not regarded as favourable (see under paragraph (A) (1)).

(3) *Muscat*.—The Anglo-Persian Oil Company obtained a concession in 1925 to prospect for oil for a period of two years with the right to a mining lease, but this concession has now lapsed.

(4) *Mokalla*.—The Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company started negotiations for a concession in 1928-29, but the matter was not proceeded with as they reached the conclusion that the prospects of discovering petroleum were quite unfavourable.

(5) *Hasa*.—The Anglo-Persian Oil Company applied, probably for prospecting rights only, to Ibn Saud in 1921. The E.G.S. came into the field later. At the beginning of 1923 Major Holmes submitted a draft concession to Sir P. Cox. In March 1923, the latter, acting under instructions from home, suggested to Ibn Saud that he should decide nothing until he had had an opportunity of considering an offer by A.P.O.C., whom His Majesty's Government considered to have a prior claim. About the same period or earlier the two companies were in touch with each other with a view to sharing interests, and it is stated that at one point they went through a pretence of breaking off negotiations so that Ibn Saud might give the concession to E.G.S. in ignorance of the interest of A.P.O.C., to whom he was hostile. Be that as it may, E.G.S. got the concession, and on the 6th May, 1923, Ibn Saud granted an oil concession (including the Qatif and Jubail areas) to the Eastern and General Syndicate. Major Holmes gave an undertaking not to sell any part of the concession to the A.P.O.C., and His Majesty's Government thought of trying to induce Ibn Saud to cancel this restriction, but the proposal was abandoned in May 1924. Thus the A.P.O.C. were left out in the cold.

The final terms of the concession to E.G.S. are not known, but there are indications that it followed the draft which had been submitted to Sir P. Cox. That draft, and probably the actual concession, included *inter alia*, provision for the following:—

- (a) Lapse of the concession if E.G.S. should fail to start operations in a specified manner within nine months.
- (b) Government right to cancel the concession after any continuous cessation of operations for more than twenty months.
- (c) Payment of £3,000 a year for "special protection" in half-yearly payments, to begin sixty days after date.
- (d) Payment of £6,000 under pain of nullity of the concession, sixty days after date.
- (e) Arbitration in the event of any dispute.

It is not clear what, if anything, E.G.S. did to implement the undertaking to start operations. It is known that on the 26th April, 1924, two geologists of theirs left Koweit to make a preliminary survey in "Nejd, Koweit Neutral Zone and Hasa," but it is not known to what this led. Anyhow, Major Holmes was in difficulties with Ibn Saud in October 1925, because, according to Bushire telegram to the Colonial Office of the 31st October, (a) Ibn Saud had refused to alter a clerical error of date, and (b) E.G.S. would advance no more money. There was also apparently difficulty in obtaining financial support in London owing to the non-existence of British diplomatic representation at Nejd. It was probably at this time or a little later that E.G.S. and Major Holmes estranged Ibn Saud by refusing a payment which he claimed.

There is no evidence that Ibn Saud formally cancelled the concession at this juncture. When, however, E.G.S. entered into an agreement with the Gulf Company on the 30th November, 1927, in regard to this, the Neutral Zone Concession and the hoped-for concession in Koweit, they admitted that both the former were "at least subject to forfeiture and cancellation, if not actually null and void."

The negotiations which led to the grant of a concession in Hasa to the Standard Oil of California are understood to have been conducted by that company directly, and not through the intervention of the E.G.S.

(6) *Koweit Neutral Zone*.—On the 17th May, 1924, an oil concession is alleged to have been granted jointly by Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Koweit to the E.G.S. The E.G.S., by an agreement of the 30th November, 1927, transferred any

rights which it might possess or acquire or which could be reinstated in Hasa or the Neutral Zone as well as in Koweit to the Eastern Gulf Oil Company. The history of the concession is somewhat obscure. A recent Colonial Office memorandum concludes from a review of the known facts the "impression . . . that Ibn Saud did actually grant the concession on his own without the consent of the Sheikh of Koweit." As against this, E.G.S. definitely claimed to have got the concession from both, and it seems hardly likely that they would have committed themselves to this statement if it were untrue, in their definite legal agreement with the Gulf Company of the 30th November, 1927, as they certainly did. In any case, however, the grounds for considering this concession to have lapsed are even stronger than in the case of the Hasa Concession. E.G.S. not only admitted in the agreement with Gulf that it was like the other "at least subject to forfeiture," &c., but stated in a letter to the Colonial Office of the 19th December, 1928, that it had "never been made operative."

The Sheikh of Koweit's account of this concession is given in a recent despatch from the Political Agent dated the 6th July, 1933, which states that the Political Resident had an interview with the sheikh and discussed the matter. The sheikh's recollection was that Ibn Saud gave the Hasa Concession proper to Major Holmes in the spring of 1923, its chief clause being that unless Major Holmes started work within three years the concession would lapse. Ibn Saud wrote in the summer of 1923 and sent the sheikh a draft joint concession in respect of the Koweit Neutral Zone, which he wished to give to Major Holmes's company, the E.G.S., and asking the sheikh to sign it. His Majesty's Government informed the sheikh that he could sign the joint concession. The concession was actually signed in April 1924, and consisted of only four pages, and it was duly sent on to Ibn Saud. About a year afterwards Major Holmes had a disagreement with Ibn Saud, who informed Major Holmes that the joint Neutral Zone Concession was there and then cancelled. Ever since the Sheikh of Koweit has assumed the joint concession to be a dead letter, that is to say, from about April 1925. The Sheikh of Koweit has been unable to ascertain whether Ibn Saud has included the Neutral Zone in the Hasa Concession recently granted to the Standard Oil Company of California.

(7) *Farsan Islands, now also a part of Saudi Arabia*.—E.G.S. would appear to have obtained some sort of a concession for the Farsans (and possibly the mainland of Asir) from Hasan-al-Idrisi in 1926. It is not clear what became of this concession, if the grant was complete, but it was superseded by a concession for the Farsans given by the Idrisi on the 25th September, 1926, to a Mr. Cooper, who marketed it to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company (Royal Dutch Shell Group). The latter formed the Red Sea Petroleum Company to work it. This company started operations of some importance at Zifaf Island. The Idrisi, acting, it was thought at the time, under Italian influence, but more probably under that of Ibn Saud, made difficulties in the summer of 1927. After abortive efforts by the company to overcome them, Ibn Saud came forward ostensibly in the rôle of honest broker between the Idrisi, now his vassal, and the company. A conference held at Wizan in December 1927 under his auspices between the representatives of the company and the Idrisi was again abortive. Ibn Saud eventually intimated "a decision in the question of the dispute which we were asked to settle between the Red Sea Petroleum Company and the Idrisi Government" to the effect that a new concession should be drawn up and that in the meantime it would be undesirable to accede to a request which the company had put forward for permission to transfer their operations from Zifaf to Great Farsan. He suggested that the company should send a representative to Jedda to negotiate the revised concession. On his persisting in this attitude the company decided to withdraw from the islands and in September 1928 they removed all material under the auspices of H.M.S. *Dahlia*. It must be assumed that this terminated any rights under the Cooper Concession. The Shell Company has recently stated that it is not interested to reopen operations in the Farsan Islands.

#### (D)—Present Position.

Whatever view might possibly be held as to the legal position in regard to past concessions, it is quite certain that Ibn Saud believes himself to be quit of



all of them and he is probably right. The position in regard to the various areas may be summed up as follows:—

(1) *Northern Hejaz*.—Midian (Limited), closely associated with Sharqieh (Limited) or some other concern, may have had rights in this area, but there is no reason to think that they survive. No one seems to be actively interested at present.

(2) *Asir*.—Ibn Saud in June 1933 intimated that he would be prepared to consider offers for a concession from British companies. The matter was referred by the Petroleum Department to the I.P.C. within whose sphere of influence Asir fell and who were the only company with any British interests who were likely to be prepared to consider the matter. The I.P.C. have intimated that they are prepared to send out geologists to make an examination if they can secure the necessary rights without payment during the exploratory period.

(3) *Hasa*.—After some competition between the Iraq Petroleum Company (who sent a representative out to negotiate in 1933) and the Standard Oil Company of California, a concession was ultimately granted to the latter. It is understood from information obtained from the I.P.C. that the concession was signed on the 29th May, 1933, the terms being an initial payment of £30,000 (gold) and a further deferred payment of £20,000 (gold) with a royalty at 5s. per ton.

(4) *Qatar*.—The A.P.O.C., acting on their own initiative but with the object of transfer to the I.P.C., secured an exclusive option from the sheikh to carry out geological investigations for a period of two years with the right to apply for a concession within that period. A draft concession approved by the I.P.C. has recently been submitted by the A.P.O.C. to the sheikh.

(5) *Koweit Neutral Zone*.—The present position in regard to this area is not clear. It may be true that Major Holmes's primary object in coming to Jedda in April 1933 was to obtain Ibn Saud's consent to a regrant, so far as the Saudi Government are concerned, of a concession for this area. But it may also be the case that so far as Ibn Saud is concerned, he has included the Neutral Zone with the Hasa Concession. This position is at present under consideration by His Majesty's Government.

(6) *Farsan Islands*.—There has been no activity since 1928 and both the Shell and the Anglo-Persian have recently informed the Petroleum Department that they are not interested any longer in obtaining a concession over these islands.

August 5, 1933.

[E 4697/469/25]

No. 16.

Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 233.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 25, 1933.

WITH reference to my telegrams No. 141 and No. 143 of the 21st and 22nd July respectively, relative to the case of two girls who took refuge with this Legation on the 15th July as escaped slaves seeking manumission, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum prepared by Captain B. W. Seager, in which the course of events is succinctly summarised.

2. The case presented certain unusual features from the outset, but the attitude of the local authorities was not of a nature calculated to assist a prompt and detailed study of it. The discussion described by Captain Seager as having passed between himself and the representative of the Governor of Jedda, corresponded very closely with that between Sheikh Ali Taha and myself, and in each case was most harmonious in character, although it was plain, from the unusual energy with which the local authorities were pursuing the question, that powerful interests were involved and that considerable pressure was being brought to bear upon the Governor.

3. In spite of the assurances of the Saudi authorities, I felt bound to insist on a full enquiry into the facts before the girls left the shelter of the Legation. It was a little difficult to detect a motive which would lead free girls voluntarily to declare themselves slaves, whilst the motive actuating a slave-owner in representing runaway slaves to be free in order to obtain possession of them again

was not so far to seek. The girls' story, moreover, was circumstantial and consistent, well-told and tenaciously held.

4. I invited the co-operation of the local authorities in a full investigation, and, as this was withheld, authorised the enquiry to proceed at once independently. The proposal made by Sheikh Ali Taha that I should agree to the case being investigated by the local Sharia Court I felt unable to accept, particularly as he attached the condition that the girls should in the meantime be handed over to the local authorities. I, however, referred this question to you in my first telegram under reference, as I felt that a ruling on a point, which, so far as we are aware here, has never arisen before, would be useful.

5. The memorandum describes the course of the investigation and the eleventh-hour confession of the girls. I saw Sheikh Ali Taha shortly after the true facts had been established, arranged to hand the girls over to him, and pointed out that much ado would have been spared the Legation if the Saudi authorities had shown a readier response to our request for their collaboration—with which Parthian shot the incident closed.

6. The question of principle, in regard to the Sharia Court, remains; and I would be grateful if, in due course, I might be favoured with your views for guidance should a similar case arise in future.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Memorandum by Captain Seager.

ON the morning of the 20th July I received a telephone call from Sheikh Ali Taha, the Deputy-Governor and Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who, speaking in his capacity as Deputy-Governor, informed me that two sisters who had taken refuge in the Chancery building on the 15th July last were not slave girls, and therefore he would be glad if they could be handed back at once to the local authorities. In reply, I told him that his news was rather surprising, as, according to the girls' interrogatories, there seemed little reason to doubt that they were slaves. However, in view of the fact that the local Government contested the case, the Legation would be glad, as usual, to see any alleged relatives or guardians of the girls at the Chancery, who would doubtless soon prove their claim to our satisfaction. Ali Taha demurred to this, and stated that detailed enquiries made by all the local authorities concerned, including the police, had elicited the fact that the girls were free and had never been slaves. He added that if we could not accept the local Government's word for this, we could send the girls to the Sharia Court, where they could soon be identified as ordinary citizens. I hastened to assure Sheikh Ali Taha at this point that we had no reason at all to doubt that the local Government's enquiry had been comprehensive and painstaking, but that we, on our side, wished to complete our own investigations. In these circumstances, I prayed him to assist us by allowing the case to take its normal course, viz., by the early attendance here of an alleged relative or relatives, guardian or guardians, with whom we could amicably discuss the matter in the first instance. I asked the sheikh here to co-operate with us in a matter which, on the face of it, appeared comparatively simple. But Sheikh Ali Taha again demurred. He said that the girls were free, and, if necessary, the local Government would give the Legation a certificate to this effect. In reply I pointed out that these girls had taken refuge at the Chancery; that we had at the moment every reason to believe that they were slaves, and, in these circumstances, all we asked for was for their co-operation in assisting us to complete our own formalities. I thanked him for his offer, but told him that, though we appreciated the Government's good faith, we could not, for the time being, solve the problem in this way. (At this juncture Sheikh Ali Taha rang off, saying that he would return to the charge later, after he had consulted his chief.)

2. I took the opportunity of this respite to send for the two girls. I told them that we had now heard that there was every reason to believe that they were not slaves, and that, if it were found out later that they were in fact free girls, the consequences to them would be serious. Neither blandishments nor



wiles, nor hectoring nor intimidation would shake them. The younger sister burst into tears during the cross-examination, but separately and jointly they reiterated that they were slave girls, and that their interrogation papers, drawn up five days previously, represented the true history of the case. I saw that it was useless to continue. I sent them away, and told them to talk over the matter together for a quarter of an hour, when I would send for them again and expect to hear the truth. (I made it easy for them to confess gracefully and without penalty, and dilated on the fearsome consequences of an obstinate persistence in their story.)

3. Sheikh Ali Taha rang up again a few minutes later. We went over the same ground. I persisted that alleged relatives or guardians should visit the Chancery in the first instance, while he insisted that the two girls should be sent to the Sharia Court at once. As no progress was made, Ali Taha rang off. A few minutes later I went to discuss the matter with head of Chancery, when we were interrupted by a telephone call from Sheikh Ali Taha, who asked for an interview with Mr. Calvert. I told him that I would speak to Mr. Calvert, and give him a reply in due course.

4. In consultation with Mr. Oppenheim I sent for the two girls as arranged and again saw them separately and jointly. We saw the younger sister first. I asked her to remember our previous talk, and to tell me finally whether she was a slave girl. In reply she stated clearly and categorically that she was a slave girl, and had been treated as such in her master's house. I put further questions, but again nothing would shake her testimony. We then saw the other sister, and repeated the process, with the same result. Further questions were put to both of them, but they remained adamant. In view of their immovable attitude, we terminated the examination and reported the matter to Mr. Calvert, who agreed to see Sheikh Ali Taha at 12.45 P.M.

5. I set private enquiries on foot the same evening (the 20th July), and on the morning of the 21st July, in order to get ampler information about the girls' position in their alleged master's house. The result of these enquiries indicated that (a) there was reason to believe that the girls were not slaves; and (b) they were reputed to be of bad moral character. As soon as I heard this I made every effort to get hold of the girls' alleged relatives in order to complete the investigations before the local Government returned to the charge. I discovered that a British Indian well known to me occupied a house next to that of their alleged master. I urged him to get into immediate touch with any of the girls' alleged relatives and to send them to me at the earliest opportunity. On the evening of the 21st July Sheikh Ali Taha asked for a further interview with Mr. Calvert, when it was arranged that the further meeting should take place at midday on the 22nd July.

6. At 9 A.M. on the morning of the 22nd July the girls' alleged mother, uncle and two brothers called on me at the Chancery, where, in conjunction with Mr. Oppenheim and with the assistance of the Legation translator, a detailed investigation was held.

7. The girls were summoned and confronted with their alleged relatives, but for two hours no progress was made, in spite of repeated questioning and cross-examining. This was in part due to the stupidity of the alleged relatives and to the defiant and obstinate attitude of the girls. Eventually it was decided to question each witness separately and alone, which would, at the same time, give the girls an opportunity of talking over their difference with their alleged relatives in the corridor. No progress was made for another half hour, until, all expedients having apparently been exhausted, both girls were summoned and questioned for the last time. Without further ado they brazenly confessed that they were not slave girls, and that they had taken refuge at the Chancery in order to avoid a beating or worse at the hands of their brother for an act of indiscretion committed when he was away in Taif.

8. This eleventh-hour confession was a veritable anti-climax. It is assumed that the girls had patched up their family differences in the corridor, and had confessed when it suited them. As it was nearing midday, I informed Mr. Calvert of the result of the enquiry, and at 1.10 P.M., on instructions from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, I handed over the two girls to a policeman, who had been sent round to Chancery by Sheikh Ali Taha.

9. This case could have been settled very much earlier if the local authorities had co-operated with us and sent the girls' relatives to Chancery

two days previously. This they would not do, with a result that the incident showed signs of assuming more serious dimensions. As for the girls, they proved consummate and facile liars, and succeeded in holding their relatives at bay for close on three hours. This case would appear to create a precedent. It would be interesting to know what our position would have been if these girls had in fact been slave girls and had maintained their claim to the end.

[E 4699/487/25]

No. 17.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 235.)

Jedda, July 25, 1933.

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's telegram No. 108 of the 30th May last, relative to the grant of the Hasa Oil Concession to the Standard Oil Company of California, I have the honour to inform you that the official announcement was made on the 10th July by Government decree published in a special supplement of the *Umm-al-Qura* of that date. The decree, a copy of which is enclosed herewith,<sup>(1)</sup> appeared unaccompanied by the terms of the concession, but announced that an agreement would in fact shortly be published and alluded to a "special agreement," which was also to be brought into force.

2. The *Umm-al-Qura* duly published, in two instalments, in its issues of the 14th and 21st July, the terms of the concession, a document of thirty-three articles, a translation of which I enclose herewith. The concession is to come into force as from the 7th July, 1933, and active operations are contemplated before the end of September 1933.

3. From a brief study of the text, the absence of details in respect of the sums to be paid by the Company as a preliminary payment (article 3), as rent (article 4), and also the lack of information regarding the exact area to be exploited, are conspicuous, and in a number of other particulars the text is, perhaps not unintentionally, vague. The "special agreement," to which allusion is made in the decree, must therefore contain these interesting items of information, which the parties to the agreement intend, it would appear, should not be divulged.

4. A copy of this despatch and enclosures are being sent to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. .

[E 4700/759/25]

No. 18.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 237.)

Jedda, July 26, 1933.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 140 of the 20th instant regarding the present position between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies, in translation, of the confidential note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of a document, purporting to be a telegram sent from Riyadh by King Abdul Aziz to Amir Feisal at Taif, both of which were left with me by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, Minister of Finance, upon his visit of the 20th instant, the nature of which was recounted in my telegram under reference. The absence of Fuad Bey Hamza at Jerusalem has left the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with no really responsible and capable official, so that it is not a matter for surprise that Ibn Saud should have instructed his son to entrust his appeal to His Majesty's Government for advice to so experienced a Minister as Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman.

2. I do not propose to retrace the conversation, which has already been, I think, sufficiently outlined in my telegram under reference, save to record the exceptional earnestness with which the Minister described the very delicate relations now subsisting between this country and that of the Imam Yahya. He

[9941]

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reiterated the charge of bad faith and of a deliberately provocative policy which, if pursued much further, would soon leave Ibn Saud no alternative but a resort to force. Ibn Saud's policy was pacific, but any encroachment upon his territories would be resisted "until not a man is left alive."

3. The claims for the restitution of territory that have so thoroughly upset the Saudi Government are defined in the telegram from Ibn Saud to Amir Feisal as "the territories of the Idrisi and the districts of Qahtan and Hamazan in Asir." I am not clear that this is a cool demand for the evacuation of the whole of Asir, but it unquestionably means a very considerable slice of that province. Qahtan is a little obscure, and Hamazan I have so far been unable to identify. *The Handbook of Arabia*, vol. I, Chapter V, on Asir, p. 132, states "in the south-eastern interior of the region live the six Qahtan tribes, each an autonomous unit, and none of them to be confounded with the nomad Qahtan of the south-western region of Central Arabia." Yet no mention of the Qahtan is made in the list of inland tribes at p. 134, though they are referred to at the foot of p. 137 as breeders of horses and the most enterprising traders of the interior. It would therefore seem likely that the perturbation of Ibn Saud arises from attempts of the Imam to suborn these tribes from their nominal, and perhaps divided, allegiance to King Abdul Aziz. I have recently received reports, in which I do not at present place much reliance, that Imam Yahya, through the intrigues of his eldest son, by subsidy and by the taking of hostages, has, indeed, established himself strongly with the tribes of the Najran.

4. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, to His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden and to the senior naval officer in the Red Sea sloops; and a paraphrase of my telegram under reference is being sent to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.*

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

The Hon. Chargé d'Affaires,

Taif, July 10, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the following, requesting that you would be good enough to communicate it as soon as possible to the authorities concerned in His Britannic Majesty's Government. The fact is that for the past year continuous news has been received by us regarding the export of arms and ammunition from Asmara, but we are not certain of their source. Various rumours have been current latterly regarding the arrival of quantities to the Idrisi from Massawa in consecutive consignments, and that there is a hope that arms will be forwarded from the Italian colonies, and we have confirmed this through persons who are in the country of Imam Yahya, from Massawa and from news we receive from Jizan. This matter must not be treated lightly. This fact was further confirmed to us by the change of the Imam Yahya during his negotiations with our delegation, as explained to you by our representative, Abdullah-al-Suleiman, and it appears that the Imam Yahya wishes to provoke us and to excite us to oppose him. We have therefore decided to discuss the matter very frankly with the British Government, believing that they are interested in the matter, whether on our part for the sake of our friendship with them (His Majesty's Government), or for the sake of the Yemen, or for other parties whose intentions and desires the British Government are not aware of, and if the matter interests the British Government as we think, we therefore ask them two things:—

First: To agree with them (His Majesty's Government) upon the case of the Yemen, and we will give them (His Majesty's Government) undertakings in respect of certain affairs which interest them, and they to give undertakings to us in respect of affairs which interest us.

Second: To seek their (His Majesty's Government) assistance in every case in accordance with the friendship which exists between two friends.

The supplies and ammunition which have been supplied, and will be supplied, to the other parties cannot come except from two sources: either from the Italian Government or from certain Amirs of the Islam and Arabs and who have certain intentions and desires. If this matter interests the British Government, we should like to know to what extent the British Government will assist us in this case.

The position is critical, and what should be avoided will occur shortly, as it seems to us, if God wills, and we must take the necessary precautions and preparation. Our preparation will be only to oppose Yahya and the Idrisi together, but we cannot do anything with foreign parties, so long as the friendly communications and relations existing between us and the British Government are as we know them.

As the matter is important and urgent, I request you would be good enough to furnish me with the reply as soon as possible regarding the opinion of the British Government in this connexion.

With highest respects,

FEISAL,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

*Ibn Saud to Amir Feisal.*

(Translation.)

My son Feisal,

July 16-17, 1933.

WE have received the following telegraphic message from the delegation at Sana and forward it for your information:—

Al Amri and Al Mitahhar came to us on Monday, deputed by the Imam Yahya as representatives, to enter negotiations with us, and after the exchange of compliments we started discussion. They said to us that they had something to say concerning the frontier, and we asked them to explain their intentions clearly so that we may know them and understand their meaning, but they requested us to postpone this till the next meeting. The second meeting was held to-day, and after a long preliminary discourse on the good faith of the Imam Yahya, and that he does not like misunderstandings between the two countries, they (the representatives) informed us with shame in their faces that they want the restitution of the Idrisi's territory and the districts of Qahtan and Hamazan in Asir to their original home (country), because they are part of the territory of the Imam Yahya. They added there is no difference between both parties, and that His Majesty the King did not enter the Idrisi's territory until after the Idrisi had taken refuge with him. Now the Idrisi is completely routed, so that there is no reason to prevent His Majesty the King from restoring the said territories to their original country. They also proposed other trifling matters. We answered them that we definitely do not agree to discuss anything connected with the territory (? Idrisi) and Asir, and that to go more deeply into the matter would cause misunderstandings between us, and that this would be of no advantage, and we could see no necessity for discussion in this respect. They appeared to be annoyed at this, and informed us that they would communicate our speech to the Imam Yahya and would give us a reply. We also wished to discuss with them the question of the Idrisi remaining at Zohb Hajar and his misdeeds, but they did not answer this. It seems that our negotiations with them will continue no longer, because it appeared from the beginning that there is no good faith here to enable an agreement to be reached.

The above is the summary of the telegraphic message sent by the delegation; therefore Ibn Suleiman should proceed to Jedda at once to inform His Britannic Majesty's Minister about this, and to inform him that we dislike evil, but people provoke us to do it. In view of the friendship which exists between us and the Government of Great Britain, we communicate this fact to them for their information and to let us know their (His Majesty's Government) opinion in this respect, specially after we have become certain that certain Governments have already supplied, and will supply, arms and ammunition to those coasts, and we should like to know their (His Majesty's Government) opinion in this respect.



Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 241.)  
Sir,

Jedda, July 29, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the usual annual report on the pilgrimage to the Holy Places of the Hejaz in 1933. It has been prepared on the same lines as the report for 1932, enclosed in Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 379 of the 2nd September last.

2. Before leaving Jedda, Sir Andrew Ryan asked me to explain that he had prepared the draft of the present report, with my assistance, while he was still here, drawing very largely as usual on the copious information supplied by the members of his staff who are specially concerned with pilgrimage work.

3. Sir Andrew Ryan also asked me to record once more his appreciation of the valuable work done by the pilgrimage officers. Although the pilgrimage as a whole was much smaller than in 1932, the diminution in the number of Indians was by no means so great as might have been expected, and both the Indian vice-consul and the Indian medical officer had their hands full. The Malay pilgrimage officer had again very few pilgrims, but the diminution in routine work was compensated by the necessity for facilitating the operation of new "Guiding Rules" and dealing with an unusual amount of destitution. Captain Seager cannot be too highly praised for his tact and good humour in handling the still growing difficulties connected with pilgrims from miscellaneous British countries of origin.

4. It is fair to draw special attention on this occasion to the tendency displayed by the Saudi Government to effect improvements in various directions and to use greater tolerance on the whole in their dealings with foreign Moslems. These are but small beginnings, but they afford proof of a genuine desire on the part of Ibn Saud and his advisers to provide greater facilities for pilgrims, a matter both of good business and of Islamic piety.

5. For the reasons given in paragraph 4 of Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 379 of the 2nd September, copies of this despatch and enclosure are again being sent only to the Government of India (Foreign and Political Department), the Government of India (Department of Education, Health and Lands) and the Government of the Straits Settlements. It will doubtless be circulated in print to other authorities interested in the pilgrimage.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Report on the Pilgrimage of 1933 (A.H. 1351).

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## (1) Introductory and General.

AS the 1932 pilgrimage season was nearing its close, the situation in Saudi Arabia was disturbed by a rebellion in the Northern Hejaz. It was invaded near Aqaba on the night of the 20th-21st May by a rebel band, whose principal leader was a Hejazi exile from Wejh named Hamid-bin-Rifada. The drastic steps taken by Ibn Saud to quell this movement included a very considerable mobilisation of Akhwan. The success of the action of the Government was largely promoted by energetic measures in Transjordan and elsewhere to prevent the passage of further rebels and to prevent Ibn Rifada from obtaining supplies from outside sources. His forces never assumed really large proportions and his defeat on the 30th July practically ended the movement. The affair, small in itself, was politically important. It was the prelude to the unification of Ibn Saud's dominions in September under the name of Saudi Arabia and to intensified Anglo-Saudi negotiations, regarding the position between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan.

2. The political agitators behind Ibn Rifada's attempt had intended to organise a more or less simultaneous revolt in Asir. This plan miscarried, but a retarded revolt broke out in that area in October 1932. Hasan-al-Idrisi, the titular ruler of Asir, or what the Saudi Government prefer to call the Tihama of Asir in contradistinction to the inland province of Asir proper or Asir Surat, put himself at the head of the rebels. They had some initial successes, but were crushed at the end of the year by formidable Saudi forces. The Idrisi took refuge in the Yemen, the ruler of which country was politic and correct throughout the whole period, with the result that, although relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen were subjected to some strain, they were successfully preserved.

3. These events did not materially affect the 1933 pilgrimage except in one respect. The number of overland pilgrims from the Yemen, which in the preceding years had been great, was reduced to negligible proportions. In general the political setting of the pilgrimage was as good as could be desired. Ibn Saud's policy, both at home and abroad, during the year following the defeat of Ibn Rifada was one of conciliation. Having demonstrated his strength by his successes against the rebels in the Northern Hejaz and Asir he made it his object to disarm possible disloyalty elsewhere by kindness and tolerance rather than repression and to do what he might to ensure the permanence of his régime. The most spectacular single step taken with the latter object after the unification of the kingdom, was delayed until June 1933, when the King's eldest son was, with much ceremonial and swearing of fealty, declared Heir Apparent. In the foreign field also Ibn Saud showed himself inclined towards rapprochements. The Anglo-Saudi negotiations already mentioned and the influence brought to bear on the Amir Abdullah by His Majesty's Government led to mutual recognition between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia on the 1st April, 1933, to be followed by negotiations for a treaty settlement, which were begun in favourable conditions towards the end of April.

4. The promise of a Friday Haj made in anticipation of the 1932 pilgrimage could not be repeated. In spite of every effort made by the Saudi Government to stimulate the flow of pilgrims from overseas, the total number was only 20,705, as compared with the already low figure of 29,065 in 1932. This must again be attributed mainly to the persistence of economic depression in the principal countries of origin and most of all in the Dutch East Indies.

5. Pilgrimage day, the 9th Zil-Hijja, fell on Tuesday, the 4th April. It is estimated that on that day there may have been 50,000 Moslems of all origins, including Arabian townsmen, camelmen and other native elements, congregated at Arafat. This estimate agrees with that of the Saudi Government.

6. Climatic conditions were again favourable and the health of the pilgrimage was unusually good. The Saudi medical personnel was rather more adequate in numbers than in 1932. These matters are dealt with in detail below.

7. Economic and financial conditions in the Hejaz were generally similar to those described in paragraph 10 of the 1932 report, although, on the one hand, enforced resignation made distress less obvious, and, on the other hand, the early part of 1933 was marked by a wave of some optimism regarding the future, inspired by hopes of economic development and the rehabilitation of Government finance. The major projects in view, each of which would, it was hoped, bring



immediate payments to the Treasury by concessionnaires, apart from ultimate benefits, were these:—

(a) In March 1933 arrangements were agreed upon for the creation under the auspices of the ex-Khedive of Egypt and his associates of a State Bank. The contract was understood to provide for a loan of £200,000 gold, but a sinister silence has since brooded over the scheme.

(b) In February a certain Dr. S. A. K. Jeelani, of Madras, obtained a concession for the building and exploitation of a railway from Mecca to Jedda, to be begun in October–November 1933 and completed within two years. The contract provided for an advance of a million rupees, to be repaid out of the Government share of the receipts. Dr. Jeelani's background in India is rather nebulous.

(c) The prospect of a petroleum concession in Hasa gave rise to active competition, prolonged over the pilgrimage, between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Standard Oil Company of California. The representative of the latter signed an agreement on the 29th May, subject to ratification by both sides. It has not been published, but it is understood that the company will pay a substantial sum down, perhaps £50,000 gold, for the right of exploring the still unknown petroleum possibilities of Hasa and eventually exploiting them, if they materialise, on agreed terms.

8. Other schemes less directly profitable to the Government but presenting a general economic interest have taken or are taking shape. The principal are these:—

(a) An agreement was concluded early in May between Sharqieh (Limited), Mr. Philby's firm, and the Government under which the company will for ten years supply, subject to certain exceptions, all the new requirements of the Government and authorised companies for motor transport, in the shape of Ford cars. Private cars of other makes may be imported, but must not be plied for hire. The company is given an absolute monopoly of the importation of tyres and accessories. They are to provide service stations. Payment for cars, &c., supplied under the agreement are to be secured on 50 per cent. of the receipts of the Naqaba, i.e., the Government organisation controlling transport.

(b) A group of Hyderabad Indians propounded some months before the pilgrimage a scheme to provide employment in the Hejaz by creating a textile industry. Initial action to finance and equip the scheme was taken early in the year in India. Some of the equipment reached the Hejaz, but the prospect of success is doubtful. The suggestion that the weavers should produce Ihrams, the traditional pilgrim garb, is thought to be impractical as the raw material would have to be imported into the Hejaz and the Ihrams then exported to the countries of origin of the pilgrims. The attraction in these countries of Ihrams made in the Holy Land seems unlikely to be sufficient to reconcile intending pilgrims to the greater cost involved, as compared with that of an ordinary home-made article.

(c) The Government are in negotiation with Messrs. Ibrahim Jewan Baksh of Calcutta to provide Mecca with a public electrical supply.

9. Pending the realisation of the schemes mentioned in paragraph 7 above, the financial situation of the Saudi Government continues to be precarious. In June 1932 they gave a great extension to the system of issuing to their creditors drafts on customs, to be met by their acceptance in payment of future duty up to a stated percentage. In November they made known the combined result of an earlier decision to assign a definite proportion of revenue to the settlement of old debts, and the system of meeting them by drafts on customs, which were treated as creating a debt by the Treasury to the Customs Department. The calculation showed that the amount of assigned revenue covered almost exactly the value of drafts issued up to date, leaving, however, a small credit balance. It was decided to postpone for a year the payment of old debts still outstanding, and to devote the credit balance in the "debt chest" to the payment of 5 per cent. interest. It is claimed that these expedients had already reduced the floating debt to almost half of its previous dimensions, but the prospect of payment of the outstandings in November 1933 is very uncertain. Meanwhile, current finance, including the payment of salaries, is much hampered by lack of funds. One minor attempt to ease the situation has been

the transfer from the Treasury to the Municipality of Mecca of the cost of entertaining the many guests from Nejd, who come annually to the Hejaz at pilgrimage time in the King's train. A more important development was the adoption on the 4th May of a new customs tariff (see paragraph 89 below).

10. The experiment of having a Dutch financial adviser produced no useful results. Even had his health not broken down twice, he would have been unable to impose reforms on the all-powerful Minister of Finance, whose methods are his own. The adviser left for good in May 1933, and died in Holland on the 7th July, to the great regret of the European community in Jedda.

11. For the present, the pilgrimage continues to be the main resource. The Saudi Government exerted great efforts to stimulate the flow of pilgrims in 1933 by intensive propaganda in the principal countries of origin. Wide distribution was given to a booklet, printed in various languages in Mecca, describing in attractive terms the arrangements for pilgrims. The Minister of Finance wrote privately to friends in India. The personal work there was carried on by Messrs. Ismail Ghaznavi and Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan, notorious agitators, of whom more below, and by a certain Jemal Pasha, an ex-officer in the Turkish army, who has been a rolling stone and a hanger-on of Ibn Saud's for some years. The last-named is a man of loose character but plausible ways, which, with his title of pasha, appear to have impressed Indians greatly. He is said to have arranged for certain Indians to make the pilgrimage as Mushayekhs at the expense of the Saudi Government. Anyhow, he was most active, and seems to have spent 24,000 rupees of his master's money on hotel bills. Ismail Ghaznavi is also said to have spent over much and to have been warned to keep within his monthly allowance. Similar activity was displayed in Java by an Iraqi journalist named Yunus Bahri and a Koweiti colleague of his, both of whom keep in touch with Ibn Saud, and in Egypt by Seyyid Rashid Ridha. Use was also made of a prominent Hadhrami in Mecca, Seyyid Huseyn-al-Attas, who has much influence in Java and Malaya, and who addressed numerous letters, booklets and telegrams to his following.

12. Although the tendency of all this propaganda is to present the pilgrimage in a light more attractive than the conditions justify, there is no doubt that the Saudi Government have done a certain amount during the past year to provide facilities. The following may be mentioned here:—

(a) Fairly well equipped hotels for pilgrims of the richer class were started early this year in Mecca, Jedda and Medina. An Indian, Sir Rahim Baksh, was invited to preside at the opening of the Mecca hotel. The future of this experiment is doubtful. The hotel at Mecca was mainly patronised by Egyptians. Only eleven guests are said to have stayed in that at Medina. The Jedda hotel has served a double purpose, having been frequented by a small number of pilgrims, but also by concession hunters. The charges have so far been moderate, from 6s. to 10s. gold a day for board and lodging.

(b) Rest houses were provided this year at Shameysi and Bahra, on the Mecca–Jedda road, and at Bir Ibn Hasani and Musajid, on the Jedda–Medina road. These supply tea, coffee, preserved food and dry rations, as well as beds at 1 riyal a night. The Indian vice-consul doubts the utility of rest houses of this kind to the great mass of the pilgrims, who can get tea and coffee cheaper at ordinary cafés. He would have preferred unfurnished rest houses to be provided free of charge, as he suggested last year to the King.

(c) It is proposed to construct caravanserais at Rabigh and Bir Ibn Hasani on the road to Medina. This scheme is being promoted by Sir Nizam Jung of Hyderabad, who has contributed 4,000 rupees personally to a fund which he is raising in that State. The Minister of Finance has expressed warm approval of the scheme, and hopes that, if Sir Nizam Jung's fund does not suffice, other Moslem benefactors may complete the work by adding rooms, in which their names will be commemorated.

(d) Improvements in other directions, e.g., in connexion with the pilgrimage tariff and the provision of repair facilities for motor cars, will be mentioned in subsequent sections.

13. The exchange value of the riyal again deteriorated to about 21 riyals to the gold pound. This suits the Government so long as they can collect payments due to them, e.g., for customs duty at gold rate, and make certain disbursements in riyals at the legal rate of 10 to the £ gold. The local exchange value of foreign



currencies like rupees was for a short time menaced in March by rumours of a general collapse in Europe, as well as in the United States following on the banking crisis in the latter. There was an inclination in the bazaars to underquote the currency equivalent of rupees, but the action of the Legation, including an arrangement made by the Indian vice-consul with Messrs. Ali Ridha, the principal firm of shipping agents, averted any serious difficulty.

14. Prices of food-stuffs in riyals were rather lower than last year, but the general purchasing power of pilgrims was again low.

15. Security on the pilgrim roads was maintained at the high standard of recent years. There was a decrease in pilferage in the frequented centres. No cases of theft were reported at Jedda, and there were only a few instances of pocket-picking in the Haram or of pilferage at Arafat, Mina and Muzdalfa.

16. The King gave his usual banquet to leading pilgrims on the 31st March, and spoke on his usual theme of unity in Islam. His address, unlike some of his past utterances, was marked by an avoidance of anything likely to offend any section of his hearers. The most notable passage was one in which he defined his position as being that of a herald of Islam, but disclaimed any aspiration to the Caliphate, as no man at the present time could fulfil the condition of being able to enforce Islamic law throughout the whole world of Islam. All he desired was unity and co-operation among Moslems. He had at his back 400,000 warriors, who were the "troops of unity."

17. The Indian vice-consul was on this occasion invited to the banquet, but was prevented by business in Jedda from attending. The rapprochement noted in paragraph 17 of last year's report has, however, continued. Since May 1932 Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah has been in constant touch with the Minister of Finance, and, on the 14th May, 1933, he was received by the King, who allowed him to submit his views on various pilgrimage matters in the form of an unofficial memorandum. This led to a careful discussion between the vice-consul and the Minister of Finance on the 30th-31st May, after which the King again received Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah and expressed general approval of the results of the discussion. The matters dealt with will be adverted to in the appropriate sections of this report. The Malay pilgrimage officer was also received by the King by private arrangement in Mecca, and was given an opportunity of drawing His Majesty's attention to two subjects which he has much at heart.

18. Marked attention was shown to notable Indian pilgrims this year both by the King, to whose banquet many were invited, and by the Minister of Finance, who gave two large dinners of his own for leading pilgrims. At the first, he is said to have urged his guests to address any complaints direct to him rather than to the representatives of their Governments. The Indian vice-consul, who was present at the Minister's second dinner only, emphasises the consideration shown this year to Indian pilgrims of the Shia creed, some of whom were detained and shown great honour after the other guests had departed. He infers a new desire to disarm Shia hostility to Wahhabi ascendancy. Jemal Pasha Ghazi and a specially appointed mutawwif helped to maintain liaison and to arrange interviews between these leading Indian pilgrims and the King and his Minister of Finance. Exemptions from road tax were accorded in many cases, and in some free transport was provided, besides recommendations to the Governor of Medina and other officials. Two Indian pilgrims reciprocated the attention shown them by the unusual gesture of presenting the Minister of Finance with voluntary offerings for charity. Mr. Ibrahim Jewan Baksh of Calcutta gave 3,000 rupees, and Sir Rahim Baksh, K.C.I.E., late president of the Council of Regency in Bahawalpur, gave 2,000 rupees. The more normal direct distribution of alms led to one or two unfortunate incidents, including the crushing to death of an Indian woman pilgrim. Two of the largest benefactors were Mr. Ibrahim Jewan Baksh and Khan Bahadur Seyyid Ahmed Husein Ridawi of Lucknow.

19. Besides the three persons just named, the following Indians of distinction made the Hajj:—

M. Nasrullah Khan, M.L.C., United Provinces; Khan Bahadur Qaim Uddin of Sind; Mian Mohammad Naqi, brother of His Holiness Mian Muhammad Taqi of Bareilly; Khan Bahadur Seyyid Ahmed Jiffry of Malabar; Khan Sahib Hajji Abdul Ghani, president of Karachi Hajj Committee; M. Hasan Ali P. Ibrahim, vice-president of Bombay Hajj Committee; Dr. Rajab Ali Patel of Bombay.

The most notable Indian pilgrims who visited the Hejaz during the off season between the 1932 and 1933 pilgrimages were Mumtaz Ali Khan, second son of the Nawab of Maler Kotla; Khwaja Shahbuddin, brother to the Minister of Education in Bengal; and Dr. S. A. K. Jeelani, ex-M.L.A., Madras (see paragraph 7 (b)).

20. Other pilgrims of distinction this year were the Amir of Katsina in Nigeria, with a numerous suite, the Amir of Qatar, two junior members of the ruling family of Bahrain, several Afghan diplomats, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Faiz Muhammad Khan, and Lady Evelyn Cobbold.

21. The only Indian agitators of known importance who came on Hajj this year were Hasrat Mohani and Ismail Surati. The most conspicuous absentees of this class were Ismail Ghuznavi and Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan. The former was refused permission to leave India for the Hejaz for reasons connected with his anti-British activities and Communist *attaches*. This decision of the Government of India involved the Legation, and especially the Indian vice-consul, in some odium, although His Majesty's Minister had deprecated it on the grounds that it would indispose Ibn Saud and that Ismail Ghuznavi, whatever his politics, had in recent years been helpful in connexion with pilgrimage matters. A meeting of Indian pilgrims in the Haram after the pilgrimage adopted a resolution strongly criticising the ban imposed by the Government of India on this person. It is not known whether Muhammad Khan was also formally refused permission. He is of less interest to the Legation than Ismail Ghuznavi, but he is intimate with the Saudi Minister of Finance.

22. Another political suspect who made the Hajj was Ghulam Siddiq, a former Afghan diplomat and a brother to the Ghulam Nabi who was recently executed for complicity in a pro-Amanullah conspiracy in Afghanistan.

23. The arrangements for the dispersal of the overseas pilgrims worked satisfactorily, and the bulk of them were embarked within an unusually short period after the pilgrimage. The usual difficulties arose in connexion with destitutes, but on no spectacular scale, considering the badness of the times. Particular categories will be dealt with in the appropriate sections of this report.

24. H.M.S. *Penzance* (Commander A. R. Farquhar, D.S.C., R.N.) paid the usual Haj visit to Jedda. She stayed from the 1st April to the 8th April and took part in the annual regatta for the pilgrim fleet. Seven Somali naval ratings performed the pilgrimage.

25. The judicial authorities in Syria are still dealing with the matter of forged rupee notes. There has been no further circulation of such notes in the Hejaz.

26. Well over 2,000 Dutch East Indians who had remained in the Hejaz from previous pilgrimages and had become destitutes were repatriated after the 1933 pilgrimage at the joint expense of the Government of the Netherlands East Indies and a charitable fund. A much more modest effort to make a clearance of Malayan destitutes is recorded in paragraph 181.

27. No progress seems to have been made towards a settlement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Relations are not unfriendly, but there is no question at present of a resumption of the practice of sending a Sacred Caravan from Egypt.

28. The Afghan Government detached their consul at Bombay for service in Jedda during the pilgrimage. He obtained a formal exequatur as consul in Jedda, but stayed only from the 16th March to the 25th April.

29. The Kiswa or cover for the Kaaba was again made by Indian weavers in Mecca for this year's pilgrimage, probably in deference to the resentment in certain quarters at its having been imported from Germany in 1932.

30. No cases of the enslavement of pilgrims so definite as those mentioned in paragraph 33 of last year's report came to the notice of the Legation in 1933. Private informants alleged that in two cases Abyssinians had sold women represented as being their wives. In one there was no evidence worth serious consideration. The other, which involved, among other people, a notorious slave broker in Jedda, seemed to merit more attention and is still under consideration, but it is doubtful whether it can usefully be pursued.

## (2) Statistics.

31. The following tables give the usual statistical information. It is possible, by the courtesy of the Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, to



give this year in Table (A) separate particulars of arrivals at Yanbu. The figures given are those compiled by the quarantine authorities, and probably the best obtainable, but there may still be discrepancies between them and those supplied from other sources, e.g., the Jedda figures for arrivals from India and the Far East are slightly in excess of those reported from Kamaran, a fact which may be partly due to the inclusion at the Jedda end of certain persons, like members of ships' crews, who do not embark as pilgrims, but take the opportunity of making the Haj. It will be seen that there was a notable falling off in the total number of nationals of the principal countries of origin, like India, the Dutch East Indies and Egypt, as well as in the number from Syria and Palestine. The number of Malaysians, though showing a slight increase, is again almost negligible. The decline in the number from North Africa, exclusive of Egypt, is less marked than it would have been but for the presence of an unusually large number of Moroccans. The only countries of origin which show an important increase are Afghanistan, where there has been a definite stimulation of interest in the pilgrimage, and Persia, where it must be assumed that the attitude of the Government has been less adverse than in 1931 and 1932:—

TABLE (A).

*Number of Pilgrims arriving by Sea and landing at different Ports of the Hejaz, arranged by Nationality.*

Nationality.	1932.		1933.		Landed at—	
					Jedda.	Yanbu.
India and Far East—						
Indian ...	9,634	7,093	7,040	53		
Malayan ...	80	101	101	...		
Dutch East Indian ...	4,375	2,316	2,316	...		
Chinese and other ...	194	35	35	...		
Africa—						
North African ...	1,822	1,474	1,284	190		
Egyptian ...	2,312	1,698	1,625	73		
Sudanese ...	527	420	420	...		
West African ...	780	509	509	...		
Senegali ...	24	23	23	...		
Somali ...	115	75	75	...		
Zanzibari and East African ...	102	1	1	...		
South African ...	62	37	37	...		
Abyssinian ...	49	11	11	...		
Arab countries—						
Syrian ...	2,154	734	504	230		
Iraqi ...	324	211	149	62		
Palestinian ...	1,352	240	197	43		
Yemeni ...	515	345	345	...		
Hadhrami ...	465	273	273	...		
Muscati ...	36	11	11	...		
Hejazi ...	500	547	524	23		
Nejdi ...	...	...	...	...		
Adenese ...	97	17	17	...		
Bahreini ...	100	179	179	...		
Unclassified ...	...	1	1	...		
Miscellaneous—						
Afghans ...	1,751	2,412	2,403	9		
Bukharans ...	1,242	1,205	1,204	1		
Persians ...	265	607	586	21		
Russians ...	...	...	...	...		
Turkish ...	188	130	52	78		
Total	29,065	20,705	19,922	783		

TABLE (B).

*Number of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.*

Country of Embarkation.	1932.	1933.
India and Far East—		
India ...	12,781	10,920
Malaya ...	308	515
Dutch East Indies ...	4,335	2,024
Africa—		
North Africa ...	1,075	853
Egypt ...	5,093	3,315
Sudan ...	1,384	999
Eritrea ...	256	76
East Africa ...	93	...
South Africa ...	62	51
Arab countries—		
Syria ...	2,648	1,243
Iraq ...	201	355
Yemen ...	559	...
Aden ...	240	344
Hadhramaut ...	...	...
Miscellaneous—		
Persia ...	...	...
Russia ...	5	5
Europe ...	25	5
Total	29,065	20,705

TABLE (C).

*Number of Ships transporting Pilgrims to the Hejaz and number of Pilgrims carried under each Flag.*

(This includes the number of voyages made by each ship.)

Flag.	1932.		1933.	
	No. of Voyages.	No. of Pilgrims.	No. of Voyages.	No. of Pilgrims.
British ...	49	21,800	44	16,017
Dutch ...	19	3,719	4	2,024
French ...	3	2,511	3	1,916
Italian ...	19	559	16	388
Soviet ...	5	403	5	360
German ...	3	73	...	...
Total	98	29,065	72	20,705

### (3) Quarantine.

32. The usual quarantine arrangements were in force at Kamaran, Tor and Suakin during the pilgrimage season under review.

#### Kamaran.

33. The proposal to amend the Indian Merchant Shipping Act so as to make vaccination and inoculation against cholera compulsory (see paragraph 38 of last year's report) had not taken effect before this year's pilgrimage. Nevertheless, the action of the authorities in India again produced the satisfactory result that all pilgrims from India, like those from Java and Malaya, were, in fact, vaccinated and inoculated against cholera before embarkation. The only cases of infectious diseases known to the Legation to have occurred on board pilgrim ships before arriving at Kamaran, were a case of chicken-pox in the *Akbar*, which left Bombay on the 23rd January, and a case of suspected chicken-pox in the *Khosru*, which left Bombay on the 27th February. The former case was discovered before the ship reached Karachi, and the case was disembarked there. The second case was discovered before the ship reached Aden, where precautionary measures were taken.



34. In these circumstances, no ships from India, the Dutch East Indies and Malaya were detained for more than the time required for medical examination.

35. Having verified to the best of his ability the declaration of the Saudi Government on the 11th April that the pilgrimage was clear, His Majesty's Minister dispensed ships returning to India and Malaya from calling at Kamaran. In view, however, of the prevalence some months previously of small-pox in certain parts of Arabia and reports of its existence on a moderately important scale, though not in any widespread epidemic form, at Medina and elsewhere in the Hejaz, he caused measures to be taken to guard against any recurrence of the incident mentioned in paragraphs 42 and 68 of last year's report. Steps were taken to ensure that only persons known to have been vaccinated within a reasonable past period should be embarked; 755 persons proceeding to Aden, Mokalla or India were newly vaccinated at the Indian dispensary attached to the Legation.

#### *Tor.*

36. Returning pilgrim ships were subjected to the usual detention of three days. No cause for suspicion was detected. The Alexandria Quarantine Board declared the pilgrimage clean on the 17th April.

#### *Suakin.*

37. Pilgrims returning by the Sudan to Africa underwent the usual five days detention at Suakin. No cause for suspicion was detected. The lack of first-class accommodation in the quarantine station at Suakin creates occasional difficulty. Special arrangements were made to overcome this in one case this year, that of Lady Evelyn Cobbold, who was allowed to undergo quarantine in hospital at Port Sudan. While drawing attention to this difficulty, His Majesty's Minister realises that cases seldom arise, and that it would be difficult in present financial circumstances to provide special accommodation.

#### *Jedda.*

38. No quarantine measures were applied to pilgrim ships or pilgrims arriving at Jedda this year. A case of virulent small-pox, discovered in the steamship *Akbar* on her arrival on the 1st February, and a case of modified small-pox in the same ship on the 16th March was removed to the local hospital.

39. There has been no change in the quarantine establishment in the islands outside Jedda. Sir George Buchanan, principal Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health, was taken to see them during a private visit to Jedda in January, and was not greatly impressed by what he saw. The only use to which the islands were put this year was for the isolation of thirty licensed porters who had consorted with the crew of a British ship of the Ellerman Line, which had touched at Alexandria, a port infected with small-pox at the time. The immobilisation of these men caused inconvenience on the arrival of the steamship *Rahmani* on the 23rd February, and they had to be replaced by unlicensed substitutes.

40. The new pilgrimage tariff, discussed in section (9) below, provides for a charge of 9½ piastres *miri* per head for boat hire in the case of pilgrims sent to the quarantine islands, with a surcharge of 1½ piastres for each day in excess of three days' stay.

41. Two quarantine doctors were maintained as usual at Jedda, both Syrians. The senior, Dr. Yahya, is favourably regarded by the Legation. He went away soon after the pilgrimage, ostensibly on leave, but apparently not intending to return. This is the more to be regretted, as his subordinate, Dr. Ibrahim Adham, who performed most or all of the visits to pilgrim ships this year, has shown himself obstructive and dilatory. "A little proud fellow," the Indian medical officer calls him, and cites a case in which his ignorance of the name of a nervous disease led him to insist, until a text-book was produced, that a pilgrim who had died of it on board must have been an infectious case. The Indian vice-consul suggests that this gentleman would be less dilatory if ships' captains were requested to offer him lemonade instead of the cold beer to which he is partial. His Majesty's Minister doubts whether this remedy would diminish obstructiveness.

42. Dr. Muhammad Salih came to Jedda as representative of the Alexandria Quarantine Board, a capacity in which he has acted on several previous occasions,

though not in 1931 and 1932. He does not go beyond Jedda, owing to a difference some years ago with the Saudi Director-General of Public Health.

#### *General.*

#### (4) *Health.*

43. Health conditions, generally, were good throughout the 1933 season. Climatic conditions were even better than in 1932.

#### *Saudi Medical Service.*

44. There was some numerical increase in the official medical personnel as compared with that of last year. The Indian Medical Officer supplies a list showing the following distribution during the season, except where certain other places were drawn upon to reinforce Mecca at the crucial moment of the actual pilgrimage:—

*Mecca.*—Seven doctors, including the Director-General of Public Health; a municipal health officer and a X-ray specialist (a Hejazi, trained in Paris); also one dentist, one analyst, and one lady practitioner of some sort.

*Jedda.*—Two quarantine doctors, one hospital doctor, and a lady practitioner or midwife.

*Medina.*—Two doctors.

*Taif.*—One doctor, who has been in Egypt for a time since the 1932 pilgrimage to study diseases of the eye, but has not yet been assigned for special work in that branch.

*Yanbu and Wejh.*—A quarantine doctor at each, the man at Wejh being a recently-appointed Indian homoeopathist with some knowledge of allopathic medicine.

*Jizan.*—Still vacant.

45. Of these 19 persons 12 are Syrians, 2 Hejazis, 3, including the 2 ladies, Egyptian, 1 Indian, and 1 Turkish. The list does not include the King's physician and three doctors at Riyadh, Qatif and Hassa, which is served by an ex-clerk to the King's chauffeur, who has picked up some medical knowledge. Most of the doctors in the Hejaz were mobilised in Mecca for the actual pilgrimage, but it was not necessary to deplete other centres quite so completely as in 1932. The number of private practitioners and pharmacists remains very small, the principal addition being a Dutch doctor, who has established himself at Jedda on the strength of a minimum income being guaranteed for one year by the Dutch Legation and the two Dutch business concerns.

46. There is little to be added to the account given in paragraph 55 of last year's report regarding hospitals, &c. The following further notes are based mainly on information supplied by the Indian medical officer:—

*Jedda.*—No important change, but early in the year arrangements were made to improve the hospital and a fund was collected from the public, headed by the Amir Feysal, who gave £100. Only minor repairs were effected before the pilgrimage, but the major work has since been put in hand.

*Mecca.*—No important change. The projected accommodation for X-ray work and maternity cases at the central hospital has been completed but not brought into use. A room for the new analyst is still under consideration. The sheds outside the town for infectious cases, which were maintained last year, were again not used. A small X-ray plant was imported some time ago, but was transported to Riyadh. The specialist mentioned above worked there, but, although he was one of the outside doctors mobilised at Mecca for the actual pilgrimage, he was not employed there on X-ray work. He was to go to India this summer to take delivery of one X-ray apparatus promised by M. Jewan Baksh, who came on Haj this year and whose generosity in other directions has been mentioned elsewhere.

*Other Centres and Pilgrim Roads.*—No important change in the arrangements described last year, except for the provision of a small dispensary at Wejh, served by the newly-appointed Indian mentioned above. It has been closed since the pilgrimage.

47. It would appear from the above account that, apart from some improvement in personnel, little has been done to remedy the defects noted in previous reports, and after the pilgrimage the service again showed a marked tendency to



disintegrate. The condition of the medical service in the Hejaz certainly does not justify the glowing description of it given in the Saudi pilgrimage guide issued in Mecca last autumn (see paragraph 11). It is there stated that the medical and health services have been organised "on good modern lines," that fully qualified doctors, hospitals with special wards, dispensaries, roadside shelters, &c., are provided, and that pilgrims may rest assured that the medical arrangements in the Hejaz are "as perfect as anywhere else." The guide also states that pilgrims can obtain free advice and medicines. The Indian medical officer reports that this statement proved quite illusory during the recent pilgrimage, that all medicines were charged for, that poor persons get no treatment, and that the well-to-do were sometimes treated gratis in the hope of their presenting substantial sums both to the hospital and to the doctors themselves. As regards the other facilities advertised in the guide, Dr. Abdul Hamid affirms that no special wards were available, and he cites two cases which tend to show that the hospital at Mecca was not provided with vaccine. In one of these cases one of the official doctors applied to Dr. Abdul Hamid for lymph with which to vaccinate his own children.

48. The Indian medical officer has prepared the following statement of cases treated and deaths in the Government hospitals during the ten months August to May 1933, from the weekly returns published in the local press. Figures for June and July cannot be included, as the present report is being prepared early:—

Disease.	Number of Cases.	Deaths.
Dysentery ...	1,134	49
Paratyphoid ...	...	...
Typhoid ...	17	10
Puerperal fever ...	43	35
Small-pox ...	64	47
Measles ...	...	...
Meningitis ...	...	...
Leprosy ...	2	...
Syphilis ...	371	1
Diphtheria ...	...	...
Malignant fever ...	...	...
Dengue ...	3	3
Consumption ...	88	45
Water-pox and chicken-pox ...	10	1
Tetanus ...	1	1

49. The figures in the foregoing paragraph are given for what they are worth. The variations from year to year are difficult to account for. In any case, the returns can give only a very partial idea of the prevalence of disease in a country where there are so few hospitals, and they present so few features likely to encourage people to rely on them, even if many orientals were not naturally inclined to shrink from official medical treatment. If the figures can be trusted, they show, in comparison with those given for a full twelve months last year, about the same amount for dysentery, with fewer deaths, and a decrease all along the line in most other instances, very noticeable in the case of small-pox, much less marked in the cases of syphilis and consumption.

#### *Disease during the Pilgrimage Season.*

50. There were no epidemics of contagious or infectious disease during the 1933 season and no cases or suspicion of plague or cholera. Some anxiety was felt in the Legation owing to reports that the serious outbreak of small-pox at Kuwait last autumn was attributed to its presence in large-scale epidemic form in Central Arabia, and to later reports that the disease was prevalent at Medina and one or two other places in the Hejaz. There was, however, no evidence that the disease had assumed epidemic proportions anywhere in the latter country. The number of sporadic cases among pilgrims at Mecca and Jedda was very small, and there were no signs of small-pox having been brought from Medina by pilgrims. Only one case was reported among Indian pilgrims. In these circumstances, it was decided, as stated in paragraph 35 above, to treat the pilgrims returning in south-bound ships as unaffected by small-pox, subject to special precautions to ensure as far as possible that all persons embarked had been

recently or newly vaccinated. Chicken-pox was much less prevalent than in 1932, and no cases came to the notice of the Legation of the relanding at the instance of ships' doctors of pilgrims suffering from it (*cf.* paragraph 67 of last year's report).

51. There were practically no cases of sunstroke. The unusual dryness following on lack of rain in the Hejaz produced cracked lips and a certain prevalence of diseases like influenzal catarrh. There was also a certain amount of malaria due to the abundance of mosquitoes. Diarrhoea and dysentery were less prevalent than in 1932 and cases of typhoid and paratyphoid were rare. The Indian medical officer mentions the occurrence on a small scale among the population generally of mumps among both adults and children and of measles among children.

52. The president, Major J. Gilmour, M.C., commented in his report to the Alexandria International Quarantine Board on the small amount of sickness on board northbound ships calling at Tor after the pilgrimage.

#### *Mortality.*

53. The Indian medical officer puts the mortality among pilgrims at 1 per cent. lower than last year, and estimates it at 0.8 per cent. only, both for Indians and others. Only two deaths were reported at Arafat, one being that of a child from Mecca. Deaths at Muna were estimated at twenty-three. None of the deaths were caused by infectious disease. In most cases they were due to debility or chronic maladies of an acute type. There were no deaths from motor accidents. See paragraph 18 as regards a death in Mecca due to over-crowding.

#### *General Sanitary Conditions.*

54. There was little change in the conditions described in the previous reports, ending with paragraph 70 of the report for 1932. There had been unusually little rain in the Hejaz (although much in Nejd) during the months preceding the pilgrimage. Mosquitoes were, nevertheless, abundant, a fact which the Indian medical officer attributes to the badness of the latrines system. He remarks that, in the absence of restrictions, numerous tents were pitched this year close to the slaughtering place at Muna. Little was again done to control the disposal of carcasses, but, after the bulk of the pilgrims had left, officers were sent to collect dried meat from African pilgrims of the poor Takruni type and to bury it. Dr. Abdul Hamid noticed outside his own house Bengali pilgrims of the poorer class cutting up and drying meat for use on their return journey.

55. The temperature on Pilgrimage Day ranged between 74° F. and 94° F.

#### *Water Supply.*

56. Conditions generally were similar to those described in paragraph 72 of last year's report. The Ain Zubeyda Committee continues to work efficiently, and has extended its system of canalisation.

57. After the 1933 pilgrimage there was a fresh spurt of interest in the water at Waziriya, a potential source of supply to Jedda, which in the meanwhile continues to depend on the adequate but costly output of its two condensers and that of certain minor wells. The Ain Zubeyda Committee were consulted regarding Waziriya, and, though they are said to have objected to any call on their funds, they inspected the supply there carefully. A fresh supply of underground water was located, a discovery the credit of which was claimed by a leading Indian resident at Mecca, who is an active member of the committee. At the time of writing (July 1933) work is being conducted actively with the object of harnessing this water and reconditioning the conduit to Jedda. The new water is favourably reported on, and is believed to be normally healthy at source.

#### *Government of India Dispensaries.*

58. Dr. Abdul Hamid was absent on leave from the 22nd July to the 4th December, 1932. He was replaced by Dr. Muhammad Khan, who had served as temporary sub-assistant surgeon in 1931, and who, on this occasion, again did excellent work, although he was rather too lavish in issuing medical stores, with the result that the stock of quinine injections had to be replenished by borrowing temporarily from Port Sudan hospital. The Jedda dispensary remained open throughout the year as usual. That at Mecca was opened this year on the



20th January, and closed rather earlier than usual on the 28th May. Dr. Muhammad Khan was again employed as temporary sub-assistant surgeon. The arrangements generally for the two dispensaries, including the concentration of all staff except one servant at Mecca during the height of the season and attendance at Muna and Arafat, were similar to those in 1932.

59. The Jeddah dispensary was visited by Sir George Buchanan, Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health, in January. He made the general suggestion that, although financial considerations still stand in the way of major improvements, notably as regards accommodation, another compounder and/or dresser might with advantage be added to the present permanent staff. The Government of India are being approached on this subject in anticipation of next year's pilgrimage. It is hoped that when financial conditions are easier the larger questions of accommodation at Jeddah, Mecca and Muna will be reconsidered. The Government of India were able, in the meanwhile, to concede certain minor desiderata, such as the allowances for whitewashing and repairs suggested in paragraph 74 of the report for 1932, and advantage was taken of the sanction this year.

60. The Director-General of Public Health showed some inclination to hamper the work in Mecca this year, more particularly by his attitude towards Dr. Muhammad Khan, with whom he refused to deal on the ground that his appointment had not been regularised *vis-à-vis* the Saudi Government. He maintained more generally, in connexion with the Indian medical officer, that the Legation should notify each year to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs its intention to open the dispensary; that the qualifications of the staff should be stated; and that the Saudi authorities should inspect the premises, &c., to ensure their suitability. This jealousy of certain Saudi authorities in regard to the status of the Legation doctors and the dispensary at Mecca is a factor to be reckoned with, but has not so far produced really serious difficulty, as the position that they form part of the Legation has been successfully maintained. The King himself is understood not to favour interference, and gave a sympathetic hearing to observations on the subject by the Indian vice-consul on the 31st May. A regulation on the practise of medicine, &c., by unofficial doctors, &c., was issued on the 8th June, 1933. It is not illiberal in form. It is too soon to judge whether any attempt will be made to impose Government control in consequence on doctors, &c., attached to foreign diplomatic missions.

#### Cases treated in the Indian Dispensaries.

61. The total number of cases (*i.e.*, separate visits, not separate patients) of all nationalities treated at the Jeddah dispensary from the 1st June, 1932, to the 31st May, 1933, was 44,914, as compared with 39,231 in the previous twelve months. The total number of cases of all nationalities treated during the pilgrimage season, *i.e.*, between the 15th December, 1932, and the 31st May, 1933, was 14,135; of these, 4,625 were British Indian pilgrims, as compared with 3,250 in the corresponding period of the previous year. The number of cases treated at Mecca from the 20th January to the 28th May, 1933, was 12,125, as compared with 13,215 in 1932; practically all of these were British Indians. Only 85 cases were treated at Muna this year.

62. Thirty-four indoor cases were treated this year, as compared with twenty-five in 1932. Any extension of this branch of work is still impossible owing to insufficiency of accommodation. Surgical work is hampered by this and by the lack of suitable assistant or other person to administer anaesthetics, with the result that the work is for the most part such as can be carried out with local anaesthesia. Dr. Abdul Hamid performed 164 major operations at Jeddah and Mecca during the year ending the 31st May, and 709 minor operations, including extraction of teeth and opening of abscesses, besides numerous interavenous injections.

63. The number of cases treated at the two dispensaries greatly exceeds the aggregate number treated in all the Saudi institutions in the Hejaz, as shown in official returns. The patients include large number of Hejazis, but in prevailing conditions of poverty the sums produced by the small charges collected for medicines from them who can afford to pay were again very small. The amount as collected in Jeddah during the twelve months ending the 31st May, 1933, was 520 riyals. That collected in Mecca, where some little attempt was made to discourage indiscriminate free treatment, was only 60 riyals.

64. The following table shows the percentage of the various diseases treated in the Indian dispensaries during the year ending the 31st May, 1933:—

Medical—	Percentage.
(1) Malaria and its complications ...	40.20
(2) Other fevers and infectious diseases...	0.5
(3) Urinary diseases, including syphilis and gonorrhoea ...	14.5
(4) Digestive troubles ...	10.4
(5) Circulatory diseases ...	1.6
(6) Respiratory diseases ...	1.5
(7) Nervous diseases ...	0.4
(8) Diseases of the locomotory system ...	0.3
(9) Women's diseases ...	4.0
(10) Children's diseases ...	4.8
(11) Eye, ear and throat diseases ...	6.8
(12) Deficiency diseases ...	0.06
Surgical—	
(13) Sinuses, fistulae, ulcers, &c. ...	7.6
(14) Wounds and other contusions ...	6.37
(15) Hydrocele and hernia ...	0.5
(16) Cystitis, stone, &c. ...	0.47
	100.00

65. The Government of India authorised last year a charge to cover transport in cases where patients at Mecca are visited in their own quarters and can afford to pay. The charge was fixed in the Indian Government's Guide for Pilgrims at 5 rupees per visit, except in the case of indigent persons. Of seventy-eight outside visits made in 1933, nearly forty were unpaid, for reasons of poverty or because of the departure of the pilgrims.

66. The doctors experienced no difficulty this year from restrictions on the circulation of cars.

67. The difficulty, noted in paragraph 82 of last year's report, in connexion with requests by doctors taking part in the pilgrimage that their prescriptions should be made up at the Indian dispensary, did not recur in 1933. The Government of India had upheld the view that such requests should be disallowed.

68. The Government of India have recently agreed to give gazetted rank to their medical officer in Jeddah, provided that the post is not held by officers less qualified than assistant surgeons in India. It will bear the title of "Indian Medical Officer attached to His Majesty's Legation at Jeddah."

69. As regards publicity and sign-boards, see paragraph 163.

#### Other Foreign Medical Assistance.

70. The Egyptian medical mission was again reduced. It worked in Mecca, and its stay was greatly curtailed. The provision for Afghans was similar to that in 1932 and was very elementary. The Indian doctor employed spent only a short time at Mecca, when he worked in the hostel bought last year. He received no new medical supplies.

71. The arrangements of the Netherlands Government appear to have been affected at least temporarily by the arrival in Jeddah of a Dutch doctor named Hartman. This gentleman is not officially employed, but he is guaranteed a minimum income by the Netherlands Legation, the Netherlands Trading Company or "Dutch Bank" and International Agencies (Limited), the successors of the old Van de Poll firm. If this experiment succeeds, the intention appears to be to employ a Moslem doctor at Mecca each year for the pilgrimage season, but to rely on Dr. Hartman in Jeddah, where he has the use of the Legation dispensary.

72. A Syrian and a Persian doctor were attached to the French and Persian pilgrims. They did not appear to have any very definite official status and worked privately among their own people, no dispensaries being opened.

73. The Russian couple mentioned in paragraph 88 of last year's report left Jeddah some time ago and have not been replaced. The Soviet Minister's wife does some general dispensing work. A Russian dentist, who arrived some months ago, practices at the Legation.



(5) *Internal Transport in the Hejaz.*

74. This section deals only with the machinery of transport. All questions of charges are dealt with in section (9) below.

*Motor Transport.*

75. There was no important change in 1933 in the organisation of motor transport and little improvement in the equipment as described in paragraph 90 of last year's report. One important improvement was, however, effected in ancillary arrangements. Stores of benzine, oil and spare parts and engineers with lorries at their disposal were provided at Rabigh and Bir Ibn Hasani on the road to Medina, and though not available at the outset of the season, were ready in time to serve the needs of the bulk of the pilgrims using it. An engineer with a lorry had already been installed at Shameysi on the Jedda-Mecca road and supplies of benzine, &c., were made available at Umm Salam. These arrangements not only enabled vehicles to be provisioned and repaired in case of need, but also provided means whereby stranded pilgrims could be conveyed to coffee shops. Before they were instituted some of the early-arriving pilgrims, mostly Javanese, suffered inconvenience of the kind mentioned in paragraph 91 of the last report. Cases are cited in which the bus journey between Jedda and Mecca took from twenty-four to forty-eight hours and one in which a bus took fourteen days to reach Mecca from Medina.

76. As in 1932 pilgrims generally were allowed to go from Mecca to Arafat by motor. The fixation of charges per car and per lorry, instead of per pilgrim, dispensed them from tedious formalities of examination and counting at "Koshan" stations. It is a cause of complaint, however, among pilgrims able to afford the high charges that, as the motors follow a special road and are not allowed to enter the central part of Muna, but have to be parked at a considerable distance, the passengers have to walk with their encumbrances to their lodging. Some complain also that owing to the timing arrangements they run the risk of having to omit certain rites.

77. The new hotels (see paragraph 12 (a)) were allowed to run cars provided by the Government and free of the control of the Naqaba, on the road between Mecca and Jedda and in the town of Mecca, where the general use of cars was again prohibited.

78. The future of motor transport may be much affected by the agreements mentioned in paragraph 7 (b) and paragraph 8 (a) above. The agreement with Dr. Jeelani contains a clause protecting the future Mecca-Jedda Railway from motor competition. The agreement with Sharqieh (Limited) aims at the use of Ford vehicles as the standard means of pilgrim transport, though it is doubtful how soon this will become effective as pilgrimages are small nowadays and there are said to be about a thousand vehicles in the hands of the Government and the transport companies. Their condition is poor, but it is doubtful whether in present conditions the transporters will be able to afford many new purchases. As regards service stations, the contract with Sharqieh binds the company to provide workshops at Mecca, Jedda, Medina and Riyadh and other places to be agreed upon. The Indian vice-consul understands that it is hoped to arrange for repairing stations, with spare parts, &c., at Shameysi and Umm Selam on the Mecca-Jedda road and at Mastura, Bir Ibn Hasani and Musajid on the road to Medina, as well as a shop for benzine, oil, &c., at Tawil on the road between Jedda and Rabigh. Reference has been made in paragraph 12 (c) to the project for erecting caravanserais at Rabigh and Bir Ibn Hasani.

79. The Saudi Government produced no final reply to the representations made last year (see paragraph 94 of the 1932 report) regarding certain difficulties in connexion with motor transport; nor did the Legation press the matter, as the whole subject was known to be under consideration. Eventually, the following subjects were dealt with in the exchange of views between the Indian vice-consul and the Minister of Finance, under the auspices of the King, in May 1933 (see paragraph 17 above):—

(a) Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah drew attention to the hardship entailed by stopping cars twice, when leaving Mecca, to undergo separate formalities at the koshan office and the police station. He suggested that as the offices were

only some 20 metres apart, all the formalities should be accomplished at one spot. The Minister demurred, but eventually agreed to make arrangements which will apparently enable pilgrims to undergo all the formalities at the town gate and undertook to apply the 2,000 rupees presented by Sir Rahim Baksh to the construction of a shed sufficient to accommodate ten cars. As the formalities take some hours the protection from the sun thereby afforded will be a boon to pilgrims. The King is understood to have approved of this and to have directed that any balance of expenditure should be made up out of public funds.

(b) Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah hammered out in close discussion with the Minister a series of agreed proposals for the better regulation of motor vehicles. They include the fixation of maximum times for journeys, four hours between Mecca and Jedda and twenty-four hours between Mecca and Medina; increased facilities on the lines indicated at the end of the preceding paragraph for repairs and for obtaining spare parts, &c., the latter to be sold at the road stations at 20 per cent. above the usual price and this profit to go to the Treasury; and a system of reporting and registration to provide the Ministry of Finance, where a motor-traffic section will be instituted, with the means of controlling the efficiency of vehicles and penalising transporters whose service proves to be defective. If these arrangements are brought into operation, but this is no small "if," one of the results will be to do away with the present system of holding up cars at Jedda on the way from Mecca to Medina for prolonged individual inspection, &c., which frequently delays pilgrims overnight in Jedda.

(c) The vice-consul pursued the question mentioned in paragraph 93 (d) of last year's report, viz., the inconvenience caused by the existing regulation that every Medina-bound lorry should carry a sabee or mutawwif's assistant. This had been the subject of representations by the Legation to the Government. The Minister objected to a suggestion that, if the sabee must be carried, he should be included in the complement of passengers, arguing that this would entail loss on the transporters. He demurred also to a further suggestion by the vice-consul that the pilgrims should be left to decide whether they needed a sabee and that, if they did, they should contribute £3 for his transport, the Government on their side waiving koshan. The discussion was inconclusive.

*Camels.*

80. There are again no special remarks to make under this head, except that a few complaints were received from pilgrims that they had been delayed on the roads owing to sickness or death resulting from the poor quality and starved condition of the animals.

81. It would appear that a considerable number of pilgrims travelled by camel in preference to motor transport for the sake of economy. The same motive caused some 500 Indian pilgrims to remain in Mecca in the expectation of being able to make the journey to Medina more cheaply after the 15th Safar (see paragraph 112 (a)), although the authorities, anxious to get koshan at the regular rate for pilgrims, tried to speed them up by putting it about, through their mutawwifs, that there would be no reduction this year.

*Cabs.*

82. The general use of motors in the town of Mecca was again prohibited this year in the interests of the cab-owners. An exception in favour of the Government hotel is noted elsewhere.

*General.*

83. No attempt was made this year to prevent pilgrims from travelling on foot between Mecca and Jedda, and many pilgrims travelled in this manner for reasons of poverty. The standing regulation which prohibits pilgrims from travelling on foot to and from Medina, appears to have been enforced with rigour on certain classes of pilgrims, although not on the poorest class, e.g., Nigerians, &c. The Indian vice-consul reports that posts were established on the roads to hold up pedestrians, and that some pilgrims were turned back half-way to Medina, only the most indigent being allowed to proceed. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah relates an amusing tale of how an Afghan party got round the restrictions by getting possession by a trick of the rifles of three Nejd soldiers



who held them up. They carried off the guards but left the rifles behind, with the result that the Nejdīs were very glad to take to flight when they prevailed on their captors to release them.

84. The question of purely internal transport can no longer be separated from that of trans-frontier overland transport. Considerable progress has been made towards an agreement between the Saudi and Iraqi Governments for the organisation of a motor route from Nejef to Medina via Hail. It is contemplated that the Iraqi cars shall transport the pilgrims as far as Medina, but no further, and that all passport, sanitary and other controls shall be centralised at Jumaima on the frontier. The route has been fully surveyed on the Iraq side, but not apparently on the Saudi side. The question of motor transport all the way has also excited interest in various quarters in India. The Legation was approached towards the end of 1932 by an official at Quetta, who proposed to bring a party of six to the Hejaz by private bus, and by a firm at Dehra Dun, who seemed to be projecting a commercial scheme. The attitude of the Saudi Government was too guarded for the Legation to give any encouragement to the applicants. In the event the Quetta party, minus the original applicant, motored as far as Bagdad.

85. Two enterprising Indians came overland independently from India on bicycles this year, the first experiments of the kind on record. One got as far as Al-Ula, where he was asked to pay customs duty on his machine, whereupon, being penniless, he either abandoned or smashed it and came on to Medina on foot. The other got to Medina, but on being asked to pay koshan for the onward journey to Mecca, was reduced to selling his bicycle for 5 rupees. One of the men returned by sea to India by the charity of a fellow-pilgrim; the Indian vice-consul arranged for the other to be taken as a ship's sweeper.

86. These developments emphasise the importance of measures being taken in India to control the movement of overland pilgrims. His Majesty's Minister doubts whether encouragement should be given to persons there wishing to organise commercial services, which would compete with the service from Iraq and might be much more difficult to organise efficiently. Another reason for taking measures to control the overland pilgrim is that the development of motor transport may stimulate the flow of pedestrian pilgrims, who would have known and frequented routes to follow, and who already swell the total of destitutes having to be repatriated to India at Government expense.

#### (6) Customs.

87. Except for the one change noted in the following paragraph, the Customs Administration worked on the same lines during the 1933 pilgrimage season as in 1932. Venality and smuggling would still appear to be rife. The Indian vice-consul states that, owing to non-payment of salaries, officials were even readier to commit irregularities in return for tips and to be content with very small ones. The Government were, he says, driven to take drastic action to cope with the traffic in contraband tobacco, and adopted the method of burning it, when confiscated, instead of themselves selling it, with the object apparently of stimulating fresh imports on which duty would be paid. Stringent measures of control were instituted at Taif, an important distributing centre for smuggled tobacco.

88. Pilgrims were this year denied the facility previously enjoyed of leaving certain articles like tobacco and betel-nut in customs and retrieving them on departure. This year they were compelled to pay duty on them, under pain of forfeiture. This gave rise to much complaint on the part of pilgrims, but the new rule could not be contested officially by the Legation, and the efforts made on behalf of the pilgrims affected by Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah in high Saudi quarters were unavailing.

89. On the 4th May, shortly after the pilgrimage, the Saudi Government introduced an entirely new system of customs duties, superseding that of which a partial account was given in paragraph 100 of last year's report. Its most notable feature was the introduction of specific duties per unit on a large range of staple commodities, including food-stuffs, piece-goods, sugar and petroleum products. *Ad valorem* duties, at rates which in nearly all cases show a heavy increase on those previously levied, were retained for a limited number of commodities, including motor vehicles, perfumes, silk, raw and manufactured cotton and metal goods. The various small surtaxes previously imposed in certain cases

in addition to the old *ad valorem* duties were abolished. So far as it is possible to make comparative estimates, the specific duties seem a good deal more onerous than the old *ad valorem* rates. It is too soon to judge the effect of the new system with any exactitude or to forecast its reaction on internal prices. It applies to the whole of Saudi Arabia.

#### (7) Religious Policy.

90. The Indian vice-consul has observed this year a marked tendency in the direction of a more liberal policy towards Moslems, who do not accept the doctrines and rigours of Wahhabism. Although extremist influences have still to be reckoned with, others, especially in Mecca and Jedda, operate in a contrary sense for reasons of policy or finance. Little has been heard during the last year of the "Committees of Virtue," which have been at times a scourge to the local inhabitants. The Amir Feisal, who is permanent President of the Council of Ministers, and is Viceroy of the Hejaz during his father's absence from the Hejaz, is disposed towards liberalism by his training and personal tastes. Last year, when the whole situation was dominated by the aftermath of the Ibn Rifada rebellion, he was not powerful enough to prevent the temporary imprisonment at Taif of members of his own staff and other officials who took part in a musical party outside the town. He has since, however, curbed the over-zeal of the police, pushing tolerance to the length of opposing the arrest by them of loose women in Mecca, and ordering them to leave the control of such persons to the sheikhs of the quarters. The Minister of Finance, who is specially concerned with pilgrimage matters, is all for respect for the personal liberty of the foreign pilgrims, who bring grist to his mill. He has quoted to the Indian vice-consul the Koranic text which says: "Let your religion be yours and mine be mine." He represents the King as sharing his sentiments, and states that he is anxious to get permission to complete the restoration of the shrines in Medina, which were partly repaired last year, though without building domes on them. He would also like to encourage pilgrims to visit Taif, the only religious attraction of which is one particular shrine.

91. Mention is made in paragraph 18 of the consideration shown this year by the Minister of Finance to Shi'a pilgrims, and in paragraph 119 to the partial removal of their grievance in respect of a charge which they regard as a discriminating tax.

92. The Governor of Medina is an elderly Wahhabi of the old school, but the experience of numerous pilgrims has been that the Nejdī guards of the Prophet's tomb, once so rigorous in the enforcement of the prohibition of practices like kissing the rail, are now very amenable to the influence of even the smallest tip, and will positively encourage those in a position to cross their palms with silver riyals, even to the extent sometimes of discreetly withdrawing altogether while they perform their devotions. It may be noted that the official Saudi pilgrimage guide, mentioned in paragraph 11, speaks of the visit to Medina, at any rate in the English version, as though it were obligatory.

93. In these circumstances there have been few specific instances of intolerance in 1933. The following may be mentioned:—

(a) A party of Indian pilgrims, who went to Jebel Nur, was challenged by the Nejdī guards. Their cabmen and the mutawwif were lightly beaten with sticks, although the latter tried to pass as a pilgrim by a quick change of clothing. The pilgrims were pelted with stones.

(b) A disciple of Mian Muhammad Taqi complained that a religious book, which he was reading in the Haram at Mecca, was snatched from him by the Saudi authorities. When eventually returned at the instance of the Indian vice-consul, it had had some pages torn out. On the other hand, a leading pilgrim from Hyderabad expressed admiration of the tolerance with which the distribution of several hundred copies of books, repugnant to the Wahhabi faith, was regarded.

(c) The Sufi teacher Pir Seyyid Jamat Ali Shah, who was mentioned in paragraph 107 of last year's report, again prayed apart at Medina. He does not seem to have been seriously interfered with, although a threat of expulsion from the town was used to induce greater moderation on his part.



94 It must not be supposed that the greater toleration shown this year removes the need for circumspection on the part of pilgrims. Visits to shrines at Mecca other than the Kaaba are still strongly discouraged, and the Indian vice-consul still recommends Indian pilgrims to avoid visiting shrines the frequentation of which may involve them in unpleasant incidents. It may be mentioned as an example of another kind of intolerance that, soon after the pilgrimage, an elderly Indian merchant belonging to the Ahmadiyya community, who has lived in the Hejaz for many years and whose family have been connected with it for centuries, was ordered to leave the country at a month's notice owing to an allegation that he had preached heresy.

#### (8) Mutawwifs.

95. Apart from the charge mentioned in paragraph 101 below, there was no radical alteration in the system of mutawwifs, wakils and muzawwars, to which much attention has been given in previous reports. The control exercised by the Saudi authorities and the pressure or influence exercised by the Legation over the first two categories have induced a greater source of responsibility, and there were few complaints this year of their conduct in the Hejaz.

96. The Legation black list system has continued to operate as a restraint on the mutawwifs concerned with Indian pilgrims. It must, however, be applied with discretion, in order to preserve the salutary effect of blacklisting, and thereby excluding temporarily from India a limited number of persons clearly and conspicuously guilty of abuses, without permanently debarring them from the exercise of their profession, except when they appear to be incurable. The knowledge that the penalty may be inflicted makes it possible to settle a certain number of minor cases in which the conduct of mutawwifs, &c., has given rise to complaint. Any excessive extension of the system would entail the risk of controversy with the Saudi Government, and might drive them, on their part, to extend the operation of the Taqir system, and might also give rise to suggestions in hostile Moslem circles that British authorities were seeking to impede the pilgrimage. The Legation has hitherto refrained from including in the black list mutawwifs' assistants or sabees, both because they are not persons of established status like the mutawwifs themselves and can easily be replaced, and also in view of the undesirability of expanding the annual black lists unduly. In deference, however, to the views of certain authorities in India, one or two sabees guilty of grave personal misconduct have been included in the list for 1934. Still, His Majesty's Minister sees no objection to this, provided that no attempt is made to include persons on the ground that they are related to or act as sabees for undesirable mutawwifs, a course which, in his opinion, would overburden the lists without producing any equivalent beneficial result. The black list and lists of recommended mutawwifs for 1934 were sent to the Government of India on the 17th June, 1933.

97. It was hoped last year that the Government of India would receive legislative powers to control under a licensing system the activities in India of mutawwifs and others concerned with pilgrims. A select committee of the Legislative Council recommended, however, the indefinite postponement of the Bill introduced for the purpose.

98. The Indian vice-consul suggests that the black list should be included in the guide for pilgrims issued by the Government of India, and should be posted in pilgrimage offices, &c., in India. His Majesty's Minister has felt unable to endorse this suggestion, as he considers it undesirable in itself and possibly open to legal objections. It would, however, be of advantage if administrative action could be taken in India (a) to control as far as may be possible, in the absence of special legislation, the proceedings of Indians indulging in undesirable practices in connexion with the pilgrim traffic, and (b) to continue to impress upon intending pilgrims, in their own interest, the importance of engaging recommended mutawwifs and of being guided by the advice of the Indian vice-consul on arrival in Jedda.

99. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah cites the following instances of malpractice this year:—

(a) Certain mutawwifs, having deluded pilgrims with promises of reduced fees, left their pilgrims and went on to Mecca on arrival in Jedda, after instructing their wakils to collect the full amount. In some cases in which they

had entered into written agreements, they found means to recover these and destroy them. Torn pieces of such agreements were brought to Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah, but were too incomplete to afford a basis for action.

(b) There were a few cases, of the kind mentioned in paragraph 124 of last year's report, in which mutawwifs obtained loans from pilgrims or obtained cash from them in return for Hundis drawn on the mutawwifs' relatives in Mecca. In one instance aabee got a loan of 150 rupees from a Bengali pilgrim, who died on the voyage. The Indian vice-consul made strenuous efforts to recover the amount, but failed, owing to theabee's impecuniosity. He was compelled to give a receipt, and it is hoped to recover the money eventually. In the meantime thisabee has been blacklisted (see paragraph 96 above) as an exceptional measure.

(c) A leading advocate of Lucknow and his party complained that a Hamladar of that locality contracted with them for the Haj, including food and transport charges, and disappeared for a day or two after receiving the agreed amount. He then extracted from them a loan of 800 rupees, which there is little chance of their recovering.

100. The Indian vice-consul has received representations from various people in India, e.g., a benevolent society in Karachi, the editor of the *Wahid* newspaper and two business houses in Lahore, complaining of the activities of mutawwifs in India, and urging that they should be prevented from going there. Another correspondent sent him, with a similar appeal, a cutting from the *Ajmal* of the 14th February regarding the scandal of disputes between mutawwifs, &c., at railway stations and musafirhanes.

101. One object which the vice-consul has long had at heart was the appointment in time for this year's pilgrimage (see paragraph 119 of the 1932 report) of a separate sheikh of mutawwifs for Indian pilgrims. The person chosen was a person of Indian origin named Abdur-Rahman Mazhar, who is employed for certain purposes by the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He has proved satisfactory so far and has been of assistance to the vice-consul and to pilgrims.

102. There has been no change in Taqir system (see paragraph 121 of the last report), to which certain Indian pilgrims, like those from Malabar, Madras and Behar and those of the Memon community, are subject. It is very desirable that it should be abolished, but the matter is still considered too delicate for official action.

103. The object of mutawwifs' dues generally, the attempt made this year to compel payment in advance on arrival in Jedda and proposed new methods for collecting them are dealt with in the following section. Cases again arose this year, similar to those described in paragraph 123 of the last report, in which pilgrims, although in possession of return tickets, were without means to pay the dues. His Majesty's Minister adheres to his attitude that pilgrims should receive no encouragement to evade payment and that the Legation cannot intervene officially. The mutawwifs themselves were, however, disinclined to detain pilgrims, having regard to the relations between the Indian vice-consul and the Minister of Finance, and the vice-consul was able to arrange with the mutawwifs to accept part-payment or, in cases of extreme indigence, to let the pilgrims off altogether.

104. Nothing of interest has come to the notice of the Legation in connexion with the sheikhs who perform the duties of mutawwifs for non-Indian pilgrims; except a complaint from the Sudan of alleged extortion by the sheikhs who look after African pilgrims. These complaints are still under examination at the time of writing.

105. The Indian vice-consul draws particular attention this year to the importance of a greater control of the muzawwars or local pilgrim guides at Medina. These persons are normally not amenable to any pressure that the Legation can exercise, as they have established rights in the various categories of pilgrims and have no occasion to go to India to compete for patronage. One opportunity was afforded this year of getting back on an erring muzawwar, but it was exceptional. The muzawwar concerned had taken an Indian pilgrim into his employment in 1930, and had swindled him by representing him to the authorities as a lunatic. There was no redress until the muzawwar's son wished to go to India on business, when the father was forced to refund £9 gold.



106. One prospective reform in connexion with muzawwars is noted in paragraph 122 (e) of the following section. The Indian vice-consul suggests that it would have a useful effect on these local guides, and generally, if he were allowed to visit Medina once a year and sanction were given for the small expenditure necessary, in addition to his present allowance for journeys to Mecca.

107. The exchange of news between the Indian vice-consul and the Minister of Finance under the auspices of the King (see paragraph 17) included the following matters, which are relevant to this section:—

(a) The vice-consul renewed previous representations relative to the wakils who act for mutawwifs in Jedda. The most important desiderata, as regards Indian pilgrims, are that the Naqib, or head of the guild of wakils responsible for them, should be an independent person; that wakils should be compelled to confine themselves to pilgrims of one category; and that wakils should attend to their own business in Jedda, instead of deputed others. Particular examples of the prevailing abuses were given in paragraph 58 of the report for 1930. When the matter was raised with the Minister of Finance this year he seemed reluctant to take action, but eventually agreed to the Indian vice-consul's proposals under the three heads just mentioned. If the reform is effected only female wakils will be allowed to employ substitutes to act for them.

(b) The vice-consul drew attention to the scandal caused by the misbehaviour of mutawwifs, &c., in India, including their quarrelsome behaviour during the assembling of the pilgrims there (see paragraph 100). It was agreed that the Saudi Government should require mutawwifs to return to this country reasonably early in the season, the final recommendation being that they should not remain there beyond the departure of the first pilgrim ship sailing after the end of Ramadhan.

108. The following two matters are included in this section, although they are only indirectly connected with its main subject.

(a) The Saudi Government have certain committees in Mecca, who are supposed to look after the interests of pilgrims, listen to their grievances, &c. The principal committee, known as the Haj Committee, has for some time past been an administrative body presided over by the Secretary of the Legislative Council. A decree published on the 2nd June, 1933, substitutes for this a superior Haj Committee composed of the three sheikhs of mutawwifs for Indian, Dutch East Indians and miscellaneous pilgrims respectively and two members of each of the separate committees of those three corporations. The new body is to hear on appeal matters which cannot be settled by the committees of the corporations or by the committee of the Medina guides. It is also to deal with disputes between mutawwifs and camelmen; and, on appeal, with disputes between the purveyors of Zemzem water, which cannot be settled by their own committee; in each case with the assistance of the head and two members of the corporation (camelmen or Zemzemis) concerned. The advantages of this transfer of jurisdiction to a body representing only the interests involved are not clear.

(b) It has been a constant grievance that pilgrims of all nationalities not returning to their countries at the end of their first season are subjected, like ordinary travellers, to rigorous formalities, which entail the nomination of a surety for possible claims against the departing person and the payment of fairly heavy fees. It would appear that in the past mutawwifs, &c., were readier to act as sureties than they are in these hard times. In the course of the exchange of views already mentioned, the Indian vice-consul secured the general acceptance of a proposal that a pilgrim staying in the Hejaz one year should be allowed to depart on production of a certificate to be given gratis by his mutawwif and endorsed gratis by the head mutawwif, to the effect that there are no claims against him and that he has not married in Mecca; and that a pilgrim staying two years or more should be allowed to go on production of a similar certificate and payment of fees at the passport office only. It remains to be seen whether this reform, which would involve a considerable change in the existing passport law, will go through.

#### (9) Pilgrimage Tariff and Cost of Pilgrimage.

109. It was stated in paragraph 145 of the report for last year that, following on the acute controversy described in the preceding paragraphs, the Saudi Government produced in August 1932 a much more comprehensive tariff

of charges authorised for the 1933 pilgrimage. The principal charges in the system followed, as distinct from the details, were the fixation of all charges in Saudi currency, *i.e.*, "piastres miri" computed on a gold basis, and the fixation of definite rates for transport by camel and motor. The use of a single currency basis must be regarded as a satisfactory reform from the point of view of clarity, although it has the natural corollary that the actual cost to pilgrims from countries not on the gold standard is liable to be affected by exchange fluctuations.

110. The early fixation of the charges for transport during the pilgrimage season redressed a grievance which has been acutely felt in the past, when charges were not definitely framed until after many pilgrims were already in the Hejaz. It is still a cause of complaint that some of the charges are high, notably those for the journey to Medina. They continue to be inflated by the inclusion of heavy Government taxation.

111. In view of its importance and the probability that it will be applied in 1934 without substantial alteration the 1933 tariff is reproduced as an appendix to this report. It will be noted that the explanatory notes embodied in it deal with several questions of principle. The tariff did not include the charges for motor transport from Mecca to Arafat and back. These were fixed separately shortly before Pilgrimage Day at inclusive rates, not per pilgrim, but per car or lorry, as follows:—

Mecca to Arafat and back by lorry : £13 gold.

Mecca to Arafat and back by car : £9 gold.

Half of these amounts is understood to be for the Government road-tax or *koshan*.

112. The burden of the charges for transport to Medina is mitigated in certain cases, for pilgrims proceeding thither after the pilgrimage, in two ways, *viz.*:—

(a) The official rates and the control of the Naqaba are maintained only up to the 15th Safar. Pilgrims going to Medina after that date pay a much lower *koshan* and may be carried at lower rate for actual transport, once the enforcement of the fixed tariff by the Naqaba ceases and competition between transports comes into play.

(b) An *ex gratia* concession not provided for in the tariff was made this year after the first rush of pilgrims had left Mecca. Those departing later were allowed to take single tickets to Medina at half the legal rate for the return journey. This enabled those returning to Jedda after the 13th Safar to take advantage of the cheaper rates mentioned at (a).

113. The explanations attached to the tariff maintained one anomaly of which pilgrims going to Medina before Pilgrimage Day complain. The rates for return tickets are the same from Mecca to Medina as from Jedda. It results that on arriving a pilgrim who goes first to Medina is liable to pay £11 for his return journey to Medina and his single fare on to Mecca, if he travels by lorry, whereas if he started from Mecca he would pay only £10 for the journey to Medina and back. Put in another way, it means that the man whose movements are Jedda to Mecca, Mecca to Medina and back and, finally, Mecca to Jedda pays the same total amount for two visits to Mecca and one to Medina as the man whose movements are Jedda to Mecca, Mecca to Medina, after the pilgrimage, and back to Jedda only. This grievance was partly remedied in the course of the 1933 season by compelling transporters who had carried pilgrims from Jedda to Medina to carry them on to Mecca on the return without further charge for transport, but the Government required payment of a further *koshan*, so that the saving was rather less than half the inclusive Jedda-Mecca charge of £1.

114. The notes to the tariff removed one grievance which had been felt by pilgrims going to Medina. The official charge for transport previously covered a stay of eight days only, including the days of arrival and departure and overtime charges were allowed after the expiration of the period to compensate the transporters for any special arrangements they might have to make to provide extra transport. It was complained that the authorised period did not allow for all the rites considered necessary by scrupulous pilgrims. It was increased this year to eight clear days or ten, including the days of arrival and departure. The surcharges for overtime are shown in the tariff.

115. The Government claimed to have lessened the amount payable to mutawwifs, a good proportion of which is payable to themselves by the mutawwifs



as tax. The Indian vice-consul suggests that there was, in fact, an increase amounting in the case of normal Indian pilgrims to about 3 rupees at gold rate, if account be taken of certain charges distributed over the new tariff, but formerly covered by the mutawwif's fee. He reckons that the normal mutawwif's fee for Indians, not including house rent at Mecca and tent hire at Arafat and Mina worked out at 24 rupees at gold rate. He sets against this the following items in the new tariff:—

	Piastres.
No. 7. Portage at Mecca ... ..	5
No. 15. Medina water-tax, paid by all pilgrims ... ..	5
No. 17. Fee for numbering houses at Mecca ... ..	5
No. 18. Fee for Haj Committee ... ..	6½
No. 19. Fee for sheikh of mutawwifs ... ..	12½
No. 28. Normal mutawwif's fee ... ..	187
Total ... ..	220½

which at the official rate of 13½ rupees to the £ comes to £2 gold or 27 rupees at gold rate.

116. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah gives the foregoing result as that arrived at by "those who were versed in the science of numbers," and it is reproduced without further comment. Whatever criticism may be directed against the new tariff it constitutes a great advance in the direction of fixity, all the more so as the Government adhered faithfully to the undertaking given when it was published that it would not be altered. It enabled the Legation to prepare a much more satisfactory estimate of the probable cost of the pilgrimage and to forward it to the Government of India on the 6th October, after it had been agreed unofficially by the Saudi Minister of Finance. The general tariff had already been circulated on the 19th September to that and other British Governments interested in the pilgrimage.

117. The Legation estimate was in due course given general circulation in India and was reproduced in the guide for pilgrims, published by the Government of India early in 1933. The Government of Bengal modified the estimate somewhat for purposes of publication in that province. The estimate does not appear to have received serious criticism in Indian Moslem circles, but many pilgrims nevertheless arrived at Jedda with insufficient funds. This may be attributed in some measures to the activities of propagandists over-eager to advertise a "cheap" pilgrimage. Thus Jemal Pasha Ghazzi (see paragraph 11) circulated broadsheets in which he gave figures which could not be described as false, but which gave no complete picture of the total necessary expenditure. He thus arrived at estimates apparently lower than those of the Legation, and he is alleged to have given still lower estimates in oral statements.

118. An inclusive charge of £18 gold is fixed in the tariff for Javanese pilgrims contracting with mutawwifs to pay a lump sum in respect of all dues, fees and transport charges from the moment of landing at the quay in Jedda to the moment of embarking there. This would also apply to Malayan pilgrims, who are assimilated by the Saudi Government to Javanese, but who do not, in fact, make much use of the contract system.

119. Another note to the tariff reads as follows: "Certain pilgrims prefer to remove the roof of the lorry when wearing Ihram. In such cases the pilgrim will have to pay half an English gold pound for this purpose." This maintains as regards lorries, the practice mentioned in paragraph 111 of the report for 1932 of levying on Shia pilgrims to Medina a charge of 10s. gold, which they regard as a discriminating tax and greatly resent. As the tax was formerly charged even to those travelling by camels, there was some ground for this grievance. During the 1933 season the Minister of Finance agreed to exempt Indian Shia pilgrims travelling by small cars from the tax, and he afterwards extended it to all Shia pilgrims using such cars, but he would make no concession in favour of those using lorries.

120. It was prescribed in the notes to the tariff that all dues, other than rates and transport charges, must be paid by pilgrims on arrival at Jedda to the wakils there of their mutawwifs. The enforcement of this rule on the earlier arrivals created much difficulty in which the Legation was involved. It raises a very thorny question. On the one hand it may seem equitable that payment should

be ensured rather than that pilgrims should get away to Mecca and seek to evade the full payment on grounds of lack of funds, once they have accomplished their main object. On the other hand, it is undesirable that pilgrims should be detained in Jedda, as happened early in the 1933 season to certain pilgrims, who resisted payment in advance. There was a time when it was thought that some pilgrims might have to re-embark without making the pilgrimage. This would have suited the Saudi Government as little as the Legation, and, although the latter could not intervene officially, the former eventually relaxed the rule, subject to obtaining guarantees from the mutawwifs for the payment of moneys accruing to the Government themselves. In the event only one party proceeded to India without making the Haj. This was a family who had performed it in 1932 and had gone to Palestine. They resented payment of further dues in 1933. The Legation could not uphold them in a claim to exemption, and they elected to return to India without making a second pilgrimage.

121. The following incidental factors in the problem just stated deserve mention:—

(a) Mutawwifs undoubtedly suffered somewhat by the eventual non-enforcement of the rule, as they get less than their dues from some of the poorer pilgrims and nevertheless have to satisfy the exigencies of the Government. They appear, however, to accept this philosophically on the ground that they are glad to get anything and may hope to do well out of richer pilgrims.

(b) It is urged against payment in advance that mutawwifs are less attentive to pilgrims once they have collected their dues.

(c) For a time the police on the road to Mecca had instructions to turn back pilgrims seeking to evade payment by proceeding on foot and thereby escaping more easily the vigilance of the wakils. This led to some corruption of the police. Ultimately the measures to turn back pedestrian pilgrims were cancelled.

122. The exchange of views between the Indian vice-consul and the Minister of Finance, under the King's auspices, in May 1933 (see paragraph 17) included the following matters which are relevant to the subject of this section:—

(a) The vice-consul drew attention to the desirability of making any estimates of expenditure circulated in India on behalf of the Saudi Government to harmonise with the estimates prepared by the Legation for the Government of India. The Minister agreed generally and asked to be furnished with copies of the Legation estimates, which the vice-consul promised to provide. The Minister intimated that the Saudi tariff for 1934 would not differ materially from that for 1933.

(b) The vice-consul drew attention to the difficulty experienced by pilgrims compelled to stay the night in Jedda on the way from Mecca to Medina, owing to the fact that the Jedda wakils are not responsible for their accommodation at this point in their journeys. He at first suggested that arrangements should be made to make the wakils responsible in return for a small fee. The matter was not pursued as it is hoped that new transport arrangements (see paragraph 75) will do away with the necessity for a halt overnight in Jedda on the way from Mecca to Medina.

(c) The vice-consul drew attention to the case of pilgrims who, having completed the pilgrimage journeys and returned to Jedda to arrange for homeward passages, may have to wait for steamers and prefer to fill in time by returning to Mecca. He asked that they should be allowed to perform this further journey to Mecca at the same rate of koshan as is ordinarily charged to natives of the country. The Minister agreed to grant this facility with effect from the 15th Zil-Hijja in each year.

(d) The vice-consul drew attention to the difficulty caused by the rule that mutawwifs' fees should be collected in advance on the pilgrims' arrival in Jedda, especially that mentioned in paragraph 121 (b) above. There emerged from this discussion an entirely new proposal, in which Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah reluctantly acquiesced. It was to separate the payments included in paragraph 115 above into two parts, that accruing to the Government and that accruing to the mutawwif as personal remuneration and to make the shipping companies responsible for the collection of the former, except in the case of



pilgrims from West Africa and the Sudan, in the same way that they at present collect quarantine dues when issuing tickets. The Minister of Finance expressed the intention of reducing the total amount of 187 piastres under item 28 of the tariff to 174 piastres, divided into 104 piastres payable to the Government and 70 piastres for the mutawwif. The shipping companies would thus be asked to collect with passage money an inclusive sum of 137½ piastres in respect of the items enumerated in paragraph 115 above. It is apparently also intended to generalise the application of these revised rates by extending them to all Indian and Afghan pilgrims and perhaps others. The views of His Majesty's Minister are given in the following paragraph:—

(e) The vice-consul urged the fixation of a definite fee for the muzawwars at Medina. Some of these have been guilty of grave abuses in the past. They work, except apparently in the case of Dutch East Indian and Malayan pilgrims, under a *taqir* system, i.e., pilgrims from particular places of origin are assigned compulsorily to particular muzawwars. The Minister of Finance agreed to fix a fee of 16 piastres, not inclusive of house rent. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah estimates that this will effect a substantial reduction in the amount hitherto estimated by the Legation for muzawwar's fee and house rent at Medina.

123. If the Saudi Government fulfil the promises enumerated above, the general result will be satisfactory. His Majesty's Minister has, however, grave doubts as to the proposal at (d) in the preceding paragraph. If put into effect it would be in the true interest of most British pilgrims. The reduction of the normal mutawwif's fee of 187 piastres to sums totalling 174 piastres would probably benefit a larger number of British pilgrims than the number who would be affected by a general levelling-up of fees. This would in itself have an incidental advantage inasmuch as Afghans would pay the same rate as Indians from the frontier districts, who have complained of being charged more than their Afghan next door neighbours. There would be less trouble on the arrival of pilgrims in Jedda and the stranglehold of mutawwifs would be relaxed. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether shipping companies would be willing to collect a further 134½ piastres on behalf of the Government and this extra charge before leaving the country of origin might easily be represented to the ignorant as a burden imposed by the Government of those countries or the shipping companies. Sir Andrew Ryan told Ibn Saud personally on the 11th June that in his opinion the proposal required further careful examination from many points of view. He gathered from subsequent conversation with the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Government were likely, for their own reasons, to disallow the proposal of the Minister of Finance.

#### (10) Indian Pilgrimage.

##### Prefatory Note.

124. Shortly after the despatch of the pilgrimage report for 1932 the Legation received from the Government of India a paper containing detailed observations on the reports for 1930 and 1931, which it had not been possible to forward earlier owing to the preoccupation of the authorities concerned with the reports of the Haj Enquiry Committee. Similar observations on the pilgrimage report for 1932 were received in March and April 1933. The Legation is greatly indebted to the Government of India for the close attention given to the three reports, which covered a most important formative period and for the anxiety shown to give effect to its views as far as possible. An endeavour has been made in the present report to take account of the observations of the Government of India on its predecessors. Owing to the great number of matters discussed and various local vicissitudes in Jedda, it is possible that this endeavour has not been completely successful. His Majesty's Minister, who is in separate correspondence with the Government of India on the subject, proposes, if other work permits, to review early in 1934 the position reached in regard to questions concerning the Legation as a result of consideration of the Haj Enquiry Committee's reports and the Legation's annual reports. His general view is that an attempt should be made next year to consolidate the results obtained since the creation of the Haj Enquiry

Committee before embarking on proposals for further improvement. In the present report he has avoided putting forward fresh proposals which might require action in new directions in India.

##### Statistics (up to end of June 1933).

125. The first Indian pilgrims arrived in the steamship *Akbar*, which reached Jedda on the 14th December, 1932. The arrivals ended with that of the steamship *Rizwani* on the 30th March.

126. The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India and from Ceylon, classified according to ports of embarkation:—

BRITISH Subjects.				
Province.	Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Bengal and Assam	272	12	255	539
Punjab	60	1,491	...	1,551
Bombay	1,043	24	2	1,069
United Provinces	914	224	1	1,139
Madras	317	7	...	324
Sind	2	437	...	439
Behar and Orissa	180	1	3	184
Central Provinces	359	68	...	427
Beluchistan	18	175	...	193
N.-W. Frontier Province	30	192	1	223
Hyderabad (Deccan)	334	1	...	335
Delhi	73	146	...	219
Burma	32	...	16	48
Ceylon	7	...	...	7
Total	3,641	2,778	278	6,697

127. The discrepancy between the foregoing total and those given in paragraph 31 above is due to the fact that the figure in paragraph 31 includes Indian pilgrims from embarkation ports other than those in India and that the present statement has been compiled from lists of pilgrims, whereas those in paragraph 31 have been compiled from information supplied by quarantine authorities whose basis of compilation is somewhat different. The present table puts the total number of pilgrims from British India, the Native States and Ceylon at 6,697, as compared with 9,503 of last year. All provinces, except the United Provinces and Madras, show a decline, in most cases very marked.

128. The following list shows the number of non-Indian pilgrims who travelled to the Hejaz via Indian ports:—

	Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Chinese (Turkestan)	25	1,004	...	1,029
Afghans	86	2,320	...	2,406
South Africans	14	...	...	14
Russian Turkestan	7	19	...	26
Persians	28	49	...	77
Hejaz-Nejd subjects	136	42	19	197
Malayans	...	1	...	1
Arabs from the Persian Gulf	97	143	...	240 <sup>(*)</sup>
Miscellaneous	5	1	...	6
	398	3,579	19	3,996

(\*) One hundred and sixty from Dubai, 30 from Bahrein, 36 from Muscat, 5 from Kuwait and 9 from Iraq.

129. Any difficulty in reconciling the foregoing figures with those in paragraph 31 is due to cases similar to those indicated in paragraph 127. The total is 3,161 as compared with 3,996 in 1932. Afghans were mainly responsible for the increase. It is noteworthy that, out of a total of 607 Persian pilgrims, only seventy-seven came via India.



130. According to information obtained from the mutawwifs, the numbers of Indian pilgrims who arrived from other than Indian ports was as follows:—

Suez ... ..	156
Port Sudan ... ..	41
Beirut ... ..	13
Massawa ... ..	15
Aden ... ..	26
East Africa ... ..	16
Dutch East Indies and Malaya ... ..	6
Hodeida ... ..	5
	<hr/>
	278

It is estimated that, in addition to the above, about 300 Indians came overland on foot via Nejd, Yemen, Iraq and Palestine. Almost all of these were indigent and had to be eventually repatriated at the expense of the Government of India.

131. The Mogul Line (Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co.) was again the only line engaged in the pilgrimage traffic from India this year.

132. The following table shows the movement of return traffic with details of the number of ships available on given dates for repatriation of pilgrims, the number of pilgrims awaiting repatriation and the number actually repatriated:—

Dates.	Number of Ships in Port.	Pilgrims awaiting Embarkation.	Pilgrims despatched.	Pilgrims remaining.	Remarks.
1933—					
April 12 .. ..	5	5,675	1,773	3,902	<i>Rehmani.</i>
" 13 .. ..	4	4,280	1,504	2,776	<i>Khooru.</i>
" 14 .. ..	3	2,939	1,781	1,158	<i>Rizwani.</i>
" 16 .. ..	2	1,490	1,490	..	<i>Akbar.</i>
" 25 .. ..	1	1,155	1,155	..	<i>Alavi.</i>
May 10 .. ..	1	1,118	1,118	..	<i>Khooru.</i>
" 23 .. ..	1	1,156	1,156	..	<i>Jehangir.</i>
June 9 .. ..	1	..	570	..	<i>Alavi.</i>

133. The following table shows the number of ships run, voyages effected and pilgrims carried by the Mogul Line:—

Outward from India.			Homeward to India.		
Number of Ships.	Number of Voyages.	Number of Pilgrims.	Number of Ships.	Number of Voyages.	Number of Pilgrims.
5	10	10,651 <sup>(*)</sup>	6	8	10,547 <sup>(*)</sup>

(\*) The discrepancy between this figure of pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz and that given in paragraph 31, is due to different systems of computation used by the authorities relied on.

(\*) This figure includes 263 destitutes who originally came overland, and 462 Hadramis, &c., who either arrived by other ships or had been resident in the Hejaz. If these numbers be deducted from the figure for homeward-bound pilgrims the disparity between it and the number of arrivals amounts to 829, made up of 621 persons whose return tickets are still held in deposit in the Legation, and 108 others, mainly Hejazis returning from India and remaining in the Hejaz, or pilgrims who went northward to visit other holy places.

134. The following table shows the distribution of the totals given in the preceding paragraph by ports of embarkation and destination. The number of arrivals at Bombay and Karachi cannot, however, be vouched for, as some

pilgrims booked as passengers for Bombay subsequently prefer to land at Karachi rather than continue the sea voyage:—

Port.	Pilgrims embarked.	Pilgrims returning.
Bombay ... ..	4,004	3,597
Karachi ... ..	6,350	6,190
Calcutta ... ..	297	..
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	10,651	9,787

135. The outgoing Mogul steamers carried, in addition to the above pilgrims for India, 462 pilgrims and others for intervening destinations as follows:—

Aden ... ..	53
Mokallah ... ..	409
	<hr/>
	462

136. Information from the same source as that mentioned in paragraph 130 above, show the following numbers of Indian pilgrims as having left for ports other than Indian:—

Suez ... ..	31
Port Sudan ... ..	10
Beirut ... ..	28
Massawah ... ..	6
Aden ... ..	28
Africa ... ..	39
Jibuti ... ..	2
Hodeida ... ..	6
	<hr/>
	150

137. The following is a statement of the number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets in India, or deposited the amount of the return passage:—

Port.	Single.	Return.	Deposit.	Total.
Bombay ... ..	160	3,831	13	4,004
Karachi ... ..	5	6,235	110	6,350
Calcutta ... ..	27	120	150	297
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	192	10,186	273	10,651

138. It is satisfactory to note that very few single tickets were issued to British Indians of the type who are apt to become destitute in the Hejaz. None were issued to British Indians at Karachi, and of 31 who took single tickets at Bombay the majority were well-to-do pilgrims travelling first and second-class. Rather less caution seems to have been used at Calcutta, as five out of ten single tickets taken there by British Indians were issued to apparently poor persons.

#### Return of Pilgrims to India: General.

139. The shipping provided for returning pilgrims was quite adequate for the reduced numbers involved this year. The table in paragraph 132 above shows that after the 16th April, only twelve days after Pilgrimage Day, there was no congestion in Jedda, and ships were more apt to have to wait for pilgrims than the reverse. In one case, however, that of the *Jehangir*, waiting pilgrims made a clamour because the ship was standing by for further arrivals from Medina. It was arranged to ante-date her departure by three days, and the complement was made up by including in it a number of destitutes who had to be repatriated.

140. The competent authorities in India and the Legation have continued to give much attention to the three more or less connected problems discussed in paragraphs 161 to 163 of last year's report, viz.:—

- (a) Whether the difficulties experienced by first and second-class passengers in getting early passages in those classes in ships returning to India can be overcome;



- (b) Whether arrangements can be made to enable first and second-class passengers to book their return passages by letter or telegram from Mecca or Medina; and,
- (c) What means can be found to relieve Indian pilgrims generally of the necessity for waiting for long periods in Jedda in congested conditions.

Owing to the smallness of the pilgrimage and the adequacy of the shipping available, none of these problems was so acute in 1933 as in previous years, but it will be convenient to sum up the main conclusions which emerge from the correspondence up to date.

141. As regards (a), Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. have expressed their inability to increase the first and second-class accommodation in their existing fleet of steamers, and they doubt the commercial feasibility of another scheme which they have had under consideration, viz., the running of a special steamer for first and second-class passengers only. Meanwhile, the number of pilgrims holding first and second-class return tickets, who elected to travel in a lower class this year in order to avoid delay, fell this year to twenty-three. The Indian vice-consul attributes this in part to the fact that some pilgrims, aware of the difficulties that have arisen, preferred to travel from India to Jedda on single tickets.

142. The problem at (b) has receded somewhat into the background, no practical scheme having been devised to overcome the difficulties surrounding any proposal to alter present arrangements. The problem in any case merges to some extent in that at (c).

143. As regards (c), the Standing Hajj Committee of the Indian Legislature expressed the opinion on the 25th February, 1933, (i) that no attempt should be made to induce pilgrims to stay behind at Mecca or Medina after the pilgrimage, (ii) that certain arrangements, which had been suggested by the Legation, for the publication of shipping news in Mecca and Medina, should be made, and (iii) that consideration should be given to the possibility of enabling pilgrims to book their passages through an agent of the shipping company at Mecca. The Government of India endorsed the opinion of the committee in regard to (i), an opinion formed after the Legation had reported the strong objections to any attempt to restrain the flow of home-bound pilgrims. The agents of the Mogul Line in Jedda have expressed inability to adopt the suggestion at (ii), although they are willing to notify the proper authorities in Mecca and Medina of prospective sailings, and to answer enquiries by pilgrims. The suggestion at (iii) has been considered very carefully in Jedda, where His Majesty's Minister has been driven reluctantly to the conclusion that no arrangement to book passages at two different centres during a rush period could be made to work satisfactorily, having regard to various difficulties which he has stated in detail in a separate despatch to the Government of India.

144. In general, it may be said that all shipping arrangements worked satisfactorily this year, and it is unnecessary to revert to matters such as those dealt with in paragraphs 164, 166 and 168 of last year's report. Under an agreement reached between the Government of India and Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., the arrangements foreshadowed in paragraph 169 of that report were brought into force in 1933. The company undertook as an experimental measure for one year to arrange for the landing and re-embarkation of pilgrims' luggage at an inclusive charge of 3 rupees per head, payable as an addition to passage money and to provide the necessary labour for handling it on board ship. The arrangement worked well and helped to reduce delay on the quay. It is hoped that it will be renewed, although at least one violent protest has been made against it in India, viz., by Ismail Ghuznavi, writing in a Lahore paper on the 4th June.

145. Cases again arose (see paragraph 167 of last year's report) in which pilgrims, who had run short of funds and hoped to recover in Jedda deposits made in India in respect of possible quarantine dues in Iraq, had to have recourse to the generosity of fellow pilgrims to help them out.

146. The Indian Section of the Legation issued 613 emergency passes to pilgrims without other papers, in accordance with the arrangements mentioned in paragraph 171 of last year's report.

#### *Representations by Pilgrims, &c.*

147. No representations of general interest in connexion with shipping arrangements, &c., were made to the Legation this year. An Amir-Al-Haj was appointed in accordance with a recommendation made by the Haj Enquiry Committee in 1930. This gentleman, Mr. Hasan Ali P. Ibrahim, vice-president of the Bombay Haj Committee, travelled in the steamship *Rizwani*, and forwarded to the president of that committee, through the Legation, a valuable report, which dealt with a certain number of general matters as well as the incidents of the voyage. No exception need be taken to this in a first report of the kind, but it would perhaps cause confusion, if it became the practice to extend the scope of the reports in such a manner, when the system of having an Amir-Al-Haj or Pilgrims' Committee in every ship is brought into general application.

148. Strong representations were made to the Legation by pilgrims who arrived in Jedda on the steamship *Akbar* on the 16th March regarding an alleged case of misconduct between the senior doctor on board, a Parsee, and a consenting woman pilgrim. The case caused great agitation, which was allayed until the ship's arrival by the tact of the master and the good sense of certain leading pilgrims. It was considered advisable to arrange to relieve the doctor of his duties on the return voyage. This was made possible by transferring a doctor from another ship and replacing him by a volunteer, who had been in charge of the Afghan dispensary and was returning to India.

149. Arising out of paragraph 174 of the last report the Legation has forwarded to the Government of India at their request suggestions by Dr. Abdul Hamid regarding medical arrangements, &c., on board pilgrim ships. They deal with the questions of women doctors, latrines, dispensary and hospital accommodation and equipment and supplies of medicines.

#### *Registration, Return Ticket and Deposit System.*

150. The Legation arrangements continued to work satisfactorily and 6,407 of the 6,697 Indian pilgrims shown in paragraph 126 as having arrived by sea registered at the Legation, the small deficit being accounted for as described in paragraph 177 of last year's report.

151. Twenty-three unclaimed or unused return halves of tickets dating from 1931 were forwarded to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay.

152. Four persons who had not deposited their return tickets at the Legation lost them. Arrangements similar to those described in paragraph 179 of last year's report were made to enable them to obtain passages.

153. The Indian vice-consul draws attention to a problem of which there were a few examples this year. Cases have arisen in which persons or associations in India purchase return tickets for servants or pilgrims to whom it is desired to give charitable assistance and later seek to establish a claim to refunds of the value of the return half, if the beneficiaries do not return to India. It is held in the Legation that only the holder of the ticket can be considered entitled to refund.

154. The Indian vice-consul again appeals for the collaboration of authorities in India in ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the information necessary to make the register kept in Jedda itself accurate and complete. The Government of India have already taken action to generalise the use of the indication letters suggested in paragraph 18 of section 9 of the report for 1929 and to request the shipping company to copy the pass numbers on to tickets in ink rather than in pencil. If these rules are observed and scrupulous care taken in making the general lists of pilgrims accurate, *e.g.*, as to whether the pilgrims shown are holders of single or return tickets and to provide complete information regarding addresses, all will be well.

155. The arrangements for the Hyderabad Pilgrimage were in some respects unsatisfactory in 1932 (see paragraph 180 of last year's report). They were greatly improved this year, and the pilgrims from that State were excellently handled under the direction of a single "Kafila Salar," a competent person of high standing.

156. In the correspondence mentioned in paragraph 124 the Government of India stated that Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. had instructed the commanders of their ships not to land stowaways at Jedda, as suggested in Recommendation No. 45 of the Haj Enquiry Committee (*cf.* paragraph 185 of



last year's report). The Saudi Government themselves showed an inclination this year to discourage stowaways by imprisoning two persons who got ashore from the steamship *Rizwani* on the 30th March, notwithstanding the company's instructions. When the fact came to the knowledge of the Indian vice-consul on the 29th April, one of the men had failed to make the pilgrimage, while the other had made it under police escort. They were released in consequence of a private appeal by the vice-consul, whose feelings were touched. His Majesty's Minister considers that they had been punished sufficiently, but does not consider that the Saudi Government can be criticised for dealing severely with persons who make themselves a nuisance to everybody. He has no doubt that stowaways should be discouraged by all means, and that it is far better that, whenever possible, they should not be allowed to land.

#### Local Haj Committee.

157. This committee, which must not be confused with the official Saudi Committee mentioned in paragraph 108 (a), was constituted as usual for the purpose of regulating return passages to India. It was feared that its rather precarious existence might be affected by the death of the old Governor of Jedda, who was also the head of the most important local firm of shipping agents. The new Amir, a Nejd official, was, however, helpful and the committee, sitting at the house of the Indian vice-consul, did useful work.

#### Destitutes.

158. Although the total number of Indian pilgrims was smaller in 1933 than in 1932, the number of persons who had to be repatriated at the expense of the Government of India was larger. The figures for the last few years have been 387 in 1930, 318 in 1931, 258 in 1932 and 299 up to the end of June 1933, with a possibility of more to follow. The following tables give an analysis of the figure just given for this year by (a) provinces of origin and (b) routes of access to the Hejaz:—

##### (a) Province of origin—

(1) Punjab	...	...	48
(2) Bengal	...	...	65
(3) Sind	...	...	117
(4) Baluchistan	...	...	20
(5) Assam	...	...	6
(6) North-West Frontier Province	...	...	16
(7) Bombay	...	...	1
(8) United Provinces	...	...	8
(9) Delhi	...	...	1
(10) Behar and Orissa	...	...	1
(11) Madras	...	...	15
(12) Central Provinces	...	...	1

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##### (b) Route—

###### (1) By overland—

Via Yemen	...	...	154
Via Iraq	...	...	22
Via Mokallah	...	...	22
Via Nejd	...	...	60
Via Palestine	...	...	3
Via Syria	...	...	2

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###### (2) By sea—

Return ticket holders from Bombay	25
Return ticket holders from Karachi	1
Single ticket holders from Bombay	1
Single ticket holders from Karachi	8
One boy with parents came free	1

36

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159. The authorities in India were able to get a quotation of 40 rupees per head direct from Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. for the repatriation of destitutes. A sum of 80 rupees was collected from two persons who seemed able to contribute to the cost of their return. The actual amount expended on behalf of the Government of India was 11,880 rupees, £24 gold and 11½ Saudi riyals.

160. The usual precautions were taken to guard against fraud, to provide the authorities in India with lists of the persons repatriated and to take from each an undertaking to repay the money expended.

160A. The problem of the destitute Indian pilgrims has been fully dealt with in previous reports. Table (b) in paragraph 158 above shows that it is still very largely a question of persons who reach the Hejaz overland. The Government of India are still considering by what means this traffic can be brought under control. The matter is undoubtedly very thorny, as so many of the persons came by land from remote parts of Arabia, the access to which from India may be difficult to regulate. It is nevertheless desirable that the problem should be tackled, lest the development of motor transport (*cf.* paragraph 86) should increase its dimensions.

160B. In so far as the problem relates to pilgrims who originally came to the Hejaz by sea, but for one reason or another have not the means of returning, good results may be expected from two sets of measures adopted by the Government of India, viz., (a) measures to restrict severely the issue of single tickets at the ports of embarkation, both by administrative action and by including in the Bill to amend the Merchant Shipping Act a clause doing away with the former provision enabling pilgrims to take single tickets on making a sworn declaration of not intending to return to India within three years; and (b) measures to check more strictly clauses by departing pilgrims to be regarded as foreign; especially Saudi nationals, and to impress on those travelling as foreigners the fact that they cannot later look for assistance as being British nationals in the Hejaz. The Government of India have been obliged to discard, owing to opposition or anticipated opposition in India, two suggestions made in previous reports, viz., that the validity of return tickets should be prolonged and discretion given to the Legation to allow or disallow refunds at any time during the period of validity, and that return tickets should be made compulsory all the year round (see paragraph 184 of last year's report, which adverts to all these points).

161. The whole subject of refunds on return tickets, which is so important an element in the problem just discussed, forms the subject of a separate despatch to the Government of India. A particular aspect of it, not primarily connected with the problem of destitutes, is mentioned in paragraph 153 above.

#### Publicity.

162. A second edition of the *Guide for Pilgrims to the Hejaz* was issued by the Government of India on the 20th December, 1932, and published early this year. This booklet contains information of the greatest utility to pilgrims, including much information about pilgrimage conditions in the Hejaz, the medical and other facilities provided there by the Government of India and precautions which should be observed by pilgrims in their own interest. The second edition gave also the Legation's tentative estimate of expenditure likely to be incurred by Indian pilgrims in 1933. Notwithstanding what was said in paragraph 190 of last year's report, the inclusion of this feature is valuable provided that it be intended to reissue the guide each year and that official information regarding the prospective cost of the next following pilgrimage is available in time. It is not anticipated that there will be any great change in the Saudi official tariff for 1934, but it has not been issued up to the time of writing (July 1933). It would therefore be unsafe to reprint last year's estimate in the guide or otherwise pending the receipt of further information from the Legation, which will forward it to the Government of India when available.

163. The signboards for the offices, &c., served by the Indian and medical sections of the Legation have been supplied from India in accordance with the suggestion mentioned in paragraph 192 of last year's report, but were not received in time to be brought into use during the 1933 pilgrimage.

#### Banking Facilities.

164. There has been no change in the position described in previous reports. Reference is made in paragraph 7 (a) to the concession granted to a group headed



by the ex-Khedive of Egypt for the creation of a State Bank, but the bank has not materialised up to the time of writing, and the prospects of the scheme must be regarded as uncertain. The principal banking concerns in Jedda are still the Netherlands Trading Society, which has branches in India, and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., whose correspondents there are the National Bank of India. The Legation again deprecates the use of Hundis.

165. Leading Indian pilgrims have renewed the suggestion (see paragraph 153 of the report for 1931) that the Legation should be equipped to cash drafts and to make payments at Mecca and Medina. His Majesty's Minister considers it undesirable that the Legation should engage in this class of business, even if it had adequate staff and could make arrangements in the interior. Arrangements already exist whereby pilgrims wishing to leave surplus cash in safe custody can deposit it at the Legation. The amount so deposited this year was 39,665 rupees.

#### Indian Staff.

166. The staff of the Indian section, consisting of the Indian vice-consul and two permanent clerks, was reinforced as usual during the pilgrimage season by the employment of three temporary clerks and two messengers. All members of the staff worked efficiently and industriously. In view of the fact that the Indian pilgrimage has not diminished in anything like the same proportion as others and that the work of the section tends to increase, as the pilgrimage is better organised, it is much to be hoped that the Government of India will sanction the re-employment of a third permanent clerk as soon as financial conditions permit. This could make it possible to dispense with one temporary clerk during the season, so long as the pilgrimage remains on the present scale. A middle solution would be to employ locally all the year round for, say, two years in the first instance, Munshi Qazi Fazlullah, who has been employed for some time past as a temporary clerk, and is highly thought of by Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah. The employment of three permanent clerks would *inter alia* facilitate leave arrangements.

167. As regards the medical section, see paragraph 58 above.

#### (11) Afghan Pilgrimage.

168. The revival of the Afghan pilgrimage has been one of the more remarkable features of a period of lean years. The figures since 1927-28, the peak years of the pilgrimage generally since Ibn Saud conquered the Hejaz, have been: 3,858 in 1927, 3,022 in 1928, 1,705 in 1929, 1,218 in 1930, 973 in 1931, 1,751 in 1932 and 2,412 in 1933, a figure not far short of 12 per cent. of the total of pilgrims from overseas. Attention has been called earlier to the presence of a fair number of highly-placed Afghan personages this year.

169. The majority of Afghan pilgrims again travelled from India on return tickets or deposit-paid passes. About twenty Afghan destitutes came to the notice of the Legation, which could not assist them any more than the Afghan consular clerk mentioned below. They were repatriated by local charity.

170. The conclusion of a Saudi Afghan treaty and the provision by the Afghan Government of certain facilities for Afghan pilgrims in Mecca were dealt with in the corresponding section of last year's report. Although the treaty has not been ratified, the Afghan Government made a further move this year by detaching their consul at Bombay for service in Mecca during the pilgrimage season. This gentleman, Silah Uddin Khan Seljuqi, was duly appointed Afghan consul in Jedda. His stay lasted, however, only from the 16th March to the 26th April. He did not take a house or establish a permanent office, but he left an experienced clerk in charge of his work.

171. Both parties in Afghanistan appear to attach importance to the Holy Places of the Hejaz as a centre where propaganda can be carried on, whence influence may radiate backward to Afghanistan, and where perhaps they can watch each other's activities. The Indian vice-consul reports that Afghan mullahs hold periodical meetings, and engage thereat in considerable pro-Nadir propaganda in their own language in the precincts of the Haram at Mecca. The visit of an important member of ex-King Amanullah's entourage is recorded in paragraph 22 above.

#### (12) Malay Pilgrimage.

172. The following paragraphs are adapted in part from the special report by the Malay pilgrimage officer, Haji Abdul Majid, a copy of which he is understood to have submitted to the Government of the Straits Settlements direct.

#### Shipping (outward from Malay Ports).

173. The steamship *Automedon* of the Blue Funnel Line, with 139 pilgrims on board, left Singapore on the 13th November and arrived at Jedda on the 30th November, 1932, thus inaugurating, as far as Malaya is concerned, the pilgrimage season under review. She was followed by two vessels of the same line, carrying a total of 513 pilgrims. This number, which agrees almost exactly with that given in the general statistics in paragraph 31 above, included, as usual, pilgrims of Dutch, Siamese, Chinese, American, Hejazi, and other nationalities, in addition to British Malays.

#### Number of Pilgrims.

174. Out of this total of 513, only 101 were from British Malaya. Their distribution by places of origin was as follows:—

Straits Settlements—				
Singapore	...	...	...	5
Penang and Province Wellesley	...	...	...	26
Malacca	...	...	...	4
Labuan	...	...	...	0
Federated Malay States—				
Perak	...	...	...	15
Selangor	...	...	...	1
Negri Sembilan	...	...	...	11
Pahang	...	...	...	9
Unfederated Malay States—				
Johore	...	...	...	20
Kedah	...	...	...	3
Perlis	...	...	...	2
Kelantan	...	...	...	5
Trengganu	...	...	...	0
Brunei	...	...	...	0
				101

175. Although the above total shows an increase on the total of 80 for last year, it again reflects the effect of economic depression on the flow of pilgrims from Malaya, who were formerly so numerous.

#### Feeding on Board Ships.

176. There appeared to be an improvement this year in the preparation of food on board the pilgrim ships. Haji Abdul Majid records that pilgrims state they would be glad of more variety in the salt-fish supplied to them, as one quality only is supplied at present. It is hoped that those responsible for the catering on board the ships will endeavour to effect further improvements next year.

#### Sheikhs' or Mutawwifs' Charges.

177. The general nature and effects of the Saudi pilgrimage tariff are again fully discussed in a separate section of this report. The Malay pilgrimage officer states that the approximate rate of exchange this year was 20 riyals = £1 gold = 13 Straits dollars on the average.

178. Haji Abdul Majid had not prepared, before leaving Jedda, an inclusive estimate of the expenditure incurred by Malay pilgrims this year. He will doubtless furnish this to the authorities in Malaya in order to facilitate the preparation there, on receipt of the Saudi tariff, of an estimate for 1934.



*General Conditions during the Pilgrimage Season.*

179. Haji Abdul Majid confirms the opinion expressed earlier that the price of food-stuffs and water was no greater this year than in 1932; perhaps, if anything, rather lower.

180. Malay pilgrims have not, as yet, availed themselves of the facilities and accommodation afforded by the hotels established by the Saudi Arab Government in Mecca, Medina and Jedda for the convenience of pilgrims of the richer class (see paragraph 12 (a) above).

*Assistance to Pilgrims.*

181. The prevalent distress due to hard times again led to an increase, under this head, of repatriation of destitute pilgrims. It was decided this year to make a clearance of a number of hard cases, including some of a kind not usually repatriated. The Government of the Straits Settlements sanctioned an expenditure of £320, of which a total of £279 1s. 7d. was expended on the repatriation of forty individuals. These persons in each case gave signed undertakings to refund the amounts expended on them.

182. The work of disposing of these distressed and destitute pilgrims was greatly facilitated by the Blue Funnel Line, who were good enough to reduce the fare for destitutes, up to a limit of fifty, from 90 Straits dollars to £6 sterling.

*Conditions governing the Issue of Steamship Tickets and Refunds.*

183. The "Guiding Rules," to which a reference was made in paragraph 213 of last year's report, have been followed this year. They were amended in October in respect of refunds to the next-of-kin of a deceased ticket-holder.

*Illicit Sale of Return Halves of Steamship Tickets.*

184. The adoption of the "Guiding Rules" suggested the advisability of dealing with another matter, namely, that of improving the precautions against the sale by Malay pilgrims of the return halves of their tickets. It is hoped that the greater liberality of the new "Guiding Rules" as regards the period of validity and conditions applying to refunds on unused tickets will of itself diminish the temptation to withdraw return tickets with a view to improper sale, but this does not constitute a complete safeguard. Correspondence is still proceeding between the Legation and the Government of the Straits Settlements as to the best means of minimising the risk of illicit transactions.

*Mortality.*

185. The number of deaths this year is given as 1, up to the 12th May, 1933. This gives a death rate of 1 per cent., whereas last year it was 2½ per cent. In view of the smallness of the Malayan pilgrimage in 1932 and 1933, these figures have little independent value, but they correspond satisfactorily with the estimates of general mortality in paragraph 53 above.

*Deceased Pilgrims' Effects.*

186. Three enquiries regarding the effects of deceased pilgrims by their next-of-kin in Malaya were referred to the Saudi Government, whose reply, in each case, had not been received when the Malay pilgrimage officer left Jedda for Malaya. Other enquiries were successfully dealt with.

*Pilgrimage Officer's Audience with the King.*

187. The audience accorded by the King to Haji Abdul Majid (see paragraph 17) afforded the latter an opportunity of submitting to His Majesty, in the form of a private memorandum, his views regarding the establishment of hostels for Malay students in Mecca. He characterised the present position as unsatisfactory, and, in advocating the creation of hostels, conducted under Government supervision and control, expressed the opinion that they could be maintained by contributions by the parents of students and by "auqaf," or charitable donations.

188. During the audience the Malay pilgrimage officer put forward a suggestion, also embodied in his memorandum, for the improvement in the system of selecting and appointing sheikhs or mutawwifs, representing that only men of the best type should be chosen in view of their functions not merely as cicerones but also as spiritual guides.

*Malay Floating Population in the Hejaz.*

189. A rough census of Malays in this country at the time of this year's pilgrimage was attempted by the Malay pilgrimage clerk. According to his estimate, there were about 500 British Malays in Mecca, survivals from earlier seasons, over and above the 101 who arrived this year. It is supposed that about 200 of the total were pilgrims who had received back from the Malay pilgrimage office here the return portions of their steamship tickets as if they were to return to Malaya, but who had sold the tickets to others and had themselves returned to Mecca to remain on in this country.

*Malay Pilgrimage Staff.*

190. Haji Abdul Majid, the Malay pilgrimage officer, arrived at Jedda on the 1st January, 1933. Haji Muhammad Jamil acted for him from the 1st December, 1932, until his arrival, and continued to assist him until the 16th January, 1933. Owing to pressure of work, due to the new system of control to prevent the sale of return tickets, Haji Muhammad Jamil had to be re-engaged from the 12th April to the 12th May, 1933.

*(13) West African Pilgrimage.*

191. The Saudi returns (see paragraph 31) show 509 West African pilgrims of all nationalities as having entered the port of Jedda on pilgrimage this year, as compared with 780 last year. There is reason to believe that the figure of 509 is made up exclusively of British and French West Africans and that about 75 per cent. of these were British or British-protected. As in previous years, a large number of West African pilgrims, computed this year at something less than 2,000, entered the smaller Hejazi and Asiri ports south of Jedda from Massawa by dhow.

192. After a further exchange of correspondence at the beginning of 1933 between the Government of Nigeria, the Sudan Government and this Legation, it was decided to bring into force without further delay the Nigerian pilgrimage scheme mentioned in paragraph 219 of last year's report. Although the scheme will take some time to produce its full effect, it is hoped that it will eventually provide means to control the West African pilgrimage more effectively, if only the flow of pilgrims by dhow from Massawa to Asiri and other ports south of Jedda can be averted. The position in this respect remains substantially the same as recorded in last year's report (see paragraphs 220 and 221 thereof). There is ample evidence to show that the traffic has been in full swing again this year, and that the estimate given above of nearly 2,000 pilgrims carried by dhow from Massawa is not far off the mark. An attempt was made last autumn to interest the new Italian Minister in this subject, and he was given privately, at his own request, a memorandum for use during a visit he was about to pay to Asmara. M. de Peppo appeared impressed with the necessity for reform, but on his return he merely said that he had done his best and avoided further discussion.

193. The situation is thrown into relief by a comparison of the figures appearing in the Alexandria International Quarantine Board's report on the pilgrimage of 1932 with statistics, locally obtained, of the arrivals of pilgrims by steamer from Massawa. On p. 61 of the board's report it is stated, on the strength of information supplied by the Government of Eritrea themselves, that 2,405 pilgrims were embarked at Massawa for the Hejaz from the 1st January, 1932, onwards. On the other hand, according to figures furnished by the Jedda agents of the small Italian steamers trading in the Red Sea—the only steamers plying direct between Massawa and this port—an aggregate of 203 pilgrims only was carried, on eight voyages, during the period the 1st January to the 30th April, 1932. It has been suggested that these facts might usefully be ventilated at the next meeting of the International Health Office. Considerable pressure will undoubtedly have to be brought to bear upon the Italian authorities before any move is made by them to dislodge the powerful vested interests in Eritrea involved in this traffic.

194. The Emir of Katsina, who made the pilgrimage this year with members of his family and numerous retainers, arrived in Jedda on the 15th March, eight days before he was due. He first proceeded to Medina and



thence to Mecca, a place which he had previously visited some twelve years before. On his departure from this country he expressed his satisfaction at the consideration shown to him by Ibn Saud. He left for Port Sudan *en route* for the United Kingdom on the 9th April. His attractive and rather striking personality assured him of popularity, but he knew how to combine charm with a canny skill in resisting the blandishments of local mendicants and touts.

195. Twelve West Africans were assisted on their onward journey to Suakin from the funds of the Nigerian Repatriation Fund. Much poverty continues to prevail among the British West African pilgrims temporarily resident in this country owing to the depressed labour market, and, although measures were successfully taken this year to discourage hopes of any mass repatriation, it is anticipated that a large number will have to be repatriated next year.

196. Repatriation of West Africans: position on the 24th July, 1933:—

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 250.
- (b) Applicants repatriated: None repatriated, but twelve assisted.
- (c) Applications still under reference: None.

#### (14) Somali Pilgrimage.

197. According to the Saudi figures (see paragraph 31), seventy-five Somali pilgrims of all nationalities entered the port of Jedda this year as compared with 115 last year. It is not possible to estimate how many of these were British Somalis, but there is reason to believe that they did not exceed fifteen from British Somaliland, and probably a lesser number from Aden. The number of British Somalis who reached Mecca overland from Aden, Hodeyda, Qunfida, Jizan and other southern ports may, perhaps, be put at twice the number who landed at Jedda, but there are no means of confirming this estimate.

198. The Government of British Somaliland, like the other British Governments in Africa, except that of Nigeria and the Sudan Government, introduced this year the new type of pilgrim pass mentioned in paragraphs 28 and 224 of last year's report. Those Somalis who took out this new pilgrim pass also deposited the sum of 50 rupees with the issuing officer. In three cases advances were made by the Legation against the sums deposited.

199. The question of the disposal of Somali destitutes applying for repatriation at the end of the pilgrimage season, nearly all of whom come on pilgrimage overland, and certain other matters in regard to Somali pilgrims, which had been the subject of earlier correspondence, were discussed in London in November 1932 between the Chief Commissioner of the Somaliland Protectorate and His Majesty's Minister in Jedda. The results of the discussion were recorded in a subsequent exchange of letters, after Sir Andrew Ryan had had an opportunity of consulting Captain B. W. Seager, who was compelled to leave London a few days before the meeting. The principal agreement reached was that the system of repatriating destitute Somalis from Jedda by steamship which was adopted experimentally last year (see paragraph 227 of the 1932 report) should be abandoned on grounds of expense, and that, except in the case of those suffering from serious illness, persons repatriated should be sent by dhow. Major Lawrance pointed out that the moneys disbursed by the Legation on Somali destitutes are recovered not from the individuals themselves, but from the tribes to which they belong, and that it is more important to study economy than to ensure the arrival of the individuals assisted at a destination in Somaliland.

200. Repatriation of British Somalis: position on the 24th July, 1933:—

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 45.
- (b) Applicants repatriated: 29.
- (c) Applications still under reference: Nil.

#### (15) Sudanese Pilgrimage.

201. According to the Saudi returns (see paragraph 31), 420 Sudanese pilgrims arrived this year in Khedivial Mail Line ships from Suakin, as compared with 527 last year.

202. At the beginning of the incoming season it was reported that a number of Sudanese pilgrims were arriving with insufficient funds to pay for their pilgrimage expenses, and it was anticipated that in the return season there would be numerous applications for assistance. This prognostication proved to be well-founded. Within eleven days of the return of the first pilgrims to Jedda from Mecca, forty-three Sudanese pilgrims were advanced a total of £E.82½. This was required for the payment of mutawwif's dues, for subsistence and for the repayment of small loans contracted on pilgrimage. Since the 21st April and up to the time of writing (July 1933) a further nineteen persons have had to be assisted, making a total to date of sixty-two Sudanese pilgrims who were unable to leave this country without financial assistance. Six Sudanese pilgrims, who were not in possession of Suakin pilgrim passes, applied for repatriation this year.

203. A number of pilgrims from the Sudan did harm to their own interests by informing their prospective pilgrim guides on arrival that they were natives of Khartum, Omdurman, El Obeid, Atbara, Wadi Halfa, &c., whereas, in fact, they were natives of small villages whose respective merkez and mudiriyehs were the towns mentioned. The danger of such statements lies in the fact that under the Saudi pilgrimage tariff inhabitants of towns, such as those named above, are subject to a fixed mutawwif's fee of 187 piastres miri gold, whereas inhabitants of the smaller villages and outlying districts "owing to their poverty pay such gratuity to their mutawwifs as they wish." The usual rule is that the Saudi passport authorities register the villages of origin of the various Sudanese pilgrims in accordance with the particulars given on their Suakin pilgrim passes, but if a pilgrim should himself volunteer the statement that he comes from a town, while he is actually from a remote village specified in his pilgrim pass, the authorities are only too prone to accept his statement as correct.

204. It is suggested that the port authorities in the Sudan should (a) instruct officers issuing pilgrim passes to be careful in all cases to specify the pilgrim's actual village of birth or residence on his Suakin pilgrim pass, and (b) cause pilgrims to be expressly warned that they should, when questioned on arrival in Jedda as to their place of origin, name only the locality shown in their passes.

205. There was the usual shortage of shipping facilities this year owing to the limited number of ships at the disposal of the Khedivial Mail Line, but no pilgrims had to wait longer in Jedda than a maximum of ten days.

206. Repatriation of Sudanese: Position on 24th July, 1933.

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 6.
- (b) Applicants repatriated: 2.
- (c) Applications still under reference: 4.

#### (16) Zanzibari and East African Pilgrimage.

207. The Saudi returns (see paragraph 31) show under the head of Zanzibari and East African pilgrims only one person as having landed this year at Jedda as against 102 last year. This must be dismissed as a definite inaccuracy, as at least twelve East Africans visited the Legation on their return journey from Mecca. A few of them were in possession of the new form of pilgrim pass mentioned in paragraphs 28 and 224 of last year's report.

208. The heirs of Ahmed Rajab, the pilgrim from Zanzibar, whose death was recorded in paragraph 235 of last year's report, were ultimately located in the Hadhramaut, and in due course appointed a person, who was making the pilgrimage this year, to act as their attorney (wakil) in connexion with the proceedings against the Indian chauffeur who caused the death of the deceased. The law requires the participation of legal representatives in all such cases, as the question of blood-money arises. In this case the wakil appointed was baffled by the working of the local judicial machinery. He had no funds and there was no prospect of any expenditure being covered by an effective recovery of blood-money, if awarded. He abandoned the case after some weeks and the Legation has now transferred its interest to the accused, also a British subject, with a view to securing the early termination of the proceedings against him and of his protracted imprisonment.

209. No Zanzibari and East African pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.



(17) *South African Pilgrimage.*

210. According to the Saudi returns in paragraph 31, thirty-seven South African pilgrims entered this country on pilgrimage this year as compared with sixty-two last year. These pilgrims are normally well-to-do, and the question of repatriating destitutes does not arise.

211. The South African pilgrims, together with natives of Kenya Colony, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, &c., generally return home on Dutch or German vessels which call at various ports on the voyage down the East African coast. A doubt has been suggested as to whether these ships conform to the provisions of the International Sanitary Convention of 1926, where they are not excepted *pro tanto* under article 96. In the absence of complaint by the British authorities concerned in the countries of destination, His Majesty's Minister doubts whether this question is sufficiently important to be pursued, especially as the Saudi Government are not ratifying parties to the convention.

(18) *Palestinian and Transjordanian Pilgrimage.*

212. According to the figures of the Palestine Government only 252 Palestinian and Transjordanian citizens were registered this year as intending pilgrims, as compared with 1,290 last year. The Saudi returns in paragraph 31 put the number of Palestinians and Transjordanians who entered this country through the ports of Jedda and Yanbu this year at 240, a number which agrees fairly closely with the number of applications in the countries of origin. As usual the greater number of these pilgrims travelled by train to Suez from Kantara, and thence arrived in Saudi Arabia on steamers of the Khedivial Mail Line.

213. During the return season there were naturally fewer applications than last year for a refund in Jedda of the sums deposited in Palestine. In all, ninety-six pilgrims, or 40 per cent. of the total pilgrimage, were each advanced the sum of £E.4.

214. The Government of Palestine, following the suggestion made by His Majesty's Minister last year (see paragraph 240 of last year's report), were good enough this year to second Fuad Efendi Onbarji, a Moslem clerk in the employ of the Palestine Health Office, for service with this Legation for a period of two months. He arrived in Jedda on the 9th April, and although the work connected with the Palestinian pilgrimage was lighter than in 1932, he was of the greatest use in assisting Captain Seager to deal with it without prejudice to his other duties. It was possible to release him for return to Palestine on the 1st May, as the pilgrimage proper had terminated by that date. The question whether similar assistance should be asked for next year will be considered in the light of the information available nearer the time as to the prospective number of Palestinian and Transjordanian pilgrims in 1934.

215. Considerable difficulty was experienced at the Legation in May and June in dealing with over thirty pilgrims who had arrived overland, and who sought assistance as destitutes of alleged Palestinian or Transjordanian nationality, although most of them were without identity papers. As the summer season approaches, it is difficult to adopt the logical course of simply telling such persons, already enfeebled by their earlier efforts, to walk back. General sanction was received from Jerusalem last year within a short period of submission being made for the repatriation of a number of pilgrims in similar cases, whose claim to Palestinian or Transjordanian nationality appeared to be *prima facie* valid. It was anticipated that similar authority would be given this year, but the authorities in Palestine found it necessary to investigate each individual case closely. The enquiries were in some cases protracted, and in a number of cases the Legation found it necessary to allow small doles to the destitutes. This made it all the more necessary to keep track of them in order that the money advanced should be recovered from them, together with any sum expended on their repatriation, in due course. The pilgrims became truculent and at times riotous, pestering both the Legation and the local authorities. The position at the time of writing is that eighteen have been repatriated piece-meal on individual sanctions from Jerusalem, a small number have vanished, and one still awaits disposal. The question arises whether it would not be better in

future to issue a general warning in the two countries of origin that pilgrims proceeding to the Hejaz overland without adequate funds will in no case be assisted by the British authorities in Jedda, and to enforce this strictly save in the most exceptional cases. His Majesty's Minister proposes to discuss the matter during his visit to Jerusalem at the end of July.

216. Repatriation of Palestinians and Transjordanians: Position on the 24th July, 1933:—

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 44.
- (b) Applicants repatriated: 18.
- (c) Applications still under reference: 1.

(19) *Adenese Pilgrimage.*

217. According to the Saudi returns in paragraph 31, seventeen Adenese and natives of the Aden Protectorate reached Jedda for the 1933 pilgrimage, as compared with ninety-seven last year. A larger number came overland, but no information is available regarding them.

218. The attention of the Government of Aden is being drawn in a separate despatch to an unfortunate imbroglio caused by the failure of the Besse Line, a small concern which has its headquarters there, and runs two small vessels very irregularly in the Red Sea, to provide a ship until the 29th April for the return voyage of a mixed lot of pilgrims to whom return tickets had been issued. About 150 pilgrims of various origins in South-West Arabia and Africa were held up in Jedda, where they paraded the streets and bombarded the Legation with complaints. By the time a ship arrived the Yemeni elements were out of hand. The agents of the Besse Line pleaded *force majeure*, but all possible steps should be taken to prevent a recurrence of the incident.

219. A number of applications for repatriation have been received from Adenese and natives of the Aden Protectorate, most of whom came on pilgrimage overland this year. Except in one case, all such applications have been referred to Aden in the first instance.

220. Repatriation of Adenese: Position on the 24th July, 1933:—

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 28.
- (b) Applicants repatriated: 10.
- (c) Applications still under reference: 7.

(20) *Hadhrami Pilgrimage.*

221. According to the Saudi returns in paragraph 31 above, 273 Hadhramis came on pilgrimage this year by sea, as compared with 465 last year. Most of these embarked as usual at Aden and at Mokalla in ships of the Besse Line, while an unknown number walked to Mecca overland via Aden, Yemen and Asir.

222. Economic depression continues to affect Hadhramis of the semi-settled class mentioned in paragraph 243 of last year's report. Many of them have been leaving the country for good. Others are selling up their businesses and are returning to the Hadhramaut, where they state they intend to remain until a more prosperous era sets in. Captain Seager estimates that in the past three years over 500 Hadhramis in both the above categories have left this country. A few of them, as is their wont, have left for the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, India, &c., in the hope of finding better prospects there.

223. During the return season over 400 Hadhramis applied to the Legation for travel papers to enable them to return home. The number would have been larger but for financial difficulties. Some have not the means to leave, whilst others are owed considerable sums of money which they cannot recover.

224. Repatriation of Hadhramis: Position on the 24th July, 1933:—

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 25.
- (b) Applicants repatriated: None, but 10 assisted.
- (c) Applications still under reference: None.



(21) *The Muscati Pilgrimage.*

225. According to the Saudi returns, eleven Muscatis, as compared with thirty-six in 1932, came on pilgrimage this year, arriving at Jedda by sea. It is probable that a great many more travelled from Muscat and Oman overland, but it is impossible to estimate their number.

226. One Muscati pilgrim applied for repatriation this year. While steps were being taken to investigate his case certain charitable persons in Jedda paid for his return journey overland.

(22) *Bahraini Pilgrimage.*

227. The Saudi returns show 179 Bahraini pilgrims as having arrived at Jedda by sea this year, as compared with 100 last year. As in the case of the Muscati pilgrimage there is reason to believe that a larger number came on pilgrimage overland via Nejd and returned the same way.

228. The *Umm-al-Qura* reported on the 17th March, 1933, that Sheikh Ibrahim and Sheikh Ali, sons of Sheikh Hamad of Bahrein, had arrived in Mecca, via El Hasa and Riyadh, to make the pilgrimage.

229. No Bahrainis applied for repatriation this year.

(23) *Koweiti Pilgrimage.*

230. No mention of arrivals by sea from Koweit is made in the Saudi returns, but the figure of pilgrims from the Persian Gulf in paragraph 128 above includes five Koweitis. No information has reached the Legation as to the numbers who came by the normal route, i.e., overland through Nejd.

(24) *The Sarawak Pilgrimage.*

231. The manager of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey & Co. (Sudan) (Limited), who acts as Sarawak pilgrimage officer, reports that the two pilgrims who came from Sarawak this year left in the best of health.

## A.H. 1351—PILGRIMAGE—1933 A.D.

(Translation of the Official Tariff published by the Hejazi Government.)

*Dues and Transport Charges imposed on Pilgrims for the Pilgrimage Season of 1351.*Chapter I.—*General Dues and Charges.*

(At the rate of 110 gold miri piastres to £1 gold (40 paras = 1 piastre).)

	Gold Miri.	Piastres.	Paras.
1. Quarantine dues, passport fees on arrival and departure, and Inspection Committee's fees—to be collected by the shipping agent with the steamer fare ...	120	0	
2. Boat hire from and to outer harbour, each way ...	8	0	
Boat hire from and to middle harbour, each way ...	6	0	
Boat hire from and to inner harbour, each way ...	4	30	
3. Porterage of baggage from boat to quay ...	0	15	
4. Porterage of baggage from quay to house on arrival ...	4	0	
5. Porterage of baggage from house to boat on departure ...	2	0	
6. Doorkeeper's storage charge ...	0	20	
7. Porterage of luggage at Mecca on arrival from Jedda and departure for Jedda ...	5	0	
8. House rent at Jedda on arrival and departure, per night for first three nights ...	1	20	
Do., per night for each successive night ...	1	0	
9. Municipality dues on each camel-litter (a "shuqduf" carries two persons), payable only by riders in "shuqduf" ..	1	10	

	Gold Miri.	Piastres.	Paras.
10. Fee payable to mutawwifs' naqib and his assistant on arrival only ...	3	0	
11. Gratuity for services of mutawwifs' wakil on arrival ...	18	0	
12. Gratuity for services of mutawwifs' wakil on departure ...	5	0	
13. Payment to servant accompanying pilgrims from Jedda to Mecca and Mecca to Jedda ...	1	0	
14. To Ain Zubeyda (water supply) at Mecca ...	8	0	
15. To Ain-as-Zarqa (water supply) at Medina ...	5	0	
16. Zemzemi gratuity at Mecca in respect of water, payable by all pilgrims except Malabaris, Sindhis, Afghans, and such others as may pay their mutawwifs what gratuity they will (see item 30 below) ...	11	0	
17. Fee for the numbering of houses in Mecca ...	5	0	
18. Haj Committee's fee ...	6	10	
19. Fee for the sheikh of the mutawwifs, payable by all pilgrims except Javanese, in whose mutawwifs' gratuity this fee is included ...	12	10	
20. Camel hire, Jedda-Mecca and Mecca-Jedda, each way, per camel ...	110	0	
21. Charge for camel-litter, Jedda-Mecca and Mecca-Jedda, each way per person ...	31	0	
22. Camel hire, Jedda-Medina and return or Mecca-Medina and return, for camel carrying two persons, per camel (i.e., 550 gold miri piastres per person) ...	1,100	0	
Camel hire Jedda-Medina only or Mecca-Medina only, per camel (or 495 gold miri piastres per person) ...	990	0	
23. Hire of camel-litter and necessary charges, specially made in compliance with the custom of Javanese and Bengali pilgrims, for journey to Medina and back, per shuqduf carrying two persons ...	165	0	
24. Camel hire to Arafat, including hire of camel-litter, per camel ...	165	0	
25. House rent at Mecca, for Indians in general and Bengalis in particular ...	65	0	
26. Tent hire at Arafat, for Indians in general and Bengalis in particular ...	25	0	

Chapter II.—*Gratuities Payable to Mutawwifs in respect of their Services.*

	Piastres.	
27. By each Javanese pilgrim in respect of services and board at Arafat and Mina, house rent at Mina, tent hire at Arafat, and cost of water, firewood, lighting and servants' wages ...	495	
Board and lodging at Mecca ...	165	660 0
28. By every pilgrim of any nationality, except Sudanese (other than citizens of Khartum, Omdurman, and other big towns), Somalis (other than natives of Massawa and Mogadiscio), Yemenis (other than natives of Hodeyda and Aden), natives of Italian Somaliland (i.e., Jabartis), Abyssinians, Malabaris, Sindhis and Afghans ...	187	0
29. By each Malabari, Sindhi and Afghan pilgrim, on account of the small expense incurred by his mutawwif ...	102	0
30. But Sudani pilgrims (excluding citizens of Khartum, Omdurman and similar towns, who pay 187 gold miri piastres), Somalis (excluding citizens of Massawa and "Makdashwah," who pay 187 gold miri piastres), Yemenis (except citizens of Hodeyda and Aden, who pay 187 gold miri piastres), natives of Italian Somaliland and Abyssinians, may, owing to their poverty, pay such gratuity to their mutawwifs as they wish.		



*General Extract showing Amount of Dues and Transport Charges payable by each Pilgrim in the Season of 1351.*

	Transport Charges and Hire Payable as Necessary.	Dues and Fees Payable at Jedda.	Total in Gold.	Equivalent to—
	Pts. Miri.	Pts. Miri. Paras.	Pts. Miri. Paras.	English gold £'s. Miri. Par.
Payable by each—				
Javanese pilgrim .. ..	1,301	744 50	2,045 30	18½ 10 30
Indian (including Bengali) pilgrim .. ..	1,061	284	1,345	12½ 25
Malabari, Sindhi and Afghan pilgrim .. ..	971	188	1,159	10 4
Pilgrim of other nationality .. ..	971	284	1,255	11 45
Pilgrim who may pay what gratuity he will (see item 30) .. ..	971	86	1,057	9 67

*Remarks.*

1. The heavier dues and fees of Javanese pilgrims are due to the fact that the mutawwif's gratuity includes board at Mecca, Arafat and Mina, house rent at Mecca and Mina, tent hire at Arafat and cost of firewood, water, lighting and servants' wages. The heavier transport charges are due to the fact that the transport of their luggage requires more camels than that of other pilgrims.
2. The heavier expenses of Indian and Bengali pilgrims are on account of house rent at Mecca and tent hire at Arafat and Mina, but they have the option of either paying these or of arranging for themselves.
3. The lighter fees and dues of Malabari, Sindhi and Afghan pilgrims are on account of the smaller gratuity payable by them, owing to the small expense which their mutawwifs bear in addition to the arrangements which they themselves make for renting houses and hiring tents.
4. The case of pilgrims who pay such gratuity as they wish (see item 30) is of the same nature.
5. In case it be necessary to disembark pilgrims at the Quarantine Island, a sum of 9½ piastres miri should be taken from each passenger as boat hire for a period of three days, and 1½ piastres for each day over three days.

*Motor Transport Charges.*

The following are the charges per passenger :—

By Car (4 or 6 seater). £ Gold.	By Bus (13-15 seater). £ Gold.	
1½	1	From Jedda to Mecca.
1½	1	From Mecca to Jedda.
15	10	From Mecca to Medina and return.
15	10	From Jedda to Medina and return.
16	11	From Yanbu to Medina and on to Mecca.
8	5½	From Yanbu to Medina, single.
8	5½	From Medina to Mecca, single.

*Remarks.*

1. These charges are fixed for the whole season of 1351, from beginning to end, without any increase or decrease either at the beginning or end of the said season.
2. The reason for the increase observed between the charges for Yanbu and for Mecca is that cars which carry pilgrims from Yanbu return empty from Jedda to Yanbu, which costs the companies additional expense.

*Explanations.*

*First.*—The Javanese pilgrim who wishes to come on pilgrimage on the basis of paying all expenses and charges in a lump sum should pay to the mutawwif the sum of £18 gold in respect of all the dues, fees and transport charges which will be required from the time of his landing at Jedda quay till his return to the quay. Boat hire is additional. This sum will cover travel by camel, but if pilgrims wish to travel by car, the hire of the car should be paid after deducting the hire of the camel.

*Secondly.*—Any foreign coin will be accepted from pilgrims at the market rate on the day of payment, if they have no gold coin.

*Thirdly.*—On pilgrims' arrival at Jedda and on demand of the mutawwif, they must pay to his wakil at Jedda the fixed dues and fees, with the exception of rents and transport charges, which will be paid as and when they become due, according to whether pilgrims wish to perform their visit to Medina from Jedda before they go to Mecca or after. To safeguard the rights of the pilgrim, the agent of the mutawwif must not pay these dues and fees to the mutawwif, but must send them to the sheikh of the mutawwifs at Mecca. The sheikh of the mutawwifs shall pay out of that amount the half of the sum due to the mutawwif and keep the other half in his possession till the departure of pilgrims. The sheikh of the mutawwifs shall pay to the mutawwif the other half due to him after the departure of the last batch of pilgrims belonging to that mutawwif, with a view to securing their comfort.

*Fourthly.*—Fixed dues and fees once paid will not be refunded under any circumstances.

*Fifthly.*—The difference between hire of camel and bus hire to Mecca and Medina is 506 piastres miri. The period of travel by car will not exceed three days and by camel twenty days.

*Sixthly.*—Certain pilgrims prefer to remove the roof of the bus when wearing ihram; in such a case the pilgrim will have to pay half an English gold pound for this purpose.

*Seventhly.*—The period fixed for passengers by motor transport to stay at Medina is eight days, excluding the two days of entering and leaving and (allowing for the fact) that they may leave Medina before the expiration of this period if they like, but if they wish to stay for a longer period they must pay to the owner of the car a fixed sum in respect of the extra days of stay as follows :—

	Piastres miri.
From the ninth to the twentieth day .. ..	137½
From the twenty-first to the thirtieth day .. ..	165
From the thirty-first to the fortieth day .. ..	220

*Eighthly.*—There is no difference in the charges for the visit to Medina, whether pilgrims proceed from Mecca to Medina, or from Jedda to Medina before they go to Mecca.

*Ninthly.*—The dues, fees and charges fixed in this tariff for the year 1351 are not liable to decrease or increase, and the pilgrim is bound to pay them. If he is asked to pay more than the tariff, he should apply to the Government, so that they may refund to him what was taken from him and punish the person concerned severely.

*Tenthly.*—The Government have made special arrangements for motor transport and have decided to appoint engineers and to establish stations on the road between Jedda, Mecca and Medina containing benzine and all spare parts which may be needed. They are taking steps to make certain places on the road where pilgrims may rest; such places will contain every means of comfort, such as food, refreshment and sleeping accommodation. The Government have also taken all necessary precautions with a view to avoiding the occurrence of trouble to pilgrims and in order to facilitate their journeys. These arrangements will be published later on in all languages and will be distributed free amongst pilgrims on their arrival at Jedda, Yanbu, Mecca and Medina.

*Eleventhly.*—Moreover, the Government have prepared a special publication giving advice and instruction of which the pilgrim may be in need, so that he may be well aware of every matter which he may need to enquire about. This publication will be made in the shape of a pamphlet printed in all the languages of the Moslems and will be distributed free everywhere.



*Twelfthly.*—The Government have also appointed a Committee of Inspection to supervise the work of the mutawwifs and afford comfort to pilgrims. The committee itself will supervise the places and houses occupied by pilgrims, enquire about their comfort, hear their complaints and take necessary action for the avoidance of any inconveniences.

*Thirteenthly.*—The Government will publish, for the information of Moslems, the prices of food-stuffs and the rates of exchange of foreign coin in order to afford to pilgrims every means of comfort which the Government consider one of their most important tasks.

*Fourteenthly.*—The Government will also publish, for the information of pilgrims, a time-table showing the dates of departure of mails from the Hejaz for Islamic countries, so that they may be able to communicate in time with their homes and families.

*Fifteenthly.*—The Government have made repairs to the motor road to Taif, so that pilgrims who may desire to go there will easily cover the distance between Mecca and Taif in four hours by car.

[E 4711/759/25]

No. 20.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.*—(Received August 16.)

(No. 248.)

Sir,

*Jedda, August 1, 1933.*

WITH reference to my printed despatch No. 240 of the 27th July last, relative to the present situation between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a further note from the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs, which, like its predecessor, the enclosure to my despatch No. 237, was handed to me by the Minister of Finance.

2. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman had not left Taif when the special messenger sent from Jedda with my note No. 109 (the enclosure to the despatch under reference) arrived, so that he had already seen the communication and was aware of the nature of the advice offered by His Majesty's Government when I called on him on the morning of the 30th July.

3. Our conversation on this occasion was of a general nature. As I reported in my telegram No. 146 of that day, he declared the situation in the Najran district continued materially unchanged; that the Saudi delegation remained, unwillingly, in the Imam's capital, a suggestion to resume negotiations on the recovery of the Imam having been made by the Imam's representatives; that the desires of Ibn Saud remained steadfastly pacific and that he would not be the first to start hostilities, but that, nevertheless, there was a limit to a policy of patience. I strongly impressed on Sheikh Abdullah the great importance attached by His Majesty's Government to a studiously unprovocative attitude on the part of Ibn Saud, and alluded to the dangers which an armed clash between the two parties would arouse. He rejoined that Ibn Saud's own inclinations fell in with the counsel of His Majesty's Government in every respect, but forbearance would be construed by the King's enemies as weakness. He handed me the note as I was taking my leave.

4. Sheikh Abdullah's visit to me of this morning, in which he informed me of the enforced detention of the Saudi delegation at Sana, the prevention by the Imam of communication between the delegation and its own Government, and between Hamad Suleiman, a member of the delegation, and his brother, the Minister himself, has, I think, been sufficiently reported in my telegram No. 149 of to-day.

5. I have been at some pains to ascertain, as far as may be possible, the extent of the territorial demands of Imam Yahya, in view of the declaration of the Saudi Minister in London that the restitution of the whole of the Asir had been the opening bid of the Imam's delegation at the abortive conference at Sana. Little seems to be known, with precision, by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, or, as already reported by Sir Andrew Ryan, by Fuad Bey Hamza either, of the geography of this somewhat Caledonian country, and the Minister of Finance has had recourse to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for information he admits he at present does not possess. He is, however, clear that the whole of Asir has not been demanded, although the territories to which claim is laid, the former territories of the Idrisi, or, roughly, Tihamat Asir, with the districts of the

Beni Qahtan and Hamazan, form the lion's share of the province. Hamazan remains obscure, but Sheikh Abdullah states that it is a district, inhabited by a number of tribes, adjoining that of the Beni Qahtan. A perusal of recent press reproductions of parts of Fuad Bey Hamza's book, in so far as Asir is concerned, fails to shed more light, but I think it may be agreed that the approximate territorial demands of the Imam now stand out with sufficient distinctness for practical purposes.

6. Copies of this despatch and enclosure are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden, and to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea sloop.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 20.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Calvert.*

(Translation.)

(Secret.)

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,**Taif, July 30, 1933.*

The Hon. Chargé d'Affaires,

WITH reference to your confidential letter No. 109, dated the 4th Rabi-ath-Thani, 1352 (27th July, 1933), I request that you would be good enough to communicate the following to the British Government:—

1. We appreciate the trouble taken by the British Government in approaching the Italian Government in this respect, and we express our gratitude for the same.

2. Outwardly Italy may deny, but the fact is that Massaua has become a main centre for supplying the Idrisi and the Imam Yahya with arms and ammunition and encouraging them both together. This has been confirmed to us.

We have learnt from another source that Soviet ships carried arms and ammunition to the Yemen coasts. Will the British Government remain neutral in this matter?

3. If the movement of the Idrisi takes place in the future, it cannot be regarded as internal movement, because we previously on the first occasion considered it to be of this nature, but after we granted pardon to the Idrisi in accordance with the request of the Imam Yahya and his undertakings to prevent him (the Idrisi) from taking any hostile action. In this present case of hostile action by the Idrisi in the future, it would mean that he would undoubtedly be encouraged and assisted by the Imam Yahya and supported by the second party. We could not keep silent about the source supporting and encouraging this action.

4. We overlooked the incidents of Najran and the violation by the Imam Yahya of our frontiers, and took no action in respect of such aggressions, and all this was by the might and power of God and not through our weakness or failure, but due to our hope to reach a satisfactory solution through our representatives sent to the Yemen. Yahya adopted a disgraceful attitude towards our representatives and used all manner of rudeness, insolence and excess in his demands.

We wish now to take no action before we are certain as to the advice of the British Government and the limit of the connexions they may entertain with incidents which may occur in future. We still await their advice in this connexion.

5. The inability of the Government to repay to the British Government the cost of arms is not due to our negligence or failure, but unavoidable circumstances and general economic conditions are the main reasons for this. We fully believe that the excellent disposition of the British Government is greater than this in view of the friendship existing between us. I therefore request that I may receive as soon as possible the advice of the British Government in respect of the foregoing, together with the information which they may have received regarding the attitude of the Italian Government in this connexion.

I have, &amp;c.

FEISAL,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*



[E 4820/759/25]

No. 21.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 158.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, August 18, 1933.*

I HAVE to-day received a further note from Saudi Government containing—

- (a) Account of statements alleged to have been made to Saudi delegation by Imam regarding exchange of views on the Idrisi territory and Asir between himself and Italian representative (at Sanaa for renewal of Italian treaty with Yemen), and his request for Italian advice. Imam maintained he had not recognised Ibn Saud's claims to Najran and Asir, both territories being claimed by both rulers. The Saudi Government consider statements made with intent to provoke.
- (b) Information that Imam sent a letter to Ibn Saud by Saudi delegation demanding Najran for Yemen and postponement of other matters. This was wirelessly from Jizan, and elicited a prompt rejection unless all questions were to be treated at the same time.

I consider information under (a) above does not merit further particularisation by telegraph unless you desire it. I am sending you copies of note by next bag, and am briefly acknowledging its receipt to the Saudi Government, taking the opportunity of saying, as instructed, that His Majesty's Government have heard of telegraphic correspondence with Imam with pleasure.

With reference to other points in your telegram, I am ascertaining prospects of being able to make an oral communication within the next few days before addressing Saudi Government in writing.

[E 4918/759/25]

No. 22.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 24.)*

(No. 249.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 2nd August, respecting the Saudi Arabia-Yemen situation.

*Jedda, August 2, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 22.

*Mr. Calvert to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Confidential.)

Your Royal Highness,

(After Compliments.)

*Jedda, August 2, 1933.*

WITH reference to your Royal Highness's secret note of the 7th Rabi ath-Thani (the 30th July) last, relative to the situation between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen in regard to Asir, I have the honour to inform your Royal Highness that I at once communicated with His Majesty's Government in the sense indicated in the note, and am now instructed to inform your Royal Highness in reply that the Italian Government have assured the British Ambassador at Rome that they would act as desired by His Majesty's Government and would urge counsels of moderation on the Imam Yahya. It was further stated by the Italian Government that, according to their information, the Imam had no desire to pick a quarrel with His Majesty King Ibn Saud.

2. I am to emphasise that this clearly shows that the Italian Government are prepared to act in the spirit of their understanding with His Majesty's Government, that both Governments should refrain from intervening in conflicts in Arabia and should exert their influence in the cause of peace.

3. Apart from other considerations (which would, however, lead them to the same conclusions) His Majesty's Government are bound by this undertaking to urge upon His Majesty King Ibn Saud the importance of adhering to his welcome and statesmanlike decision to avoid hostilities with Imam Yahya if possible, and they are under an obligation, if hostilities should unfortunately break out, to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality.

With highest respects,

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 4921/902/25]

No. 23.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 24.)*

(No. 252. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, August 4, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for July 1933.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 23.

JEDDA REPORT, JULY 1933.

## I.—Internal Affairs.

134. The King remained in Riyadh throughout the month. Emir Feisal, who is summering at Taif, remained there all the month, Taif becoming as usual the headquarters of the Saudi Government during the hot weather, as far as the Hejaz is concerned. Fuad Bey Hamza visited Jedda twice before leaving by the steamship *Taif* on the 12th July for Egypt *en route* for the Saudi-Transjordan Conference at Jerusalem (see paragraph 145 below), and Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman, Minister of Finance, paid two visits to Jedda during Fuad Bey's absence, in circumstances which will be described later in this report (paragraph 148).

135. The Legislative Assembly also moved up to Taif at the end of June, and, according to the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 30th June, was to resume its session, which had been adjourned on the 29th June, on the 8th July in its summer quarters.

136. A decree was issued at the end of June exempting passengers to Taif by motor-car from road ("koshan") taxes up to the first week in October.

137. The Hyderabad textile industry scheme (see paragraph 58 (d) of the report for April last) rather unexpectedly took a long step forward with the arrival from India by the steamship *Jehangir* on the 17th July of a quantity of machinery, believed to be looms, and a number of bales of cotton. Further details are lacking of the materials which, at the end of the month, were lying in the customs warehouse at Jedda awaiting permission for entry into the country free of customs duty, a permission the Saudi authorities show no great alacrity to grant. The stuff is addressed to Dr. Moin-ud-Din, who, together with two weavers, is reported to have come on pilgrimage this year and remained on in Medina. It is understood that official permission for their work, the weaving of "ihrams," has already been secured.

138. On the 10th July an official announcement was made by Government decree published a little unusually by special supplement of the *Umm-al-Qura* of that date, concerning the grant of the Hasa Oil Concession to the Standard Oil Company of California (reference paragraph 109 of last report). The decree appeared alone, and *inter alia* contained a reference to an agreement; defined the area of the concession vaguely, as "the eastern portion of our Saudi Arab Kingdom, within the frontiers"; and also alluded to a special agreement which was to supplement the main agreement. The terms of the concession were



published in two instalments in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 14th and the 21st July, and constituted a document of thirty-three articles. The concession, which is for a period of sixty years, is to come into force as from the 7th July, 1933, and active operations were contemplated for the end of September 1933. Payments, designated in the Arabic text "loans," are to be made by the company in two lump sums, the first upon the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and the second a year later. In addition, an annual payment, termed "rent," is to be paid, commencing from fifteen days from the coming into force of the agreement, viz., the 22nd July, 1933, and continuing up to the date of the discovery of oil in commercial quantities. Royalties are fixed at 4s. gold per ton net weight of crude oil, or the equivalent in United States currency on certain terms, and an annual payment in kind to the Saudi Government of "about" 200,000 gallons petrol plus "about" 100,000 gallons kerosene, free of all charge, is agreed upon. Provision is made for the eventual erection of refineries, termination of the contract, &c. Mr. Hamilton, who stated on his departure for London on the 31st May that he expected to return here in two months' time, is still away and there is little news of his intended movements. Rumour has it, however, that the first instalment of the "loan" is to be paid next month, and that arrangements have already been made for the shipment on the 4th August from London (or Holland) of a large sum in specie.

139. (Reference paragraph 82.) Both the National Bank and the Jedda-Mecca railway schemes appear to be in the doldrums, as they have given no signs of life during the month.

140. The activity over the water-supply at Waziriya, noted in paragraph 111 of the last report, has continued with some success. The water was led through the old underground water-channel to within about half a mile of Jedda (that is, a distance of approximately 11 miles), where an obstacle was encountered and a stoppage in the flow resulted. It is considered that the set-back is only temporary. Meanwhile, the Indian medical officer attached to the Legation conducted an analysis of the water, which he pronounces to be normally safe at source.

141. By notification direct to shipping agents in Jedda, the Director of the Quarantine Administration announced that as from the 20th July the Saudi Government would increase the tonnage dues in force at this port by 100 per cent. in respect of all shipping calling here. The dues hitherto levied were 4 p.T. per 10 tons for the first 500 tons, 2½ p.T. per 10 tons for the second 500 tons, and the balance at 1½ p.T. per 10 tons—registered net tonnage in each case. The increase will involve for example for the Khedivial Mail Line, whose ships calling here average 900 tons, an additional sum of about £2 10s. per visit, or, they estimate, approximately £250 per annum. The agents of the Khedivial Mail Line here have protested, and other companies have followed suit.

142. The misgivings in regard to the situation in Asir vented in the last report (paragraph 114) proved all too justified by events. Although the province as a whole remained quiescent, and although there was no armed clash between Saudi and Imamic forces on the southern frontier, yet the latter were reported to have been actively engaged with the tribes of the Najran district, an area claimed by both Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya. The situation is delicate, and with so many combustible elements involved, the immediate prospects of avoiding a serious flare-up are not very encouraging. The question, which now largely turns on relations with the Yemen, will be treated at greater length below (paragraph 148).

143. Towards the end of the month a decree was issued authorising the formation of a Board of Education, composed of five officials, of whom the most important is the Acting Director of Education, as President.

144. On the 14th July, the *Umm-al-Qura* published an official decree announcing the Government's intention to deal drastically with the problem of mendicancy in the Hejaz, particularly in the Holy Cities, where the condition of the beggars, a multitude of unclean, verminous and offensive creatures, was a reproach to all good (and clean) Moslems and a defilement of the sacred places. Beggars and the unemployed generally were to depart to their homes, either in this country or abroad. It is not yet known how thoroughly this edict is being followed up. The question, in so far as it concerns British subjects and protected persons, bears a relation to the question of the enforced adoption of Saudi nationality adverted to in paragraph 123 of the June report. The situation, therefore, is being carefully watched (see paragraph 151).

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

145. Fuad Bey Hamza had two further conversations with Sir Andrew Ryan in connexion with the Saudi-Transjordan negotiations at Jerusalem (see paragraph 117 of the last report), the first conversation taking place on the 2nd July and the final one on the 11th, the day before Fuad Bey sailed for Egypt on his way to the conference. He was seen off at the landing-stage by Sir Andrew Ryan, other members of the diplomatic body and Saudi officials in Jedda. He was followed on the 16th July by Sir Andrew Ryan, who travelled via Port Sudan. The conference, which was to commence on the 24th, was successful, and the treaty was signed at Jerusalem on the 27th July. A message of congratulation from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was communicated to the Saudi Government by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, and a cordial acknowledgment was promptly received in reply.

146. An echo of the Ibn Rifada revolt of May-June 1932 gave rise to a little uncertainty when it was reported from Jerusalem that Selim Abu Dumeik, a chieftain of the Beni Atiya, who had been removed early in the year to Palestine as a measure of precaution, had evaded surveillance at Beersheba on or about the 10th July, that he was believed to be heading for Transjordan, and that an intensive search was being made for him. The information was communicated by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in a personal letter to Emir Feisal, who replied at once informing Mr. Calvert that Abu Dumeik had already arrived at the Saudi frontier, had sued for and had been granted pardon by Ibn Saud. He has since been lost to view, but his movements appear to cause the Saudi Government no anxiety.

147. About the same time a personage whose activities are viewed with much more concern by Ibn Saud also gave occasion for some enquiry. Khālid-bin-Hithlain, a young and warlike chief of the Ajman who was implicated in the rebellion of 1929, was stated by Fuad Bey Hamza in a personal letter to Sir Andrew Ryan to be making preparations to enter Saudi Arabia with evil intent from Koweit, and it is said that his agents were busy assembling supplies in Koweit and Bahrein for the purpose. It was soon established that Khālid-bin-Hithlain was somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kerbela, far enough away from the scene of his alleged activities, and that there was no sign of his agents at either Koweit or Bahrein, whose rulers, moreover, readily gave assurances that preventive measures, were they ever necessary, would be promptly taken. This information was conveyed to the Saudi Government and evoked a grateful response.

148. Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (see paragraph 121 of the last report) have rapidly and seriously deteriorated during the month. On the 20th July Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, used as a go-between in the absence of Fuad Bey Hamza, called on His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and delivered a message from Ibn Saud for His Majesty's Government, intimating that negotiations between the delegations at Sana, opened on the 17th, had immediately broken down owing to the inordinate demands of the Imam. These demands, which included the restitution of the territories of the Idrisi, and the districts of the Beni Qahtan and Hamazan, coupled with the consistently hostile attitude of Imamic forces in Najran, and the asylum afforded the Idrisi in the Yemen, had fired Ibn Saud with feelings of the most intense distrust. He charged the Imam with bad faith, breach of the treaty between them and deliberate provocation. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman alleged that the Imam and the Idrisi were receiving help in the shape of arms and munitions from "foreign" sources, and stated he had come to ask for the advice of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in view of the old friendship subsisting between the two Governments. He left with Mr. Calvert a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which much the same thing was said in good set terms, the "foreign" sources being roundly declared to be Italian, proof of which was in the hands of the Saudi Government. The note also asked for assistance in the matter of supplies.

149. His Majesty's Government responded, in a note delivered by Mr. Calvert on the 27th July, by urging counsels of moderation and by drawing attention to the risks inseparable from an outbreak of hostilities. At the same time the note made the position of His Majesty's Government, in the event of hostilities, quite clear as one of strict neutrality. Appropriate steps were also taken through Rome to enlist the co-operation of the Italian Government in a



policy of assuagement with the Imam Yahya, a support which was readily promised. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman paid a further visit to Jedda on the 30th July, and saw Mr. Calvert on that day and again on the 1st August, when, to anticipate the report for next month, he had to impart the serious news that the Saudi delegation was being forcibly detained in Sana, and that no communication was permitted between the delegates and their own Government, or, indeed, the outside world. This new development, which had only come to their knowledge the day before through the receipt of a telegram in cypher to an intermediary here purporting to have been sent by Hamad Suleiman, the Minister of Finance's brother and a member of the delegation, through an intermediary in Sana, was characterised by Abdulla Suleiman as contrary to civilised usage and neighbourliness. Ibn Saud, who was further incensed, asked that it be brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government, pointing out the impossible situation into which he was being manoeuvred. The month ended with steadily rising temperatures, at least in Saudi Arabia, and unless some olive branch be offered, and offered quickly, by the Imam Yahya, all the sedative and restraining counsels that can be offered will be of little avail.

150. On the 13th July, a note was received from the Saudi Government to the effect that about the third week in June two men of the Arab Legion in Transjordan seized a number of camels belonging to the Sherarat, grazing at Dair-al-Bid, drove them off and threatened the tribesmen with seizure of camels whenever they grazed in that district. The matter was referred to the authorities in Transjordan for enquiries.

### III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

151. It will be readily understood from foregoing paragraphs that Anglo-Saudi relations continue very friendly. The report at paragraph 123 of last report that pressure was being brought to bear on British subjects and British-protected persons from Africa to adopt Saudi nationality, is thought to have been well-founded, but Sir Andrew Ryan's note seems to have had a salutary influence, as complaints, formerly numerous, have now almost, though not entirely, ceased. A development of this, and of the campaign to clear the country of idle and worthless foreigners (reference paragraph 144), is the refusal to renew the licences of foreign chauffeurs, driving Government-owned motor vehicles. There is a steadily growing volume of complaints on this score.

152. On the 24th July His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad reported that a flying-boat of the Royal Air Force had been forced by engine trouble to alight within Saudi territorial waters, and was lying off the Jinna Islands on the Hasa coast. A spare engine was flown down on the following day in view of the risk to the flying-boat and crew, a second infringement of Saudi sovereignty being involved. The Legation was subsequently informed through the sloop H.M.S. *Bideford*, which was also standing by, and by the Political Resident, Bushire, that the flying-boat got away safely on the 29th. The Saudi Government was immediately informed of the occurrence, and was notified of subsequent developments, but it was not until the 29th that a reply was received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs noting the information, expressing regret at the unavoidable incident and concern for the safety of the machine and crew—an unusually complaisant attitude.

153. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 7th July announced that the Saudi Government had received an invitation from the Egyptian Government to be represented at the forthcoming International Postal Conference to be held at Cairo. The invitation is stated to have been accepted.

### IV.—Miscellaneous.

154. Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan left Jedda on the 16th July on leave of absence. They were to spend a few days at Jerusalem on their way home in connexion with the Saudi-Transjordan Conference.

155. Nasir Bey-el-Gaylani, the Acting Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, went on leave on the 5th July, leaving a clerk in charge of consular work only.

156. On the 2nd July, Sir Andrew Ryan asked Fuad Bey Hamza what the attitude of the Saudi Government would be if an English clergyman wished to

visit Jedda to hold a service for the British community. This problem had engaged the attention of the Legation for some time in consequence of a suggestion by the Bishop in Egypt and the Sudan that such a visit should be paid by a clergyman at Port Said. Sir Andrew Ryan had formed the opinion that there need be no objection subject to great discretion as regards the arrangements and provided that means could be found to obtain a visa for entry into the Hejaz some time next winter. The matter was precipitated by the receipt at the end of June of a telegram from the chaplain at Port Sudan offering to come over and hold a service on the 9th July. As this telegram was sent *en clair*, Sir Andrew Ryan felt that there was no alternative but to put a direct question to Fuad Bey. The latter replied most categorically that no non-Moslem minister of religion could be admitted for any purpose. Sir Andrew Ryan informed the chaplain at Port Sudan accordingly through the commissioner there, and reported the facts to the Foreign Office.

157. The sloop, H.M.S. *Hastings*, Captain C. S. Sandford, O.B.E., R.N., arrived from Port Sudan on the 6th July and left again for Suez on the 9th. During the visit the Jedda cricket team regained the ashes.

158. The British community in Jedda were grieved to learn during the month that M. van Leeuwen, the Dutch financial adviser to the Saudi Government, who recently left this country on retirement for reasons of ill-health, died at Amsterdam on the 7th July.

159. Messrs. Tallents and Anderson, two members of the firm which manages the Orient Line, paid a flying visit to Jedda on the 9th July on the steamship *Talodi*.

160. A new doctor, whose name is given as George, arrived during the month from Russia, and is attached to the Soviet Legation in the room of M. Morsen, the dentist, who recently left, it is said, for the Yemen. Dr. George is accompanied by his wife.

161. The Frenchwoman (reference paragraph 127 of last report) acquitted of the charge of poisoning her Arab husband left Jedda by the steamship *Taif* on the 5th July. Her departure from the landing-stage in the French consulate launch did not pass unnoticed—she was a pathetic figure simply dressed in her widow's weeds. It is learned that this "femme fatale," still known to the Levantine press as Mme. d'Andhurin, has since acquired another husband.

162. Salvage work has been proceeding for some time on the French Fabre Line steamship *Asia*, the melancholy wreck lying on the reefs in the roads of Jedda. So far a little over 300 tons of coal of an inferior quality has been recovered, and will, it is supposed, be the property of the Saudi Government, as any claim to the wreck by those originally interested has been abandoned long ago.

163. A curious case, so far the first of its kind, arose during the month when two girls, aged 16 and 13, took refuge in the Legation declaring themselves to be slaves. The family from which they had fled claimed them through the local authorities as daughters of the family who had never been slaves. The Legation refused to hand the girls over without an enquiry, which, however, when held (without the collaboration of the Saudi authorities), proved the self-styled slave-girls to be imposters and the relatives to be in the right in demanding them back as mere naughty and recalcitrant runaways.

164. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves in July was as follows:—

On hand at beginning of month : One male.  
Took refuge in July : None.  
Manumitted in July and repatriated : One male.  
Locally manumitted : None.  
On hand at end of month : None.

It has not been possible without fresh evidence to proceed further with the case of the two children of the man in Kamaran (reference paragraph 133 of last report), as the Saudi Government inform the Legation that the daughter is now married and free, whilst the son, who was free, has been resold into slavery.



*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 24.)*

(No. 255.)

Sir,

*Jedda, August 8, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 248 of the 1st instant, relative to the present situation between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two further notes from the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 5th and 6th August respectively, a summary in each case having been telegraphed to you on the 6th and 7th instant.

2. At the time of writing I have no further information regarding the situation of the delegation at Sana beyond that contained in the second enclosure. The pretext first advanced by the Imamic delegates to delay the departure of their guests, according to my Saudi informants, viz., that negotiations could be resumed upon the recovery of the Imam from his present sickness, was, indeed, a postponement to too remote and indefinite a date to be acceptable. Imam Yahya's illness seems not only genuine, but serious, and you will doubtless be already aware of the reports that the King of Egypt and the King of Iraq have each sent two of their private physicians to his aid.

3. With regard to the attack the Saudi Minister in London states the Imamic forces are expected to launch on Badr, referred to in your telegram No. 100 of the 3rd instant, I have had no mention of this actual locality made to me so far in my conversations with Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman. Badr, however, has been threatened for some time past, according to the Aden Political Intelligence Summaries, *vide* paragraph 2411 of the summary for the 28th June and paragraph 2425 of the summary for the 5th July last.

4. Copies of this despatch and enclosures are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Rome, His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, and to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea sloops.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

*Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Calvert.*

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

The Honourable Chargé d'Affaires,

*Taif, August 5, 1933.*

WITH reference to your two confidential notes dated the 10th Rabi-ath-Thani (the 2nd August) and the 11th Rabi-ath-Thani, 1352 (the 3rd August), I request you to be good enough to communicate the following to the authorities concerned in His Britannic Majesty's Government:—

1. We are very grateful for the reply of the British Government indicated in the two notes under reference relative to the situation between the Government of His Majesty and the Yemen, and their attention to this case for the cause of peace and friendship.

2. The intention of approaching His Britannic Majesty's Government in this respect is for three matters only:—

(a) The firm friendship existing between us and His Britannic Majesty's Government causes us to lay before them all difficulties which may confront us either with the Arab Governments or with the other Governments, for consultation between two friends, for exchange of views and for knowing the attitude of the British Government towards those difficulties.

(b) In view of what we understand about the agreement between the British Government and the Italian Government by which they have undertaken not to interfere in the Arab coast, we find that the Italian colonies on the African coast have become an asylum to the Idrisi party, and that he receives money and arms from that place, and this is contrary to the known attitude. We therefore wish to enquire

from the British Government whether any change has happened to this agreement, to cause the Italian colonies to become the centre of such action. The reply of the British Government shows that this agreement still remains outwardly, but the fact is that we have become certain that hostile actions still continue. We therefore wish to know the advice of the British Government in respect of this suspected attitude on the part of the Italian Government.

(c) We explain to the British Government hereunder the attitude which we will follow with the Imam Yahya in respect of his repeated aggressions, and if he agrees to and accepts them it will be as desired, otherwise God may excuse us; people and humanity may acquit us of meeting him with the same:—

(1) We will request him to make apology and to give necessary satisfaction to us in respect of the treatment with which he treated the Saudi Arab delegation at Sana preventing them from communicating with us, detaining them as though they were criminals and preventing them from returning to us. This fact cannot be tolerated by the honour of any nation all over the world and cannot be allowed by the general rules and laws of Governments or tolerated by (manly) self-respects.

(2) His treatment of and assistance to the Idrisi and placing him in the extremities of the frontiers is contrary to the treaty which was concluded between the Government of His Majesty the King and him (Imam Yahya), and which was signed by the representatives of the Government of His Majesty the King and his representatives, and was ratified by His Majesty the King and by him. His insistence upon the stay of the Idrisi in the extremities of the frontiers clearly shows the intention of taking evil action, picking quarrels and creating disturbances. We are therefore compelled to request that the Idrisi may be delivered to us in pursuance of the treaty or he may be deported far from the extremities of the frontiers.

(3) We cannot agree to keep silent till the end in respect of Najran and the entry of the forces of Yahya within our frontiers, but his advance and aggression should be stopped, and we may then come to an understanding about the delimitation of the frontiers which have already been agreed upon and confirmed to us by the Imam Yahya. If he does not agree to come to an understanding in this connexion, the position will then be difficult and should not be neglected.

(4) The necessity of delimiting all the frontiers between us and him for the purpose of comfort and tranquillity.

3. This is what we wish to demand from Imam Yahya at the present time and we explain it to His Britannic Majesty's Government so that they may be aware that we do not desire hostility in any case.

4. We wish to say that, if His Britannic Majesty's Government have any observations, we are prepared to listen to their views in view of the friendship existing between us.

With highest respects,

FEISAL,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

*Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Calvert.*

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

The Honourable Chargé d'Affaires,

*Taif, August 6, 1933.*

IN continuation of our letter dated the 13th Rabi-ath-Thani, 1352 (the 5th August), I request that you be good enough to communicate to the authorities concerned in His Britannic Majesty's Government that we have received a telegraphic message from the Saudi Arab delegation at Sana to the effect that



they were leaving Sana on Thursday last, the 11th Rabi-ath-Thani, 1352 (the 3rd August, 1933), and that it is possible that this has happened after the communication made by the British Government.

With highest respects,

FEISAL,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 4970/759/25]

No. 25.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received August 25.)*

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, August 24, 1933.

MY telegram No. 158.

Minister of Finance called on me this afternoon and left with me copies of two telegrams purporting to have been addressed to Ibn Saud by King of Iraq, in which latter stated that he had learnt from the press that a dispute had arisen between Ibn Saud and Imam. The King of Iraq expressed the hope that no Arab blood would be shed and a peaceful settlement reached, declaring his readiness to mediate.

2. In the second, Ibn Saud replied to Feisal's, asserting his own concern that no Arab blood should be spilled; that his attitude is one of restraint, but that his defensive might be tried too high; that his aim is to secure respect by Imam for treaties between them. He expressed his gratitude with much pious verbiage for Feisal's offer of mediation.

3. Minister of Finance informed me that Ibn Saud would appreciate observations of His Majesty's Government, adding that it was impossible for one Arab to trust another. I agreed to pass the message on.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 168.)

[E 4820/759/25]

No. 26.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Murray (Rome).*

(No. 35. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 26, 1933.

JEDDA telegram to Foreign Office No. 155 of the 13th August: Saudi-Yemeni relations.

According to Jedda telegram No. 158 of 19th August (see sections) Imam has now written to Ibn Saud demanding cession of Nejran and postponement of other questions at issue, and Ibn Saud has replied refusing to consider matter unless all points in dispute are dealt with together. Saudi Minister stated on the 16th August that, according to his latest information, the two rulers were now again in telegraphic correspondence, and that Imam's advance in Nejran had at present ceased.

If information in letter from Saudi Legation, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 660 of the 10th August, is correct, Imam's claim to Nejran appears to involve repudiation of the agreement of 1927 between the Imam and Ibn Saud.

Unless you see objection, you should communicate the substance of the above to the Italian Government, and it would be useful to learn from them if possible the Imam's version of this dispute and details of any action they may have taken with Imam. You might also, at your discretion, suggest that cessation of Yemeni advance and reopening of telegraphic correspondence between rulers make moment suitable for Italian Government to urge on Imam desirability of reaching settlement by negotiation. His Majesty's Government understand (see Jedda telegram No. 151 of the 7th August) that Ibn Saud is ready to negotiate on basis of 1927 agreement and to arrange delimitation of entire Saudi-Yemeni frontier. As

Italian Government already know, His Majesty's Government have repeatedly urged upon Ibn Saud counsels of moderation. They have also recently expressed to Saudi Government satisfaction at learning of renewal of telegraphic correspondence with Imam.

(Addressed to Rome, No. 35. Copy to Jedda.)

[E 4970/759/25]

No. 27.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Calvert (Jedda).*

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 28, 1933.

YOUR telegram No. 159 of the 24th August: Saudi-Yemeni relations.

Ibn Saud's request for advice is rather embarrassing, but if after reply returned to his last advance (see my telegram No. 104 of the 17th August) His Majesty's Government were again to be completely non-committal, their influence with him might suffer.

2. His distrust of Feisal is understandable, and so long, at any rate, as correspondence between himself and Imam continues it would certainly be unwise to press Ibn Saud to accept Feisal's offer.

3. You should accordingly, unless you see objection, reply orally and confidentially on following general lines, which I leave it to you to elaborate: His Majesty's Government earnestly desire peaceful settlement of dispute, but are not in position to judge how far mediation would contribute to this end at present stage. They understand that Ibn Saud and Imam are still in communication, and having regard to the Minister of Finance's concluding remark, His Majesty's Government see nothing to criticise in non-committal reply which they understand Ibn Saud to have returned to King Feisal's offer.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 107. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 236.)

[E 5072/759/25]

No. 28.

*Mr. Murray to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 254.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, August 30, 1933.

YOUR telegram No. 35, Saving.

I left a note to this effect with Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, at the same time making a verbal suggestion in the sense of second sentence of paragraph 3.

Head of African Department said that information which Italian Government had requested from their local agents on the subject had been delayed owing to interruption of telegraphic communication between Hodeidah and Asmara for twenty-five days, but he would answer our enquiries as soon as possible. He received verbal suggestion not unfavourably, without, however, committing Italian Government to act on it. It was clear from his attitude that Italians regard annexation of Asir by Ibn Saud as origin of the present trouble. They had none the less, as His Majesty's Government knew, repeatedly urged counsels of moderation on Imam, and this they would continue to do, since neither they nor His Majesty's Government had any interest in seeing the two rulers in conflict.



[E 5328/759/25]

No. 29.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 265.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copies of notes from and to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 17th and 20th August respectively, on the subject of the Saudi Arabia-Yemen situation.

*Jedda, August 20, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

*Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Calvert.*(Translation.)  
(Confidential.)

The Hon. Chargé d'Affaires,

*Taif, August 17, 1933.*

I AM requested by the Government of His Majesty the King to inform you of the following, with a view to its communication to the authorities concerned in His Britannic Majesty's Government:—

2. The Imam Yahya, in one of the meetings which were held between the delegation of the Government of His Majesty the King and the Imam Yahya, said that the Italian Government's representative (who has been deputed for the purpose of renewing the treaty which was concluded between the Imam Yahya and the Italian Government, which expires in a year and a half, and who (the representative) was at that time in Sana and is said to have left a week before the return of the delegation without arriving at any useful result), asked the Imam Yahya in one of their meetings about his point of view regarding the Idrisi's territory and Asir. He added that the Italian Government have certain views and intentions in regard to these territories, and that they have not recognised them as belonging to the Government of Ibn Saud. The Imam answered him saying that he also had not recognised Ibn Saud's claim either to the territory or to Asir. Both of them demand them (the two territories) for themselves. He (the Imam Yahya) asked the Italian representative to communicate to him the advice of his Government as to how he should attain his intentions and whether this should be done in a military or in a peaceful manner.

Immediately after that, the Italian representative asked his Government for their advice, and he subsequently informed Yahya that his Government did not wish to express their views in this connexion, but that they requested that the Imam should give his own opinion first and state his intentions and objects. The Imam Yahya then changed the subject and did not tell the delegation about the remainder of the Italian Government's reply. There is no doubt that the Imam's intention was only to pick a quarrel and to threaten. He requested the delegation very strictly not to mention this statement to any one.

3. The Imam Yahya sent a letter to His Majesty the King through the Saudi Arab delegation, requesting him to recognise Hajran as belonging to the Imam Yahya and that other matters could be postponed until later. The delegation communicated the contents of the letter to His Majesty the King by wireless from Jizan. His Majesty the King replied that this was impossible and that he could not agree to it unless they came to an agreement over all the matters in dispute. No reply has yet been received about this from the Imam Yahya.

4. We have been delayed in communicating this information to His Britannic Majesty's Government owing to the damage caused to the Mecca wireless station and to atmospheric conditions. We received this information only yesterday.

With highest respects,

FEISAL,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

*Mr. Calvert to Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Confidential.)

Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)*Jedda, August 20, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's confidential note of the 17th August last, relative to the situation between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and to state that the information contained will be conveyed to His Majesty's Government in accordance with your Royal Highness's request.

2. I should like to take this opportunity to inform your Royal Highness that His Majesty's Government learn with pleasure, through the Saudi Minister in London, that telegraphic correspondence between His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and Imam Yahya has been resumed, and further that the latter would appear to have made no forward move recently.

With highest respects,

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 5329/759/25]

No. 30.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 267.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 22nd August, respecting the Saudi Arabia-Yemen situation.

*Jedda, August 22, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 30.

*Mr. Calvert to Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Confidential.)

Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)*Jedda, August 22, 1933.*

WITH reference to your Royal Highness's confidential notes of the 6th and 17th August respectively, relative to the situation between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to express to your Royal Highness my thanks for the information they contain and, in reply to the latter, to explain that His Majesty's Government feel the position is too obscure and the information in their possession too incomplete to enable them to express any opinion.

The news of the release of the Saudi delegation at Sana, of which your Royal Highness was so good as to inform me, has been received by His Majesty's Government with pleasure, and it may not be out of place here to draw your Royal Highness's attention to the prompt and favourable reply given by the Italian Government to the representations of His Majesty's Government in this connexion.

With highest respects,

A. S. CALVERT.



[E 5330/487/25]

No. 31.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 268.)

Sir,

*Jedda, August 23, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 235 of the 25th July last, relative to the terms of the Hasa Oil Concession granted by the Saudi Arab Government to the Standard Oil Company of California, I have the honour to report that certain rumours which had been circulating in Jedda during the past few weeks regarding the payment of the first large sum as a loan to the Government proved in the main to be correct with the arrival on the 20th August of the sum of £35,000 gold in English sovereigns. The specie was not, however, landed here owing to some deficiency in the shipping documents, but remained on board the Khedivial steamer, the *Talodi*, and left with her again the same day for Port Sudan, whence she is due to return to-day. I understand that shipping arrangements were made in London through the Haines Line, by one of whose ships the money was brought to Suez, where it was transhipped into the Khedivial steamer for Jedda. The documents, instead of being sent to the Dutch bank here, who are charged with the handling of the money, were addressed to the local agent of the Blue Funnel Line, and were received by him too late for the £35,000 gold to be landed at the first visit. It will be landed to-day.

2. That this large sum of money, amounting to over £50,000 sterling at present rates, is only a loan has been confidently asserted by persons who claim to have received their information direct from those concerned on behalf of the company, and the repayment, it is further stated, is to be made gradually against the eventual royalties received by the Saudi Arab Government. This arrangement, if correctly stated, would therefore be provided for in the "special agreement," the terms of which have not so far been disclosed.

3. Mr. K. Twitchell, who, in the continued absence of Mr. Hamilton, represents the company here, states that he intends to leave Jedda about the 28th August for the Hasa coast by car. He has been away from the 1st August on a short tour of inspection, on behalf of the Saudi Government, of the old gold mines in the Hejaz, which it is believed are by no means "worked out," and returned unannounced on the 14th August, to prepare for the arrival of the company's consignment of specie to the Saudi Government.

4. It is stated here that active operations are contemplated by the Standard Oil Company of California within the next few weeks, and that oil mining gear is already well on its way to the Hasa coast by way of the Persian Gulf.

5. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 5380/222/91]

No. 32.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting Resident, Aden.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 13.)*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Downing Street, September 11, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 25 of the 9th September, I have the honour to inform you that the questions raised in your despatches Nos. 162 and 163 of the 12th July, regarding relations with the Imam of the Yemen, have been carefully considered, in consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel Reilly, and that His Majesty's Government have come to the following conclusions:—

2. There now seems a reasonable possibility of bringing the treaty negotiations to a successful conclusion if an envoy can be sent to Sanaa for personal discussion with the Imam, and it is proposed that Lieutenant-Colonel Reilly should proceed to Sanaa for this purpose after his return to Aden. It is, however, considered by Lieutenant-Colonel Reilly that an essential condition of such negotiations is that the envoy should have an assurance that, if necessary, His Majesty's Government will use force to clear the Audhali country and other areas in the protectorate occupied by Zeidi forces, since the position in respect of those

areas would be quite impossible unless an ultimatum could be sent to the Imam in the event of the negotiations for a treaty being broken off. His Majesty's Government have endorsed this view.

3. The Resident will, therefore, have authority, when he goes to Sanaa (i) to inform the Imam, if the latter proves obdurate, that the breaking off of negotiations will inevitably follow a failure to reach agreement; that he feels sure that His Majesty's Government will not any longer tolerate the presence of Zeidi forces in territory which His Majesty's Government claim for the Aden Protectorate, and that if negotiations are broken off His Majesty's Government will in all probability feel compelled to assert forcibly their rights in Audhali and other territory occupied by Zeidi forces; and (ii) to break off negotiations. It is hoped that if the Resident is placed in the position to make a statement as in (i), this will, in fact, clinch the negotiations and avoid the need for any forcible action for clearing the Audhali and other occupied territory.

4. It is realised that the decision to continue negotiations for a treaty may be regarded as a departure, in a strict sense, from the instructions approved earlier in the year to the effect that His Majesty's Government had said their last word, but it is considered that the Imam's letter of the 20th June can be accepted as a sufficient advance to justify the continuance of negotiations.

5. I accordingly request that you will now inform the Imam in reply to his letter of the 20th June that His Majesty's Government have authorised the Resident to proceed to Sanaa, after his return to Aden in the autumn, for the purpose of concluding a treaty; but that, in order that there may be no misapprehension, the Imam must understand that His Majesty's Government require the trade restrictions to be raised and the other preliminaries laid down in the Resident's admonitory note to be carried out *before the treaty is actually signed*, and that while the Resident will be prepared to discuss certain variations of wording in the text of the treaty proposed in the Imam's letter, the secret annex cannot be agreed to in any form.

6. In the event of the treaty negotiations breaking down, the Resident will, after his return from Sanaa to Aden, arrange for the despatch of an ultimatum to the Imam; and in the event of force being required to clear the Audhali territory now occupied by Zeidi forces, His Majesty's Government have decided that action should not be limited to the territory now occupied by the Zeidis on the Aden side of the boundary, but that, after the usual warnings, suitable military objectives within the territory of the Imam may be bombed.

7. Further, His Majesty's Government take the view that in any scheme for forcible recovery of territory occupied by Zeidi forces, it would not be possible to rely upon irregular tribal levies to carry out an organised attack; that their rôle should be limited to temporary occupation of territory when cleared by air action; and that it will, in the main, rest with the Royal Air Force not only to clear territory occupied by Zeidi forces, but also, if necessary, to prevent reoccupation of that territory by the threat or resumption of air action against military objectives in the Imam's territory.

8. A separate communication is being sent to you in regard to the recent incursion into the Subeihi area, upon which you have reported in your telegrams No. 37 of the 14th August and No. 43 of the 5th September.

I have, &amp;c.

P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

[E 5422/759/25]

No. 33.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 15.)*

(No. 275.)

Sir,

*Jedda, August 29, 1933.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 273 of to-day's date and with reference to my telegram No. 161 of the 24th August, relative to the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities between King Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen, I have the honour to report that Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who has been in Jedda since my meeting with him on the 24th August, yesterday requested a further interview with me. I accordingly called on him in the afternoon at the Khuzan Palace.

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2. He produced a sheaf of telegrams which, he explained, he had just received from the Amir Feisal with instructions to read them over to me. I was not offered copies of these telegrams, as on previous occasions, but perused them, with the Minister of Finance, sentence by sentence. As the telegrams were six in number and, of these, four were long and not a little involved, it may be that the following summary may not be in every respect complete, but I believe, in the main, the contents of the telegrams, particularly in regard to the more important points, have been adequately retained.

3. The telegrams were prefaced by a short note, also in the form of a telegram. It was carefully read by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman and stated that, from information received in Riyadh, it appeared that Imam Yahya was mobilising his forces in the Yemen and that therefore Ibn Saud had ordered the Saudi forces on the north-east of Nejd to proceed to the south-west, i.e., to Asir, as a reinforcement to the troops already there. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman here explained that the military forces of Saudi Arabia are divided into three zones, or commands, the north-western (which had dealt with the Ibn Rifada rebellion), the north-eastern and the south-western. He described this measure as a purely precautionary one, and, in reply to a question, informed me that the orders had been issued three weeks ago. He added that he had heard, but not officially, that, should the situation deteriorate and the use of force become inevitable, Amir Saud, the King's eldest son, would probably be appointed to command the troops operating in Asir. He was unaware whether the troops of the North-Eastern "Command" had yet arrived in Asir, but thought not.

4. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman did not enlighten me as to the address to which this telegram, if telegram it was, had been sent, but I inferred that it had been sent by the King to Amir Feisal at Taif. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman then proceeded to read five telegrams, all of which, he informed me, had been sent by Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya. It would appear, although the Minister of Finance himself was not clear on the point, that the Imam's letter to Ibn Saud, entrusted to the delegation who wirelessly the contents to Riyadh (as reported in my telegram No. 158 of the 19th August), and to which Ibn Saud replied at length, had, indeed, elicited a reply from the Imam in which he stated that he was quite unable to grasp the meaning of Ibn Saud's telegram or understand the demands he was putting forward. To this, Ibn Saud rejoined, in the first of the five telegrams read by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, that, although he considered his position perfectly understandable, yet for the sake of clarity he would put each of his main points in a separate telegram. In this rather lengthy introductory telegram he recalled the measure of agreement reached previously and embodied in the treaty between them, and called attention to the signal gesture of conciliation, affording proof of his desire for a permanent settlement, in his action over the Arwa mountains dispute.

5. Of the four telegrams embodying his desiderata, the first dealt with the Tihamat Asir, a question which Ibn Saud regarded as concerning himself and the Imam only and one which had been definitely settled by their treaty. The intention here would appear to be to exclude the Idrisi from any consideration in respect of a territory which had previously been an essentially Idrisi sphere.

6. The remaining three telegrams were somewhat more complicated. Ibn Saud set forth at length his claims in respect of the Beni Yam, with whom many of the tribes of Nejd were intimately related—which could not be said of the Yemen's relations with that congeries of tribes. A division of the various sections in accordance with their individual affiliations was proposed. The treaty was repeatedly invoked with reference to the Najran, Ibn Saud maintaining that the agreement concluded between the Imam and the Saudi delegates, Ibn Duleym and Turki-al-Mahdi, provided for a division of that territory, from Weileh to the south to go to the Yemen and from Weileh to the north to Saudi Arabia. This was the agreement to which the Imam Yahya had set his hand, yet which had so far only been honoured in the breach.

7. The protection and assistance offered by the Imam to the Idrisi drew bitter words from the King. Ibn Saud had allowed the Idrisi to remain with Imam Yahya, upon the conclusion of the treaty, for two reasons: Firstly, because of his (Ibn Saud's) affection for his brother the Imam, and, secondly, because the Imam had given a guarantee for the good conduct of the Idrisi whilst within his territories. This guarantee, also, had not been observed, for the Imam must be only too well aware of the activities of the Idrisi in fomenting discontent along

the frontier. The Idrisi was, after all, a very paltry fellow. Had not he been driven out of Jizan, horse, foot and artillery, at the time of the Asir revolt, by a mere 300 Saudi soldiers? He was, moreover, a liar and cheat, and Ibn Saud would tolerate no more of his mischief-making, but would ruthlessly punish should he (the Idrisi) pursue his present tactics. It was suggested, therefore, that the Idrisi should be expelled from the Yemen before further complications occurred and the relations between the two rulers were involved in the trouble. At any rate, Ibn Saud added a little significantly, all the necessary measures had been taken to deal with the Idrisi and those who were assisting him.

8. This summary is necessarily bald and somewhat simplified. I may perhaps record that I became increasingly conscious of the determination with which Ibn Saud was putting forward his demands. The telegrams, it seemed to me, contained noticeably less than the usual seasoning of pious utterances with which he is wont to lard his communications. He seemed to mean business. The telegrams were sent some ten days ago and so far no reply has been received from Sana. The delay in communicating them to me was explained by the absence of Amir Feisal recently, with his family, in Khurma, a village some little distance east of Taif, and Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's own absence for a time in Nejd (where, however, it may be mentioned, he had not seen the King).

9. I questioned Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman concerning the treaty between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen in regard to the frontier in the Najran area. He admitted that he was unable to tell me whether the agreement was a written one or whether it was merely a verbal understanding. He informed me that a number of the leading tribal personages of the Beni Yam had recently been to Riyadh for a conference with the King.

10. It may be perhaps inferred from the stand now taken by Ibn Saud that his attitude is stiffening slightly. Feeling reassured as to the security of his northern and other frontiers and enriched by the recent arrival of a handsome sum in ready cash, which he no doubt regards as the earnest of more to come, King Ibn Saud may now conceivably feel more able to take a strong line.

11. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome and Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, the senior naval officer in the Red Sea sloops, and to the Acting Chief Commissioner at Aden.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 5694/759/25]

No. 34.

*Mr. Murray to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 722.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the dispute between King Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya.

*Rome, September 22, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 34.

*Note verbale communicated by the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

(Translation.)

IN their *pro-memoria* of the 15th July His Britannic Majesty's Embassy drew the attention of the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the state of the relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya as being one calculated to result in the outbreak of an armed conflict, and added that, with a view to avoiding the outbreak of hostilities, the British Government had already, and in strong terms, urged counsels of moderation on the Saudi Government, and they trusted that the Royal Government would for their part, in accordance with

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conclusions (1) and (2) of the Rome conversations of 1927, proceed similarly with the Imam, and take all possible steps to ensure that neither the Imam himself nor the followers of the Idrisi should receive assistance and encouragement of any kind from territory under Italian sovereignty.

In a further *pro-memoria*, dated the 3rd August, His Britannic Majesty's Embassy stated that the Government at London had received information that the Imam had prevented the Saudi delegation at Sanaa from leaving the Yemen or from communicating with King Ibn Saud; and they requested the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs to make urgent representations to the Imam with a view to the latter restoring their liberty to the above-mentioned delegation.

Finally, in their *note verbale* of the 30th August last, His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, while stating that the two Arabian Monarchs were again in telegraphic communication, represented that, according to a report received from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, the Imam had demanded of King Ibn Saud the cession of Nejran and the postponement of the other questions at issue; that, according to the Saudi interpretation of an agreement concluded in 1927 between the two States, Nejran and northwards was to belong to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, while Wayla and southwards was to belong to the Yemen; that the Imam had accepted this settlement except where it related to the Idrisi territory; and that the Imam's recent request would therefore appear to constitute a repudiation of the agreement in question. His Britannic Majesty's Embassy finally asked what was the Imam's version of the dispute regarding Nejran and the above-mentioned agreement of 1927.

2. In reply to the above communications, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to inform His Britannic Majesty's Embassy as follows:—

The information in the possession of the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs is to the effect that there was no question of any detention of the Saudi delegation at Sanaa, such as that described in His Britannic Majesty's Embassy's *pro-memoria* of the 3rd August. This information was implicitly confirmed by a Saudi official communiqué, published in the semi-official Jedda paper *Umm-al-Qura* of the 11th August, which makes no mention of such a detention, and states that the Saudi delegation had left Sanaa, as the illness of the Imam did not permit him to continue the conversations already begun; the communiqué added that, as was stated in His Britannic Majesty's Embassy's *note verbale* of the 30th August, Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahia were continuing to maintain telegraphic communication, with a view to reaching a settlement of the questions outstanding between the two States.

3. In accordance with the request contained in His Britannic Majesty's Embassy's *note verbale* of the 30th August, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have already taken steps to ascertain the Imam's point of view regarding the agreement said to have been concluded between him and King Ibn Saud in 1927 in regard to the frontiers between the two States.

Pending, however, the receipt of this information, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs deem it useful to submit to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy certain observations on the existence of such an agreement. In the first place, the fact remains that neither during the Italo-British conversations held in Rome in 1927 nor in the correspondence subsequently exchanged between the Italian and British Governments regarding the relations between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the general situation in the Arabian Peninsula was mention apparently ever made, or recourse ever had, to the agreement referred to above.

In the second place, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs are able to communicate to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy the following information, which recently reached them from an authoritative and entirely reliable source at Sanaa, at the very moment when the negotiations with the Saudi delegation there were commencing. The latter delegation did, in fact, refer to an alleged agreement regarding the frontiers, concluded some years ago between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, but the Yemeni Government represented to the Saudi mission that this agreement did not, in fact, exist, and that all that had taken shape was a mere draft, prepared by the Amir of Midi with some Saudi delegates on the occasion of the dispute regarding Jebel Ayir—a draft which was never approved by the Imam. The Saudi delegation were invited by the Yemeni Government to produce the text of this agreement, but they were never able to do so.

In the third place, it is known that during the months previous to last May the Imam's eldest son, Seif-el-Islam Ahmed, undertook a military police expedition in Nejran to subdue certain tribes.

These operations in a territory which, according to the alleged agreement of 1927, was under the sovereignty of Ibn Saud, did not prevent the latter from subsequently sending a delegation to Sanaa to negotiate with the Imam. This suggests that the possession of Nejran by the Saudi Arabian Kingdom was at any rate not clearly stipulated in any agreement between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, may have occasion to communicate further information as a result of the enquiries which they have already set on foot.

4. The Royal Government is in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government in considering the present tension between the two Arabian kingdoms as being of a grave character; and, with a view to contributing their share towards the maintenance of peace in that region, they consider it incumbent upon them to submit, in the same spirit of frank and friendly collaboration as that which marked the Rome conversations in 1927, the following further considerations to His Britannic Majesty's Government:—

The principal question which divides the two Arabian kingdoms is that of the sovereignty of Asir, a territory in which King Ibn Saud has, since 1926, exercised rights of occupation and possession, thus modifying the pre-existing situation to the detriment of the interests of the Yemen. In their *note verbale* of the 10th September, 1931, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs had occasion to recapitulate the past history of the question, setting forth in detail the subsequent interventions of King Ibn Saud in that territory, first by the imposition of a Saudi protectorate (in 1926) and then by the transformation of the protectorate into an annexation (October 1930).

As mentioned in the above *note verbale*, the *de facto* situation created by King Ibn Saud in Asir resulted in an exchange of views between the Italian and British Governments, which agreed to postpone any formal or direct act of recognition of the sovereignty of King Ibn Saud over Asir.

The Royal Government have already had occasion to represent to His Britannic Majesty's Government that this action of King Ibn Saud in Asir might provoke natural and comprehensible reactions on the part of the Imam, and accordingly to indicate the desirability of restraining King Ibn Saud from proceeding on the path on which he had set out. The Foreign Office replied that they saw no possibility of an outbreak of hostilities between the two Arabian kingdoms, and that they did not consider that there were for the moment any grounds for preoccupation.

Since then the situation has been aggravated. As a result of the recent revolt of Asir tribes against the Saudi Government (a revolt during which the Imam maintained a correctly neutral attitude), King Ibn Saud completely eliminated the family of the Idrisi from participation in the government of Asir and transformed that territory into a mere province of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.

5. In considering the present situation, the Royal Government, as they had occasion to state in their *note verbale* of the 10th September, 1931, referred to above, are of the opinion that it is impossible to disregard the foregoing events, since the situation itself originated in the absorption of Asir by King Ibn Saud against the will of the local population and without taking into account the vaunted rights of the Imam.

The attitude of absolute intransigence characterising Saudi policy in regard to Asir was illustrated in a conversation which took place last May between the Royal Minister at Jedda and Fuad Hamza, the Saudi Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter categorically stated that "Asir is an integral part of the Saudi Arabian territory and kingdom, whose ownership thereof is not open to question."

6. The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs must further draw His Britannic Majesty's Embassy's most serious attention to the fact that, while negotiations between the Imam Yahia and Ibn Saud are still proceeding, the latter has taken the initiative in warlike preparations which leave little doubt as to his intentions. He is, in fact, concentrating considerable forces on the Yemen



frontiers, reinforcing the base at Jizan, enrolling troops in Nejd and Tehama, transporting troops and war material into Asir (availing himself, among other things, of the steamers of Besse and Co., of Aden), acquiring arms and munitions and distributing arms to the tribes.

It is natural that such steps should provoke the Imam to take the necessary precautionary and defensive measures.

7. The Italian Government are confident that the British Government are in agreement with them as to the necessity of avoiding at all costs a conflict between the two States. The origin of such a conflict would be found in the suppression of the buffer State, the existence of which was held by the Rome conversations to be necessary for the very purpose of preventing acute friction between the two Arab kingdoms. The conflict would, it is unnecessary to state, hold the possibility of grave consequences and disorders throughout the Arabian Peninsula.

8. The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs are disposed to regard as a satisfactory consequence of the British action at Jedda and the similar Italian action at Sanaa the fact that, despite the return to their country of the Saudi delegation which were despatched to Sanaa, negotiations between the Imam and King Ibn Saud have not been broken off, but are continuing by means of telegraphic correspondence between the two Arabian Sovereigns.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to assure His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that, in accordance with the conclusions of the Rome conversations of 1927, they have taken urgent steps to use fresh counsels of moderation at Sanaa.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs nevertheless, having regard to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the conclusions of those conversations and to the indications contained in the previous paragraphs of their present note, consider it necessary that fresh counsels of moderation should also be urged upon King Ibn Saud, having due regard to the *de jure* and *de facto* elements in the situation, so as to induce him, on the one hand, to suspend his preparations for war, and, on the other, to recede from the intransigent attitude which he has adopted, so that, by recognising the necessity of finding between the parties an equitable settlement of the question of Asir, the necessary atmosphere may be created for the successful progress of the negotiations.

Rome, September 21, 1933—XI.

[E 5724/902/25]

No. 35.

Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 282. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, September 6, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for August 1933.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 35.

JEDDA REPORT FOR AUGUST 1933.

I.—Internal Affairs.

165. IBN SAUD remained in Nejd during the month. Early in August the Amir Feisal left Taif, with his family, for Khurma, a village some distance to the north-east, where he stayed for ten days before returning to Taif.

166. Fuad Bey Hamza, who left on the 12th July for the Transjordan Conference, remained abroad during August, and the Jedda office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the end of the month professed to have had no word as to the date of his return (see paragraph 180 below). The Minister of Finance,

Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, continued to deputise for him in various matters passing between the Legation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (see paragraphs 177-9 below). He was in Jedda at the beginning of August and again on the 24th. In between he spent a week in Nejd, where, however, so he informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, he did not see the King.

167. The Amir of Jedda, Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Muammar, left for Riyadh on the 4th August and was still away at the end of the month. During his absence Sheikh Ali Taha, the joint Deputy Governor and representative in Jedda of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was Acting Governor. Sheikh Abdul Aziz, who is reputed to be that rare bird in Arabia—a bachelor—is popularly supposed to have gone to Nejd to find a bride. Indeed, the lady designated by Jedda Society newsmongers is a recently divorced wife of the King, for whom the young Governor has long entertained an all but hopeless passion. It is also averred, in less romantic circles, that the Amir has been called to Riyadh for a consultation with the King. He broke his journey at Taif, one hears, and accompanied the Amir Feisal on his way thence to Khurma.

168. (Reference paragraph 137.) The material which arrived recently for the Hyderabad textile industry scheme was admitted into the country free of customs duties by order of the Minister of Finance, and was forwarded early in the month to Dr. Moin-ud-Din at Medina. The consignment, it is understood, consisted of twenty-four bales of cotton, ten cases containing a total of 110 spindles and one case containing one hand-loom. It is reported that Dr. Moin-ud-Din has already hired large premises in Medina in which to house his scheme, has engaged about twenty hands, both local subjects and Indians, and has had some eight dozen spindles made locally. Whether he will succeed in his project to manufacture "Ihrams" for the pilgrimage arouses a little mild scepticism in some quarters.

169. The rumour regarding the Hasa Oil Concession "loan" mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 138 of the report for July proved to be well-founded, for on the 20th August the sum of £35,000 gold in English sovereigns arrived by the steamship *Talodi*. It was found impossible to land it that day, owing to some confusion over the shipping documents, so the money, contained in seven chests, was carried across to Port Sudan and returned on the 23rd, when it was safely landed and handed over to the Dutch Bank (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij N.V.) here. This sum is confidently asserted in certain quarters here to be a loan, and repayment, it is stated, is to be made gradually against the eventual royalties received by the Saudi Government. This arrangement, if correctly stated, would therefore be provided for in the "special agreement," the terms of which have not yet been disclosed. Meanwhile, the reports now circulating that the money has been sent on direct to the King at Riyadh and is being used to pay the troops, wear, at least, the air of possibility. The Royal appetite having been thus pleasantly titillated, Ibn Saud is supposed to have already asked for the payment of the second instalment of the loan in advance.

170. Mr. K. S. Twitchell, whose movements recently have been not unconnected with the arrival of the Standard Oil Company of California's loan to Ibn Saud, left on the 1st August on a mystery excursion in the direction of Medina on behalf of the Saudi Government. It is believed that he inspected old gold-mines in the Hejaz, which, it is considered, are by no means "worked out." He returned on the 14th, and at the end of the month was on the point of departure by car for the Hasa coast. He was keenly anticipating, in the intervals of seeking new worlds to geologise, repeating a former visit to the wells, palm groves and other pastoral delights of Hofuf. He expected to meet Ibn Saud at Riyadh.

171. News of the National Bank scheme (reference paragraph 139) is scanty and, what little there is, conflicting. The Egyptian press reports that the ex-Khedive Abbas has abandoned the project on account of difficulties encountered in trying to interest London financiers, whose participation, so runs this report, has been discouraged by the British Government. On the other hand, it is rumoured here that the Minister of Finance contemplates a visit to London, when circumstances and Ibn Saud permit, in order to put in hand the printing of Saudi bank notes.

172. There is nothing further to report on the Jedda-Mecca Railway scheme, save that status reports on Dr. Jeelani are far from encouraging to those who wish to see the scheme succeed.



173. On the 26th August the work of several months on the wells and water supply at Waziriya (*vide* paragraph 140) was crowned with success, when once again in their history these wells supplied water to Jedda. The event was celebrated on the 26th by a ceremonial inauguration, at which local dignitaries, the Minister of Finance and a crowd of some thousands were present. The water is brought over the 7 miles from Waziriya and is stored in the reservoir of Idarus on the skirts of one of the poorer quarters of the town. Mr. Twitchell states the rate of supply is 40 gallons per minute, and that shortly it will be possible to increase that rate threefold. He estimated present water consumption in Jedda at 38 gallons per minute, but other authorities here would place the figure much lower, probably at about 24 gallons per minute. The Waziriya water is free at the reservoir, and the price paid for it per 4-gallon kerosene tin (from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 piastre Saudi) is the cost of transport only. It is therefore proving itself a great boon to the poorer inhabitants of the town who are able to draw unlimited supplies of water for the mere trouble of carrying it away. It may thus be expected that Jedda's water consumption will increase, and that the sales of condenser water (now retailed at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  piastres Saudi per kerosene tin) will be adversely affected. The British engineer-in-charge of the condenser plant is inclined to scout this, however, on the grounds that the better-to-do will still buy condenser water for drinking purposes, as Waziriya water, though potable at present, is peculiarly vulnerable to persons of evil intent, and will, it is probably true, be somewhat suspect, as drinking water, for some time to come.

174. The Province of Asir has remained outwardly peaceful (*vide* paragraph 142) in spite of a tense and obscure situation along its southern frontier. As in last month's report, the situation will again be dealt with in connexion with the situation *vis-à-vis* the Yemen (see paragraphs 177-9 below).

175. Reports of extreme misery in Medina continue to reach the Legation. This city is the victim of tragic reductions in population and economic circumstances, and the lot of those who remain, few of whom can be far above subsistence level, is indeed an unenviable one.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

176. The treaty with Transjordan (reference paragraph 145) was first mentioned by the *Saut-ul-Hejaz* in its issue of the 8th August and at greater length in an article on the 15th August. It is a little curious that the *Umm-al-Qura*, usually regarded as the semi-official organ of the Saudi Government, should so far have refrained from any reference to the treaty.

177. The Saudi press has been almost equally mute on the subject of the Yemen (reference paragraphs 148 and 149), whose relations with Saudi Arabia had reached a critical stage at the beginning of August. The detention of the Saudi delegation against their will at Sana, which had further exacerbated Ibn Saud, proved happily to be of short duration, as they were allowed to leave the Yemen on the 3rd August. The Saudi Government, in informing His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires of this on the 6th, attributed the release to the steps taken by His Majesty's Government, who had requested the Italian Government to make urgent representations to the Imam Yahya. In the meantime (on the 5th) the Minister for Foreign Affairs had addressed a further lengthy note to Mr. Calvert for the information and comments of His Majesty's Government, setting forth the Saudi desiderata for the settlement of their differences with the Yemen, which included: (i) an apology and satisfaction for the detention of the delegation at Sana; (ii) the Idrisi either to be expelled from the Yemen, or handed over to Ibn Saud, as the shelter afforded him by the Imam Yahya, particularly in such unsettled territory as the Asir frontier districts, was not merely a breach of the treaty, but a token of the Imam's intention to force a quarrel; (iii) the Imam's encroachments in Najran were to stop and the frontier there to be delimited; and (iv) all frontiers between the two countries were to be settled.

178. The returning delegation brought with them a letter from the Imam to the King, the contents of which were wirelessly to Riyadh from Jizan. Ibn Saud replied by telegram stating his grievances and the remedies that would satisfy him. At this juncture it was possible to mark a certain *détente*, in the

situation consequent upon the release of the delegation, the apparent absence of any forward movement by Imamic troops in the Najran, and the resumption of direct telegraphic correspondence between the two rulers. This interlude was interrupted by a report received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Husain-ad-Dabbagh, one of the conspiratorial family of that name, had recently landed at Medi and had joined the Idrisi, taking with him supplies and money, and that a certain Adnan, one of Ad Dabbagh's followers, had established himself at Kamaran as an Idrisi agent. As the result of enquiries, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was able to inform the Saudi Government that Adnan had left Kamaran on the 16th August. On the 17th His Majesty's Government replied to the Saudi Government's request for comments on their desiderata regretting that the position was too obscure and their information too incomplete to enable them to express any opinion. They, however, expressed their pleasure at the release of the delegation and the resumption of direct communication between Riyadh and Sana.

179. On the 25th August Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman called on Mr. Calvert and left with him copies of two telegrams, one purporting to have been received by Ibn Saud from King Feisal, in which the latter, speaking in the name of the Arabs of other countries, expressed the hope that every effort would be made to avoid the shedding of Arab blood and declared his readiness to mediate. The other telegram contained Ibn Saud's reply, asserting equal concern for Arab blood, declaring his desire for peace and summarising his case against the Imam. He expressed his gratitude, non-committally, to Feisal for his offer of mediation. The Minister of Finance dilated, during this interview, on the impossibility of Arab trusting Arab and again sought the counsels of His Majesty's Government, to whom this information was conveyed, and whose reply was received before the end of the month, but was held up for oral communication, as Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman had, in the meantime, returned to Taif. Before he left Jedda, however, he informed Mr. Calvert at a further meeting that on the receipt of reports, some three weeks earlier, of mobilisation of troops within the Yemen, Ibn Saud had ordered the reinforcement of Saudi forces in the south-west by troops from the north-east. The Minister went on to read a series of telegrams from Ibn Saud to the Imam Yahya elaborating, in firm language, his previous demands. The month closed, therefore, on a somewhat more martial note, and it is perhaps not altogether fanciful to detect in the language of the telegrams addressed to the Imam (at the end of the month still unacknowledged) and the precautionary military dispositions made, a quickening of Ibn Saud's resolve to brook the procrastinations of the Imam Yahya only a little while longer.

180. The absence of Fuad Bey Hamza (see paragraph 166) is causing a certain amount of comment. The *Saut-ul-Hejaz* of the 29th August quotes from the *Akram*, at length, an article which reads into the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs' recent visit to the Lebanon a move to reopen negotiations with the British and French authorities concerned over the Hejaz Railway.

## III.—Relations with Powers Outside Arabia.

181. There is little to report under this head. Anglo-Saudi relations continue to be as cordial as ever, the Saudi Government leaning heavily—or affecting to—on the counsels of His Majesty's Government to an almost embarrassing degree. Italian shares are not well supported in the Saudi market, where suspicions of Eritrean complicity in the Imam Yahya's present attitude are too deep to be easily eradicated.

182. The *Umm-al-Qura* announced on the 25th August that Ibn Saud had sent a telegram of congratulations to King Feisal on the anniversary of the latter's accession (the 23rd August) and had received a reply the following day.

## IV.—Miscellaneous.

183. M. Roger Maigret, French Chargé d'Affaires, left by the steamship *Talodi* on the 9th for Syria, where he is spending a short leave of absence. Hamdi Bey, his Algerian vice-consul, remains in charge.

184. On the 19th Khan Sahib Haji Rashid Ahmad, a Delhi municipal councillor, returning to India from London, arrived by way of Medina, leaving



for Port Sudan the following day. He was the bearer of a letter of introduction from the India Office.

185. M. A. N. van de Poll, the Islamised Dutchman, whose Moslem name is Muhammad Husain-el-Mahdi, arrived here by the steamship *Alavi* on the 12th from Aden, having spent the last three months in Hadhramaut. He left for Europe on the 25th, after spending a week or so in Mecca.

186. Feridoun Bey, the official in charge of the Turkish Legation, fell rather seriously ill about the middle of the month, and on the 27th left, with his wife, for Asmara with the intention of undergoing an operation for appendicitis.

187. Mr. D. Macfarlane, of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., accompanied by his wife, paid a flying visit to Jedda, on the steamship *Taif*, on the 27th. They left the same day for Port Sudan and Khartum.

188. At the beginning of the month reports were received that a German ship, stated to be the steamship *Mosel*, ran aground on Perim Island, and, to refloat herself, jettisoned a large quantity of flour destined for Jedda. The news, which disturbed prices for a day or two, was said to be not unwelcome to the merchants involved, as they were fully insured and over-bought.

189. A Russian ship, the steamship *Samaweith* (?), arrived on the 30th and left the next day after discharging (both into the dhows and into the sea) a consignment of some 7,000 sacks of wheat, barley and other grain, said to have been brought from Basra.

190. The climate in August has lived up to usual Jedda standards. Throughout the month, skies have been heavy with clouds and sultry nights have been enlivened by occasional thunder and distant lightning. Showers of rain were recorded on several nights. These atmospherics, unfortunately, have meant no diminution in either heat or humidity. But climate apart, it may be admitted that existence in Jedda compares not unfavourably (it is surmised) with normal prison life elsewhere.

191. From Taif comes news of rains and horse-racing. No reports of the state of the turf have been received, unfortunately, but it is at least encouraging to learn that so young a monarchy as Saudi Arabia is taking kindly to the sport of kings.

192. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves in August was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: None.

Took refuge in August: None.

Manumitted in August and repatriated: None.

Locally manumitted: None.

On hand at end of month: None.

[E 5726/1494/25]

No. 36.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 285.)

Sir,

*Jedda, September 9, 1933.*

WITH reference to Mr. Hope Gill's despatch No. 160 of the 31st March, 1932, paragraph 4, relative to the activities of Mr. K. S. Twitchell in regard to the Jedda water supply, I have the honour to report that water has again been brought to Jedda from the wells at Waziriya, and the event was ceremonially inaugurated on the 26th August in the presence of the Minister of Finance, local notables, and a large gathering of townspeople. As the result of the discovery of a fresh spring, to the south-east of the wells themselves, work has been in progress for some months past, under the direction of Sheikh Muhammad Dehlavi and experts of the Mecca water supply of Ain Zubeyda. The water has been led through the old pipes, put down in Turkish times, and now falls into the Idarûs reservoir, situated on the outskirts of one of the poorer quarters of the town. The present rate of flow, according to Mr. Twitchell, who still shows active interest in this undertaking, is 40 gallons per minute, and this, he says, it will shortly be possible to increase to as much as three times that amount on the completion of work on a second conduit which runs alongside the first, but which is not yet connected over its entire length.

2. Mr. Twitchell points out that here there is an ample and cheap water supply sufficient for the needs of the town, whose present rate of consumption he places at 38 gallons per minute. Although other local experts would estimate the local rate of consumption at probably not more than 24 gallons per minute, it may be conceded that the new source of supply is more than sufficient, is cheap (for it costs nothing at the Idarûs reservoir), and at present is reasonably safe at source. The Indian Medical Officer attached to this Legation recently conducted an analysis of the water, chemically and bacteriologically, and pronounced it to be fit for consumption. The total water consumption of Jedda, therefore, may be expected to increase, particularly as the poorer classes are able to draw as much as they require for the mere trouble of carrying it away.

3. From past experience, however, considerable doubt is expressed as to the prospects of Waziriya water becoming a permanent factor in the town's water supply. The doubt is not diminished by reports that, although from Waziriya to Ras Qaim (a place 5 kilom. from Jedda) the conduit has been cemented and is at present fairly sound, over the remaining distance the pipes are old and rotten and require constant care to prevent leakage. Sheikh Muhammad Dehlavi has unsuccessfully approached the Jedda municipality in an endeavour to get the pipe-line thoroughly repaired, and has now placed the matter before Ibn Saud, stating his preference for a cement conduit over iron piping.

4. In the meantime, the sea-water distillery, or condenser plant, continues to supply the town with drinking water of a kind at the rate of about 8½ gallons per minute, and the English engineer in charge anticipates no great reduction in demand for his product, in spite of its greater cost, on account of the lack of confidence in Waziriya water on the part of those who are able to afford the other.

5. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 5730/759/25]

No. 37.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 290.)

Sir,

*Jedda, September 12, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 275 of the 29th August last, relative to the strained relations at present existing between the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and the recent telegraphic exchanges that have taken place between them, I have the honour to inform you that from my conversation with Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman on the 7th September, briefly reported to you by telegram the same day, I understand that his correspondence with the Imam Yahya has so far yielded Ibn Saud scant satisfaction. The series of telegrams addressed to the Imam, the gist of which was reported in my despatch under reference, embodying all the main heads of the Saudi case, had been carefully designed to leave no doubt or ambiguity in the way of an equally considered reply by the Imam. A reply was, indeed, in due course received, but beyond a Koranic text and a platitude, contained no more than a bare, and rather dismissive, acknowledgment. The Minister of Finance did not dwell on the matter at any length, but I gathered the impression that the failure of this attempt to elicit a reasoned reply had been received by Ibn Saud with chagrin and a deepening of his resolve to seek, if other means failed, a solution by a resort to force of arms. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman stated that, in his personal opinion, matters would now be allowed to rest where they were until the King had completed his military dispositions, whereupon he would confront the Imam with an ultimatum.

2. That this was no idle speculation seems daily more and more evident. I have reported by telegram and in my despatch under reference that, as long as five weeks ago, Saudi forces of the North-Eastern "Command" were ordered to proceed in the direction of the Najran district, if, indeed, they were not to enter the district itself, and since then rumours have been current to the effect that



recruiting has been actively carried on of late in the Medina and Taif districts, and that the forces so collected have been drafted south.

3. I have to-day reported by telegram that over 700 soldiers were embarked here and left by steamer yesterday for Jizan. So large a force can scarcely be explained by the normal requirements of garrison duty in Asir or of replacements and reliefs. Ibn Saud's military preparations are, it seems certain, approaching completion, and unless the Imam Yahya can be persuaded to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, it is to be feared that an armed clash cannot be very distant.

4. These more recent developments have naturally excited a good deal of interest and a certain measure of apprehension locally. I enclose herewith an extract from the *Egyptian Gazette* of the 6th September, in which the Jeddah correspondent of the *Ahram* fairly accurately summarises the course of events, as far as they are generally known here.<sup>(1)</sup> I also enclose a further report, which appeared in the *Egyptian Gazette* of the 2nd September, in which the *Ahram's* Rome correspondent records information obtained from a reliable source as to the nature of the first letter addressed by the Imam to Ibn Saud after the rupture of negotiations at Sanaa and confided to the Saudi delegation to deliver to the King. In paragraph (b) of my telegram No. 158 of the 19th August, and from the Minister for Foreign Affairs' note to me, forwarded under my printed despatch No. 263 of the 17th August, it will be observed that the Saudi Arab Government assert that this letter proposed that Ibn Saud should recognise Najran as part of the Yemen, and that the consideration of other questions in dispute should be postponed. From this press report, whose general accuracy it may be possible for His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome to verify, it would appear that the Zeidi overture was conceived in, perhaps, not quite such intransigent terms as Ibn Saud would have us believe.

5. Events seem to be steadily marching towards a climax and from the determination which Ibn Saud is pursuing his military plans the possibilities of a peaceful settlement and the efficacy of sedative counsels are just as steadily diminishing.

6. Copies of this despatch and enclosures are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, the Acting Commissioner, Aden, and to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 37.

*Extract from the Egyptian Gazette of September 2, 1933.*

#### YEMEN-SAUDI RELATIONS.

THE *Ahram's* Rome correspondent learns from a reliable source that when the Saudi delegation which had been to Sanaa, the capital of the Yemen, to discuss outstanding questions between the Saudi Kingdom and the Yemen with the Imam Yahya, and which was for some time kept virtual prisoner, returned to Mecca and Riad, the capital of the Nejd, it carried with it a lengthy letter from the Imam to King Ibn Saud regarding the questions which the delegations had gone to discuss.

Although the contents of the letter are not yet fully known, declares the correspondent, it is certain that the Imam has expressed a desire to conclude a treaty of defence with King Ibn Saud.

It would appear, he continues, that the Imam's viewpoint on the subject is that he would like a treaty with King Ibn Saud, but that he is about to conclude a treaty of friendship and "bon-voisinage" with Britain regarding the nine protected settlements, and he believes that the conclusion of a treaty between him and King Ibn Saud would obstruct the progress of negotiations between him and Great Britain and might be given an unsuitable interpretation by Italy and Russia.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

#### The Frontier Question.

The Imam's opinion of the frontier question is that the inhabitants of the district of Najran, the subject of dispute, are neither Sunnis nor Zeidis, and that they have never actually been subject to the Yemen or to the Nejd, and that, therefore, he considers that the occupation of this district does not constitute a violation of pledges or transgression on Nejd.

As regards Asir and Tihamah, the Imam maintains that although these two territories were handed over to King Ibn Saud by their original rulers, Al Aid and the Idrisi, yet there are historical considerations which induce him to consider these two territories as part of the Yemen.

Nevertheless the Imam has suggested an alternative solution of the problem, namely, that the Idrisi should again be allowed to rule over these two territories and should be given the choice to conclude a treaty with whichever side they wish.

King Ibn Saud's opinion on this subject is not yet known.

All Moslems in Egypt are Sunnis. The great majority of Moslems in Iraq and in Persia are Shias. The Sunnis make their pilgrimage at Mecca and Medina, whereas the Shias go to Najaf and Karbala in Iraq. The Zeidis are neither Sunnis nor Shias.

[E 5694/759/25]

No. 38.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Graham (Rome).*

(No. 314.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, September 29, 1933.*

Mr. MURRAY'S despatch No. 722 of 22nd September: Saudi-Yemeni relations.

It is undesirable to embark on argument with Italian Government as to territorial claims of Ibn Saud and Imam, geographical and political facts being obscure. Nor is it necessary to reaffirm attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Ibn Saud's position in Asir, since this is already well known to the Italian Government (see Mr. Arthur Henderson's despatch No. 892 of 17th July, 1931).

You should therefore reply that His Majesty's Government have at frequent intervals urged moderation on Ibn Saud, and will continue to use all their influence to this end. Meanwhile, they await with interest any further information which the Italian Government may be able to obtain from the Imam.

For your own information, I consider that main weakness of Imam's position in present dispute is not so much his alleged violation of ill-defined frontier arrangements (although it seems clear that he has penetrated well into Asir) as his evasion of Ibn Saud's demands for discussion (see Mr. Calvert's telegram No. 163 of 7th September). From this it seems unlikely that representations by His Majesty's Government would restrain Ibn Saud from completing his military preparations.

[E 5865/759/25]

No. 39.

*Memorandum respecting Saudi-Yemeni Relations.*

(Confidential.)

I HAD a conversation this morning with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, assisted by M. Zada, about the Najran situation. I explained that I was puzzled as to the exact significance of the expression "Najran," and as to the precise nature of the present situation. As regards the latter, Fuad Bey Hamza had expressly told me in June that the operations of the Yemeni forces, while giving ground for anxiety, were confined to what was admittedly Yemeni territory. He had distinguished between "Najran" as being Saudi and the Beni Yam as being Yemeni, and, on my pressing him, had identified the admittedly Yemeni territory with the geographical name of "Jauf." The last information he had given me before we both left Jeddah was that Seif-ul-Islam Ahmed and his brother, operating against the local tribes, had sustained a reverse and been driven back, but were preparing

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a counter-attack. It was now suggested that the Yemenis were in Saudi territory, but I could not find any precision as to when they had altered the situation, as described to me by Fuad Bey, by crossing the alleged frontier.

2. Sheikh Hafiz admitted that the use of the name "Najran" in Arab geographical parlance was very vague. It merely meant the area on the confines of the Yemen, but could not be defined as having geographical boundaries. He admitted also that the 1927 agreement was an oral arrangement, but it was an agreement which the Imam himself had invoked on several occasions and notably when asserting his claim to Jebel Arwa in 1931. The sheikh and M. Zada agreed that there had been a definite change in the situation since the early summer. The Yemenis had succeeded in their operations against the tribes, and flushed with this success, had pushed on into Saudi territory, advancing to the neighbourhood of Badar, without meeting with opposition, and then stopping short. Sheikh Hafiz's first telegrams regarding the actual presence of the Yemenis in Saudi territory had reached him about the beginning of August. The Imam's attitude, according to M. Zada, was that Ibn Saud had no officials or forces in the invaded area, and that he (the Imam) was free to do what he liked there.

3. Sheikh Hafiz agreed with me that, as regards the frontier, a distinction must be made between (a) the frontier between Najran and the Yemen, which, in the Saudi view, was settled in 1927; and (b) the frontier between what is now called Asir Tihama (i.e., the late Idrisi's territory) and the Yemen, which was settled in 1931. I did not gather that the frontier at (a) was expressly confirmed in the 1931 negotiations, which had turned only on Jebel Arwa, although, as stated above, the Imam had invoked the 1927 agreement when claiming Jebel Arwa. Sheikh Hafiz agreed that Saada was Yemeni, but said that Waila was Saudi.

4. I confined the conversation to an elucidation of the facts, as viewed by the Saudi Government, and avoided any mention of the merits of the quarrel or Ibn Saud's military preparations. Sheikh Hafiz and M. Zada, while describing the situation as recorded above, appeared to share the general ignorance regarding the exact geography of the region.

ANDREW RYAN.

September 30, 1933.

[E 5990/759/25]

No. 40.

Sir R. Graham to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 753.)

Sir,

Rome, October 5, 1933.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 286, I send you herewith a record of a conversation between a member of my staff and the head of the African Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, regarding the relations between the Imam Yahya and King Ibn Saud.

2. I have the impression that the Italian Government are greatly disturbed over the situation in Asir. Indeed, Signor Suvich mentioned it himself to me the other day and said it looked as if we were heading for war. It would accordingly be of great assistance to me if all the arguments of the Italian Government (i.e., those contained in their various *notes verbales* and in the enclosed record of conversation) could be carefully examined with a view to seeing whether any of their desiderata can possibly be met. Should this not be the case, I think that a full and reasoned reply to their representations would in any case be appreciated. In view of the delicacy and complexity of the subject, I submit for your consideration that it might be desirable to hold a meeting of experts, either here or in London.

3. Nothing has so far appeared in the press, but it is fairly evident that this silence would not be maintained in the event of actual hostilities between the Yemen and the Hejaz-Nejd.

4. I am sending a further despatch to you on the subject by bag.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

Enclosure in No. 40.

*Relations between the Imam and Ibn Saud.*

I ASKED for an interview with Signor Guarnaschelli last night, and told him, in effect, that the Foreign Office did not desire to reply at length to the Italian Government's *note verbale* of the 21st September, partly owing to the fact that many of the issues were still obscure, and partly owing to the Italian Government being already aware of their attitude in regard to Asir. Signor Guarnaschelli did not seem to think that the Italian Government were entirely aware of it, so I referred him to our *note verbale* of the 24th July, 1931. I then gave him verbally a literal translation in French of the second paragraph of Foreign Office telegram No. 314.

Signor Guarnaschelli thanked me for my communication, but was quite obviously disappointed with it. He said the Italian Government's note had been drafted in no polemical spirit (a remark with which I hastened to agree), that it was a reasoned *exposé* of their attitude, and that he had hoped it would not have been entirely without effect in London. He then repeated to me the well-known Italian arguments in regard to Asir, laying stress on the fact that the Imam had not committed any aggressive act against Asir, though nothing would induce him to recognise Ibn Saud's position there. I said, what about Najran? But he replied that was not, and never had been, part of Asir, and that the Imam had just as much claim to it as Ibn Saud—possibly more. (He maintains that Asir is the coastal belt by Jizan, and does not extend inland nearly as far as Najran.) As for the alleged agreement of 1927, the Italian Government remained persuaded that it never existed. (I interposed a remark to the effect that the Saudi Government had never said that a *written* agreement did exist, but Signor Guarnaschelli observed that we could hardly admit the possibility of a "Gentlemen's Agreement" between Arabian monarchs?) Hence it was no good Ibn Saud complaining of a *non possumus* attitude on the part of the Imam. The question at issue was the status of Asir. The Imam had never recognised Ibn Saud's annexation; there was absolutely no reason why he should; but Ibn Saud was apparently using this refusal as an excuse for making war on him. The Italian Government had the most disturbing accounts of Ibn Saud's military preparations. They could not dismiss the possibility that he was out to smash the Imam in the same way and by much the same methods as he had smashed King Hussein. It might not actually be a question of occupying Sanaa. The Imam himself was, of course, also arming in defence, and his tribes were warlike. Also Ibn Saud's finances were none too good. But a heavy defeat would discredit the Imam, might even cost him his throne, and would earn for Ibn Saud the title of "Ghazi." In any case a war would be lamentable from every point of view (I assured him that this at least was an opinion entirely shared by His Majesty's Government).

Well, continued Signor Guarnaschelli, why couldn't we do something rather more positive than just counselling moderation? The situation was very grave; anybody could see that it was going from bad to worse. Our influence with Ibn Saud was clearly very great. If it had sufficed to induce him to conclude a treaty with his deadly enemy, Abdulla of Transjordan, surely it would suffice to make him come to some sort of terms with the Imam? Provided the question of Asir was not definitely and finally closed so far as we were concerned, we would not find the Imam unreasonable. An agreement might be arrived at on various bases—reinstatement of Idrisi with liberty to conclude a treaty with either side (see cutting from *Egyptian Gazette* enclosed in Jeddah despatch No. 290), partition of Asir, not necessarily in equal portions, &c. There were, indeed, obvious lines of compromise, if only we told Ibn Saud firmly that he had got to behave, and the Asir question was not absolutely closed.

I said nothing which could possibly be interpreted as showing that we regarded it as in any way open, but promised to report faithfully his point of view, which was very friendly expressed. During our long (and I fear rather discursive) conversation, Signor Guarnaschelli referred once or twice to "a Great Empire" and "a small State," and though he was too polite (or too politic) to say so, I had a feeling that he was trying to represent us as bullies. Again when he referred to the "rancune" of the Imam if he was forced to climb



down absolutely, it was quite possible to infer that he was also referring to Italian rancour as well. This part of the conversation, however, dealt with Aden, and I have recorded it in a separate minute (see Rome telegram to Foreign Office No. 285).

G. J.

October 5, 1933.

[E 6042/14/91]

No. 41.

*Sir R. Graham to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 10.)*

(No. 757.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 4th October, 1933, respecting the restoration of the Centre Peak Light in the Red Sea.

Rome, October 6, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 41.

*Note verbale.*

(Translation.)

WITH reference to the contents of the second and third paragraphs of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy's *note verbale* No. 221 of the 6th July, 1932, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to bring the following to the notice of the Embassy:—

2. The captain of the port at Massawa has informed the Government of the Colony of Eritrea that, according to reports received from the captains of Italian vessels navigating in the lower Red Sea, and particularly on the route from Massawa to Hodeida, the safety of shipping in that zone is gravely impaired by the discontinuance of the Centre Peak Light, more especially on account of the currents around that island, which, by causing considerable deviations of route, may give rise to accidents, should the discontinuance of the light be prolonged. The captain of the port has accordingly requested that steps be urgently taken for the restoration of the light in the interests of the safety of shipping, particularly on the route from Massawa to Hodeida, which is continually used by steamships and sailing vessels, both of Italian and foreign nationality.

3. The Government of the Colony of Eritrea have acceded to this request and taken the necessary steps for the restoration of the light, the operation of which has been resumed as from the 1st October last.

The lighthouse zone of Massawa has already taken steps to issue the necessary wireless notice to navigators containing particulars of the light.

4. In bringing the above to the knowledge of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs need hardly add that the presence of an Italian staff on the Island of Zebait (Centre Peak), which will ensure the operation of the light, implies no modification of the international juridical status of the island itself, which, together with that of the Islands of Abu Ail and Jebel Taiz, was considered by the Italian and British Governments in 1928 during the negotiations for the Red Sea Lights Convention, when the conclusion was reached that the question of the sovereignty of those islands should remain in suspense.

Rome, October 4, 1933 (XI).

[E 6077/16/91]

No. 42.

RELATIONS BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SHEIKH OF KOWEIT.

*Final Record of a Meeting held at the Foreign Office, on October 5, 1933.*

THE following were present at the meeting:—

Mr. G. W. Rendel (*in the Chair*), Foreign Office.  
Mr. K. R. Johnstone, Foreign Office.  
Sir A. Ryan, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.  
Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. Fowle, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.  
Mr. J. G. Laithwaite, India Office.

The meeting had before it Sir Andrew Ryan's note of the 16th August, regarding the attitude of King Ibn Saud towards Koweit (see Appendix A).

Mr. Rendel outlined the present political situation of Koweit. The Sheikh was tied to His Majesty's Government by his treaty engagements, but at the same time was being courted both by Ibn Saud and by Iraq. It was clear that the sheikhdom was not in a position which in the ordinary way would enable it to stand alone either as a political or as an economic entity, and that it must therefore depend on some stronger Power. He understood that it was the policy of His Majesty's Government, in view of the strategic importance of Koweit, not to allow it to be absorbed by any foreign Power, but, so far as was possible, to maintain their present treaty relationship with the Sheikh.

Mr. Laithwaite suggested that Koweit was at the present moment of more vital importance to His Majesty's Government than it had been at any time, since it had bulked so prominently as the terminus of the Bagdad Railway before the war. This was the result first of the development of the air route to India and Australia, which had made the Gulf as important imperially from the air standpoint as was the Suez Canal for naval reasons, and, secondly, owing to the expiration of the mandatory régime in Iraq and the uncertainty of the future relations of His Majesty's Government with that country. So long as Iraq had been under British control, there had been a natural tendency to give it prior consideration and the less important question of Koweit had been kept comparatively in the background. But now that Iraq had attained full independence, the position was changed and Koweit had once again assumed major importance. Geographically, Koweit occupied a key position at the head of the Persian Gulf, and one from which the Gulf could be controlled. In the event of war we could probably safely assume that Koweit would be on our side and her territory would afford us a base of operations of definite value, to the use of which, on the assumption in question, no objection could be raised on the ground that we were violating her neutrality. Further, with the development of the Arabian coast air route to the East, Koweit was likely to prove more and more vital as a station on that route, especially if our relations with Iraq should at any time become so strained that we were unable to rely on the use of the Iraqi aerodromes for the purposes of that route.

Colonel Fowle suggested that in point of fact it might one day be possible to avoid the use of Iraq altogether, and fly direct from Palestine to Koweit, as the range of the aircraft using the Arabian route increased.

Mr. Rendel concurred with Mr. Laithwaite's estimate of the position as regards Iraq. In view of recent events in Iraq it was possible that our whole relationship with that country might have to be modified, and he considered that both the future of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and of the position of the Royal Air Force in Iraq must be regarded as doubtful. On the general point at issue, he observed that one of the main points to be borne in mind was the fact that Koweit was not naturally independent from either the geographical or the economic point of view. It was a port without a hinterland, cut off at present by the Iraqi and



Saudi frontiers from the territory which it would naturally feed, and at present denied free communication with the country behind it. Moreover, even its present trade might be jeopardised by the development of the Saudi port at Ras Tanura under the auspices of the American oil concessionaires on the Hasa coast. What was even more important was that its fresh-water supply was not derived from its own territory, but had to be imported from Iraq. It was for consideration, therefore, whether it would, in fact, be practicable for His Majesty's Government to maintain the independence of Koweit as against its neighbours, at any rate on the present basis of a rather loose and ill-defined dependence on His Majesty's Government.

Colonel Fowle concurred generally in Mr. Rendel's description of the economic position of the sheikhdom. He pointed out, however, that Koweit had always been the port of the deserts of northern Arabia, as Bahrein was the port of Central Arabia. In regard to the position of Koweit *vis-à-vis* of Iraq, he added that beside the influence which Iraq could exert by controlling Koweit's fresh-water supply, it was also powerful enough to bring pressure to bear upon Koweit over, for instance, the question of smuggling.

Mr. Rendel agreed that both Iraq and Saudi Arabia were in a position to exert strong pressure on Koweit. This being so, the rivalry between them over Koweit was likely to increase, unless, of course, Saudi Arabia disintegrated. The present position of Koweit between these two States was weak, and Sir Andrew Ryan's note showed how powerful an attraction Ibn Saud could exert. The question, therefore, was whether His Majesty's Government would not be well advised to develop and tighten up their own relations with Koweit in order to strengthen its position. It had, in fact, been suggested that it might be more advantageous to convert our present treaty relationship into a definite protectorate, on, for instance, the analogy of the Hadramaut, which was now regarded as part of the Aden Protectorate, but where our treaty relationship with the local rulers and obligations to afford them protection had been if anything looser than those we had towards Koweit. Would not a protectorate ensure Koweit more effectively against absorption than the present attempt to maintain the sheikhdom as a kind of political vacuum in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Laithwaite drew attention to three points:—

- (a) At present the obligations of His Majesty's Government to Koweit were represented by their undertaking to grant "good offices" in respect of Koweit under the 1899 agreement, by their promise of 1907 that "the town of Koweit and its boundaries belong to Sheikh Mobarak-us-Suba, Ruler of Koweit, and to his heirs after him," and their undertaking of the 3rd November, 1914, that Koweit, in the event of a victory over the Turks, would be recognised by us as an independent principality under British protection. They were thus very general in terms, and, in accordance with our normal policy on the Arab littoral, which dated from a period in which it was possible to protect a sea port by action from the sea, but not to afford effective help inland, we had consistently endeavoured to limit our obligations, save as regards "good offices" to Koweit town and the immediately adjoining area. Recent experience had, however, shown that in cases of intervention from outside it was in fact necessary to give the Sheikh, at our discretion, and on our own terms, a measure of active assistance up to the limit of his frontiers and with the development of aircraft the problem of inland defence was now less difficult. This was to some extent a strengthening of his strict treaty position, as also possibly an extension of our strict treaty obligations.
- (b) With regard to the suggested establishment of a protectorate, it was necessary to consider what the reactions of the Sheikh would be, and also what effect the proclamation of a protectorate might have on the other Arab rulers of the Gulf. It would in any case be wiser not to make an overt proclamation of this nature, since both in Bahrein and in Qatar and along the Trucial Coast it would probably rouse apprehensions and might even cause the local sheikhs to turn away from His Majesty's Government and consider submitting themselves to Persia or to Ibn Saud.

- (c) The basis of His Majesty's Government's present treaty relationship with Koweit was unsatisfactory. In the first place, it did not rest, as was the case with Bahrein, Muscat and the Trucial Sheikhdoms, on a long series of formal treaties with the Sheikh dating back for over a century, or, as in the case of Qatar, on a comprehensive treaty, but was based only on a comparatively brief correspondence exchanged between the sheikhs and His Majesty's Government since 1899 and on the reciprocal engagements, still presumably binding since they had not been abrogated, entered into in connexion with the lease of Bunder Shweikh in 1907; secondly, there were certain gaps, *e.g.*, we had no slavery agreement with Koweit. It might, he suggested, be possible to fill in the gaps left by this correspondence and tighten our control in that way. An example was our recent request to the Sheikh for certain undertakings in regard to air facilities in his sheikhdom, one result of which would be to concentrate effective control of such facilities, whether military or civil, in the hands of His Majesty's Government. Another instance was the recent proposed amendment of the Koweit Order in Council so as to place responsibility for jurisdiction over non-Moslem foreigners in the hands of His Majesty's Government. A gradual tightening of our control of this character, particularly if pursued as a definite policy on all convenient occasions, would, he thought, at once avoid the difficulties involved in establishing a formal protectorate and would make it very much simpler.

Colonel Fowle expressed the view that there did not seem to be any intermediate position possible between a treaty relationship with the Sheikh on the present lines and a full protectorate. The Sheikh would certainly be unwilling to agree to the sheikhdom becoming a formal protectorate, and, *prima facie*, he (Colonel Fowle) was not much in favour of it. He agreed, however, that it would be advisable, on suitable opportunities, to try to tighten up our control over the Sheikh.

On being questioned whether he did not consider that our restricted position *vis-à-vis* of the Sheikh in regard to the Koweit oil concession indicated the essential weakness of our treaty position, he replied that our difficulties in that case had been due rather to the special undertakings given to the United States Government in that matter than to any weakness in our normal control over the Sheikh under the treaty engagements. Had we been able, without violating our pledges to the United States Government, to tell the Sheikh that we required him to give the concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company he would have done so.

Mr. Rendel drew attention to the fact that in the event of serious misgovernment by the Ruler of Koweit such as prejudicially to affect foreign citizens in Koweit, we might find ourselves in a difficult position *vis-à-vis* of the foreign Power concerned.

Mr. Laithwaite said that on this point he thought that Bahrein might be regarded as *locus classicus*. We had for many years put up with a considerable degree of misgovernment by Sheikh Isa. But when conditions at last, in our view, became intolerable, we did not hesitate to intervene and to depose the Sheikh. There were obvious arguments for doing so, for were we not to intervene when misgovernment had reached a certain pitch, it would be most difficult for us to justify a refusal to allow foreign Governments which might be affected to take steps to protect the interests of their nationals. He did not think that there need be any apprehension in the case of Koweit that we would fail to bring pressure on a sheikh who was abusing his position, once it became necessary to do so. The case for early intervention would probably be stronger now that the Gulf was so much more in the public eye.

The meeting then went on to consider relations between Ibn Saud and Koweit.

Sir Andrew Ryan stated that he had been impressed by the apparent weakness of His Majesty's Government's position *vis-à-vis* of Ibn Saud with regard to Koweit. His Majesty's Government were not strongly placed when it became necessary to warn Ibn Saud to keep his hands off Koweit, since they were



committed to maintaining that Koweit was technically an independent State. A case in point had been the Saudi intrusions into Koweit territory, referred to in paragraph 3 of his note, when Saudi officials had performed acts of authority within the limits of the sheikhdom.

*Colonel Fowle* pointed out that, in fact, our treaty engagements did entitle us to prevent foreign Powers from dealing direct with the Sheikh. Ibn Saud had certainly been informed of the special relations existing between the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government. Speaking generally, he added that, in fact, little trouble was likely to be experienced with foreigners in Koweit, so long as it remained a Bedouin town ruled by a Bedouin sheikh, and not, like Bahrein, a relatively cosmopolitan commercial centre. If, however, oil were discovered within the sheikhdom, it was possible that difficulties might arise.

*Mr. Rendel* pointed out that the Arabian air route was likely to develop quickly. If Iraq were to adopt an anti-foreign policy, and Koweit became correspondingly more important as a centre of international traffic, other countries might well wish to take advantage of the facilities there. We might well find many foreign Powers becoming increasingly interested in Koweit. We could not have it both ways, and should sooner or later have to define our position. His Majesty's Government ought, therefore, to orient their policy definitely either towards the greater independence of the sheikhdom or towards a tightening of their own control.

*Mr. Laithwaite* agreed, and added that, in his view, our policy should be directed towards a closer control, but that it was undesirable to hasten any overt declaration of full control, such as the establishment of a protectorate would be. Such a declaration might well frighten the Sheikhs of Bahrein and of the Trucial Coast, and do more harm than good. The policy to be followed was, therefore, one of occasional minor adjustments, as these became necessary, tending to increase, or at any rate not to relax, our control over the sheikhdom.

Reverting to the question of Saudi-Koweiti relations, *Sir Andrew Ryan* drew attention to the toleration extended by His Majesty's Government to direct correspondence on business matters between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud. This, no less than the independence formula, placed us in a weak position in defending Koweit, and the correspondence in question was of such long standing that it was difficult now for us to take the line that Ibn Saud should write to us rather than to the Sheikh. What was desirable was that we should be able to tell Ibn Saud openly that we were responsible for defending the Sheikh's interests in any given dispute.

*Mr. Laithwaite* said that the explanation of the system of direct correspondence between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud was, he thought, that it dated from a time when the latter was not so important a ruler as he had since become, and when we had taken the view that it was unnecessary to take too strict a view of correspondence between sheikh and sheikh. That position was now changed, and reconsideration seemed desirable. Ibn Saud was well aware both that His Majesty's Government conducted the foreign relations of Koweit and that the Sheikh had undertaken certain obligations towards us. He agreed that it was now necessary to exert stricter control over the correspondence in question and to emphasise our own special position in Koweit *vis-à-vis* of Ibn Saud more definitely than had been the case while Iraq was still under British control. He suggested that we might (a) check Ibn Saud when he appeared to be presuming too far with regard to Koweit—a policy which we were, in fact, now prepared to follow in regard to the Saudi-Koweit blockade; and (b) enforce stricter regulations on the Sheikh in the matter of direct correspondence.

*Colonel Fowle* agreed. Such action would show both the Sheikh and Ibn Saud that we considered the Sheikh to be under our direction. If we did not take some such step as this, we might be in danger of finding ourselves faced with the results of a kind of conspiracy between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud. We ought, therefore, to write to the Sheikh in the sense that we noted that his private correspondence with Ibn Saud had assumed an increasing importance, and tell him that that correspondence must now cease.

*Mr. Rendel* concurred. A straightforward control of this nature would be easier to maintain, and would prevent a repetition of such incidents as the letter

in which Ibn Saud had recently tried to detach the Sheikh of Koweit from his connexion with His Majesty's Government.

*Sir A. Ryan* also concurred, and drew attention to the success with which Ibn Saud was spreading the idea that he might naturally absorb Koweit and was bound to do so sooner or later. He pointed out that such an idea could never have prevailed to the extent to which it had, if His Majesty's Government had equally definitely made known their own special position with regard to Koweit.

The meeting then discussed what point in the correspondence between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud could most suitably be taken up in connexion with the reprimand which it was proposed to address to both parties.

*Mr. Laithwaite* suggested that if it were discovered that the Sheikh had committed himself to Ibn Saud in regard to the grant of an oil concession in the Koweit Neutral Zone, this might be an excellent opportunity for checking him. The question then arose, what action could be taken if the United States Government, in dealing with whom His Majesty's Government had consistently emphasised the Sheikh's independence, were to produce communications from him regarding the grant of a concession in the Neutral Zone? It was, however, agreed that His Majesty's Government could demonstrate from the Sheikh's treaty engagements that he had not been entitled to make any such grant without our knowledge and consent. Eventually it was agreed that the most suitable occasion for the proposed representations to the Sheikh and Ibn Saud would be Ibn Saud's letter suggesting terms for the settlement of the Saudi blockade of Koweit and warning the Sheikh against His Majesty's Government.

At the conclusion of the meeting *Sir A. Ryan* raised the question of the pressure which might be exerted upon Ibn Saud in regard to the Saudi blockade of Koweit. This blockade had one of two purposes, either to complete the economic strangulation of Koweit and lead to its complete absorption in Saudi Arabia, or else the safeguarding of Saudi economic interests. His Majesty's Government could not possibly allow the first of these alternatives. The question, therefore, was what real force there was in Ibn Saud's suggestion that his own purely economic interests required the maintenance of the blockade.

*Colonel Fowle* suggested that we might well revert to the Sheikh's proposal that Ibn Saud should have customs posts at a given place along but outside the Koweiti border, and that this might, if necessary, be coupled with a system of manifests for Koweiti-Saudi trade. He gave it as his opinion that even if Ibn Saud were to develop Ras Tanura, possibly with American help, this port was not likely to compete seriously with Koweit, which served quite a different hinterland, nor was there any port between the Koweit area and the Ras Tanura area which could be successfully developed as a rival to Koweit.

*Colonel Fowle* suggested that on his return to the Gulf on the 16th October he should discuss the situation with Colonel Dickson, Political Agent, Koweit, who had great experience of the sheikhdom, in the light of the conversations at the present meeting, and should submit a comprehensive report. It was agreed that this course should be adopted, and that in the light of the Resident's report and of the conclusions of the present meeting the question of future policy in Koweit should be discussed if necessary in the Middle East Official Sub-Committee.

The conclusions of the meeting were as follows:—

- (1) That in dealing with Ibn Saud, His Majesty's Government should increasingly emphasise the closeness of their relations with the Sheikh.
- (2) That the Sheikh should be told that his personal correspondence with Ibn Saud on official matters was to cease.
- (3) That the issue of the Saudi blockade of Koweit should be taken up with Ibn Saud by His Majesty's Government on the basis of their obligation to protect the interests of Koweit.
- (4) That on receipt of the despatch promised by Colonel Fowle the whole question of relations between His Majesty's Government and Koweit might suitably be referred for further discussion to the Middle East Official Sub-Committee, to which a note should be sent recording the points discussed at the present meeting, and setting forth the arguments for and against the possible declaration of a protectorate.



## Appendix A.

Note by Sir Andrew Ryan.

*Ibn Saud's Attitude towards Koweit.*

I HAVE been turning over in my mind for some time the possibility that it may be a definite object of Ibn Saud's policy to reduce Koweit to a position of dependence on him somewhat similar to that of Asir from 1926 to 1930. This is in the nature of a pure speculation, but it is a speculation so interesting that I think it worth while to collect the principal data bearing on it. It must be admitted at the outset that, if Ibn Saud had such an idea in his head, he would realise the need for great caution lest he should indispose His Majesty's Government. His only formal obligation towards the latter is that contained in article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, but he understands very well the implications of the words therein "who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government." On the other hand, he has seen His Majesty's Government tolerate direct correspondence on business subjects between him and the Sheikh of Koweit. He might think that they would not react over strongly if he and the Sheikh confronted them with the *fait accompli* of a political deal.

2. Apart from the correspondence, of which we have knowledge, there has been other intercourse between the rulers, notably the Sheikh's visit to Riyadh in 1932, the secret messages brought by Ibn Saud's confidential messenger to the Sheikh early this year, and the Sheikh's mysterious dashes into Nejd last February, when Colonel Dickson surmised that he had gone to meet some high Saudi personage, possibly Ibn Saud himself.

3. I may interpolate, as a minor indication of Ibn Saud's attitude, a reference to two occasions on which it has been suggested or hinted by his Ministry for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government should not concern themselves with affairs between Saudi Arabia and Koweit. I class them as minor, because this position has never been categorically asserted. The first was when, in reply to a complaint of mine regarding Saudi encroachments on Koweit territory, which had perturbed His Majesty's Government, the reply was in effect: "Sorry you have been perturbed. You need not have been if the matter had been pursued through An. Nafisi." On another occasion Fuad Bey, in rather light conversation, asked me why we concerned ourselves in matters between his Government and Koweit.

4. The personal relations between the two rulers are peculiar. Ibn Saud grew up at Koweit, and it is sometimes said that he has shown himself ungrateful to his former hosts. It is said by others, I do not know on what precise grounds, that Mubarak treated Ibn Saud very badly. Anyhow, through all the relations there runs a thread of old friendship, however flimsy and however frayed by frequent friction over raids, the embargo and so on. It has helped towards the settlement of minor questions. It has not deterred Ibn Saud from enforcing the embargo on trade, but the embargo on trade has not destroyed the Sheikh's ostensible friendliness towards Ibn Saud. They are "Arcades ambo," as I once wrote, and they both combine some real friendship for His Majesty's Government and a healthy fear of them with a good deal of fundamental mistrust.

5. The point of my theory or speculation is that, if the Sheikh of Koweit were at all willing to be "Asirised," Ibn Saud could make the proposal quite attractive on the following lines, if I may venture to put into his mouth the sort of language he could use:—

- (a) "You are not really independent, my dear fellow. You are under the thumb of the English. They might annex you at any moment, or even present you to Iraq. If you must be dependent on some one, why be dependent on those untrustworthy imperialists, when you might depend, without being exactly dependent, on a man like me, old friend, fellow Moslem, fellow Arab and the one big independent man in Arabia?"
- (b) "I don't like squeezing you, I really don't, with that embargo. As things are at present, I have to think of my own interests. But if your interests were mine, we could easily have an understanding. A sort of 'Zollverein' as they say; same duties levied in our ports; free competition between yours and mine; free trade over our land border.

What have the English done about it? Nothing; because they cannot get at me. 'Sois mon frère et je te fais vivre. Sois le leur et je te tue.'

(c) "I should not mop you up, of course. You would rule your State under an understanding with me. Indeed, if you were in with me, I might recognise a sort of influence of yours over those three Lost Tribes that you always want back. Look at how I treated the Idriisi. I made a sensible agreement with him in 1926. He remained a ruler with tribal influence. I did not take charge in his country, until he got into such a mess that he asked me to in 1930. I did not hit him on the head until the poor mutt thought he could try conclusions with me in 1932. He looked to foreigners and he got it in the neck from me.

(d) "You have had trouble with Iraq over your property there. What has England been able or even willing to do for you? If I had the right to protect you against third parties, you would find that I knew how to see you through.

(e) "Then there's oil. People are after it in my country, and in yours, and in the Neutral Zone. Why not have an agreed policy and present a common front to the West? You know what the Anglo-Persian Oil Company is. Another name for the British Government, as we saw in Persia the other day, even if we had not known it before. Take my tip and keep them out at all costs. Play about with Holmes, if you like. But don't trust him, and remember that in the long run your best policy would be to deal, like me, direct with American interests, using the others to put up the price."

6. It is easy enough to detect fallacies in the above imaginary address. I do not know enough about the Sheikh of Koweit to judge what his reaction to it would be, but many an Arab, not well pleased with British protectors, might find it convincing enough to be attracted into Ibn Saud's parlour.

7. I wrote the above notes in Jedda at the end of June. I thought them too hypothetical at that time to submit them for official consideration. They may, however, be worthy of some attention now that the Political Resident and I are both in this country, and Colonel Dickson will soon be available for consultation. Except that Ibn Saud continues to show a marked anxiety to avoid all complications, I see no material reason to modify what I wrote nearly three months ago, subject always to the consideration that I merely suggest an uncertain working theory to be tested by further examination and by keeping a close watch on future developments.

August 16, 1933.

## Appendix B.

## NOTE.

*Obligations of His Majesty's Government towards the Sheikh of Koweit.*

(A)—*Nature of the Undertakings given.*

By the agreement of the 23rd January, 1899, His Majesty's Government formally assured the Sheikh "of the good offices of the British Government" towards you, your heirs and successors, so long as you, your heirs and successors scrupulously and faithfully observe the conditions of the said bond," under which the Sheikh had pledged himself, his heirs and successors, not to receive the agent or representative of any Power or Government at Koweit without the previous sanction of the British Government, and not to cede, sell, lease or mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose, any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government.

2. By article 9 of the Secret Agreement of the 15th October, 1907, for the lease of the Bunder Shweikh foreshore, the Political Agent intimated that he



was "duly authorised on behalf of the precious Imperial English Government to promise, and do hereby promise, that the town of Koweit and its boundaries likewise belong to Sheikh Mobarak-us-Suba, Ruler of Koweit, and to his heirs after him, and that all Sheikh Mobarak's arrangements in the matter of customs, &c., and all his arrangements at the present day shall remain in the hands of Sheikh Mobarak-us-Suba, Ruler of Koweit, and of his heirs after him, and . . . ." In consideration of this promise the Sheikh undertook not to levy customs dues in excess of 4 per cent. on goods imported or exported by "the subjects of the aforesaid English Government," save with the approval of that Government.

3. The undertakings given in writing to the Sheikh on the 3rd November, 1914, in return for his co-operation against the Turks, contained an assurance that "Koweit shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection."

(B)—Construction of the Undertakings given to the Sheikh.

4. As will be seen, the engagements entered into by His Majesty's Government with the Sheikh are in rather general terms, and it is perhaps desirable briefly to record the construction placed upon them at various times by His Majesty's Government.

5. In 1901, when there was a Turkish threat to Koweit, the Viceroy was informed (Secretary of State's telegram No. 45 of the 4th December, 1901) that this "appears to constitute a distinct violation of the Sultan's promise" (to respect the *status quo*), "and in these circumstances His Majesty's Government are prepared to support the Sheikh, and will not tolerate an attack by Turkish troops or ships upon Koweit. The Sheikh should not leave Koweit, and should continue to observe his engagement with us." The assurance given is clearly limited by the words "in these circumstances" to this particular case. Moreover, it is not conditional on, and is independent of the Sheikh's observance of his agreement of 1899.

6. On the 21st March, 1902, Lord Lansdowne, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a memorandum on the situation in Koweit, remarked that our obligations toward the Sheikh were "as ill-defined as the boundaries of his principality. We have distinctly announced that he does not enjoy British 'protection'; on the other hand, we once made him a present of £1,000, and promised him our 'good offices,' whatever that may mean. When we made this promise we were, I feel no doubt, thinking of Koweit proper, if there is such a thing, and not of Boobyah or other outskirts over which the Sheikh has rights of one sort or another. . . . We might, it seems to me, explain (1) to the Porte; (2) to the Sheikh; and (3) to the foreign Powers immediately interested the objects of our policy. I should be inclined to say that our engagements to Koweit do not extend beyond the district adjoining or close to the bay of that name, and to endeavour to obtain the adhesion of the Porte and of the Sheikh to our approximate definition of that district. . . ."

7. Later, in 1902, it was reported that Ibn Rashid was making energetic preparation for attacking Ibn Saud, then the Sheikh of Koweit's friend, and the Sheikh was warned not to take any action likely to bring him into difficulties with either Nejd or Turkey. About the same time the Sheikh informed us that Ibn Saud had with him a gun presented by the Turks, and asked for a gift of two or three guns, which it was understood were wanted for Jehara to protect Koweit against land attack. The Viceroy (telegram No. 39 of the 3rd October, 1902) proposed to reply that the Sheikh's request could not be granted, "but that, provided he complied with the injunction conveyed to him in pursuance of your telegram of the 4th December, 1901 (see paragraph 5 above), His Majesty's Government would charge themselves with the defence of Koweit district." The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Foreign Office (Foreign Office letter of the 13th October, 1902), replied (telegram No. 133 of the 14th October, 1902): "I approve your proposed reply about the guns, provided Koweit district is clearly defined as the district adjoining or close to the bay of that name." This assurance similarly admits of being read as an assurance *ad hoc*, and it is relevant that when, in April 1911, enquiry was made by the Secretary of State for India of the Government of India whether the definition in question of Koweit territory had been communicated to the Sheikh, they replied that it

might be assumed that it had, but that it "only referred to our pledge to defend him against Ibn Rashid, who was threatening the immediate neighbourhood of Koweit" (telegram of the 6th April, 1911).

8. The more specific undertakings embodied in the Bunder Shweikh lease of 1907, and quoted in paragraph 2 above, may be regarded as to some extent committing us in respect of "the town of Koweit and its boundaries." The phrase "its boundaries" is, however, very vague, and could perhaps most reasonably be construed as applying to the immediate district around Koweit town. The discussions as to our obligations to the Sheikh which took place in 1911, and which are summarised in paragraphs 9 to 12 below, appear to have turned essentially on the undertakings of 1899.

9. In 1911, in connexion with the Anglo-Turkish negotiations, the question of our obligations was examined in some detail. The Government of India, on being asked, with reference to Lord Lansdowne's memorandum of 1902, to which reference is made in paragraph 6 above, to "define the region to which our obligation extends," and "whether they accepted" general description of boundaries in *Persian Gulf Gazetteer*, p. 1059, &c., replied: "We are of opinion that (1) our obligations extend to the limits of the Sheikh's territory; (2) these limits, to the best of our knowledge, are defined with fair accuracy by *Lorimer*, especially as regards northern portion. . . ."

10. The Secretary of State for India, in the light of the Government of India's views, wrote as follows to the Foreign Office (the 8th April, 1911):—

"Viscount Morley is not aware on what grounds the opinion expressed by the Marquess of Lansdowne in his memorandum of the 21st March, 1902, is based, but he observes that the language used is very tentative, and, so far as he knows, the subject was never pursued along the lines suggested by his Lordship, except in the case of the attack on the immediate neighbourhood of Koweit threatened by Ibn Rashid in the autumn of 1902. It will be seen from the Government of India's telegram of the 6th April that this incident does not affect their opinion that our general obligations extend to the limits of Koweit territory as described in Vol. II, pp. 1059-1061, of *Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf*, copy of which is in your possession. In this Lord Morley concurs; that is to say, he thinks that, in the event of unprovoked aggression by the Turks or by Arab tribes under Turkish control, upon those limits, His Majesty's Government could not abstain from using their 'good offices' in the Sheikh's favour. But the term 'good offices' is a very vague one, which His Majesty's Government are at liberty to interpret at their discretion, and which they would doubtless interpret with more or less strictness, according to the nature and locality of the aggression, and all the circumstances of the case. It would, however, in his Lordship's opinion, be very impolitic to attempt, in dealing with the Sheikh, to whittle down the extent of our obligations, since such a course would fill his mind with suspicions, and could not fail to affect unfavourably our prestige in the Persian Gulf. . . ."

11. The Foreign Office replied, on the 9th May, 1911, that Sir E. Grey concurred "in the view of the Government of India, shared by Viscount Morley, that these obligations extend to the whole territory of the Sheikh, as described in the passage of *Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf* to which your letter refers."

12. In August 1911 the Government of India, after consultation with the Political Resident (Sir P. Cox), recommended that His Majesty's Government should communicate to the Turks a copy of the agreement of 1899, with a note that His Majesty's Government had subsequently informed the Sheikh that, so long as he and his heirs and successors acted up to their obligations under the agreement, we charged ourselves to support them and to protect Koweit against attack by land or sea. The Secretary of State for India, on closer consideration, found himself unable to accept this proposal. India Office letter to the Foreign Office of the 30th October, 1911, remarked:—

"The telegrams of the 4th December, 1901, and the 14th October, 1902, on which the Government of India appear to base the obligation to protect Koweit by land and sea, in the Marquess of Crewe's opinion, clearly refer only to the incidents that occasioned them, and cannot be understood to have given any general undertaking. Nor, in view of the fact that it has since



been decided that our obligations extend to the whole of the Sheikh's territory, as described in *Lorimer's Gazetteer*, would it be safe to pledge ourselves to any specific method of defending them. As was pointed out by Lord Morley in this Office letter of the 8th April last, the term 'good offices' (which, by Colonel Meade's letter of the 23rd January, 1899, we undertook to accord to the Sheikh) is a conveniently vague one, and Lord Crewe is of opinion that it is neither necessary nor safe to go beyond it. The action taken by His Majesty's Government in 1901-02, when men and guns were landed at Koweit to defend it against unprovoked Turkish aggression, will, moreover, have made it plain to the Porte in what way we are prepared to interpret the term if necessity arises.

"His Lordship would therefore suggest that the formula should run: 'As regards No. 1, His Majesty's Government have informed the Sheikh of Koweit that, so long as he and his heirs and successors act up to their obligations under the agreement, His Majesty's Government undertake to support them and accord them their good offices,' with, perhaps, the addition that His Majesty's Government reserve to themselves the right to interpret that term at their discretion."

The Foreign Office (Foreign Office letter dated the 1st November, 1911) accepted the proposed redraft and addition, and a communication in this sense was made to Tevlik Pasha in Sir Edward Grey's letter of the 24th October, 1911.

13. The undertaking given in 1914 that Koweit "shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection," may be regarded as importing a degree of responsibility for the protection of the principality as a whole.

14. On the death of Sheikh Mobarak his eldest son was informed, in March 1916, on his accession, by the Viceroy, that, "so long as you act up to the existing arrangements with the British Government, you may expect the same support as was enjoyed by your father." A similar assurance was given on Sheikh Jabir's death in 1917 to his brother and successor, Sheikh Salim, in March 1917. Sheikh Salim's conduct was unsatisfactory, and it was found necessary to warn him, through the Political Resident, on the 5th July, 1918, that the assurances (which presumably covered the assurance of the 3rd November, 1914) conveyed to him on his accession were conditional on his good behaviour, and that, should acts "contrary to the interests of His Majesty's Government unfortunately be committed in future," he would be held personally responsible.

15. In connexion with the operations against the Akhwan in 1928, the question of the precise extent of the obligations of His Majesty's Government for the defence of Koweit was considered in the India Office, when the view was put forward that consideration of our engagements suggested that, on a strict reading, our liability could be confined to the protection of the town of Koweit, and that we are not called upon to protect Koweit territory as a whole. The history of the 1928 discussion is, however, examined in greater detail in Appendix C, to the conclusions of which attention is invited.

#### CONCLUSION.

16. As will be seen from the correspondence summarised above, (a) we appear consistently to have taken the view that our obligations are conditional on the good behaviour of the Sheikh; (b) secondly, that, subject to this reservation, we are committed to "good offices" in respect of "Koweit," an assurance which has, since 1911, been accepted as extending to the whole territory of the sheikhdom, but which would not commit us to anything further than diplomatic support; (c) thirdly, that we have promised "that the town of Koweit and its boundaries" belong to the heirs of Sheikh Mobarak (while the payment of rent for the Bunder Shweikh site was terminated in 1907, the agreement of 1907 was not abrogated, and the reciprocal pledges embodied in that agreement should apparently still be regarded as binding in so far as they are not affected by other subsequent instruments. We communicated article 9 of the Bunder Shweikh Agreement to Ibn Saud in 1928; and in 1933 the Political Agent, Koweit, and the Political Resident brought to notice the continued existence of the obligations of the Sheikh in regard to customs duties (paragraph 2 above) under article 10 of the agreement); (d) fourthly, that we have undertaken to recognise, and have in fact recognised, Koweit as an independent principality under British

protection. No definition has been given or attempted of the meaning of "British protection" in this connexion; and, while *prima facie* the Sheikh would apparently be justified in claiming that it represented an assurance of effective protection in respect of the whole of his principality, there is some room for discussion as to its precise implications, and it is noteworthy that no appeal appears to have been made under it either by the present Sheikh or by his predecessors.

J. G. LAITHWAITE.

India Office, October 11, 1933.

#### Appendix C.

##### SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.

##### *Question of Liability for the Protection of Koweit against Aggression from Outside, 1928-29.*

Akhwan raids on Koweit had taken place in 1924 and 1925, but on an inconsiderable scale. The Akhwan raids on Iraq by Feisal-al-Dawish and the Mutair tribe at the end of 1927 had, however, more important reactions on the principality. At the request of the Sheikh His Majesty's Government agreed to aerial reconnaissance over his territory; and, with his concurrence, it was later decided to withdraw the restrictions originally imposed by His Majesty's Government on bombing in pursuit of raiders within Koweit territory. An Akhwan raid was successfully dealt with by Koweit forces at El Riqai on the 27th January, 1928, and whilst retiring into Nejd was pursued and successfully attacked by the Royal Air Force on two following days. A further raid occurred late in February, which was not opposed by ground forces, but was again successfully pursued by the Royal Air Force for two days. In view of the possibility of further serious developments, and of the recognised liability of His Majesty's Government under existing engagements for the "protection of Koweit" (a phrase the exact scope of which is open to argument), further defence measures were now taken. A temporary air base (political objections to a permanent station being regarded as conclusive) was established in Koweit: a flight of aeroplanes and a detachment of armoured cars were despatched to the town for its protection: three vessels of the Persian Gulf Squadron (later reduced to one) were stationed off Koweit itself, and a landing party disembarked and remained on shore until the crisis had passed. All action taken was taken with the concurrence of the Sheikh, who was, in addition, allowed to purchase from the Government of India a small supply of machine guns and Lewis guns. After some discussion His Majesty's Government and the Government of India agreed that his Excellency might be allowed to purchase armoured motor cars, on the understanding that they would be used only for defence, and would not cross the borders of Koweit in repelling raids save with the concurrence of the Political Agent. The crisis, however, passed off without incident, and the special forces which had been despatched to Koweit were withdrawn during the late spring. For financial reasons the Sheikh abandoned the idea of purchasing armoured cars.

2. On the 15th August, 1928, the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, in order to provide against all eventualities, asked permission to send car or air reconnaissances into Koweit territory and to establish a defence air base at Koweit in the event of a raid. The India Office remarked (letter of the 22nd August, 1928): "The Secretary of State would see strong objection on political grounds to the use of Koweit territory in connexion with air operations against the Akhwan, by which Koweit was not directly or immediately threatened. Having regard, however, to the treaty liability of His Majesty's Government for the protection of Koweit and to the action taken with the consent of the Sheikh in the early part of this year, he would see no objection to the grant of the authority now requested when Koweit was directly or indirectly menaced, on the understanding that the prior consent of the Sheikh was obtained from the Resident . . . so far as may be practicable, on each specific occasion, and subject to the further restriction that there shall be no question of establishing a permanent base in Koweit territory." As the result of considerable further interdepartmental discussion, the Air Officer Commanding was authorised on the 25th September, at his discretion, to carry out occasional reconnaissances over



Koweit territory, both by air and car. "His Majesty's Government are anxious, however, that—

- (1) These reconnaissances shall be carried out as infrequently and in as unprovocative a manner as possible, and
- (2) That the Sheikh shall be given no ground for supposing that responsibility for the defence of Koweit has been assumed by His Majesty's Government, or that he himself has been relieved of his obligations in this respect. These considerations should be borne in mind by the Air Officer Commanding in acting under the authority now given him." (Colonial Office telegram to Bagdad, No. 306, dated the 25th September, 1928.)

3. Approval was subsequently given in view of a threatened Akhwan raid over the border, to the concentration, subject to the approval of the Sheikh, of armoured cars in Koweit "for protection of Iraqi tribes for so long a period as one month." (Colonial Office telegram to Bagdad, No. 76, dated the 23rd February, 1929.)

4. In April 1929 the question of the policy to be adopted by the Sheikh of Koweit in the event of Nejd tribesmen taking refuge from King Ibn Saud in Koweit territory arose, the air authorities suggested that the Sheikh should be asked to concur in the use, if necessary, of military force, the nature and extent of which should be determined by the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, for the purpose of preventing any such refugees from entering or remaining in any part of Koweit territory. On the 8th May, 1929, the India Office, in a letter to the Colonial Office, remarked: "Viscount Peel gathers that the attitude of the Sheikh is no longer in question and that he has already promised to endeavour to prevent refugees making use of Koweit territory. As regards the question of giving the Sheikh military assistance for this purpose, the Secretary of State remains of his previous opinion that it is undesirable to extend in any way the general liability hitherto accepted by His Majesty's Government for the defence of Koweit territory, if this can at all be avoided. . . . It would, on the whole, be preferable, if possible, to avoid asking the Sheikh to concur in the use of military force, but if . . . such a request is still essential, he is prepared to agree that the Sheikh should be asked to concur. . . ." The other Departments regarded it as essential to make a request in the sense referred to of the Sheikh and the necessary instructions were sent to the High Commissioner on the 11th May.

5. The view held as regards our liability for protection of Koweit during the operations of 1928-29 is perhaps best stated in the India Office letters of the 22nd August, 1928, and the 8th May, 1929, quoted in paragraphs 2 and 4 above. While our precise liability for protection was not investigated in any great detail, the course of action adopted in dealing with threats to Koweit territory appears to have been generally consistent with the construction of our liability suggested by Colonel Fowle in paragraph 10 of Bushire despatch No. 1365-S of the 25th October, 1933.<sup>(1)</sup>

J. G. LAITHWAITE.

India Office, February 6, 1934.

<sup>(1)</sup> [NOTE.—The paragraph referred to runs as follows:—

"The 1914 agreement states that in return for the Sheikh's co-operation against the Turks 'Koweit shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection.' This, unlike the phraseology of the previous agreements, is a most categorical assurance, and the word 'principality' and not 'town' being used, would seem definitely to place the responsibility of protecting the whole of the Koweit Sheikhdom on His Majesty's Government. Personally, I cannot agree with the view quoted in paragraph 15 of the India Office note, that 'on a strict reading our liability could be confined to the protection of the town of Koweit, and that we are not called upon to protect Koweit as a whole.' It is true, as pointed out in the note, paragraph 16 (d), that neither the present Sheikh, nor his predecessors, appear to have appealed under this agreement to His Majesty's Government, but that hardly relieves us from our obligations. This does not imply, of course, that His Majesty's Government's obligations relieve the Sheikh completely of the responsibility of his own defence. The Sheikh should certainly be able to deal with any small raids across his frontiers, and should only look for assistance from His Majesty's Government in the case of more serious incursions. This, in fact, was presumably the attitude taken up after the Akhwan operations of 1928, when the Sheikh was encouraged to purchase half-a-dozen Ford vanettes, Lewis guns, which were mounted in the vanettes, and ammunition, and when some of his men received training from the Royal Air Force as machine-gunners."]

[E 5990/759/25]

No. 43.

Sir John Simon to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 868.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 13, 1933.

FROM your Excellency's despatch No. 753 of the 5th October there appears to be some danger of a serious misunderstanding between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government with regard to the present dispute between King Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen. You have from time to time been sent such items of information received from various sources as appeared to throw light on the origins or details of that dispute. I realise, however, that where the issues are so complicated it may not be easy to construct a complete picture of the position from such fragments. I therefore send you this statement of the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the present Arabian crisis in the hope that, although it may not be possible to meet the wishes of the Italian Government entirely in this matter, you will at any rate have sufficient material from which to give them a full account of the position as it is seen from here.

2. There is one important point in regard to which the views of His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government seem to be particularly at variance, namely the question of Asir. As stated in my telegram No. 314 of the 29th September, I had hoped to avoid further controversy on this subject, but from the Italian *note verbale* of the 21st September, a copy of which was enclosed in Mr. Murray's despatch No. 722 of the 22nd September, and also from the record of a conversation with Signor Guarnaschelli (enclosed in your despatch under reply), it appears that the Italian Government are still anxious to press the point. The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Ibn Saud's gradual absorption of Asir into his dominions has not changed since the date of Mr. Arthur Henderson's despatch No. 892 of the 17th July, 1931; His Majesty's Government consider that as a result of the agreements of 1926 and 1930 Asir has become, both *de facto* and *de jure*, an integral part of Ibn Saud's territories. The Italian Government have never recognised this absorption and it was purely out of deference to their views that His Majesty's Government agreed to postpone a formal expression of their own recognition of Ibn Saud's sovereignty over Asir, although they reserved their right, which they have since exercised, to correspond with the Saudi Arabian Government on matters connected with Asir (including the Farsan Islands). With regard to Signor Guarnaschelli's geographical definition of Asir, it may be remarked that the "coastal belt" to which he refers is what is known as "Tihamat Asir," which, according to the official Saudi account, constitutes the Idrisi's proper dominions, recognised by Ibn Saud as such until the rebellion of 1932, whereas the interior of Asir, known as Asir-as-Surat, which stretches from this coastal belt to the border of Nejran, is claimed by Ibn Saud in his own right as a result, it is believed, of his agreement with the present Idrisi's predecessor in 1919-20.

3. But whatever may be the geographical truth regarding Asir, His Majesty's Government consider the arrangements made by Ibn Saud and the Idrisi in 1926 and 1930 as valid engagements binding upon both parties. Unlike the alleged agreement of 1927 regarding Nejran, the agreements of 1926 and 1930 regarding Asir were recorded in writing and duly published (as shown in Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch No. 131 of the 29th January, 1927, and Mr. Arthur Henderson's despatch No. 192 of the 16th February, 1931). Further, whatever view may be taken of the reasons for the rebellion of the Idrisi in 1932, the fact remains that, in spite of the attempts made by Ibn Saud to effect a settlement by negotiation, the Idrisi conducted an armed revolt against Ibn Saud and may thus be held to have forfeited the privileged position which he previously enjoyed. It is most unlikely that Ibn Saud will ever agree to give up Asir, unless he is obliged by force of arms to do so, and the Italian proposal for the erection of a buffer State between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia could probably be put into effect only—if at all—by the armed expulsion of Ibn Saud from the province. Considerable though the influence may be which the Italian Government believe His Majesty's Government to possess with Ibn Saud, it is certainly not powerful



enough to persuade him to abandon Asir without a struggle, and even to suggest such a course to him might well deal that influence a blow from which it would with difficulty, if ever, recover.

4. Finally, even if the Imam may not actually have attacked Asir (although on certain maps the town of Badr, which was at one time reported to be threatened by Imamic troops, is shown as being well within Asir), he is stated to have laid claim to a large part of that province as recorded, for instance, in paragraph 5 of Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 248 of the 1st August (*Eastern Arabia*), August 16, Section 4). Further, his retention of the Idrisi in the neighbourhood of the Asiri frontier, where he can do the most mischief, is in itself an act of doubtful friendliness, against which Ibn Saud has already protested as mentioned in paragraph 2 (c) (2) of the note of the 5th August from the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Calvert (*Eastern Arabia*), August 24, Section 3).

5. As regards the alleged agreement of 1927 and other frontier arrangements, there is little to be said which has not already been communicated to you by despatch or telegram (in particular my despatches No. 660 of the 10th August and No. 860 of the 10th October and letter of the 3rd October). Further enquiry, both in London and in Jedda, has failed to elicit any more substantial information, but such information as there is tends to show that there was probably an oral arrangement regarding Nejran, which was concluded in 1927 and divided the regions east of Asir between Ibn Saud and the Imam in an uncertain proportion and possibly regulated other sections of their common frontier as well. The Imam himself is said to have appealed to this agreement at least twice (see paragraphs 2 and 3 of the enclosure in my despatch No. 660 of the 10th August). Lastly, there are two points in connexion with Nejran, which are worth noting: one is the arrangement which Ibn Saud is said to have made with the tribesmen early last year, under which they obtained a virtual independence (see my despatch No. 860 of the 10th October); the second bears on the expedition of Seif-al-Islam Ahmed, the Imam's son, in the spring of 1933, which is referred to in paragraph 3 of the Italian *note verbale* of the 21st September. During the earlier part of the Yemeni operations in or near Nejran the Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs maintained to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda that there had been no violation of the frontier at all. But it is possible that this attitude was dictated partly by the hope that the resistance of the tribes concerned to the Yemeni troops might render intervention unnecessary.

6. In point of fact, the only frontier arrangement which is definitely known to have been concluded between Ibn Saud and the Imam is Ibn Saud's decision of 1931 acknowledging the Jebel Arwa to be in the Yemen, contained in the enclosed copy of Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 486 of the 19th December, 1931.<sup>(1)</sup> But in judging the Imam's conduct in the present crisis, His Majesty's Government have attached little importance to any of the accusations of frontier violation made against him. The facts are too confused to permit of any conclusion on this point and His Majesty's Government are not prepared to give any opinion upon it, far less to embark on a controversy over it. And in so far as they believe Ibn Saud, rather than the Imam, to be in the stronger position in the present dispute, they base that view not on any alleged agreements which may have been concluded between these potentates, but on the present behaviour of the two parties concerned.

7. After Asir, the second main point of difference between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government appears to be with regard to Ibn Saud's immediate intentions. These must necessarily be, in the last resort, a matter of speculation, but after considering all the evidence supplied by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that Ibn Saud does not desire to undertake a campaign against the Imam, much less operations on the scale envisaged by Signor Guarnaschelli, since both the financial and the political strain would involve him in grave risk. In particular, it is becoming increasingly difficult to collect the Nejd tribesmen for further warfare in the south. To represent his present military preparations as the deliberate prelude to an attack on the Yemen similar to that launched against the Hejaz in 1924-25, is, therefore, an exaggeration. The most likely interpretation of those preparations is that given in Mr. Calvert's telegram No. 163 of the 7th September, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 775 of the

<sup>(1)</sup> January 15, 1932, Section 1.

12th September, namely, that having failed to secure any but the most evasive replies to his representations to the Imam, Ibn Saud intends to exact a satisfactory answer by supporting his final demand with a threat of force. As indicated in my telegram No. 318 of the 3rd October, the Imam does not yet seem to have responded to Ibn Saud's full statement of his case.

8. This being so, the question arises whether His Majesty's Government can in fact, as the Italian Government suggest, restrain Ibn Saud from his present course by exercising their influence. It may be said at once that the analogy of the treaty between Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah is not applicable here, since it is evident that in the case of that instrument His Majesty's Government were in a position to exert their influence over both parties at once and thus bring about a rapprochement. In the present instance, unless the Imam shows signs of being willing to negotiate, there appears to be little hope that His Majesty's Government will be able to restrain Ibn Saud. They will almost certainly not be able to do so before his preparations are completed, and, in their view, the only moments at which they are likely to be able to make their influence felt at all are either when the Imam definitely offers to settle by negotiation the outstanding differences between himself and Ibn Saud (a move which, according to the present evidence, he has not yet made) or at the actual moment when Ibn Saud's ultimatum has been delivered. At either of these junctures it will be for His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government to intervene with all the persuasion at their command to induce the two rulers to listen to reason and to settle their differences by negotiation. Failing a conciliatory reply from the Imam before Ibn Saud's military preparations are complete, there appears to be no prospect of an earlier solution of the crisis, and His Majesty's Government feel that their intervention would be entirely ineffective, unless they were prepared in their turn to threaten Ibn Saud with forcible action, if he did not come to terms with the Imam—a course which appears to them both unwise in itself and unjustified by the facts of the position as they see them.

9. I realise that the attitude outlined above affords little material for a reassuring answer to the representations of the Italian Government. At bottom, this is so because His Majesty's Government feel unable to accept either the Italian thesis regarding Asir or the Italian Government's interpretation of Ibn Saud's intentions or their reluctance to criticise the Imam's conduct in this dispute. I hope that Mr. Jebb's reference in his conversation on the 4th October with Signor Guarnaschelli to the 1931 correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government regarding the status of Asir will have given sufficient indication of the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to that question to enable you to avoid further discussion of that point. If, however, your Excellency feels that it is necessary to repeat those views, the account of them given in this despatch will assist you in giving a full definition of them. I would prefer, however, that apart from a brief reference to the 1931 correspondence, you should base your reply to the Italian Government on the considerations set out in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, and in particular on the view taken by His Majesty's Government of the intentions of Ibn Saud and the Imam's evasive conduct, and also regarding the appropriate moment for intervention. You should assure the Italian Government that His Majesty's Government are no less anxious than they to avert a war between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen; but that in view of the respective characters of the two disputants and their present conduct of the dispute, it appears to His Majesty's Government unlikely that their intervention would, at present, have any effect. They are, however, willing to exert to the full whatever influence they possess either when the present deadlock in the telegraphic correspondence between the two rulers is resolved or at latest before the actual outbreak of hostilities, and they feel confident that they may count upon the continued co-operation of the Italian Government when the moment arrives for this intervention.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I am, &c.  
JOHN SIMON.



[E 6328/902/25]

No. 44.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 23.)*

(No. 304. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 2, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for September 1933.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 44.

JEDDA REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1933.

## I.—Internal Affairs.

193. During the month Ibn Saud remained in Nejd and Amir Feisal at Taif. The Amir of Jedda, Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Muammar (see paragraph 167), was absent the whole month, as was Fuad Bey Hamza, whose return from abroad, however, is predicted for the first week in October. The Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, carried on in the latter's absence as intermediary between the Legation and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and visited Jedda twice during September (see paragraphs 195 and 196).

194. Dr. Moin-ud-Din (see paragraph 168) left for India on the 13th by the steamship *Jehangir*. He proposes, whilst in Hyderabad, to buy a further fifty looms and a quantity of Rangoon teak for spindles for his textile project at Medina, and hopes to be able to stimulate interest in, raise funds and arrange a sales organisation in Hyderabad for the "ihrams," &c., produced. It would appear that his institution in its present stages is primarily instructional and is intended to promote home industry.

195. As far as can be gathered, the situation in Asir has changed only in regard to the concentration of Saudi military forces in the province against the Yemen. This has proceeded steadily throughout the month. Reports of a conflict at Salla in the Tihamat Asir between Saudi and Yemeni troops, which appeared in the Egyptian press as emanating from Aden, and which were repeated in the *Times*, were contradicted by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman in conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 29th. He admitted that a minor disturbance had occurred some six weeks ago when Saudi troops were used against a small tribe, whose name he professed to have forgotten, inhabiting a village immediately south of Jizan, who had refused to pay their taxes. They had been suitably dealt with and their leaders thrown into prison at Jizan. The general situation will be further treated below in connexion with relations with the Yemen (see paragraph 196).

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

196. The month opened with relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (see paragraphs 177-9) hardening and with the promise of hostilities in the air. On the 7th, the Minister of Finance, at a meeting with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, declared the situation remained substantially unchanged. His personal opinion was that the Imam would be allowed to gang his ain gait until Saudi military dispositions were complete, when he would be confronted with an ultimatum. On the 11th, over 700 troops (mainly tribesmen) were embarked on the steamship *Jehangir* for Jizan, and a further 200 left by dhow on the 18th and succeeding days, although the latter were, according to Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, replacements only. Quantities of stores were both shipped and sent overland by motor transport during the month. Amir Feisal-bin-Saud, nephew of the King, was appointed Commander-in-chief for the present, with headquarters at Abha, but might be superseded by the King's eldest son, Amir Saud, should it become

necessary. On the 29th Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman again informed Mr. Calvert that the situation remained much the same. Correspondence between the two rulers had ceased with a curt and platitudinous acknowledgment by the Imam Yahya of Ibn Saud's telegraphic exposition of his demands. There was no cessation, however, of hostilities in Najran between local tribes and Imamie troops. The Beni Yam had been reinforced by certain kindred tribal elements from the Wadi Dawasir, and were now gradually getting the upper hand and were compelling the Zeidis to withdraw. The month has, therefore, seen no improvement, and unless the efforts of distinguished Moslem leaders abroad, who are reported to be offering to mediate, are unexpectedly successful, the prospects are not such as to encourage much optimism.

197. Hamad Suleiman, brother of the Minister of Finance, and Khalid-bin-Qarqani, members of the Saudi delegation to Sana, were due to arrive in Jedda from Jizan at the end of September.

198 (paragraph 362 of 1932). The question of transit dues on goods passing through Bahrein for the mainland of Saudi Arabia was carried a step further when His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, on the instructions of His Majesty's Government, informed the Saudi Arab Government on the 9th September that, in view of Saudi unwillingness to accept a proposal to hold a conference on the matter, the Government of Bahrein could see no alternative but to terminate, as from that date, the customs arrangement of 1920 with Ibn Saud. It was still considered that the proposal to hold a conference offered the best prospects of arriving at a friendly settlement.

199. Informal communications, chiefly through Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, have passed between Mr. Calvert and Amir Feisal during the month regarding the exchange of ratifications of the Transjordan-Saudi Treaty, signed at Jerusalem on the 27th July last (see paragraph 145). The Saudi Arab Government are inclined to insist on the exchange taking place at Jedda, but are awaiting the return of Fuad Bey Hamza before taking up a final attitude, in view of His Majesty's Government's desire to see the exchange take place at Amman.

200. Telegrams were received on the 5th and 6th from Transjordan reporting the presence of a Saudi military post at Hazim, on the Transjordan side of the frontier with Saudi Arabia. They were reported to be interfering with passers-by and making use of the wells. Urgent representations were made to the Saudi Arab Government, who replied that, pending a demarcation of the frontier, they considered that Hazim lay exactly on the frontier line. A subsequent telegram from Transjordan announced the withdrawal of the Saudi military post by several miles into what was probably Saudi territory.

201. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 15th announced that, upon the death of King Feisal, telegrams of condolence were sent by Ibn Saud, Amir Saud and Amir Feisal to King Ghazi and Rashid Ali, Prime Minister of Iraq, respectively, and by Ibn Saud to Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. Suitable replies were in each case received.

202. The same issue of the *Umm-al-Qura* reported the visit of the Amir Abdullah-bin-Qasim-bin-Thani of Qatar to Riyadh. The visit is represented to have been a friendly one, undertaken with the object of congratulating Amir Saud on his proclamation as successor to the throne, and the Amir is stated to have been hospitably met and entertained by Ibn Saud and his family.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

203. Anglo-Saudi relations continue friendly. Otherwise there is little of interest to note. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires has during the month been endeavouring to obtain from the Saudi Government information on the situation with the Yemen. He appears to have had little success so far, and on the 21st he suggested to Mr. Calvert, as from himself, that the Corps diplomatique should make a joint *démarche*. Mr. Calvert was unable to show any enthusiasm, and Signor Tonci admitted he had not succeeded with the doyen, the Russian Minister. Jelal Bey, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, who returned from leave early in September, was understood to be sympathetic, but inclined to dissociate himself from any joint representation, preferring to take his own line. Whether or no this move had official Italian inspiration, it was a complete failure.



204. Signor de Peppo, the Italian Minister, is not returning to Jedda, having received an appointment in connexion with the League of Nations. His successor is not yet known.

205. (Reference paragraph 306 of last year.) Dr. Mahmud Hamdi Bey Hammuda, Director-General of Health, is to represent Saudi Arabia at the forthcoming meeting of the International Health Office at Paris on the 18th October, 1933. Dr. Mahmud Bey, who also attended the meeting held last year, left for France on the 22nd September.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

206. (Reference paragraph 170.) Mr. K. S. Twitchell left for the Hasa Coast on the 1st September.

207. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves in September was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: None.

Took refuge in September: Four males, one female.

Manumitted in September and repatriated: Four males, one female.

Locally manumitted: None.

On hand at the end of the month: None.

[E 6329/759/25]

No. 45.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 23.)*

(No. 305.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 3, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 295 of the 19th September last, regarding the strained relations at present existing between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to inform you that, as reported in my telegrams Nos. 173 and 176 of the 25th and 29th September respectively, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman described the general situation as unchanged.

2. The exchange of telegrams which for some time encouraged the hope that an amicable settlement would be the ultimate issue of present differences, has unfortunately been interrupted, and no further correspondence has taken place, if the Minister of Finance is to be believed, since the Imam Yahya's unsatisfactory reply, to which I referred in my despatch No. 290 of the 12th September. In consequence, Saudi preparations for a settlement by force of arms are being energetically pushed forward, and the Minister of Finance himself is actively engaged in the despatch of men and material to the south. His statement that Amir Feisal bin Sa'ad had been appointed commander-in-chief, with his headquarters at Abha, I have already reported, and to this he added, in reply to my question, that if later developments made it necessary Amir Saud would himself supersede his cousin in the command. Indeed, I learn from a source usually fairly well-informed, that Amir Saud has already left Riyadh in the direction of Asir, but has not unfurled his standard as such a proceeding would be tantamount to a declaration of war. The same source, although unaware of the appointment of Amir Feisal bin Sa'ad, mentioned that three important personages, viz., Ibn Jiluwi, Feisal-bin-Lawey and the Amir Muhammad, brother of the King, had all been given a command in Asir.

3. There are many minor indications of widespread activity. A number of tribal leaders recently arrived in Jedda by Khedivial mail steamer from Yanbu for Asir, and recruiting in those northern littoral districts is reported to be active. Ibn Saud, it is further stated, has pressed into service and drafted to Najran all available camels in Nejd, including even those belonging to the Royal family.

4. During Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's call on me on the 29th September, I took the opportunity to enquire concerning the report, which had appeared in the Egyptian press, and which was stated to have emanated from Aden, that a clash had recently occurred at Salla (a place I have been unable to identify, unless it be Santa) in the Tihamat Asir between Saudi and Yemeni forces. He professed to know of no such happening and said the report was probably due to an incident,

now more than six weeks old, when a force of some 300 Saudi soldiers was employed to exact taxes from a small but recalcitrant tribe inhabiting a village, whose name he had forgotten, immediately south of Jizan. The tribe had been brought to order and its tribal chiefs were now in prison at Jizan.

5. He then volunteered the information that fighting was still going on in Najran between the tribes and the Zeidi forces, and that as the former had been reinforced by certain tribal elements from the Wadi Dawasir, they were now getting the upper hand. The Imamic forces were withdrawing, not rapidly it was true, as to abandon Najran would be to admit defeat, but the district was being steadily cleared. At my remark that the Dawasir tribe is related by blood ties to the Beni Yam of Najran, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman stated that the Yam (as he called them), really consisted of elements of Yam proper, Dawasir and Mirri, a congerie inhabiting a fairly wide area.

6. His last reference to this subject was to reiterate his personal belief, to which as you are aware he has previously given utterance, that Ibn Saud would allow events to take their course until he was militarily ready to enforce upon the Imam his demands. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman added that he was also of the opinion that, war or no war, Ibn Saud would maintain his army in Asir in readiness until he obtained complete satisfaction. This, it might be supposed, would involve a heavy drain on the Saudi exchequer, but the Minister of Finance made the statement with some emphasis.

7. The dangers in the situation, therefore, have not diminished. It would be unwise to venture a forecast, but it is to be hoped that the offers of mediation and appeals to avoid a fratricidal war, which, it is reported, have been made by a number of leading Arab personages in different countries, including Prince Omar Toussoun of Egypt, will avail to bring about a peaceful settlement.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, the Acting High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, the Acting Chief Commissioner at Aden, and to the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6560/759/25]

No. 46.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 30.)*

(No. 184.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, October 30, 1933.

YOUR telegram No. 128.

I saw Minister of Finance this morning and made oral representations which he promised to convey to the King. Minister asked whether initiative had come from Italian Government or His Majesty's Government. I replied both Governments were equally concerned to preserve peace, and that, as he was aware, His Majesty's Government had made representations on several previous occasions to Ibn Saud, whilst Italian Government had similarly exerted themselves with the Imam.

He expressed his personal opinion, which he thought Ibn Saud would endorse, that Imam should show conciliatory spirit by evacuating Najran and by handing over Idriisi.

He drew attention to Imam's treatment of more than one of Saudi delegations in the past, contrasted Imam's aggressive with Ibn Saud's defensive attitude and asked what guarantee had the King that Imam would abandon that attitude if Saudi troops were withdrawn. Would Italian Government give such a guarantee?

Minister expressed appreciation of His Majesty's Government's solicitude. If, however, the strength of his feelings on this subject is a measure of those of the King I can anticipate only a very moderate effect from representations at present juncture.



[E 6669/759/25]

No. 47.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 2.)*

(No. 186.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, November 2, 1933.

MY telegram No. 184.

Minister of Finance called on me this morning with Ibn Saud's reply, contained in lengthy telegram, which he read over to me. Translation is being sent by bag. Summary is as follows:—

The King expressed his thanks to His Majesty's Government for advice, which he considered showed goodwill towards himself and his country. He had kept His Majesty's Government informed of all developments in the situation and they were aware of his desire for peace. They might be assured that had his efforts to this end been successful he would not have taken the military measures that he now had, particularly in view of the expense involved.

His overtures of peace had failed and Imam's intentions were evil. From the foreign press the King gathered that Imam claims were to Asir, Tihama and Najran, and this was substantiated by latter's occupation of Najran and advance on Bedr, concerning which the King is unable to remain silent. The Imam's activities had also been directed against Asir and Tihama, and had it not been for the presence of Saudi forces insurrections would have occurred in those parts. Imam was, moreover, circulating news that he was being encouraged by Italian Government and had been promised assistance by them in the event of trouble.

Yemeni policy, in short, was first to weaken Ibn Saud by fomenting internal dissension and by involving him in heavy financial expenditure, then to launch the attack. The King is therefore bound to take defensive measures.

Affairs had now come to such a pass that a settlement was necessary and should be such that the Imam would be left no excuse for causing difficulties in the future. The King summarised his claims as follows:—

1. Idrisi to be handed over, and Imam to cease intrigue and disturbing peace.
2. Najran to be evacuated; question of frontier and damage suffered to be liquidated subsequently.
3. The present frontiers to be established (Minister of Finance himself explained by a treaty or exchange of notes).
4. "Establishment" of the present treaty in force between the two countries.

The King concluded by stating his desire to preserve peace was well known; he would refrain from aggression, but would be vigilant in his own defence. If his demands were accepted, God be praised; if not he would have to put an end to this deplorable state of affairs.

[E 6768/759/25]

No. 48.

*Sir E. Drummond to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 6.)*

(No. 51. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Rome, November 2, 1933.

MY telegram No. 309.

During course of conversation on 31st October Signor Suvich reverted to the suggestion of a meeting of experts to discuss the whole position in Arabia (*cf.* last sentence of Sir R. Graham's despatch No. 801 of 20th October), and asked that Mr. Murray should speak to Signor Buti on the subject.

Mr. Murray saw Signor Buti to-day. Signor Guarnaschelli was also present. Signor Buti argued at great length that there was discrepancy between language used in Embassy note of 24th July, 1931 (*cf.* Sir R. Graham's despatch No. 561 of that date), and that of *note verbale* of 20th October last enclosed in Sir R. Graham's despatch No. 801 of the same date. He contrasted phrase in latter note: "His Majesty's Government regard the question of the sovereignty of Asir as determined by their entry in 1931 into correspondence with the Hejazi

Government, &c.," with the phrase in the former note: "They remain of the opinion that, in consequence of the recent agreement between King Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, Asir has *de facto* and *de jure* become an integral part of King Ibn Saud's dominions." Mr. Murray pointed out that 1931 note was reply to specific request of Italian Government that His Majesty's Government should refrain from any formal and direct expression of their recognition of King Ibn Saud's sovereignty over Asir. Note of 20th October last, on the other hand, represented a general statement of the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the political situation in Arabia in reply to a similar statement of their views which the Italian Government had been good enough to make. The views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the position of Asir in international law were the same in 1933 as they were in 1931. Signor Buti tried repeatedly to elicit some admission that His Majesty's Government might be induced to modify their attitude in this respect, but he was given no encouragement to think that there was any chance of such a development.

He finally suggested that the whole situation in Arabia should be discussed "on the basis of the 1927 conversations" by representatives of His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government. The latter would be represented by Signor Buti himself on this occasion and Signor Gasparini as in 1927, and he assumed that if they concurred in the proposal His Majesty's Government would be represented by myself and by an expert from the Foreign Office. Mr. Murray enquired when Signor Buti suggested that the conversations should take place, to which he replied that Italian Government would like them, if possible, to begin not later than the middle of the present month, by when I hope to have presented my letters of credence.

Finally, reverting to instructions to Jedda contained in your telegram No. 343 (*cf.* my telegram No. 309), Signor Buti said that Italian Government felt that danger of hostilities would be greatly reduced if Ibn Saud could be induced to refrain from the despatch of the ultimatum. It seemed to him that counsels of moderation and restraint would be much less effective after despatch of the ultimatum had taken place.

I should be grateful if you would inform me whether the Italian proposal for discussion of Arabian situation is acceptable to His Majesty's Government, and, if so, whether date proposed would be convenient and name of expert who, in this case, would be sent to Rome to participate in the discussions.

[E 6772/759/25]

No. 49.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 7.)*

(No. 322.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 24, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 305 of the 3rd October, regarding the strained relations at present existing between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to inform you that upon receipt of the Acting Chief Commissioner at Aden's telegram of the 18th October to the Colonial Office, reporting renewed fighting in Najran and the capture of Badr by Zeidi forces, I at once sought an interview with Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who happened to be on a visit to Jedda, in order to obtain what further information on the situation he would be willing to impart. I took the step of approaching the Minister of Finance, notwithstanding the return of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs from abroad, owing to the latter's absence in Riyadh, whence he was not expected to return for at least ten days and in view of the necessity as it seemed to me, of bringing my information, from Saudi sources, up to date as early as possible. I saw Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman on the 19th October, and reported to you the gist of his remarks in my telegram No. 179 of the same date.

2. I opened the conversation by remarking that to judge from the exiguous information which had reached Jedda for some two or three weeks past, there would appear to have been a lull in hostilities on the southern frontiers of Asir, but more recently I had received reports which went to show that there was now a renewal of activity, particularly in Najran. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman at first was inclined to repeat what has recently become rather a stock phrase of his,



that the situation remained unchanged and that no further reply had been received from the Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud's last telegrams. He, however, soon became more communicative and admitted that heavy fighting had recently taken place between the Beni Yam and Imamic forces in Najran, whither the Imam's eldest son, Saif-ul-Islam Ahmad, had returned to take command. He confirmed that Badr, a township which for so long has been on the point of falling into the hands of the Imam, had at last fallen, but he implied that this had occurred not so much as a result of fighting but through the local sub-tribe of the Beni Yam, always an independent element in the tribe, throwing its lot in with the forces of the Imam. The place had been "occupied."

3. I next enquired whether Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman himself considered that this renewal of local hostilities signified that Yemeni preparations for more general operations were being pushed forward. He replied that the Imam was, in reality, short of men as he was unable to count on the tribesmen "press-ganged" from the districts his forces had occupied, and that Zeidi troops were few in number. He added that there was now scarcely a Saudi soldier left in Nejd, they were all either in Asir or on their way there, and that within one week he anticipated that Saudi military preparations would be complete. His own personal view was that the Imam Yahya would remain unyielding to the demands that Ibn Saud would soon be pressing upon him and that war was inevitable. "Before ten days were up we should see what we should see," and the first thrust of the Saudi army against the Yemen would be through Najran.

4. He professed to be glad to be able to pass on the information to me, the Saudi Arab Government entertaining such exceptionally friendly sentiments for the British Government and so forth. He informed me that other foreign representatives in Jedda had recently requested information on the situation with the Yemen and had been refused. This I took to be a reference to the Italians here, as Signor Tonci some weeks ago informed me he had made a verbal request of this nature.

5. The low estimate entertained by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman of the resources of the Imam Yahya is not borne out by what appears to be the opinion of certain of my foreign colleagues here. From conversations with the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires and the Egyptian consul, I gather they consider that Ibn Saud has a formidable task in front of him if he is to maintain his position in Asir. They state that the Imam, although himself less intelligent than his rival, has not only greater financial resources, but has better trained and equipped soldiers who are at home in the mountainous country of Asir, where Ibn Saud's bedouin are at a disadvantage. I do not consider either of my colleagues is particularly well-informed, but their views are perhaps worth a mention.

6. On the 20th October the *Umm-al-Qura* appeared containing an official communiqué, a copy of which I enclose herewith,<sup>(1)</sup> issued by the Press Department, Mecca, a brief summary of which was telegraphed to you on the 21st October. It was accompanied by a very lengthy leading article, of which I enclose a résumé, which is in the form of a reply to a letter addressed by the Imam Yahya to Tahsin-al-Faqir and published in the newspaper *Falestin* of the 29th September last. I have been able to obtain a copy of the article containing the Imam's letter and enclose a translation herewith.<sup>(2)</sup> These articles reveal little of fresh interest; they cover much old ground, protest each in turn the desire of their respective parties for peace and friendship, but bring the prospect of an amicable settlement not a whit nearer. There would indeed appear now but slender hopes for a peaceful solution, and Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's prophecy that a clash will occur within a few days seems to destroy the half-formed expectation that the situation might be allowed to remain for the present as one of stalemate.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's Ambassador, Rome; His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, Jerusalem; the Acting High Commissioner for Egypt, Cairo; the Acting Chief Commissioner, Aden; and to the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 6861/759/25]

No. 50.

Sir E. Drummond to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 11).

(No. 854.)

Sir,

Rome, November 8, 1933.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 321 of to-day's date regarding the situation in Asir, I have the honour to inform you that I made the communication to the Italian Government based on your telegram No. 352 in the form of a *note verbale*, with the exception of the second half of the last sentence of paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference, the gist of which was conveyed to the head of the African Department verbally.

2. Signor Guarnaschelli said at once that if this last information was a reference to recent importations of Italian arms into the Yemen, he would not deny that shipments had taken place. The Imam had entered into negotiations for the purchase of arms with an Italian firm, and in view of the fact that Ibn Saud was arming heavily, the Italian Government had not thought that they could stand in his way. But they were not a party to the transaction. Their position was exactly the same as that of the British Government *vis-à-vis* the British firms from whom Ibn Saud had bought arms and the firm of Besse and Co. who had conveyed them to Asir.

3. The member of my staff who interviewed Signor Guarnaschelli said that as a matter of fact no rumours had reached him of recent acquisitions of Italian arms by the Imam, nor did he know whether Ibn Saud had purchased any British arms. He thanked Signor Guarnaschelli, however, for the information he had volunteered.

4. From subsequent conversation it was evident that the Italian Government were inclined to be comforted by the latest communication of His Majesty's Government, and to read into it some prospect that Ibn Saud had abandoned, at any rate for the moment, his intention of sending in an ultimatum. The member of my staff accordingly, in view of recent despatches and telegrams from Jedda, thought it best to sound a note of caution, and to suggest that the danger of the despatch of an ultimatum was by no means averted. It depended to a considerable extent on the behaviour of the Imam, who, Signor Guarnaschelli would observe, had just attacked Badr. Signor Guarnaschelli replied that he would, of course, get in touch with the Imam (owing to the changing of the Italian doctor at Sanaa this would take about four days) and again impress on him the desirability of resuming negotiations. The essential object was to get these started again. Once they were started, it was perhaps legitimate to hope that some definite agreement by consent might be reached.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

P. NICHOLS.

[E 6929/222/91]

No. 51.

Sir John Simon to Sir E. Drummond (Rome).

(No. 368.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 15, 1933.

SITUATION on frontier between Aden Protectorate and the Yemen has long been causing His Majesty's Government increasing anxiety. Negotiations have been in progress for several years with the Imam for a treaty of friendship, main object of which would be to settle frontier and eliminate this constant source of friction.

2. Last April His Majesty's Government sent to the Imam a draft treaty, and in July the Imam replied that he was prepared to agree to it in principle, subject to certain minor modifications. Matter was discussed here orally with Resident at Aden this summer, and it was decided that Imam's letter of July offered sufficient basis of agreement on main question to justify Resident, on return to his post, proceeding to Sanaa to endeavour to conclude treaty. In accordance with this decision, Resident is about to address to Imam communica-



tion to the effect that he is prepared to proceed to Sanaa to conclude treaty whenever Imam will receive him.

3. Main object of treaty being to regulate relations on Protectorate frontier, question has always been dealt with independently of general political situation in South-West Arabia, and His Majesty's Government do not consider that recent developments between Imam and Ibn Saud need modify the earlier decision that Colonel Reilly should proceed to Sanaa.

4. Imam is still in occupation of small but important area in north-west region of Protectorate belonging to Audhali tribe, with whom His Majesty's Government are in special treaty relations, and it is largely with a view to securing his early evacuation of this territory that His Majesty's Government are anxious to secure conclusion of treaty in near future.

5. Although Resident is sending letter to Imam immediately, he will have to await Imam's reply, and, in view of difficulties of communication, he is not likely to be able to reach Sanaa for four or five weeks.

6. You should immediately inform Italian Government of the above, lest they should obtain false impression from possible local reports. You should emphasise importance which His Majesty's Government attach to regularising situation on frontier and avoiding risk of repetition of incidents such as recent incursion into Subeihi territory, necessitating, as it did, issue of ultimatum to Imam and possibility of air action.

7. You should add that, as it is the common object both of His Majesty's Government and of the Italian Government to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between the Imam and Ibn Saud, Colonel Reilly will take advantage of his presence at Sanaa to use his best efforts to achieve this object.

(Repeated to Aden, No. 63.)

[E 6929/222/91]

No. 52.

*Sir John Simon to Mr. Calvert (Jedda).*

(No. 137.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, November 15, 1933.*

AS you are aware, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have long been negotiating with the Imam of the Yemen for the conclusion of a general treaty of friendship, the main object of which would be to regularise the position on the frontier of the Aden Protectorate, secure the evacuation by the Imam of the Protectorate territory still in his occupation, and reduce the risk of further frontier incidents and incursions by the Imam into the Protectorate, which have on previous occasions made it necessary for His Majesty's Government to threaten to take air action against him.

2. As a result of long negotiations, His Majesty's Government informed Imam last April of the terms which they would agree to for the conclusion of such a treaty, and in July the Imam replied that he was prepared to accept these terms subject to certain minor modifications. The matter was discussed orally with the Resident at Aden while on leave, and it was decided that he should be authorised to continue negotiations with the Imam, on above basis, and to visit Sanaa for this purpose.

3. Colonel Reilly has accordingly now been authorised to inform the Imam that he will be ready to proceed to Sanaa as soon as the Imam can receive him in order to endeavour to conclude treaty. The Resident's visit cannot, however, take place for four or five weeks, as he must await the Imam's reply, and communications are slow and difficult.

4. Decision of His Majesty's Government to authorise the Resident to proceed to Sanaa is thus entirely independent of recent political developments in Arabia, and it is important to emphasise that the sole objects of His Majesty's Government in continuing these negotiations with the Imam are to settle the frontier question, to secure the evacuation of the Protectorate territory still in Yemeni occupation, and ensure the immunity of the Protectorate in future from further encroachments.

5. Please inform Saudi Government immediately of the above, preferably in semi-official letter to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, explaining that this step

will in no way affect the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Saudi Government or involve any weakening of their friendly dispositions. On the contrary, they trust that by establishing this contact they may be able to influence Imam with a view to inducing him to adopt a more peaceful and conciliatory attitude towards Ibn Saud, if direct negotiations between the two rulers have by that time not already brought about a *détente*.

[E 6768/759/25]

No. 53.

*Sir John Simon to Sir E. Drummond (Rome).*

(No. 375.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, November 17, 1933.*

YOUR telegram No. 51, Saving, of 2nd November: Proposed conversations with Italian Government regarding Arabian affairs.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom appreciate the desire of Italian Government to eliminate all potential sources of friction between them, and to co-operate in securing re-establishment of peaceful relations between local rulers, in South-West Arabia. They therefore welcome Italian Government's initiative and will be glad to co-operate to the best of their ability.

2. It is, however, not clear from suggestion in your telegram what procedure Italian Government contemplate. In view of difficulties of local situation, it would be helpful to know in advance more precisely proposals and, if possible, programme which Italian Government have in mind. I feel bound to make it clear at once that His Majesty's Government are unable to depart from previous attitude in regard to Ibn Saud's sovereignty over Asir proper, *i.e.*, over that area, at least, over which the Idrisi held sovereignty at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Mecca of 1926. They will be glad to state legal grounds on which they base this attitude if the Italian Government so desire. His Majesty's Government assume that there is no question of any proposal to modify the conclusions of the Rome conversations of 1927, which must still, in their view, form the basis of Anglo-Italian relations in Arabian and Red Sea matters.

3. Provided these points are clearly understood, I shall be glad to send a Foreign Office representative to Rome to take part in the proposed discussions as soon as possible; but, owing to the necessity for collecting the necessary material and to extreme pressure of work in the department concerned (already depleted owing to the discussions at Geneva on the Assyrian question), it will be difficult for him to arrive in Rome before the first week in December.

[E 7103/222/91]

No. 54.

*Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister to the Resident at Aden.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, November 20.)*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Downing Street, November 20, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my secret despatch of the 11th September, and to inform you that His Majesty's Government have now considered the various modifications and amendments which the Imam has proposed in the draft treaty. Mr. Champion commented upon these in his secret despatch No. 162 of the 12th July.

2. I now enclose a memorandum embodying the conclusions of His Majesty's Government upon these various modifications and amendments. You should be guided by the comments made in this memorandum during the forthcoming negotiations. It will be observed that in a number of instances His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the Imam's amendments, and that in others, though His Majesty's Government would prefer their own wording, you are given discretion to accept the Imam's amendments, if necessary. In certain instances, however, His Majesty's Government must insist upon the adoption of their own wording; the memorandum makes clear those instances in which this course must be followed.



In particular, I desire to draw your attention to the fact that the Imam's proposal for a secret appendix to the treaty is wholly unacceptable.

3. I understand that you anticipate that, if you succeed in concluding a treaty with the Imam, the latter is very likely to enquire what facilities His Majesty's Government are prepared to grant to him for the purchase of arms from British sources, and you have asked that you should receive instructions on this point.

4. In this connexion it should in the first place be made clear that there is a basic difference between the grant of "special facilities" for the purchase of arms, &c., in this country, and the proposal that the existing embargo on the export to the Imam of arms purchased from private sources in this country should be removed. The question of the grant of special facilities is ultimately a financial one, since the only special facilities which would be of any practical use to the Imam would be either the supply of arms from Government stocks at a reduced price, or the supply of arms on special terms of long credit, &c., or free of charge. It would be quite impossible for His Majesty's Government, in existing circumstances, to consider the grant of such facilities. Moreover, as you are no doubt aware, King Ibn Saud recently applied to His Majesty's Government for similar special facilities for the purchase of arms, &c., and, after careful consideration, His Majesty's Government were obliged to refuse his request. It would obviously be impossible, for political reasons, to grant to the Imam facilities which have already been refused to Ibn Saud.

As regards the removal of the embargo, however, the position is quite different. As you are aware, the embargo on the export from this country to the Yemen of arms purchased from private sources was imposed solely as a result of the strained relations existing between His Majesty's Government and the Imam, since it would obviously have been undesirable that arms of British manufacture should have been exported to a ruler by whom they might subsequently have been used against British forces. When the question of the possible removal of this embargo was discussed in 1928, it was agreed that, if a treaty were concluded with the Imam, the reasons which had led to the imposition of the embargo would no longer apply, and that it would therefore be only logical that the embargo should be removed. It was accordingly agreed that the British negotiators should be authorised to inform the Imam that on the conclusion of the treaty he would be free to import arms, &c., from this country, subject to the provisions of the Arms Traffic Convention (although that convention is not actually in force), *i.e.*, for the use of his Government; and it was proposed that this communication should be embodied in an exchange of notes to be concluded simultaneously with the treaty, on the analogy of the notes exchanged with Ibn Saud at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Jeddah. A copy of Command Paper 2951, which contains the text of the notes exchanged with Ibn Saud, is enclosed.<sup>(1)</sup>

This conclusion does not appear at any time to have been reconsidered, and may therefore still be regarded as applicable to the present case.

On the other hand, a somewhat new element has been introduced into the situation by the acute conflict which has now developed between the Imam and King Ibn Saud. An outbreak of hostilities between these two rulers may affect the policy of His Majesty's Government on the whole question of the export of arms to Arabia. As you are aware, His Majesty's Government are committed by their undertakings to the Italian Government, in virtue of the Rome conversations of 1927, to a policy of neutrality and impartiality as between Ibn Saud and the Imam. It is conceivable that the situation might so develop as to render it necessary for His Majesty's Government to consider the imposition of a new embargo against the export of arms to either of the two contending parties, and, although this contingency at present seems improbable, it may be necessary to bear it in mind in giving the Imam any undertaking regarding the removal of the embargo which is at present in force.

In these circumstances, I consider that at the present stage it will be preferable to inform the Imam that, if a satisfactory treaty is concluded, and provided that no new and unexpected political development in Arabia renders it necessary for His Majesty's Government to reconsider their general policy regarding the export from this country of arms of private manufacture, the Imam will, after the conclusion of the treaty, be in the same position as regards the

<sup>(1)</sup> Printed separately: see Cmd. Paper 2951.

purchase of arms, &c., from private sources in this country as any other independent Arab ruler.

At the same time there would be no objection to your giving the Imam an undertaking, on the lines agreed upon in 1928, that His Majesty's Government, subject always to their international obligations, will be prepared, after the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty, to render to the Imam such assistance in the selection of personnel or equipment or requirements for economic projects as he may require.

5. You have asked for guidance as to the attitude which you should adopt if the Imam raises the question of the Red Sea Islands. The position in regard to these islands is as stated in paragraph 6 of your letter to the Imam of the 11th April, 1933. You would not yourself, of course, raise the matter with the Imam, but if the Imam himself refers to this question, you may, while refusing to discuss the merits of the case, say that you will report to His Majesty's Government any observations which the Imam may make.

6. As India is also to be a party to the treaty, two full powers from His Majesty the King will be required, one to enable you to sign for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the other to enable you to sign for India. These full powers were sent to you in my despatch, secret (2), of the 23rd October.

7. In connexion with the remarks in the memorandum on article 3 of the draft treaty, I enclose, for convenience of reference, a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the 7th March.<sup>(2)</sup> These minutes should on no account be taken outside a British possession.

8. If there are any points upon which you wish for further guidance or instructions either before you leave Aden or during the course of the negotiations, you will, no doubt, consult me by telegraph.

I have, &c.

P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 54.

#### *Memorandum.*

HIS Majesty's Government have considered the amendments of the draft treaty proposed by the Imam of the Yemen in his letter to the Resident of the 20th June, 1933, and have reached the following conclusions. These conclusions are set out in the accompanying note and the Resident at Aden should be guided by them in his forthcoming negotiations with the Imam:—

It has been decided that the Government of India shall be a party to the treaty, and it will, therefore, be necessary to amend the preamble as follows:—

Have resolved to conclude this treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and the British Dominions beyond the Sea, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

For India:

His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam:

#### *Article 1.*

The Imam wishes to insert the words "and his Government" in this article after both "His Majesty the King of Great Britain, &c.," and "His Majesty the King of the Yemen." There are serious objections to inserting either in the body of the treaty or in any formal exchange of notes to be attached to it any specific statement to the effect that the treaty will be applicable to the Governments of the high contracting parties, since the effect of such a statement might well be to throw doubt on whether other treaties with Arabian rulers made in the

<sup>(2)</sup> Not printed.



names of the heads of States alone would, in fact, remain binding on the Governments of the States concerned. There can, in fact, and in law, be no doubt that a treaty between heads of States binds them, their successors, their Governments and succeeding Governments. The head of the State in concluding a treaty contracts on behalf of, and binds, the State as a whole, as an entity, and no distinction between him and his Government exists in the matter. It would, therefore, be in the highest degree undesirable to admit, even by implication, that any such distinction could validly be drawn either in the case of His Majesty or of the Imam. Were His Majesty's Government now to acquiesce in the Imam's demand that any of His Majesty's Governments should be specified in terms either in the treaty or in notes to be attached to it, as being bound by the treaty as well as the King himself, it is possible that other Governments might raise similar questions in connexion with existing treaties, particularly those with other Arabian rulers.

On the other hand, if, through ignorance of international law and practice in this matter, the Imam requires some special reassurance on this point, the Resident is authorised to address a note to the Imam in the terms of the attached draft, provided that it is made absolutely clear to the Imam that this note does not impose any obligation on either party additional to that contained in the text of the treaty, or, indeed, add anything at all to what will in any event be the effect of the treaty, but that it is merely a document intended to explain what, according to established law and practice, is the meaning and effect of any treaty to which His Majesty, as head of the State, is a party on behalf of the United Kingdom and India, viz., that it is necessarily binding on His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, and upon the Government of India.

#### Article 3.

The Imam wishes to omit the words "of the territories of His Majesty the King of the Yemen." For reasons which have been fully explained in previous correspondence it is essential that these words should be reinserted and the Resident should insist on this. In this connexion attention is invited to the views expressed by the Foreign Office representative at the meeting of the Middle East Official Sub-Committee meeting on the 7th March.<sup>(\*)</sup>

The Imam has omitted the words "by persons under their protection." The Imam's omission may be accepted or alternatively the words "by their subjects or" may also be omitted if the Imam so desires.

#### Article 4.

The Imam wishes to substitute the phrase "general international principles" for the phrase "the principles of general international practice." This amendment may be accepted.

#### Article 5.

The Imam has omitted from paragraph 1 the words "from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty." His Majesty's Government are advised that the legal position would be unchanged whether these words are retained or not, since it is clear that the obligation will apply as from the date specified in article 7 for the coming into force of the treaty as a whole. While, therefore, the retention of the words might be of some slight advantage to His Majesty's Government, as possibly avoiding ambiguity in the event of the benefits of the treaty being claimed in a case which had arisen before its entry into force, but was still outstanding at that date, it is considered that it is hardly worth embarking on an argument with the Imam on a purely formal point of this nature, which has little substantive importance. Unless, therefore, there is reason to believe that the Imam desires the omission of these words in order to avoid some obligation under the treaty, the Resident may agree to the proposed omission.

In paragraphs 1 and 2 the Imam has substituted the phrase "each of the high contracting parties" for the phrase "one high contracting party." This amendment may be accepted.

In paragraph 1 the Imam has inserted the words "and judgments" for the words "local laws." The Resident should ask the Imam to explain why he made this insertion, and if the Resident is satisfied that the reasons are innocuous, he

(\*) Minutes of Middle East Official Sub-Committee Meeting of the 7th March, 1933.

may agree to the insertion of some phrase such as the Imam suggests. His Majesty's Government are advised, however, that it would be preferable that the words "and courts" or "and tribunals" should be used rather than "and judgments," as giving effect more accurately to what they understand to be the meaning of the Imam's proposal.

The Imam has omitted the provision in paragraph 1 to the effect that the subjects of one high contracting party shall receive treatment no less favourable than that enjoyed by the subjects of the other high contracting party. For this he has substituted words which provide that the subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall receive equal treatment to that enjoyed by the subjects of a most-favoured Power; he has, in fact, preserved most-favoured-nation treatment, but omitted national treatment. His Majesty's Government consider it preferable that this paragraph should provide for national as well as most-favoured-nation treatment, and the Resident should endeavour to get the article amended accordingly, but if he is unable to persuade the Imam to agree to this, the Resident may accept the Imam's proposal. Reference is invited in this connexion to the Secretary of State's Secret despatch of the 13th October, 1932.

The Imam wishes to omit the whole of paragraph 3. This paragraph is necessary to ensure, *inter alia*, that, while the privileges granted in paragraphs 1 and 2 in respect of British subjects, vessels, &c., apply to all British subjects, vessels, &c., from whatever part of the British Commonwealth of Nations they may come, the privileges granted to Yemen subjects, vessels, &c., do not apply in the territories of the Dominions. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are bound by inter-Imperial obligations to endeavour to secure that in treaties made between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and foreign Powers, benefits of the nature of those conferred by article 5 should be extended to British subjects and vessels generally, and to make it clear by definition in the treaty that the benefits are so extended. Paragraph 3 is necessary also in order to make it clear that the privileges granted by the Imam apply to all persons under His Majesty's protection, that is to say, *inter alios*, to inhabitants of the Aden Protectorate. His Majesty's Government must insist, therefore, that this paragraph should be reinserted.

In paragraph 2 the Imam has substituted the words "in the ports of the other" for the words "in the ports of the territories of the other." This amendment must be read in conjunction with the proposed omission of paragraph 3. The phrase "in the ports of the other" might possibly be interpreted to include Dominion ports. The phrase "in the ports of the territories of the other" by virtue of the definition of the word "territories" (on the inclusion of which, as stated above, His Majesty's Government must insist) cannot be so interpreted, and must for that reason be adopted.

The Imam has also omitted the words "and their passengers" from paragraph 2. The intention in these words is to make it clear that in the case of a vessel of one of the high contracting parties calling at the ports of the other high contracting party with passengers of a foreign State on board, those passengers would not receive less favourable treatment in the port than if those passengers were travelling on a vessel of their own or any other nationality. The inclusion of these words is intended to secure that passengers in British ships shall not, because they are carried in British ships, be less favourably treated in a port of the Yemen than they would be had they been carried in a vessel flying the flag of any other country. These words must, therefore, be retained.

#### Article 8.

His Majesty's Government's draft proposes that the English and Arabic texts shall have equal force, whereas the Imam wishes the Arabic text to prevail in case of doubt. His Majesty's Government are inclined to think that if the more serious difficulties which the Imam has raised in regard to other articles of the treaty are successfully overcome by negotiation, it is unlikely that the Imam will go to the length of refusing to conclude a treaty merely because the language question remains unsettled. Both in the Treaty of Jeddah of 1927 with King Ibn Saud and in the Treaty of Alliance with Iraq of 1930, it is provided that in case of a divergence between the English and Arabic text of the treaty, the English text shall prevail, and His Majesty's Government feel that there would hardly be sufficient justification to treat the Imam in this matter more favourably than



King Ibn Saud or King Feisal of Iraq, particularly as to do so would create an unfortunate precedent in a matter which is of considerable importance on grounds of general principles and policy. For these reasons His Majesty's Government are not disposed to make a concession on the point of language, but, if the other outstanding questions are all successfully settled and the negotiations appear likely to break down on this issue alone, the Resident should refer by telegraph to His Majesty's Government for further instructions.

*Secret Appendix.*

This is wholly unacceptable and must be omitted.

Enclosure 2 in No. 54.

*Draft Note from the British Resident at Aden to the King of the Yemen.*

Your Majesty,

WITH reference to the question which arose in the course of the negotiations for the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation which we have signed this day, I have the honour to inform Your Majesty that all treaties concluded by His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India in respect of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and in respect of India are deemed to be binding in every respect upon His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and upon the Government of India.

[E 7094/487/25]

No. 55.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 21.)*

(No. 323.)

Sir,

*Jedda, October 31, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 268 of the 23rd August last, relative to the Hasa oil concession granted by the Saudi Arab Government to the Standard Oil Company of California, I have the honour to inform you that an official of the company, Mr. W. J. Lenahan, arrived here as its Jedda representative on the 18th October. Mr. Lenahan, who has previously served his company in South America in an administrative rather than a practical capacity, has had no previous experience of this part of the world. In conversation with me recently he stated that five geologists, presumably Americans, had already arrived in Hasa and had been met by Mr. Twitchell, who had assisted them in commencing their work. Mr. Lenahan added that more geologists were on their way and were shortly expected to arrive in Hasa.

2. It is understood that Mr. Twitchell is returning to Jedda very shortly and that he expects to proceed on leave almost at once.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7095/6509/25]

No. 56.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 21.)*

(No. 325.)

Sir,

*Jedda, October 31, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, in somewhat greater detail than I was able to give in my telegram No. 182 of the 27th October, of my interview with the Minister of Finance on that day, relative to the successful request of M. Roger Maigret, French Chargé d'Affaires, to be allowed to visit Ibn Saud at Riyadh.

2. M. Maigret, as was recorded at paragraph 183 of Jedda Report for August, left on the 9th August for Syria, where, it is understood, he passed the whole of his leave of absence. According to a statement of a member of the French Legation here to Mr. Furlonge, he was expected to return by a French naval despatch-boat, which was calling at Beirut on its way to the Red Sea. His return was due almost any day, when I received Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's request for an interview on the 27th October. As I have reported, his Excellency informed me that he had been instructed by the King at Riyadh, through Amir Feisal at Mecca, to bring to my notice that M. Maigret had approached Fuad Bey Hamza, whilst the latter was in Syria, with a view to obtain the King's permission to pay a private visit to Nejd upon his return to this country. Upon his return from abroad, Fuad Bey Hamza had placed this request before His Majesty, who had been pleased to accede to it. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman went on to say that M. Maigret was expected the following day and would leave for Nejd at once, and again referred to the private and personal nature of the visit, and alluded to M. Maigret's wish to see the country. He added that, should anything transpire during this visit not of a strictly private character, I should learn of it in due course from Fuad Bey Hamza himself. In reply to a question, he said that the French Chargé d'Affaires' interview with the King would take place at Riyadh or perhaps somewhere in the vicinity.

3. The following morning, the 28th, the French naval despatch-boat *Ypres* duly arrived, but no M. Maigret was observed to come ashore. From information subsequently received it would appear he was not on board, and I now learn that he is expected on or about the 5th November.

4. It is unprecedented for a foreign representative in Jedda to be allowed not merely to pay a visit to Nejd, but to be accorded an interview by Ibn Saud in his desert fastnesses at Riyadh. Whether it is fanciful to read, or attempt to read, into this rather startling piece of information more than its superficial meaning I am at present unable to decide. M. Maigret, in September 1932, paid a visit to Taif—an achievement in its way, though of no special significance—and also, I believe it is true to say, that he takes an intelligent, if not scholarly, interest in matters pertaining to the Arab world. This, however, seems scarcely adequate as a reason, and the alacrity, almost, with which his desire in this instance has been granted does little to dispel one's doubts as to the reasons for this so-called private visit. The cloak of privacy is often the most useful wear in the more delicate dealings with Eastern minds, and the news when it becomes generally known will be, I believe, thus construed.

5. In my telegram under reference I have drawn attention to the fact that this meeting at Riyadh will, if it occurs, form a precedent which other foreign representatives, not least the Soviet Minister, may welcome. It will be interesting to observe whether, indeed, they make any attempt to follow where M. Maigret is so unexpectedly leading the way.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus for information.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7141/16/91]

No. 57.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 22.)*

Sir,

*India Office, November 21, 1933.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf respecting relations with Koweit.

I am, &c.

S. F. STEWART.



Enclosure in No. 57.

*Political Resident, Persian Gulf, to Secretary of State for India.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, October 25, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your letter dated the 13th October, 1933, enclosing a copy of the record of an interdepartmental meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 5th instant, note by Sir Andrew Ryan on Ibn Saud's attitude towards Koweit, and India Office provisional note, dated the 11th October, 1933, on the obligations of His Majesty's Government towards the Sheikh of Koweit. I discussed the matter with the Political Agent, Koweit, when I passed through there recently on my way to Bushire.

2. One of the two questions (the other is dealt with below in paragraphs 7 and 8) discussed at the meeting was, briefly, whether, with a view to maintaining our control over Koweit, which was undoubtedly fast increasing in importance as a political and strategical centre in the Middle East, (a) it was advisable to declare a British protectorate over that sheikhdom, or (b) whether sufficient control could not be obtained over it by adopting a policy of tightening up our control over the sheikh as opportunity offered by filling in the gaps which at present existed in our agreements with him.

3. As will be seen from the record, *prima facie*, I favoured (b) rather than (a), and further reflection and my discussion with Colonel Dickson, who agrees with me, has confirmed me in that opinion. The objections to (a) are that, in our (*i.e.*, Colonel Dickson and my) opinion, a protectorate would most probably meet with considerable opposition from the sheikh, who, while valuing his British connexion, values equally highly his independence in the eyes of his fellow Arab rulers, and the outside world in general. The declaration of such a protectorate would likewise alarm the other sheikhs on the Arab coast of the Gulf. It might also involve His Majesty's Government in a measure of interference in the internal affairs of Koweit which can at present be avoided. The question of slavery in Koweit, for example, as part of the slavery question in the Gulf generally, will doubtless be raised in the future by the recently established Permanent Slavery Committee of the League of Nations, and as we have no slave agreement with the ruler, such as exists with the other Arab rulers by which the local Political Agent can manumit slaves, the Koweit aspect of this problem offers special difficulties. So long as Koweit remains "independent," His Majesty's Government's responsibility in the matter is presumably limited to representations and persuasions to the sheikh. In the event, however, of a British protectorate being declared over the sheikhdom, His Majesty's Government might possibly be committed to more drastic action. Finally, it is not improbable, though this is a matter outside my sphere, that the declaration of a Koweit protectorate might lead to somewhat awkward accusations from other Governments of "land grabbing" and the like, with which we have been familiar enough in the past with regard to other areas.

4. An examination of the alternative policy (b) shows that, unsatisfactory as our present treaty relationship with the sheikh may be (as was pointed out at the meeting), we have a certain control over the ruler (see India Office note—Obligations of His Majesty's Government towards the Sheikh of Koweit), and where our agreements show gaps, these can, to a large extent, be filled up. Thus, control of aviation through Koweit, whether military or civil, would be in the hands of His Majesty's Government under the proposed air agreement (*vide* correspondence ending with India Office letter dated the 11th August, 1933, to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department) with the sheikh, while the proposed amendment of the Koweit Order in Council (*vide* correspondence ending with Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, express letter dated the 21st August, 1933, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India) would place jurisdiction over non-Moslem foreigners in Koweit in the hands of the Political Agent.

5. A third "gap" is the habit of direct correspondence which has grown up between the sheikh and Ibn Saud, and which was dealt with at some length at the meeting. The outcome of my discussion with Colonel Dickson on this point

is as follows: There would appear to be two ways in which we can ensure control over this correspondence:—

(1) By informing the sheikh that before despatching any official communication to Ibn Saud he should show it to the Political Agent, and should take similar action with communications received from Ibn Saud. This has been the sheikh's custom in the past, at any rate in regard to his outward correspondence; whether he has shown *all* Ibn Saud's official letters to Colonel Dickson, we do not, of course, know. After the sheikh had received our communication, which would, of course, be tactfully worded and would merely ask him to continue the practice which he already observed, he would not be able to quote officially any letters which he had not shown to the Political Agent. If, for instance, in order to present His Majesty's Government with a *fait accompli* on some point agreed upon between Ibn Saud and himself, he should produce a communication which had not been seen by the Political Agent, we could ignore it.

Both Colonel Dickson and I think that perhaps it would be better in our communication not to refer to any particular correspondence, but to treat the matter on general grounds.

The above refers, of course, to *official* correspondence; nothing we can do will prevent "private and personal" letters passing between the two potentates.

(2) The second alternative is to insist that official correspondence between the sheikh and Ibn Saud should pass through His Majesty's Government's local representatives: the Minister at Jedda, and the Political Agent, Koweit (or, perhaps, the Resident, Persian Gulf). This is already the procedure in force (at the sheikh's own request) in regard to the sheikh's correspondence with the Iraq Government, and so no new departure in principle would be involved. The advantage of this alternative would be its emphasis to Ibn Saud of the special relations that Koweit has with His Majesty's Government, which emphasis is apparently particularly needed at the present juncture (*vide* conclusion 1 of the meeting). As against this advantage, Colonel Dickson is of the opinion that the sheikh, who regards Ibn Saud, in spite of the latter's treatment of Koweit, in a somewhat different light to Iraq, might object more or less strongly to the proposal.

6. Considering all the circumstances, I would suggest that I be authorised to instruct Colonel Dickson to approach the sheikh verbally on the following lines: That His Majesty's Government have had it recently brought to their notice that Ibn Saud apparently harbours designs of trying to reduce Koweit to a position of dependence on him, similar—for instance—to that of Asir; that it is possible that the practice of direct correspondence between him—the sheikh—and Ibn Saud which has grown up of late, even though he—the sheikh—shows the correspondence to the Political Agent, has somewhat obscured in the eyes of Ibn Saud the fact of Koweit's special relations of protection, &c., with His Majesty's Government; that it would put this correspondence on a safer and more regular footing, if it was conducted as was the correspondence with the Iraq Government, *i.e.*, through His Majesty's Government's local representatives; that, in addition, an intimation to this effect to Ibn Saud would bring sharply to his notice Koweit's relations with His Majesty's Government; and that, finally, His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn, confidentially and informally, what were his—the sheikh's—reactions to the proposal.

I trust I may be authorised to take this step as soon as possible, and when the sheikh's attitude has become known I will make recommendations as to which alternative should be adopted.

7. The other question discussed at the meeting (referred to at the beginning of paragraph 2 above) was the exact extent of His Majesty's Government's obligations to protect the interests of Koweit. The most important of these obligations, which are dealt with in the India Office note on the subject, and the one which in a sense determines any others there may be, is that of protection against hostile incursions or invasions. His Majesty's Government's agreements with the sheikh are three in number: that of January 1899, that of October 1907 and that of November 1914.

8. The agreement of 1899, as far as "protection" is concerned, in return for the good behaviour of the sheikh and his successors, merely promised "the good offices" of His Majesty's Government, "whatever that may mean" as



Lord Lansdowne later remarked. Our construction of this agreement appears to have been the convenient one that we could choose the circumstances in which we need, or need not, protect Koweit in any particular crisis that arose, the exact area which we were responsible for defending being left more or less vague.

9. The agreement of 1907 merely confirmed from His Majesty's Government that "the town of Koweit and its boundaries" belonged to the sheikh of that day and his successors. This agreement in no way added, in principle, to our nebulous responsibilities for the defence of Koweit, though, possibly, read with that of 1899, it might increase these responsibilities up to the "boundaries."

10. The 1914 agreement states that, in return for the sheikh's co-operation against the Turks, "Koweit shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection." This, unlike the phraseology of the previous agreements, is a most categorical assurance, and the word "principality," and not "town," being used would seem definitely to place the responsibility of protecting the whole of the Koweit sheikhdom on His Majesty's Government. Personally, I cannot agree with the view quoted in paragraph 15 of the India Office note that "on a strict reading our liability could be confined to the protection of the town of Koweit, and that we are not called upon to protect Koweit as a whole." It is true, as pointed out in the note (paragraph 16 (d)), that neither the present sheikh, nor his predecessors, appear to have appealed under this agreement to His Majesty's Government, but that hardly relieves us from our obligations. This does not imply, of course, that His Majesty's Government's obligations relieve the sheikh completely of the responsibility of his own defence. The sheikh should certainly be able to deal with any small raids across his frontiers, and should only look for assistance from His Majesty's Government in the case of more serious incursions. This, in fact, was presumably the attitude taken up after the Akhwan operations of 1928, when the sheikh was encouraged to purchase half a dozen Ford vanettes, Lewis guns which were mounted in the vanettes, and ammunition, and when some of his men received training from the Royal Air Force as machine gunners.

11. In conclusion, I venture to suggest that this question, the exact extent of the obligations of His Majesty's Government for the protection of Koweit, be investigated with a view to a definite decision on the subject. The question is an important one, and the advantages of having a clear conception of what our responsibilities may be in time of crisis, before such a crisis arises, are obvious.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India and His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

T. C. FOWLE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[E 7249/902/25]

No. 58.

Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 326. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 6, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for October 1933.  
2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 58.

JEDDA REPORT FOR OCTOBER, 1933.

# I.—Internal Affairs.

208. The King has remained in Nejd and Amir Feisal at Taif during October. The Amir of Jedda, Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Muammar, was still absent at the end of the month (see paragraphs 167 and 193). The Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, was constantly on the move between Taif, Mecca and Jedda, chiefly occupied in organising the despatch of troops and stores to Asir (see paragraphs 217 and 219).

209. Fuad Bey Hamza, accompanied by his wife, returned from abroad on the 9th October by Italian steamer. He was met at the landing stage by local authorities and notables, and, clad in "Ihram" towels only, presented a somewhat incongruous figure inspecting (very cursorily) the guard of honour mounted for the occasion. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was present to welcome him. The Deputy Minister left the same day for Mecca and three or four days later went on to Riyadh to pay his respects to Ibn Saud. He was expected to return early in November.

210. Arriving by the same boat as Fuad Bey Hamza, and indeed a member of his party, was Khalid-al-Hakim, an ex-Turkish officer of Syrian or Palestinian origin, whose record may be consulted in this Legation's compilation: "Personalities in Saudi Arabia" (No. 56). It is interesting, in view of press reports that Fuad Bey Hamza's prolonged leave has not been entirely unconnected with the question of the Hejaz Railway (see paragraph 180), to note that Khalid-al-Hakim accompanied Dr. Damluji in July 1928 to take part in the abortive conference at Haifa on this question. He left with Fuad Bey Hamza for Riyadh on the 14th.

211. (Reference paragraph 169.) On the 18th October Mr. W. J. Lenahan, an official of the Standard Oil Company of California, arrived here and proceeded to establish himself as the company's Jedda representative. He has had no previous experience of this part of the world, having previously been employed by his company, in an administrative capacity, in South America. He recently stated, in conversation, that five geologists of the company had already arrived in Hasa and were now at work, and that more were expected to arrive there shortly. Mr. Twitchell is believed to be soon returning to Jedda.

212. (Reference paragraph 110.) Mr. Philby, accompanied by his wife, arrived from the United Kingdom via Port Sudan on the 18th. His return, it is understood, was rather hurried, due to difficulties with the Saudi Government over Sharqieh Limited's motor and tyre concession.

213. (Reference paragraphs 171 and 172). The National Bank scheme remains as much as ever a castle in Spain, and the Jedda-Mecca railway project is still darkly incubating in Madras. One suspects the egg!

214. The general financial situation is far from reassuring. Government employees, who for a number of months past have been receiving their salaries in the form of one-third cash, one-third in kind (flour, rice, sugar, &c.), and one-third carried forward to their credit, have, according to fairly reliable reports, been latterly receiving nothing at all. The Treasury is said to have adopted the simple expedient of making no disbursements whatsoever, except to a favoured few. Government debts are ignored. Saudi currency has weakened. Large sums have been absorbed by military preparations against the Yemen, and the £35,000 gold received as an oil loan (see paragraph 169) has probably been utilised for the purpose. Altogether the picture is not a pleasant one and the bright spots are far to seek. Of these it may be mentioned that the first pilgrim ship of the season left Sourabaya on the 28th October—but next year's pilgrimage, by all accounts, will be as disappointing as this year's.

215. Government Departments and officials were returning from Taif to Mecca during the second half of October. Amir Feisal and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are expected to last the month out and return early in November. The Legislative Assembly adjourned at Taif on the 24th and reassembles ten days later in Mecca.

[9941]

N 4



216. (Reference paragraph 141.) Whilst it is still doubtful whether the increased tonnage dues on shipping, which were introduced in July, are going to be enforced, certain new taxes on local craft have been announced, during the month, and are to take effect as from the 24th June last. These are:—

	Piastres miri per month.
Motor-launch ... ..	15
Sanbuq ... ..	15
Boat ... ..	5

(Where 110 piastres miri = £1 gold.)

The annual tax on a motor-launch, therefore, amounts to about £2 10s., but, in view of the fact that the amount per annum is not excessive and compares not unfavourably with similar taxes in various ports of neighbouring countries, local representatives of foreign shipping concerns have accepted the new tax philosophically.

217. The situation in Asir (reference paragraph 195) continues to monopolise public attention here. Further concentration of Saudi troops has taken place during the month, until, according to Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, scarcely a soldier remains in Nejd, and he confidently expected that Saudi military dispositions would be complete by the end of October. Amir Feisal-bin-Saad was still Commander-in-chief, with his headquarters at Abha, where he is in constant wireless communication with the King, being accompanied wherever he goes by a mobile wireless set. Saudi resources in respect of communications were further augmented by the arrival on the 29th of two large motor-launches, which had come under their own power from Bahrein, where they had been recently acquired by Ibn Saud. They were immediately got ready for use and, to anticipate next month's report, left on the 1st November for Jizan with about 500 troops on board. At the end of the month the Saudi force had generally advanced, in Asir, to positions somewhat nearer the frontier, in order to be readily available should its defence become suddenly necessary. The situation in Asir will be further dealt with (see paragraph 219 below) in connexion with relations between the Saudi Government and the Yemen.

218. (Reference paragraph 197.) Abul Walid Khalid-el-Qarqani, Sheikh Hamad Suleiman and Turki-bin-Mahdi, the three members of the recent Saudi delegation to Sana, who were for a short period forcibly detained there by the Imam Yahya, left Mecca for Riyadh on the 14th October.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

219. The tension between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya (*vide* paragraph 196) shows no signs of relaxing. For the first three weeks of October, although military preparations went on unabated, the fact that hostilities did not break out as time went by encouraged the hope that neither side would be rash enough to take the first hostile step and that the situation would remain unprecipitated. A report, attributed to the Saudi delegation to Sana who passed through here early in the month for Mecca, that the two rulers had agreed to a six months' truce, gave further grounds for optimism. Hopes of this nature, however, were soon dashed by reports, confirmed shortly afterwards, of renewed fighting in Najran, where the Imam's forces were again captained by Saif-al-Islam Ahmad, and the fall of Badr. The Minister of Finance admitted to Mr. Calvert on the 19th October that Badr had been occupied by Zeidi troops upon the defection of the Makarimi, an independent sub-tribe of the Beni Yam, a changed tune from his previous one of a Yemeni withdrawal before victorious tribesmen.

He gave another ten days before Ibn Saud presented the Imam Yahya with an ultimatum, and expressed his own view that, as, in his opinion, the Imam would reject the King's demands, war was inevitable.

220. On the 20th the *Umm-al-Qura* published an official Saudi communiqué, in which the situation and its recent developments in Najran were outlined, and Ibn Saud's pacific intentions and rigid determination to defend his territory restated. The communiqué called on the Imam to pause and reflect, and to exert himself to avoid the shedding of Arab blood. The *Umm-al-Qura* on the

same day published a leading article on the crisis, in the form of a reply to a recent letter by the Imam to the newspaper *Falestin*. No ultimatum had been issued by the end of the month, and, acting under instructions, Mr. Calvert informed Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, on the 30th October, that the Italian Government were again urging the Imam to agree to negotiate, and expressed His Majesty's Government's earnest desire that, in view of this, every effort would be made by Ibn Saud to avoid hostilities.

221. On the 9th October His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed the Saudi Government that the survey of the Koweit Neutral Zone was to recommence about the 1st November from Qurain, 17 miles west-south-west of Ras-al-Qaliya. On the 17th the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Saudi Government had no objection to the resumption of the survey.

222. (Reference paragraph 199.) Further communications relative to the exchange of ratifications of the Saudi-Transjordan Treaty have passed during the month between Mr. Calvert and the Saudi authorities through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' local representative at Jedda. Fuad Bey Hamza has been in Nejd since his return from leave, but an early opportunity of treating this question with him in person is now in prospect.

223. On the 15th October Muhammad Hamdi-el-Chokhidar arrived here from Bagdad as acting Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general, in the room of Nasir Bey Al Gaylani (*vide* paragraph 155), who has been appointed vice-consul at Kermanshah. Muhammad Hamdi has previously served in a consular capacity at Angora, Kermanshah and Mohammerah. He is pleasant, speaks a little English, and seems anxious to be friendly. Abdullah Rashid remains here as consular clerk.

224. Forty days after the death of King Feisal, *i.e.*, on the 24th October, the Iraqi Legation held a commemorative reception. Flags were flown half-mast.

225. (Reference paragraphs 5 and 94.) The proposed motor-road between Najaf and Medina appears to have got no forrader. Enquiries from India led the Legation to ask the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for information on the subject. The Ministry replied, on the 18th, that the matter is still under discussion with the Iraqi authorities.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

226. There is nothing of fresh interest to report as far as Anglo-Saudi relations are concerned—they continue friendly.

227. The Egyptian consul, Hafiz Bey Amer, returned from a lengthy leave on the 8th October.

228. Mr. Calvert was informed on the 27th by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, as from Ibn Saud, that the King had recently agreed to allow M. Maigret, French Chargé d'Affaires, to visit Nejd immediately upon his return from leave. M. Maigret had met Fuad Bey Hamza in Syria and had enlisted his support for his request. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman emphasised the private and personal nature of M. Maigret's visit, but, as the latter is to be received by the King in or near Riyadh, it is a little difficult to be quite satisfied with the *bona fides* of this assurance. The visit, however, is not so imminent as at first appeared likely. M. Maigret was expected to arrive on the 28th October by a French naval despatch-boat, the *Ypres*, which had called at Beirut on its way to the Red Sea. The despatch-boat duly arrived, but the French Chargé d'Affaires was not on board. His return is now expected for the 12th November, but Fuad Bey Hamza, who had at first intended to await his arrival in Riyadh, was on his way back to Mecca at the end of the month.

## IV.—Miscellaneous.

229. Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Depui, M.C., formerly in charge of the French consulate here, and now reported to be employed in the Intelligence Department of the French War Office, arrived on the 20th October by Italian steamer from Massawa, after touring certain Red Sea ports (Aden, Jibuti, Hodeida, &c.). As he is a Moslem, he spent most of his visit to this country at Mecca and Medina; he left for Suez on the 1st November.



230. The French naval despatch-boat *Ypres* arrived here from Beirut on the 28th October and left the next day.

231. The Saudi Government, in spite of several reminders, have as yet been unable to issue their official tariff of dues and transport charges for the forthcoming pilgrimage season. The Minister of Finance has informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires most categorically that the official tariff for 1934, which was in course of being printed as part of the pilgrimage guide published annually in Mecca, was exactly the same as the 1933 tariff. British authorities concerned have been, therefore, notified to that effect.

232. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves in October was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: None.  
Took refuge in October: None.  
Manumitted in October and repatriated: None.  
Locally manumitted: None.  
On hand at the end of the month: None.

[E 7251/759/25]

No. 59.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 27.)*

(No. 328.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 7, 1933.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 186 of the 2nd November, summarising the reply of Ibn Saud to the representations of His Majesty's Government, made orally by me to the Minister of Finance on the 30th October regarding the present dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a complete version in rough but, I believe, reasonably accurate translation of the telegram read over to me by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman at our meeting of the 2nd November.<sup>(1)</sup> I refrained from comment on the contents of the communication, limiting myself to an expression of thanks and a promise to convey the King's reply without delay to my Government.

2. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman went on to refer to Saudi preparations in Asir as being now practically complete. Units of the forces under the command of Amir Feisal-bin-Saud were now disposed somewhat nearer to the frontier with the Yemen, and he considered they would be readily available should they be called upon to resist a sudden incursion into Asir by Imamite troops. The Commander-in-chief still had his headquarters at Abha, in the vicinity of which the major part of the Saudi army was centred. He was accompanied by a mobile wireless set, and was in constant touch with Ibn Saud, who was, of course, similarly equipped. There was also a wireless set at Jizan, probably in addition to the wireless station known to have been established there by Marconi (Limited), as Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman stated that the set at Abha and that at Jizan were the two portable sets presented to Ibn Saud by Sir Francis Humphrys in 1930.

3. Saudi military authorities have also had their resources in respect of communications considerably augmented recently by the arrival at Jedda towards the end of October of two large motor launches. These, named the *Nejd* and the *Riyadh*, were purchased by Ibn Saud at Bahrein and made the voyage under their own power. They were at once put into commission for the transport of troops, and left for Jizan on the 1st November, carrying a number of soldiers estimated at 500.

4. No ultimatum, such as was foreseen by the Minister of Finance, has yet, as far as I am aware, been sent by the King to the Imam. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman was unable to inform me whether, if an ultimatum were issued, it would at once be published or become generally known, but, as I have reported in my telegram No. 183, he spontaneously promised to inform me privately as soon as he himself had news of its issue.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador, Rome, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, the Acting High Commissioner for Egypt, the Acting Chief Commissioner, Aden, and to the senior naval officer in the Red Sea sloops.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7492/759/25]

No. 60.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 5.)*

(No. 333.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 14, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 328 and my telegrams Nos. 190 and 193 of the 7th, 12th and 12th November, respectively, regarding the present dispute between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya of the Yemen, I have the honour to report more fully than was possible in my telegrams under reference my conversation of the 12th November with Fuad Bey Hamza in so far as it concerned the present situation of tension between the two countries. The meeting was the first I had been able to have with the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs since his return from abroad, owing to his somewhat prolonged absence in Riyadh, as I have reported to you elsewhere.

2. Fuad Bey Hamza explained that he had gone to Riyadh immediately upon his return to this country in order to consult Ibn Saud in regard to the Saudi-Yemen situation, to bring his own information on the subject up to date and to acquaint himself with what he termed the "inside" of the question. He was cognisant of the communications which had already passed between Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government through Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman and this Legation, and said that it was the King himself who was dealing with all matters relating to the present situation, as all papers were at once passed on to Riyadh by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, copies only being retained by the Ministry at Mecca. It was a case, therefore, of the two rulers, rather than their Governments, being in direct control of this delicate situation.

3. He informed me that since my last interview with Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman there had been certain further developments of importance. On the 8th November Ibn Saud had received (probably by wireless) a communication from the Imam Yahya asking to be informed of the reason for the recent concentration of Saudi troops near the southern frontiers of Asir. Two days later the King had replied stating that the measures were purely precautionary and were a consequence of similar concentrations and other military activities which had for some time been steadily pressed forward on the Yemeni side of the border. The King had again emphasised, according to Fuad Bey Hamza, his firm intention of avoiding any act of aggression, but maintained his resolve to defend the integrity of his territories. The King had also seized the opportunity presented by this renewal of correspondence with the Imam to include with his reply a reformulation of his demands, his four points (summarised in my telegram No. 186), and Fuad Bey Hamza went on to describe the communication as being in the nature of an ultimatum. He represented the King's demands as reasonable, for, said he, as far as the Tihamah was concerned, Ibn Saud would be justified, from a legal point of view, in demanding the cession of more territory to the south than he was actually claiming. When Ibn Saud concluded his first treaty with the Idrisi some fourteen years ago, the latter's seat of government was at Hodeida, and territory as far south as that port was then considered as the Idrisi sphere. Ibn Saud, however, was now contenting himself with that portion of Tihamat Asir as far only as the present frontier. Surely this was reasonable.

4. As regarded the Idrisi himself, by the terms of the Saudi-Yemen Treaty of "Bon-Voisinage," &c., of December 1931, he should have been handed over to Ibn Saud by the Imam. The treaty provided for the extradition of all offenders, political as well as other, yet the Imam's obligation in this respect had not been carried out. But Ibn Saud was magnanimously prepared not to insist on the surrender of the Idrisi (in deference to the traditional Arab custom in regard to asylum and sanctuary), provided that he was either expelled from the Yemen or, Fuad Bey Hamza gave me to understand, removed from the frontier zone to some



place as, for example, Sana, where he would be out of harm's way. Surely this, too, was reasonable.

5. When the Deputy Minister stated that this ultimatum, or quasi-ultimatum, had not been published, and that on the nature of the Imam's reply would depend the King's future course of action, I intervened, as described in my telegram No. 190, to inform him of my instructions in the event of the issue of an ultimatum. He thereupon endeavoured to define the nature of Ibn Saud's communication to the Imam as a restatement of the Saudi case and an invitation to the Imam to give his views thereon. Although earlier in the conversation Fuad Bey Hamza had stated that the King was well aware of Zeidi ambitions, both through the Imam's statements to the last Saudi delegation to visit Sana and from inspired articles in the Arabic press of neighbouring countries, as well latterly as from the Yemen's sole newspaper the *Iman*, I accepted his explanation and agreed to take no further action for the moment beyond acquainting you with these new developments. I might here say that I have since received information from a source which in the past has proved most reliable, a source, moreover, in touch with official circles, to the effect that Ibn Saud's latest communication was his "last and decisive" message, and I may therefore have to address you again by telegraph in the course of the next few days in regard to the real nature of this ultimatum.

6. An ultimatum had been prepared, Fuad Bey Hamza continued, and would be issued, if necessity arose, together with a Green Book which would contain a complete statement of the Saudi case and which was now in the hands of the printers, in the course of ten or fourteen days.

7. He went on to speak of the situation should it unfortunately deteriorate into hostilities. Of the sympathy of His Majesty's Government they had no doubt, but the Saudi Government would like to feel as assured of the attitude of the Italian Government. The latter were in treaty relations with Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Government were sincerely desirous that those relations should remain friendly, but they (the Italian Government) were also in treaty relations with the Imam, and should a conflict ensue, might be inclined to lend support to the Imam as the older friend. I pointed out that this doubt had been raised by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman several months ago, and expressed my conviction that the Italian Government's attitude in the event of hostilities would be strictly correct. As far as the supply of arms by them to the Imam was concerned, I said, making use of an argument already used at the Foreign Office with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, that the Italians were entitled to trade in munitions and, moreover, had been doing so for a considerable time before this crisis arose—a point Fuad Bey Hamza seemed to admit. As he pressed me to request His Majesty's Government to favour his Government with their views, I promised to inform you that he had expressed these misgivings. He then asked me point-blank, as Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman had done (and reported in my telegram No. 184), who, in regard to the recent representations, had taken the initiative, His Majesty's Government or the Italian Government? I answered, as on the previous occasion, that, as far as I was aware, the *démarche* was the outcome of joint consultations.

8. The Deputy Minister went on to speak, feelingly, that counsels of moderation should be offered to the other side rather than to Ibn Saud, whose patience and longanimity in dealing with so obstinate, perverse and fractious an individual as the Imam Yahya had won general recognition. He said that he had gathered from his recent visit to Riyadh that Ibn Saud was determined to avoid hostilities "at all costs." For one thing, were the King to ignore the numerous appeals he had received from Moslems in neighbouring countries, calling upon him to avoid a fratricidal Arab war, and to take the first step in a war with the Yemen, he would at once forfeit the sympathy of the whole Islamic world. For another, the cost of a war would prove disastrous and the financial situation of this country was bad enough as it was. But, Fuad Bey Hamza added, any attack on the honour of the country would be resisted by all the means in their power. He quoted the Arab proverb to the effect that if the only road that presents itself be a thorny one, then one is obliged to go that way.

9. He concluded by describing certain frontier intrigues which, he said, had been suitably dealt with, and denied, on my putting a question to him, that Saudi troops had crossed the frontier into the Yemen in the neighbourhood of Medi (as reported in my telegram No. 193). With regard to this denial, however, I am not altogether satisfied, for strong rumours are current, and are reported by the source

I have referred to earlier in this despatch, that such an infraction of the frontier at that point by Saudi troops has actually occurred, and it is also said that serious fighting is now in progress in the Tihama, whither a further 400-500 troops were sent from here (by sea to Jizan) yesterday. While I am not at the moment prepared to accept the latter report, the next day or two may witness the commencement of hostilities and a war may well be in full swing before the formal ultimatum, which Fuad Bey Hamza states is still up the Saudi sleeve, can be launched in accordance with the punctilio of more enlightened practice.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan, the acting High Commissioner for Egypt and to the senior naval officer, Red Sea sloops.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7639/7639/25]

No. 61.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 12.)*

(No. 338. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, November 22, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Talaat Harb Pasha, who is described in No. 45 of the List of Leading Personalities in Egypt, enclosed in Cairo despatch No. 68 of the 9th January, as a Senator and chairman of directors of the Banque Misr, is understood locally to be flying from Suez to Jedda, with stops at Wejh and Yanbu, on or about the 2nd December, in a De Havilland Dragon aeroplane belonging to Messrs. Misr-Airwork; a ground engineer sent by the latter to prepare the ground for landing arrived by steamer on the 19th November, and the agency work for it has been entrusted to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), Jedda.

2. Talaat Pasha's objects in this visit, which is not expected to exceed four days, are said to be threefold, viz., (a) to fix up local representation for the two pilgrim ships, which, I understand, have recently been purchased by the Egyptian Government for the conveyance of Egyptian pilgrims to and from the Hejaz; (b) to organise the sale of Egyptian products in this country, in particular the cotton goods which are said to be produced nowadays by a subsidiary company of the Banque Misr; and (c) to explore the possibility of the Banque Misr opening a branch in Jedda to assume the functions of a State bank for the Hejaz, in view of the apparent demise of the ex-Khedive's project (see the correspondence ending with your confidential despatch No. 266 of the 5th October).

3. To these objects may, perhaps, be added a fourth, namely, that of demonstrating one of Misr-Airwork's aeroplanes to Ibn Saud. You will recall that this company last year proposed to send an Avro to Jedda for this purpose (see the correspondence ending with the Acting High Commissioner for Egypt's Savingram to you, No. 91 of the 19th August, 1932), but did not proceed with the scheme. Their object at that time was to sell Ibn Saud light military aircraft, and it seems probable that the recent reports of tension between him and the Imam Yehya have led them to consider the moment opportune for a serious effort to this end. Local gossip is rife on the subject, the establishment of an air service between Egypt and Jedda being suggested in some quarters, whilst other and unkindly ones suggest that Talaat Pasha's idea in arriving by air is to be able to leave the country quickly in the event of war with the Yemen materialising.

4. The aeroplane, if and when it arrives, will be the first machine of any sort to fly in or near the Hejaz since the ill-fated Wapiti, whose crash was reported in Mr. Hope Gill's telegram No. 201 of the 14th September, 1931. Its arrival may serve to focus local attention on the parlous condition of the Saudi Air Force. The latter still consists of the four Wapitis and five old D.H.9's bought from His Majesty's Government; but the former, which alone might be made to fly, still remain, as they have remained since the time of the crash referred to above, in their ramshackle hangar, with absolutely no attention except an occasional greasing by an inexperienced hand; while Ibn Saud remains without a single pilot capable of flying the machines, and without a single competent air-mechanic. No attempt has been made to develop any ground organisation, and projects, which



have been reported on various occasions from this post, of engaging Turkish pilots and/or training Saudi subjects in Turkey, have remained unrealised.

5. With Saudi finances still further depleted by the war-preparations, the scale of which is easily the greatest yet made, the prospects of Ibn Saud being able to afford the heavy and continuous expense of employing competent pilots and ground staff, and of his embarking upon the essential refitting of his present machines and the ground organisation necessary for any extensive flying, are receding further and further into the future. The prospects of his buying new machines seem even more remote, however tempting the opportunity thus to steal a march on the Imam, unless the realisation of a State bank project should bring with it a substantial loan or credit arrangements. The advent of a financier will, in any event, be awaited with no little interest in this country.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Department of Overseas Trade and to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7640/759/25]

No. 62.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 12.)*

(No. 339.)

Sir,

*Jedda, November 27, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 333 of the 14th November, relative to the present state of tension between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy in translation of an extract, of obviously official inspiration, from the Mecca newspaper the *Umm-al-Qura*, in which press and other reports of the commencement of general hostilities between these two countries are categorically denied.

2. I have already reported in my telegrams Nos. 193, 196 and 201 of the 13th, 15th and 22nd November respectively that Amir Feisal and Fuad Bey Hamza have similarly contradicted to me reports of the infraction by Saudi forces of the southern frontier of Asir in the neighbourhood of Medi. Hostilities, of course, still continue in Najran between certain elements of the Beni Yam and the Imamic forces, the most recent development in that area, according to Fuad Bey Hamza, being the defeat of the Yemenis at Wadi Habuna, south-east of Badr, by a section of the Beni Yam under one Husayn-bin-Jabir (or Jabir-bin-Husayn), and the occupation of the valley by the tribe. Badr, Fuad Bey confirmed, was still in the hands of the Imam Yahya's men.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador, Rome, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Trans-jordan, His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden, and to the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 62.

*Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura of November 24, 1933.*

#### PROCLAMATION OF A FACT.

WE read in certain foreign newspapers various reports of battles taking place between the forces of His Majesty the King stationed along the frontiers and the Yemeni forces.

On enquiring from those authorities who know the facts as to the correctness of these reports, we have learnt that no skirmishes whatsoever have yet taken place between the troops, that strict orders have been issued to His Majesty's forces stationed near the frontiers not to come into contact or to mix with the Yemeni forces and not to take any action that might lead to unfavourable

consequences, and that, besides this, orders have been issued to all commanders to the effect that they should adopt an attitude of patience, tranquillity and defence until the diplomatic situation, regarding which telegraphic communications have been directly exchanged between His Majesty the King and the Imam Yahya, becomes clear.

[E 7646/487/25]

No. 63.

*Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura of Rabi-ul-Awwal 17, 1352 (July 14, 1933).  
(Received in Foreign Office, December 12.)*

(Translation.)

DECREE NO. 1135.

#### *Grant of a Concession for Exploiting Petroleum.*

WE, Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Feisal-al-Saud, King of the Saudi Arab Kingdom,

After reliance upon God,

And after perusal of the agreement signed at Jedda on the 4th day of Safar of the year 1352 by our Minister of Finance and Mr. L. N. Hamilton, the representative of the Standard Oil Company of California, America,

And after approval by the Council of Ministers, give the following orders:—

*Article 1.*—The Standard Oil Company of California is permitted to exploit petroleum and its extracts in the eastern portion of our Saudi Arab Kingdom, within its frontiers, in accordance with the conditions and regulations laid down in the agreement signed by our Minister of Finance and the representative of the said company at Jedda on the 4th day of Safar of the year 1352.

*Art. 2.*—We sanction the agreement under reference, which is attached to this our decree, and order that it should be put into force as from the date of its publication.

*Art. 3.*—We also sanction the special agreement annexed to the original agreement, and order that it shall be put into force.

*Art. 4.*—Our Minister of Finance should see that the provisions of this decree are put into force.

Issued in our palace at Riyadh on this day the 14th Rabi-ul-Awal of the year 1352, corresponding to the 7th day of July, 1933.

ABDUL AZIZ.

By order of His Majesty the King.

His Majesty's Viceroy:

FEISAL.

THIS Agreement has been concluded between his Excellency Abdullah-al-Suleiman-al-Hamdani, Minister of Finance of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, on behalf of the Saudi Arab Government, hereinafter called the Government, on the one hand, and Mr. L. N. Hamilton, on behalf of the Standard Oil Company of California, hereinafter called the Company, on the other hand.

The Agreement concluded between the Government and the Company is as follows:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

The Government grant the Company, in pursuance of this agreement and in conformity with the following conditions concerning the area defined hereunder, for a period of sixty years as from the date on which this agreement is put into force, full right to survey, prospect, drill, extract, produce, treat, manufacture, transport, handle and export petroleum, asphalt, naphtha (mineral oil), natural grease and tallow, other carbonaceous liquids, and the extracts of these products. It is understood that this right does not under any circumstances include the grant of full right to sell crude or refined products within the limits of the undermentioned zone or within the Saudi Arab Kingdom [*sic*].



## ARTICLE 2.

The area to which the full right referred to in article 1 of this agreement applies has been agreed upon between the two contracting parties.

## ARTICLE 3.

The Company shall remit to the Government within the period agreed upon in this agreement a preliminary loan as agreed.

## ARTICLE 4.

The Company shall pay to the Government annually an amount which has been agreed upon. This payment will for the sake of simplicity be denoted as "annual rent," and this rent shall be paid in advance. The rent for the first year shall be paid within the period provided for in article 15 of this agreement, and subsequently, and for so long as this agreement is not cancelled, the annual rent will be payable at the beginning of each period of one year reckoned from the date on which this agreement is put into force. This rent must be paid within thirty days from the beginning of each year, provided that, immediately after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, no further annual rent will be claimed or will be liable for payment.

## ARTICLE 5.

As from the date of this agreement coming into force, the Company shall proceed with its plans and preparations for the geological work and its arrangements for work, so that it may take advantage of the cold weather in order to undertake effectual field work, and may carry out the clerical work and make reports, &c., during the hot season. In any case, the field work shall not be delayed beyond the end of September 1933. Such work shall be energetically and continuously carried on until the beginning of boring operations or to the end of the agreement.

## ARTICLE 6.

Within ninety days of the date on which boring operations start, the Company shall surrender to the Government those parts of the included area in which it may decide to discontinue work or which it may decide to use in another manner in connexion with this undertaking. The Company shall also surrender to the Government from time to time during the period of this agreement such other areas as the Company may decide are no longer required for prospecting or examination, or for use for any purpose in connexion with this undertaking. All the areas thus surrendered by the Company shall be released from the restrictions and conditions of this agreement, but the Company shall have the permanent right to employ those areas for the purposes of transport and communications, during the duration of this agreement, provided that this use of them shall cause only slight interference with the other purposes for which these areas surrendered by the Company can be used.

## ARTICLE 7.

The Company shall start boring operations as soon as it discovers a suitable site, and in any case, if the Company shall not have started boring operations within a period of three years from the end of September 1933 (subject to the observation of the provisions of article 24 of this agreement), the Government may then terminate this agreement. Whenever the Company begins boring operations it shall continue them energetically, either until it discovers oil in commercial quantities or until the expiry of this agreement. If the Company fails to announce the discovery of oil in commercial quantities at the time, then the date to be reckoned as being the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities shall be the date on which the Company shall have completed the sinking of a well or wells, and shall have examined them and found them capable of supplying not less than 2,000 tons of crude oil per day for a period of thirty days consecutively, in conformity with the practice observed in first-class oil-fields.

Boring operations include the ordering of implements and plant and their shipment to Saudi Arabia, and also include the making and preparation of roads, camps, buildings, fittings, transport and communications, and the erection and running of tools, machines and other means of well-sinking, &c.

## ARTICLE 8.

Immediately after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall remit to the Government the loan which has been agreed upon, and after one year shall make them another loan. The date of remitting the first loan shall be that on which oil is discovered in commercial quantities as laid down in this agreement, and that of remitting the second loan shall be after one year from that date. In both cases the Government shall grant the Company a period of sixty days' delay in which to pay it.

## ARTICLE 9.

As it has been agreed that the annual rent shall be paid up to the date of discovering oil in commercial quantities, and as it has also been agreed that the annual rent should be paid in advance, it is possible that the last payment of annual rent before the date of discovering oil in commercial quantities may include a certain period after the date of discovery. If this extra period equals one-fifth of a year or more, an amount of annual rent proportional to this period will be considered as a loan due by the Government.

## ARTICLE 10.

As soon as possible (*i.e.*, the Company will be allowed a reasonable time for ordering tools and additional materials and for getting them shipped to Saudi Arabia to start the additional work) after the date of discovering oil in commercial quantities the Company shall resume boring operations, employing at least two of the machines, and shall continue these operations persistently and energetically till it completes boring all over the prescribed area, in conformity with the practice observed in first-class oil-fields, or until the expiry of this agreement.

## ARTICLE 11.

The Company shall pay to the Government royalty on all crude oil drawn out and stored, and which flows from the field storage reservoir, after deducting—

- (1) Water and other foreign substances.
- (2) Oil required by the Company for the ordinary running of its plant in the Saudi Arab Kingdom.
- (3) Oil required for the purpose of making those quantities of benzine and kerosine which will be supplied free to the Government every year in pursuance of article 16 of this agreement.

The amount of royalty per ton net weight of crude oil will be—

- (a) 4s. gold, or its equivalent; or
- (b) In accordance with the choice which the Company may make at the time of payment of each instalment, 1 dollar United States currency per ton net weight of crude oil, plus any difference there may be between the average dollar exchange value of 4s. gold taken over the three months directly previous to the date of payment of the instalment, and 1·10 dollars United States currency.

For instance, if the average rate of exchange is 1 dollar 14 cents United States currency for each 4s. gold (*i.e.*, £1 gold = 5·70 dollars), then the amount of royalty on each ton net weight of crude oil will be 1 dollar 4 cents.

## ARTICLE 12.

If the Company extracts, stores and sells any kind of mineral oil it shall pay to the Government a royalty equivalent to one-eighth of the revenue from



the sales. It is understood that the Company is in no case bound to extract, store and sell any mineral oil, and it is also understood that the Company is not bound to pay any royalty in respect of the oil used for the ordinary running of its plant in the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

#### ARTICLE 13.

The Government have the right through their properly authorised representatives to inspect, during ordinary working hours, the work carried out by the Company in accordance with the provisions of this agreement and to check and verify the quantities produced. The Company shall always measure the quantities of oil produced and stored and which run from the field depot, in accordance with the practice observed in first-class oil-fields, and shall keep true and correct accounts of them; similarly for the mineral oils which it may produce, store and sell, properly authorised Government representatives have the right to check these accounts at all convenient times. After the expiry of one half year from the date on which oil is discovered in commercial quantities, the Company shall submit to the Government a half-yearly account within a period of three months from the end of the said half year, and a statement showing the amount of royalty due to the Government for that half year. The Government shall be bound to treat these accounts and statements as confidential, with the exception of those figures which they may find it necessary to publish for financial purposes. The royalty due to the Government shall be paid at the end of each half year from the date on which oil is discovered in commercial quantities, within three months of the end of that half year. In the event of any dispute occurring in respect of the amount of royalty due for a half year, the Company shall hand over to the Government, within the period stipulated above, that part of the royalty which is not in dispute.

The matter of dispute which may arise between the two parties shall be settled by mutual agreement; if a settlement is not arrived at in this manner, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration as provided for in this agreement. Any amount the payment of which is decided as a result of this settlement shall be paid to the Government within sixty days of the date on which the decision is given.

#### ARTICLE 14.

It is agreed that all gold payments provided for in this agreement, whether gold pounds or gold shillings, shall be calculated by means of English gold pounds in accordance with their weight and pureness at the time of payment. It is also agreed that the payments of gold currency provided for in this agreement, whether gold pounds or gold shillings, may be made by means of an equivalent amount of American dollars or pounds sterling. It is furthermore agreed that such payment in sterling or in American dollars, corresponding to the amount of the first loan and the first year's rent, shall be calculated according to the rate of exchange on the day of payment of those sums, but that apart from this the equivalent in sterling or American dollars of the gold pounds or gold shillings, due under the terms of this agreement, shall be reckoned on the basis of the average rate of exchange during the three months immediately preceding the date of payment of that equivalent.

#### ARTICLE 15.

All payments provided for in this agreement and due to the Government shall either be paid to them direct or shall be placed to their credit in the bank which they may appoint in writing. The Government have the right to change this bank from time to time provided that they inform the Company of such action in writing, so as to give the Company sufficient time to enable them to arrange for subsequent payments to be made to the new bank. It is agreed that the Government should nominate for this purpose a bank in either Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, England, or Holland, provided that no bank be fixed in Saudi Arabia unless it has a correspondent in the United States of America, England or Holland, through whom money can be remitted to Saudi Arabia. In the event of the Company having made any payment to the Government in the proper manner, or having deposited the sum due to them in

any bank, or having paid the sum to the correspondent of a bank for transmission to Saudi Arabia, then the Company shall be released from all responsibility in respect of such payment. It has been agreed that the first payment agreed upon (i.e., the preliminary loan and the rent of the first year) shall be paid within a period of fifteen days from the date on which this agreement comes into force to the correspondents of the Netherlands Trading Society of Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) at New York or London for immediate transmission to the Netherlands Trading Society mentioned above, and for handing over to the Government against proper receipt. The expenses incurred in this connexion will be charged to the Company. If this first payment is not paid in gold it may be paid in pounds sterling at the rate of exchange ruling at the time when the Company pays the said amount to the correspondent of the bank.

#### ARTICLE 16.

After the discovery of oil in commercial quantities within a reasonable period, the Company shall choose a place within Saudi Arabia so as to establish a factory to make a quantity of benzine and kerosine sufficient for the ordinary requirements of the Government, provided that the crude oil found is of a nature adequate for such manufacture on a commercial basis by ordinary processes of refining, and that the oil produced is adequate for these purposes. It is understood that the requirements of the Government will not include sales on their part inside or outside Saudi Arabia.

The Company shall proceed to establish this factory after completing the necessary preliminary arrangements, and after obtaining the Government's approval of the place which they suggest. During each successive period of one year following the date of completion of the establishment of this factory, the Company shall supply to the Government, in bulk and free of charge, 200,000 American gallons of benzine and 100,000 American gallons of kerosine. It is understood that the methods adopted by the Government in taking delivery of these quantities shall not hamper or endanger the operations of the Company.

#### ARTICLE 17.

The Company shall employ at its own expense the number of guards and guides needed for the protection of its representatives, camps, and establishments. The Government promise to afford full assistance to the Company by supplying the best soldiers and men they possess, and making them responsible for the discharge of this duty. The Government will supply to the Company all reasonable protection at rates not exceeding the usual ones they pay to them or to other persons in return for similar services. It is understood that the expenses incurred in connexion with such services shall be paid to the Government by the Company.

#### ARTICLE 18.

In return for the obligations undertaken by the Company in pursuance of this agreement, and in respect of the payments due from the Company as provided for in this agreement, the Company and the undertaking shall be exempted from all direct and indirect taxes, dues, charges and fees (including customs dues on export and import). It is understood that this privilege does not apply to the sale of products inside the country, nor to the personal requirements of the members of the staff of the Company. The Company is not allowed to sell within the country any of its materials imported free of customs duty, except after payment of such duty.

#### ARTICLE 19.

It is naturally understood that the Company has the right to use all the means and facilities which it may consider necessary or advisable to employ so as to take advantage of the rights granted to it under the terms of this agreement and so as to enable it to fulfil the objects of this enterprise, and which comprise, amongst other things, the construction and use of roads, camps, buildings, constructions and all means of communication, and the erection and running of machines, apparatus, and devices connected with the sinking of wells, transport,



or storage, or with the treatment, manufacture, handling, or export of petroleum and its products, or any other thing which may have connexion with the camps, buildings or dwellings of the Company's staff. The Company has the right to build and use cisterns, dams, reservoirs, and basins, and also has the right to build piers, quays and lines for shipment and to use them and all other port facilities. It may employ all kinds of methods for the transport of its employees, machines and petroleum and its products. It is understood in all cases that the question of employing aeroplanes within the country shall be subject to another separate agreement. The Company has the right to exploit, take and use water, and has also the right to take and use any water which belongs to the Government in order to carry out operations in connexion with the undertaking, provided that such action does not cause harm to irrigation and does not at any time deprive land, houses or watering places of sufficient water. The Company has the right also to take and to make use for its operations connected with this enterprise of any natural products which belong to the Government, such as soil, timber, stones, lime, gypsum, and other materials of this kind. Government employees and agents (during the performance of their official duties) will have the right to use such means of transport and communications as the Company may establish, provided that such action does not delay or hamper the operations of the Company indicated in this agreement, and does not cause the Company any material expense. Use by the Government of the means of transport and communications belonging to the Company during times of national emergency will entitle the Company to just compensation for any loss which it may have suffered as a result of such use, whether through damage occurring to the Company's constructions, preparations, or establishments, or through its operations being hampered or delayed.

#### ARTICLE 20.

The undertaking specified above in this agreement shall be managed and supervised by Americans, and they shall employ, as far as possible, subjects of the Saudi Arab Government. So long as it is possible for the Company to find suitable officials who are Saudi subjects, it shall not engage subjects of any other Government. The Company shall observe the regulations in force in this country regarding the treatment of employees.

#### ARTICLE 21.

The Government reserve the right of prospecting for and exploiting other products and materials, apart from those provided for in this agreement, within the area defined in this agreement, except in those sites occupied by the Company's wells and establishments. It is stipulated that this right reserved by the Government shall be exercised in such a manner as not to violate the rights granted to the Company, and shall not expose its operations to danger, and that the Government shall pay to the Company reasonable compensation for all harm which the Company may suffer as a result of the exercise of this right. Whenever rights reserved by the Government for themselves are granted, the person in possession of this concession will be bound by the provisions of this article.

#### ARTICLE 22.

The Government authorise the Company to obtain from landowners surface rights over such land as the Company may consider it necessary to use for its work in connexion with this project, provided that the Company pays to the occupier a reasonable sum in consideration of his vacating the land for its use. This sum must be equitable and estimated on the basis of the advantage which the occupier gets from these lands. The Government will afford reasonable assistance to the Company in case of difficulties arising over obtaining such surface rights. The Company shall naturally have no right to obtain or occupy any sacred place.

#### ARTICLE 23.

The Company shall submit to the Government copies certified by itself of all typographical maps and geological reports in their completed forms relating

to the area defined in this agreement. The Company shall also submit to the Government within four months of the end of every year (as from the date of the discovery of oil in commercial quantities) a report describing the work done during that year and provided for in this agreement, on condition that the Government treat these maps and reports as confidential.

#### ARTICLE 24.

Any failure or omission on the part of the Company to carry out any of the conditions and provisions of this agreement shall not entitle the Government to claim compensation from the Company or to consider it as a breach of the agreement, if such failure or omission is due to *force majeure*. If the execution of any of the conditions or provisions of this agreement is delayed through *force majeure*, the period of delay together with the period necessary for the reparation of the harm caused by the delay must be added to the period and conditions defined in this agreement.

#### ARTICLE 25.

The Company has the right to terminate this agreement at any time it wishes by giving to the Government thirty days' notice in writing, either by letter or by telegram, provided that telegraphic notice is confirmed by letter. On termination of this agreement by the giving of such notice or by any other means, neither the Government nor the Company shall any longer be bound by any of the obligations laid on them by this agreement with the exception of the following:—

- (1) All immovable property of the Company, such as roads, oil or water wells with their pipes, permanent buildings, constructions, &c., shall become the property of the Government without charge.
- (2) The Company shall grant the Government a period of delay to enable them to purchase the movable property connected with the undertaking in Saudi Arabia at a reasonable price compared with the price ruling at that time for similar property, after allowing for depreciation. Any dispute which may arise in respect of the fixing of this reasonable price shall be settled by arbitration in the same way as is provided for in article 28 of this agreement. In case the Government refuse or fail to buy these movable properties within a period of two months from the date of the termination of this agreement, and also in case the Government fail to pay the amount of the cost within thirty days of its being fixed either by mutual agreement or by arbitration, the Company shall have the right to remove its property within a period of six months.

#### ARTICLE 26.

In case the Company fails in any of its undertakings, either to pay the second loan agreed upon in accordance with this agreement, or to commence the boring operations provided for in this agreement, or to pay the two loans agreed upon as indicated in article 8 or if it fails in its undertakings laid down in article 28 of this agreement regarding the payment of any compensation which may be imposed upon it, the Government shall have the right to warn the Company immediately of such failure, and if the Company does not take immediate steps to fulfil the broken undertakings the Government shall have the right to terminate this agreement.

#### ARTICLE 27.

The penalty for failure on the part of the Company in any of its undertakings laid down in this agreement (except those provided for in article 24) shall be a fine, to be paid by the Company to the Government under the following conditions:—

The Government shall warn the Company immediately of any breach attributed to it and shall explain to the Company the nature of this breach.



Any dispute which may arise whether from the Company having committed such breach of undertaking or otherwise shall be settled by the means indicated in this agreement, and if the Company is proved to have committed such breach and to have failed to take immediate steps to remedy it, it shall be rendered liable to pay compensation to the Government for the harm caused. In the event of disagreement concerning the amount of compensation it shall be settled by the means of arbitration provided for in this agreement. The Company shall pay the Government the sum awarded by way of compensation in the manner mentioned above within a period of sixty days from the date of the award.

## ARTICLE 28.

If any doubt, difficulty or dispute shall arise between the Government and the Company concerning the interpretation of this agreement or its execution, or in the interpretation or execution of anything in it or connected with it, or concerning the rights or responsibilities of either of the two parties, and if the two parties fail to settle it by any other method, the case shall be referred to two arbitrators, one chosen by each party, and one chairman chosen by the arbitrators before the commencement of the arbitration. Each party shall nominate his arbitrator in writing within a period of thirty days from the date of the application of the other party. If the two arbitrators fail to agree upon the appointment of a chairman, the Government and the Company shall appoint the chairman by agreement; if they fail to do this, they shall apply to the president of the Permanent International Court of Justice to appoint the chairman, who shall be definitely considered as chief arbitrator in the case, but if the two arbitrators do not agree in their opinion, the judgment of the chairman in the case shall be considered as final. The two parties shall fix the place of arbitration by agreement; should they fail to do so, the place to be fixed for this purpose shall be The Hague, Holland.

## ARTICLE 29.

The Company shall not have the right to transfer its rights and obligations provided for in this agreement to any body whatsoever without the consent of the Government, except that it is understood that the Company shall have the right to transfer its rights and obligations provided for in this agreement to another Company which it may establish in connexion with this undertaking after notifying the Government to this effect. The Company shall also have the right to establish other similar companies or institutions whenever it appears to the Company that they are advantageous or necessary in order to carry out the purposes of this undertaking. Such companies or institutions shall immediately become invested with some or all of the rights and undertakings provided for in this agreement, and after the Government have been duly notified, they shall also be subject to the conditions and provisions of this agreement. In case the newly formed company or institution issues shares for public sale, the inhabitants of the Saudi Arab Kingdom shall be allowed a reasonable time to subscribe (under the same conditions as those offered to others) to at least 20 per cent. of the shares offered for sale.

## ARTICLE 30.

It is understood that the periods of time referred to in this agreement shall be calculated on the basis of the solar calendar.

## ARTICLE 31.

The date on which this agreement shall be considered as coming into force shall be the date of its publication in the Saudi Arab country after its ratification by the Company.

## ARTICLE 32.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be clearly understood that neither the Company nor any person belonging to it or connected with it has the right to interfere in the administrative, political or religious affairs of the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

## ARTICLE 33.

It is understood that this agreement, after being signed in Saudi Arabia, shall be referred to the Company's principals at San Francisco, in the State of California, for ratification before it becomes operative. After signature of the two copies of the text of this agreement in Saudi Arabia, the signed copies shall be forwarded in a registered cover to the headquarters of the Company at San Francisco (California). Within fifteen days of receipt of the copies the Company shall cable to the Government agreeing to the ratification of this agreement, or otherwise, and if this agreement is not ratified within fifteen days as from that date, it shall be considered as cancelled and of no effect. Likewise if the preliminary loan and the rent for the first year are not paid to the Government within the period agreed upon in article 15 of this agreement, the Government shall have the right to announce the annulment and cancellation of this agreement and to consider it of no effect. In the event of the agreement being ratified the Company shall return to the Government one of the two signed copies of both texts together with the necessary certificate attesting to the Company's ratification. Similarly, this agreement after ratification by the Company shall be published in Saudi Arabia in the usual manner.

Signed on this day the 4th Safar in the year one thousand three hundred and fifty-two, corresponding to the 29th May, 1933, A.D.

For the Government of the Saudi Arab Kingdom:  
ABDULLAH-AL-SULEIMAN-AL-HAMDAN,  
*Minister of Finance.*

For the Standard Oil Company of California:  
L. N. HAMILTON.

(N.B.—In the above translation the word "loan" is an exact translation of the Arabic word used, but probably the word "subsidy" would be more correct.)

[E 7725/7491/25]

No. 64.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 332.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, December 14, 1933.*

WITH reference to Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 330 of the 12th November, I transmit to you the accompanying copy of a provisional agreement relating to commerce, shipping, &c., which was signed on the 7th November last in London by the United States Ambassador and the Saudi Arabian Minister on behalf of their respective Governments.

2. This copy has been obtained from the Saudi Arabian Minister in London, who stated that the agreement was not confidential and would eventually be published both in Saudi Arabia and in the United States.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I am, &amp;c.

JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 64.

*Provisional Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in regard to Diplomatic and Consular Representation, Juridical Protection, Commerce and Navigation.*

THE undersigned, the Hon. Robert Worth Bingham, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America at London, and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at London, desiring to confirm and make a record of the understanding which they have reached in the course of recent conversations in the names of their respective



Governments in regard to diplomatic and consular representation, juridical protection, commerce and navigation, have signed this provisional agreement:—

## ARTICLE 1.

The diplomatic representatives of each country shall enjoy in the territories of the other the privileges and immunities derived from generally recognised international law. The consular representatives of each country, duly provided with exequatur, will be permitted to reside in the territories of the other in the places wherein consular representatives are by local laws permitted to reside; they shall enjoy the honorary privileges and the immunities accorded to such officers by general international usage; and they shall not be treated in a manner less favourable than similar officers of any other foreign country.

## ARTICLE 2.

Subjects of His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the United States of America, its territories and possessions, and nationals of the United States of America, its territories and possessions, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, shall be received and treated in accordance with the requirements and practices of generally recognised international law. In respect of their persons, possessions and rights, they shall enjoy the fullest protection of the laws and authorities of the country, and they shall not be treated in regard to their persons in any manner less favourable than the nationals of any other foreign country.

## ARTICLE 3.

In respect of import, export and other duties and charges affecting commerce and navigation, as well as in respect of transit, warehousing, and other facilities, the United States of America, its territories and possessions, will accord to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will accord to the United States of America, its territories and possessions, unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment. Every concession with respect to any duty, charge or regulation affecting commerce or navigation now accorded or that may hereafter be accorded by the United States of America, its territories and possessions, or by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to any foreign country will become immediately applicable without request and without compensation to the commerce and navigation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and of the United States of America, its territories and possessions, respectively.

## ARTICLE 4.

The stipulations of this agreement shall not extend to the treatment which is accorded by the United States of America to the commerce of Cuba under the provisions of the Commercial Convention concluded between the United States and Cuba on the 11th December, 1902, or the provisions of any other commercial convention which hereafter may be concluded between the United States of America and Cuba. Such stipulations, moreover, shall not extend to the treatment which is accorded to the commerce between the United States of America and the Panamá Canal Zone or any of the dependencies of the United States of America or to the commerce of the dependencies of the United States of America with one another under existing or future laws.

Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as a limitation of the right of either Government to impose, on such terms as it may see fit, prohibitions or restrictions of a sanitary character designed to protect human, animal or plant life, or regulations for the enforcement of police or revenue laws.

Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to affect existing statutes of either country in relation to the immigration of aliens or the right of either Government to enact such statutes.

## ARTICLE 5.

The present stipulations shall become operative on the day of signature hereof and shall remain respectively in effect until the entry in force of a definitive treaty of commerce and navigation, or until thirty days after notice of

their termination shall have been given by the Government of either country, but, should the Government of the United States of America be prevented by future action of its Legislature from carrying out the terms of these stipulations, the obligations thereof shall thereupon lapse.

## ARTICLE 6.

The English and Arabic texts of the present agreement shall be of equal validity.

Signed at London, this 7th day of November, 1933.

(Seal)

(Seal)

[E 7492/759/25]

No. 65.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 333.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, December 14, 1933.*

I HAVE noted with interest the remarks of the Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding King Ibn Saud's territorial claims in the Tihama, as reported in paragraph 3 of Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 333 of the 14th November.

2. Fuad Bey Hamza appears to have suggested that, in virtue of his treaty of 1920 with Mahomet-al-Idriai, Ibn Saud would be justified in laying claim to territory as far south as the region of Hodeids, which was at that time part of the Idriai's dominions. As you are aware, the terms of that treaty have never been made public; but it has always been assumed in this department that, although the 1920 treaty may have regulated the frontier between the territories ruled by Ibn Saud and those ruled by the Idriai, it did not give Ibn Saud any rights over the territories remaining under the Idriai's sovereignty. The transfer of ultimate sovereignty over the Idriai's remaining dominions was, in fact, effected by the Treaty of Mecca of 1926, by which date the Idriai had already lost Hodeids to the Imam.

3. It may perhaps be arguable that, since in 1926 the southern frontier of the Idriai's territories was still in dispute, in taking over those territories Ibn Saud also took over the Idriai's claims to that part of his dominions further south from which he had recently been ejected by the Imam. In view, however, of the frontier understanding of 1931 between Ibn Saud and the Imam by which a *de facto* southern frontier seems to have been established between Asir Tihama and the Yemen, running roughly from the mouth of the Wadi Tasshar to the north of the Jebel Arwa, it has hitherto been assumed that, whatever claims Ibn Saud might continue to maintain in respect of the Saudi-Yemeni borderlands east of the Jebel Arwa, a working agreement had been reached as regards the division of the Tihama. It is therefore somewhat difficult to understand Fuad Bey Hamza's suggestion that Ibn Saud still considered himself as having claims in that region also.

4. I realise that the legal position in regard to these territorial claims is in all probability extremely loose and vague. I shall be glad, however, to receive your observations on the points raised above, notably in regard to the 1920 treaty and the frontier understanding of 1931.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.



[E 7771/222/91]

No. 66.

*The Resident at Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 16.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Aden, November 29, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with your telegram of the 22nd November, 1933, on the subject of the proposed mission to Sana, and to enclose herewith translations of my letter of the 18th November, 1933, to the Imam, of his telegraphic reply of the 23rd November, 1933, received via Taiz, and of my acknowledgment thereof despatched through the same channel.

2. The mention in the Imam's telegram of the meeting to be held at Perim refers to an arrangement that had provisionally been made, at the suggestion of the Officer Commanding, Taiz, at the time of the recent Subeihi incidents, that he should meet the Political Secretary at some convenient place near the frontier (later fixed at Perim) to discuss a number of outstanding matters concerning inter-tribal relations on the Protectorate boundary facing the District of Taiz. The Yemeni authorities do not wish to proceed with this proposal, and it is in my opinion inexpedient now to press them to do so.

I have, &amp;c.

B. R. REILLY, Resident, &amp;c.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

*Resident, Aden, to the Imam.*

(After Compliments.)

Your Highness,

Aden, November 18, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Highness's letter of the 25th Safar, 1352 (the 20th June, 1933), on the subject of the proposed treaty, and to inform you that I have been authorised by His Majesty's Government to visit your Highness in Sana for the purpose of concluding this treaty.

In order, however, that there may be no possibility of misapprehension in your Highness's mind, I am directed to explain that, however satisfactorily our direct and personal negotiations may proceed, they cannot be consummated by the act of signature of the treaty unless your Highness shall previously have removed all restrictions on overland trade between the Yemen and Aden, and restored and surrendered all the territories and subjects of the chiefs who are in treaty relations with His Majesty's Government, especially the territories of the Amir of Dhala in the vicinity of Sana, and the territories of the Audhali Sultan at Adh Dhaher, and the subjects of the latter chief, and of the Chiefs of Beihan, without damage or detriment to property or person.

I desire, moreover, to make it clear to your Highness that although I have been authorised to discuss with you certain variations of wording in the text of the treaty which was put forward in your Highness's letter of the 25th Safar, 1352, to which I have referred, His Majesty's Government cannot agree to any form of secret annex such as was suggested by your Highness.

Having made these conditions clear to your Highness, I now have much pleasure in notifying you of my readiness to proceed to Sana at an early date; and subject to your Highness's convenience and consent, I would propose to leave Aden by sea on the 15th December, 1933 (the 27th Shaban, 1352), to arrive at Hodeida on the following day, and to proceed onwards by car immediately, arriving at Sana on the 19th December, 1933 (the 2nd Ramadhan, 1352). I propose to bring with me Mr. Champion, the political secretary, and another British officer, and personal staff and attendants to the number of about eleven persons. If these proposals meet with your Highness's approval, I would suggest that the details in regard to transport and other necessities and arrangements for my journey should be settled in direct correspondence between the political secretary and your Highness's Governor at Hodeida.

I shall be glad if your Highness will favour me with your reply at the earliest possible moment, and by the quickest means, viz., by telegraph via Taiz or Perim, in order that I may complete the preparations necessary for my journey and for my absence from Aden.

I have the honour to convey to your Highness the expression of my sincere satisfaction at the possibility of our early meeting, and my earnest hope that it will result in a complete and honourable settlement.

B. R. REILLY,

*Resident and Commander-in-Chief.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

*Telegram from the Imam to the Resident, Aden.*

November 23, 1933 (Shaban 5, 1352).

WE have received your esteemed letter of the 30th Rajab, 1352 (the 18th November, 1933), and are thankful to you for the explanation given therein.

We say nothing other than "Welcome," and we welcome your visit at the time fixed by you, and even though it will be in the days of Ramazan, which may be inconvenient, yet it behoves your benevolence to show forgiveness. We will be waiting to receive your Excellency with honour, together with those whom you wish to bring with you.

We have now ordered our son, Seif-al-Islam Abdulla-bin-el-Imam, at Hodeida, to be ready to attend to all that you communicate to him. Such being the case, there remains no necessity for the meeting to be held at Perim. By the will of God and your good endeavours and sincerity, there will, as you have said, be a full and honourable settlement.

Please accept our best respects, esteem and honour.

Enclosure 3 in No. 66.

*Telegram from the Resident, Aden, to the Imam.*

November 27, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed telegram of the 5th Shaban and to express to your Highness my high satisfaction that we shall meet so soon, and my sincere thanks for your kind welcome. I shall communicate with your son Seif-al-Islam Abdulla at Hodeida. I agree that the Perim meeting can be cancelled. I reciprocate your sincere wishes for a complete and honourable settlement Inshallah.

[E 7966/902/25]

No. 67.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 28.)*

(No. 347. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 4, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for November 1933.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 67.

JEDDA REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1933.

I.—Internal Affairs.

233. Ibn Saud remained in Nejd during the month.

234. Amir Feisal returned to Mecca from summering in Taif early in November and almost at once left for Jedda, where he arrived on the 8th. He received His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in formal audience on the 9th and again, this time on business (see paragraph 252), on the 15th. He returned to Mecca on the 17th.



235. Fuad Bey Hamza arrived back in Mecca from Riyadh (see paragraph 209) in the first week of November and visited Jedda twice during the remainder of the month. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had a lengthy conversation with him on the 12th, the first since the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs' return from leave, and again on the 21st.

236. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman continued to flit backwards and forwards between Mecca and Jedda, chiefly occupied with the administration of his departments. He is now perhaps less busily employed in organising the despatch of troops and supplies to Asir (see paragraph 244), as Saudi military preparations in the south are believed to be more or less complete. He is, however, bending his energies to intensive deep-sea fishing and generally, nowadays, has some new record to announce. From his activities as Minister of Finance it is not surprising to find him endowed with all the instincts of the born angler. Mr. Calvert was his guest some weeks ago at a late-night fishing expedition.

237. The young Amir of Jedda, Sheikh Abdul-Aziz-bin-Muammar, who left for Riyadh on the 4th August to get married (see paragraph 167) returned to his post on the 30th November.

238. On the 10th November the *Umm-al-Qura* announced the appointment of Asad Effendi-al-Faqih to the post of assistant in the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He is another Syrian recruit to Saudi officialdom and, as he speaks French, has probably been selected by Fuad Bey Hamza, whose knowledge of that language is elementary, partly on that account.

239. The *Umm-al-Qura* stated, in its issue of the 24th November, that a municipal administration had now been inaugurated at Riyadh; that royal palaces and Government departments had been linked up by telephone; and that the system had been further extended from the Al Badia Palace and the royal residence to the Riyadh wireless station. It pointed out with pride that last year a police administration was set up, and added that the lighting of the main streets of the capital is now contemplated.

240. (Reference paragraph 211.) Mr. K. S. Twitchell returned on the 15th from the Hasa coast, where he left the Standard Oil Company of California's geologists at work.

241. Mr. Philby's difficulties with the Saudi Government over Sharqieh (Limited)'s motor and tyre concession were briefly referred to at paragraph 212 in Jedda report for last month. These difficulties had been brewing for several months, and may be attributed to Sharqieh (Limited)'s failure to carry out their obligations under their contract with the Government. The latter were in urgent need, for military purposes in connexion with their expeditionary force in Asir, of 200 motor vehicles and a supply of tyres, but Mr. Philby had left for Europe on the 18th May and the vehicles and tyres had failed to materialise. Further, the company's skeleton staff in Jedda had made no attempt to open up service stations in accordance with the terms of the concession. Whilst in England, Mr. Philby got wind of an arrangement under consideration by the Minister of Finance, whereby a consignment of British tyres in the Customs here, imported by Muhammad Sadiq, the King's Indian chauffeur upon authorisation given, it is said, before the grant of the tyre monopoly to Sharqieh (Limited), was to be taken over by the Government. He telegraphed protesting against the infringement of his concession and was thereupon allowed by Ibn Saud one month in which to return and effect an arrangement with the Minister of Finance and Muhammad Sadiq. Mr. Philby, as was recorded last month, returned in haste and negotiations took place between him, the Minister of Finance, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., Muhammad Sadiq and a representative of General Motors, a Mr. Daimpre, who had in the meantime also arrived here from Egypt. The result, in brief, was the virtual abrogation of the Sharqieh concession in regard to motor vehicles and the signature of a contract for the supply of fifty Chevrolet trucks with Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., as agents, and Sadiq, as sub-agent, on terms considerably less favourable to the Government than Sharqieh (Limited) had been prepared to offer. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 17th November contained an announcement in which the Sharqieh concession in regard to cars was, in effect, abrogated, though the contract in respect of tyres appears to have been maintained, probably in some modified form. Mr. Philby, who still appears to hope to import Fords for pilgrimage and private uses, though only in open competition, left hurriedly for Egypt on the 17th. His journey is said to have been taken in order to make an arrangement with Ford's to

supply cars for Government use and he is believed to have received an advance of money from the Government for this purpose. He was still away at the end of the month.

242. The demise of the National Bank scheme (and the Jedda-Mecca Railway project, for the fate of the latter now seems as apparent as that of the former), has seemingly not quenched all hope in this country of a national bank. The forthcoming visit by aeroplane from Cairo of Talaat Pasha Harb, Egyptian Senator and chairman of directors of the Banque Misr, though ostensibly for other purposes (see paragraph 254 below), is considered here to be not unconnected with a possible extension of the activities of the Banque Misr to this country.

243. (Reference paragraphs 168 and 194.) The Hyderabad textile industry scheme at Medina, organised by Dr. Moin-ud-Din, is receiving further supplies from India, a quantity of material, including twelve looms, having arrived here towards the end of the month.

244. There has been no appreciable change in the situation in Asir (reference paragraph 217) during November. Strong rumours were current locally during the first half of the month that Saudi troops had crossed the frontier in the Tihama and after heavy fighting had penetrated as far south as Medi. Both Amir Feisal and Fuad Bey Hamza categorically denied these reports to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and the *Umm-al-Qura* published on the 24th an article, of obviously official inspiration, containing a similar *démenti* of reports alleged to have appeared also in the foreign press. Saudi military preparations are thought to be now complete, but recruiting is believed to be going on still, and on the 13th November a further batch of from 400-500 troops left Jedda by sea for Jizan. The general situation will be further treated below in connexion with Saudi relations with the Yemen (see paragraph 245).

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

245. There has been no *détente* in the relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya during the month (see paragraphs 219 and 220). In Asir (see paragraph 244 above) the general position remained much the same, save that additional reinforcements continued to be drafted south. In Najran Imamic forces still maintained a substantial hold on the district and still occupied Badr, its principal centre. Latterly, however, according to Fuad Bey Hamza, a sub-tribe of the Beni Yam had scored a local success in driving the Yemenis out of and in occupying the Wadi Habuna, in the vicinity of Badr, a fertile and inhabited prolongation of the Wadi Najran. If the military tempo remained *moderato sostenuto* it was in accordance with strict orders from Riyadh, and was due to Ibn Saud's desire to preserve as favourable an atmosphere as possible for diplomatic exchanges, the tempo of which quickened during the month. On the 2nd November Ibn Saud replied, through Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, to Mr. Calvert's representations of the 30th October (see paragraph 220) reiterating his desire for peace, declaring that his overtures to the Imam Yahya had been rejected and denouncing the latter's territorial pretensions, his military aggressiveness and his intrigues to foment internal trouble in Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud was therefore compelled to take measures for the defence of his country. A settlement, however, was necessary and he summarised his claims under four heads: (a) Surrender of the Idrisi; (b) evacuation of Najran; (c) establishment of present frontiers; and (d) reaffirmation of the present treaty (of December 1931) between the two countries. On the 12th Fuad Bey Hamza stated that Ibn Saud had received a communication from the Imam enquiring the reason for the concentration of Saudi troops on the Asir frontier, to which Ibn Saud replied two days later that it was precautionary and was due to similar concentration in the Yemen. He took the opportunity afforded by this resumption of correspondence of reformulating his demands, his four points, and inviting the Imam's observations on them. Fuad Bey stated that an ultimatum had been prepared, together with a Green Book setting forth the Saudi case, and its issue would depend upon the nature of the Imam's reply to Ibn Saud's last message. Fuad Bey asserted Ibn Saud's determination to avoid hostilities "at all costs," and gave what are undoubtedly two weighty reasons for this attitude—that were Ibn Saud to take the first step in a fratricidal Arab war he would assuredly forfeit the sympathy of the whole Islamic world; and that a war would prove financially disastrous to Saudi Arabia in the present difficult economic



circumstances of the country. Fuad Bey also expressed misgivings as to the attitude of the Italian Government in the event of war, but later in the month he informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires confidentially that he had received friendly assurances from the Italians, which may help to dissipate Saudi uneasiness on that score.

246. The Imam in due course replied to Ibn Saud's communication, accepting a proposal for a conference, but maintaining silence on the subject of the four points. This elicited a rejoinder that the omission to clarify the principal issues beforehand made a facile acceptance of a conference proposal by no means agreeable to Ibn Saud. The request for the Imam's views was again made, and during the last ten days of November the Imam replied with no less than three telegrams, each one asking for additional information on the four points. Fuad Bey considered the questions were insincere and procrastinating, but Ibn Saud had replied fully in each case. The situation was unsatisfactory and Fuad Bey personally was inclined to believe the issue of the ultimatum could not long be delayed. In fact, he said, the tribes on the Asir frontier might anticipate an ultimatum by coming to blows at almost any day.

247. On the 18th November His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, under instructions, informed the Saudi Government by semi-official letter to Fuad Bey Hamza, of the present situation between the Aden Protectorate and the Yemen and of His Majesty's Government's intention to send Colonel Reilly to Sanaa to negotiate a treaty with the Imam. The Saudi Government was assured that this step, the outcome of negotiations which antedated the present Saudi-Yemeni imbroglio, implied no change in the feelings of friendship His Majesty's Government entertained for the Saudi Arab Government, but that on the contrary it was hoped that it might present an opportunity to His Majesty's Government to exercise their influence with the Imam to reduce the dangers in the present situation between the two Arab States. On the 27th Mr. Calvert received Fuad Bey's reply in which Ibn Saud acknowledged and expressed his gratitude for these assurances. The King felt, however, that His Majesty's Government would discover in their dealings with the Imam that he flattered only to deceive.

248. (Reference paragraph 222.) Mr. Calvert discussed with Fuad Bey the question of the exchange of ratifications of the Saudi-Transjordan Treaty on the 12th November, the first opportunity since the return of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs from abroad. Fuad Bey, on this occasion, forbore to press the earlier Saudi proposal of an exchange at Jedda, and suggested that the formality should take place either in Egypt or at Jerusalem. The question was still under consideration at the end of the month.

249. The suggestion referred to at paragraph 19, that a personal meeting between the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan and Ibn Saud might prove useful, was further pursued by Mr. Calvert in conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza on the 21st November. Fuad Bey promised to refer to Ibn Saud, and on the 27th informed Mr. Calvert that the King welcomed the suggestion, but found it difficult to fix a date earlier than the middle of March, and proposed, further, that he should proceed to the meeting, whenever it took place, by embarking at Jedda. The matter was still receiving His Majesty's Government's consideration at the end of the month.

250. On the 28th November two cases of robbery of camels belonging to Transjordan tribes by members of the Beni Atiya tribe encamped in the Hejaz were brought to the notice of the Saudi Government. Whilst there had been no time for an official reply before the end of the month, Fuad Bey informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, orally, that he understood a number of camels, which were stolen in July and August last, had already been returned. An official statement is awaited. In this connexion Fuad Bey observed that he gathered that relations between Saudi and Transjordan frontier authorities were cordial. He added that Abdullah-as-Sdayri, Governor of Tebuk, had been recently on a visit to Mecca, and had returned to his post, where his brother (probably Abdul Aziz-as-Sdayri) had acted for him, about the 28th November.

251. (Reference paragraph 200.) On the 28th November His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires addressed Fuad Bey Hamza on the subject of the frontier post of Hazim, stating that the Transjordan Government were unable to agree that this place lay on the frontier line between the two countries, but that it was situated well within Transjordan territory. The Saudi military post was still in the vicinity of Hazim, but its relations with the Arab Legion post there

continued to be friendly. The communication concluded with a suggestion that reciprocal arrangements might be made for the posts on either side to water at Hazim and at Isawiya in Saudi territory respectively. No reply had been received at the end of the month.

### III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

252. In anticipation of the expiration on the 17th November of the Saudi moratorium in respect of their governmental debts, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, under instruction, made oral representations to Amir Feisal on the 15th to the effect that His Majesty's Government now expected the Saudi Government to make a serious attempt to deal with this long outstanding question. On the 18th His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, in an official note, requested the repayment of the principal of the debts in question. On the 21st Fuad Bey stated that a written reply was in preparation, but in the meantime stated verbally that, owing to the serious economic situation of the country and recent political development (alluding to the dispute with the Yemen), his Government found themselves unable at present to liquidate their indebtedness to His Majesty's Government, although plans to that end had been drawn up earlier in the year. The official reply was duly received on the 27th, and was couched in much the same terms. The next step in the matter was receiving careful consideration at the end of the month.

253. (Reference paragraph 151.) There has been recently a decided recrudescence of complaints from British subjects and protected persons, chauffeurs of Government and other motor vehicles, that the authorities were refusing to renew driving licences to all foreign chauffeurs who failed to adopt Saudi nationality. No regulations have been published by the Saudi authorities on the subject, and as many cases of hardship are occurring owing to inadequate notice of termination of employment, Mr. Calvert on the 12th November brought the matter orally to the notice of Fuad Bey Hamza, who promised to make enquiries. He is still enquiring.

254. During the latter half of the month it became known in Jedda that the Egyptian Senator and chairman of the directors of the Banque Misr, Talaat Pasha Harb (see paragraph 242 above), was expected to arrive here by air early in December, from Suez, stopping *en route* at Tor, Wejh and Yanbu. On the 19th one of the staff of Misr-Airwork, a ground engineer, arrived here and a landing ground close to the town was eventually selected. With the co-operation of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), as agents, preparations were going actively forward at the end of the month for the arrival of the plane on the 3rd December. The objects of the visit are stated to be (a) the selection of a local shipping representative for the two pilgrim ships, steamship *Zamzam* and steamship *Nil*, which, it is understood, have recently been acquired by the Egyptian Government for the conveyance of Egyptian pilgrims to and from the Hejaz; (b) the organisation of the sale of Egyptian products in this country, in particular the cotton goods produced by a subsidiary company of the Banque Misr; and (c) to explore the possibility of the Banque Misr extending its activities to this country by assuming the functions of a State Bank. Misr-Airwork, also, may not be indifferent to the opportunity of displaying their aircraft to the Saudi Government, whose guests the members of the Egyptian Mission will be during their stay in this country.

255. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires, Signor Tonci, left on the 17th for two weeks' local leave in Egypt, where he was to meet his wife, whom he proposed to bring to Jedda on his return. Shortly before his departure he informed Mr. Calvert that he still had no news of the nomination of a successor to Signor De Peppo, the late Minister.

256. (Reference paragraph 228.) M. Maigret, the French Chargé d'Affaires, did not arrive, as expected, on the 12th, and had not returned from leave at the end of the month. Nothing further has been heard of his proposed excursion to Riyadh.

257. Foreign missions in Jedda, otherwise, are slowly returning to full complement. The Dutch Chargé d'Affaires returned on the 5th. His Legation has acquired a new doctor, Abdurrahman, who arrived from Java on the 17th and who will be in charge of the medical work of the Dutch Legation, both in Mecca and Jedda. Dr. Hartmann's contract, therefore, terminates at the end of December, and it is thought he will not be long in shaking the dust of Jedda from



his feet. The Persian Chargé returned from leave in Syria on the 19th, but expects to be transferred to Tehran within a few weeks, his successor, Muhammad Ali Khan Maqdam, having been already named. Habibullah Khan Hoveyda has been given the rank of Persian Minister, but this is not to take effect whilst he is still in this country.

258. On the 10th November the *Umm-al-Qura* announced that diplomatic notes, relating to commerce, shipping, &c., had been signed on the 7th in London by the United States Ambassador and the Saudi Arab Minister on behalf of their respective Governments. This development follows, it may be assumed, the grant of the Hasa Oil Concession to an American company.

259. Telegrams of condolence and acknowledgment were exchanged between Ibn Saud and King Muhammad of Afghanistan and Amir Feisal and Ghulam Yahya, the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the assassination of King Nadir Shah.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

260. The sloop H.M.S. *Penzance* (Commander R. H. Bevan, R.N.), arrived in Jedda Roads on the 18th and left for Port Sudan on the 23rd November.

261. The Indian vice-consul and pilgrimage officer returned from leave on the 19th, and the Malay pilgrimage officer arrived on the 21st from Malaya, thus completing the Legation's pilgrimage staff in readiness for the forthcoming season. The first pilgrim ship to arrive was the steamship *Peisander* from Sourabaya, with a matter of some 680 pilgrims on board. She has since been followed by other ships. It is, however, still too early to form a reliable estimate of the size of this year's pilgrimage.

262. The position in regard to the manumission of slaves in November was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month : None.  
Took refuge in November : None.  
Manumitted in November and repatriated : None.  
Locally manumitted : None.  
On hand at the end of the month : None.

[E 7969/234/25]

No. 68.

Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 351.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 5, 1933.

IN my telegram No. 197 of the 15th November I had the honour to indicate certain aspects of the local financial situation which might have a bearing on the Saudi attitude towards repayment of their debts. I submit herewith a somewhat fuller review of the situation.

2. All indications are that the Saudi Government are making the most determined efforts to reduce expenditure to a minimum and to lose no chance of augmenting their income, in order to leave themselves the widest possible margin for the heavy expenditure entailed by the military preparations now being undertaken. The latter are, of course, on a scale unparalleled in the history of this country, for tribal contingents from every quarter of Arabia have now been sent south, together with all available munitions, including even such items as a battery of field-guns from Medina brought in by the Turks before the Great War. The tribesmen receive little or no actual pay, but need equipment, food and transport; a recent Mecca estimate put the present expenditure under this head at £5,000 a day. The figure is doubtless exaggerated and will be reduced in any case once the army has been transported to the required area, but even a tenth of this figure would be a sufficient drain on the Saudi income. To minimise it, the Government have recently taken to themselves importing such necessities as paraffin, rice and sugar through certain old and trusted local firms such as Haji Zeinal Ali Ridha, with whom the Minister of Finance has been in relations since his Bombay days. This practice has hit other merchants hard.

3. The revenue has diminished almost to vanishing point. As you are aware, the bulk of it is derived from two sources, pilgrims and customs receipts. The pilgrimage of 1933, 20,000, was the worst since the inauguration of the Saudi régime, and the prospects for 1934 tend to suggest that little, if any, improvement can be looked for. At present three pilgrim ships have arrived from the Straits and Java, bearing exiguous cargoes of pilgrims, and bookings are reported poor. The decline in the average value of pilgrims is moreover noticeable. Better-class and rich pilgrims are becoming rarer, and the tendency seems to be more and more for the pilgrimage to be confined to peasants, who bring with them the minimum sum necessary to do the pilgrimage in the cheapest manner. This reduces the total of their purchasing power and with it that of the shopkeepers and other classes of Hejazi who live by them.

4. The decline in customs receipts cannot be measured, for no statistics are available, but must be considerable. The decreased number of pilgrims, the uncertainty of future numbers, the decline in the purchasing power of the people, the excessive increase of customs dues last May (see Jedda despatch No. 154) and the heavy stocks still held by local merchants as a legacy from the last eighteen months, have all contributed to the reduction of imports. Figures contributed privately by the Director of Customs are remarkable; during the first eight months of the current Arabic year (April to November 1933) the number of packages imported through Jedda was 9,847, as compared with 48,735 during a similar period last year.

5. Customs receipts are in any case heavily mortgaged by the system of drafts which the Saudi Government have adopted to an increasing extent in the last two years as a means of satisfying creditors without paying them. Fuad Bey Hamza told me on the 1st December that no such drafts had been issued since the beginning of the current Arabic year. My information suggests that this statement is not entirely accurate, and that certain favoured creditors, notably the importing firm mentioned in paragraph 2, have, in effect, received such drafts; and that, moreover, these new drafts are "100 per cent." ones, i.e., allowing the importer to admit goods free of all duty until the amount of the draft is paid off, instead of the "25 per cent." once formerly issued which merely entitle him to write off one-quarter of the amount of duty on each consignment while paying the remaining three-quarters in cash. In any case, the total of the drafts issued previous to this Arabic year and still unredeemed must be very large. The Soviets are stated to hold such drafts in respect of their 1931 importation of kerosene and benzine, but to be holding them until such time as they can import with less certainty of loss.

6. All Government revenue is collected—one might say snatched—at the earliest moment and remitted to Riyadh. Forced loans on merchants, which were such a feature of the autumn of 1931, have not been in evidence, principally because of the lack of merchants rich enough to afford them, though this method was recently resorted to to pay Mr. Philby for a consignment of tyres. A tendency to impose new taxes, for example, on motor launches and on water-carts, is, however, noticeable.

7. Meantime other Government expenditure is cut down to the barest minimum. Official salaries are even more in arrear than usual; for many months employees were being paid on the principle "one-third cash, one-third kind, one-third carried forward," but even this has now been modified to "all carried." Bribing is consequently even easier, cheaper and more prevalent than before. Money is refused for all kinds of necessary and even profitable expenditure; the condenser engineer laments the lack of essential spares, and the piping necessary to supply Jedda with good water is not forthcoming. Even contingency allowances for Government offices have of late been held up. Redemption of debt, in such an atmosphere, seems the height of improbability.

8. The currency position reflects the general situation: the Saudi rial, which a year ago stood at 18½ to the £ gold and two years ago at 17½, is now fluctuating round 26. The value of its silver content is understood to be about 30 and, while at the moment it is showing a slight tendency to rise, as it does each year before the pilgrimage on account of the demand for it created by the arrival of pilgrims, the general opinion is that, after the pilgrimage, it will depreciate to nearly 30.

9. Despite the catalogue of depression in the preceding paragraphs, there is some reason to believe that the régime is in reality far from bankrupt and



that its protestations of poverty are the result of Semitic cupidity and dislike of disbursement, far more than of actual lack of money. The Minister of Finance has been noticed to be far less worried than he might be expected to be and the Royal Family still seem able to afford luxury cars. The money, however, it is agreed, is not in the Hejaz, but where it has been remitted so steadily and so long by the faithful Minister of Finance—Riyadh.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7970/7639/25]

No. 69.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 28.)*

(No. 352.)

Sir,

*Jedda, December 5, 1933.*

TALAAT PASHA HARB, whose anticipated visit to this country by air was reported in my despatch No. 338, Confidential, of the 22nd November, duly arrived in Jedda on the 3rd December, accompanied by three others associated with him in this mission. He was met on the landing-ground close to the town, which for the previous two days had been the scene of considerable activity, by the Amir of Jedda, a posse of local notables and a large concourse of the inhabitants. He had left Egypt on the 2nd December and had spent the night at Tor, where he had taken the opportunity of inspecting the quarantine station. He had resumed his journey on the 3rd, had descended at Wejh, where a stay of some little time was made, and at Yanbu, where a short stay was necessary for the purpose of refuelling. His pilot was Mr. G. J. Mahony, of Misr-Airwork, S.A.E.

2. It is still early to learn more than I was able to report in my despatch under reference as to the objects of his visit and the measure of success he is likely to achieve. I understand from my Egyptian colleague that Talaat Pasha is pleased with his reception by the Saudi authorities. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, the Minister of Finance, has been in Jedda during the past two days, and I learn that conversations have been proceeding at the Kandara Palace, where the members of the mission are being entertained as the guests of the Saudi Government.

3. Talaat Pasha, whom I met for a short time to-day, informed me that he proposed to leave for Mecca by car to-morrow and expected to return in two or three days' time. He would take to the air again on the 9th December for Yanbu, whence he intended to go to Medina by car, returning to resume his journey to Egypt from Yanbu two days later.

4. His visit has naturally received a good deal of local attention, and has, it is believed, excited considerable interest in Government circles. One is inclined to wonder how far Fuad Bey Hamza, during his leave, which was partly spent in Egypt, was instrumental in preparing the ground for this visit. At any rate, the obvious intention of Talaat Pasha is to create an impression as favourable to the objects he has in view as he possibly can. The D.H. Dragon aeroplane has been partly occupied since its arrival in carrying out short demonstration flights for the benefit of both European and native passengers. I am also informed by my Egyptian colleague that Talaat Pasha, to mark the occasion, brought with him a large selection of goods, probably of Egyptian manufacture, for distribution as charity to the poor of this country. It is pleasant to observe this pious practice, one of the five obligations of the true Moslem, going so happily hand in hand with, and sanctifying, a more material commercial purpose. I hope to be in a position to report further on this matter in due course.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Department of Overseas Trade, and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

## CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 3543/7/93]

No. 70.

*Air Ministry to Foreign Office.—(Received July 1.)*

(Secret.)

THE Secretary, Air Ministry, presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, and begs to transmit, for the information of Secretary Sir John Simon, copy of the report by the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, on the second phase of the Assyrian Nationalist movement and the reorganisation of the Iraq Levies.

*Air Ministry, June 29, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 70.

*Report on the Second Phase of the Assyrian Nationalist Movement and the Reorganisation of the Iraq Levies.*

(By Air Vice-Marshal C. S. Burnett, Air Officer Commanding Iraq Command.)

*Assyrian Political Situation prior to December 1932.*

THE events of June and July 1932 are described in a report to the Air Ministry submitted by my predecessor, dated the 3rd August, 1932.

2. The events between November 1932 and May 1933 may be regarded as the second phase of the Assyrian Nationalist movement. At the opening of this phase the situation was briefly as follows:—

3. Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the East, representing the Assyrian community, had gone to Geneva in September 1932 to state the Assyrian cause before the League of Nations, and it was expected that a decision would be given about the middle of December.

4. As the result of a letter sent by Mar Shimun in July in accordance with his agreement with the High Commissioner, all Assyrian officers and men of the Iraq Levy units had given an undertaking, on their word of honour, to serve the British Government loyally and truly until an answer was received from the League of Nations. If they wished to take their discharge on receipt of this reply, they would not go in a body, but would be discharged over a reasonable period, not exceeding one month, and in accordance with the orders of their British officers.

5. In a letter dated the 28th June, 1932, the High Commissioner had assured Mar Shimun that the Assyrians in the Iraq Levies would be kept at the existing strength until the 15th December, 1932, or until an answer was received from the League of Nations, whichever should be the earlier.

*The Iraq Levy Organisation prior to December 1932.*

6. Prior to the advent of the political troubles plans had been made for the conversion of the Iraq Levies into the force outlined in article 4 of the annexure to the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance of June 1930, as amplified by a secret letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the High Commissioner, dated the 30th June, 1930.

In brief, this force was to consist of not more than 1,250 men, exclusive of British personnel, and paid for by His Majesty's Government. It was to be regarded as part of the forces of the King of Iraq, but was to be commanded by a British officer under the Air Officer Commanding, who would have full powers to make rules regarding recruitment, administration and conditions of service, &c.

Negotiations were proceeding with the Iraqi Government for the legalisation



of the force, its conditions of service had been prepared in draft form, and a tentative establishment had also been worked out.

7. As the result of the Assyrian political unrest in June and July 1932, it was decided that the racial constitution of the Iraq Levies must be modified so as not only to avoid undue preponderance of one race in the force, but also to make available personnel physically suitable for service in Southern Iraq. It was intended that detachments of the force should eventually be stationed at Basra and Shaibah, where the climate is unsuitable for Assyrians. As a preliminary move in July 1932 recruiting was initiated for two companies of Marsh Arabs and one company of Kurds.

8. At the beginning of November 1932 the total number of native personnel in the force was 1,429, consisting of:—

Assyrians	...	...	...	1,195
Arabs	...	...	...	110
Kurds	...	...	...	55
Transport personnel (mostly Kurds)	...	...	...	69
Total	...	...	...	1,429

9. The Arabs and Kurds were organised as three cadre companies. In view of the more satisfactory Assyrian situation after July 1932 these companies were not brought up to full strength for financial reasons, but plans were made for rapid recruiting to full strength should further Assyrian trouble develop, or to meet the situation if the Assyrians should decide to take their discharges within the month's period referred to in paragraph 4 above.

10. To conform with the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, and in the interests of economy, it was considered most desirable to bring this force, if possible, down to its authorised strength of 1,250 native ranks by the 1st April, 1933. At the same time, however, recruiting of the two Arab and one Kurdish companies required to be completed to bring them to full strength, involving an addition of 180 Arabs and 50 Kurds. If this recruiting were completed without discharge of Assyrians, the force would have totalled 1,699 men. It was therefore necessary that about 450 Assyrians should be discharged before the 1st April, 1933.

#### *Decision of the League and return of Mar Shimun.*

11. On the 16th December, 1932, information was received stating that the Council of the League of Nations had adopted a resolution in regard to the Assyrian petition. Its general effect was that the demand of the Assyrians for administrative autonomy in Iraq could not be accepted. It noted with satisfaction the declaration of the representatives of Iraq that the intention of the Iraqi Government to select from outside Iraq a foreign expert to assist them for a limited period in the settlement of all landless inhabitants of Iraq, included Assyrians. It registered confidence that if these measures did not provide a complete solution of the problem and should there remain Assyrians not willing or unable to settle in Iraq, the Iraqi Government would take all steps possible to facilitate settlement of such Assyrians elsewhere.

12. On the 4th January, 1933, Mar Shimun arrived in Bagdad from Geneva. In collaboration with His Majesty's Ambassador, it was decided that he must be met immediately on arrival, and our joint views about the Assyrian situation and the Iraq Levies presented to him, almost in the form of an ultimatum before he had time to initiate any action himself. Mar Shimun expressed to us his disappointment at the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, and stated that he had lodged a formal protest at Geneva. He hinted that the large number of unemployed and landless Assyrian families might be driven to desperate methods to provide for the necessities of life.

13. The question of the Iraq Levies was then discussed. Mar Shimun was told by me that the Assyrians in the levies must now make an immediate decision as to whether any of them were to continue to serve, or whether any of them were to take their discharges in the month's period. This was qualified by my insisting that any Assyrian, Kurd or Arab re-engaged or remaining in the force must give an oath to refrain from any form of political activity, or from making political demands individually or collectively during his service. Secondly, he

was told that it was necessary for us to continue our measures to reduce the levies to the new establishment of 1,250 ranks by the 1st April, 1933. He was told that to allow for the completion of the Arab and Kurd recruiting, which was in hand, it was essential that we should discharge about 450 of the Assyrians whose engagements expired before the 1st April, 1933.

14. Thirdly, he was also told that it would be necessary for us to reduce the number of Assyrians still further in due course, but that to avoid undue hardship these discharges would be spread over a period of months until the number of Assyrian companies, which were to be retained, had ultimately been decided upon. Throughout the discussions I aimed at conveying to Mar Shimun the conviction that, although we intended to implement all promises previously made, I was not prepared to have any Assyrians in the force unless they could be absolutely relied on.

15. All these points were subsequently embodied in letters to Mar Shimun, and in order that he should not play for time by indefinitely deferring his decision, he was told that it was necessary for him to give a definite decision by midnight, the 17th January, 1933.

16. During the interval between 4th and 17th January, 1933, plans were made to deal with the complete discharge of Assyrians, and for measures to meet any possible political unrest which might arise, and for the Arab and Kurdish personnel, supplemented by rapidly recruited new men, to carry out the essential duties of the Iraq Levies.

17. It did not prove necessary to carry any of these measures into effect. After the exchange of several telegrams with Air Headquarters, Mar Shimun held a conference of representative Assyrian officers serving in the Iraq Levies, on the 16th January, 1933, in the course of which he gave his strong advice to continue their service in the levies according to the new conditions. This advice was accepted and Mar Shimun thereupon instructed them to pass the messages on to officers and men in their respective units on their return to their stations. I had interviewed Mar Shimun at Mosul immediately prior to this conference, and had impressed upon him that there was no reasonable or sensible alternative to him taking this attitude. On the 18th January I informed the Air Ministry that I had received definite assurance that the Assyrians would continue their service in accordance with my new terms and under the new conditions, and that I intended to proceed with the measures previously contemplated for the reorganisation of the force.

#### *Decisions regarding Levy Reorganisation.*

##### *Status of the Force.*

18. By January it had become obvious that considerable delay would be involved in the carrying out by the Iraqi Government of the legalisation measures necessary to afford a satisfactory status of the "Air Defence Force" into which the Iraq Levies were to be converted after the treaty. I therefore decided on receiving an assurance from the legal advisers to the Iraqi Government, that we were in a sound legal position to retain a levy force until the new force was formed, to convert the levies so far as strength, organisation, pay, &c., were concerned into the form decided upon for the Air Defence Force, if possible by the 1st April, 1933, without awaiting the legalisation measures by the Iraqi Government.

##### *Constitution of the Force.*

19. The future force was to consist of 17 British officers, 8 British warrant officers and n.c.o.'s, and 1,250 native ranks. It was to be organised into a headquarters, a sub-headquarters for the administration of the detachments in Southern Iraq and eight companies.

The racial constitution of the force had been subject to much consideration with a view to ensuring, firstly, a racial balance, secondly, suitable personnel to meet the varied climatic conditions of Northern, Central and Southern Iraq, and thirdly, a fighting personnel, whose loyal services could be relied upon in the event of internal disturbance in Iraq. I decided that immediate needs could be met by raising the two Arab and one Kurdish companies to full strength. It would then be possible to base the future decisions upon a better knowledge



of how the Assyrians were accepting the new conditions, bearing in mind that the sooner we could remove this factor of uncertainty in the future of personnel of the force, the better it would be for all concerned.

#### *Location of the Force.*

20. The eventual location of the force had been previously decided upon provisionally as headquarters and four companies at Hinaidi, one company at Mosul, and a sub-headquarters and three companies in the Southern Area, distributed between Basra and Shaibah. Diana and Sulaimani, where the majority of the levies have in the past been stationed, were to be evacuated, and the building handed over to the Iraqi Government.

#### *Reduction of Strength.*

21. The number of Assyrian discharges which it was immediately necessary to carry out to bring the force on to the new establishment was about 450. I decided to effect all these discharges, if it were possible, but to do so in such a way as to avoid the breaking of any man's contract, and thereby causing discontent; to avoid having any large number of discharges leaving any one station at one time, and to ensure that the men retained in the force were the best of those available for future service. Furthermore, it was desirable that every effort be made simultaneously with the discharges, with the Iraqi Government for some measures for the placing of the discharged men in civil employment.

Being subject to these limitations the discharge programme required very careful organisation, and it was therefore placed under centralised control by Air Headquarters.

#### *Recruiting.*

22. Recruiting during the transition period was similarly closely controlled by Air Headquarters in order to ensure that the financial aspect received full consideration, and that any overbearing of personnel was avoided.

#### *Execution of the Reorganisation.*

23. The stages in the execution of the reorganisation of the force are given below in diary form:—

*February 1, 1933.*—To ensure that Mar Shimun's promise that all Assyrians in the levies would in future refrain from political activity, a form was prepared incorporating an oath to this effect (see Appendix (A)). Sufficient forms were issued for every man to be sworn personally, and for the completed form to be included in his official papers. Authorised Syriac, Arabic and Kurdish translations were issued simultaneously to ensure uniformity of local translation. Orders were issued that the taking of the oath was to be carried out in such a way as to impress its importance upon all ranks.

#### *Move of the Arab Company to Shaibah.*

*February 8, 1933.*—Orders were issued for one Arab company to move to Shaibah to take over the guard duties from Iraq army there with effect from the 1st March, 1933.

#### *Levy Guard on A.O.C.'s Residence.*

*February 8, 1933.*—Assyrians were again detailed as guards on the A.O.C.'s residence, to mount alternately with Arabs.

#### *New Establishment.*

*February 14, 1933.*—Information was received from the Air Ministry that the new establishment of the force had been agreed to.

#### *Recruiting and Re-engagement Procedure.*

*February 14, 1933.*—New engagement and re-engagement forms incorporating the oath of abstention from political activity, and provisional conditions of service were issued to levy units.

#### *Employment of Discharged Assyrians.*

*February 15, 1933.*—After discussion with the British Ambassador and the Iraqi Government about the finding of employment for discharged men, it was decided that each dischargée should furnish particulars about his desire for future employment, for the information of the Iraqi Government. The requisite form (see Appendix (B)),<sup>(1)</sup> was issued for use by the levies.

#### *Conditions of Service.*

*February 18, 1933.*—The new conditions of service for native ranks having received Air Ministry approval, they were promulgated to all concerned.

#### *Discharges and Recruiting.*

*February 18, 1933.*—In view of the satisfactory reports about the attitude of the Assyrians in the levies, it was decided to hold up Arab and Kurd recruiting temporarily in order to lessen the number of Assyrian discharges necessary before the 1st April, 1933.

#### *Guard Duties at Shaibah.*

*March 1, 1933.*—No. 2 Arab Company took over the guard duties at Shaibah from the Iraq army.

#### *Evacuation of Sulaimani.*

*March 20, 1933.*—The main body of the 2nd Assyrian Battalion arrived at Hinaidi from Sulaimani.

#### *Levy Strength.*

*April 1, 1933.*—That part of the discharge programme designed to bring the levies to the strength of 1,250 ranks duly completed. The strength of the levies was reported as 1,237 native ranks, made up as follows:—

Assyrians	...	...	...	...	925
Arabs	...	...	...	...	165
Kurds	...	...	...	...	147

#### *Evacuation of Sulaimani.*

*April 18, 1933.*—Sulaimani finally evacuated by the levies and taken over by the Iraq army.

#### *Evacuation of Diana.*

*May 8, 1933.*—Diana station finally evacuated and handed over to the Iraq army; the main body of the levies having arrived at Hinaidi from Diana on the 6th May, 1933.

#### *Summary of Assyrian Political Situation.*

24. The general policy of the Iraqi Government is to break up tribal organisations among the minorities and as far as the Assyrians are concerned they bid fair to succeed. The local Government officials are busy furthering internal dissension among the Assyrians themselves, and seem to attach more importance to staging intrigues than to getting down to the main problem, *i.e.*, settlement.

25. Hitherto, Mar Shimun has been to all intents and purposes paramount chief of the tribal Assyrians. The Government seems willing to recognise him as a spiritual leader only, but this does not satisfy Mar Shimun, who is unwilling to renounce the temporal authority enjoyed by the Assyrian Patriarchate for centuries and which he seems to regard as more important than the spiritual side.

In consequence, Mar Shimun is looked upon by the Iraqi authorities with grave suspicion. He is subjected to petty annoyances, including censorship of correspondence and police surveillance.

Mar Shimun has brought this upon himself by an attitude of non-co-operation in the Government schemes for Assyrian land settlement. He maintained that nothing should be undertaken until the foreign expert recommended by the League

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



of Nations had arrived in the country and examined the situation. He counsels those who come for advice to wait and see. It has just been announced that the foreign expert upon the land settlement problem has now been appointed and will arrive in a few days.

Mar Shimun is jealous of the authority and recognition given by the Government to Malik Khoshaba, who has been formally appointed "malik" and land settlement official by the Mutessarif of Mosul. Mar Shimun regards the appointment of maliks as his own prerogative and resents the Government action.

26. The Assyrians in general, outside the levies, are divided in allegiance, some looking to Mar Shimun, and others to the Government party. A large number of the peasant Assyrians appear tired of what is now a losing cause and may welcome the arrival of the foreign expert. Considerable tension still exists in certain quarters, and there is always the possibility of some small racial fracas developing into trouble if the authorities show any hesitation or nervousness.

#### *Summary of the Iraq Levy Situation.*

27. Subject to certain small outstanding matters and the important question of the legalisation of the Air Defence Force, the reorganisation has now been carried into effect without hitch.

28. As regards the legalisation, despite pressure being maintained upon the Iraqi Government, no progress was made. On the 16th May, 1933, His Majesty's Ambassador informed me that King Feisal had requested that we should postpone the legalisation until the autumn of 1933. The Ambassador told him that the only alternative was to allow the old levy conditions to continue. Juridically, the position of the levies is secured under Iraq law as it stands to-day. We have done everything to implement the terms of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty Agreement and the Iraqi Government cannot, because of their failure to reciprocate, accuse us of breach of faith.

29. The Iraq Levies now consist of a headquarters and sub-headquarters and the following companies:—

- Assyrian company: Hinaidi.
- Assyrian company: Hinaidi.
- Assyrian company: Hinaidi.
- Assyrian company: Hinaidi.
- Assyrian company: Mosul.
- Kurdish company: Hinaidi.
- Arab company: Shaibah.
- Arab company: To move from Hinaidi to Basra in autumn 1933.

Of these companies, those at Mosul and Shaibah, and two of the Hinaidi companies are provided with first line pack transport.

30. Subject to certain Assyrians, who still await discharge in the next two months, being held in Arab and Kurdish company vacancies, the strength of the force has been adjusted to the establishment, not only in totals but also in individual appointments. A number of minor economies have been effected by civilianising certain trades.

Unless any untoward event should happen it seems likely that the cost of the Levy Force in the present financial year will represent a saving over the estimate of the previous year of £42,000.

31. The Arab and Kurdish personnel of the force are proving satisfactory. The Assyrians as a whole are still loyal to Mar Shimun, but they appear to have learnt a lesson last year. They have accepted the reorganisation measures in a good and reasonable spirit, appear to be content to carry out their military duties and seem unwilling to mix themselves up in the general Assyrian domestic unrest.

*Air Headquarters, Iraq Command,  
Hinaidi May 26, 1933.*

#### Appendix (A).

##### IRAQ LEVIES.

##### *Oath of Abstention from Political Activity.*

"I, (Name) Number (Unit) swear that I, whilst a soldier in the Iraq Levies (or Air Defence Force) will not take part, by talking, attending meetings or signing papers, in any matters concerning the tribal affairs of my people, or others, either inside or outside of Iraq."

Seal or signature of soldier.

Seal or signature of witness.

##### *Certificate of Witnessing Officer.*

The above oath has been administered in my presence to the above-named person in his own language, according to the authorised translation and method applicable to his race. I am satisfied that he understands the obligation which it entails.

Signed at this day of , 193 .

(Signature of Witnessing Officer.)

[E 3416/3118/93]

No. 71.

*Sir John Simon to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Bagdad).*

(No. 391.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 1, 1933.*

I CALLED on King Feisal at the Hyde Park Hotel at 5 P.M. on the 22nd June. After an exchange of courtesies, I obtained His Majesty's permission to discuss with him one or two matters touching the relations of His Majesty's Government with Iraq.

##### *The British Judges.*

2. I opened with the question of the appointment to proper posts of the British judges now in Iraq under the terms of the Judicial Agreement of 1931 and the undertakings given by the Iraqi Government to the Council of the League of Nations shortly before Iraq's admission to the League. I explained that I was convinced that the League Council, if the matter ever came before them, would hold that it had been intended that at least six of the British jurists, whose services had been employed by the Iraqi Government, were to be appointed presidents of the provincial courts of session. I added that, in the light of the text of the Judicial Agreement and of the undertakings given by the Iraqi Government, and in view of the statements which had been made on behalf of Iraq to the several different League commissions and committees which had dealt with this question, His Majesty's Government would find it exceedingly difficult to defend any departure from this interpretation of the Iraqi Government's obligations.

3. King Feisal assured me that the Iraqi Government had no desire whatever to evade their responsibilities to the League. The matter seemed to him to be merely one of two different interpretations of the undertakings which had been given. The view of the Iraqi Government was that the British jurists should be employed where they were most needed and could be most useful. They considered, for example, that there was greater need for a foreign expert in the Legal Drafting Department of the Ministry of Justice than in some of the provincial courts, where there was very little legal work of importance to be done. Four judges had already been appointed to the district courts, and another would soon be sent to the Diyala district. There was, therefore, really only one judge



whose appointment was in question, and the Government desired, if possible, to employ him in the Ministry of Justice.

4. I explained again that I could not believe that the League would accept such an arrangement as implementing satisfactorily the Judicial Agreement of 1931, and I pointed out that the aim of this agreement (which the Iraqi Government had promised the Council of the League to maintain in force for ten years) was to establish a uniform system of justice throughout Iraq, and that this uniformity would be broken if one of the principal judicial areas were left without a British president of its sessions court. Moreover, the capitulatory Powers, who had agreed to surrender the special judicial privileges which they had enjoyed under the Turkish Government, had done so in the belief that the Judicial Agreement assured that, in all important matters, the interests of their subjects would be in the hands of courts presided over by British (or other foreign) jurists. They would certainly not be satisfied with the alternative of an expert jurist in the Legal Drafting Department, and would be entitled to claim that they had been deceived as to the intention of the Iraqi Government.

5. King Feisal said that he was grateful to me for having explained to him so frankly the attitude of His Majesty's Government. Since I had made it clear that His Majesty's Government could not support the view of the Iraqi Government, the whole matter would have to be reconsidered, as he realised that it would be foolish for Iraq to adopt a policy in this matter with which His Majesty's Government did not agree. He was sure that his Ministers would find a satisfactory solution in the near future.

6. I thought it undesirable to press His Majesty any further in regard to this point, and I turned to the question of the proposed Railway Corporation in Iraq.

#### *The Railway Corporation.*

7. I began by reminding the King that, before becoming Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I had for many years practised as a barrister, and had gained a wide and varied legal knowledge, which I thought might be of value in dealing with the difficulties which had arisen in regard to the creation of the Railway Corporation in Iraq. I had been informed that the most important of these difficulties was the interpretation of the term "beneficial ownership," which occurred in the annexure to the treaty of 1930 which dealt with this matter. I had studied this document carefully, and had formed the opinion that if it were ever referred to The Hague, or to any arbitral body of the League of Nations, there would be no real difficulty in determining the intention of the agreement which had been entered into by both Governments. The agreement would be regarded as a whole, and since the words "beneficial ownership" were followed by details defining their scope and meaning, it would, I felt sure, be ruled that they should be interpreted in the light of the clear intention of the agreement itself.

8. King Feisal then explained that the difficulty in Iraq was to reconcile the provision that the ownership of the railways should be transferred to the Iraqi Government with the stipulation that the land of the railways should be registered in the Land Registry in the name of the Railway Corporation. Under Iraqi law, once the land had been registered in this manner, the Government would cease to have any title to the property at all.

9. I said that I readily understood this difficulty, as it was one which I had already met with in other countries when dealing with similar matters. It could, however, be got over, and the best way to do this was for the Government to include in the law creating the Railway Corporation a clause making it necessary for that law to be attached to the register in which the railway lands would be entered in the name of the corporation. The law would define the rights and powers of the corporation, and its attachment to the register would ensure that the form and limitations of its title over the land registered in its name would be clearly expressed. I gave His Majesty a document (annexed) which I had prepared, setting out my suggestion.

10. The King readily took up this suggestion, and asked me to arrange that my representative should discuss the matter in further detail with his Ministers for Finance and Economics, who are now in London. I agreed to do so, and to arrange for the meeting through Sir Francis Humphrys.

#### *The Sheikh of Koweit's Date Gardens.*

11. I recalled that His Majesty's Government had undertaken to protect the sheikh's title to his date gardens in Iraq, but could not, of course, do so without the assistance of the Iraqi Government. Sir Francis Humphrys had, I understood, already discussed the matter with His Majesty, who had been so good as to promise his personal intervention to prevent any action being brought in the Iraqi courts to dispossess the sheikh. I added that His Majesty's Government were most grateful to His Majesty for his friendly and helpful attitude in this matter, which was one of some importance, involving as it did the fulfilment of a pledge given in the name of the Government.

12. King Feisal reaffirmed his intention to safeguard the sheikh's rights, and added with a smile that he ventured to express his pleasure at this further evidence of the British Government's fidelity to its pledges. There were other pledges, given about the same time to other rulers in the Middle East, and he felt sure that His Majesty's Government would hold them to be as sacred and binding as those given to the Sheikh of Koweit. I gathered that he was referring to the correspondence with King Hussein, generally known as the McMahon letters.

#### *Arab National Policy.*

13. From this point King Feisal turned the conversation easily to the subject of his ambitions for the Arabs. He had, he explained, been most anxious to have an opportunity to discuss this with me, and to express frankly all that was in his heart. He did not wish to go back into matters which were better, perhaps, left in the past to which they belonged, but he would like to recall the conversation which he had had with Mr. Churchill (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) just before he left England to go to Iraq as a candidate for the throne. At that conversation Mr. Churchill had explained a policy which he had agreed to follow, and he thought he might say that, since that date, he had worked out that policy in all sincerity and loyalty. He felt now, however, that the stage covered by the understanding entered into with Mr. Churchill had been traversed, and a new stage lay before his country. What path were they to follow? For his own part, bearing in mind the close alliance into which he had entered with Great Britain, he was most anxious that the policy of his Government should be in accord with that of His Majesty's Government. It was for this reason that he would like to discuss with me several aspects of the Arab question with which his Government were confronted.

14. To begin with, they desired to establish a line of communication between Iraq and the Mediterranean. This could be done either through Syria or Palestine. The Iraqi Government, however, were puzzled to know which route to favour. On the one hand, the manner in which the French mandate had been exercised in Syria gave them no hope that there would in the near future be set up in Syria a Government favourably disposed to Arab aspirations; and on the other hand, although they felt confident of the general sympathy of His Majesty's Government, the development of Zionism in Palestine gave rise to many misgivings concerning the future of the Arabs in Palestine. The Arabs were being driven out of Palestine and Transjordan, and would soon be quite unable to withstand the economic and financial strength of the Jews. The potentialities of such a situation made Palestine unattractive as a route for Iraq's line of communication with the sea.

15. These problems could, King Feisal explained, in his opinion all be solved if the Arabs worked in harmony with British policy, and continued to enjoy British sympathy and support. His aim was to lay down a policy in full consultation with His Majesty's Government, and thereby to obviate the possibility of embarking on a course of action which might involve his Government in serious difficulties with His Majesty's Government, or even jeopardise the continuance of the happy relations now existing between the two countries. For example, there was a growing desire among people in Iraq, and their representatives in Parliament and the Government, to help the Arabs in Syria, and it had been proposed that Iraq, as a member of the League of Nations, should, in the Assembly, challenge the French application to Syria of the principles of article 22 of the Covenant of the League. What would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards such a *démarche*? Again, so long as Syria remained under a French mandate in its present form, the Iraqi Government felt obliged to obstruct the development of Syrian communications with Iraq,



and across Iraq with Persia, as they feared that, particularly in the north, any facilities given for the development of lines of communication with Syria would be used by the French for the spread of their influence into Iraq. Such a policy might involve the Iraqi Government in difficulties with France, to which His Majesty's Government could not remain indifferent. Here again, he would be glad of my views.

16. I replied that I could not, of course, give an immediate opinion on the very important issues which His Majesty had raised. I promised, however, to inform my colleagues of the most interesting and valuable conversation which I had had with him, and I undertook that the situation which he had described should be most fully considered.

#### *Arab Congress.*

17. I mentioned also the matter of the proposed Arab congress, and explained the view of His Majesty's Government that the holding of such a congress in Bagdad would, in all probability, cause serious embarrassments for Iraq with her neighbours.

18. King Feisal replied that he attached far more importance to working out with His Majesty's Government a policy which would offer reasonable hope of bringing about the realisation of Arab aspirations than to the congress, and, provided such a policy could be agreed upon, he would exercise all his influence to prevent the congress from being held in Bagdad or elsewhere.

19. I again assured His Majesty that I had listened to his views with the greatest interest, and I renewed my undertaking to give them the closest consideration and study.

#### *Assyrian Situation.*

20. Before taking leave of His Majesty I mentioned briefly the present difficulties of the Iraqi Government with the Mar Shimun. I said that if the Government were to resign over this question they would greatly enhance the Patriarch's importance by giving him the appearance of being strong enough to overthrow the Government. On the other hand, if repressive measures were taken, such as the detention or arrest of the Mar Shimun, he would be invested with all the glamour of martyrdom and might thereby arouse powerful influences which would compel the Iraqi Government in the end to go to Canossa.

21. King Feisal expressed his entire agreement with my remarks, and told me that he was advising his Government in Bagdad in this sense.

22. Sir F. Humphrys and Nuri Pasha were both present during my interview, which lasted over two hours.

I am, &c.  
JOHN SIMON.

[E 3415/1857/93]

Enclosure in No. 71.

#### *Memorandum respecting the Iraqi Railway System.*

THE future of the Iraqi railway system is to be determined by clause 4 of the Financial Agreement of the 19th August, 1930, which is an integral part of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930 and has been confirmed by both Parliaments. There does not appear to me to be any real difficulty in carrying this agreement out, and the supposed impossibility only arises from mistaking mere technicalities for the substance of the matter. The real question has nothing to do with the technical meaning of "legal" and "beneficial" in a particular system of law, for the agreement itself makes plain what is the sense in which these words are used; a corporation is to be created by special statute of the Iraqi Legislature, and this corporation is to have the free and independent control and administration of the railway system. There is no difficulty whatever in passing an Iraqi statute which would create such a corporation with such powers, and very serious consequences would follow, going to the root of the status of Iraq under the treaty, if it was really the case that the agreement, which is part of the treaty, could not be carried out.

The only remaining question is as to the best way of recording the title of the State and of the corporation respectively to the property included in the railway system. Here, again, any difficulty there is can perfectly well be got over by appropriate language in the Iraqi Act of Parliament; for example, the Act of Parliament could provide that there should be attached to the Tapu Sanad of registration of the property, in the name of the Iraqi Government, a copy of the Iraqi statute setting up the Railway Corporation, and that the rights of the latter under that statute should be made effective in any dealing with the property. By this means the exact position of the Railway Corporation and their rights and powers would be on official record in the Tapu Department.

I will add one word on the question of lease. The agreement provides that the rights and responsibilities of the new corporation shall be secured "by lease or otherwise and at a nominal rent." The reference to "lease" is natural because it is quite common in English Acts of Parliament dealing with railways to provide that a railway shall be leased in perpetuity to a railway company at such and such a rent. There is no question of granting a lease for a few years—the transfer is in perpetuity. And, of course, the reference to a nominal rent is to make plain what are the financial terms on which the Railway Corporation will exercise its rights over the property. But the matter is of no real importance because of the phrase "or otherwise." The substance of the matter is, to my mind, quite plain, and I hope I may be permitted to say, on the basis of some thirty-five years' experience at the English Bar, that it is a fundamental principle in cases such as this that the real intention of the two parties to the agreement should be carried out according to its real nature and effect, and that no jurist of first-rate standing would imagine that merely technical difficulties could prevent this being done. This is most manifestly the case when an Act of Parliament is going to be passed, for I presume it is not suggested that the Iraqi Legislature, supported by the King of Iraq, is not competent to legislate in whatever are appropriate terms about a matter which arises within the boundary of the Kingdom of Iraq.

J. S.

June 21, 1933.

[E 3569/733/93]

No. 72.

Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 384.)  
Sir,

Bagdad, June 15, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 342 of the 31st May, I have the honour to report that the Iraqi Government, at the beginning of June, caused a proclamation and a copy of an amnesty law to be dropped by aircraft on the Barzani outlaws, granting a free pardon to all those who should report themselves to the local authorities and return quietly to their homes within ten days, on the condition that the chiefs should reside outside the Barzan area.

2. I have this morning received a report from His Majesty's vice-consul at Diana to the effect that the brothers of Sheikh Ahmad, Sheikh Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, together with Oula Beg and Ahmed Nadir, accompanied by 100 riflemen, have surrendered at the Shirwan-i-Nazin Police Station, presumably in compliance with the terms of the amnesty. It is also stated to be the intention of the Ministry of the Interior to furnish a grant in aid of ID. 3,000 to assist loyal Barzani cultivators and to open dispensaries in several places.

3. It is hoped that the unrest in this area is now at an end.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.



[E 3567/7/93]

No. 73.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 152.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, July 2, 1933.*

FOLLOWING is appreciation of present Assyrian situation:—

In the north Assyrians are depressed and nervous after success of firm action taken by military in calling Yaku's bluff. Iraqis, on the other hand, are elated and wish to press their advantage home by partial or total disarmament of Assyrians, a course of action which would meet with resistance and bloodshed.

In Bagdad Acting Adviser of the Interior is with great difficulty restraining Iraqi Government from such action. Mar Shimun, who is as defiant as ever, is in constant correspondence with Assyrians in the north, and in view of his evident intention to obstruct settlement Edmonds holds strongly that not only is this not the moment to press the Iraqi Government to allow Mar Shimun to return, but that if he does return now he will probably cause trouble and embarrassment to settlement work, which is making good progress. He also considers there will be no effective means of preventing local Iraqi authorities from picking a quarrel and so finding a real excuse for the drastic action they are hankering after.

On the other hand, the Air Officer Commanding, Administrative Inspector of Mosul, and Thomson consider that presence of Mar Shimun would increase confidence and that his obstruction is a risk to be accepted.

Deeply impressed as I am with Sir F. Humphrys's and other arguments referred to in your telegram No. 112, after most careful consideration I feel I must support Edmonds's view, as I know only too well what a struggle we are having to save Mar Shimun from legal proceedings, quite apart from the question of his return. A new disquieting factor in the situation is a letter from Mar Shimun to the Minister of Interior delivered on 1st July and circulated to foreign representatives in Bagdad challenging legality of Patriarch's detention, opposing settlement on present lines, and claiming the right to ask the League for alternative scheme. Copy is being sent to you by air mail 3rd July.

In view of above difference of opinion on a problem on which there seems good arguments on both sides, do you wish me to press Iraqi Government to allow Mar Shimun to return to the north?—You will of course realise that Prime Minister will almost certainly refuse or attempt to hold His Majesty's Government responsible for any consequences which Iraqis themselves might provoke. Another telegram from King Feisal, for what it is worth, will also be necessary.

[E 3672/7/93]

No. 74.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 158.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, July 5, 1933.*

PRIME Minister informed me last night that the Chamber of Deputies had just voted in the teeth of strong opposition grant of £13,000 for settlement.

I also understand Iraqi Government will take no action on Mar Shimun's letter for one week.

The question of disarming Assyrians has also been dropped.

So far so good. But the price the Adviser of the Interior has had to pay for restraining the Iraqi Government from ravaging Assyrians in the north is tendering of advice that from point of view of internal administration he cannot recommend Mar Shimun's return to Mosul for the present. I also understand Administrative Inspector of Mosul, as a result of Mar Shimun's letter, is weakening in his opinion that the Patriarch should return.

In view of inevitable future publicity and possible submission to the League of Mar Shimun's letter which you should receive by 6th July, I suggest that the question of what reply, if any, the Iraqi Government should be guided to make is a matter which requires most careful attention. My advice to take no notice

was a stop-gap to prevent hasty and ill-considered action. We have one week's respite. I suggest that attempt might be made to induce the Iraqi Government to reply in the following sense:—

"You are perfectly free to return to Mosul provided you will undertake not to impede (or alternatively to co-operate in) present settlement of scheme."

Edmonds thinks the Minister of the Interior might agree to the above, but would expect written confirmation from Mar Shimun.

If Mar Shimun refuses to accept this reply he will come out very badly in the eyes of the world, while on the other hand His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government will be seen to have done their best.

The Air Officer Commanding and Edmonds concur.

[E 3738/870/93]

No. 75.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 405.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 26, 1933.*

FOR some weeks prior to the departure of His Majesty's Ambassador in May last there had been a good deal of agitation in the Bagdad press against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Some of the airy and vapid talk of the sacred aspirations of the Iraqi people found its echo in Parliament, and speculation was rife as to whether His Majesty King Feisal would find an opportunity to broach the question of treaty revision in London, and if so how far he would be successful in removing those provisions to which the extreme Nationalists profess to object.

2. During the course of an interview with Sir Francis Humphrys on the 17th May last, His Majesty expressed the view that, in view of his own impending departure, it was essential that the position of the Iraqi Government in regard to their relations with Great Britain should be made clear, if only to dissipate certain current misconceptions regarding the object of his visit to London. He deplored the pusillanimity of his Ministers, all of whom protested anxiety individually to preserve the closest relations with Great Britain. Not one had the courage, however, to come into the open and do his share towards the settlement of the outstanding questions arising from the treaty for fear that his Cabinet colleagues would make political capital at his expense. This drifting with the stream had gone far enough, and he had decided that, before he left Iraq, the Government must make an unequivocal statement of policy which would eliminate the possibility of any misunderstanding concerning the attitude of the Iraqi Government towards Great Britain. He hoped it would be possible for such a statement to be made on the introduction of the budget a few days later.

3. His Majesty left Iraq on the 5th June, but neither before his departure nor since have I been able to discover any trace of an unequivocal statement by the Government on the lines suggested on the 17th May. On the contrary, during the opening debate on the budget, the Prime Minister, replying to several pointed questions on the relations between Great Britain and Iraq, said:

"We have no new foreign policy other than of aiming at the realisation, at the earliest opportunity, of the sacred aspirations of the people, which have been and continue to be the aspirations of every patriotic citizen. We have placed this sacred object before our eyes and are proceeding for its realisation with wisdom and resolution, guided by the unerring and wholesome advice of His Majesty."

"The acceptance by His Majesty of the invitation extended to him by His Majesty the King of Great Britain will be most effective in strengthening the friendly relations between the two kingdoms. We are hopeful of realising the greatest material and moral benefits from this auspicious visit."

"The high political position now enjoyed by our beloved country among the nations of the world will improve in proportion to the future cultural and constructive achievements of the country and to the extent to which we shall have shown ourselves able to improve the administration of justice and to satisfy the world that we have taken all possible effective steps to enable us to undertake the defence of our country by our own hands."



4. On the 3rd June, during the resumed discussion on the budget, Yasin Pasha, the Minister of Finance, replying to the former Prime Minister, said:

"I say that there is no doubt that the treaty was a step forward.

"It should be understood that all treaties are subject to ratification by legislative councils, and that the Iraqi nation has not yet been represented on such councils. Our admission to the League of Nations was due to a promise given by Great Britain in 1929. Therefore we cannot credit to the treaty our admission to the League."

5. There has, it is true, been a diminution in the press criticism of the treaty since the King's departure, but I cannot bring myself to believe that this is, in any way, due to the evasive statements of the Government's chief spokesmen.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 3739/653/93]

No. 76.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 406.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 27, 1933.*

THE vernacular press of Bagdad appears to have entered upon a conspiracy of comparative silence concerning the reception accorded to King Feisal during the State visit to London.

2. Prior to His Majesty's departure there had been a certain amount of editorial comment on the visit—mainly consisting of pointed references to the necessity for some revision of the provisions of the 1930 treaty—culminating in the production in the *Istiqlal* of the following journalistic jewel: "The country wants its great King on this auspicious tour to let the world hear the voice of Iraq thundering out its demand for freedom and emancipation and its denunciation of all that is derogatory to its national honour."

3. Since the King's arrival in London, however, all the papers, with the exception of the extremist *Ahali*, which has been completely dumb on the subject, have confined themselves to reproducing translations of the bare extracts from Reuter's cables which have appeared in the British-owned *Iraq Times*.

4. There has been a significant absence of anything in the shape of editorial comment, and certainly nothing to suggest that those responsible for the information of the Iraqi public either share or appreciate the cordial sentiments towards Great Britain expressed by His Majesty during the official functions in London.

5. On the contrary, leading articles have appeared in certain organs of the press, and notably the *Ikha-al-Watani*, urging the celebration, in a manner worthy of the occasion, of the Iraqi insurrection of 1920.

6. There are reasons for believing that this agitation has been deliberately worked up to offset the unrest amongst the Shiah, which formed the subject of my despatch No. 397 of the 22nd June last.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[T 7854/965/374]

No. 77.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 407.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 27, 1933.*

WITH reference to Sir George Clerk's despatch No. 224 of the 4th July, 1932, I have the honour to inform you that the ratifications of the Turco-Iraqi Extradition Treaty, signed at Angora on the 9th January, 1932, and of the Convention d'Etablissement, signed on the same day, were exchanged on the

21st June last by the Iraqi Prime Minister and the Turkish Plenipotentiary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Embassy at Istanbul.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 3744/733/93]

No. 78.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 415.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 28, 1933.*

THE report mentioned in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 384 of the 15th June concerning the tranquillisation of the Barzan district appears to have been somewhat optimistic.

2. I am informed by the Ministry of the Interior that, following upon the telegram received on the 15th June from the Director-General of Police at Shirwan Mazin, further reports tended to show that the rebels were not only not disarmed, but had not even surrendered.

3. It now transpires that the first telegram stated that the sheikhs mentioned in my despatch under reference, together with 100 armed followers, had been interviewed near Shirwan Mazin and were the guests of Subi Beg, the Director-General of Police. The Ministry of the Interior naturally took this to mean that their surrender was complete, but a later telegram showed that Subi Beg's hospitality consisted of *sending* food to the rebels and that parleys were continuing as to the conditions upon which they would be willing to come in.

4. The arrangement eventually reached was that the rebel leaders, with the exception of Sheikh Ahmed, whose case will be treated separately, together with their followers, took an oath of allegiance to the King of Iraq and were allowed to return to their villages and retain their arms.

5. It is evident that the rebels have been let off lightly. The considerations which moved them to come to terms appear to have been:—

(i) Starvation owing to police control of supplies.

(ii) The receipt of a letter from Sheikh Ahmed in Eskishehr advising surrender. (This is possibly due to Turkish pressure.)

(iii) The expected arrival of a Turkish battalion at Berokh.

5. The Iraqi Government on their side appear to have been only too glad to put a stop to the mountain guerrilla warfare, as their troops and police are of the kind that prefer to retreat from rather than march towards the sound of the guns. Moreover, the present Assyrian crisis makes their presence desirable nearer home.

6. The position with regard to Sheikh Ahmed is not clear. It is uncertain whether he will return to Iraq from Turkey.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 3590/3443/34]

No. 79.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 418.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 28, 1933.*

THE incident reported in my telegram No. 146 of the 26th June affords me an opportunity for bringing to your notice the unsatisfactory attitude of the Persian naval commanders towards the port authority at Basra.

2. As you are aware, there is, at the entrance to the Shatt-al-Arab, a deep water channel (the Rooka), constructed and kept dredged at great expense by the

[9941]



Basra Port Directorate. This channel is wide enough to allow of the passage of only one ship at a time, and there are controls at the ends to ensure that this is done. Ever since the arrival of the new Persian sloops, however, their commanders, although well aware of the regulations governing navigation in the dredged channel, and in spite of frequent protests by the port authorities, have consistently ignored the signals of the control boat. They pass through the channel at high speeds, irrespective of whether or not other vessels happen to have right of way, and in a manner which suggests a total lack of responsibility or a knowledge of the rudiments of seamanship. This behaviour on their part has more than once caused an unwarranted interruption in the dredging operations, which, especially during the flood season, are vitally necessary to keep the channel open. Indeed, it has happened that only the prompt action of the masters of the dredging vessels has averted a collision.

3. Their conduct is the more reprehensible when it is remembered that a great part of the shipping using the channel consists of Anglo-Persian Oil Company tankers filled to the brim, on the homeward journey, with highly inflammable material. In these circumstances, the danger of collision or grounding in the channel is such as to cause the Port Directorate continual anxiety, and their concern is by no means diminished by the behaviour of the Persian war vessels when they cross the Fao Bar and enter the Shatt.

4. Reports which have reached me privately from Colonel Ward show beyond doubt that the unseamanlike manner in which the Persian sloops are handled constitutes a very real danger to shipping in the river, and that though the commanders are averse, on principle, from availing themselves of a harbour-master's services, they are only too glad to do so when their own inexperience lands them in difficulties. This applies particularly to their activities in the Abadan Reach, and the following examples will serve to show that the preoccupation of the port authority is far from groundless.

5. On the 10th June last, the Persian sloop *Simorgh* arrived in the harbour at Abadan from Mohammerah without signalling her time of arrival and without requesting the services of the harbour-master. After a series of inexplicable manoeuvres, in the course of which the lower part of the harbour was circumnavigated no less than three times, the vessel finally passed outside the mooring buoys and rounded into the fairway, in the centre of which she anchored until removed by the harbour-master. These Persian antics not only delayed the departure of steamship *Gorgistan* of the Strick Line, but also involved an unnecessary and dangerous turn in the strong ebb which was running at the time. The *Simorgh* again got into trouble on the 19th June. It was arranged that she should be transferred from the workshop jetty at Abadan to No. 7 berth, to allow of the berthing of the sloop *Karkas*, which was then undocking. A harbour-master was despatched to carry out the movement, but before he arrived the *Simorgh* had cast off and was endeavouring to shift her berth without using her engines, in spite of a high shamal (north wind) and strong ebb. By the time the harbour-master arrived she was in a precarious position, and only his prompt action prevented her from grounding and sustaining great damage. On another occasion the firm attitude of the harbour-master prevented two of the Persian sloops from shifting ammunition in close proximity to the Abadan refinery and well within the harbour limits.

6. The records of the Port Directorate show that on no less than thirteen occasions since the 1st April last, the movements of Persian war vessels have been actually carried out by the harbour-master at Abadan Reach, notwithstanding that, for what are called "political" reasons, their services are never requested by the Persians, and in spite of the fact that in the case of war vessels their services are given free of charge.

7. I am satisfied that it is only the anxiety of the port authorities to guard against the danger of serious accident in the Shatt and the Rooka Channel that prompts their solicitude in regard to these Persian sloops. In these circumstances, the arrest of Captain MacLeod is a matter calling for strong protest and the support of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, for such steps as may be taken by his Iraqi colleague to secure the harbour-master's immediate and unconditional release.

8. I have the honour to enclose herewith two memoranda<sup>(1)</sup> furnished by the Port Director at Basra describing the events leading up to Captain MacLeod's

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

arrest, and incidentally illustrating the casual way in which the Persian commanders take their duties.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

P.S.—I have just received from Colonel Ward Captain MacLeod's own report of the incident, together with a report of an interview with him after his arrest by Captain Shoosmith, the port officer at Basra. Copies of these are enclosed herewith.

It will be seen that Captain MacLeod had, in the ordinary course of his duties and in accordance with the Basra port regulations, boarded the vessel at 5 A.M. on the 23rd June to advise the captain regarding berthing. At that hour he found no responsible officer on duty. He ascertained, however, that the ship would not be ready to move for two hours. When, in the interim, he learned that the ship was actually under way, he followed and boarded her in accordance with what he understood to be the arrangement made a short while previously. No objection was raised by the officer on duty, and the only signal he received was a dumb show on the part of a sailor, which he interpreted as meaning a warning to keep away from the propeller.

In the circumstances his arrest seems to have been in the nature of an after-thought, and in any case to be due to a complete misunderstanding.

I would add that Captain MacLeod's version of the affair is completely borne out by the statements of his boat's crew.

G. O.-F.

[E 3587/7/93]

No. 80.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 419.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 29, 1933.*

IN my despatch No. 396 of the 22nd June I reported a sudden change in the attitude of the Iraqi Government towards the Mar Shimun, and a serious intention, despite all their talk of resignation—which was genuine—to go back on their word and to arrest him after all. The reason is now clear. Two events had been happening in the north. One was that the Government had succeeded in buying off the starving Barzani rebels with promises of an amnesty, repatriation and retention of arms. The other was that Yaku, son of the Malik Ismail, a prominent Assyrian of the Mar Shimun party, had been giving trouble. The Government were thus able to drop the Barzanis and to concentrate with more vigour both on the Assyrians in the north and on the Patriarch here in Bagdad. Hence the move to arrest the Mar Shimun, which I think I again foiled—I wonder how long I can keep it up—failing which the order to stay in Bagdad, which no doubt in practice amounts to open arrest. In the meanwhile, not knowing what was happening in the north, I stressed to you in my telegrams Nos. 135, 136 and 139 the importance of King Feisal sending clear and peremptory instructions to the Cabinet to allow the Mar Shimun to return to Mosul unmolested.

2. But Yaku had entirely changed the situation. Shortly after receipt of the official news of his defiance, reported in my telegram No. 142, there arrived his Lordship the Bishop in Jerusalem, who not only confirmed the reports concerning Yaku, but who also brought a disquieting account of the general atmosphere amongst the Assyrians and of the impossibility of making any progress in educational or missionary work until the political situation was cleared up. I enclose copy of a letter which the bishop has addressed to this Embassy on the subject.

3. The Air Officer Commanding also paid a visit to Mosul, intending to proceed further to his summer camp near Ser Amadia. But he found the



situation so preoccupying that he felt precluded from doing so, and, indeed, he returned to Bagdad three days earlier than he had intended.

4. By the 25th June it was clear that Yaku was persisting in his defiance, and accordingly the Iraqi Government, fearing the effect of such conduct on the Kurdish tribes, decided that it was necessary to take strong action and to bring him into Mosul by force if necessary. Orders were accordingly issued for the introduction of 200 police and for the concentration at Dohuk of three battalions of infantry, two batteries of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, with one battalion and the remainder of a cavalry regiment in reserve at Mosul. These arrangements had the full concurrence of the local British advisers, one of whom would, I understand, have preferred a stronger military demonstration.

5. The Air Officer Commanding returned to Bagdad on the eve of the move of the main body. We immediately held a conference, at which Air Vice-Marshal Burnett, his chief staff officer, Mr. Edmonds and myself were present. All our information was to the effect that on the morrow, when the troops advanced, Yaku, who was reported to have with him 200 armed men, would resist capture and there would be fighting, with consequences the repercussion of which no man could foretell. It was therefore essential to leave no stone unturned to prevent hostilities. The various intermediaries who had tried and failed to induce Yaku to comply with the Government's order to give an assurance of good behaviour had brought back the reply that he would only take his instructions from the Mar Shimun. The hint had also been unmistakably conveyed to Mr. Edmonds that the Iraqi Government would welcome some approach to the Mar Shimun by a British intermediary with a view to easing the situation. Who should undertake this task? Mr. Edmonds was the adviser to the Minister of the Interior, and the Mar Shimun, in the present strained relations, would undoubtedly make capital out of any such approach by him. The Air Vice-Marshal felt that any word from him would have no effect, as only a few days before he had in the strongest of terms reproached the Mar Shimun for his obstinacy. The only other alternative was myself. Time was extremely short, so short that the Air Officer Commanding offered to send a message from the Mar Shimun to Yaku by special aeroplane that evening. The great objection to approaching the Mar Shimun on this subject was, of course, that of increasing his self-importance. But it was already leaking out that he had caused a Cabinet crisis, and, in view of the tremendous issues hanging from hostilities between Iraqi troops and the Assyrians, it seemed to us all that the advantages of such action far outweighed the disadvantages.

6. I accordingly sent for him, and, as reported in my telegram No. 142, I appealed in vain to the highest sentiments of Christianity and humanity in order to induce him to write a letter to Yaku requesting him to comply with the orders of the Government. Three times I asked him; three times he refused, except on conditions which would be quite unacceptable to the Iraqi Government. He was completely indifferent to the sufferings, and possibly the ruin, which hostilities might involve for him and his.

7. On the following day the leading battalion reached Dohuk. Colonel Stafford, the Administrative Inspector, was sent ahead on what was considered to be a forlorn hope, to endeavour at the twelfth hour to bring in Yaku. I understand that he was accompanied by Major Thomson. To our surprise and relief, a telephone message was received in the evening of the 26th to the effect that Yaku had consented to return to Mosul with the Administrative Inspector. I am not yet in possession of the details, but this sudden surrender of Yaku seems due to the realisation that the Iraqi Government were this time in earnest. Colonel Stafford, moreover, appears to have acted with considerable tact and skill. The Mar Shimun figured in the conversations hardly at all.

8. The present position is that Yaku is in Mosul, surety for his good behaviour to the amount of £300 having been deposited either by Mr. Panfil or by some other missionary. The Iraqi Government, encouraged by their success in calling the bluff of Yaku, have decided to concentrate three battalions, a battery of mountain artillery and a squadron of cavalry at Badi, on the road between Dohuk and Ser Amadia, with one battalion and the remainder of the cavalry regiment in reserve at Mosul. It is in this moment of triumph for the Iraqi Government that there lies a danger for the person of the Mar Shimun, especially if he is allowed to return to Mosul at present. This, however, must form the subject of my despatch next week.

9. I enclose copies of two interesting reports by Mr. Edmonds, one describing the latest phase of this crisis, and the other treating of the legal issues between the Iraqi Government and the Mar Shimun.

10. A copy of this despatch is being sent by air mail the 29th June, original by bag.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 80.

*His Lordship the Bishop in Jerusalem to Sir F. Humphrys.*

*St. George's Close,*

*Jerusalem, June 23, 1933.*

Your Excellency,

THE Archdeacon in Palestine and I came to Iraq on Tuesday, the 13th June. The purpose of our visit was to collect information on which to base a report for his Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury regarding the twenty-seven schools now being almost entirely supported by the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission of Help to the Assyrian Church.

The immediate need for this report was caused by the information from America that the sources from which the financial support has been derived during the past ten years are now exhausted. If these schools are to be maintained we shall require to make a fresh appeal to the Anglican Communion.

In making our enquiries we found ourselves at every turn faced by a political situation so sensitive that we were unable to attain, or even pursue, our objective, without being compelled to listen to many things which were not strictly within our sphere. We propose to send to your Excellency a copy of our report to the archbishop.

At every stage we made it a primary duty to call upon the local authorities and explain the purpose of our visit. We would desire to record our sense of gratitude for the cordial and sympathetic way in which they received us.

The archdeacon leaves for Jerusalem on Sunday, the 25th, and I return on Wednesday, the 28th.

Believe me, &c.

GEORGE FRANCIS,

*Bishop in Jerusalem.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 80.

*Mr. C. J. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(P.S. No. 523. Secret and Personal.)

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Bagdad, June 25, 1933.*

IN continuation of my P.S. 519 of the 22nd June, 1933.

1. On the 22nd June I had a long talk with the Bishop of Jerusalem, who had kindly brought down the full and able report from Stafford (S. 206 of the 21st June, 1933), on the Assyrian question, which has been sent to you separately. The bishop, who had come out to enquire in what way the Anglican and American Episcopal Churches could assist the Nestorian Church in its spiritual life, related to me at some length his experiences and observations during a short tour he had just made in the Dohuk and Amadiya districts. His narrative emphasised that there is, under the political differences, a deep emotional loyalty to the Mar Shimun as Patriarch among the majority of Assyrians, and confirmed our view that the premature arrest or prosecution of Mar Shimun would serve to combine in opposition to Government many Assyrian elements that would normally give no trouble whatever. I advised the bishop to see you, and, indeed, happened to be with you later when he called. It was clear that he could be counted on to use all the influence of his sacred office to induce Mar Shimun to see reason.



2. In the course of the morning Mar Shimun rang up to say that he had received no intimation from the Ministry instructing him to stay; he gave the impression that failing such instructions he proposed to leave, notwithstanding your advice. I told him to telephone to the Minister and advised him on no account to attempt to leave without his express concurrence. Fortunately, Mar Shimun at once got Hikmat Beg, who told him clearly to stay in Bagdad, and promised, subject to the Prime Minister's approval, to confirm the intimation in writing on Saturday.

3. On Saturday, the 24th June, I found the Minister much calmer. He asked my opinion on Mar Shimun's request for written confirmation of orders not to leave. I advised that this should be given and in the following form: "I confirm my answer given to you by telephone on Thursday, that I do not wish you to leave Bagdad for the present, pending further intimation." I had gathered that for some days at any rate Mar Shimun would not leave in defiance of written orders; the important thing at the moment was to provide against the possibility of a sudden departure, a chase and the hauling back of the Patriarch.

4. In the meantime constant reports were being received of the vagaries of Yaku, son of Malik Ismail. You will remember that early in the month he had come into Dohuk with an armed following to ensure that he should not be detained by the Kaimakam. On the 14th June, 1933, he came in to see Major Thomson similarly escorted, and was refused an interview in consequence. On the 19th June Yaku was reported to be loitering on the Dohuk-Amadiya road with a band of armed men (variously estimated at between 100 and 300, and, it is said, admitted by Yaku himself to have been eighty), at the time when Malik Khoshaba and other members of the Assyrian Settlement Advisory Committee were motoring to Amadiya. Yaku was interviewed in turn by the Kaimakam of Amadiya, Major Sargon, Rev. Mr. Panfil, and various minor officials who endeavoured to persuade him to come in. His letters contain among other demands as conditions precedent to his coming in: (1) that the police reinforcements sent to Dohuk must be withdrawn; (2) that agreement must be reached between the Government and Mar Shimun on the manner of land settlement; (3) that his tribe must not be forced to accept chiefs whom they dislike; (4) that an Assyrian, named Warda, imprisoned in Dohuk must be released. Other Assyrians were reported to have refused to come in to Dohuk, and the general atmosphere of defiance of Government was unsettling the Kurds.

5. On the same day, the 24th June, the mutessarif and the director-general of police asked for a military column to be sent to Dohuk. At the request of the Minister I spoke on the telephone to Stafford at Dohuk; he told me that he regarded the situation as serious, and that the best chance of avoiding a clash and bloodshed was for the Government to make an overwhelming demonstration of force in the Dohuk-Amadiya area. I informed Hikmat Beg that I agreed with this appreciation. The Chief of the Staff was then summoned. It was arranged that the battalion now standing by at Mosul should march at once for Dohuk, and that two more battalions, two batteries of artillery and a squadron of cavalry should follow as soon as possible. Hikmat Beg emphasised to Taha Beg that this was in no way a punitive expedition; the rôle of the army was to make a demonstration of force with a view to avoiding bloodshed; Yaku was still a police matter; on the 25th, at Stafford's suggestion, I asked the Minister to ensure that Bekir Sudqi should not be put in command of the force.

6. On the morning of the 25th June I heard from you that King Feisal had telegraphed out instructions that Mar Shimun was not to be molested pending his return. I asked the Minister what effect the instructions would have on his attitude. I gathered it would have very little, except that perhaps he would not precipitate legal action if Mar Shimun did not challenge the legal validity of the intimation that he should not leave Bagdad. The Government had now been obliged to send a large expedition; was it also to let Mar Shimun, the prime cause of the trouble, return with successful defiance of the Government to encourage him? The Minister said that he was still anxious for a satisfactory solution that would make the despatch of the troops, and the resultant expenses, unnecessary. He agreed that Stafford should go out and make one last effort to persuade Yaku to come in, and hoped that somebody British would still persuade Mar Shimun to sign the short statement required, and even to tell Yaku to come in. It is hardly necessary to recall that both the Bishop of Jerusalem and yourself have failed to persuade this obstinate young man to do either.

7. Up to the last moment I have held (and a private letter from Colonel Stafford written on the morning of the 25th June still expresses the same view), that Mar Shimun would have best been allowed to return to Mosul and ignored, while individual law-breakers like Yaku were dealt with severely. The King's instructions to the Cabinet, however, arrived when the despatch of a large military column had already become an imperious necessity, and even with these instructions in mind I should hesitate to press an unwilling Minister for Mar Shimun's release from the invitation to stay. From what you tell me of your interview with him this evening, the 25th June, and his intransigent and defiant attitude, I now incline to think that the time is past when Mar Shimun can safely be allowed to return to Mosul. One might risk it oneself, but only if every subsequent move were in one's own hands.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. EDMONDS.

Enclosure 3 in No. 80.

*Mr. C. J. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(P.S. No. 527.)

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

Bagdad, June 26, 1933.

THE narrative of the Mar Shimun affair, in so far as I am concerned, is brought up to date by my P.S. 523 of yesterday evening, the 25th June. The situation has been changing so rapidly that any attempted appreciation risks being out of date before the ink is dry, or at any rate before the manuscript is typed. Nevertheless, yesterday evening does seem to mark the end of a phase and the moment is perhaps opportune to pause to take stock.

2. On the 21st May Mar Shimun was summoned to Bagdad. The object was to clear up the question of his co-operation with, or obstruction of, the settlement of the remaining landless Assyrians, to carry out which Major Thomson had just arrived. The alarms and excursions of the last month have been caused by two irrelevancies, namely, the necessity, in the general interest, of preventing two things. The first was the premature arrest or prosecution of Mar Shimun on an extremely flimsy charge of treasonable and unconstitutional claims to temporal power; the League and Europe would never be convinced of the *bona fides* of such a prosecution; locally, it would antagonise Assyrians otherwise obedient to Government and increase the possibility of ultimate avoidable bloodshed. The second was a Cabinet resignation on an anti-Assyrian slogan, which could only jeopardise the satisfactory solution of the Assyrian question indefinitely. For the moment these two irrelevant developments have been successfully prevented.

3. This morning the position is that Mar Shimun is staying in Bagdad in obedience to an administrative intimation (hereinafter referred to for convenience as an order, though it is not that) that the Minister wishes him to stay. In the meantime we have been obliged to send a large military force to the Dohuk-Amadiya area to preserve the semblance of Government authority. In view of developments there the time is now past when anybody not directly in control of every subsequent step can safely say that Mar Shimun can unobjectionably be allowed back to Mosul. Once back in Mosul he would probably want to go to his summer camp at Ser Amadiya and the question of restraining his movements by administrative order would again arise in an acute form. If Mar Shimun were to acquiesce and stay quietly here, we could go on deliberately consolidating our strength in the disturbed area.

4. But the moment Mar Shimun challenges the legality of the Minister's order, or otherwise demonstrates against what he would term his detention, the Minister's hand will be forced to take legal action in some form: (a) A prosecution under the Penal Code; (b) a demand for security for good behaviour under the Criminal Procedure Regulations; (c) an order under Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, section 40; or (d) deportation as an undesirable alien under the Residence Law (but see paragraph 7 below). The question may arise at any moment and it is necessary to be prepared for it.

5. I think the events of the last month have left no doubt whatever that Mar Shimun is determined, and will stick at nothing, to prevent the Iraqi Government from carrying out a single item of its promises to the League,



except on his own terms without the abatement of a single demand or ambition; there is nothing of the "better-ole" philosophy in Mar Shimun's make-up. These demands include: (a) The maintenance by himself of a degree of tribal authority to which the Government would never agree, both on grounds of general policy and on grounds peculiar to Mar Shimun himself; (b) settlement, and partial resettlement, more concentrated than even the decision of the League of Nations suggests as desirable; (c) the grant to the Assyrians of a privileged position of priority over other inhabitants in matters of security of tenure and title in the lands where they settle; (d) the corollary of (a), viz., that Government should only work through his nominees. In the meantime, for him, neither he nor the Assyrians are Iraqi subjects until settlement is completed on the lines he demands. As an example of what I have said, it was clear to me from the conversation recorded in the last paragraph of my P.S. 510 of the 19th June, 1933, that he rejected the invitation to co-operate in the preparation of the Community Law because (a) the Government would thereby have honoured one of its promises to the League, and (b) his attitude on the nationality question just referred to would have been compromised.

6. The point I wish to make is this. The issue between Mar Shimun and the Government allows clearly for no compromise. Even if it had not come to a head at this particular moment in the confused atmosphere created by the two irrelevancies, it would have had to be faced sooner or later, and decided once and for all. We have now reached the position in which Mar Shimun, for most practical purposes, is detained and a military expedition has had to be sent to the settlement area. There is therefore no point in tiding over the present situation.

7. When Mar Shimun issues the fresh challenge anticipated in paragraph 4, alternative (d) would have offered the most satisfactory solution. Unfortunately there are legal difficulties. The Government might not improbably claim that he was not an Iraqi; it is equally probable that Mar Shimun would not claim Iraqi nationality in order to defend himself against deportation. Nevertheless, nationality in such a case is not a matter of choice, but of fact arising out of facts of birth and residence, and there seems little doubt that Mar Shimun is an Iraqi. There are objections to effecting a deportation in violation of the law, even when the deportee does not invoke the terms of law on his own behalf, and I should have to place on record for the Minister's information, and in case of future repercussions, that the deportation was illegal. The next best alternative would be the application of Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, section 4, ordering him to live in Basra with the option of leaving the country; this involves considering Mar Shimun as a tribesman. Action as at (a) or (b) in the regular courts would be most unfortunate politically. On the other hand, the Minister might maintain it was the soundest course as against possible criticism and enquiry.

Yours sincerely,  
C. J. EDMONDS.

[E 3705/7/93]

No. 81.

Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 6.)  
(No. 422.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter, dated the 29th June, 1933, from Mar Shimun to the Minister of the Interior, Bagdad, respecting the Assyrian settlement.

Bagdad, July 3, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 81.

Mar Shimun to the Minister of Interior, Bagdad.

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, June 29, 1933.

I BEG to state that the action of the Government now confirmed by your letter of the 24th June, detaining me in Bagdad against my will for no just cause, is illegal; and that any responsibility of what may happen when the news reaches my people rests with the Government.

I also wish to point out that the methods adopted by the local officials in dealing with the Assyrian settlement policy is contrary to the "Fundamental Law" or the guarantees given by the Iraq Government to the League of Nations on the 30th May, 1932. Therefore I am arranging to place the documentary evidence before the proper authorities.

I am quite prepared to suffer any further injustice that the Government may put on me, but in no way will I submit to the methods which have been used to make me sign documents which betray my people into accepting an unreal fulfilment of the promises and recommendations of the League of Nations.

Finally, I again repeat, as per my previous correspondence with your Excellency, and also through your British advisers:—

- (a) I am willing to assist in the settlement of the Assyrians in Iraq.
- (b) After settlement I will give the required promises in writing to do my utmost to make my Assyrian people as one of the most loyal and law-abiding subjects of His Majesty and his Government.
- (c) I will then make preparations in accordance with the canons of my Church, for drafting of a law according to your Excellency's suggestion and conformable to article 6 of the Fundamental Law.

If this is not agreeable to the Government, I claim the right to ask the League of Nations for the alternative settlement scheme.

I am, &c.

ESHAI SHIMUN,  
By the Grace of God, Catholicos  
Patriarch of the Assyrians.

P.S.—May I draw your Excellency's attention to the inflammatory speech of an honorary Deputy, recorded and broadcasted in *Al Istiklal* of the 29th June, and other local papers, inciting hatred towards the Assyrians.

[E 3757/1857/93]

No. 82.

Record of a Meeting held at the Foreign Office on July 5 between Representatives of the Iraqi Government and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the Subject of the Draft Iraqi Railway Corporation Law.

Present:

Foreign Office—  
Mr. Rendel (in the chair).  
Mr. Beckett.  
Mr. Sterndale Bennett.  
Mr. Gorell Barnes.

Yasin Pasha-el-Hashimi, Iraqi  
Minister of Finance.  
Rustam Beg Haidar, Iraqi Minister of  
Economics and Communications.

Treasury Solicitor's Department—  
Mr. Stuart King.

MR. RENDEL opened the meeting by explaining that it had been arranged, as a result of the conversation which Sir John Simon had had with His Majesty King Feisal on this subject at the Hyde Park Hotel on the 22nd June. He understood that it had then been agreed that the question of the legal difficulties connected with the proposed Railway Corporation Law should be discussed in detail between the Iraqi Ministers and British legal experts, and that King



Feisal was anxious that at any rate a preliminary discussion should take place before his return. The meeting would therefore be in the nature of a more or less technical discussion on the legal aspects of the question, with the object of reaching, if possible, a preliminary agreement which would of course be *ad referendum* to the two Governments.

3. Mr. Rendel then briefly resumed the history of the question. It had been agreed in clause 4 of the Financial Agreement attached to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of the 30th June, 1930 (copies of which were circulated to the meeting), that the Iraqi railways should be administered by an independent Corporation. His Majesty's Government had prepared a draft law (copies of which were also circulated to the meeting)—see Annex A—with a view to giving effect to clause 4 of the Financial Agreement, and had communicated this draft law to the Iraqi Government early in 1932. The Iraqi Government, however, had seen various objections to the law prepared by His Majesty's Government, and had accordingly prepared an alternative draft (copies also circulated)—Annex B—which they had sent to His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad last April.

4. The question now for discussion appeared to be how far these two drafts could be harmonised, so as to meet the difficulties of the Iraqi Government as far as possible, and to reconcile the differences between the views of the two Governments. The Secretary of State had told King Feisal that British legal experts would be ready to assist; and Mr. Beckett and Mr. Stuart King were accordingly prepared to discuss the two drafts with their Excellencies, in whatever way (*e.g.*, taking them article by article) the Iraqi Ministers might prefer.

5. YASIN PASHA said that Rustam Beg was the Minister who had been authorised by the Iraqi Government to discuss the draft laws, and he would not doubt be able to give more detailed views than himself on all the various points. In his opinion, however, there were two outstandingly important questions, firstly, that of the ownership of the railways, and, secondly, that of eventual financial liability at the time of the dissolution of the Corporation. He had seen the note on the question of ownership which the Secretary of State had handed to King Feisal—see Annex C(1)—and he had also been informed briefly by His Majesty of what had passed in the course of their conversation. It might conceivably be possible for the two Governments to come to some agreement on the question of ownership, *i.e.*, the legal ownership of the railways being transferred to the Iraqi Government and the Corporation enjoying beneficial ownership. The question of financial liability, however, was more difficult, and the Iraqi Government could not undertake to assume the liabilities of the Corporation when it should cease to exist.

6. Yasin Pasha then said that, although no Government, and certainly no Iraqi Government, would contemplate refusing to honour an agreement which they recognised as a treaty obligation, the Iraqi Government, at the outset of the discussion of the draft laws, wished to express quite frankly their views about the future of the railways. The railway system in Iraq as it existed at present had been built for war purposes, and not for commercial purposes. It ran parallel to two rivers, one of which was navigable whilst the other might soon become so, and had to suffer not only from the competition of river transport, but also from the ever-increasing competition of motor transport. It was his conviction that the Iraqi railways could never be a paying concern, and that the proposed Corporation would find it impossible to raise the money which would be needed. The Corporation was, in fact, bound to prove a failure. It was only by having the entire resources of the State behind it that the Iraqi railway system could hope to carry on at all. The Iraqi Government thought, therefore, that the only practical solution would be for themselves to take over the railways and for the railways to be formally transferred to the Iraqi Government without more ado to be run out of general revenues. He was not sure how far this aspect of the question had been touched on by King Feisal and the Secretary of State, and he would like to know whether His Majesty's Government were willing to consider such a suggestion.

7. Mr. RENDEL pointed out that what Yasin Pasha had said amounted to a plea for revision of a treaty engagement rather than an argument in favour of any particular method of fulfilling that engagement. He understood that

(1) No. 72.

when the question had been discussed by King Feisal and Sir John Simon the main Iraqi point had been not that it was desired to revise the agreement, but that the agreement could not be carried out owing to certain practical legal and technical difficulties, due chiefly to the fact that certain English legal terms, &c., had been used which were regarded as inapplicable to Iraq or incompatible with Iraqi law. It had been explained that these difficulties could be overcome, and it was with a view to discussing how best to overcome them that the present meeting had been called.

8. The present meeting was not empowered to discuss a revision of the treaty, but only the practical difficulties in the way of giving effect to it, and with this object he and the legal experts present would be happy to discuss details and to see how far the two draft laws could be harmonised. But if the Iraqi Government took the line that what was required was a revision of the engagement itself, then the present discussion could not advance matters any further. Would their Excellencies care to discuss provisionally and *ad referendum* the details of the two draft laws?

9. YASIN PASHA thought that such details could better be discussed by legal experts than by Ministers. He referred to the Secretary of State's memorandum (E 3415), which he had found some difficulty in understanding, and which the advisers to the Iraqi Government would be better suited to discuss than Ministers.

10. Mr. RENDEL said that Sir John Simon had discussed the question with Sir Francis Humphrys before he saw King Feisal, and had understood that the chief objection put forward by the Iraqi Government was that it was not possible under Iraqi law to give effect to the agreement. This attitude was based on the contention not that the agreement was inequitable or disadvantageous to Iraq, but that its application was legally impracticable. It was for this reason that the Secretary of State, who had himself the highest legal qualifications, had gone into the matter and produced his memorandum in order to clear up one of the points on which he understood the Iraqi Government to be in difficulty. If their Excellencies did not wish to discuss the legal and practical difficulties of the question, however, it would, perhaps, be better to postpone any further discussion of the matter till they were in a position to put forward their proposals for treaty revision in the proper quarter. He could say, however, on behalf of His Majesty's Government that they certainly regarded the agreement as a binding treaty engagement, and that they expected the Iraqi Government to carry it out as part of the treaty settlement. A proposal to modify the treaty would be a serious matter, and while it could be put forward, no modification could, of course, be effected except by mutual agreement; and he thought he could say that, in the present case, it was most improbable that His Majesty's Government would agree to any modifications. Meanwhile, if their Excellencies would care to proceed provisionally with the discussion with the object of trying to give effect to the agreement, he and his colleagues would be happy to do so.

11. RUSTAM BEG HAIDAR said that, before he left Bagdad, he had been authorised to discuss the question with members of the staff of His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad, and that in the course of several meetings he had gone through the two drafts with them. They had not found it difficult to reach agreement on many points, and there had been only two questions which had presented any real difficulty. These were the two questions already referred to by Yasin Pasha, those of ownership and financial liability.

12. He would like first of all to say that both the memorandum which had been handed to King Feisal by Sir John Simon and the remarks which had been made by Mr. Rendel at the present meeting had confirmed the opinion which he had previously held, that His Majesty's Government had a false impression of the wishes of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government had never sought to escape from their treaty obligation in this matter, a treaty obligation which had been formally entered into and approved by the Parliaments of both countries. The Iraqi Government knew that they were bound to honour this agreement if called upon to do so, and that they must do so. What Yasin Pasha had expressed was the private view of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government did not



mean to insist on this view, but they wanted to point out that there were other means of settlement if it proved impracticable to set up the proposed Corporation. The whole question was one of interpretation, and of the "twist" which might be given to the agreement. It seemed to him that it was His Majesty's Government rather than the Iraqi Government who were trying to read a meaning into the agreement which it did not bear. The origin of the agreement had been this: His Majesty's Government had not felt satisfied that the Iraqi Government would be able to manage the railway system properly without the assistance of His Majesty's Government. In order that the administration of the system might be in expert hands, an agreement had been drawn up which entrusted it to a board with a British majority. The Iraqi Government had agreed to this, but on the understanding that the Iraqi Government should be the owners of the railway and that no financial liability for the system should rest either with the Iraqi Government or with His Majesty's Government.

13. In the draft law which they had prepared, however, His Majesty's Government had tried to interpret the two important points of ownership and financial liability in a manner contrary to the agreement. He did not know the reason of this. It might be because, as a result of the world crisis, money was difficult to obtain, and the Iraqi Government were accordingly being asked to hand over the ownership of the railways to the Corporation so that the latter might be able to raise money on them. But if that were done the agreement would be nullified. If the Iraqi Government were under the agreement to be the owners of the railways, why should ownership be given to a Corporation? It would have been simpler to transfer the ownership of the railways to the Corporation direct in the first place. Again, the agreement had laid down that neither the Iraqi Government nor His Majesty's Government should have any financial responsibility for the railways. But, according to the draft law prepared by His Majesty's Government, this financial responsibility would, in fact, fall on the Iraqi Government when the Corporation ceased to exist. This was a responsibility that they hesitated to accept, especially at a time when they read of deficits in the railway budgets of almost every country and all railways were a wasting asset, for which it was almost inconceivable that there could ever be a prosperous future.

14. MR. BECKETT said that as long as their Excellencies were willing to discuss the matter on these lines it was a question of finding a means of putting into effect paragraph 4 of the agreement. Their Excellencies had singled out two important points in which the views of the two Governments differed. It was now necessary to consider what the agreement said on these two points, what it meant, and how far it could be carried into effect. He would first take the point of ownership. With regard to this, Mr. Beckett pointed out that the Secretary of State had, in fact, made a new suggestion in his memorandum. The main lines of the agreement were perfectly clear, but too much importance had been attached to certain words of legal terminology which occurred in the British draft law. The agreement said that legal ownership of the railway system should be transferred to the Iraqi Government. His Majesty's Government accepted this and were quite willing to meet the Iraqis over the manner in which this point should be dealt with. The agreement also said that simultaneously with such transfer full "beneficial ownership" should be vested in a special body or Corporation. This was a somewhat obscure phrase, but it was perfectly clear from the rest of the agreement that it meant that the Corporation should be free to use and administer the railway system and the land on which it stood. The Iraqi Government had taken objection to the article of the draft law which laid down that the property of the railway system should be registered in the name of the Corporation. His Majesty's Government were willing to meet the Iraqi Government on this point, and agreed that the property should be registered in the name of the Iraqi Government, and to amend their draft law accordingly. But, though the Iraqi Government would be owners of the railways, they would only be so under certain conditions, namely, the conditions laid down in the agreement, whereby the system should be administered by the Corporation and the Corporation should have free and unfettered use of the assets of the system. In order to make this point clear, the suggestion now was that the Corporation Law would be annexed to the deeds when the railway property was registered in Tapu in the name of the Iraqi Government.

15. MR. RENDEL pointed out that this would involve a complete change in article 6 of the British draft, and that His Majesty's Government were willing to make this change.

16. RUSTAM BEG HAIDAR said that the difference of opinion was as to how far the Corporation would be able to dispose of the assets. In the opinion of the Iraqi Government the management and administration of the railways should be vested in the Corporation, and the railway revenues should be disposed of by the Corporation, but neither the Corporation nor anyone else should have the right to sell or alienate any of the railway assets. If a man rented a house, he could have the full use of it and he could do what he liked with it for himself during his lease, but he could not sell it to somebody else. If the Corporation were to be given the right to sell the railways, what was the use of vesting the ownership of them in the Iraqi Government? He did not see why it was necessary to attach the Corporation Law to the deed of registration in Tapu; once the law had been passed, which handed over to a Corporation the management and use of the railway system, nothing further seemed necessary.

17. MR. BECKETT explained that, when the Iraqi Government were registered in Tapu as the legal owners of the railways, it was important that it should be made clear that they were only legal owners under certain conditions. It was with this object that the law would be annexed to the deeds relating to every piece of railway land, so that anyone who examined the deeds in Tapu would be able to see that the Iraqi Government could not dispose of the land and that it was held by them subject to certain conditions.

18. YASIN PASHA said that the difficulty was that the Iraqi Government felt convinced that the Corporation would not be able to make a success of the railways or to find the money which would enable them to develop them in such a way as to meet the requirements of the Iraqi Government; that was why they thought that the idea of the Corporation was wrong.

19. MR. BECKETT asked what the Iraqi Government proposed to do if His Majesty's Government did not agree with them in this.

20. YASIN PASHA replied that the Iraqi Government certainly did not want to fail to fulfil a treaty obligation. All that they wanted to do was to put forward suggestions for the consideration of their ally and friend. Yasin Pasha then turned again to the question of ownership, and said that he had not understood the statement contained in Sir John Simon's memorandum, that a lease could be in perpetuity. In Iraqi law this was impossible.

21. MR. RENDEL and MR. BECKETT explained that His Majesty's Government did not propose a lease. What the agreement said was "by lease or otherwise," and the Secretary of State had only made this statement to show that in certain systems of law a perpetual lease was possible (in English law a lease of this kind was sometimes for 999 years) and that the legal difficulties which the agreement presented were not insuperable.

22. YASIN PASHA said that he understood that the Iraqi Government were to be the legal owners of the railways; but, supposing the Corporation found that some part of the property belonging to the railways was of no use to them and decided to sell it in order to meet a deficit, what would the position of the Iraqi Government be then?

23. MR. BECKETT said that this was the kind of point of detail which it was possible to discuss. There were provisions in both the draft laws governing the disposal of property belonging to the railway system. According to the Iraqi draft (article 6 (a)), the Corporation could not dispose of any of that property without the consent of the Iraqi Government; according to the British draft (article 7), they could dispose of the movable property, but not of the immovable property, without the consent of the Iraqi Government.



24. MR. RENDEL agreed that there would be no difficulty in discussing points of detail such as this. He fully realised the wish of the Iraqi Government to clear up the position with regard to such points. This could best be done by working out a new draft on the basis of the two which had already been prepared. Mr. Beckett and Mr. Stuart King were ready to try to draft some satisfactory compromise, if their Excellencies desired.

25. MR. BECKETT expressed the opinion that it would be more useful to work through the drafts article by article than to discuss isolated aspects of the matter as had been done so far at the meeting.

26. YASIN PASHA, after consultation with Rustam Beg Haidar, said that before details were discussed he would like to have a talk on the subject with King Feisal. The Iraqi Government might perhaps like to express their views in a small paper similar to the Secretary of State's memorandum.

27. MR. RENDEL said that it had been left by King Feisal and Sir John Simon that the meeting should explore the position, discuss outstanding points and explain mutual difficulties. Now it would be better, perhaps, to postpone for a further meeting the discussion of details of drafting.

28. YASIN PASHA said that, though he thought agreement on the question of ownership might be possible, the question of financial liability was a different matter. The Iraqi Government did not see why they should be liable for the debts of the Corporation when it ceased to exist, and he did not think that they would be willing to accept this responsibility.

29. MR. STUART KING and MR. BECKETT pointed out that the Iraqi Government would only assume this responsibility if and when the Corporation were to be dissolved by the voluntary act of the Iraqi Government itself.

30. MR. RENDEL said that it seemed to him that what Yasin Pasha meant was that he feared that, since, in his opinion, the future of the railways in Iraq was so precarious, the Corporation might become completely bankrupt, and that, if it were then to go into some kind of liquidation, the Iraqi Government would at that moment inherit its liabilities. Yasin Pasha agreed that this was one of his points.

31. MR. BECKETT replied that, according to the British draft, the only event in which liability could rest upon the revenues of the Iraqi Government was if that Government, of its own free will, put an end to the life of the Corporation. If the Corporation went into liquidation, then only the assets of the railways would be liable to meet its debts.

32. YASIN PASHA then asked whether, in such circumstances, the land forming part of the assets of the railways would not fall to the creditors.

33. MR. BECKETT replied that the British draft had provided that the Corporation could not alienate its land without the prior consent of the Iraqi Government. It was true that the Corporation might wish to issue a loan and that it might be necessary to hypothecate a part or the whole of the land belonging to the railways as security; but the Corporation could not issue such a loan without the consent of the Iraqi Government, and before the Iraqi Government gave that consent they would presumably insist on seeing and approving in detail the conditions on which the loan was issued. All that the law said was that, subject to the consent of the Iraqi Government, loans might be issued and charged on the property of the railways. The part of the property on which they would be charged must be considered between the Iraqi Government and the Corporation at the time when the loan was proposed, and could not be decided before that. The law in fact only gave power in this matter and did not bind the Iraqi Government to any particular course of action.

34. YASIN PASHA said that, although the Iraqi Government might have the legal right to refuse their consent to proposed loans, if they did so they would certainly be regarded by His Majesty's Government as being obstructive, and a dispute would result.

35. MR. BECKETT replied that naturally His Majesty's Government would not expect the Iraqi Government, as a party to a treaty obligation, to refuse a request of this nature unreasonably.

36. MR. RENDEL said that he quite appreciated the fears of Yasin Pasha that the Iraqi Government might find themselves committed to the eventual alienation of part of the land belonging to the railway system. All concerned, however, were equally interested in making the Corporation a success. Perhaps his Excellency might be right, and the Corporation might be doomed to failure; but it was a little late to raise this objection now, when an agreement had been made which was based on the intention of both parties to make the Corporation a success. The only liability the Iraqi Government could incur was the exceedingly remote possibility that, in the event of the Corporation becoming bankrupt, land belonging to the railway system might be alienated to creditors. They would be under no financial liability whatsoever.

38. YASIN PASHA stated that he was quite sure that the Corporation would fail and that the land would be lost.

38. MR. STUART KING said that the object of the agreement had been to set up a body to manage the railways which would be in a position to raise money by loans, and that the possibility of the Corporation wishing to raise such loans was clearly envisaged in that agreement. If the Corporation were not in a position to give reasonable security, then they would not be able to raise money, and without money the railways could not be run successfully. When the time came to raise money, the Corporation, in consultation with the Iraqi Government, should drive the best bargain they could with the financiers, but that was a question for the future, and the immediate necessity was to ensure that the Corporation would have the power to raise money.

39. YASIN PASHA said that the idea seemed to be that the Iraqi Government were to give the railways to a Corporation which could not run them, and were thus to be deprived of a useful asset. When it was pointed out to him that this asset did not at present belong to the Iraqi Government, he was understood to reply that he could not understand why it did not.

40. MR. RENDEL said that it appeared to him that the Iraqi Ministers were speaking with two voices. Rustam Beg Haidar had said that the Iraqi Government were prepared to discuss the question with a view to harmonising the differences of opinion; he thought that His Majesty's Government had given a twist to the agreement and were trying to go beyond the treaty obligations, and what was required, therefore, was to bring the question back into focus. But he had based himself on the idea of working within the framework of the agreement. Yasin Pasha, on the other hand, had always come back to his view that the whole arrangement contemplated in the agreement was wrong, and that, if a Corporation was set up, the railways were doomed to failure.

41. MR. BECKETT agreed, subject to the consideration that Yasin Pasha had said that, if His Majesty's Government did not agree with his view, the Iraqi Government had no intention of trying to escape from their treaty obligation.

42. RUSTAM BEG HAIDAR replied that there was, in fact, no difference between the points of view of Yasin Pasha and himself. He shared the convictions of his colleague. He also considered that, if the suggestion put forward by him was not approved by His Majesty's Government, the Iraqi Government were bound to fulfil their obligations. This was precisely the view which had been expressed by Yasin Pasha.



43. Mr. BECKETT said that the representatives of His Majesty's Government present could not discuss the substitution of a new scheme for that contemplated in the agreement, and asked whether their Excellencies wished to continue discussing the details of the draft laws.

44. YASIN PASHA, after consultation with Rustam Beg, replied that before the details were further discussed, he would like to discuss the whole question with Nuri Pasha and Mr. Wheatley.

45. Mr. RENDEL said that he understood, therefore, that the conclusion of the meeting was that their Excellencies should discuss the question with King Feisal and the advisers of the Iraqi Government, and that another meeting of a more definitely technical nature should be arranged later, at which the two drafts should be discussed by the advisers of the Iraqi Government and the legal experts of His Majesty's Government, who would bear in mind the basic difficulties, and see how far the views of the Iraqi Government could be met.

46. YASIN PASHA said that he agreed with this conclusion, except that he would prefer that it were not specifically stated that he would discuss the matter with King Feisal. He could discuss it, in the first instance, with Nuri Pasha and his advisers.

*Foreign Office, July 11, 1933.*

#### ANNEX A.

(British Draft.)

#### *A Law to constitute the Iraq State Railway Corporation.*

WE, Feisal, &c. :

Name and  
serial number.  
Definitions.

1. This law may be called "The Iraq State Railway Corporation Law, 1933."
2. In this law, save where there is anything repugnant in the context, the following expressions shall have the meanings assigned to them :—

- (1) "The Corporation" shall mean "The Iraq State Railway Corporation."
- (2) "The railway system" shall mean the undertaking railways, stations, buildings, bridges, culverts, works, plant and land, held and enjoyed at the date of coming into force of this law by the Iraqi Government as operators of the existing railways in Iraq, all of which, for the purposes of description only, are set out on the map marked "A" and signed by and deposited in the (Dept. Office of) prior to the promulgation of this law (and more particularly described in the schedules annexed thereto), together with the rights and privileges in connexion therewith and all material, plant, rolling-stock and other property and things movable and immovable at that date held or used by or for the said railways and together with any modifications, additions and extensions which may be made thereto under the provisions of this law.
- (3) "Light railways" shall mean railways the gauge of which does not exceed 2 feet 6 inches or 60 centimetres.
- (4) "Appointed day" shall mean the day on which this law shall come into operation in accordance with section 20 (1) hereof.

Incorporation  
of the board on  
the appointed  
day (see  
clauses )

- 3.—(1) For the purpose of maintaining, administering and working the railway system and for the other purposes of this law there shall be constituted, with effect from the appointed day, a corporate body to be called the "Iraq State Railway Corporation," with perpetual succession and an official seal which shall be judicially noted and with power to sue and be sued in that name, to enter

into contracts; and (subject to the provisions of this law) to purchase, take hold and dispose of movable and immovable property in Iraq for the purposes of this law.

(2) The headquarters of the Corporation shall be in Bagdad.

4. The Corporation shall and may, subject to the provisions of this law and to any rights existing on the appointed day, have and exercise the following rights and powers, that is to say :—

(1) The sole and exclusive right to construct and operate railways and light railways within the area shaded in green in the map marked "B" and signed by and deposited in the prior to the promulgation of this law.

(2) The right, with the prior consent of the Iraqi Government (which shall not unreasonably be withheld), to construct and operate railways and light railways outside the said area.

(3) The right to carry and convey by railway all such passengers and goods as shall be offered to them.

(4) The right to provide ancillary forms of transport and such facilities as they may consider necessary for the conveyance of passengers and goods to and from railheads and stations.

5.—(1) By virtue of, and subject to, the provisions of this law, the management, direction and control of the railway system, together with all rolling-stock, machinery, movable stores and all assets and liabilities of the Iraqi Government in connexion with the management and control of the railway system shall, as from the appointed day, pass to and devolve upon the Corporation.

Vesting of  
railway system  
in the  
Corporation.

(2) As from the appointed day, all land forming part of the railway system, which immediately before that day was vested in, or at the disposal of, the Iraqi Government, shall, by virtue of this law, be transferred to the Corporation.

(3) Any land forming part of the railway system on the appointed day, which was not on that day vested in or at the disposal of the Iraqi Government, or which may thereafter reasonably be required by the Corporation for the development or better working of the railway undertaking, shall, at the request of the Corporation, be acquired by, and at the expense of, the Iraqi Government, in accordance with the law for the time in force governing the expropriation of land for public purposes, and when so acquired shall be transferred to the Corporation, subject to the payment by the Corporation to the Iraqi Government of an annual sum not exceeding 4 per cent. of the cost to the Iraqi Government of acquiring it.

6. All lands and rights in land vested in, or acquired by, the Corporation shall be registered without charge in *Tapu* in the name of the Corporation and no separate valuations of plots shall be required.

Registration  
of title in  
*Tapu*.

7.—(1) The Corporation shall not, without the previous consent of the Iraqi Government, by sale, lease or otherwise, part with any land for the time being forming part of the railway system exceeding ( ) in extent or, save as hereinafter expressly provided, charge or hypothecate any land, buildings or immovable property so vested in or held by it.

Prohibition of  
sale or disposal  
of railway  
lands.  
Some appro-  
priate acreage.

(2) The Corporation shall not, without the consent of the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq, abandon or cease to maintain and operate any part of the railway system.

#### *Administration.*

8.—(1) Subject as hereinafter provided, the Corporation shall be administered by a board of five directors, two of whom shall be appointed by the Government of the United Kingdom, two by the Iraqi Government, and the fifth, who shall be the general manager of the Corporation and *ex officio* chairman of the board of directors, by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq jointly.

Appointment  
of members of  
Board of  
Administra-  
tion.

(2) The first general manager of the Corporation shall be Lieutenant-Colonel J. Ramsay Tainsh, C.B.E., V.D. (the present director of the Iraqi railways).

(3) In the case of the absence or anticipated absence of the chairman from duty for more than one month, the chairman may, by writing under his hand and in his default the board by resolution shall, appoint a deputy for a period of not more than three months, with power to renew the appointment, and the deputy



so appointed shall have all the powers of the chairman of the board while so acting.

(4)—(a) Directors other than the general manager shall hold office for two years, and shall be eligible for reappointment. The general manager shall hold office for five years, or such shorter period as may be agreed upon between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government, and shall be eligible for reappointment.

(b) Any casual vacancy in the board of directors shall be filled by the nomination of the Government or Governments by whom the director whose retirement or death gives rise to the vacancy was appointed, and a person so appointed to fill a casual vacancy shall hold office only for the remainder of the period for which the person whose vacancy is being filled was appointed, but shall be eligible for reappointment.

(5)—(a) Provided that the board may at any time, with the prior consent of the Iraqi Government and of the Government of the United Kingdom, by a resolution duly passed, increase the number of directors to not more than nine.

(b) The resolution shall prescribe the manner in which any additional directors are to be appointed (including provision for filling any casual vacancies that may arise), the period for which they shall hold office and their remuneration, and may increase the number of directors required to form a quorum.

Meetings of the board

9.—(1) The board shall meet at least twice annually at such times and places as the chairman may decide.

(2) The chairman may, and if so required by two directors shall, at any time summon a meeting of the board, which shall be held at such time and place as the chairman shall direct.

(3) The board shall issue rules to govern the conduct of business at board meetings as they think fit.

(4) The quorum necessary for the transaction of the business of the board and the passing of resolutions shall be three.

(5) The acts of the board shall not be invalid by reason only of any vacancy so long as their number is not reduced below the quorum for the time being.

Appointment and conditions of service of officers and servants of the board.

10.—(1) The board may appoint a secretary and such other officers as they require, and on such terms as regards pay, allowances, superannuation, conditions of service, suspension, retirement or dismissal, as they think fit.

(2) All existing officers and servants of the Iraqi Government employed on the railway system on the appointed day shall become the officers and servants of the Corporation, and the Corporation shall be subrogated to the Iraqi Government in all contracts of service with such officers and servants then subsisting.

#### Financial Provisions.

Issue of capital in preferred, deferred stock, and debentures or debenture stock.

11.—(1) The capital of the Corporation shall consist of 570·85 lakhs of rupees, comprising:—

(a) Preferred stock to an amount of 320·85 lakhs of rupees, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum (which shall rank as a first charge upon the net annual surplus revenues of the Corporation), such interest being non-cumulative for the first twenty years, and thereafter to be cumulative, of which 275 lakhs of rupees shall be allotted to and registered in the name of the Government of the United Kingdom, and 45·85 lakhs of rupees shall be allotted to and registered in the name of the Iraqi Government.

(b) Deferred stock (ranking both as to capital and interest after the preferred stock) to the amount of 250 lakhs of rupees, to be allotted to the Iraqi Government.

(2) Stock certificates shall be issued to the Governments in respect of the stock so allotted to them respectively.

Power to raise additional capital.

12.—(1) Subject to the consent of the Iraqi Government, the board may raise loans for the reconditioning or development of the railways by the issue of debentures, debenture stock or otherwise, and may decide the terms and conditions of such loans.

(2) Such loans may rank before the stock referred to in article 11 hereof, and may be secured by mortgage or charge on any property or thing which forms part of the railway system.

13. The board shall cause proper books of account to be kept with respect to:—

Books of the Corporation.

(a) All receipts and expenses of the Corporation, showing the matters to which the receipt or expenditure relates.

(b) All sales of the property of the Corporation.

(c) The assets and liabilities of the Corporation. The books of account shall be kept at the headquarters of the Corporation and shall be open to inspection by the directors and the auditors.

14.—(1) The board shall in their annual accounts set aside out of the revenues and profits of the Corporation, after making due provision for the essential working expenditure of the railway system, including depreciation and renewals, such sums as they think proper as a reserve or reserves for the improvement of the railway system.

Accounts and payment of dividends.

(2) The net annual surplus revenue of the Corporation shall mean the net balance of revenue after providing for such reserve or reserves.

15.—(1) The provisions of article 1 of the Law for an Audit Department of Public Accounts (No. 17 of 1927) shall on the appointed day cease to apply to the railway system.

Accounts and audit.

(2) The board shall appoint as its auditor or auditors a person or persons nominated by the Iraqi Government after consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom.

(3) The board shall prepare annually and deliver to the said Governments a duly audited report in English and Arabic of the finances and working of the railways.

16. The board shall cause to be kept at their head office a register of debentures, debenture stock and other charges, which register shall be open to public inspection at all reasonable times on payment of fee not exceeding 50 fils.

Register of debentures.

1/-d. is usual.

#### General.

17. The board shall have power to make regulations for all or any of the following purposes and from time to time to amend existing regulations:—

A power to make regulations is necessary, and unless already covered by Iraq law, to make bye-laws for their enforcement.

(1) For regulating the entry of the public in and upon the premises and rolling-stock of the Corporation.

(2) For regulating the receipt and delivery of goods and other things to and by the railway and the conditions of carriage of them.

(3) For governing the conditions of the use of the Corporation's rolling-stock stations and property.

(4) For regulating the rates, fares, tolls and conditions upon which members of the public and their luggage, vehicles, waggons and goods of every description may be admitted to, accepted by, pass over or be conveyed by the railways.

(5) And, generally, for regulating the working of the railway system.

18.—(1) For the better observance of any such regulations it shall be lawful for the Corporation, by writing under their seal, to issue bye-laws and to repeal and amend the same. Such bye-laws shall be published in the *Official Gazette*, and copies thereof shall be exhibited continuously in a conspicuous place or places in and about the premises of the Corporation, provided that such bye-laws shall not be repugnant to the law of Iraq.

Sanction for bye-laws publicity.

(2) Any person offending against any such bye-laws shall forfeit for every first offence against them any sum not exceeding and for every subsequent offence not exceeding to be imposed by the Corporation in any such bye-law as a penalty for an offence, and to be recoverable by the Corporation at the suit of any duly-authorised officer in

40/-d. and £5 in England

(3) Any such bye-law may be proved by certified copies deposited by the Corporation in the (Courts).

The most convenient court.

19. It shall be lawful for the Corporation to carry and convey by railway all such passengers and goods as shall be offered to them, and to make such reasonable charges in respect thereof and classes thereof and in respect of passage over and user of the premises of the Corporation as may from time to time be determined by the board, by writing, given under the hand of the chairman, a copy or copies whereof shall be conspicuously exhibited in and about the premises of the Corporation.

Rates, charges and tolls.



20.—(1) This law shall come into operation on the day of 1932, or such prior date as may be promulgated by Royal Iradah, and shall continue in force until the dissolution of the Corporation as hereinafter provided.

(2) If and so soon as the Government of the United Kingdom shall cease to hold any of the preferred stock allotted to them so much of sections 7 (2), 8 (1), 8 (5) and 15 (2) as requires the consent or approval of or consultation with the Government of United Kingdom in connexion with the appointment of certain officers, and so much of sub-section 15 (3) as requires a statement to be furnished to the Government of the United Kingdom, shall cease to have effect.

(3) If the Iraqi Government shall acquire the whole of the preferred stock allotted to the Government of the United Kingdom, the Iraqi Government may by Royal Iradah dissolve the Corporation on a date to be specified therein not being earlier than six months after the date on which the said stock shall have been so acquired by that Government.

21. On the dissolution of the Corporation under the preceding section the railway system as then existing and all existing assets shall vest in the Iraqi Government and all existing obligations of the Corporation (including obligations to debenture holders) shall devolve upon the Iraqi Government and shall constitute a charge upon the general revenues of Iraq.

#### ANNEX B.

(Iraqi Draft.)

#### *Draft Railway Corporation Law.*

Article 1. This law shall be called "The Iraq Railway Corporation Law, 1933."

Art. 2. For the purpose of this law, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth against them:—

(a) "The Corporation" shall mean the Iraqi Railway Corporation set up under this law.

(b) "The railway system" shall mean the undertaking consisting of the railways, stations, bridges, culvert works, plant and land held and enjoyed at the appointed day by the Iraqi Government as operators of the existing railways in Iraq, all of which for the purpose of description only are set out on the map marked "A" and signed by and deposited in the Department prior to the promulgation of this law (and more particularly described in the schedules annexed thereto), together with the rights and privileges in connexion therewith and all material plant, rolling-stock and other property and things, movable and immovable, at the appointed day or prior thereto held or used by or for the said railways, and together with any modifications, additions or extensions which may be made thereto under the provisions of this law.

(c) "Light railways" shall mean railways the gauge of which does not exceed 2 feet 6 inches or 76 centimetres.

(d) "Appointed day" shall mean the day on which this law shall come into operation.

Art. 3. With effect from the appointed day there shall be constituted, in accordance with this law, a corporate body, having the status of a juristic person, which shall be called "The Corporation" and shall have its headquarters in Bagdad, and shall be vested with the right of enjoyment of the railway system for a nominal annual "badal" (? rental) of

Art. 4. The Corporation shall have the right of full enjoyment of the railway system, to ensure the exercise of which by them the Corporation shall have power and right—

(a) To enter into contracts, subject to the provisions of this law.

(b) To sue and to be sued.

(c) To work and improve railways within the area shaded in red on the map marked "B," signed by and deposited with prior to the promulgation of this law.

(d) To carry and convey by railway all such passengers, goods and other things as shall be offered to them.

(e) Subject to the provisions of this law, to dispose of all rolling-stock and movable stores and other assets of the railway system.

(f) Subject to the provisions of this law, to dispose of all lands which on the appointed day formed part of the railway system, and was immediately prior to that day vested in or at the disposal of the Iraqi Government.

Art. 5.—(a) Any land forming part of the railway system on the appointed day which was not on that day vested in or at the disposal of the Iraqi Government, and any land which may thereafter reasonably be required by the Corporation to ensure the best enjoyment by them of the railway undertaking, shall be acquired by the Iraqi Government in accordance with the law for the time in force governing expropriation for purposes of public benefit; provided that the Corporation shall bear "all the expenses consequent thereon" (? the whole cost of such expropriation), including fees for the registration provided for in clause (b) under.

(b) All land acquired by the Iraqi Government under the preceding clause shall be registered in Tapu in the name of the said Government, the Corporation being vested with right of disposal of such land in accordance with this law.

(c) All improvements and additions, whether integral or independent, which the Corporation may introduce into the railway system as it stood on the appointed day shall become the property of the Iraqi Government, provided that the Corporation shall be vested with right of disposal thereof in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Art. 6.—(a) The Corporation shall not, except with the consent of the Iraqi Government, make such disposal of any movable or immovable property for the time being forming part of the railway system as may involve the immediate or ultimate transfer of the ownership of such property to another party, or the enjoyment of such property by another party with or without return.

(b) The Corporation shall not without the consent of the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq abandon or cease to maintain and operate any part of the railway system.

#### *Administration.*

Art. 7.—(a) Subject as hereinafter provided, the Corporation shall be administered by a board of five directors, two of whom shall be appointed by the Government of Iraq, two by the Government of the United Kingdom, and the fifth, who shall be the chairman of the board of directors, by the Governments of Iraq and the United Kingdom jointly subject to clause (b) below.

(b) The first chairman of the board of directors of the Corporation shall be Lieutenant-Colonel J. Ramsay Tainsh, C.B.E., V.D. (the Director of the Iraqi Railways).

(c) In the case of the absence or anticipated absence of the chairman of the board of directors of the Corporation from duty, the board by resolution shall appoint a deputy who shall act for the chairman.

(d) Directors, including the chairman of the board of directors of the Corporation, shall hold office for two years and shall be eligible for reappointment in the manner set forth in clause (b) of this article. The chairman of the board of directors of the Corporation shall be once a Britisher and once an Iraqi, by rotation.

(e) Any casual vacancy in the board of directors of the Corporation shall be filled by the nomination of the Government or Governments by whom the director whose death or retirement, or dismissal under article 11 (3) of this law, gives rise to the vacancy was appointed, and a person so appointed shall hold office for the remainder of the period for which the person whose vacancy is being filled was appointed, but he shall be eligible for reappointment.

Art. 8. The board of directors of the Corporation shall, "with the consent of" (? in agreement with) the Iraqi Government, and subject to the provisions of this law, fix the wages and conditions of service of the directors appointed under article 7 thereof.

Art. 9.—(a) The board of directors of the Corporation shall meet at least once monthly at their headquarters at the invitation of the chairman. The chairman shall summon a meeting of the board when so required by two directors.



(b) The quorum necessary for the transaction of the business of the board and the passing of resolutions shall be four directors.

(c) The board will make such rules as they may consider suitable for the conduct of the proceedings in their meetings.

Art. 10.—(a) The board may appoint such Iraqi officials and employees as may be necessary for themselves and for the working of the railway system on such terms in regard to allowances, superannuation, conditions of service, suspension, retirement from service, and expulsion as they think fit. The board may not employ any foreigner to any post unless they satisfy themselves that no Iraqi is available capable of carrying out the duties of such post, in which case the board shall refer the matter to the Iraqi Government and obtain their consent.

(b) All existing officials and employees of the Iraqi Government employed on the railway system on the appointed day shall become the officials and servants of the Corporation, and the Corporation shall be substituted for the Iraqi Government in all contracts of service with such officials and employees then subsisting.

Art. 11.—(1) If the board of directors or a director are or is discovered to have so "contravened" the duties of their or his office, or so abused the powers vested in them or in him by this law, as to cause harm to the railway system or to impair in any way the accrued or anticipated benefits and profits of the Corporation, the Iraqi Government may withdraw from the board or the director concerned the "quality" (? powers) acquired by them or by him under this law pending the result of the enquiry provided for in the following clause, subject to prior consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom when such withdrawal affects the board or when the director concerned is one appointed by or in agreement with the said Government.

(2) When action under the preceding clause is taken against the board or a director, the Iraqi Government shall make arrangements for the work of the board or the director concerned to be carried on, and shall appoint a person or a body to undertake enquiry into the charges made against the board or the director concerned, and report the result of such enquiry to the said Government, who shall furnish the Government of the United Kingdom with a copy of such report if so required by the latter.

The Iraqi Government shall also consult the Government of the United Kingdom on the arrangement (for the carrying on of work) and the appointment of persons or bodies (for enquiry) as above when the withdrawal of quality affects the board or a director appointed by or in agreement with the said Government.

(3) If it is found out from the report submitted to the Iraqi Government under the preceding clause that the charge preferred against the board or the director concerned is true, "he" (*sic*) shall be removed from office by the Government by whom he was appointed or by the Iraqi Government and the Government of the United Kingdom by whom he was appointed in agreement, and the vacancy arising therefrom in the board shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of article 7 of this law. The Iraqi Government may recover from the director or directors concerned indemnity for the damage caused or the forfeited actual or anticipated benefits in accordance with law.

(4) Removal from office under the provisions of the preceding clause shall not prejudice the institution of legal proceedings under the laws for the time being in force against the offending director or directors if the offence committed by him or by them constitutes a punishable offence under the said laws.

#### Financial Provisions.

Art. 12.—(1) The capital of the Corporation shall consist of 570.85 lakhs of rupees, comprising—

(a) Preferred stock to an amount of 320.85 lakhs of rupees, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum (which shall rank as a first charge upon the net annual surplus revenues of the Corporation), such interest being "non-cumulative" (*literally*: not necessarily payable) for the first twenty years from the appointed day, and thereafter to be "cumulative" (*literally*: necessarily payable), of which 275 lakhs of rupees shall be allotted to and registered in the name of the Government of the United Kingdom, and the

remaining 45.85 lakhs of rupees shall be allotted to and registered in the name of the Iraqi Government.

(b) Deferred stock (ranking both as to capital and interest after the preferred stock) to the amount of 250 lakhs of rupees, to be allotted to and registered in the name of the Iraqi Government.

(2) Stock certificates shall be issued to the two Governments in respect of the stock so allotted to them under the preceding clauses (a) and (b).

(3) The net annual surplus revenue of the Corporation shall mean the net balance of revenue left after deducting the amounts provided for under article 15 of this law, including provision for reserve and such sum or sums as are required for the service of loans raised by the Corporation under article 13 of this law, and also including interest on the preferred stock mentioned in clause (a) of this article, when such interest is "necessarily payable" (? cumulative).

Art. 13.—(a) The board may with the approval of the Iraqi Government raise loans for the reconditioning or development of the railways by the issue of debentures, debenture stock or otherwise, and may decide the terms and conditions of such loans.

(b) Such loans shall rank before the stock referred to in article 12 hereof.

Art. 14. The board shall cause proper books of account to be kept with respect to :—

(a) All receipts and expenses of the Corporation, showing the matters to which the receipt or expenditure relates.

(b) All sales of the property of the Corporation.

(c) The assets and liabilities of the Corporation. The books of account shall be kept at the headquarters of the Corporation, and shall be open to inspection by the directors or the auditor-general of accounts or person or persons deputed by him for the purpose.

Art. 15. The board shall in their annual accounts set aside out of the revenues and profits of the Corporation, after making due provision for essential work and for the working expenditure of the railway system, including depreciation and renewals, such sums not exceeding as they think proper as a reserve or reserves for the improvement of the railway system.

Art. 16. All transaction of the Corporation shall be conducted in the Arabic language. Nevertheless, and subject to approval by the Iraqi Government, transactions may be conducted in the English language in certain special cases to be declared by the board.

Art. 17. The board shall prepare annually and submit to the Governments of Iraq and the United Kingdom an audited report in the Arabic and English languages on the finances and working of the railways.

Art. 18. The board shall keep at their head office a register of debenture stock or other debt debentures, which register shall be open to public inspection at all reasonable times on payment of a fee not exceeding 50 fils.

#### General Provisions.

Art. 19. The board shall have power to issue instructions for the following purposes :—

(a) For regulating the entry of the public in and upon the premises and rolling-stock forming part of the railway system.

(b) For regulating the receipt and delivery of goods and other things to and by the railways and conditions of carriage of them.

(c) For regulating the conditions of the use of the property, stations and rolling-stock forming part of the railway system.

(d) For regulating the conditions upon which members of the public and their luggage, vehicles, waggons, and goods may be admitted to, accepted by, pass over or be conveyed by the railways.

(e) And, generally, for regulating the working of the railway system.

Art. 20.—NOTE: The drafting of this article depends on the determination of the acts of contravention which the Railway Administration considers should be punishable, in order that such acts shall be set forth in the law and provision made later on for the punishment of offenders.



Art. 21. The board shall (if have the right to) levy charges and fees in respect of persons and goods and other things conveyed or carried by the railways and in respect of passage over and use of premises forming part of the railway system, or in respect of other than these (if services) "as" (if at the rate) indicated in the schedule marked ( ) forming an annexure to this law, these charges and fees being regarded as the maximum charges and fees admissible for collection.

Art. 22. As soon as the Government of the United Kingdom shall cease to hold the preferred stock allotted to them, so much of the provisions of this law as relate to them shall cease to have effect.

Art. 23. Any transfer of any part of the preferred stock allotted to the Government of the United Kingdom to any party other than the Iraqi Government shall be utterly invalid.

Art. 24. When the Iraqi Government shall have acquired all the preferred stock allotted to the Government of the United Kingdom, the Iraqi Government shall have the right by Royal Iradah to dissolve the Corporation.

Art. 25. On the dissolution of the Corporation under article 24 of this law, the Iraqi Government shall "be" (if become) responsible for the discharge of all the then existing obligations of the Corporation (including obligations to debenture holders) from the revenues of the railways as then standing.

Art. 26. This law shall come into operation on the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*, and shall remain operative until the dissolution of the Corporation as provided in article 24 of this law.

[E 3885/597/93]

No. 83.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 424.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 4, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith two statements of receipts and expenditure of the port of Basra for the financial year which ended on the 31st March, 1933, as compared with the budget estimates,<sup>(1)</sup> and a copy of the general balance-sheet of the port as at the 1st April, 1933.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. The results of the year's working may be summarised as follows:—

	Iraqi dinars.
Revenue ... ..	243,956
Operating expenditure ... ..	168,109
Depreciation of new assets charged against revenue ... ..	4,154
Tenth instalment of capital debt and interest charges ... ..	36,960
Revenue surplus... ..	34,733
Expenditure on capital works ... ..	23,417
Net balance taken to reserve ... ..	11,316

3. The actual revenue surplus of 34,733 Iraqi dinars compares with an estimated surplus of 38 Iraqi dinars only. The wide difference is due chiefly to the fact that imports into Iraq during the year were considerably greater than had been anticipated, the heavy traffic in oil pipes and material for use in the construction of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipe-line not having been taken into account when the estimates were prepared. The amount of tanker shipping entering the port limits was also greater than had been anticipated, and more than that of the preceding year. Despite a substantial reduction in the dues charged on shipping, the revenue from this source showed only a small reduction. Although the results of the year have proved to be exceptionally favourable, they are the result of abnormal factors, and the export tonnage figures, which are a matter of real importance to Iraq, were disappointing and fell below the estimates.

4. The practice of the port in showing the cost of new works in their accounts as an investment of surplus funds tends to give the reserve funds, which

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

together total £295,000, an appearance of greater solidity than is actually the case. The financial position of the port is nevertheless very strong, in consequence of an unbroken series of substantial revenue surpluses for the past ten years and, provided that the same conservative policy is followed, the port administration can look forward with comparative equanimity to a continuance of the present economic depression.

5. The financial position is clearly shown in the following summary of the reserve account as it stood on the 31st March, 1932, and on the 31st March, 1933:—

	1932.		1933.	
	Iraqi dinars.	Iraqi dinars.	Iraqi dinars.	Iraqi dinars.
(a) General reserve .. ..	..	225,000	..	225,000
(b) Surplus revenue reserve .. ..	..	35,700	..	70,496
Total reserves .. ..	..	260,700	..	295,496
Cash deposit in Treasury .. ..	90,000	71,250	108,180	41,250
Cash in bank and on hand .. ..		12,000		50,610
Net amount due to port on current accounts .. ..		6,750		16,320
Stores .. ..		31,950		29,695
Expenditure on capital works .. ..	..	138,750	..	157,621
Total reserves .. ..	..	260,700	..	295,496

6. The programme of capital works authorised for construction during the financial year, details of which are contained in Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 513 of the 1st June, 1932, allowed for expenditure of 66,375 Iraqi dinars, of which approximately 50,000 Iraqi dinars remains to be spent and will form a charge against the liquid resources set out in the preceding paragraph. A further capital programme, which will also require to be financed from reserves, is now under the consideration of the Iraqi Government, and I have asked for particulars of the proposals.

7. The Fao bar dredging service also benefited by the increase in the volume of shipping, as will be seen from the enclosed statement of receipts and expenditure for the financial year.<sup>(1)</sup> Receipts from dredging dues and miscellaneous sources totalled 267,327 Iraqi dinars, and operating expenditure was 116,711 Iraqi dinars. A sum of 170,605 Iraqi dinars was repaid to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in reduction of the capital debt, in addition to a sum of 11,658 Iraqi dinars as interest. After making these payments, the reserve funds of the service showed a credit balance of 62,628 Iraqi dinars in cash and stores. The capital amount due to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (originally £462,000) had been reduced to £97,000 on the 1st April, 1933, and there is every prospect of this balance being repaid during the current financial year. In this connexion I would invite a perusal of paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 329 of the 24th May last. The Minister of Finance has hinted that the Iraqi Government may decide, after the capital indebtedness of the service to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company has been entirely liquidated, to retain the dredging dues at their present rate and to devote the surplus revenues to the furtherance of a speedier liquidation of the port's indebtedness to His Majesty's Government than is provided under the present system of annual payments from port revenues.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



[E 3788/7/93]

No. 84.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 430.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 6, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 419 of the 29th June, the two principal features of the present Assyrian crisis during the course of the week have been—

- (i) The question of the return of the Mar Shimun to Mosul; and
- (ii) The reaction produced by the Mar Shimun's letter to the Minister of the Interior, dated the 29th June and delivered on the 1st July.

2. The various arguments for and against the return of the Mar Shimun to Mosul have been discussed at length in the telegraphic correspondence which has passed between us. Moreover, the situation is constantly changing. It may, indeed, have entirely changed by the time you receive this despatch. So I will limit myself to summing up the arguments for and against and the actual position as it is to-day.

3. In favour of the return of the Mar Shimun to the north it is contended that—

- (i) This would induce a considerable section, nay, the majority of the Assyrian people, who are specially devoted to the person and to the aspirations of the Patriarch to cease opposition to or to co-operate with the settlement.
- (ii) That his presence amongst his people would instil them with confidence in the good faith of the Iraqi Government, which confidence has been somewhat shaken by the unwise conduct of certain high officials in the Iraqi civil and military administration.
- (iii) That if he were allowed to return and left quietly alone, he could not hold himself out as a martyr for the Assyrian people and could gradually be ignored.
- (iv) That his continued detention against his will would be very unfavourably viewed abroad, especially by those who doubted either Iraq's willingness to keep her word or her ability to govern herself with success.

4. On the other hand, the arguments against allowing him to return are as follows:—

- (i) He was summoned to Bagdad to give an assurance of loyalty and co-operation in the form of signing a simple letter of acknowledgment. He refuses and is accordingly suspect.
- (ii) It is well known that he intends to do all he can to impede the present settlement. He can do less harm in Bagdad than in the north.
- (iii) He has offended the dignity of the Minister of the Interior. He cannot get off scot free without amends.
- (iv) He will almost certainly be a party in some quarrel picked or the victim of some incident provoked by local Iraqi authorities in the north, several of whom, such as the General Officer Commanding, Mosul, and the Director-General of Police, are itching to have at him. He can be better looked after here.

5. In addition to the above arguments for and against, there are two overriding considerations, in this case against. They are—

- (i) The Iraqi Government were thoroughly frightened by Yaku. His sudden and unexpected collapse has correspondingly elated them. They have incurred trouble and expense in concentrating nearly half of their army to overawe the Assyrians, who, incidentally, are thoroughly nervous and cowed. Threatened as they consider themselves to be in the Euphrates area, where the King's writ does not run in two liwas out of three, they want once and for all to have done with the Assyrians and the Assyrian question by disarming them partially, totally, or worse. The Acting Adviser to the Interior has, rightly I consider, been straining every effort to prevent them from thus ravaging the Assyrians in the north, by dangling before them the bait of the Mar Shimun in Bagdad.

- (ii) The second overriding consideration is the constant desire of the Iraqi Government to take proceedings against the Mar Shimun under the criminal law, a craving which is for ever being stimulated by the wilful provocation of that stubborn young man. I have hitherto succeeded in keeping him out of the courts. How long this protection will be effective I do not know, as I have no legal control over the Mar Shimun. Moral suasion over the Iraqi Government is my only instrument. *Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.*

6. The second event of the week, which has effectually kicked the scale in the wrong direction, was the Mar Shimun's letter to the Minister of the Interior of the 29th June, a copy of which was sent to you by air mail in my despatch No. 422 of the 3rd July. Before he actually delivered it he came to see me in order to hand to me the copy destined for His Majesty's Government. Indeed, he half hesitatingly hinted that, if the Minister took action that evening to let him return to Mosul, the letter might not be delivered after all. I understand he also sounded Mr. Edmonds with the same object. I told the Mar Shimun that as he was inviting my comments he would have them straight from the shoulder. Stop all this letter writing—he had written another letter the same day—except for one of two sentences. He knew quite well to what I was referring. Then the difficulty in the way of his return would disappear. Of course he again declined to do so on the well known plea that he must consult his people first.

7. He said he had also come to draw my attention to the anti-Assyrian agitation which had broken out in Mosul and in the Bagdad press, particularly the inflammatory speech of a Deputy from Mosul on the occasion of a question in Parliament. I enclose a translation of this question, answer and further comment. I said he had nobody but himself to blame for this outburst of anti-Assyrian feeling.

8. Now for his letter. You will observe that in the first paragraph he definitely challenges the Minister of the Interior to show legal justification for his detention in Bagdad. The first reaction of Hikmet Beg was to stop settlement at once and to put the Mar Shimun into the dock, his offence being aggravated by the circulation of the letter to the representatives of foreign Governments. I went to see the Prime Minister and persuaded him to take no action for the present. In fact, we have a respite for a week, subject, of course, to any future folly on the part of the Mar Shimun.

9. You will also observe that the Mar Shimun offers allegiance and the draft Community Law only after the settlement, which, he implies, must be worked out in accordance with his wishes. Otherwise he claims an alternative settlement. I think by this he means the right to have a home found for his people elsewhere than in Iraq. In other words, His Majesty's Government or the League is the cuckoo that lays the Assyrian egg, but the fledgling has the right to object to the nest and if so it is incumbent on the cuckoo to find another nest to the liking of the young one.

10. I have submitted in my telegram No. 158 of the 5th July my views as to how this letter might be answered in such a way as to cover a possible formula for the return of the Mar Shimun to Mosul. But I fear that this would-be martyr may not play up.

11. The Mar Shimun, always shadowed by a group of Criminal Investigation Department detectives, who permanently station themselves outside his residence at the Y.M.C.A., has been in most cases delivering his letter personally to the foreign heads of mission. To the Turkish Legation, however, he sent a messenger. The German Minister, who regarded his visit rather as a joke, told me he was tickled by the Mar Shimun's embarrassment when he reminded him that some of his troubles might have been due to the Assyrians having gone to war against the Germans. The French Chargé d'Affaires, who is grateful for help afforded over the Syrian frontier question, has been quite communicative, and has told me that the Mar Shimun declared to him that he was a prisoner both of the Iraqi and of His Majesty's Governments. The United States Minister, who is already annoyed at being jockeyed by Mr. Lampard, the local head of the Y.M.C.A., into seeing the Mar Shimun on a private pretext, informs me that he will refuse to receive him again or to discuss this subject.



12. I also enclose a précis of an interesting account by Colonel Stafford, the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, of the whole Assyrian situation, and also a copy of Major Thomson's first report to the Minister of the Interior on his settlement work. His comment on the suitability of the Dashtazi area, for the adaptation of which the Chamber of Deputies has just voted 13,000 dinars, makes not very encouraging reading. But sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.

13. A copy of this despatch is being sent by air mail on the 7th July. Original by bag.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 84.

*Extract from Proceedings of Parliament, June 30, 1933.*

(Translation.)

SA'ID CHALABI HAJI THABIT, Deputy for Mosul, put the following question addressed to the Prime Minister:—

"1. What is the attitude of the Assyrians *vis-à-vis* the Iraqi Government? Did the Government adopt the necessary measures for the prevention in future of any aggression by the Assyrians on the tranquil residents of other villages, in view of the fact that the Assyrians are heavily armed?

"2. From where did the Assyrians get these arms? Does his Excellency the Prime Minister not fear that the possession of arms by the Assyrians may disturb public security?

"3. What interests do the British have in Diana, which necessitated the establishment of a British consulate there?"

The Prime Minister, on the 28th June, made the following statement in reply:—

"The attitude of the Assyrians towards the Government has undergone no change. All that has happened is that a number of Assyrians having attempted to disturb the peace and declined to obey Government orders, the Government were compelled to take effective steps for their punishment, whereupon they submitted. The Government are now adopting measures to prevent the future recurrence of incidents of this kind.

"There has been no acts of aggression against villagers on the part of the Tiari. The Government are prepared to mete out strong punishment to anyone who may disturb the peace or violate the laws.

"As to the honourable Deputy's query regarding the origin of the arms in the possession of the Assyrians, I think that the honourable Deputy is aware of the origin of these arms and that it is not hid from him. There is no cause for anxiety concerning public peace. Nevertheless, the Government consider it their duty to adopt all necessary measures for the removal of all that is calculated to lead into a disturbance of the public peace in future.

"As regards the third clause of the question of the honourable Deputy, I am examining its contents and hope to be able to answer it on a future occasion.

"As regards the statement of the honourable Deputy concerning the settlement of Assyrians, I think it needs some explanation. Gentlemen, you are aware of the fact that the Government are carrying out the settlement of the Assyrians in accordance with a decision of the League of Nations. There is, however, nothing to compel the Government to settle them in one single locality. The Government share with the honourable Deputy the feeling that this country is the home of his forefathers and that its soil is mixed up with their blood. Neither conscience nor law allows us to expel any member of the natives of this country from his property which is under his possession, or to rob him of his right to exercise possession thereof, in order to make it over to another party. This is what I am able to say on the subject, having regard to my present situation."

In reply to the above, Deputy Sa'id Chalabi, the questioner, made a lengthy statement, which may be summarised as follows:—

He denied the Tiari the right to call themselves or to be called Assyrians, asserting that they were given this appellation by the English during the occupation for certain imperialistic purposes. Except for a small section, they were alien to Iraq, having come into it from Persia, Turkey and Russia, under encouragement from the imperialistic authorities.

Proceeding, he accused the Assyrians of having been a danger to public peace and to the inhabitants of Iraq, recalling, in support of his contention, the two bloody incidents of Mosul and Kirkuk between the Assyrians and the Arab natives of these towns. He said:—

"Why have the Government not considered the question of disarming this element? I know the source from which they obtained their arms during the mandatory régime. That régime has passed away, and I request the Government to disarm them [*i.e.*, the Assyrians], or else allow neighbouring villages to arm themselves."

Turning to the question proper of the settlement of the Assyrians, he said:—

"The Tiari comedy is a wonderful one. We know the aim behind their settlement in the north. We have allotted for this purpose an extensive stretch of land. They are now being settled by a British expert, and the Government intends allotting a sum of 13,000 I.D. for the construction of quarters for these ungrateful ones, who do not acknowledge the kindness they have been shown by this country. I suspect that it is intended by the Assyrian question to create (for Iraq) a problem similar to the Zionist problem in Palestine. It appears as if the Government have struck the Barzanis only in order to settle the Assyrians in their place. We do not agree to their being settled in one single locality *en bloc*. We cannot trust them, because they are non-Moslems, and foreign hands are always toying with them."

*The British Vice-Consulate, Diana.*

Turning to this affair (which formed subject of that part of his question to which the Prime Minister deferred the reply to a future occasion), Sa'id Chalabi said:—

"As regards the question of the British consulate, Diana. What interests does that institution possess there? What are those officers doing in the villages and towns? Their doings are well known. We had thought that the mandatory era had come to an end. Iraq was the home of our forefathers. We do not agree that it should be dealt with in this manner. (Applause.) Our ally has certain interests and benefits, which we shall safeguard as long as our own rights are respected. I want her to be plain as to what she wants from us, and not to resort to such harmful methods."

In reply to the above remark the Prime Minister said:—

"The honourable Deputy refers to intrigues being carried out in the country by 'officers' [*sic*]. I beg the honourable Deputy to allow me to say that I am not aware of any such intrigues going on. If, however, any such intrigues actually exist they must be suppressed, and they should come to an end together with the defunct régime. But this does not depend entirely upon the Government exercising watchfulness and taking action, but also on members of the public showing interest and knowing their national obligations."

Replying to the above, Deputy Sa'id Chalabi declared:—

"Yes, the people should co-operate with the Government in such matters. We are ready for the defence of our country. I hope that the rumour that 1,000 Assyrian families are to be settled in the north will prove untrue."



## Enclosure 2 in No. 84.

*Précis of Report, dated June 21, 1933, by Colonel R. S. Stafford, Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, on the Subject of the Assyrians.*

COLONEL STAFFORD has only been in Mosul for one month. The following are his first impressions on the Assyrian question:—

The intensive propaganda of the Mar Shimun and his followers has exaggerated the importance of the Assyrian question as a whole. Iraqi Government have a stronger case than is generally realised. Its full strength was unfortunately not displayed at Geneva last year.

The Assyrians are neither poor nor on the edge of starvation. There are about 5,500 Assyrian families in Iraq. Of these 4,500 are settled, not necessarily all on the land. Maximum number of Assyrian "houses" to be settled is 900, probably less. Only one section of the Assyrian people require settlement on a considerable scale, the Ashuti (Tiyari Zair) tribe. They are pastoral rather than agricultural (400 to 500 houses). It should be remembered that some Assyrians who already have employment in the towns desire allotments of land to be cultivated for them by other people. This is unreasonable, and implies giving Assyrians preference over Arabs and Kurds.

The most suitable area for settlement is Dashtazi, which could accommodate 1,000 families, i.e., nearly all the families requiring land.

The Assyrian Advisory Board, under the presidency of Malik Khoshaba, stated that 10,000 Assyrians required settlement. This is an exaggeration, as this figure includes many who are already settled in privately-owned villages, but who are uncertain of the security of their tenure. Unfortunately, the same insecurity applies to all Iraqi subjects.

Assyrian conditions of life in the country are equal to those of the Kurds. Colonel Stafford saw no signs of destitution or under-nourishment, even amongst the landless. If there is destitution it is amongst the unemployed Assyrians in the towns. It is hoped that the Iraqi Government will employ such people, especially ex-levy officers, in the army and police. This is of great importance, as it will increase confidence.

Recent history shows that the temporal power of the Mar Shimun is not as strong as generally supposed. It was only in 1915 that the Assyrians rallied to the leadership of the Mar Shimun. The British authorities also found it more convenient to deal with one leader. It is noteworthy that the special adherents of the Mar Shimun, who do most of the agitation, are already settled. It is the anti-Mar Shimun section (the Ashutis) who really require settlement.

Probably a majority of the Assyrians still support the Mar Shimun, but to a lesser extent in the future. Only one of the four Nestorian bishops supports him. It is, nevertheless, important to bear in mind that, while the party for the Mar Shimun are devoted to him, the party against him are only dissatisfied with him; there are few really strongly opposed to him. Action against the person of the Mar Shimun would have the effect of increasing the number of his followers.

The Mar Shimun's complaint, that local officials are unsympathetic, is not justified as applied to the Assyrians in general. As applied to the Mar Shimun in particular, it is true, but that is the Mar Shimun's own fault.

A further complaint of his, that the majority of the Advisory Settlement Committee is opposed to him politically and is Presbyterian in religion, is also due to his own fault, as he has declined to appoint his own nominees.

Colonel Stafford, while placing on record the fact that the Mar Shimun cannot in modern conditions be granted temporal power, hopes that this demand is put forward on unselfish motives in the interests of the Assyrian people as a whole.

*Recommendations as to Immediate Policy.*

(1) Settle those Assyrians who really require settlement. Unfortunately, the Mar Shimun, either openly or secretly, will oppose this, and will disseminate false reports about the intentions of the League of Nations. Major Thomson is the most suitable person to combat this propaganda by personal interviews with the Assyrian leaders. This he is doing.

(2) Avoid, if possible, direct action against the Mar Shimun himself. This would tend to unite the Assyrians against the Iraqi Government. It is, however, probable that the Mar Shimun is encouraging Assyrians to oppose the Government and decline settlement, e.g., despite notices in the press, no applications for land have been received from Bagdad, very few from Mosul. This propaganda may even go further, and encourage disobedience to the Government, in which case the Assyrians should be told that they will be treated like other Iraqis and punished if they break the law.

(3) It is almost certain that if the Mar Shimun returns to Mosul he will try to upset the settlement. In that case the Government should increase the prestige of the opposition party, which, though numerically weaker, contains three or four bishops and persons of education, and a certain number of Maliks, such as the Malik Khoshaba, and at the same time ignore the Mar Shimun. A Syriac newspaper might be started, and Assyrians notified that no complaints conveyed through the Mar Shimun will be considered. At the same time, it should be made clear that the Government does not interfere with the Mar Shimun's spiritual position.

*Conclusion.*

In conclusion, the question is one of extraordinary difficulty, the most difficult that Colonel Stafford has had to deal with since he came to the East twenty years ago. The Iraqi Government should publish to the world its Assyrian policy, possibly on the following lines:—

- (i) To treat them in the same way as the Arabs and Kurds, so that they may be contented Iraqi citizens.
- (ii) To fulfil undertaking given to League to take every possible step to settle landless and jobless Assyrians. Major Thomson's presence is a proof of this.
- (iii) Not to interfere with Mar Shimun as a religious leader, but to insist that, in temporal matters, his position shall be no different from the other religious leaders.

It is also to be hoped that the Iraqi Government will not be compelled to use force, in which eventuality the Iraqi Government will have to show that it has acted with the greatest forbearance.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 84.

*Major Thomson to Minister of the Interior.*

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

*Assyrian Settlement Office,  
Mosul, June 28/29, 1933.*

I HAVE now been one month in Iraq studying the problem of the Assyrian settlement.

The whole issue has been embarrassed since my arrival by the refusal of the Mar Shimun to agree with the Iraq Government on the extent of his powers and duties as Patriarch of the Assyrian Church and people. In consequence the atmosphere of mistrust, suspicion and non-co-operation has become accentuated and it has been found exceedingly hard to dispel.

Since my arrival in Mosul a good deal of time has been spent in interviewing those Assyrian leaders who have come to see me. I have also visited Assyrian villages and explained the question of settlement to some seventy maliks.

The reply I have received as regards settlement by the Assyrians in Iraq has been the same with few exceptions, namely, "We will do as we are ordered by the Mar Shimun." This reply, in view of the present attitude of the Mar Shimun, must lead to an *impasse* unless we can succeed by some other means in persuading the people to accept settlement.

Recent events have brought us into close touch with several of the Assyrian maliks and leaders who had previously held aloof. Discussion with these people has emphasised the belief which I had already formed, that the Mar Shimun had not fully and clearly explained to them his failure to get agreement from the League of Nations on the chief points which he submitted.



Consequently, I feel that only by freely and clearly explaining the true facts amongst the Assyrian leaders can we succeed eventually in making them understand the real position of affairs, namely:—

1. That the Government is wholeheartedly prepared to assist the Assyrians in their settlement in Iraq.
2. That as settled members of the Iraqi people they will enjoy all the benefits which fall to Iraqi subjects in Iraq, as regards security, tenure of land, education, medical aid, &c.
3. That there is no question of any commission being appointed for Assyrian settlement other than myself.
4. That this is their last chance of settlement by a foreign authority and that failing their acceptance of his advice and proposals they will have to accept whatever conditions of settlement the Iraqi Government is prepared to offer.

I have gathered in the course of my interviews that the maliks of the seven chief Assyrian tribes who asked the Mar Shimun to go to Geneva and plead their cause there now feel that the Mar Shimun as their representative still has these desires as basis of his policy. They suggest that if they could meet the Mar Shimun and further discuss the question, they could then modify their requests in accordance with general policy for their settlement which, I believe they now realise, is the only feasible one in the circumstances.

I consider that the Mar Shimun's attitude in Bagdad is largely influenced by his failure at Geneva and his consequent desire to obtain some *quid pro quo* which he can show to his followers as a result of his efforts. I hope, however, that the time is now near for a rapprochement locally both as between the two parties of the Assyrians and also *vis-à-vis* of the Iraq Government.

To this end I trust that it will be possible to persuade the maliks to use their influence directly with the Mar Shimun and induce him to abandon his attitude of non-co-operation and disobedience of the Government's order, and so ensure a settled future for the Assyrian people in Iraq.

I recently visited the proposed settlement area in Dashtazi and I must confess that it did not appeal to me. The supply of water from springs is poor and limited and such as there is, even after attention, would not, in my opinion, be sufficient for large villages. The climate is very hot in summer. Moreover, it would be impossible to keep flocks of sheep, &c., in Dashtazi during the summer, the distance from the mountain to the River Zab being too far for watering purposes and there are no springs in the mountain.

The proposed irrigation scheme is a difficult one, and, I believe, will be found when the present investigations are finished to be much more costly than originally anticipated.

In addition, I believe, though in this I may be wrong, that the scheme would entail the further recurrent charge of an engineer being at Dashtazi from April to October, firstly, to repair damage which may be done to the canal by winter rains, and secondly, to repair such breaks as which may occur during the cultivating season. Any stoppage of the flow of water for irrigation purposes would be a very serious matter.

Moreover, those of the Assyrians who have seen the place are definitely against living there. The area is an excellent one for growing winter crops, and had this area been a really good one for permanent occupation, it most certainly would have been by now thickly populated, instead of being occupied by ten small Kurdish villages, and large areas of land cultivated for winter crops by Kurds resident in villages outside the Dashtazi area.

There is land reputed to be sufficient for at least 1,000 families at Champashi, on the Tigris, some miles north of Mosul. I am told that this land is excellent for cultivation and that its owner, a certain Nejefi Beg, wishes to sell it. I would submit for the consideration of the Iraq Government the question of the purchase of this land for Assyrian settlement. The cost would be very considerably less than that granted for the Dashtazi scheme, and there would be no recurrent charges for maintenance, &c. I believe that this area would be acceptable to those Assyrians who are at present unsettled or are living in villages which are definitely unhealthy.

I propose visiting Champashi within the next few days, but am raising the question now so that I may know what are the views of the Government in

principle on the proposal to purchase should the land be found suitable for the purpose of settlement. I shall then be in a position to explain matters more definitely to the Assyrians.

As soon as I have visited Champashi I will submit a further report to your Excellency, setting out my views on the matter in greater detail.

D. B. THOMSON, Major.

[E 3943/1857/93]

No. 85.

*Record of Second Meeting held at the Foreign Office on July 12, 1933, at 11 A.M., between Representatives of the Iraqi Government and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to discuss the Draft Iraqi Railways Corporation Law.*

Present:

Mr. Beckett, Foreign Office (*in the Chair*).  
 Mr. Sterndale Bennett, Foreign Office.  
 Mr. Gorell Barnes, Foreign Office.  
 Mr. Stuart King, Treasury Solicitor's Office.  
 Nuri Pasha Al Said, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
 Rustam Beg Haidar, Iraqi Minister of Economics and Communications.  
 Mr. Hogg, Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance.  
 Mr. Wheatley, Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Economics and Communications.

THE meeting had been called, in accordance with a suggestion made by King Feisal to Sir Francis Humphrys, to discuss the draft law in greater detail than had been found possible at the meeting held on the 5th July.

2. At the opening of the meeting there was some disagreement as to the nature of the discussion which should take place. The Iraqi representatives expressed a desire to confine it to three main points, namely: (1) The ownership of the railway system; (2) the rights of the corporation to dispose of the assets of the system; and (3) the eventual financial liability when the corporation ceased to exist: they thought that if these points could be discussed at the present meeting, details of drafting could be settled later at Bagdad, since the next session of the Iraqi Parliament was not until November, and the draft law could therefore not be passed until then. The representatives of His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, urged that the whole draft should be discussed in detail and as much as possible settled in principle, at all events, and *ad referendum*, while the Iraqi Ministers were still in London. The Iraqi Ministers were understood eventually to acquiesce in this procedure.

3. The first point taken was that of the ownership of the railway system. Mr. Beckett explained that His Majesty's Government were willing to agree that the railway system should be registered in Tapu in the name of the Iraqi Government, provided that a copy of the law setting up the corporation should be attached to each separate registration. It was important that anyone who examined the deeds of registration and saw that the Iraqi Government were legal owners of the system should also see that they were only owners of it under certain conditions, *i.e.*, that the corporation should have the rights in regard to the system which would be granted to it under the proposed law.

4. The Iraqi representatives thought that this was really a legal point, and said that they could therefore not bind themselves to a decision. They had little doubt, however, that, although they did not see the necessity of attaching the law to the registrations in Tapu, there would be no difficulty over this point. They professed, however, that the question of registration was one of minor importance since it was subsidiary to that of the right of the corporation to dispose of the assets of the railway system.



5. On the latter question, Mr. Beckett pointed out that under both the Iraqi and British drafts it was laid down that the corporation could not dispose of the immovable property of the railways without the consent of the Iraqi Government. Should the Iraqi Government give such consent, it would, however, be necessary for them, as the legal owners of the property, to execute the documents of sale or mortgage, by which the corporation proposed to dispose of the property, and it would perhaps be advisable to insert a clause in the draft law to the effect that the Iraqi Government would execute the necessary documents.

6. The Iraqi representatives said that they did not wish to raise objections to the rights of the corporation to dispose of the movable property of the system or of small parcels of land, but that they regarded it as important, not only from a financial but also from a political point of view, that they should on no account be able to alienate the immovable assets of the system. If the corporation were given this right, the Iraqi Government would lose all that they had gained by insisting that the system should be registered in their name.

7. When it was pointed out that the corporation could not dispose of the immovable property of the railway without first obtaining the consent of the Iraqi Government, Mr. Hogg explained that this might put the Iraqi Government in a very awkward position. The board of the corporation, on which the Iraqi Government at present considered that they would be in a minority, might decide that a loan should be raised and that this loan should be charged on the fixed assets of the railways. The Iraqi Government would definitely regard as unsatisfactory any loan at any time which might mean the alienation of the railway system. They would therefore rather know in advance what were to be the utmost powers of the lenders if such a loan were raised.

8. The representatives of His Majesty's Government replied that this was a question which could only be decided at the time when the loan was actually raised. It was only then that it would be possible to see on what terms the loan could be raised, and the corporation, in collaboration with the Iraqi Government, would then make the best possible bargain. The Iraqi Government would always know the terms of the loan before they consented to it. The object of the law, which was now being discussed, was to give the corporation the widest possible powers, so that, if later they wished to raise a loan on terms agreed upon with the Iraqi Government, they would not find that they were prevented from doing so by the terms of the law.

9. Mr. Hogg said that, from the point of view of the Iraqi Government, it was necessary to set a limit to the powers of the corporation to dispose of the railway assets, and in particular to state that they should only have the right to raise loans provided that such loans should not result in the alienation of the fixed assets to a third party. He did not think it was usual for debenture holders to foreclose on the fixed assets of a railway company; the security which they usually demanded was the railway as a running concern, and he thought it would be enough if they were given the power to put in an administrator of their own if the interest on the loan was not paid and they were not satisfied that the corporation were running the railways properly.

10. The representatives of His Majesty's Government were inclined to think that this would be sufficient security on which to raise the necessary loans, but they said that they must obtain expert financial advice before they could give any definite opinion on the point.

11. The meeting then discussed the question of the eventual financial liability when the corporation ceased to exist. The representatives of His Majesty's Government pointed out that, if a loan was raised, the lenders would wish to be sure that their power under the loan could not be cancelled before the time came for the loan to be repaid. It was therefore necessary that, if the Iraqi Government bought the shares allotted to His Majesty's Government, dissolved the corporation and themselves took possession of the railway system, they should also take over the corporation's liabilities to its debenture holders. For instance, if the debenture holders had the right in certain circumstances to put in an administrator of their own, they must continue to have this right if the railway passed into the possession of the Iraqi Government.

12. The Iraqi representatives then asked what would happen if the corporation was either unable to continue its functions owing to failure through lack of funds, or if it was unable to run the railway in a manner satisfactory to the Iraqi Government. How long would the Iraqi Government have to allow this

state of affairs to continue? They were informed that the only possible course for the Iraqi Government to take in such a situation would be to buy the shares of His Majesty's Government and to take over the railway themselves. If this solution was not practicable there would have to be further negotiations between the two Governments.

13. To explain his fear that the corporation might not run the railways in a manner satisfactory to the Iraqi Government, Nuri Pasha said that the Iraqi Government were eager that an extension should be constructed to Mosul as soon as possible, and it was possible that the corporation might not be able to undertake this work. Mr. Beckett pointed out that it had already been agreed at Bagdad that the Iraqis should have the right to construct any extension which they thought necessary but which the corporation were unwilling or unable to undertake. The Iraqi representatives did not, however, think that this would help them very much, since it would be virtually impossible for them to manage a single line of this kind if the rest of the railway system was in the hands of the corporation.

14. The question of the removal of directors from the board was then touched upon. It was explained that no article allowing for this possibility had been included in the British draft, but that it had been dealt with in article 11 of the Iraqi draft. His Majesty's Government had considered the question and admitted that the possibility must be allowed for. They had, however, found certain difficulties in the article drafted by the Iraqi Government, and Mr. Stuart King had accordingly drafted a new article (Annex A). It was agreed that the Iraqi representatives should examine this new draft, and that it should be discussed at a later meeting.

15. The meeting then discussed the question whether the corporation should be given the right, with the prior consent of the Iraqi Government, to construct and operate railways outside the area occupied by the existing railway system. The representatives of His Majesty's Government thought it extremely important that the corporation should have this right, without which the possibilities of its developing and running successfully the railways would be seriously curtailed. The Iraqi representatives, however, thought it unnecessary to include this provision in the corporation law. If the corporation wished to construct new lines beyond the existing system they could apply to the Iraqi Government, and if the Iraqi Government considered that the new line was needed there would be no difficulty in obtaining the consent of Parliament to its construction. On the other hand, the presence of such a provision in the present law would create great difficulties when the law came before Parliament. The representatives of His Majesty's Government pointed out that it was just these difficulties which His Majesty's Government feared would be created if it was necessary in the future to go to Parliament every time it was desired to construct an extension. Future Iraqi Cabinets might not be on such good terms with their Parliaments as the present one, and, simply because parliamentary sanction had to be obtained, difficulties and delays might be created which would postpone or prevent entirely the construction of an extension which both the corporation and the Iraqi Ministers considered necessary. The Iraqi representatives said that they must refer this question.

16. The last question dealt with at the meeting was that of ancillary transport. The Iraqi representatives objected to the provision in the British draft law which would give to the corporation the right to provide transport and facilities for the conveyance of goods and passengers to and from rail-heads and stations. The representatives of His Majesty's Government thought it of the utmost importance that the corporation should have this right. Without such a right it was probable that the corporation would, in fact, be a failure, as it would be almost impossible for it to stand up against road competition. The Iraqi representatives seemed to fear at first that what His Majesty's Government wanted was to secure a monopoly for the railway corporation, but it was explained to them that all that was proposed was that the corporation should not be prevented from providing ancillary forms of transport.

17. The Iraqi representatives said that in this case the provision seemed unnecessary, since the railway administration already had this right, just as anybody in Iraq had it, and that it therefore seemed unnecessary to provide for it in the law. Mr. Hogg explained that according to Iraqi law, if the corporation



were not expressly forbidden in the law to provide ancillary forms of transport, then they had the right to do so.

18. Mr. Beckett said that it was necessary to ensure that this right would never be taken away from the corporation; what His Majesty's Government feared was that the Iraqi Government might grant a monopoly to someone else and the right of the corporation would thus be taken away. Mr. Hogg replied that, if this happened and if His Majesty's Government wished to protest, they could base their protest on the financial agreement of 1930. It was impossible to reach agreement on this point, and further discussion on it was postponed.

19. It was finally agreed that the representatives of His Majesty's Government should prepare a revised draft which should embody both the points which had been agreed upon during previous discussions at Bagdad and those upon which agreement had been reached during this meeting, and that a further meeting should be held on the 14th July to discuss this revised draft. Meanwhile representatives of His Majesty's Government would obtain expert financial advice as to whether the absence of a power to confer on lenders the right to sell immovable assets in the event of default would prejudice the corporation's prospect of obtaining a loan on reasonable terms.

*Foreign Office, July 18, 1933.*

#### Annex A.

##### *Draft Clause relating to Directors.*

THE office of director shall be vacated if the director—(a) becomes bankrupt; or (b) is found lunatic or becomes of unsound mind; or (c) resigns his office by notice in writing to the Government or Governments by whom he was appointed; or (d) if he absents himself from three consecutive meetings of the board without having a reasonable excuse for such absence.

2.—(a) (i) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government may, by a joint notice addressed to any director, remove that director from office before the expiration of his period of office, and the Government by whom the director so removed was appointed may thereupon fill that vacancy; the person so appointed shall hold office for the remainder of the period for which the director so removed was originally appointed.

(ii) A notice under this clause shall, subject to the provisions of the next succeeding paragraph, take effect on the seventh day after the date thereof.

(b) (i) A director receiving a notice under the foregoing clause may within seven days of its receipt, by a counter-notice addressed to the representative of the Government of the United Kingdom in Bagdad and the Iraqi Government demand an enquiry into the circumstances leading to his removal and on receipt of such counter-notice the Government of the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government shall jointly appoint a person or body to hold an enquiry into and to report to them upon the matter; and, pending the receipt of such report, the director in question shall be suspended from carrying out his duties as a member of the board.

(ii) On receipt of such report the Government of the United Kingdom or the Iraqi Government shall take it into consideration, and shall thereupon decide finally whether the director in question is to be removed from the board or to be reinstated, and the decision of the two Governments shall take effect as from the date upon which it is notified to the director.

[E 4120/1857/93]

No. 86.

*Joint Record of the Third and Fourth Meetings, held in the Foreign Office on July 14 and 15, between Representatives of the Iraqi Government and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to Discuss the Proposed Iraqi Railway Corporation Law.*

THE following were present:—

Mr. Beckett, Foreign Office.

Mr. Gorell Barnes, Foreign Office.

Mr. Stuart King, Treasury Solicitor's Department.

Rustam Beg Haidar, Iraqi Minister of Economics and Communications.

Nuri Pasha Al Said, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Hogg, Adviser to the Iraqi Minister of Finance.

Mr. Wheatley, Adviser to the Iraqi Minister of Economics and Communications.

2. Mr. Beckett recalled that at the meeting which had been held on the 12th July the representatives of His Majesty's Government had agreed to obtain financial advice as to whether the proposed corporation would be in a position to raise the necessary loans if the security given to debenture holders did not include the right to dispose of the immovable assets of the railway system in the event of default; they had also agreed to prepare a revised draft of the law embodying all points on which agreement had been reached at previous meetings in Bagdad or in London. He had now been provisionally advised that the proposed limitation on the power of the corporation when issuing loans would not necessarily prevent the corporation from raising the necessary funds on reasonable terms, and he hoped therefore that it would be possible to reach agreement on this point. He and Mr. Stuart King had also prepared a revised draft of the law, and he proposed that the meeting should now discuss this draft article by article. It was agreed that the draft should be discussed *ad referendum*.

3. The Iraqi representatives were able to accept a great number of the articles of this draft (copy Annex A<sup>(1)</sup>), without discussion. The following articles were, however, discussed and in some cases amendments were provisionally agreed upon.

4. *Article 2 (3).*—It was agreed to omit this sub-article—see paragraph 7.

5. *Article 3 (1).*—At the suggestion of Mr. Hogg, who stated that the words had no meaning in Iraqi law, it was agreed to omit "with perpetual succession and on official seal which shall be judicially noted and" from this article.

6. *Article 3 (3).*—The sub-article was added as a result of discussion of article 14 (2) (see paragraph 23).

7. *Article 4 (1).*—The Iraqi representatives pointed out that they could not grant the corporation the sole and exclusive right to construct and operate light railways since that right was, in fact, enjoyed by the oil companies in Iraq. They suggested that the words "and light railways" should be omitted from this article and that article 2 (3) should accordingly be omitted. Mr. Beckett said that, although it might be impossible to grant the corporation the sole and exclusive rights in this respect it was necessary to ensure that they should have the right to construct and operate light railways. The Iraqi representatives pointed out that this would be covered by the article concerning ancillary transport if agreement was reached on that article, and it was accordingly agreed provisionally to amend the article 4 (1) and to omit article 2 (3) as proposed by the Iraqi representatives.

8. *Article 4 (2).*—Mr. Hogg thought that it was unnecessary to grant the corporation specifically in the Corporation Law the right with the prior consent of the Iraqi Government to construct and operate railways outside the shaded area since, according to Iraqi law, the corporation would not necessarily be prevented from doing anything which was not mentioned in the Corporation Law, and there would therefore be no necessity to obtain parliamentary sanction, each time that the corporation wished to construct an extension. The representatives of His Majesty's Government said that, if this was so, they would

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



not object to the article being omitted, provided that some assurance was given that the existing position would not be changed. The Iraqi Ministers, however, thought that it would be necessary to obtain parliamentary sanction on each case. In their opinion, it would be extremely difficult to pass the Corporation Law through Parliament now if it contained such a provision; later when the Iraqi Parliament saw that the corporation was a success and in a position to construct any particular extension, they would be only too pleased to grant permission to do so. The representatives of His Majesty's Government were of the opinion that the necessity of obtaining parliamentary sanction on each case would cause endless difficulties and delays, and, as it was impossible to reach agreement, the point was postponed for further discussion.

9. *Article 4 (4).*—Mr. Beckett pointed out that, though the Iraqi Ministers had been unable to agree to this article at the meeting of the 12th July, according to the record which they had seen of the meetings held at Bagdad, Rustam Beg Haidar had expressed willingness to agree to it then, but Rustam Beg Haidar said that he could only suppose that his remarks in Bagdad had been wrongly reported since he had only agreed that the corporation should be given the right to provide ancillary forms of transport, provided that the Iraqi Government should retain the right to grant a monopoly for ancillary transport if they so desired. The Iraqi Government might find that it was in the general interest of communications in Iraq that such a monopoly might well prove of advantage to the railway corporation.

10. Mr. Beckett said that if the monopoly would be of advantage to the Railway Corporation the corporation would be willing to agree to its being granted, but that it was possible that the company to whom the monopoly was granted might not work in co-operation with the railways, and it was therefore necessary to preserve the rights of the corporation. There would be no objection to the Iraqi Government granting a monopoly subject to the rights of the corporation. The Iraqi representatives thought that a monopoly which was subject to the rights of the corporation would not be attractive to other companies and that the Iraqi Government might be compelled to grant a monopoly under conditions as favourable as possible to another company in order to be able to compete with the French, who were already subsidising transport companies with a view to the development of the road from Nisibin through Mosul and Rowanduz to Persia.

11. It seemed possible that the Iraqi representatives might be willing to grant the corporation the right to run ancillary forms of transport within the area covered by the existing railway system, but Mr. Wheatley pointed out that the ancillary transport, at present run by the railway, was almost entirely outside that area and the representatives of His Majesty's Government were not in possession of sufficient knowledge of local geography and of the requirements of railways to be able to give an opinion on this point. The question was according reserved for further discussion.

12. *Article 6 (c).*—The representatives of His Majesty's Government agreed to insert "and at the cost" after "at the request" in this article.

13. *Article 8 (1).*—The Iraqi representatives asked what was to happen if at any time the two Governments failed to agree regarding the choice of the general manager. They suggested that in such an event the principle of rotation should be applied and quoted as a precedent the Board of the Ottoman Debt Council. Mr. Beckett pointed out that the case of the Ottoman Debt Council was different since, if his recollection was correct, each of the delegates in turn held the office of president, whereas in the case of the Railway Corporation Board it was a question of electing a fifth director who was to be *ex officio* chairman. It had been laid down in the agreement of 1930 that the chairman should be appointed by agreement between the two Governments, and, therefore, if the two Governments failed to agree, it would be a matter for diplomatic discussion. The Iraqi Ministers felt that if agreement was not reached in the first place it would not be reached as a result of diplomatic discussion, and a method of procedure to meet this eventuality should be laid down now. They thought that the procedure suggested by them would be in the spirit of the agreement which envisaged a position of equality between the two Governments. The representatives of His Majesty's Government maintained that the adoption of the Iraqi proposal would mean an alteration in the agreement of 1930, and, therefore, even if acceptable to His Majesty's Government, could only be warranted through the

diplomatic channel. At the particular request of the Iraqi Ministers, the representatives of His Majesty's Government promised to submit the proposal to higher authority.

14. *Article 8 (2).*—Mr. Wheatley pointed out that the mention of Colonel Tainsh by name in this article was extremely unusual (he might die, for instance, while the law was before Parliament), and it was agreed to leave out his name and refer only to "the present director of the Iraqi railways."

15. *Article 8 (3).*—The representatives of both Governments agreed that it would be more satisfactory to have a standing deputy chairman, who should always be ready to take the place of the chairman in the event of his absence. The article was accordingly redrafted as follows: "The board by resolution shall appoint a deputy chairman, and the deputy chairman so appointed shall, in the absence of the chairman, possess all the powers of the chairman."

16. *Article 8 (5) (a).*—The Iraqi representatives at first raised objection to this article, saying that it would open the door for pressure on Iraqi Ministers by Iraqis, who wished the number of the directors to be increased with a view to obtaining for themselves a position on the board. It was pointed out to them, however, that the consent of His Majesty's Government as well as of the Iraqi Government would be needed before the number of directors could be increased, and they agreed that the article should stand unchanged.

17. *Article 9 (4).*—It was agreed that as a result of the amendment to article 8 (3) already agreed upon (see paragraph 15), the words in brackets in this sub-article should be omitted.

18. *Article 10 (2) a (ii) and b (i).*—In these clauses it was agreed at the suggestion of Mr. Wheatley to alter "seventh" to "fifteenth" and "seven" to "fifteen" respectively.

19. *Article 11 (1).*—The Iraqi representatives pointed out that it had been agreed in Bagdad that a clause should be inserted providing that in making appointments the board should normally give preference to persons of Iraqi nationality. The representatives of His Majesty's Government said that they would prefer to have a more definite clause which would explain the occasions in which exception could be given to this general rule, and it was finally agreed that the following provision should be added at the end of the sub-article: "In making appointments the board shall employ persons of Iraqi nationality provided that, in cases where Iraqis of suitable qualifications are not available, the board may appoint persons of another nationality."

20. *Article 12 (3).*—The Iraqi representatives said that they wished to be sure of two points: (1) that if His Majesty's Government sold the preferred stock allotted to them, the Iraqi Government should still have the right to buy that stock at par whenever they so desired, and that the stock should never be sold by His Majesty's Government or anyone else to anyone who was not a British or Iraqi subject. It was pointed out that the first point was covered by the words "by whomsoever owned" in line 4 of the clause; to cover the second point the representatives of His Majesty's Government agreed to insert at the end of the clause the following words: "No part of the preferred stock allotted to the Government of the United Kingdom, if not held by the Government of the United Kingdom or the Iraqi Government, shall be held at any time by a person or corporation other than a British or Iraqi subject, or a British or Iraqi corporation."

21. It was agreed that the various sums quoted throughout article 12 in rupees should be converted into dinars, and Mr. Hogg suggested as a rate of exchange 7,500 dinars to one lakh of rupees.

22. *Article 13 (2).*—It was agreed that the words "immovable property" should be substituted for the words "land or buildings," and that a footnote should be appended to this article, explaining that immovable property includes land, buildings, permanent way and works.

23. *Article 14 (2).*—Mr. Beckett pointed out that he had inserted a provision in this article that the books of account should be kept in the Arabic language. The Iraqi representatives said that they had agreed in the discussions at Bagdad that there should be a general provision saying that all transactions of the board should normally be conducted in the Arabic language, and the Iraqi Government would prefer a general clause of this nature. They did not intend that all the business of the board should be conducted in Arabic, or that the



directors should be forced to speak Arabic at their meetings, but they wished it to be made clear that Arabic was the normal language of the corporation. Mr. Beckett said that he was quite willing to admit that many of the documents of the board would have to be in Arabic, *e.g.*, notices, posters in stations, tickets, regulations, &c., but he must be sure that there would be nothing to prevent English being used in certain documents, which would be official, but in which it would be necessary to use the English language, *e.g.*, contracts between the corporation and English firms. Mr. Wheatley pointed out that in contracts of this kind it was often stated at the beginning of the contracts that the English version was the official version, and that there had been no difficulty over this point in connexion with any other commercial undertaking in Iraq. It was accordingly agreed to insert the general clause desired by the Iraqi Government as article 3 (3).

24. *Article 17.*—At the suggestion of Mr. Beckett, who pointed out that many of the debenture holders who would be the persons most likely to want to examine the register, would not be resident at Bagdad, it was agreed to insert after "Head Office" the following words: "And such other places as the board may decide."

25. *Article 19.*—The advisers thought it unlikely that it would be possible in Arabic to distinguish between by-laws and regulations, and it was agreed that, although the representatives of both Governments were in agreement in principle with regard to this article, it could be best decided in Bagdad how exactly this article should be drafted.

26. *Article 21.*—The Iraqi representatives wished that it should be made quite clear that debenture holders would not have the right to dispose of the immovable assets of the railway system after it had passed into the hands of the Iraqi Government, any more than they had when the corporation was still in existence. It was accordingly agreed that "revenue and assets" should be substituted for "assets" in the last phrase of the article, and the following words added: "Provided that execution in respect of such debts cannot be levied on the immovable property of the railway system."

27. This ended the discussion of the revised draft law, and Mr. Beckett, summing up, said that there were three points on which it had been impossible to reach agreement:—

- (1) The right of the corporation to construct and operate railways outside the area covered by the existing railway system.
- (2) The right of the corporation to run ancillary forms of transport.
- (3) The procedure for appointing the chairman or general manager of the corporation. He did not know what the next steps should be, but perhaps it would be advisable for the Ministers to speak to Sir Francis Humphrys on these three questions before they left England. Meanwhile, he would have copies of the draft law made embodying the amendments agreed upon at the two meetings, and would send copies of this law to Rustam Beg and Nuri Pasha. (Copy Annex B.) Before the meeting broke up it was definitely agreed and stated that the discussion of the draft had been *ad referendum*, and that neither side could be definitely bound by the points on which they had reached agreement.

Foreign Office, July 26, 1933.

Annex A not printed.

# Annex B.

## A Law to constitute the Iraq State Railway Corporation.

WE, Feisal, &c.,

1. This law may be called "The Iraq Railway Corporation Law, 1933."

Name and  
Serial  
Number.

2. In this law, save where there is anything repugnant in the context, the following expressions shall have the meanings assigned to them:—

(1) "The corporation" shall mean "the Iraq Railway Corporation."

(2) "The railway system" shall mean the undertaking, railways, stations, buildings, bridges, culverts, works, plant and land, held and enjoyed at the date of coming into force of this law by the Iraqi Government as operators of the existing railways in Iraq, all of which, for the purposes of description only, are set out on the map marked "A" and signed by

and deposited in the (department office of) prior to the promulgation of this law (and more particularly described in the schedules annexed thereto) together with the rights and privileges in connexion therewith, and all material, plant, rolling-stock, and other property and things movable and immovable at that date held or used by or for the said railways, and together with any modifications, additions, improvements and extensions which may be made thereto under the provisions of this law.

(3) "Appointed day" shall mean the day on which this law shall come into operation in accordance with section 20 (1) hereof.

3.—(1) For the purpose of maintaining, administering and working the railway system, and for the other purposes of this law, there shall be constituted, with effect from the appointed day, a corporate body to be called the "Iraq Railway Corporation," with power to sue and be sued in that name, to enter into contracts.

Incorporation  
of the board  
on the  
appointed day  
(see clauses )

(2) The headquarters of the corporation shall be in Bagdad.

(3) All transactions of the corporation shall normally be conducted in the Arabic language.

4. The corporation shall and may, subject to the provisions of this law, have and exercise the following rights and powers, that is to say:—

(1) The sole and exclusive right to construct and operate railways within the area shaded in green in the map marked "B" and signed by and deposited in the prior to the promulgation of this law—

Provided always that if his corporation decline or refuse to construct and operate within the said area a line or portion of railway which, in the opinion of the Iraqi Government, is necessary in the general interests of Iraq, the Iraqi Government may at their own expense construct and operate such line themselves.

(2) The right with the prior consent of the Iraqi Government to construct and operate railways and light railways outside the said area.

(Reserved for  
future  
discussion.)

(3) The right to carry and convey by railway for payment all such passengers and goods as shall be offered to them.

(4) The right to provide ancillary forms of transport and such facilities as they may consider necessary for the conveyance of passengers and goods to and from rail heads and stations.

(Reserved for  
future  
discussion.)

(5) Subject to the provisions of this law, the right to acquire, hold and dispose of immovable and movable property, including land, which on the appointed day formed part of the railway system and was immediately prior to that day vested in or at the disposal of the Iraqi Government, and all rolling-stock and movable stores and other assets of the railway system.

5. By virtue of, and subject to, the provisions of this law, the management, direction, control and possession of the railway system, together with all rolling-stock, machinery, movable stores and all assets and liabilities of the Iraqi Government in connexion with the management and control of the railway system, shall, as from the appointed day, pass to, and devolve upon, the corporation.

Transfer of  
railway system  
and movable  
assets to the  
corporation.

6.—(1) Any land forming part of the railway system on the appointed day, which was not on that day vested in, or at the disposal of, the Iraqi Government,

Land.



and any land, which may thereafter reasonably be required by the corporation for the development or better working of the railway undertaking, shall, at the request and expense of the corporation, be acquired by the Iraqi Government in accordance with the law for the time in force governing the expropriation of land for public purposes, and such land shall form part of the railway system and the corporation shall enjoy in relation thereto all the rights granted to it by this law in respect of such land.

(2) All land and rights in land at any time forming part of the railway system shall be registered in *Tapu* in the name of the Iraqi Government and to each separate registration there shall be annexed a copy of this law.

(3)—(a) The corporation may, with the consent of the Iraqi Government, sell or grant leases of any land forming part of the railway system and the proceeds of sale or rent received in respect of any such land shall form part of the assets of the corporation.

(b) The consent of the Iraqi Government shall not be required for the sale or lease of parcels of land not exceeding 10 donums in area.

(c) The Iraqi Government shall, at the request and at the cost of the corporation, execute all deeds and other instruments necessary to give effect to any sale or lease under the preceding sub-paragraph.<sup>(\*)</sup>

7. The corporation shall not, without the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom and Iraq, abandon or cease to maintain and operate any part of the railway system.

#### Administration.

8.—(1) Subject as hereinafter provided, the corporation shall be administered by a board of five directors, two of whom shall be appointed by the Government of the United Kingdom, two by the Iraqi Government and the fifth, who shall be the general manager of the corporation and *ex-officio* chairman of the Board of Directors, by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq jointly.

(2) The first general manager of the corporation shall be the present Director of the Iraqi Railways.

(3) The board, by resolution, shall appoint a deputy chairman, and the deputy so appointed shall in the absence of the chairman possess all the powers of the chairman.

(4)—(a) Directors other than the general manager shall hold office for two years, and shall be eligible for reappointment. The general manager shall hold office for three years or such shorter period as may be agreed upon between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government and shall be eligible for reappointment.

(b) Any casual vacancy in the Board of Directors shall be filled by the nomination of the Government or Governments by whom the director whose retirement, death or dismissal gives rise to the vacancy was appointed, and a person so appointed to fill a casual vacancy shall hold office only for the remainder of the period for which the person whose vacancy is being filled was appointed, but shall be eligible for reappointment.

(c) The board shall, subject to the provisions of this law, fix by resolution the remuneration and conditions of service of the directors appointed under the preceding paragraphs of this article.

(5)—(a) The board may at any time with the prior consent of the Iraqi Government and of the Government of the United Kingdom by a resolution duly passed increase the number of directors to not more than nine.

(b) The resolution shall prescribe the manner in which any additional directors are to be appointed (including provision for filling any casual vacancies that may arise), the period for which they shall hold office and their remuneration, and may increase the number of directors required to form a quorum.

9.—(1) The board shall meet at least once every three months at Bagdad at such times and places as the chairman may decide.

(2) The chairman may, and if so required by two directors shall, at any time summon a meeting of the board, which shall be held at such time and place as the chairman shall direct.

(3) The board shall issue rules to govern the conduct of business at board meetings as they think fit.

<sup>(\*)</sup> Treasury Solicitor has suggested that this word should ultimately be in the plural—"sub-paras."

(4) Unless increased under paragraph 5 (b) of the preceding article, the quorum necessary for the transaction of the business of the board and the passing of resolutions shall be any three other members of the board and the chairman or deputy chairman.

(5) The acts of the board shall not be invalid by reason only of any vacancy so long as their number is not reduced below the quorum for the time being.

10.—(1) The office of director shall be vacated if the director (a) becomes bankrupt; or (b) is found lunatic or becomes of unsound mind; or (c) resigns his office by notice in writing to the Government or Governments by whom he was appointed; or (d) if he absents himself from three consecutive meetings of the board without having an excuse for such absence accepted by the board as reasonable.

(2) (a) (i) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government may by a joint notice addressed to any director remove that director from office before the expiration of his period of office, and the Government or Governments by whom the director so removed was appointed may thereupon fill that vacancy; the person so appointed shall hold office for the remainder of the period for which the director so removed was originally appointed.

(ii) A notice under this clause shall, subject to the provisions of the next succeeding paragraph, take effect on the fifteenth day after the date thereof.

(b) (i) A director receiving a notice under the foregoing clause may within fifteen days of its receipt by a counter-notice addressed to the representative of the Government of the United Kingdom in Bagdad and the Iraqi Government demand an enquiry into the circumstances leading to his removal, and on receipt of such counter-notice the Government of the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government shall jointly appoint a person or body to hold an enquiry into and to report to them upon the matter, and, pending the receipt of such report, the director in question shall be suspended from carrying out his duties as a member of the board, and the Government or Governments by whom he was appointed may appoint another person temporarily to carry out his duties as a member of the board.

(ii) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government shall take such report into consideration, and shall on its receipt thereupon<sup>(\*)</sup> decide finally whether the director in question is to be removed from the board or to be reinstated, and the decision of the two Governments shall take effect as from the date upon which it is notified to the director.

(3) A director shall be responsible to the corporation according to law for any loss sustained by his personal misconduct or negligence.

11.—(1) The board may appoint a secretary and such other officers as they require and on such terms as regards pay, allowances, superannuation, conditions of service, suspension, retirement or dismissal as they think fit. In making appointments, the board shall employ persons of Iraqi nationality, provided that in cases in which Iraqis of suitable qualifications are not available the board may appoint persons of other nationality.

(2) All existing officers and servants of the Iraqi Government employed on the railway system on the appointed day shall become the officers and servants of the corporation, and the corporation shall be substituted for the Iraqi Government in all contracts of service with such officers and servants then subsisting.

#### Financial Provisions.

12.—(1) The capital of the corporation shall consist of 570·85 lakhs of rupees, comprising—

(a) Preferred stock to an amount of 320·85 lakhs of rupees, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum (which shall rank as a first charge upon the net annual surplus revenues of the corporation), such interest being non-cumulative for the first twenty years and thereafter to be cumulative, of which 275 lakhs of rupees shall be allotted to and registered in the name of the Government of the United Kingdom, and 45·65 lakhs of rupees shall be allotted to and registered in the name of the Iraqi Government.

(b) Preferred stock (ranking both as to capital and interest after the preferred stock) to the amount of 250 lakhs of rupees to be allotted to the Iraqi Government.

<sup>(\*)</sup> Treasury Solicitor has now suggested that this word should ultimately be omitted

Registration of title in *Tapu*.

Sale or disposal of lands forming part of railway system.

Appointment of members of Board of Administration. (Reserved for future discussion.)

Meetings of the board.

Appointment and conditions of service of officers and servants of the board.

Issue of capital in preferred, deferred stock and debentures or debenture stock. (N.B. Amounts quoted in rupees to be converted into dinars. Rate of exchange suggested—7,500 dinars = 1 lakh of rupees.)



(2) Stock certificates shall be issued to the Governments in respect of the stock so allotted to them respectively.

(3) The Iraqi Government may at any time buy at par the preferred stock allotted to the Government of the United Kingdom, or any part thereof, by whomsoever owned, and no part of such preferred stock shall be sold by the Government of the United Kingdom until the expiration of three months after a notice of their intention to sell the same or any portion thereof to a person or persons named in that notice shall have been given to the Iraqi Government and to the corporation. No part of the preferred stock allotted to the Government of the United Kingdom, if not held by the Government of the United Kingdom or the Iraqi Government, shall be held at any time by a person or corporation other than a British or Iraqi subject or a British or Iraqi corporation.

Power to raise additional capital.

13.—(1) Subject to the consent of the Iraqi Government, the board may raise loans for the reconditioning or development of the railways on such terms as, subject to the provision of this law, they may think fit.

(2) Such loans may rank before the stock referred to in article 12 hereof and may be secured by a charge on the railway system or any part thereof, but not so as to confer on the lender, or any person on his behalf, any power to sell or dispose of any immovable property<sup>(\*)</sup> forming part of the railway system.

Books of the corporation.

14.—(1) The board shall cause proper books of account to be kept with respect to—

(a) All receipts and expenses of the corporation, showing the matters to which the receipt or expenditure relates.

(b) All sales of property forming part of the railway system.

(c) The assets and liabilities of the corporation.

(2) The books of account shall be kept at the headquarters of the corporation, and shall be open to inspection by the directors and the auditors appointed under article 16 (2) and by the Government auditors. The said books of account shall be kept in the Arabic language.

Accounts and payment of dividend.

15.—(1) The board shall, in their annual accounts, set aside out of the revenues and profits of the corporation, after making due provision for the essential working expenditure of the railway system including depreciation and renewals, such sums as they think proper as a reserve or reserves for the improvement of the railway system, provided that such reserves shall not at any time, save with the consent of the Iraqi Government and the Government of the United Kingdom, exceed, in the aggregate, the sum of £

(2) The net annual surplus revenue of the corporation shall mean the net balance of revenue after providing for such reserve or reserves.

Accounts and audit.

16.—(1) The provisions of article 1 of the Law for an Audit Department of Public Accounts (No. 17 of 1927) shall, on the appointed day, cease to apply to the railway system.

(2) The board shall appoint as its auditor or auditors a person or persons nominated by the Iraqi Government after consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom.

(3) The board shall prepare annually and deliver to the said Governments a duly audited report in English and Arabic of the finances and working of the railways.

Register of debentures.

17. The board shall cause to be kept at their head office, and such other places as the board may decide, a register of debentures, debenture stock and other charges, which register shall be open to public inspection at all reasonable times on payment of a fee not exceeding 50 fils.

Is is usual.

### General.

18. The board shall have power to make regulations for all or any of the following purposes and from time to time to amend existing regulations:—

(1) For regulating the entry of the public in and upon the premises and rolling-stock of the railway system.

(2) For regulating the receipt and delivery of goods and other things to and by the railway and the conditions of carriage of them.

(\*) N.B.—Immovable property includes land, buildings, permanent way and works.

A power to make regulations is necessary and, unless already covered by Iraq law, to make bye-laws for their enforcement.

(3) For governing the conditions of the use of the corporation's rolling-stock, stations and property.

(4) For regulating the rates, fares, tolls and conditions upon which members of the public and their luggage, vehicles, wagons and goods of every description may be admitted to, accepted by, pass over or be conveyed by the railways. Provided that the same shall not, without the consent of the Iraqi Government, exceed the scales laid down in the annex to this law.

(5) And, generally, for regulating the working of the railway system.

(6) Copies of all regulations made by the board under this article shall be conspicuously exhibited in and about the premises of the corporation.

19.—(1) For the better observance of any such regulation it shall be lawful for the corporation by writing under their seal to issue bye-laws and to repeal and amend the same provided that such bye-laws shall not be repugnant to the law of Iraq. Such bye-laws shall be published in the *Official Gazette*, and copies thereof shall be exhibited continuously in a conspicuous place or places in and about the premises of the corporation.

Sanction for bye-laws publicity.

(2) Any person offending against any such bye-laws shall forfeit for every first offence against them any sum not exceeding and for every subsequent offence not exceeding to be imposed by the corporation in any such bye-law as a penalty for an offence, and to be recoverable by the corporation at the suit of any duly authorised officer in

40s. and £5 in England.

(3) Any such bye-law may be proved by certified copies deposited by the corporation in the (courts).

The most convenient court.

20.—(1) This law shall come into operation on the day of 1933, or such prior date as may be promulgated by Royal iradah, and shall continue in force until the dissolution of the corporation as hereinafter provided.

(2) If the Iraqi Government shall acquire the whole of the preferred stock allotted to the Government of the United Kingdom—

(a) So much of this law as refers to the Government of the United Kingdom shall cease to have effect, and

(b) The Iraqi Government may, subject, if any loans issued under article 13 are outstanding, to the terms and conditions contained in the instruments securing the loans, by Royal iradah dissolve the corporation on a date to be specified therein, not being earlier than six months after the date on which the said stock shall have been so acquired by that Government.

21. On the dissolution of the corporation under the preceding article the railway system and all the rights and powers of the corporation under this law shall vest in the Iraqi Government, and all existing obligations of the corporation (including obligations in connexion with loans raised under article 13, if any such loans are outstanding) shall be met by the Iraqi Government out of the revenues and assets of the railway system, provided that execution in respect of such debts cannot be levied on the immovable property of the railway system.

(\*) Exact wording of this article to be agreed upon later at Bagdad.

[E 3901/7/93]

No. 87.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 449.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 13, 1933.*

I CLOSED my despatch No. 430 of the 6th July with a brief comment on Major Thomson's references to the Dashtazi settlement area. This matter has been to me the cause of some concern. If Major Thomson's criticisms are true, there is danger that by tacitly approving expenditure by the Iraqi Government for settling Assyrians in what is already known to be poor, if not useless, land both His Majesty's Government and the British officials concerned in selecting the ground, doing surveys and preparing the estimates would make themselves a laughing stock. I have accordingly suggested to Mr. Edmonds that this point should receive immediate attention before the Iraqi Government commit themselves to spending the sum voted. The acting Financial Adviser also confirms Major Thomson's fear that the Dashtazi scheme may cost considerably more than



the £13,000 assigned, and considers that it will be difficult to obtain a supplementary grant from Parliament.

2. I understand that Major Thomson is of opinion that the Champaishi area, which he suggests as an alternative, could accommodate all the Assyrian families who are in need of land. Although it is low-lying on the Tigris, about 42 miles north-west of Mosul, it is close to mountains and to areas already settled by Assyrians, and many Assyrians would like to settle there. I am also informed that the land was bought by its present owner for about £2,000, that he might be willing to sell, and that it is of such a nature that settlement could be speedily begun. Once a start was made the waverers would flock to register their claims.

3. I enclose copy of a letter<sup>(1)</sup> from Mr. Edmonds covering correspondence<sup>(1)</sup> with the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, on the subject of the Mar Shimun's return. From this you will see that Colonel Stafford somewhat hesitatingly arrives at the conclusion that, while the Mar Shimun's return would be eventually desirable, he should not be allowed to return on his own terms and against the wishes of the Iraqi Government.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent by air mail on the 13th July. Original by bag.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 4049/7/93]

No. 88.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, July 23, 1933.*

SITUATION to-day was as follows:—

Exact number of Assyrians who have already crossed into Syria is uncertain, but it is estimated at between 800 and 1,200 armed men. Iraqi Government do not yet know names of leaders, though Yaku is suspected. More Assyrians are moving towards Syria, this time from Amadia district. Iraqi Government have issued no orders to stop them. Troops and police are being posted on river bank and at ferrying points between junction of Tigris and Khabur Rivers and Tel Abu Dhahir, from which point it is proposed to throw out a line of outposts barring passage down right bank of Tigris. Troops have orders not to allow Assyrians to recross unless they surrender their arms.

It is considered this movement is result of plan probably arranged last year and carried out with the knowledge and consent of Lady Surma and Mar Shimun. It is feared that the Assyrians will not surrender their arms without a fight either with French or Iraqis.

Assuming that the French will not receive them, Iraqis must take them back. Problem is how without a fight over disarmament. In the present unhealthy internal political situation Iraqi Government cannot indefinitely tolerate that half of their army should be tied up in Mosul district to cope with the vagaries of Assyrians. Every major movement of troops is also expensive. Quite apart from the question of prestige, it will therefore be difficult to induce the Iraqi Government not to insist on disarmament as a condition of allowing them back.

Possible solution might be for the French to establish a concentration camp pending negotiations with Iraqis for the return of Assyrians. This would avoid bloodshed either at the hands of the French or Iraqis and solve imminent problem of providing for large body of hungry armed men.

If above suggestion meets with acceptance Edmonds considers the Iraqi Government might agree to allow returning Assyrians to retain small number of rifles for each village. It is important that the French should on no account drive the Assyrians back before terms of return have been arranged.

It is possible that the Assyrians, if pushed back, may cut across Turkish territory into their own country behind Iraqi forces on the Tigris. There are not sufficient troops to prevent this.

(Repeated to Beirut, No. 7.)

[E 4049/7/93]

No. 89.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Dodds (Berne).*

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1933.*

PLEASE convey following message from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to King Feisal of Iraq at Bellevue Hotel. If His Majesty has already left and is still in Switzerland message should be sent to him wherever he is by special messenger:—

"Recent telegrams from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad show that Assyrian situation is developing most dangerously. Between 800 and 1,200 armed Assyrians are reported to have crossed into Syria, and further bodies are moving in same direction from Amadia district. Iraqi Government are not attempting to stop movement, but troops and police are being posted along frontier with orders not to allow Assyrians to return unless they surrender their arms.

"His Majesty's Government view this situation with grave concern. They hold firmly to their opinion that any attempt forcibly to disarm Assyrians in advance of any general plan for disarmament of tribes would be folly and could only lead to bloodshed, with grave consequences. Manner in which matter has been handled by those Iraqi Ministers who have remained in Bagdad causes them greatest uneasiness, and unless whole problem is dealt with on new and more far-sighted lines, it seems probable that serious crisis will develop which will do lamentable injury to Iraq's good name in this country and at Geneva, and undo much of work which has been so successfully accomplished during last few years.

"In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel bound to call your Majesty's serious attention to the situation and to urge on your Majesty advisability of immediately returning to Bagdad to take situation personally in hand. If this is done situation may well be retrieved and peaceful and satisfactory settlement reached with this important element of population of Iraq, fortunes of which have been followed with so much sympathy and anxiety in this country."

(Addressed to Berne, No. 16. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 134.)

[E 4049/7/93]

No. 90.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Dodds (Berne).*

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1933.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Please also convey to King Feisal following personal message from Sir Francis Humphrys:—

"I venture to express the hope that your Majesty will give the most serious consideration to the message from His Majesty's Government which has been conveyed to you to-day through His Majesty's Legation at Berne. This message has been prepared in consultation with me.

"Your Majesty will remember that we both agreed in London that the forcible detention of the Mar Shimun in Bagdad was unwise and that forcible disarmament of the Assyrians must be avoided at all costs, as it would inevitably lead to bloodshed. Unless, therefore, your Majesty is confident that your Ministers in Iraq will act in accordance with these views, I feel that nothing but your Majesty's personal intervention is likely to save the situation from taking an increasingly dangerous course. Your Majesty told me shortly before leaving London that unless this situation could be cleared up satisfactorily you would feel obliged to return to Bagdad, and, though I am most reluctant to suggest any curtailment of your Majesty's rest and holiday, there seems to me to be no alternative."

(Addressed to Berne, No. 17. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 135.)



[E 4119/7/93]

No. 91.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Dodds (Berne).*

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1933.*

YOUR telegram No. 4 of 25th July: Assyrian crisis.

Please convey to King Feisal following further personal message from Sir F. Humphrys:—

"Reports from Bagdad indicate that 1,500 Assyrians have already crossed into Syria with their arms. Of these, forty-eight returned on 25th July, and have surrendered their rifles peaceably. I understand that your Majesty wishes to know why my Government apprehend that forcible disarmament of Assyrians who might return to Iraq would lead to bloodshed. On the occasions on which I have discussed the Assyrian question with your Majesty, we have always agreed that an attempt forcibly to disarm the Assyrians by Iraqi troops or police would inevitably lead to fighting, in which blood would be spilt, and once fighting began it is impossible to say where it would end.

"The Prime Minister's letter of 26th July to His Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires*, which has been telegraphed to London from Bagdad, causes me grave misgiving. Letter contains following passage: 'Assyrians in question (that is, those who have crossed into Syria) will not be disarmed by force unless Government forces are compelled to use it, that is, if Assyrians return to Iraq with their arms in spite of Government authorities' order to them to leave their arms.' Unless, therefore, your Majesty can persuade the Prime Minister by telegram to prevent steps being taken forcibly to disarm the returning Assyrian refugees, I feel that the time has come for your Majesty to return to Bagdad and to intervene personally to avoid a conflagration which we should all deplore.

"I have reason to believe that your Ministers misinformed your Majesty in saying that His Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad concurred in their attitude.

"I also feel strongly that some means should be found for putting an end to the forcible detention of the Mar Shimun at Bagdad and saving the Government's face in the matter. I appeal to your Majesty to take action before it is too late."

(Addressed to Berne, No. 18. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 144.)

[E 4049/7/93]

No. 92.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Harvey (Paris).*

(No. 123.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1933.*

BAGDAD telegram No. 178 of 23rd July: Assyrian crisis.

Earlier telegrams referred to go to you by to-night's bag, and you will find history of crisis in telegram sections and recent Foreign Office Weekly Summaries.

His Majesty's Government view recent developments with grave concern, and are impressing on King Feisal, who is in Switzerland, desirability of his returning to Iraq as soon as possible.

I am also instructing His Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad to impress on Iraqi Government in strongest terms objections to any attempt forcibly to disarm Assyrians if they try to return to Iraq.

Meanwhile, it is important in interests of all parties concerned and of maintenance of general tranquillity in Middle East that everything possible should be done to reduce risk of any clash or bloodshed, consequences of which might be serious and far-reaching.

Please therefore approach French Government immediately, and draw their earnest attention to dangers which would attend any attempt on part of French authorities forcibly to expel Assyrians from Syria or otherwise to drive them back into Iraq before satisfactory arrangements have been made for their return. (Addressed to Paris, No. 123. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 136.)

[E 4081/7/93]

No. 93.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon. (Received July 25.)*

(No. 462.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 19, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 449 of the 13th July, the most important event during the past ten days in the story of the Assyrian crisis has been the meeting of maliks and other leaders called at Mosul on the 10th July by the Acting Governor on the suggestion of Colonel Stafford and Major Thomson. It seemed at first that the proceedings would unfortunately be marred by the presence and the speeches of certain uninvited guests. After the Acting Governor had read out a detailed statement of the Government's policy, Colonel Stafford and Major Thomson were requested to address the meeting. I enclose a précis of their speeches. Questions were then invited, and it soon became clear that opinions were sharply divided. A number of questioners proclaimed complete sympathy with the policy of the Government; others regretted the absence of the Mar Shimun. An inflammatory speech by an uninvited guest caused some excitement, and set the pro- and the anti-Mar Shimun parties at loggerheads. It was felt necessary to adjourn the meeting until the next day.

2. That same evening Colonel Stafford received a communication to the effect that the party in favour of the Mar Shimun would decline to attend the adjourned meeting. It was accordingly arranged that on the 11th July two meetings should be held—one for the party against the Mar Shimun, the other for the Patriarch's special adherents. The first passed off quite satisfactorily, and all present, about forty in number, expressed their loyalty to the King and their obedience to the Iraqi Government.

3. The second meeting, which lasted for over two and a half hours, disclosed the anxiety of certain Assyrians for the security of their tenure of privately owned lands. Nearly all the speakers said that the presence of the Mar Shimun was absolutely essential. It was explained to them that the Mar Shimun was free to return immediately he signed the simple acknowledgment required from him by the Minister of the Interior. The draft of this acknowledgment was read out. At the same time it was pointed out that the Government were determined not to grant any temporal power to the Mar Shimun.

4. In the opinion of Colonel Stafford the result was that those present acknowledged that they understood the policy of the Government and promised obedience so long as they were in Iraq. They reserved, however, the right to consult the Mar Shimun as to whether they should remain in this country or go elsewhere. The Commandant of Police explained that those who wished to leave Iraq were free to do so, but if they stayed in the country they must obey the laws of the land. At the end of the meeting, the Acting Governor requested four representative maliks to remain behind, and suggested to them that they should go to Bagdad to see the Mar Shimun and endeavour to bring the Patriarch into a more reasonable frame of mind. It was, however, clearly pointed out to them that the Government had irrevocably decided on their policy, both as regards the position of the Mar Shimun and as regards settlement of the Assyrians, and that this would be carried out wherever the Mar Shimun might be. At the same time it appeared that a certain number of Assyrians would not apply for land until advised to do so by the Mar Shimun. Those people would suffer irreparable harm, whereas the Government would not be affected at all. The maliks promised they would think the matter over, and eventually decided that Yaku, the instigator of the abortive rising of the 25th June, the Malik Luco and the Malik Andreas should proceed to Bagdad in order to explain the local situation to the Mar Shimun.

[9941]



5. Colonel Stafford considers that these meetings have done much good. While they will not, for the moment, have greatly influenced the allegiance of the more ardent supporters of the Mar Shimun, they have nevertheless brought the Assyrians to understand, without any possible doubt, the policy of the Iraqi Government, which they did not appreciate before; nor were they aware of the decisions of the League. For this the Mar Shimun is largely, if not entirely, to blame, and this, in Colonel Stafford's opinion, has cost the Patriarch the support of many of the more enlightened Assyrians.

6. In order that there should not remain the slightest cause for misunderstanding, Colonel Stafford reports arrangements are being made in Mosul for the printing in Syriac and the distribution of 2,000 copies of the Acting Governor's, Colonel Stafford's and Major Thomson's speeches, and of the decision of the League of Nations, prefaced by an introduction written by the Acting Governor giving notice to the Assyrians to apply for settlement by the 15th August, and inviting all those who wish to leave the country to apply for the necessary permits. Colonel Stafford also reports that he has advised that these introductory remarks should contain a statement reassuring those settled Assyrians—and there are many—who are uneasy over the security of their tenure.

7. Although the three emissaries were reported to have left Mosul for Bagdad on the 13th July, they have not yet put in an appearance in this city, neither the police authorities nor the Air Officer Commanding having any knowledge of their whereabouts.

8. With regard to the continued detention of the Mar Shimun in Bagdad, in compliance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 129 of the 14th July, I duly acquainted the Prime Minister with the views of His Majesty's Government, and, in order that there should be no misunderstanding, I placed them on record in the form of a letter, a copy of which I enclose. I gave verbally the intimation that the United Kingdom representative would not be able to defend the action of the Iraqi Government in detaining the Mar Shimun against his will if the matter were raised in Geneva. As forecasted in my telegram No. 153 of the 3rd July, the Prime Minister said that he regretted that he disagreed with His Majesty's Government, and that, for reasons of prestige, the Iraqi Government could not restore freedom of movement to the Mar Shimun unless and until he signed that well-known so-called "Cornwallis" acknowledgment to the Minister of the Interior's letter of the 18th June. His Excellency admitted that King Feisal had telegraphed instructions to that effect and that the three Ministers in London were in agreement with the King, but he said, on the other hand, that the five Ministers remaining in Bagdad were solidly against the unconditional release of the Mar Shimun. They formed the majority in the Cabinet, and if the King, on his return, did not agree with their attitude they were quite prepared either to resign office or reconstruct a new Cabinet of Ministers of kindred views. Gentle though he is in manner, Rashid Ali spoke with ill-concealed warmth of the tone of some of King Feisal's telegrams, and was even at one moment inclined to hint that I had been misleading you in not sufficiently pleading the Iraqi cause! He was evidently shaken by some of the King's messages on the subject of the change in registration of the so-called Railway Lands (my telegram No. 137) and on the failure of the Government to reappoint one of His Majesty's friends as President of the Senate. In fact, he told me that during the last few days he had had a rough passage. It appears, however, from the equanimity with which he viewed the King's return and a possible resignation of the Government, that the effect of these reprimands has been only to make him more stubborn. This is, indeed, a commentary on the lack of control which King Feisal has on the Government during his absence from the country.

9. In the north the situation continues to improve. The extra police have for the most part been withdrawn, although the troops remain. In Bagdad, the Minister of the Interior is content for the present to refrain from bringing the Mar Shimun into court, although I admit I was somewhat apprehensive of the effect that might be produced by the communication which you instructed me to make. The Mar Shimun continues to reside at the Y.M.C.A., and, although he is shadowed by detectives, he is allowed to move about Bagdad unmolested. Colonel Stafford in Mosul does not consider that the continued detention of the Mar Shimun in Bagdad will lead to trouble, except possibly at the instigation of some of his near relations. Provided the Minister of the Interior does not

take more serious action against the Mar Shimun, he is of opinion that the troops can be withdrawn, except for one battalion, which should remain at Dohuk.

10. In short, as already reported by telegraph, the situation in the north has much improved, and the impending visit of the Assyrian maliks to the Mar Shimun may result in the Patriarch reconsidering his attitude towards the Minister of the Interior.

11. A copy of this despatch is being sent by air mail, the 20th July. Original by bag.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 93.

*Précis of Speech by Colonel Stafford, Acting Administrative Inspector, Mosul, at the Meeting of the Assyrians held on July 10, 1933.*

HE was much impressed by lack of contact between the Assyrians and Government officials. Result has been misunderstanding and suspicion. This is largely the fault of the Assyrians themselves, and is an intolerable situation, which must end. Assyrians must either recognise they are Iraqi citizens, with the same rights and duties as the other inhabitants of the country, or they must be prepared to leave Iraq. There is no middle path. This is the last chance that landless Assyrians will have of obtaining holdings in Iraq, and anyone who persuades them not to apply for settlement is doing them irreparable harm.

The Iraqi Government will give every facility to those Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq, but they are not responsible for finding a place outside the country for them to go to. Nor has the League of Nations promised to find lands outside Iraq. It seems unlikely that any country will be prepared to receive Assyrians on a large scale. As regards the neighbouring countries:—

- (1) Turkey will not accept Assyrians at any price.
- (2) Persia would accept small groups, but on hard conditions, i.e., surrender of arms, scattered settlement, no permanency of tenure, no financial assistance.
- (3) Syria. The French are full up with Armenian refugees, and have no land to offer Assyrians.

In view of the present economic crisis all countries in the world are refusing immigration. Therefore the real future for Assyrians lies in Iraq. All responsible Iraqis are anxious to settle the Assyrian question and to make the Assyrians contented Iraqi citizens. It is the duty of the Assyrians to reciprocate, and they must therefore rid themselves of their present spirit of aloofness and learn Arabic or Kurdish.

The time has now come for the Assyrians to decide once and for all. In the opinion of Colonel Stafford they cannot do otherwise than remain.

Enclosure 2 in No. 93.

*Précis of Statement made by Major D. B. Thomson to the Assyrian Meeting held on July 10, 1933.*

MAJOR THOMSON has come to advise the Iraqi Government in the settlement of Assyrians in accordance with a promise made by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations. The resolution of the Council of the League of Nations has been read to the meeting. Whether settlement is made or not, Major Thomson must write a full report for the Iraqi Government, who will send a copy to the League.

The Mar Shimun has definitely refused to assist in settlement or to furnish the names of the Assyrian leaders who advised him, and whom Major Thomson wished to see. The Mar Shimun based his refusal on the ground (1) that he did not agree with the Government's settlement policy; and (2) that he had been asked by the Government to give an assurance that he would not take an active



part in the administration of the Assyrians. There has been much misunderstanding over the phrase "temporal power." All the Government asks is that the Mar Shimun will give an assurance that he does not claim the right to exercise powers similar to those of an administrative official of the Iraqi Government in his dealings with the Assyrians. This is a perfectly reasonable demand. The Mar Shimun promised to give his reasons in writing for differing with the Government's policy. Although this was over a month ago, Major Thomson had heard nothing from the Patriarch, and in the meanwhile he has done nothing to facilitate the settlement, and is still in disagreement with the Government in Bagdad on the question of his personal position. If the Mar Shimun really understands the decision of the League and the request of the Iraqi Government, and if he has the welfare of the Assyrians really at heart, he should instruct his maliks to co-operate with Major Thomson. The present policy of "wait and see" will only end in alienating the sympathies of the world from the cause of the Assyrian people.

If the maliks consider the presence of the Mar Shimun to be essential, they should use all their influence to urge him to comply with the Government's wishes.

Major Thomson was there to help the Assyrians, and if his advice was not taken it is their responsibility. This was their last chance. They must make up their minds once and for all to settle in Iraq. No other country will offer better terms.

As regards method of settlement, Major Thomson will endeavour, in so far as is possible, to arrange for the settlement of each village by members of the same tribe. Very few applications for land registration have come in. Remember that when the time comes for settlement it will be a case of first come first served. Therefore, register without delay. Those who live in unhealthy villages will be considered when the landless have been provided for. But those who already have employment in Bagdad or elsewhere and apply for land to be worked by others will not be considered until those who work their own holdings have been dealt with.

Various areas will be considered for settlement—Dashtazai, Champaishai and Gaz Fakdah. The Iraqi Government has voted 13,000 dinars. The comments of the Assyrian leaders on these places will be welcome, and Major Thomson will always be ready to receive any Assyrian and explain points on which there may be any difficulty or doubt. The Iraqi Government desires to help the Assyrians in every way possible, and in Colonel Stafford and himself they have two absolutely fair and impartial helpers.

Enclosure 3 in No. 93.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Prime Minister of Iraq.*

My dear Prime Minister,

YOUR Excellency may remember that, when we were discussing the subject of the Mar Shimun on the 3rd July, I informed you that I would probably have to convey to you a message from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the sense of restoring to the Assyrian Patriarch his freedom of movement.

His Majesty's Government, in conjunction with His Majesty King Feisal and your Cabinet colleagues at present in Great Britain, have been giving the matter their most careful consideration. In order that the Iraqi Government should be under no misapprehension as to their views, I have been instructed to state that they are definitely of opinion that, great though the internal difficulties may be, the objections to detaining the Mar Shimun in Bagdad against his will are still greater because of the adverse criticism in Europe which the reputation of the Iraqi Government will incur. This view is also shared by His Majesty King Feisal and the Iraqi Ministers at present in London.

His Majesty's Government therefore hope that the Iraqi Government will see their way to relieving the Mar Shimun of any impression that his liberty of movement is being restricted.

Yours sincerely,  
G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 3734/653/93]

No. 94.

*Sir John Simon to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Bagdad).*

(No. 452.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1933.*

HIS Majesty the King of Iraq arrived in this country on a State visit to His Majesty the King on Tuesday, the 20th June. This visit ended on Thursday, the 22nd June, when His Majesty and members of his suite became the guests of His Majesty's Government, and were accommodated at the Hyde Park Hotel from that date until Sunday, the 25th June, when King Feisal, accompanied by Sir Francis Humphrys and certain members of His Majesty's suite, left London for Edinburgh to carry out a tour of Scotland, in the course of which he paid visits to the Duke of Atholl, Sir Ian Malcolm and Major-General Sir James Burnett of Leys.

2. His Majesty left Scotland on the 5th July, and proceeded direct to Torquay, where he was entertained by Rear-Admiral W. M. James, C.B., R.N., on board H.M.S. *Renown*, and was present at naval exercises in Tor Bay arranged in his honour. He returned to London on the evening of the 6th July, and again took up his residence at the Hyde Park Hotel, where he remained as the guest of His Majesty's Government until the 10th July. As certain important questions were still under discussion on that date, His Majesty decided to remain in London privately for a further period, and eventually left for Switzerland on the 20th July.

3. The Iraqi members of King Feisal's suite were Nuri Pasha Al Said, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tahsin Beg Qadri, Chief Master of Ceremonies, and Major Shakir-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp. Sir F. Humphrys, Captain Vyvyan Holt and Mr. P. S. W. Y. Scarlett were officially attached to His Majesty throughout the visit. Mr. Scarlett was, however, prevented by illness from taking any part in the State visit. For the period of the State visit, Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, the Earl of Dunmore, Lord-in-Waiting to the King, and Captain Lord Claud Hamilton, equerry to the King, were in attendance on King Feisal.

4. King Feisal was met at Dover by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, and at Victoria Station by His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. The State visit included a visit to the grave of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey, where King Feisal laid a wreath of Flanders poppies, a State banquet at Buckingham Palace, the presentation of an address and a luncheon at the Guildhall, and a dinner given at the Foreign Office by me on behalf of His Majesty's Government. A detailed account is contained in the programme entitled "Ceremonial of the Visit of the King of Iraq," issued by the Lord Chamberlain's Department, which forms the first enclosure to this despatch.<sup>(1)</sup>

5. On the day of his arrival King Feisal received from His Majesty the King the Grand Cross of the Bath, and in turn bestowed upon His Majesty the Chain of the Order of Hashimi, which is restricted to heads of States. You will receive in a separate despatch lists of the British and Iraqi decorations bestowed during the visit. On the conclusion of his visit to Buckingham Palace, King Feisal received from His Majesty the King a gift of a pair of special sporting guns, made by Messrs. James Purdey and Sons (Limited).

6. The text of the speeches of His Majesty the King and His Majesty the King of Iraq at the State banquet form the second enclosure to this despatch,<sup>(1)</sup> and copies of the other speeches and addresses delivered during King Feisal's visit appear in the third enclosure.<sup>(1)</sup>

7. A copy of the official programme of the visit, which constitutes a diary of the unofficial portion of His Majesty's stay in this country, forms the fourth enclosure to this despatch,<sup>(1)</sup> while a collection of newspaper cuttings, giving sufficiently accurate accounts of the different functions attended by His Majesty, forms the fifth enclosure.<sup>(1)</sup>

8. In addition to the naval exercises in Tor Bay mentioned in paragraph 2 above, King Feisal attended selected military exercises at Aldershot on the 23rd June, and was afterwards entertained to luncheon by Sir Charles Harington, General Officer Commanding, Aldershot, at the officers' club there. On the

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



following day His Majesty attended the Royal Air Force display at Hendon. The only sporting event at which His Majesty was present was the finals of the Lawn Tennis Championships at Wimbledon on Saturday, the 8th July.

9. Before leaving Bagdad, King Feisal had informed Sir F. Humphrys that he did not wish to visit any factories, shipyards, mines, &c., during his stay in this country. Consequently it was decided to decline, on His Majesty's behalf, all invitations by manufacturers, &c., to visit their works. Exception was, however, made in the case of the Grampian hydro-electric scheme under construction by Messrs. Balfour Beatty and Co., which, at the invitation of the firm, His Majesty visited on his way from Blair Castle to Poltalloch, the residence of Sir Ian Malcolm, on the 29th June.

10. His Majesty's visit, and the presence in London of the Iraqi Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Economics and Communications, together with senior members of the British Advisory Staff, provided a favourable opportunity for the discussion of certain questions outstanding between Iraq and this country. Advantage was taken of this opportunity, and a number of important discussions took place. You have already received a record of my conversation with King Feisal on the 22nd June, and notes on the other discussions which took place and on the results achieved will be communicated to you in separate despatches.

11. King Feisal appeared to be much impressed by the cordiality of his reception by His Majesty the King and by the ceremonial and pageantry of the State visit; and throughout his stay in this country he showed himself appreciative of the efforts made for his entertainment and amusement.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 3914/91/34]

No. 95.

*Sir John Simon to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Bagdad).*

(No. 458.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1933.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 418 of the 28th June, regarding the unsatisfactory attitude of the Persian naval authorities towards the port authority at Basra, I transmit to you the accompanying copy of a memorandum from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the same subject.

2. On the 20th July Nuri Pasha called here and discussed the question at considerable length. He was informed that His Majesty's Government had heard of the difficulties caused by the Persian warships in the Shatt-el-Arab, and that they realised the dangers to which the Iraqi memorandum called attention. At the same time, the situation in the Shatt-el-Arab was unsatisfactory. The Persians had a certain grievance in the fact that they had no voice in the management of a waterway which, though not so vital to Persia as to Iraq, did, nevertheless, lead to important Persian ports. This had been recognised when the Persians first started pressing their claim for a revision of the frontier, and the proposed convention for a Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Board had then been devised not only as a means of providing for the safety and better administration of the waterway, but also as a means of giving the Persians a certain measure of satisfaction without in any way impairing Iraq's legitimate rights. It seemed, therefore, that the best way to deal with the difficulties which were now arising would be for the Iraqi Government to take up the whole question officially with the Persian Government without further delay; to point out to them the serious difficulties and dangers which were being caused by the behaviour of the Persian ships; to explain that Iraq fully understood Persia's desire to have a voice in the control of this important waterway; and formally to propose that the whole question should now be disposed of, to the best interest of all concerned, by the negotiation, as soon as possible, of a Conservancy Board Convention on the lines of the draft which had already been unofficially communicated to the Persian Government last year.

3. Nuri Pasha replied that in his opinion the Persians were bent on securing something much more far-reaching than this. They had never abandoned their claim for a revision of the frontier in the Shatt. To propose

that the matter should be dealt with by the conclusion of the Conservancy Board Convention would be unlikely to satisfy them. They would probably refuse the proposal, and what was to be done then?

4. It was explained in reply that, even if this occurred, the Iraqi Government would be no worse off than they were now. His Majesty's Government understood (and Nuri Pasha confirmed this impression) that the Iraqi Government were determined not to yield on the question of the revision of the frontier. If this was so, the Iraqis would, it seemed reasonable to conclude, much improve their diplomatic position *vis-à-vis* the Persians by putting forward an alternative proposal, which would meet the reasonable desire of the Persians to have a voice in the control of the waterway and which would obviously be to the interests of both parties. If such a proposal were formally put forward with a view to remedying a situation which was unsatisfactory, and the Persians were to refuse it, their position would be considerably weakened, and they might well lose a great deal of sympathy which they might acquire if their representations were merely met by a blank refusal on the part of the Iraqis.

5. Apart from these considerations, it was, for purely material and physical reasons, desirable that an effort should now be made to secure the conclusion of the Conservancy Board Convention as soon as possible. Colonel Ward and other officials had pointed out that there was a real danger of the Shatt either silting up or breaking through its banks as a result of the waters of the Karun being uncontrolled in flood time, and of the general lack of proper unified control. If no steps were taken within a reasonable time to provide for the effective international control of the waters of the Shatt and the Karun, both Iraq and Persia might suffer seriously. His Majesty's Government also had a material interest (though a lesser one than that of Iraq) in keeping the waterway of the Shatt safely open to navigation, since so large a percentage of the shipping using the Shatt was British. If, therefore, the Iraqi Government should decide that the right policy was now to try to persuade the Persian Government to agree to the proposed convention for a Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Board, it was probable that His Majesty's Government would be glad to co-operate with the Iraqi Government in trying to secure this object at Tehran.

6. Nuri Pasha at first seemed reluctant to commit his Government to press the Persians to accept the proposed convention. As the discussion progressed, however, he appeared more and more attracted by the idea, particularly in view of the consideration that such action as had been suggested on the part of the Iraqi Government would strengthen the Iraqi, and weaken the Persian, diplomatic position in regard to the whole Shatt-el-Arab question. He also seemed to realise that it was important that something should be done without delay. He eventually let it be understood that the Iraqi Government would probably follow the course suggested, though it was made clear to him that His Majesty's Government did not in any way wish to dictate to the Iraqi Government in this matter, which involved a question of policy which it was obviously for the Iraqi Government alone to decide.

7. I had already, before the receipt of Nuri Pasha's memorandum, been considering the question whether action should be taken by His Majesty's Government with the Persian Government regarding the behaviour of the Persian warships in the Shatt-el-Arab, and Sir Francis Humphrys and Colonel Ward have been consulted on the point. As at present advised, I contemplate instructing His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran to address to the Persian Government friendly representations based on the risk involved of serious damage to British interests, including those of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, if such proceedings continue. I propose, however, first to await the report from Mr. Mallet, requested in my telegram No. 109 of the 7th July to him (repeated to you as No. 123), regarding the results of the representations which the Iraqi Minister at Tehran is understood to have made to the Persian Government on this subject, in connexion with the recent arrest of Captain MacLeod.

8. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.



Enclosure 1 in No. 95.

*Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir John Simon.*(Translation.)  
Excellency.*Iraqi Legation, London,  
July 17, 1933.*

MEMORANDUM on Persian offences in the Shatt-el-Arab.

No doubt His Majesty's Government are already aware of the claims of the Persian Government regarding the frontier between Persia and Iraq in the Shatt-el-Arab area.

The representatives of the Persian Government have frequently mentioned the desire of their Government to make the median line the frontier between the two countries.

The frontier in question was defined in treaties concluded in the past between the Turkish and Persian Governments, and, as the Iraqi Government has inherited from the Turkish Government all the rights of these treaties, they did not attach any great importance to these claims nor give heed to the opinions of the Persian representatives. Recently, however, the Persian Government, having purchased a few war vessels, have begun to act in the Persian Gulf in a manner which is detrimental to the rights of Iraq referred to above and to Iraqi sovereignty. We believe that His Majesty's Government is aware of what has been happening, but, nevertheless, we enclose herewith a report prepared by the Port Director.

The Iraqi Government have issued regulations and instructions for the control of navigation in the Shatt-el-Arab, and these regulations and instructions should be observed by all ships entering Iraqi waters. Copies of these documents have many times been sent to the Persian Government.

From the incidents which repeatedly occur, it appears that Persian ships do not intend to obey these regulations and instructions when passing through Iraqi waters, and that they desire in this way to raise the question of the frontier in the Shatt-el-Arab.

The Iraqi Government consider these acts to be a violation of Iraqi territory and an infringement of Iraqi sovereignty in this area. They consequently find themselves confronted with a dispute in their foreign affairs, the outcome of which may be of great importance.

In accordance with the treaty existing between us, we desire to bring this serious state of affairs to the notice of His Majesty's Government in order to consult with them as to the steps which should be taken regarding these Persian transgressions.

NURI-AL-SAID,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 95.

*Copy of a Report presented by the Director-General of the Port of Basrah.*

THE ships of the Persian navy, since their arrival in Iraq waters, have always disregarded the Basra Port Rules and Regulations. According to these rules, all vessels, without exception, when about to enter the Rooka Channel, which is only a one-way channel, must first obtain permission from the control officer, either through the pilot master on the pilot vessel, if entering the port, or Port Officer, Abadan, or Basra, if leaving the port. This the ships of the Persian navy have refused to do, and, by the disregard of these very important regulations, collision with the dredgers at work in the channel have, on more than one occasion, only been very narrowly averted, and it is particularly dangerous during dust storms.

These vessels also manœuvre within the harbour limits, Abadan Reach, at will, and they avoid taking a harbour master on every possible occasion, and are frequently a danger to other craft. They also anchor in the fairway in such a way as to restrict the movements of vessels.

Recently, before dry docking, one of the sloops in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's dry dock, which is moored in the Shatt-el-Arab, close to the Iraq

bank, commenced to discharge her ammunition practically within the danger zone limits, and only shifted her berth at the request of the port officer after a great deal of protesting on the part of the commanding officer.

During the last week in June, Captain MacLeod, one of the port's harbour masters at Abadan Reach, boarded one of the Persian sloops as usual to advise and assist, if necessary, in berthing the vessel alongside the jetty. When about to leave the ship, he found that he was placed under arrest, and was sent to Mohammerah under an armed guard and kept in confinement for seven days.

It would appear that, by the continuous disregard of port rules and regulations, they wish to indicate as clearly as possible that they do not recognise the port authority, and desire to raise the question of the frontier on the first possible occasion; in fact, Major Biyander, the Naval Commander-in-chief, asked me to use my influence to raise the question as early as possible in March last.

[E 4206/7/93]

No. 96.

*General Jafar-el-Askeri to Mr. Rendel.—(Received July 31.)**Royal Iraqi Legation,  
London, July 29, 1933.*

Dear Mr. Rendel,

HEREWITH the aide-mémoire which Nouri Pasha asked me to forward to you.

Yours sincerely,  
JAFAR-EL-ASKERI.

Enclosure in No. 96.

*Aide-Mémoire.*

THE Council of the League of Nations, during the session held on the 15th December, 1932, adopted the following resolution:—

"In conformity with the proposal submitted by the committee charged by its decision of the 5th December, 1932, to prepare a draft resolution regarding the question of the Assyrian community in Iraq in the light of the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the 14th November, 1932;

"Adopts the view of the Permanent Mandates Commission that the demand of the Assyrians for administrative autonomy within Iraq cannot be accepted;

"Notes with satisfaction the declaration of the representative of Iraq of the intention of the Iraqi Government to select from outside Iraq a foreign expert to assist it for a limited period in the settlement of all landless inhabitants of Iraq, including Assyrians, and in the carrying out of its scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians in Iraq under suitable conditions and, so far as may be possible, in homogeneous units, it being understood that the existing rights of the present population shall not be prejudiced;

"Feels confident, if these measures do not provide a complete solution of the problem and there remain Assyrians unwilling or unable to settle in Iraq, that the Iraqi Government will take all such measures as may be possible to facilitate the settlement of the said Assyrians elsewhere;

"Requests the Iraqi Government to be so good as to keep it informed in due course of the result of the foregoing measures."

According to the above resolution, the Iraqi Government obviously cannot be held responsible for those Assyrians who, unwilling to settle in Iraq, emigrated to other countries of their own free will. The Government deeply regrets the unwarranted action of the Assyrians who left their homes in Iraq, but was not in a position to impede their freedom to emigrate to countries outside of Iraq when they desired to do so; the responsibility of this action falling entirely on the emigrants themselves.



The Iraqi Government, therefore, is under no obligation to sanction the return of such restless elements who were, and in all probability will continue to be, the cause of trouble and strife both harmful to the peace of the country.

In the same session the Iraqi delegate stated that his Government deeply sympathised with the Assyrians in the hardships and sufferings they had undergone in the past, and, for reasons of humanity if for none other, would do all that lay in their power to provide for them. He was confident that the measures which the Iraqi Government would take would satisfy the majority of the Assyrians, who would find in Iraq a new home and renewed prosperity.

After considering this declaration, weight must be given to past steps in their favour taken by the Iraqi Government, *i.e.*, the exemption of the Assyrians from certain taxes; their settlement on lands given to them by the Government; their employment in large numbers in Government services (army, police forces, railway); and other privileges accorded to them, and all of which were put before the League of Nations by His Britannic Majesty's representative, and is recorded in the League archives.

Moreover, the settlement schemes proposed by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations are now being put into execution under the supervision of the expert, and large sums provided for.

Keeping in mind the above facts, the Iraqi Government is at a loss to understand the inexplicable departure from Iraq and the discontent of this small section of Assyrians, and their lack of appreciation of all that has been done for them and is being done for their benefit.

The Government is inclined to the opinion that this small section of Assyrians, following Mar Shimun, has engendered trouble with an aim to establishing administrative autonomy under the leadership of Mar Shimun himself. This the Iraqi Government can never accept, and, furthermore, the Council of the League categorically rejected this demand in its above-mentioned decision.

In the opinion of the Iraqi Government no satisfactory solution of this delicate situation can possibly be reached unless the Iraqi Government takes a firm stand and refuses reimmigration into Iraqi territories of those Assyrians who left the country, or shall leave it, of their own accord.

This decision shall put an end to these intrigues perpetrated in an attempt to bring about their unrealisable ambition. It should also prevent other Assyrians belonging to the same groups who have been showing signs of similar intentions from committing similar acts of folly. It is obvious that these measures are for the vital interests of overwhelming majority of the rest of the Assyrians who have on various occasions expressed their gratitude to the Iraqi Government for the generous help and assistance rendered to them.

The Iraqi Government considers that this is not only in contradiction with the resolution of the Council, but is directly in accordance with the spirit of their decision.

With regard to disarming the Assyrians, the Iraqi Government has no intention of disarming the large majority of Assyrians who are still in Iraq, as it would do no such unjust action as the disarming of one individual part of the population.

London, July 28, 1933.

[E 4224/3443/34]

No. 97.

Mr. Mallet to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 1.)  
(No. 340.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note sent to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 15th July, on the subject of the arrest and detention of Captain J. Macleod by the Persian naval authorities.

Tehran, July 15, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 97.

Mr. Mallet to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre,

Gulhek, July 15, 1933.

I HAVE the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to address your Highness on the subject of the recent detention at Mohammerah by the Persian naval authorities of Captain J. Macleod, a British subject, employed by the Basra Port Trust as harbour-master at Abadan Reach.

2. Your Highness is already, I believe, well acquainted with the circumstances of this case, and I need only mention that at about 6 o'clock in the morning of the 23rd June (the 2nd Tyr, 1312) Captain Macleod proceeded on board the gunboat *Palang*, of the Imperial Persian navy, which was then lying in mid-stream at Abadan Reach, in order to offer his assistance in berthing the *Palang* at No. 7 jetty at Abadan. No senior officer was available at that hour, but a junior officer told him that the vessel would not be ready to move for another two hours. Captain Macleod accordingly arranged, without any objection from the officer, to return at 8 o'clock.

3. At about 7 o'clock, however, Captain Macleod saw that the *Palang* was already moving towards No. 7 jetty, and, thinking that there had been some misunderstanding, he followed her in his launch. When he came close to the *Palang* one of the officers or seamen on the deck made an indistinct signal which Captain Macleod and those with him in the launch thought was a warning to keep clear of the propellers. He accordingly came alongside about amidships on the river side and boarded the *Palang* direct from the roof of the launch, a method frequently employed. Once on board he met the senior naval officer, who said he was busy at that moment, but would speak to him later. Captain Macleod accordingly went to the bridge and watched the completion of the berthing of the vessel, which was proceeding in a normal fashion. The operation being completed, he attempted to return to his launch, but to his surprise was stopped by a sentry. A little later he was told that he must proceed under arrest to Mohammerah, and he was eventually taken there by land under an armed escort. At Mohammerah he was detained for seven days in the naval barracks, the excuse given being that he could not be released until a court of enquiry had been held into the circumstances in which he had "forced" his way on board the *Palang*. He was finally released on the 30th June (the 9th Tyr) as the result, I believe, of instructions from the Imperial Government.

4. This brief summary will be sufficient to show, first, that a British subject was arrested by an officer of the Persian navy on the flimsy pretext that he, a single unarmed man, had forced his way on board a man-of-war, and, secondly, that the said British subject was detained by the naval authorities for a whole week without any formal charge being brought against him, and without being brought before any magistrate or judicial officer.

5. Sir John Simon has accordingly instructed me to protest against this unwarrantable treatment of a British subject by the senior naval officer of the Imperial navy. Captain Macleod was merely doing what he rightly conceived to be his duty under the Port of Basra Regulations, and was acting in the interests of the safety both of Persian and foreign shipping. His detention at Mohammerah for a week was an arbitrary and highly improper action, against which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are constrained to register the strongest protest.

6. His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction the prompt recognition of the error which had been committed, when once the matter had been brought to the notice of the Imperial Government at Tehran, resulting in the release from detention of Captain Macleod, as well as the courtesy with which he was treated while the detention lasted, but they must ask that stringent orders may be issued to the Persian naval authorities with a view to avoid the occurrence of any further such incidents.

7. From the above your Highness will recognise that His Majesty's Government are concerned with the fact that the arrested person was a British subject. The fact of his employment under the Government of Iraq and the relations of



the Basra Port Trust with the Imperial navy are matters which concern the Government of Iraq, regarding which I understand your Highness has already received representations.

I avail, &c.  
V. A. L. MALLET.

[E 4215/7/93]

No. 98.

*Mr. Dodds to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 189.)

Sir,

Berne, July 28, 1933.

I HAVE had the honour to report in my telegrams Nos. 4 and 5 of the 25th instant and of to-day that I duly carried out the instructions in Sir Robert Vansittart's telegrams Nos. 16 and 17 of the 24th and No. 18 of the 27th instant to convey messages from His Majesty's Government and Sir Francis Humphrys to His Majesty the King of Iraq regarding the Assyrian situation in Iraq.

2. I have nothing to add to the information contained in my telegrams, except that I gained the impression from His Majesty at the audience which he accorded me this morning, when I conveyed to him the message from Sir Francis Humphrys contained in Sir Robert Vansittart's telegram No. 18, that he is confident that he will be able to put an end to the trouble, which he does not appear to regard as grave, as soon as he arrives at Bagdad. He said that he was returning there, partly because his Government thought only of the domestic affairs of Iraq and were not capable of realising the effect of what they did at home on Iraq's reputation abroad, and partly because he wished to maintain his present good relations with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

3. His Majesty intimated that the League of Nations seemed to regard Iraq as though it were a highly-organised State, whereas it really contained a number of heterogeneous and savage tribes, and that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, although they realised the facts of the situation in Iraq, wished always to proceed very gently. Such a policy, His Majesty suggested, was not always possible. Trouble might ensue as a result, and then who was responsible?

4. His Majesty said that he hoped to return to Berne to complete his cure, but he evidently realises that this may not be possible. I am informed by his "maître de cérémonies" that His Majesty does not feel well, and that he is badly in need of a rest.

I have, &c.  
J. L. DODDS.

[E 4276/4276/93]

No. 99.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 464.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 20, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to report that the recent eviction of Arabs in the Wadi Hawarith district in Palestine from lands owned by the Jewish National Fund has given rise to anti-Zionist agitation on the part of Nationalist elements in Bagdad, and that there are signs that the traditionally peaceful relations between Jew and Moslem in Iraq may deteriorate.

2. There has been irresponsible talk of a boycott of Jewish goods and of the raising of a fund to assist the Wadi Hawarith Arabs, and the agitation has gone as far as a meeting on the 14th July in the Haidar-Khana mosque at Bagdad, when Zionism and the nefarious activities of "the colonisers" were amply denounced before some 3,000 persons.

3. I learn that a meeting of leading Jewish merchants and notables was held recently in Bagdad to discuss the situation, and that it was decided that

the Chief Rabbi should approach the Government and request them to take all necessary steps to ensure the protection of Jewish interests.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.  
G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 4353/7/93]

No. 100.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 208.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, August 3, 1933.

THE King sent for me this morning.

He said he hoped to be in Iraq only two or three days. Before he went His Majesty desired Minister of the Interior, Embassy and Cabinet should have an agreed policy in dealing with Assyrians problem. I said this was an excellent idea provided the Cabinet did not act either previous to any necessary consultation with you or against His Majesty's Government's advice.

His Majesty thought the best way of settling the question of Assyrians' immigration was to try to induce the French to take them. For this he would be prepared to pay from £2,000 to £3,000, but not to give French any alternative concession.

The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance and Minister of the Interior were then introduced, and after a lengthy discussion of intentions of the Iraqi Government [group undecypherable] certain questions to His Majesty's Government were set forth as in the text of my immediately following telegram. English of penultimate sentence is somewhat cumbersome, but I cannot myself alter it too much.

I found Nuri Said quite intransigent over the return of Assyrians armed and over the question of Mar Shimun, so were Yasin and Edmonds to a lesser extent. The King alone was neutral, but in a day or two it seems that he will have to toe the line. Over the return of Mar Shimun and the arrest of Lady Surma and company I was in a minority of one. It was pointed out with some gusto that even the British adviser and the local experts were against me. The Iraqi Government maintain, probably with truth, that Lady Surma is inciting more Assyrians to emigrate, and also—and here I disagreed for want of evidence—that continuous presence of certain Assyrian leaders in Mosul will certainly lead to bloodshed. I pointed out that arrest of leaders, quite apart from unfortunate impression abroad, would much more probably lead to bloodshed, but the Ministers do not agree, and imply that if His Majesty's Government insist on protecting these people His Majesty's Government will be responsible for the consequences.

As Iraqi Government are hoping to dump Assyrians on to the French we did not seriously tackle the question of their return, and they now await reply to my immediately following telegram.

[E 4357/7/93]

No. 101.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 209.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, August 3, 1933.

MY telegram No. 208.

"Iraqi Government, with concurrence of Adviser to the Interior, are of the opinion that for avoidance of bloodshed, the maintenance of order, and successful carrying out of settlement scheme, following measures should be adopted:—

"1. Keep the Mar Shimun in Bagdad.

"2. As Mosul authorities, including Administrative Inspector, are pressing for deportation of about fourteen pro-Mar Shimun agitators who are inciting Assyrians to further emigration, about four at first to be removed from Mosul.



"3. Send Nuri to Syria to negotiate with the French (a) settlement in Syria of emigrating Assyrians, (b) disarm remainder outstanding.

"His Majesty King Feisal has taken opinion of Iraqi Government as above. In view of British Government's previous advice in favour of release of Mar Shimun, His Majesty desires to know, in the event of Iraqi Government taking action contrary to their own judgment as expressed above, but in compliance with advice of British Government, and trouble and bloodshed ensuing, what will be the attitude of His Majesty's Government? In other words, will His Majesty's Government see Iraqi Government through all difficulties caused by following the advice of His Majesty's Government? Iraqi Government have requested an immediate reply."

[E 4252/7/93]

No. 102.

*Sir R. Vansittart to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Bagdad).*

(No. 153.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 3, 1933.

MY telegram No. 150 of 1st August: Assyrian crisis.

If no satisfactory agreement can be reached between Iraqi Government and Syrian authorities for settlement of emigrant Assyrians in Syria, together with their wives and children, and if King Feisal decides to restore unconditional freedom of movement to the Mar Shimun, I realise that it will be necessary for the Iraqi Government to save their face if they are to readmit emigrant Assyrian men without giving impression that they have yielded, as regards release of Mar Shimun, to a successful demonstration.

It occurs to me, therefore, that, now that Assyrians have, in fact, been disarmed by French, solution might be found if they were to be allowed to return unarmed on the clear understanding that, provided they take oath of allegiance to King Feisal and conduct themselves satisfactorily meanwhile, their arms will be returned to them by a fixed date in the autumn. This would be a two or three months' punishment and would save the Iraqi face. It would mean that Iraqi Government would in principle not have departed from the policy, to which they are committed, of not disarming any particular section of the population until disarmament can be generally applied.

While fact that even this comparatively small proportion of the Assyrians remained unarmed during next few months would of course involve certain risks, since defenceless people are always a temptation to armed and lawless neighbours, dangerous period would be reduced to a minimum, during which Iraqi Government, particularly if they gave guarantee suggested in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 150 of 1st August, would no doubt be able to take special precautions for ensuring their safety.

While continuing to emphasise to Iraqi Government fatal reaction which any attack by their armed neighbours on unarmed Assyrians would produce in this country, you may, unless you see objection, suggest above solution to King Feisal for his consideration.

[E 4346/7/93]

No. 103.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 478.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of his letter of the 25th July to the Prime Minister, Bagdad, and of the Prime Minister's reply of the 26th July, respecting the Assyrian settlement in Iraq.

*Bagdad, July 26, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 103.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to the Prime Minister, Bagdad.*

My dear Prime Minister,

*July 25, 1933.*

I AM now in a position to furnish your Excellency with the first instalment of the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, which you requested at our interview on the 22nd July.

My Government hold most strongly that any attempt to disarm the Assyrians by force, whether they be in Iraqi territory or on the way back from Syria, would be a fatal mistake and would inevitably lead to bloodshed, the consequences of which would be far-reaching and disastrous, not only for the internal security and stability of Iraq, but also for her good name in Great Britain and in the world in general, and would undo the good work of progress and national development which has been so successfully accomplished during the last few years.

His Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, too strongly urge upon the Iraqi Government the essential necessity that the strictest instructions be issued to the police and to the troops that in no circumstances are they to attempt to disarm by force the Assyrians whenever and wherever they may meet them, even those Assyrians who may decide to return from Syria to Iraq.

In conclusion, I desire to convey to your Excellency in the clearest possible manner the message from my Government that in no circumstances should any attempt be made to disarm Assyrians against their will.

Yours sincerely,

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 103.

*Prime Minister, Bagdad, to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Dear Mr. Forbes,

*Bagdad, July 26, 1933.*

I HAVE received your letter of the 25th July, 1933, concerning the Assyrians who left Iraq recently and entered into Syrian territory, and would like to point out that the Iraqi Government, as you know, has fulfilled by all possible means its undertakings to the League of Nations in respect of the settlement of the Assyrians and has also given them every assistance in its power to ensure their welfare and good settlement and that the Assyrians themselves had expressed their agreement to the Government's settlement policy laid down in accordance with the League's decision. This agreement was exposed in the presence of the settlement expert himself.

In spite of all this, an important part of the pro-Mar Shimun Assyrians have left Iraq by their own will and crossed the Iraqi-Syrian frontier armed, without sanction from the Government.

In view of this, the Government does not see any justification to admit them into Iraq again, especially when they are regarded as offenders under the Passports Law. If, however, they come to reason and want to return to Iraq, the Government cannot admit them with their arms. The necessary measures in this respect have been taken by the Government for the enforcement of its policy.

The Assyrians in question will not be disarmed by force unless Government forces are compelled to use it, i.e., if the Assyrians return to Iraq with their arms despite Government authorities' order to them to leave their arms; the Government feels strongly that it is only carrying out its duty in this matter.

In any case, it is very difficult for the Government to stand with a tied-up hand opposite these people, who did not appreciate Government's sympathy and did not take its wishes and laws into any account. For all this, the Government is unable to change its policy, a policy which it was only compelled by these Assyrians themselves to adopt in the interests of the country.

Yours sincerely,

RESHID ALI.



[E 4347/7/93]

No. 104.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 482.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 27, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 462 of the 19th July, I have the honour to transmit herewith an interesting report by the Acting Adviser to the Interior on the Assyrian exodus up to and including the 25th July.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent by air mail, the 27th July. Original by bag.

I have, &amp;c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure in No. 104.

*Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(P.S. No. 571.)

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Bagdad, July 25, 1933.*

REFERENCE correspondence ending with my P.S. No. 557 of the 15th July, 1933.

1. You will remember that on the 11th July, at the second meeting in Mosul, the leaders of the Mar Shimun party had given the impression that the explanations given them had carried a certain degree of conviction; they undertook to be obedient as long as they were in Iraq, but intimated that they would wish to consult Mar Shimun as to whether they should stay or leave (Stafford's S/236 of the 11th July, 1933, paragraph 5). Yaku and Luko then promised to come down to Bagdad and endeavour to persuade Mar Shimun to sign the Cornwallis draft; the wilder spirits were reported to be still talking of leaving Iraq.

2. Yaku and Luko were supposed to have left Mosul for Bagdad on Friday, the 14th July, but, as you know, never turned up. It now transpires that they went across to Syria and interviewed the French Special Service Officer at Aindivar, the administrative headquarters of the Bec de Canard; the interview took place, one may suppose, on or about the 16th July. In the meantime messages had evidently been sent to Mar Shimun, for on the 15th or 16th July he called on the French Chargé d'Affaires to sound him regarding a move to Syria and employment in the French military units. From M. Lépiessier's account of the interview, I gather that, while he disclaimed, on the part of the French Government, any desire to get involved in the political or settlement issue, he was not entirely categorical in turning down the desire to enlist, as he was unaware of the policy of the military. From other accounts it seems clear that the French officers at Aindivar did not, when seeing Yaku and Luko, stifle all hopes of enlistment. It is now alleged that this was not Yaku's first visit to Syria.

3. Since both Mar Shimun and Yaku are reported to have referred to Colonel Stafford's remarks on the 10th July about military service in Syria, I attach, for convenience, the relevant passage from his statement.\* It is clear that the possibility was only mentioned to be dismissed as impracticable, and the references to it as an encouragement to them to decide on emigration are quite disingenuous.

4. Both Yaku and Mar Shimun evidently sent encouraging messages back to Mosul regarding the results of their interviews with the French authorities. On the 20th July it was reported in Mosul that Yaku and Luko had gone to Syria and that villagers of the Dohuk area were being encouraged to emigrate from Iraq. The same evening concentrations of armed Assyrians were reported near the group of villages north-west of Dohuk. On Friday, the 21st, Major Sargon, Inspecting Officer of Police, visited a number of these villages and confirmed that they were entirely empty of the able-bodied men, who had gone off to the hills with their arms, ammunition and mules; the women and children remained, and were in some places markedly truculent. At each village the reason for the exodus was said to be the intention of the Government to take the arms of the Assyrians.

(\*) Not printed.

At the Mosul meeting this alleged intention had been categorically denied, and the constant repetition of the allegation indicates intensive propaganda; Mar Shimun had made the same allegation to M. Lépiessier. This was the argument used to bring out the rank and file by the leaders, whose motives, as I shall show in a following letter, were very different.

5. On Friday morning there was a belief that the movement to the hills was preparatory not to an exodus to Syria, but to the presentation of certain demands in support of the familiar ambitions of Mar Shimun. But the arrival of the first party of 150 armed men at Faishkhabur, followed by, it was reported, another thousand that night and the next day, showed that the earlier rumours had been well-founded. Smaller parties crossed on Sunday, the 24th.

6. On Saturday, the 23rd, the French Chargé d'Affaires protested to the Iraqi Government against this armed incursion. The Iraqi Government, on its side, called upon the Syrian authorities to disarm and remove to a distance the recalcitrant Assyrians who had crossed the boundary without Iraqi permission, as required by articles 5 and 6 of the "Accord provisoire." The French Chargé d'Affaires was also informed that the Assyrians who had crossed would not be allowed back except on condition of being disarmed.

7. On the 22nd July additional police reached the area as follows:—

Left bank—				Men.
Faishkhabur	...	...	...	107
Shailki	...	...	...	70
Right bank—				
Tall Abu Dhahir	...	...	...	50
Tall Uglu	...	...	...	30

On the 24th and 25th July the Iraqi army column, comprising four battalions of infantry, motor machine-gun company, one mountain battery and one squadron of cavalry, arrived in the area east of the Tigris and took up positions with orders to prevent any recrossing by the Assyrians. All reports, however, seem to indicate that there are as yet no practicable fords; all parties that crossed the river used ferries.

8. On the morning of the 25th July a party, stated to be 100, with some Ashutis, under another ex-levy officer named Yaku, arrived at Faishkhabur and demanded to cross. The Minister was in a dilemma. On the one hand, the French had demanded that the Assyrians should be prevented from crossing, and the troops were now on the spot; on the other hand, forcible prevention might precipitate fighting. He eventually issued instructions that an attempt was to be made to persuade them to go back; if they persisted they were to be allowed to cross. But before these instructions had arrived the Assyrians, alarmed by the presence of troops and the delay, broke away. One party of, it is said, forty encountered a military patrol; sixteen were rounded up; the remainder scattered. I happened to be with the Minister when the news was received, and orders were issued that they should be released with their arms and allowed to cross. A letter was also written to the French Chargé d'Affaires reminding him of the request to remove the refugees from the vicinity of the frontier, and explaining the impossibility of preventing new arrivals from crossing, without risk of a serious engagement, as long as the first batch remained in position on the right bank.

9. M. Lépiessier, who was dining with me on the evening of the 25th July, informed me that his information gave the number of Assyrians who had crossed as 700, considerably less than the Iraqi figure. He also informed me that Mar Shimun was to see him on the 26th July.

10. In this letter I have confined myself to a narrative of events up to the evening of the 25th July. In another letter I will try to put down some ideas and conclusions.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. EDMONDS.



[E 4357/7/93]

No. 105.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Bagdad).*

(No. 154.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 4, 1933.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 208 and 209 of 3rd August: Assyrian crisis.

Attitude of King Feisal and Nuri Pasha towards proposed release of Mar Shimun is in complete contradiction with that which they adopted while in Europe, and in still more striking contradiction to statements made by Nuri Pasha at Foreign Office on 28th July. This is of course surprising and disappointing. Proposal to arrest and deport Lady Surma seems open to all objections which originally applied to detention of Mar Shimun.

The advice given to Iraqi Government by His Majesty's Government is that which the latter believe to be in the best interests of the former. If Iraqi Government choose to disregard it, and the advice is justified by the sequel, it is they who will have to face the consequences, and not His Majesty's Government who will assume responsibility for any consequence of its adoption. The Iraqi Government must therefore consider and decide for themselves in the light of the foregoing.

Please inform King Feisal accordingly.

What is the precise meaning of (b) in your paragraph 3? I take it for granted that this cannot imply an intention of disarming the Assyrians who have remained in Iraq.

As to 3 (a), I agree of course that this is now the best course to pursue, and an agreement with the French on the subject of settlement would provide an unobjectionable solution. But it seems at present from Beirut telegram No. 6 of 3rd August to you (repeated as No. 9 to Foreign Office) that the French may be contemplating restoration of arms to any returning Assyrians. If the negotiations for settlement in Syria were to fail and French to proceed on these lines there might, in view of proclaimed Iraqi intention to disarm the Assyrians, be a dangerous clash. The only possible compromise on this point in such an eventuality, which I trust will not arise, is that suggested in my telegram No. 153 of 3rd August, coupled, of course, with a guarantee of safety in the short intervening period by King Feisal and Iraqi Government.

[E 4375/7/93]

No. 106.

*Air Ministry to Foreign Office.—(Received August 5.)*

(Secret.)

THE Secretary, Air Ministry, presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, and, with reference to Air Ministry communication dated the 29th June, begs to transmit, for the information of Secretary Sir John Simon, two copies of a further report by the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, on events in connexion with the Assyrian situation during the period the 26th May to the 28th June, 1933.

*Air Ministry, August 4, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 106.

*Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, to Air Ministry.*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Air Headquarters, Iraq Command, Hinaidi,  
June 29, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my letter dated the 26th May, 1933, and to forward herewith a report dealing with events in connexion with the Assyrian situation between the 26th May and the 28th June, 1933.

I have, &c.

C. S. BURNETT,  
*Air Vice-Marshal.*

*Report on Events in connexion with Assyrian Situation between May 26 and June 28, 1933, by Air Vice-Marshal C. S. Burnett, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command.*

(Secret.)

*Summary of Assyrian Political Situation prior to May 26, 1933.*

THE events between November 1932 and May 1933, which were regarded as the second phase of the Assyrian Nationalist movement, were described in my report dated the 26th May, 1933.

2. The events subsequent to the 26th May, 1933, may be regarded as the introduction to the third phase of the Assyrian Nationalist movement. At the opening of this phase, the situation was briefly as follows:—

3. The Iraqi Government was pursuing a policy designed to break up tribal organisations among the minorities, and local Government officials were attaching more importance to staging intrigues than to getting down to the main problem of settlement.

4. Mar Shimun had incurred the grave suspicion of the Government through his policy of non-co-operation. He was unwilling to renounce the temporal authority enjoyed by the Assyrian Patriarchs for centuries, and was jealous of the authority and resented the recognition given by the Government to Malik Khoshaba, who had been appointed "Malik" and Land Settlement Official by the Mutessarif of Mosul.

5. The Assyrians in general, outside the levies, were divided in allegiance, some looking to Mar Shimun, and others to the Government party.

*Political Negotiations with Mar Shimun subsequent to May 26, 1933.*

6. By the 26th May, 1933, it had become definitely established that not only would Mar Shimun give no support to any Government settlement scheme, but that he would use every means in his power to upset such schemes in order to be in a position to submit a complaint to the League that Iraq had failed to make good her promises.

7. Mar Shimun's propaganda, backed up by tours made by Yacon, son of Malik Ismail, not only had an adverse effect on the Government scheme, but produced a distinct feeling of unrest among the majority of settled Assyrians.

8. It was also definitely established that Mar Shimun would leave no stone unturned to force the Iraqi Government to submit to him full temporal and spiritual power.

9. It now became necessary for the Government to call a halt to the activities of Mar Shimun, and he was invited to visit Bagdad.

10. On the 31st May, 1933, Mar Shimun attended the Ministry of Interior, Bagdad. The attitude of the Government towards his personal position was explained verbally to him. A memorandum dated the 28th May was read to him. Briefly, the Government was prepared to recognise him officially as spiritual head of the Assyrian community, but could not agree to delegate to him any temporal (administrative) authority. The Government was also prepared to create a source of income to assist him to maintain his spiritual dignity. In return, Mar Shimun had to give a written assurance that he would do nothing to make more difficult the task of the Government and of Major Thomson, the settlement expert, who arrived in Mosul on the 3rd June. He had further to give a solemn promise in all ways and at all times to act as a loyal subject of His Majesty King Feisal.

11. On the 31st May Mar Shimun wrote a letter to the King complaining of his treatment by the Minister of the Interior, Hikmet Beg, and of the attitude towards the Assyrians of the Mosul authorities. He also brought to His Majesty's notice the unfavourable attitude of the Government towards him personally.

12. Mar Shimun's reply to the Government memorandum, outlined in paragraph 10 above, was considered so unsatisfactory by the Minister of the Interior, that he was in favour of dealing with Mar Shimun under the Tribal, Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, or of bringing him before a magistrate.

13. The British adviser to the Ministry of the Interior managed to persuade the Minister to delay this action, but after further interviews and exchange of letters the patience of the Minister of Interior became exhausted, and only the



direct intervention of the Acting British Ambassador prevented the arrest of Mar Shimun.

14. As the British Embassy had prevented Mar Shimun from being sent to the courts, the Minister of the Interior considered that he had no alternative but to resign.

15. The Cabinet had in the meantime met and decided that Hikmet Beg's resignation should stand over till after the State visit to London, when the whole Cabinet would place their resignations in the hands of the King, who would be asked to return to Iraq forthwith.

16. On the 19th June the Regent sent for the Acting British Ambassador, and asked for his opinion on the situation which had arisen as the result of his intervention. The British Ambassador advised a policy of caution, and agreed to see Mar Shimun and try to persuade him to change his attitude.

17. In the meantime the Minister of the Interior had issued instructions for the arrest of Mar Shimun.

18. The Acting Ambassador immediately went to the Prime Minister and persuaded him to keep hands off Mar Shimun, as repercussions would certainly arise in the Mosul Vilayet.

19. In view of this interview, the Cabinet decided to suspend action at present, and Mar Shimun was warned to stay in Bagdad. He very reluctantly agreed, saying that his people were becoming restive at his continued absence from Mosul.

20. It is doubtful whether the present Iraqi Government or Mar Shimun really want to reach an agreement, the Iraqis for religious, racial and economic reasons, Mar Shimun because he sees that he is losing authority, and would in any case figure as a martyr if defeated.

*Summary of Events in the Amadia and Dohuk Districts from May 22 to June 28.*

21. As mentioned in paragraph 7 above, Yacou, son of Malik Ismail, chief of the Upper Tiari, an ex-levy officer, had attracted the attention of the local Government authorities, and he was called to Dohuk in connexion with his alleged pro-Mar Shimun activities in the Amadia and Dohuk districts.

22. He arrived at Dohuk on the 22nd May in reply to this summons, attended by a following of fifteen to thirty armed men, but was unable to see the Kaïmakam, who was ill. On the 12th June he appeared in Dohuk town with about twenty-five armed followers, and asked for an interview with Major Thomson and the Administrative Inspector, who were in Dohuk at the time. The request was refused. In addition to these two acts, Yacou Ismail continued to behave and express himself in a manner which could no longer be ignored by the Administration. He was therefore summoned to attend Liwa Headquarters, in order to explain his recent actions, and to give assurances of good behaviour in the future. He reported to the Kaïmakam of Dohuk on the 13th June, and temporised about coming in to Mosul.

23. On the 19th June Yacou, with about 200 armed followers, appeared on the road between Dohuk and Amadia, and rumour stated that he intended to ambush Malik Khoshaba. In view of this forty extra police were drafted to Dohuk.

24. I visited Mosul on the 23rd June, and saw the Administrative Inspector, Colonel Stafford, who said that Yacou Ismail had refused to come in as requested. Major Sargon, the police adviser, and others, had visited this ex-levy officer, but without result. He stated that he was prepared to come in provided the Iraqi Government withdrew the extra police sent to the Dohuk area, that Government officials treated the Assyrian community in a proper manner, and that the Government concluded an agreement with Mar Shimun on the Assyrian question.

25. I was informed that the Government could not possibly agree to these terms, and a notification was to be sent in the near future that, unless he came in to Government within twenty-four to forty-eight hours, he would be treated as a rebel, and action would be taken against him.

26. Colonel Stafford's proposal was to use police for the actual operation backed up by a large force of the Iraqi army, in order to overawe Yacou and his followers, and thereby prevent serious casualties, which would involve hardship to the followers of Yacou, who are mostly ignorant men.

27. On the 25th June the 8th battalion, Iraqi army, left Mosul for Dohuk by motor transport.

*Action taken to prevent Iraq Levies from becoming involved.*

28. Whilst in Mosul I interviewed David d'Mar Shimun, and impressed upon him the importance of trying to keep the peace and using any influence he had to that end. He appeared to me to be rather afraid of getting mixed up in this business, which might involve his family and Mar Shimun.

29. I also interviewed his sister, Lady Surma. She gave me to understand that Yacou's difficulties were the direct outcome of conspiracy by the Government, and although she hoped for peace, nothing could be done to prevent trouble unless the Government gave in to Yacou's demands, which were, in her estimation, both sensible and just.

*Summary of Events in Bagdad from June 25 to June 28.*

30. I returned to Bagdad on the 25th June, and saw Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes of the Embassy, and Major Edmonds of the Ministry of Interior. I gave them the general information that I had heard in Mosul, and suggested that if troops were to be used it would be disastrous to employ Bekr Sidki in command, as it is well known that he has strong anti-Assyrian feeling, and his action last month in Mosul, where he was entirely responsible for the very high tension between the Assyrians and the Iraqi army, nearly led to a serious situation. In connexion with this it is a point of interest to note that, although His Majesty King Feisal gave an undertaking to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes that Bekr Sidki and the Mutessarif, Mosul, would be removed from there owing to the inefficient way they had handled the Assyrian crisis in May, they are, in fact, both still in Mosul. I also felt that, if it could be avoided, the Iraqi army should not be employed against Yacou and his followers. I did not think they would discriminate sufficiently between the followers of Yacou, who were following him against the Government, and the local Assyrian inhabitants, who might be sitting on the fence or even be against Yacou's policy. Any hasty or unwise action on the part of the Iraqi army might lead to a combined action by numerous sections of the Assyrians against the Government.

31. I also suggested that Colonel Stafford himself should interview Yacou, so that there could be no question but that Yacou understood his position *vis-à-vis* the Government and the action necessary for him to take to avert trouble.

32. I informed the meeting that I proposed to recall all levies from leave in the Mosul Vilayet, as I did not wish them to be implicated in any way with this dispute.

33. It was then suggested that Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes should interview Mar Shimun again, and try to get him to prevail upon Yacou to come in to Government as requested. This interview failed. Mar Shimun refused unless the Government gave him an order in writing to act for them, and withdrew their request to him to remain in Bagdad for the present.

*Action taken with regard to Levies.*

34. On the 26th June orders were issued to O.C., Levies, that all men on leave in the Mosul Vilayet were to report to Mosul forthwith. Those for Hinaidi would be transported by air in due course. In the event of the Government taking action against Yacou, O.C., Companies, were to explain to the officers and men the reason for Government action, and to point out that it was not directed against the Assyrians, but against the individual Yacou for definitely disobeying the Government's demands. In no way were the Assyrians as a whole implicated, and the levies must remain outside this dispute under the severest penalties.

35. On receipt of a request from the Ministry of Interior, the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, Colonel Stafford, went out to interview Yacou, who finally came in with him on the evening of the 26th June. In view of this, I rescinded, on the morning of the 27th June, orders recalling levies on leave in the Mosul Vilayet.

*Situation on June 28.*

36. Though the appearance of Yacou before the Administration may be regarded as having put matters on the road to a satisfactory conclusion, the incident cannot yet be regarded as closed. Yacou may adopt a high-handed



attitude, and it is reported that his followers, under the control of his second-in-command, ex-Rab Emma Shmuel Tiya, are still at large in the hills. In addition to this, Mar Shimun's house in Mosul are reported to be broadcasting the fact that the followers of Yacou expect him back in the Dohuk Qadha in two days, failing which they will regard the matter as being at the stage where it was prior to Yacou's visit to Liwa Headquarters.

37. With regard to the levies, I am satisfied that, although the majority are keen supporters of Mar Shimun, they will abide by the spirit of their oath of allegiance, and I do not anticipate any difficulty from them unless the situation seriously deteriorates. At the present moment I consider it unwise to take any action beyond the warnings and assurances I have already given them in order to allay any anxiety or doubt that may exist in their minds. The air is full of rumours and counter-rumours, and it is very difficult to know exactly what is taking place in the minds of the Assyrians, whether levies or civilians.

38. Mar Shimun still remains in Bagdad at the express wish of the Iraqi Government. I understand that His Majesty King Feisal has instructed the Government by cable not to detain Mar Shimun, but the Government have not acted on these instructions because they state that the King was not aware of the situation in the north when he sent them, and they feel, with some justification, that Mar Shimun's presence in Mosul or Amadia at the moment would only aggravate the situation, and might lead others to follow Yacou Ismail's example.

39. It is probable that, if the administrative authorities are satisfied with Yacou's explanation and he gives assurances with regard to his future behaviour, the Government may find it possible to allow Mar Shimun to return to Mosul, but it would be unwise to attempt any forecast of the situation at the moment.

C. S. BURNETT.

*Air Headquarters, Iraq Command, Hinaidi,  
June 29, 1933.*

[E 4371/7/93]

No. 107.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).*

(No. 147. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 5, 1933.*

YOU will have seen from recent telegraphic correspondence that His Majesty's Government strongly favour proposal that emigrant Assyrians should be settled in Syria and rejoined there by their women and children. As these Assyrians appear all to be personal followers of the Mar Shimun, whose personal relations with the Iraqi Government are likely to be difficult for some considerable time, permanent emigration of this section of the Assyrians from Iraq would greatly ease problem of dealing with the remainder. Moreover, any other solution would necessarily involve serious difficulties of various kinds.

2. Position of His Majesty's Government, however, is most delicate, as they cannot assume any responsibility in connexion with policy or actions of Iraqi Government, and no contribution towards expenditure involved could be made from British funds.

3. Moreover, practical difficulties of settlement in Syria may prove considerable, since, apart from difficulty of arranging for transfer of women and children, it seems somewhat doubtful whether it will be possible to find in Syria high-lying land for settlement of the type which the Assyrians have hitherto always insisted on.

4. Further, there seems to be some reason to believe that French, in pursuance of their policy of acting as protectors of Christian communities in the Middle East and also of making most of diversity of elements in population of Syria, may, for their own reasons, be prepared to welcome Assyrians as permanent settlers in French mandated territory. This, however, is for your own very confidential information only.

5. In these circumstances, although His Majesty's Government are anxious to do whatever may be possible to facilitate an agreement between Iraqi Government and French authorities in Syria providing for settlement in Syria of emigrant Assyrians and their women and children, I leave it to your judgment

whether or not to press French Government further in the matter. In view of Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's strongly expressed opinion that instructions from Paris will be required if any satisfactory agreement is to be reached locally, you may, if you think it desirable, and if you are satisfied that your further intervention would not do more harm than good, discuss whole question informally with French Government and do what you can to encourage them to give necessary instructions to local authorities to conclude agreement on lines proposed.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 155, and Beirut, No. 6.)

[E 4408/7/93]

No. 108.

*Lord Tyrrell to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received August 7.)*

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Paris, August 7, 1933.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 147 and 157.

I saw M. Léger this morning with regard to Assyrian incursion into Syria. Impression I gathered was that the French authorities had been wholly unprepared for this incursion, and though determined to disarm incursionists they had not on the spot sufficient physical force to carry out their intention. The result has been that a certain number of Assyrians broke away for fear of being disarmed, and this led to the conflict which has taken place.

M. Léger told me that instructions would be sent out to-day to insist upon the disarming and internment of any further Assyrians, but reproach he made to Iraq Government was that they had not warned the French authorities that Assyrians were rebels. Local authorities assumed when incursion took place that these were nomadic tribes who, dissatisfied with conditions of life in Iraq, were seeking new settlements in Syria. On being informed by Nuri Pasha that Assyrians were considered rebels, the French Government are now in a position to treat them as such, and will do so.

M. Léger said that Nuri Pasha was proposing that Syrian authorities should allow Assyrians to settle in Syria, to which Iraq Government had no objection, of which they were prepared to bear the financial burden. M. Léger said that, in principle, his Government might have no objection to such a proposal, subject to financial arrangements being satisfactory. The French authorities would also have to be satisfied that any such settlement would not have a bad effect on the native population of their own.

I made the position of His Majesty's Government in this matter perfectly clear as described to me in your telegram under reply.

M. Léger reiterated to me that there could be no question of Assyrians being allowed to return until a settlement had been arrived at with Iraq Government as to the condition of their repatriation.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Beirut.)

[E 4475/7/93]

No. 109.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 484.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 27, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 478 of the 26th July, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for purposes of record, a letter from the Air Officer Commanding setting forth his views on the Assyrian situation on the 25th July.

2. This letter was written previous to his visit to Mosul for the purpose of supplying a considered reply to question "A" in your telegram No. 137 of the 24th July, the substance of which is being sent to you by telegraph to-day.

I have, &c.

GEORGE OGILVIE-FORBES.



Enclosure in No. 109.

*Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command, to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(Secret.)

My dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Air Headquarters, Iraq Command,  
Hinaidi, July 25, 1933.*

WITH reference to my conversation with you on the 24th July, I feel that it is necessary that I should put on paper my views concerning the present Assyrian situation, in order that my attitude shall be clearly demonstrated.

The situation on the 25th July, as far as my information goes, is that there are some 1,300 armed Assyrians of the pro-Mar Shimun party who have, without the consent of the Iraqi Government or the knowledge of the French, crossed into Syria for the purpose of finding settlement in that country. Another party, about 200 strong, are concentrated in the neighbourhood of Feish Khabur with the intention of joining the main party in Syria.

No hostile action has been taken as yet by these armed Assyrians while passing from their villages in Iraq across into Syria, and it would be inconsistent with normal tribal precedence that they should leave their arms behind them when proceeding to take up their habitat in another country. From the information I have received from you and from General Headlam, I understand that it is the intention of the Iraqi Government to prevent the return of these Assyrians, or, alternatively, if allowed to return, to disarm them. To this end the Iraqi army troops have been concentrated in the neighbourhood of Feish Khabur and small armed parties distributed along the left bank of the Tigris with orders to disarm any Assyrians attempting to return to Iraq. I feel that any attempt to disarm them without any definite show of hostility on the Assyrian's part will lead to bloodshed and, perhaps, to a general conflagration, which would, in my opinion, be most difficult for the present Iraqi army to handle, and might lead to a general disorganisation of the whole of the northern frontier and unsettlement in other parts of Iraq.

It is only just within the last few weeks that the Kurdish banditry, which had assumed somewhat serious proportions in the Barzan area, was brought to a quiescent stage by the Government allowing those who had been in arms against them to retain them with the grant of a full pardon. I consider that any attempt to take more drastic action with the Assyrians than was meted out to the Barzanis will lead to serious criticism, which will be very difficult to justify.

I have been pressed on several occasions to withdraw the company of Assyrian levies, eighty-eight in number, who are guarding the station at Mosul, and to substitute for them Kurdish or Arab levies now situated in Hinaidi. Since I assumed command in Iraq the levies have been completely reorganised, and every Assyrian officer and man has given a guarantee not to concern himself with politics. They were encouraged to do this by the Mar Shimun, and up to now I have been given no proof that they have not abided by their oath. I made it clear that the alternative to taking the oath was the disbandment of all the Assyrians in the levies, and I have no reason to believe that they did not quite understand that any breaking of their oath would entail dismissal. Besides the men actually enlisted in the levies, it must be realised that there are approximately 3,000 other Assyrians, men, women and children, depending for their living on the earning of their relations who are serving, and this, you must appreciate, is a very strong deterrent to those men to commit any active irregularity. I am informed that the taking of this oath has in a large measure been a comfort to these Assyrians, because it has allowed them to use it as an excuse for not becoming involved in political discussions. I consider that it would be most inadvisable to remove the Assyrians from Mosul at this juncture for the following reasons:—

- (a) I feel that their removal would at once give them the impression that they were not being trusted, with the consequent and natural incentive to become untrustworthy.
- (b) I consider that the large number of Assyrian dependents situated in Mosul would become very anxious about their future existence, which in itself would lead to trouble.

The ultimate result of removing the Assyrians from Mosul in the face of the above reasons for not doing so would lead to trouble in the remainder of the

Assyrian companies, which might entail the total abandonment of the employment of Assyrians in the levies and would place on the Iraqi Government the extra responsibility of handling 700 trained Assyrians and settling their 3,000 dependants. I think there is little likelihood of the Assyrians at Mosul breaking their oath, or at any rate without warning, but I consider that it is a risk that should be accepted. It was always my intention to effect changes in the company at Mosul as a matter of routine with the other companies at Hinaidi, and after reasonable warning I do not anticipate there will be any trouble in doing this. But I do think, however, that an attempt suddenly to evacuate the company that is there now would precipitate what we are trying to avoid.

My advice for handling the situation from a military point of view is as follows: To ignore as far as possible the movement of the Assyrians, provided they do no hostile act against the Government. If this action is taken, there are two situations which may arise, (i) that the French may approve of the Assyrians remaining in Syria, in which case they cease to be a burden for Iraq and the problem solves itself, and (ii) that the French do not permit them remaining in Syria, in which case they will want to return to Iraq. No action should be taken to prevent their return, and if unmolested they will undoubtedly filter back to their villages, realising that they have been made to look ridiculous and have again been hoodwinked by their leaders. It will further have been brought home to them that their only chance of settlement is in Iraq and that the sooner they get down to it the better. This will materially assist the labours of Major Thomson, who is engaged under the direction of the League in advising on their settlement.

I consider that it is most important at this juncture that a responsible British officer should be sent up to the Feish Khabur area to keep in the closest touch with the situation in order to keep the inspector-general reliably informed of current events. He will undoubtedly have a steadying influence on both Iraqis and Assyrians.

I recommend that the Iraqi and French Governments should come to some arrangement whereby the French terms to these emigrants, either allowing them to remain in Syria or compelling them to move, should be made known to the Iraqi Government before the Assyrians themselves are told.

If the Iraqi Government can compel its servants to deal with the situation as I have detailed above, there is no doubt that its reputation will be enhanced at Geneva by the long-suffering and conciliatory attitude it will have adopted under certain provocation. I fear, however, that all its efforts may come to nought if the high command in the northern area remains with Bekr Sidki. He is a well-known anti-Assyrian. He has already shown his inability to handle a situation and is, in my opinion, a most grave danger to the peace of that area. I have already protested against his retention at Mosul and have been assured of his removal, without result.

I consider therefore that the Iraqi Government should be very definitely warned that, in my opinion, any such drastic action, such as attempting to disarm the Assyrians without any definite hostility on their part, may lead to such far-reaching consequences that the lives of the British subjects may be endangered. It is for you to say how far the political effect of such a situation would affect His Britannic Majesty's Government's policy or Iraq's standing with the League.

Please excuse this very hurried letter, owing to the urgency of the matter.

Yours sincerely,

C. S. BURNETT.

[E 4476/209/93]

No. 110.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 485.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 27, 1933.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 362 of the 7th June last, I have the honour to transmit herewith an official copy, in English, of the budget estimates of the Iraqi Government for the current financial year as finally approved by



Parliament.<sup>(1)</sup> It has not been possible to obtain more than three copies in all of this publication, and I regret that I am accordingly unable to forward to you more than a single copy.

2. The figures of revenue and expenditure for the year are as follows:—

	I.D.
Revenue ... ..	3,765,000
Expenditure ... ..	3,764,904
Surplus ... ..	96

A list of the alterations which have been effected in the estimates is attached.<sup>(1)</sup> No alteration, except those necessitated by the change in the figures, has been made in the draft Budget Law.

3. The estimated receipts from customs import duties have been increased by 66,000 I.D., presumably in anticipation of a further improvement in trade. The improvement in the outlook is timely, as the additional revenue is required in compensation for a reduction in the estimated receipts from export duty and liquor excise, owing to the practical abolition of the former, and a considerable reduction in the rates of excise tax on locally manufactured liquor. Full information regarding these two measures have already been sent to the Department of Overseas Trade (Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. A. 13 of the 4th May and my despatch No. A. 18 of the 6th June).

4. The additional expenditure authorised, as shown in the list, has no special significance.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch, together with a copy of the printed estimates, to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 4482/7/93]

No. 111.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 79.)

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his despatch No. 5 to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Bagdad, of the 2nd August respecting the Assyrians entering Syria.

*Beirut, August 2, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 111.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Bagdad).*

(No. 5.)

Sir,

*Beirut, August 2, 1933.*

WITH reference to recent telegraphic correspondence relative to the malcontent Assyrians who have migrated into Syrian territory, I have the honour to point out that the Iraqi authorities would appear from your telegram No. 200 of 31st July to the Foreign Office to have misunderstood the position as it is viewed here. It is not the intention of the French authorities to make either conditions to the Assyrians or proposals to the Iraq Government. They regard the armed Assyrian immigrants who have descended upon them as most unwelcome guests, and wish to see the last of them as soon as possible. They do not want them to settle here whatever stories may have been spread among them that they would receive a warm welcome in Syria. M. Chauvel has told me that a certain Malik Kambar, a swindler who is well known to the police of various countries, was responsible for spreading the story, that he has been brought here and will probably be expelled. The French consider that it is for the Iraqi authorities, from whose territory the Assyrians have come, to take the earliest possible steps to relieve them of an incubus. They expect the Iraqi authorities to devise conditions upon which the Assyrians can return to Iraq, and to have

these conditions explained to one accepted by the emigrants. From your telegram No. 194 to Foreign Office it would appear that the Iraqi Government is hardly competent unaided to deal with the situation. While its delight in shifting, at least partially, the responsibility on to other shoulders is entirely natural and comprehensible, the French are quite disinclined to bear the responsibility for any length of time. Yesterday the Political Director of the French High Commission, with whom I was discussing the matter, intimated that if something did not happen soon it would probably be necessary to ask the League of Nations to intervene. M. Chauvel expressed dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Iraq Government on the question of supplies, and appeared to resent their apparent intention of casting the whole burden of feeding the Assyrians in difficult circumstances on the French authorities.

2. As regards the disarmament question, M. Chauvel said that my telegram No. 5 to you of the 28th July correctly recorded their intentions. They do not intend to expel the Assyrians by force, but on the other hand the presence of an armed and trained body of men on Syrian territory had confronted them with a difficult and delicate problem. It was their wish and intention, in which from your recent telegrams they seem to have succeeded, to minimise the risk by inducing the Assyrians voluntarily to surrender, as a temporary measure, their arms while on Syrian territory. What eventually will happen to these arms will depend on the settlement reached with the Assyrians by the Iraq Government, and, as already stated, it is hoped that this settlement will be reached at the earliest possible date.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 4478/685/93]

No. 112.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 496.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 3, 1933.*

ON receipt of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 146, I addressed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs a note, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose, conveying to his Excellency a sense of the concern with which His Majesty's Government view the campaign of slander and defamation which the Iraqi press is conducting against Great Britain, and enquiring what action the Iraqi Government propose to take in the matter.

2. While this note was in preparation I learned of the publication on the 30th July in the *Ahali*, a journal of socialistic sympathies, which possesses a wide circulation in Iraq, of an article containing allegations of such a gross and dangerous character in connexion with the present Assyrian crisis that I considered it essential to lodge an immediate and specific protest. I accordingly addressed a note to Rashid Ali Beg (a copy of which is also enclosed), requesting his Excellency to take steps to have a *démenti* inserted in that newspaper in as prominent a position as the offending article, failing which I suggested that there were grounds for its suspension. I also took the opportunity to inform his Excellency that he was about to receive a further note which you had instructed me to address to him on the subject of the anti-British attitude adopted by the Iraqi press in general and with increasing intensity during the last few weeks.

3. I learn from various sources in touch with local opinion that, largely as a result of the recent unlicensed campaign of slander and misrepresentation in the press, the view is generally held in Bagdad that His Majesty's Government have deliberately provoked the recent incidents in the north, and that the Royal Air Force have been in active touch with the Assyrian "rebels" throughout the whole period. As an example of the present state of mind of Iraqi officialdom, I may add that I am creditably informed that three-quarters of the budget and almost all the energies of the intelligence branch of the Iraqi army are being expended in shadowing the movements of the special service officers of the Royal Air Force.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.



Enclosure 1 in No. 112.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, August 1, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to draw your Excellency's attention to the increasingly hostile attitude which has characterised the Bagdad press during the last two months. No opportunity has been lost of misinterpreting the policy and actions of my country in the most offensive spirit and of imputing to His Majesty's Government the most discreditable motives. I regret that this applies without exception to all the political newspapers published in this capital.

2. It is unnecessary to cite specific examples of this attitude, as they are to be found in abundance by a perusal of the Arabic press at any time during the last few weeks, and it is impossible that they should have escaped your Excellency's notice. I wish, however, to draw particular attention to the scandalous allegations made recently in the *Ikha-al-Watani*, the *Istiqlal* and the *Ahali*, that Great Britain, the ally of Iraq, has of late deliberately fostered unrest and disaffection amongst the Assyrians and has fomented dissension between the Shiah and Sunni communities. These allegations have been reproduced in the press without any attempt by the Iraqi Government to put a stop to such a libel on their ally or to correct the most unfortunate impression which must follow from the uncontrolled circulation of untruths of this nature.

3. His Majesty's Government have learnt of the hostile tone adopted by the Iraqi press with great concern, and take a serious view of the situation, since they can only regard as unfriendly the attitude of the Iraqi Government in allowing such a campaign of slander and vilification to continue unchecked. The negative attitude of the Iraqi Government is all the more disappointing to His Majesty's Government in view of the cordial reception accorded to His Majesty King Feisal in the United Kingdom. It is in striking contrast to the sentiments expressed by His Majesty and his Ministers during the Royal visit.

4. I am instructed to enquire from your Excellency what action the Iraqi Government propose to take in order to prevent a continuation of these false and mischievous attacks upon a friendly and allied Government.

I avail, &amp;c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, August 1, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a translation of a leading article in the *Ahali* of the 30th July, which contains most offensive and unfounded allegations as to the connexion of Great Britain with the present unrest amongst the Assyrians.

2. I have no reason to believe that this translation contains any material inaccuracies. I accordingly look to your Excellency to take the necessary steps for the publication of a denial in as prominent position as the article in question. Failing which I would suggest that the Iraqi Government should consider whether this is not a case for the exercise of their suspensory powers under the Press Law.

3. I should add that, on instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I am about to address a further official note to the Iraqi Government conveying the grave concern with which my Government view the increasingly unfriendly tone of the Iraqi press.

I avail, &amp;c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 3 in No. 112.

*Extract from the Ahali of July 30, 1933.*

(Translation.)

## THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION AND THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION.

REPORTS from the north indicate that the English are in constant touch with the Tiari rebels in the frontier district of Wadi Sifan. This touch is not being maintained only through secret messengers and British army intelligence officers, but is also being insured by British military aircraft and armoured cars. It is possible that these military "means" are supplying the rebels with what is necessary for the continuance of rebellion and disobedience. If this report is true, as it appears to be, then Great Britain is adopting a disgraceful and ignominious attitude; while the Iraqi Government are in a most critical and serious position, not only in so far as regards the Tiari question in itself, . . . but also in view of the attitude of the English, which aggravates the situation. Should the [Iraqi] Government ignore this attitude and fail to consider the interference of the English in this affair to be contrary to international principles and to constitute an international incident, we would lose even our nominal and counterfeited independence, and we would be establishing a bad precedent for British interference in all our affairs.

Indeed, the action to be adopted by the Cabinet and the international attitude it will adopt will place the Iraqi Government on the parting of roads, either for the good or for the bad.

The Government should use all the strength they possess in the punishment of the rebels, and should consider the attitude adopted by the English in this connexion as definite interference in contravention of international principles. They should address a formal warning to the British Government through the usual diplomatic channels and should immediately refer the question to the League of Nations, using all possible diplomatic means with the League for the settlement of this and similar questions and the definition of our relations with this ally.

The present is a great opportunity open before our Government for a fundamental revision of the Tiari question. They should reconsider the question of their settlement as a rebel group constituting a menace to the safety of the State. This question should be reconsidered on the ground that the Government had committed a great mistake in consenting to the settlement of the Tiaris in the vicinity of the frontier at a time when they showed themselves disposed to be peaceful. But now that they have openly declared themselves hostile to the country which had afforded them a shelter, and have ungratefully rebelled against it, they should be disarmed and should be scattered in localities remote from the frontier. It would be high treason on the part of any Iraqi Government to allow this group of rebels to be settled in localities close to each other.

Turkey and Persia have, thanks to their loyal leaders and to the independence that they enjoy, got rid of these ignominious conditions. We do not agree that our country should alone remain a field for mischief-making and a toy in the hands of the foreigners.

Britain should be made to understand that the policy of "divide and rule," which she pursued in the past, is a policy of the past.

[E 4615/597/93]

No. 113.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 499.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 2, 1933.*

IN my despatch No. 404 of the 26th June last I forwarded a copy of a note to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the right of His Majesty's Government to prior consultation regarding proposed capital expenditure by the port of Basra.

2. I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a law passed by the Iraqi Legislature authorising expenditure on capital works from port



funds.<sup>(1)</sup> The works authorised in this law, which should have been referred to His Majesty's Embassy before the proposals were approved, involve expenditure of £15,500 from reserve funds. They represent desirable improvements and additions to the assets of the Port Directorate, whose liquid reserves are amply sufficient to finance the programme without difficulty, as a reference to paragraphs 5 and 6 of my despatch of the 4th July last (No. 424) will show.

3. The programme is that mentioned in paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned note to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to which no reply has yet been received.

4. In addition to the capital works mentioned above, the Port Directorate have been authorised, also by law, to grant to the Basra Municipality a sum of £15,000 as a loan, repayable, with interest at the rate of 2½ per cent., by equal annual instalments over a period of twenty years. The interest and capital of the loan are guaranteed by the Iraqi Government. The purpose of the loan is to enable the municipality to purchase and instal new electrical and distribution plant within municipal limits consequent upon the erection of the new Basra power house.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 4479/7/93]

No. 114.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 500.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 2, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 478 of the 26th July, as I have already reported at some length by telegraph the rapid succession of events in the present Assyrian crisis and the steps taken to meet them, I feel that it would be redundant to repeat a narrative the facts of which are already in your possession. In this despatch, therefore, I propose to fill some of the gaps which necessarily occur in the outline which I have transmitted to you by telegram. I also enclose copies of two letters which I have received from the Acting Adviser to the Interior in continuation of his letter enclosed in my despatch No. 482 of the 27th July.

2. The period from the 10th to the 21st of July was, indeed, one of peace and hope. Except for the continued refusal of the Iraqi Government to restore freedom of movement to the Mar Shimun, all indications pointed to good progress being made towards a solution of the Assyrian problem by consent. In Bagdad the Iraqi Government had dropped the proposal to take proceedings under the Criminal Law against the Patriarch, who was living in comfort and congenial surroundings at the Y.M.C.A., in a climate which was not proving too unkind and with absolute freedom of correspondence and of movement within the Bagdad area. In the north Major Thomson had succeeded for the first time in bringing together representatives of all shades of Assyrian opinion and apparently reaching a form of agreement with the pro-Mar Shimun element, representatives of whom had, moreover, apparently agreed to proceed to Bagdad in order to discuss the situation with the Patriarch in an atmosphere which even showed promise of leading to his release from the restrictions under which he lay. Unfortunately, this was not to be, and even those who had years of experience of this country and of oriental mentality were destined to be deceived. For day after day passed by and no emissary was forthcoming. He had entirely disappeared from the ken even of the police. A silence then ensued which became ominous, and an atmosphere of uneasy suspense was increased by the discovery that Assyrian villages in the Dohuk district were left in the charge of the women and children and that the men had taken to the hills. There was something brewing, and something unpleasant at that. To me this news came as a bitter disappointment, as we had been working the Iraqi Government into a much more reasonable mood.

3. We were not kept waiting for long. Twenty-four hours later came the news, first, that 500, then 800, and then over 1,300 Assyrians had crossed the frontier before the Iraqi authorities realised what was afoot. This movement,

by reason of the smoothness and precision with which it was carried out, must, I am sure, have been in accordance with some prearranged plan, leading up to a preconceived conclusion, as the Assyrians would not have left their women behind were they making just a leap in the dark, knowing full well, as they must, that the Iraqis would put obstacles in the way of their return. The evident intention undoubtedly was that an advance guard of men should establish themselves in a land where they must have been led to believe they would be welcomed and that the women would follow as a matter of course, abandoning in many cases comparatively well-to-do and comfortable holdings. It is believed that Yaku, instead of proceeding to Bagdad as arranged, went to Syria, received encouragement and returned to organise the exodus in accordance with a scheme probably prepared last year. Support for this theory is found in the fact that, two days after the Mosul meeting, in plenty of time for a message to pass from the Lady Surma to the Mar Shimun, the Patriarch called on the French Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad and sounded him on the possibility of the Assyrians finding employment in the Syrian police and military forces. The Mar Shimun made his proposal after referring to a piece of crumpled, flimsy paper, on which was writing in Syriac. Very probably a message secretly conveyed to him. M. Lépassier declared that he gave him no encouragement.

4. The causes of this exodus appear to have been twofold. First, the persistent refusal of the Mar Shimun party to co-operate in the scheme of settlement, an attitude encouraged by the Mar Shimun, the Lady Surma and other near relations in the hope that better terms might in the end be secured from the League, whose settlement of December 1932 they never genuinely accepted. The second clause appeared to be the not unfounded rumour that the Iraqi Government intended to disarm all the Assyrians. This report had been assiduously spread all over the Mosul liwa by Bekr Sidqi, the Iraqi military commander, who is notorious for his hatred of the Assyrians, his unbalanced judgment and his advocacy of the old-fashioned Turkish method of dealing with a recalcitrant minority. Bekr Sidqi, be it remembered, was the originator of the stone-throwing incident of last May, which was the immediate cause of the Mar Shimun being invited to Bagdad. His Majesty King Feisal, who professed to be aware of the failings of this officer, on two occasions assured me that he would be removed from his command in Mosul, undertakings which were not implemented. There was certainly a witness on the first and probably also on the second occasion. If, therefore, there eventuates suffering and bloodshed as a result of any act of Bekr Sidqi, I desire to place on record that a grave responsibility rests on King Feisal personally.

5. The Assyrians of the Mar Shimun party therefore decided to take at his word the statement somewhat lightly made by the Mutessarif of Mosul at the meeting with the Assyrians, that if they were not satisfied they would be at liberty to leave the country.

6. I have described by telegram the steps taken by the Iraqi Government to deal with the exodus, the conversations which ensued between the Prime Minister and myself, the views of the Adviser to the Interior and of the Air Officer Commanding, and some suggestions of my own. I have also transmitted in my despatch No. 478 of the 26th July a copy of the letters I exchanged with the Prime Minister on the question of the disarmament of the Assyrians. At the moment of writing I learn that the French authorities have disarmed all but 150 and have removed them from the Iraqi frontier. I have just received your telegrams Nos. 149 and 150. These must form the subject of further communications, the terms of which depend on the developments arising from the impending arrival of King Feisal this afternoon, and so for the present I will say no more than that I fully realise the responsibilities, be they moral or more tangible, which weigh upon His Majesty's Government in moulding the future of this ancient Christian people.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch by air mail the 3rd August. Original by bag.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.



Enclosure 1 in No. 114.

*Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(P.S. No. 574.)

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Ministry of the Interior,  
Bagdad, July 25, 1933.*

IN continuation of my P.S. No. 571 of to-day.

1. On the 24th July the kaimakam, Zakho, reported that he had received from the Assyrians across the river a petition in English as follows: "We beg to state that as a result of the recent meeting at Mosul the Iraqi Government pointed out to us its policy regarding the question of settlement and the patriarchate. We were informed by the mutessarif that those who do not agree with his policy are free to emigrate from Iraq, and, therefore, we came to the frontier and request the Iraqi Government not to close the way in the face of those who want to join us. We have no intention of fighting unless we are made to."

2. The exodus to Syria is a natural consequence of the general condition diagnosed in my letters No. 527 of the 26th June, paragraph 5, and No. 541 of the 4th July, paragraph 3. Mar Shimun and his followers refuse to accept the League decision and to acquiesce in the Iraqi policy towards the patriarchate; they have, therefore, made up their minds, to revert to my earlier metaphor, to force the cuckoo to lay its egg elsewhere; the method is drastic, but, as I said in my first letter quoted, Mar Shimun will stick at nothing.

3. For this reason I do not think we should treat the present situation as an isolated phenomenon. If the Assyrians go back to their homes unconditionally, what next? Are we any better off? Are the ultimate prospects of bloodshed any less? I am sure they are not. The attitude of the Assyrians, which has brought about the present situation, will be as bad or even more obstinate; the exasperation of the Iraqis will be ten times what it was. No British agency or authority has any influence over the Assyrians whatever. One day, sooner perhaps rather than later, there will be an appalling flare-up whenever Christians are found in the north.

4. I think we should, therefore, go very slowly and treat the real malady described in paragraph 2 and not the symptom. This involves keeping the Assyrians of the exodus in Syria for perhaps several weeks. The balance of the Lunn fund is only £38, but has the League got no funds for refugees? I understand from M. Lépiessier that the Armenians in Syria have paid back all the advances made to them; where is that money?

5. Since the supporters of Mar Shimun are determined not to settle down quietly in Iraq and want to settle in Syria, the simplest thing would be to try to prevail on the French to let them do so. If they must stay in Iraq their future attitude must be cleared up. Mar Shimun has always blackmailed the Iraqi Government with the threat of force in the background; the absence of 1,000 rifles in Syria improves the chances of a satisfactory solution. The surrender of their arms by the refugees is only one method of partially toeing the line, but there are others. If Mar Shimun gives in, the arms question might lose its importance.

6. So much for the general problem, and the problem of the Assyrians in Syria. In addition to these, two problems of some immediate local importance present themselves.

7. The first is the question of the effect of the exodus on the levies. Even before receipt of Wilkins's reports of the rumoured intention of some levy officers at Hinaidi to resign, it seemed to me that it was expecting too much of flesh and blood to think they would not be profoundly affected by the decision of the leaders of their people to sever their connexion with Iraq and to seek a home elsewhere. Even British officers have been known to find political circumstances too strong for their loyalty and discipline, and to ask the question is no reflection on the levy command. In any case the presence of the levies in Mosul is now more than ever a cause of anxiety to the Iraqi authorities. If a date could be fixed some time in advance for a routine relief the lack-of-confidence objection could be overcome.

8. The second concerns Surma and the other members of the Mar Shimun family. We talk of the Patriarch, but we know that the real organiser of the

Assyrian defiance is Surma. She is reported to be busy spreading propaganda against the Government and trying to induce more Assyrians to migrate to Syria. The Mosul authorities have proposed her removal. It was urged against this at yesterday's conference that Mar Shimun's detention had "failed," and the expulsion of Surma would make matters worse. This appears to indicate a fundamental misconception as to what has actually occurred. No decision was ever deliberately taken to detain Mar Shimun in Bagdad in order to produce a given result. The detention first came about as the result of Mar Shimun's impertinences which made it impossible for the Cabinet to allow him back and maintain their prestige. Once his detention became inevitable the logical thing would have been to pack him with other active members of the family off to Basra or Nasiriya. But the constant pressure of His Majesty's Government to secure the return of Mar Shimun made further action impossible, and the result was the unsatisfactory middle course of leaving the real source of the mischief, Aunt Surma, in Mosul and the Patriarch free to conduct correspondence from Bagdad.

9. From the internal point of view I have little doubt that the withdrawal of the levies from Mosul and the removal of Aunt Surma and one or two others of the patriarchal family, would have a wonderful tonic effect (the second might be dangerous without the first); but I would not advise it if it were further to alienate the sympathy of His Majesty's Government, which is, of course, more important than anything else for the Iraqi Government.

10. I gather that His Majesty's Government are angry with the Ministers here. It is only fair to them to remember that they have not persisted in any positive line of action against which they have been advised. They have been forced by Assyrian vagaries into two positions, from which they have felt unable to retreat, the open detention of Mar Shimun and the refusal to allow the unconditional return of the armed men of the exodus. But the result of the many conflicting influences at work has resulted in unsatisfactory compromises and half measures.

Yours sincerely,  
C. J. EDMONDS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 114.

(P.S. No. 591.)

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Ministry of the Interior,  
Bagdad, August 2, 1933.*

IN continuation of my letters P.S. Nos. 571 and 574 of the 25th July, 1933.

1. Between the 25th July and the 29th July the military encountered and disarmed several small parties of Assyrians on the left bank. It was alleged that some of these had recrossed from the right bank, but I confess I am rather sceptical; one or two parties were certainly trying to cross from the right bank for the first time; one party of thirty-three with seventeen rifles was only a mile or two west of Zakho. At any rate, in some of these cases the disarmament was contrary to orders as they then stood; the military commander was taking the line that he could not allow parties of armed men to be wandering about in the vicinity of the troops. The orders had been issued with a view only to minimising the possible causes of a clash; they had not been made public in the Mowul Liwa in any way. Since no resistance was encountered, no harm was done. The total number of rifles confiscated by the military appear to be about fifty.

2. The only shooting that has taken place throughout the whole affair occurred at about 1 A.M. on the morning of the 30th, when a party of about twenty Assyrians trying to cross from right to left are reported to have opened fire on a picquet near the Khabur junction when challenged. Desultory firing appears to have continued in the dark for some time, without casualties.

3. In consequence of French pressure on the one hand, and, on the other, of the objections of the military commander against action tending to increase the rifle strength of the potentially hostile concentration on the right bank, orders were issued on the 27th July that no more Assyrians were to be allowed to cross to the right bank. The mutessarif was also authorised to forbid the carrying of arms by all civilians in the zone occupied by the army. Steps were taken to warn all Assyrian villages that further parties setting out would render themselves liable to be disarmed and turned back when they reached this zone.



4. On the 27th and 28th July the majority of Yaku's band appear to have moved across the Wadi Suffan into *de facto* Iraqi territory. At a meeting between French and Iraqi representatives on the 29th July the former intimated that they would disarm the band and drive them back into Iraqi territory as soon as the new boundary came into operation. On the 30th July, however, there was a sudden movement back to the north side of the Suffan, where over a thousand handed in their arms to the French and were then sent westwards to Herik. On the 1st August it was reported that about 150 armed men remained on the Suffan, presumably on the south side, but that is not clear.

5. During the next forty-eight hours no explanation of the reasons for this sudden development or of French intentions was forthcoming from the local French officials. M. Lépiessier told me last night (the 1st August) that the action was due to the request of the British Ambassador in Paris that Yaku's band should be disarmed and moved from the vicinity of the frontier, pending negotiations as to the manner of their return. The last boundary pillar was erected on the 31st July.

6. The action of the French in the sense asked for by us has relieved a dangerously tense situation, and they deserve our gratitude. The fear of bloodshed is removed for the time being, and it is to be hoped that we can now get down to tackling the fundamental problem in a calmer atmosphere.

7. A disquieting feature of the recent situation is the increasing tendency of the army to interfere in, or to influence the conduct of, affairs that are solely the concern of the civil authority. From about the 26th July the Ministry of Defence began to object to the rôle assigned to the army, viz., to prevent armed members of Yaku's band from crossing from the right to the left bank with their arms, and to have recourse to force only in the last resort; it wished the army to cross the river and attack the enemy. The protest against the flying of British aeroplanes over Faishkhabur originated with the military commander. He, moreover, sent, through the Ministry of Defence, two protests against action by Major Sargon, I.O.P., Mosul; the first, a visit of inspection to the right-bank villages, where he saw some members of Yaku's band (the inspection was reported as if it was a furtive interview); the second, a proposal made by Major Sargon to the commandant of police, that the police on duty in the Assyrian quarter of Mosul should be strengthened with additional Assyrian constables (this matter, of course, has not the remotest connexion with the military). It seems to me, from internal evidence, that the offensive articles that have appeared in the press in the last few days draw their inspiration in some way from the attitude of the army. I have spoken seriously to the Minister several times about the danger of allowing the army to dictate or influence a civil policy. In the course of one of these conversations, he told me he would have been very glad to see Bekr Sidqi changed; but they had no other officer who could really control a force in the field in circumstances like the present, and therefore, in spite of his defects, it was safer to keep him in command.

8. In the meantime, at Mosul, Surma and a number of others have been busy spreading propaganda to the effect that all the official announcements are untrue and encouraging more Assyrians to set out for Syria. The mutessarif and the Administrative Inspector have constantly pressed for permission to deport them to the south. My own opinion, as you know, is that this is a *sine qua non* of a solution. I, however, pressed the Minister to beware of annoying His Britannic Majesty's Government further before they were convinced of the necessity. Fortunately, the French action of the 30th July reduced the necessity of action and the proposal is now in suspense.

9. I am afraid the King's constant telegrams have had anything but a calming effect on the Cabinet. Feisal repeated the text of the Foreign Office note and the Ministers are most incensed at being called narrow-minded; they are also caustic over the sentence about taking matters in hand himself—so much for the Constitution the British thrust upon the nation. I had quite an anxious time on the 27th July: if His Britannic Majesty's Government disapproves of us so much in spite of our patience (see last paragraph of my No. 574 of the 25th July) why worry any more? Let the army have its free hand; let us arrest Surma and all the other agitators at Mosul and pack them off, with Mar Shimun himself, to Nasiriya; or why not put Mar Shimun in the dock as we always wanted to, and so on. It took me several hours of argument and banter to limit action to that described in paragraph 3.

10. Before the *dénouement* of the 30th July I had gathered that after the King's return the Cabinet would still refuse to change their policy and would, moreover, refuse to resign. They feel they have public opinion strongly behind them, and I suspect that the flood of articles in the press about the Assyrians that have appeared since the King's intention to return became known (to them as soon as to you) are, if not wholly inspired, at least welcomed as a means of consolidating that opinion. The Ministers might possibly agree to a reconstruction of the Cabinet by Yasin, as leader of their own party, but they would raise the constitutional question in the face of any attempt to dismiss them to make room for Nuri or for Jamil Madfai.

Yours sincerely,  
C. J. EDMONDS.

[E 4882/7/93]

No. 115.

Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 508.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a press cutting from the *Iraq Times* of the 4th August, 1933, respecting Assyrians in Iraq.

Bagdad, August 5, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Extract from the *Iraq Times* of August 4, 1933.

LAST evening we received two official communications from the Press Bureau: one concerning His Majesty's plans, and the other concerning the Assyrians. The King, it is announced, "will spend a few days in Bagdad to acquaint himself personally with certain confidential affairs, and will then return to Switzerland to resume his recuperation."

The communiqué regarding the Assyrians is intended to be read in continuation of the official statement which we published on Wednesday. "The action of some of the Assyrians who left Iraq territory without the Government's permission, and their entry into Syria without obtaining the permission of the Syrian authorities, have caused some uneasiness. The Iraqi Government has now been informed that a number of other Assyrians intend to follow these men's example. The Government therefore wishes to make an explicit announcement that it will not allow such Assyrians to return to Iraq at any cost. In the meantime the Government will pursue its former policy of settling the Assyrians on the land, on condition that they behave peacefully like other Iraqis and co-operate with Government officials wherever they may be."

[E 4494/7/93]

No. 116.

Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 509.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his note to the Prime Minister, Bagdad, dated the 5th August, and of the Prime Minister's reply of the 6th August, respecting the protection of Assyrians in abandoned villages.

Bagdad, August 7, 1933.

[9941]

x 2



Enclosure 1 in No. 116.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Prime Minister (Bagdad).*

My dear Prime Minister,

August 5, 1933.

IT has just come to my knowledge that a party of Assyrians have forced their way across the River Tigris from west to east, and that hostilities with the Iraqi army have been opened.

It is my first duty as the representative of the ally of Iraq to impress upon your Excellency the importance of taking immediate and adequate steps for the protection of the Assyrian villages which, in present circumstances, have been deprived of their menfolk, and for the prevention in general of any act of reprisal against law-abiding Assyrians, so that they should not be the innocent victims of the folly of a few hotheads.

I am sure that the Government will maintain the prestige of Iraq abroad by dealing with the present trying situation in a moderate and statesmanlike manner.

Yours, &amp;c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 116.

*Prime Minister, Bagdad, to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Dear Mr. Forbes,

Bagdad, August 6, 1933.

I WOULD like to refer to your letter No. 414, dated the 5th August, 1933, and to inform you that necessary orders have been issued to the authorities concerned as desired by you.

Yours, &amp;c.

RESHID ALI.

[E 4639/7/93]

No. 117.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Beirut, August 11, 1933.

I TO-DAY again saw, at his request, M. Chauvel, Acting Secretary-General of the French High Commission, and discussed with him various points connected with the Assyrians now apparently in revolt against the Iraqi Government.

2. I found him distinctly annoyed, in view of a strange incident of which the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad had been the victim. In the presence of the King, of M. Lépiessier himself, and others, Nuri Pasha Said had stated that, when on the 5th August he lunched at the Residency at Aley, M. Hellen, the Acting High Commissioner, and M. Chauvel had informed him that M. Lépiessier had failed to pass on to them communications from the Iraqi Government embodying the latter's wishes and views, and that he had also failed to carry out instructions received from here in regard to communications to be made to the Iraqi Government. This, said M. Chauvel, was quite untrue and pure invention. M. Lépiessier's name had only been mentioned incidentally in the discussion. M. Lépiessier has been requested to deny the story in the most public and emphatic manner possible. While the matter is one for the French Government to deal with, you will doubtless like to know what has happened.

3. M. Chauvel appeared to be mystified as to the intentions of the Iraqi Government in regard to negotiating the admission on terms of a certain limited number of Assyrians into Syria. While on the 9th August the Iraqi consul-general, who then made his first appearance since the crisis developed, called at the High Commission and practically asked for an immediate reply to Nuri Pasha's proposals, on the same day M. Lépiessier was informed in Bagdad and reported here that negotiations with Beirut were not intended. M. Chauvel asked what it all meant. I, bearing in mind Bagdad telegram No. 236 to you, told him that it was my belief that the Iraqi Government would wish to negotiate in Paris or at Geneva.

4. M. Chauvel had a day or so previously shown me a copy of the Iraqi Government's protest to the French Chargé d'Affaires. In this a good deal of capital is made of the alleged failure of the French to act in accordance with the Provisional Agreement of the 6th April, 1927, for the settlement of tribal affairs on the frontier. The French view is that this agreement was intended to apply only in the case of desert tribes, and that it was entirely inapplicable in the case of the Assyrians. To an outsider there seems to be much force in that contention. However that may be, Nuri Pasha, though fully informed of the situation—he had spoken to the King by telephone from Rutba—had made no mention at all of the agreement when he was at Aley on the 5th August. If the agreement is one of the corner-stones of the Iraqi protest, it is not understood here why Nuri Pasha failed to refer to it.

5. The French are also mystified at Nuri Pasha's sudden departure, but have taken it surprisingly well. On the 5th August he was told that his proposals must be referred to Paris, and that a little time must elapse before the reply was received. It was understood that he would wait. He installed himself at a hotel in Aley, and on the Monday morning M. Chauvel telephoned to ask him to lunch and was told he had left for Damascus. The French had placed a motor car at Nuri's disposal, and later the chauffeur arrived and reported that he had driven the Pasha to Damascus on the Sunday, who there told him he was leaving early the next day for Bagdad. No word of explanation or thanks has so far been received from Nuri Pasha. His silence is charitably explained on the ground of ignorance.

6. You will doubtless wish to have the following details, which the French believe to be facts: On the 18th July Yaku and Luco went to Aindivar on the part of Mar Shimun, and asked for permission for 300 Assyrian families to cross at once into Syria and to be followed later by 5,000 families. On the 19th July the French High Commission replied refusing the request, and instructed M. Lépiessier to inform the Iraqi Government and also notify the French consul at Mosul. On the 21st July, at 7 P.M., a telegram was received from M. Lépiessier that he carried out his instructions. On the same day the French consul at Mosul denied the story, which was by then current, that the French would receive the Assyrians. At 5 P.M. on the 20th July some 500 Assyrians, of whom 300 were mounted, arrived at the Sufan Déré (Iraq *de facto* side). The number later increased to some 700. There they remained till the 30th July, when 400 crossed the stream, a mere trickle of water, and were disarmed with no difficulty. Late on the 4th August these men regained possession of their arms and recrossed the Sufan Déré, proceeding later to recross the Tigris, when fighting took place. The Iraqi note to M. Lépiessier rather surprisingly records that permission to recross on surrendering arms had been given (see Bagdad telegram No. 217 to you). Yaku and Luco both remained on the southern side of the stream, except that they once crossed into Syrian territory to interview a French intelligence officer. On the 5th August, at 3 P.M., the Iraq *de facto* territory became *de jure* Syrian territory, as the French sent out patrols, which, however, avoided both parts of Khanik, Christian and Moslem, there being still an Iraqi post in Moslem Khanik. The Assyrians used to obtain supplies from Khanik. On the 6th August the Assyrians came back across the Tigris. The French now have 515, or more than there were originally on Syrian soil. It is said that Colonel Iselin, Mr. Booth of the Iraq Survey Department, and Commandant Bonnot, who were in the neighbourhood in connexion with frontier delimitation, can confirm this. I have seen a photograph taken by Commandant Bonnot, which clearly shows the Assyrian camp on the south and one French tent on the north of the Sufan Déré.

7. The French hold that during most of the time the Assyrians were on territory in *de facto* Iraqi occupation, and that the Iraqi authorities did nothing to prevent them crossing the Tigris to get there. This seems to have been the case and in accordance with the wish of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.



[E 4645/7/93]

No. 118.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 267.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, August 15, 1933.*

A PRIVATE letter dated 14th August brought by safe hand from Stafford to Edmonds discloses a shocking state of affairs in the north. It appears that over 500 Assyrians have been killed, at least 200 of whom were not out in the rising. Irregular police mainly to blame, and also for looting, much of which was done by Shammar tribes.

Condition of Assyrian women and children, of whom there are about 1,500 destitute near Dohuk alone, is pitiable, and their agony is all the longer drawn by the desire of Iraqi officials to hush things up. Iraqi Government will not allow Thomson to undertake relief work.

As it appears that Iraqi machinery of government has broken down in the north and King Feisal has taken refuge in his harem and is not to be seen, I have therefore taken the following action: (1) I have sent for Nuri and told him that he must at once send orders to Minister of Interior in the north to depute a British official with funds to organise relief. As they will not have Thomson, Stafford is the only one available. He telephoned to the Prime Minister in my presence and added that Iraqi Government had allocated funds and were beginning relief. (2) If necessary after Embassy conference this morning I will arrange for Edmonds to be flown north. Subject to Air Officer Commanding's views, the effect of condition of women and children on levies is more serious than risk of ill-treatment of Mar Shimun, whom Iraqis will seize at any moment. (3) I am sending a word of encouragement to Stafford through His Majesty's consul at Mosul. (4) I consider we should devote all machinery of His Majesty's Embassy and consulate towards helping these women and children, that you should authorise me to advance funds, if necessary, which I would issue to Edmonds, Stafford or other British officials. (5) I also suggest that you might interest Archbishop of Canterbury and Assyrian and other charities in the United Kingdom with a view to immediate provision of relief funds or stores, as I have no trust in Iraqi arrangements.

[E 4645/7/93]

No. 119.

*Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Bagdad).*

(No. 199.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, August 15, 1933.*

I AM shocked at the lamentable and horrible news contained in your telegram No. 267 of 15th August, which fully justifies my worst fears as to the way in which the situation was being handled in the north.

2. The news of this massacre and of the consequent misery and destitution, which will of course soon become widely known, will have a deplorable effect on the reputation of Iraq. Nothing can now avert this, but the consequences of the attacks to which Iraq will justly be exposed may be somewhat mitigated if the Iraqi Government can be made to realise the gravity of the situation and the fact that they are themselves responsible for it, and to take really effective steps to make such amends as lie in their power.

3. I note that the irregular police recently recruited by Bekr Sidqi are mainly to blame, and that much of the looting was done by Shammar tribesmen, who were presumably those whom you recently reported as being brought to the scene under Bekr Sidqi's auspices. Whether Iraq will be able to re-establish her position and reputation or not will depend primarily on how effectively measures are taken to secure the punishment not only of Bekr Sidqi himself, who must obviously bear the main immediate responsibility for the present catastrophe, but also of all guilty parties, particularly among the irregular police who were enlisted for the ostensible purpose of averting such a development. In the interests of the future

of Iraq, His Majesty's Government therefore earnestly hope that these essential disciplinary measures will be taken without delay.

4. Meanwhile, the most immediate need is clearly for effective relief. It is outrageous that the Iraqi Government should make difficulties about allowing Major Thomson, who obviously has quite exceptional qualifications, to take part in the relief work. Unless there is some objection of which I am unaware, you should therefore strongly press that both Colonel Stafford and Major Thomson, and any other British officials whom you consider suitable, should be given full powers to carry out relief measures without delay.

5. It is also essential that they should be furnished with really adequate funds on a generous scale from Iraqi sources. The financial position of Iraq is such that funds could without difficulty be made available. You should make every effort to ensure that these funds are sufficient, if necessary pointing out that, whatever may have been the faults and follies of the Assyrians, it is the Iraqi Government who will be regarded as directly responsible for the present disaster by the outside world, and that if appeals have to be made to private charity abroad to supplement the funds allocated by the Government, each appeal will amount to a public condemnation of Iraq and will deal a further blow to Iraq's good name. For this reason I am deferring an immediate appeal to charity in this country on the lines you suggest under point 5, but should the Iraqi Government fail to provide adequate resources, such an appeal will, of course, have to be made.

6. As regards point 4 in your telegram, there are unfortunately no public funds on which you could be authorised to draw in order to advance money for this purpose, but His Majesty's Embassy and consulates may certainly give all assistance which lies in their power with a view to facilitating the work of relief.

7. I approve the measures you have hitherto taken, but you should supplement them immediately by firm representations to the Iraqi Government on the above lines.

[E 4712/7/93]

No. 120.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 510.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad, dated the 7th August, respecting Assyrians in Iraq.

*Bagdad, August 8, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

*Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy, Bagdad.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and have the honour to forward, for their information, the enclosed copy of telegram, dated the 6th August, 1933, which the Ministry have addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations concerning the defiant Assyrians.

The Ministry avail themselves of this opportunity to renew the expression of their high consideration and esteem.

*Bagdad, August 7, 1933.*



Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

*Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations (Geneva).*

ON the 14th December, 1932, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution regarding the Assyrian community of Iraq and the settlement of landless Assyrians.

The Iraqi Government lost no time in engaging an expert, Major Thomson, who reached Mosul on the 1st June, 1933. It also provided funds for the execution of certain irrigation works to bring fresh land under cultivation especially for allocation to landless Assyrians. Not only did Mar Shimun reject the invitation of Major Thomson to co-operate with him in his work of settlement, but certain of his followers, notably a certain Yaku, formed an armed band to hinder progress and to intimidate other Assyrians who had expressed their readiness to co-operate.

The Government was obliged to send a military force to meet this threat to public security. On the 26th June Yaku and his band made their submission and, having given assurances of future good behaviour, were pardoned without any punishment, however light. All the sectional leaders of the Assyrians were then invited to Mosul, where, at a series of meetings held on the 10th and 11th July, 1933, the resolution of the Council of the League and the policy of the Government in giving effect to it were explained. The leaders expressed almost unanimously their satisfaction with the policy.

Nevertheless, on the 21st July a band of armed Assyrian tribesmen, estimated at about 1,000, under the command of the above-mentioned Yaku, crossed without permission of the Iraqi Government into Syrian territory as a protest against the policy explained to them. On the 23rd and 27th July and the 5th August letters were addressed to the French Legation in Bagdad requesting that these defiant tribesmen should be disarmed and removed from the frontier in accordance with the precise terms of articles 5 and 6 of the provisional agreement in force between the two Governments since 1927 and which had specifically been confirmed by a fresh agreement signed at Geneva on the 3rd November, 1932, pending negotiations for a peaceful solution of the problem created by this movement.

In view of the illegality of this armed assembly having for its object to intimidate and influence the action of the Government, and in order to ensure the preservation of law and order, the Government announced that recalcitrant tribesmen desiring to return to Iraq would be allowed to do so after surrendering their arms.

Although in spite of repeated reminders no reply was received from the French Legation during the fifteen days that elapsed after the first request referred to above, nevertheless, in view of the arrival of large Syrian forces in the neighbourhood of the frontier and their occupation of positions commanding the camps and bivouacs of the recalcitrant tribesmen, and of reports that some of them had been disarmed, the Iraqi Government was confident that the Syrian Government had taken all necessary steps to prevent their making Syrian territory a base for hostile incursions into Iraq.

On the 2nd August the Iraqi Political Officer attached to the military forces met French representatives at Khanik, who assured him that the armed members of the band remaining in the territory just transferred from Iraq to Syria would also be disarmed. On the 3rd August the Iraqi Government decided to send the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Syria to discuss with the mandatory authorities the arrangements to be made for the execution of the provisional agreement and other matters regarding the emigrants.

On the evening of the 4th August a party of the Assyrians applied to surrender their arms and to offer submission. This was accepted, but after crossing the river they attacked the detachment sent to take over their arms. On the morning of the 5th August another large force, which had crossed the river that here forms the boundary, attacked the camp of the Iraqi forces. On the evening of the same day the Iraqi Government learned indirectly that the mandatory authorities in Syria had actually returned 500 rifles to the members of Yaku's rebel band who had previously been disarmed.

The Iraqi Government has been obliged to record the most vigorous protest against the failure of the mandatory authorities in Syria to execute the provisions of the provisional agreement, and in particular against the rearming of the rebels (after they had been lodged and fed for two weeks by the mandatory authorities, an action that would only be justified on the basis that the rebels had been rendered harmless), and also against the facilities that have clearly been accorded to them for making Syrian territory a base for their incursion and attack on Iraqi troops. The Iraqi Government has informed the French Chargé d'Affaires that it holds the mandatory Power in Syria responsible for all moral and material losses which have occurred or may occur as a result of these proceedings.

I request that the above may be brought as soon as possible to the notice of all States members of the League of Nations.

August 6, 1933.

[E 4883/7/93]

No. 121.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 23.)*

(No. 511.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 8, 1933.*

WITH reference to Beirut despatch No. 5 of the 2nd August on the subject of the Assyrians who recently migrated into Syrian territory and forced their way back into Iraq, it seems clear that the French authorities did make conditions to the Assyrians. They disarmed them on the understanding that their arms would be restored on leaving the country. That this was done seems to have been proved by the fact that many of the captured rifles still bear the owner's name and the receipt of the French authorities. Therefore the rifles were presumably surrendered and handed back.

2. It may be true that the French local authorities did not intend to make proposals to the Iraqi Government, whom apparently they hold in great contempt. It may also be true that they expected the Iraqi authorities to devise conditions for the return of the Assyrians. Such conditions were being considered when the irruption took place and the French authorities saw fit to allow these Assyrians to return, notwithstanding their undertaking not to expel them until conditions of return had been arranged.

3. In conclusion, it may be that the French will argue that the Assyrians were not expelled, but left of their own free will. In view of the circumstances of their coming, the loudly expressed objection to their reception and the presence of French troops to hold them in check, such a contention would savour of a quibble.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 4768/7/93]

No. 122.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 522.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 12, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 515 of the 9th August on the subject of the present Assyrian crisis, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two letters from the Acting Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, enclosing interesting and valuable reports by Colonel Stafford, Acting Administrative



Inspector in the Mosul district, which go far towards clearing up the circumstances in which fighting broke out on the 4th August between the Assyrians and the Iraqi armed forces.

2. A telegram which I received on the 10th August from His Majesty's consul at Mosul confirmed the remarks about the tension in Mosul town at the end of Colonel Stafford's report, No. S/291, of the 7th August. Mr. Monypenny stated that the Christian population of Mosul were in constant fear of attack by Moslems, and that although the authorities (including the Administrative Inspector himself), were confident that they could maintain order, there had already been a disturbance in the town leading up to the shooting of an Assyrian. However, a further telegram from Mr. Monypenny to-day (the 12th August) reports that the situation is now easier.

3. The position of the Assyrians in Iraq who have not left their villages to join the rebels remains one of considerable danger, and isolated attacks on them by Kurds have already been reported (see paragraph 5 of Colonel Stafford's report No. S/291).

4. Daoud Mar Shimun, the father of the patriarch, called on His Majesty's consul at Mosul on the 7th August, and complained that the Iraqi authorities were instigating the Kurds to attack Assyrians. He alleged that the Kaimakams of Rowanduz, Dohuk and Amadia were arming the Kurds, and that Assyrian villages in the Dohuk area were being robbed daily. Daoud added that the arrest and removal from Mosul on the 6th August of seven Assyrian leaders (reported in my telegram No. 237) had further embittered the Assyrian community, who would now never be willing to settle in Iraq. In any case, they could have no confidence in the Iraqi Government; over 100 Assyrians, he maintained, had been murdered in Kurdistan in the last few years without a single murderer being brought to justice.

5. I am informed by Mr. Edmonds that it is not correct that villages are being looted "daily" by the Kurds. The first cases of this sort since the exodus occurred only on the 8th August, and the damage appears to have been confined to property.

6. Mr. Monypenny reports that His Majesty's vice-consul at Diana was successful in stopping an emigration of Assyrians from Diana village. A party of villagers had already set out to join their compatriots on the Syrian border, but Mr. Chapman-Andrews sent messengers after them and was able to persuade them of their folly in leaving their village undefended and at the mercy of the Kurds. The men were induced to return and there seems to have been no further move by Assyrians from villages in the Diana area. Meanwhile the commander of the Iraq army battalion at Diana has surrounded his camp with wire and has mounted machine guns to cover the village—in the opinion of His Majesty's vice-consul a quite unnecessary act of panic.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 122.

Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.

(Secret.)

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

Bagdad, August 9, 1933.

I SEND herewith copy of Stafford's S/291 of the 7th August, 1933, which gives a most interesting, and our first connected, account of the events of the 4th and 5th August.

Before receipt of this I had already asked the Minister to forbid the panicky employment of Kurdish lashkars when the first news of these events reached the qadhas.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. EDMONDS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 122.

Memorandum by the Administrative Inspector, Mosul and Arbil Liwas.

(No. S/291. Secret.)

IN paragraph 5 of my S/290 of the 5th August, 1933, I gave my opinion that the French authorities would not commit so definitely an unfriendly act to the Iraqi Government as to return the arms to the Assyrians. Events have proved that I was wrong.

On the afternoon of the 4th August the French did give back the arms. What makes this action more blameworthy is that (1) the Iraqi Political Officer, in the course of the meeting with Captain Larist on the 2nd August, particularly requested that, if it was the intention of the French authorities to return the rifles, they should first inform the Iraqi authorities. Captain Larist noted this request in his pocket-book. (2) About 2 p.m. on the afternoon of the 4th August Lazar Effendi (Mudir of Dohuk), who was acting as Assistant Political Officer, crossed over to Khaniq, as the French were taking over the police post. He met a French officer there. This officer said nothing whatever about the return of the rifles to the Assyrians. It is, of course, possible that the blame for the extraordinary conduct of the French authorities must be entirely attached to the local French officers. The superior authorities may have ordered the return of the rifles and the immediate expulsion of the Assyrians, which orders were carried out at once by local authorities, who must have known full well what the result would be. It is, however, common knowledge that the French authorities would welcome any trouble in the north of Iraq, which might strengthen their claim for the continuation of their mandate in Syria. In any case, it is quite obvious that no credence can be given to any statement of the French. This will have to be remembered when their account is received of what occurred on the evening of the 4th August. It is certain that this account will be distorted.

2. I have seen Makki Beg, the Political Officer, and Lazar Effendi, the Acting Political Officer, and from their accounts and from other reports which I have received I have been able to obtain some idea of what happened on the evening and night of the 4th August.

Naturally, much still remains obscure, but the following is at least a rough outline:—

- (a) As noted above, Lazar Effendi was in Khaniq police post at 2 p.m. While he was there Werda, Mukhtar of Simmel village, spoke to him and said that a number of Assyrians wished to return to Iraq. Lazar Effendi told him that they could do so, but would have to return their rifles. Werda said that he understood that.
- (b) At about 5 p.m. the French authorities brought down two lorries to the head of Wadi Suffan. These lorries were full of Assyrian rifles, which were given to their owners. The Assyrians were then told to leave Syrian territory at once.
- (c) At about 6 p.m. Aziz Agha, Mukhtar of Faish Khabur village, telephoned to the Political Officer at Dairabun camp, saying that Assyrians were crossing the river about 500 yards above Faish Khabur. The Political Officer instructed him to send some of his people (Aziz Agha is a Chaldean Christian) to tell the Assyrians that they must surrender their rifles if they came into Iraq.
- (d) On receipt of the above news the G.O.C. troops sent a company to meet the Assyrians. It appears to have been thought that these Assyrians intended surrendering their rifles. Verbal orders were given to the officer commanding the company (1) not to open fire unless fired on; (2) to avoid firing shots which would drop in Syrian territory.

This company proceeded to meet the Assyrians until they were fired at without warning. One of the first shots killed one of the officers.

Comment.—There is reason to think that at least a part of the Assyrians did intend to surrender. Certain of the leaders were determined to prevent this at all costs. It is stated that Yaku was one of the first to cross the river and that it was he who was the first to open fire on the Iraq army troops.



- (e) The company, which was heavily outnumbered, returned the fire, but was forced to retire to some small hills lying between the river and the camp (north-west of Dairabun). A squadron of cavalry was sent to reinforce them. In the meantime night fell. The company sent back repeated requests for ammunition. Finally the G.O.C. sent a lorry with three boxes of ammunition. This lorry was ambushed. Four of the six soldiers were killed by rifle fire. The driver is said to have had his throat cut. The dead soldiers are said to have been mutilated.

*Comment.*—All stories of atrocities should be accepted with reserve. They are the usual accompaniment of the commencement of hostilities.

- (f) The Assyrians later (about 10 P.M.) appeared to have attacked the Iraq army pickets situated to the north and north-east of the main camp. These attacks were pressed hard, but were gallantly resisted. Finally, just before dawn No. 7 picket was captured. The officer in charge and three soldiers were killed. The tents and blankets were then set on fire, and this has given rise to the story that the bodies were deliberately burnt. This may be true, but it is by no means proved. This picket was recaptured shortly after dawn with artillery and air assistance.

*Comment.*—It is not clear why these attacks were pressed so strongly. Heavy rifle fire would have been sufficient to contain the posts, while the main body stepped past to the north, if this was their intention.

3. What happened on the morning of the 5th August and all yesterday is still most obscure. There has been very little information as to the movements of the Iraq army forces or regarding the location of the Assyrians. It appears, however, to be definite that—

- (a) A considerable body of Assyrians still remain on the right bank near Wadi Suffan.

*Comment.*—It is possible that a number of the Assyrians do not wish to engage in open warfare with the Iraq forces. An air reconnaissance on the evening of the 6th August reported that 150 Assyrians were bathing in the river. This does not suggest that they had any immediate offensive intention.

- (b) The Faish Khabur and other army posts on the river have been abandoned. Thus the Assyrians are free to cross the river as they like.

- (c) Air reconnaissances report considerable crossing and recrossing of the river. The recrossing of the river may have been parties taking back wounded. Of these it is reported that forty-five have been taken to Derik in Syria (nearly opposite Jeziret-bin-Omar).

*Comment.*—All reports regarding casualties should be accepted with considerable reserve. It is reported that Yaku and Qasha Gergis of the Tkhuma, a very violent agitator, are among the wounded.

- (d) Some rifles taken from dead Assyrians had papers affixed bearing name of owner. This is sufficient proof—not that any more is necessary—that the French did return the rifles.

- (e) A report has been received that a fight occurred on the right bank of the Khabur between the Assyrians and a Turkish post in which a Turkish officer and three men were killed.

4. As noted above, the locations of the Assyrians remain uncertain. It appears that they have split into small bands. They lie hidden by day and move at night. A few of such bands have been rounded out. Their general intention is also uncertain. It is, however, probable that they intend to move up towards Dohuk and possibly towards Amadiyah. This last is confirmed by the statement of an Assyrian who surrendered himself to the police south of the Jebel Bekhair and who has been brought into Mosul. I am submitting a separate report regarding his statements. He said among other things that (1) the rank and file had been completely deceived by the lying stories of the leaders; (2) that these leaders would never surrender alive.

5. The attitude of the Kurds gives cause for anxiety. The employment of Kurdish patrols under their own leaders is dangerous. I have not yet been able to ascertain the true facts of the encounter which took place near Majal Makht on the 5th August and which resulted in two Assyrians being killed and two wounded. Two things, however, are clear: (1) That these Assyrians could not possibly have belonged to those who crossed into Syria. It was quite impossible for them to have recrossed into Iraq on the evening of the 4th August and to have reached Majal Makht twenty-four hours afterwards.

*Later.*—It appears that they belonged to a party which had originally intended to go over to Syria, but who had changed their minds and were going back to their villages. They ought not to have been fired on.

- (2) Ibrahim Agha of Karamarg is not a fit man to be in charge of independent patrols. He has a stormy past.

6. Reports were received on the 6th August that a number of Assyrians from Diana and Batas were going to leave their villages and move westward. They actually appeared to have done so, but returned almost at once. Steps had been taken to prevent them getting through, but these appear to have included bringing in Kurdish bands. The commandant of police was taking measures to control these bands. But the employment of such bands is somewhat dangerous. It is not difficult to imagine the Kurds getting out of hand. Nothing could damage the good name of Iraq more than this.

7. Owing to intensive propaganda on the part of certain agitators, for instance, Yunis Bahri (the Iraq globe-trotter) and an ex-army officer, Ismail Sabri, there has been much excitement in Mosul. The atrocity stories have been circulated. A meeting which was planned to be held yesterday was forbidden. The local authorities fully realise the danger of the situation, and have taken every possible step to prevent trouble. Nevertheless, the Christians of the town express considerable nervousness. It is to be noted that much of the agitation is of a violently anti-British character.

8. In consequence, it was not considered advisable to carry out the deportation order as far as it concerned Surma Khanum and Daoud Effendi. It was feared that they—or their supporters—might resist. One shot fired might bring in the town mob, and if this happened it was feared that the levies, who are confined to camp, might break out fearing for the safety of their families. If this happened, a catastrophe would have followed. As it was, seven persons were deported, of whom Malik Andrews was the only one of note. Perhaps it would have been better not to deport anyone at all, if it was not considered desirable to deport Mar Shimun. For it may now be thought either (1) the Government is afraid to take action against Mar Shimun's family, or (2) that the Government made a mistake in deporting some persons and leaving the prime cause of all the trouble. For it is undoubted that Surma Khanum is this. The question of her deportation, which must be carried out if possible, will be further discussed on the arrival in Mosul of the Minister of Defence and the Director-General of Police.

9. I must here point out that the difficulties, already very great, of the civil authorities have been greatly increased by the almost entire absence of news from the army. Not only are the movements, in fact, even the position of the headquarters of the army, unknown, but no information has been received as to the location of the Assyrians. It would appear that the time has arrived for the civil authorities to intervene if possible in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. It is to be borne in mind that the great majority of the rank and file are poor, deluded fools. On the other hand, the leaders who have led them astray deserve the severest punishment.

R. STAFFORD,  
Administrative Inspector.

Mosul, August 7, 1933.



Enclosure 3 in No. 122.

*Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

Bagdad, August 9, 1933.

I SEND herewith Stafford's S/292 of the 7th August, 1933, reporting the most interesting statement taken from a prisoner.

Yours sincerely,  
C. J. EDMONDS.

Enclosure 4 in No. 122.

*Memorandum by the Administrative Inspector, Mosul and Arbil Liwas.*

(No. S/292. Secret.)

ON the 6th August an Assyrian named Kapu Selim gave himself up to the Government forces south of Jebel Bakhair and close to the main Zakho road. He was brought into Mosul. This morning in my office the Political Officer and the Assistant Political Officer, Lazar Effendi (an Assyrian), questioned him.

His statement was as follows:—

His name is Kapu Selim, of the Tkhuma, living in Basirian village. He is a cultivator, and had never served in the levies. He has a wife and three children. He did not at first leave his village when the others did, but was induced to do so later. The leaders told them that the French had promised them land in Syria, and further that the Iraqi Government had decided to split them up in small groups in different villages and also disarm them. The party, about 700 in number, left the mountains above Basirian and proceeded along the foothills to the river. Part of them crossed at Chailiki, but the majority at Faish Khabur. Their leader was Yacu, son of Malik Ismail, with Loco, of the Tkhuma, as second in command.

They encamped on both banks of the Wadi Suffan. They had taken food with them and at first also brought food from a canteen. After three days the French fed them free. The French told them that if they crossed into French territory they must give up their arms. Their leaders told them that the French said that if they came they would be given lands, exempted from taxation for five years, and probably return their rifles. Five hundred then crossed into Syria and surrendered their arms. About forty had no rifles, of whom he was one. Later the leaders said that the French now said they could not accept them because they had heard that some of the Assyrians wanted to go back to Iraq. This man states that there was, in fact, a strong divergence of opinion among these Assyrians, and that two-thirds of them wanted to return to Iraq (*Comment*—this confirms previous reports), but the leaders were stopping them. It was originally intended that the others, about 400 in number, should also cross into Syria the next day and give up their rifles. Yacu, however, prevented this on the grounds that there had been a fight near Amadiyah between Government forces and the Assyrians, and it was therefore necessary for arms to be retained.

At about 5 P.M. on the 4th August the French returned their rifles and told them to leave Syrian territory at once. They asked the French whether they were to fight the Iraq forces or not. The French replied that this was not the concern of the French. About 700 then started crossing. The others, including this man, did not do so because firing started. When they crossed they found the road blocked by Iraq troops. The Assyrians were carrying two white flags and intended to surrender. (*Comment*—It is possible that some of them really did mean to surrender, but their leaders precipitated violent action.) He states that the troops were the first to open fire. He admits that four men (not soldiers), came and told them that they must give up their arms. He denies all knowledge of what happened during the fighting as he was not involved in it. He crossed the next day with the intention of giving himself up. He never possessed a rifle (*Comment*—He had not one when he surrendered).

When asked as to intentions of Assyrians, he said that he thought that they intended to go in small groups to the Amadiyah district and concentrate there. He was certain that the leaders at any rate would never surrender and would fight to the death. The Assyrians were formed into military formations

immediately they crossed the river. It is stated that there are upwards of 500 to 600 rounds of ammunition per rifle (*Comment*—presumably carried on mules). Only about thirty rounds per rifle were handed over to the French. He says they have no machine guns (*Comment*—this is contrary to reports. The troops say they were fired on by a machine gun). He said he only heard of two Assyrian casualties, one killed, the priest of Badi village, and one wounded, the son of Qasha Girgiz, of the Tkhuma (who is one of the most violent agitators).

He said he wanted to go back to his village and settle down quietly.

R. STAFFORD,  
Administrative Inspector.

Mosul, August 7, 1933.

[E 4782/685/93]

No. 123.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 524.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 14, 1933.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 232, reporting the suspension of the newspaper, the *Ahali*, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note from the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to the two notes (copies of which were forwarded to you in my despatch No. 496 of the 3rd August) which I recently addressed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in protest against the hostile attitude adopted by the Iraqi press in general and the *Ahali* in particular.

2. I also enclose a translation of extracts<sup>(1)</sup> from the *Ahali* of the 6th and 7th August, from which you will observe that the newspaper was not deterred from continuing its attacks on British policy by the warning from the Press Bureau, which it was obliged to publish in the number of the 6th August. The journal was consequently suspended on the 8th August for a period of ten days.

3. The suspension of the *Istiqlal*, to which the Ministry refer in their note, was provoked by its embarking upon Sunni-Shiah controversy (see my despatch No. 503 of the 3rd August) and had no connexion with its offensively anti-British attitude.

4. With the exception of the now suspended *Ahali*, there has been a notable absence of hostile articles in the Arabic press for the past few days. The Iraqi Government are doubtless encouraged to put an end to these attacks on Great Britain by their desire to secure the diplomatic assistance of His Majesty's Government at Geneva in the event of the Assyrian question coming before the Council of the League of Nations, and it is significant that the *Ikha-al-Watani*, the semi-official organ of the present Government, expresses in its number of the 8th August the hope that Iraq will be able to rely upon support from her "great ally" in denouncing the conduct of the French authorities in Syria in allowing the emigrant Assyrians to return to Iraq with their arms.

5. The campaign of abuse and allegation has now been transferred to the French Government, who are vociferously denounced in all the Arabic newspapers as the cause of the recent bloodshed.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure in No. 123.

*Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy, Bagdad.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and, with reference to the two letters addressed to his Excellency the Prime Minister by the Chargé d'Affaires of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, of which one dealt with a leading article published in the *Ahali* newspaper and the other with the tone of the Bagdad press

(1) Not printed.



as a whole, have the honour to inform the Embassy that immediately upon the receipt of the two above-mentioned letters of the Embassy, his Excellency the Prime Minister instructed the competent authorities to take the necessary steps with a view to the local press avoiding the publication of any matter of a nature inconsistent with the spirit of accord and sincere amity characterising Anglo-Iraqi relations. The competent authorities carried out the instructions given them, exercising the maximum powers vested in them by law, and warned the *Ahali* newspaper for the publication of the article dealt with in the Embassy's letter, and then suspended that journal temporarily.

As regards the *Istiqal* newspaper, this had already been suspended by a decision of the Council of Ministers.

The authorities have also drawn the attention of all newspapers to the necessity of avoiding the publication of matter calculated to arouse unfriendly feelings towards the British Government.

The Ministry wish that His Britannic Majesty's Embassy should feel certain that the Iraqi Government have been, and continue to be, anxious for the consolidation of the relations of amity and friendship obtaining between the two allied Governments. They [*i.e.*, the Iraqi Government—translator] have (already given) such ample evidence of this that they need not put forward any further proof. There is, therefore, no question of it having occurred to them to adopt a negative attitude in this matter.

His Excellency the Prime Minister regrets what has happened, and the Iraqi Government trust that the British Government will always feel confident of their good intentions, in view of the earnest and constant desire of the Iraqi Government for the continuance, undisturbed by anything, of the good relations obtaining between the two States.

The Ministry avail, &c.

Bagdad, August 9, 1933.

[E 4783/7/93]

No. 124.

Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 525.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter from the Mar Shimun, dated the 13th August, respecting the alleged maltreatment of Assyrians in unprotected villages in the north.

Bagdad, August 13, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 124.

Mar Shimun to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.

Dear Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes, C/o Y.M.C.A., Bagdad, August 13, 1933.

YOU will perceive from the position in which the Iraq Government have placed me that I am able to do very little to help my people but in this way.

I am therefore asking your noble Excellency that you will allow me this opportunity to make my protest to the British Government through the high office which you hold.

I have information which I can depend on, and which I feel bound to record until the day when a fair hearing will be given to the Assyrians.

If the Iraq Government "for humanity's sake" feels it has a right to arm certain Kurdish tribes who have actually begun to massacre, ravage, rape and burn the villages in which only women, children and a few old men have been left, then I would ask you to bring this method of enforcing its will on the Assyrians to the notice of the British Government, and request that some immediate steps be taken to stop these atrocities.

How can the British Government keep neutral, knowing that they have serving in their levies so many young and able-bodied men of the Assyrians, whose families are going through such persecution?

I appeal to you in the name of humanity to take urgent action.

Believe me, &c.

ESHAI SHIMUN,

By the Grace of God Catholicos  
Patriarch of the Assyrians.

[E 4819/7/93]

No. 125.

Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Iraq, to Chief of Air Staff,  
Air Ministry.—(Received in Foreign Office, August 20.)

(Secret. Personal and Private.)

(Telegraphic.)

August 19, 1933.

IT is estimated not less than 700 Assyrians have been killed, of whom 100 were killed in action by army. There are approximately 515 in Syria under French guard. Many killed do not belong to original exodus, but met their death while in their villages chiefly at hand of irregular police and army supplemented by Kurdish and Arab raiders. Major Thomson and Colonel Stafford visited Simel 15th August and report 315 men slaughtered there by Iraqi army on 11th August after disarming on 10th August. A few women and children were also killed in rounding up of villages, but no further reports have been received of any women and children being molested.

2. Operations of army have been at a standstill for some days, and I have pressed for their withdrawal from Dohuk area, where their presence leads to further terror on part of destitute civil population. Photographs and records of twenty-nine burnt villages taken by air reconnaissance will be forwarded to you next air mail. Number of looted villages impossible to record, but there must be many.

3. I have at last obtained permission for British officer and picked levies to visit area, and have formed committee to superintend collection and evacuation where necessary of levies' families in the disturbed area to Hinaidi, where accommodation is being made ready. I have taken Squadron-Leader Reed from Jerusalem for this purpose. There is naturally tension in most towns, especially Mosul, where strong anti-Christian propaganda is being carried on. Levies here have behaved in exemplary manner, and I do not now foresee any change unless some stupid act by Iraq Government forces the issue.

4. Main points for immediate action are: (1) Proclamation of complete amnesty and issue of orders that severest penalties will be inflicted on any found looting, raiding and [? corrupt group]. I have drafted suggested proclamation yesterday and given it to Nuri, who is taking it to King. (2) Disarming of irregulars and protection of the defenceless villages if necessary by rearming male Assyrians. (3) General properly organised relief measures and the establishment of British representative in the area for this purpose.

5. No action has been taken by the King up to date against Bekr Sidki or others responsible for the massacres, and until this is done general feeling among subordinates and rank and file is that of satisfaction and that authorities have approved of their actions up to date.

[E 4831/7/93]

No. 126.

British Embassy, Bagdad, to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)

Dear Department,

Bagdad, August 17, 1933.

HEREWITH in haste an advance copy of despatch No. 44 of the 16th August from His Majesty's consul at Mosul giving further details of the atrocities committed in the north on Assyrian and other Christian population. This despatch was flown down from Mosul yesterday by the R.A.F.

As this week's bag is already closed, we are sending copies of the despatch officially by the next bag.

Yours, &c.

CHANCERY.



Enclosure in No. 126.

*Consul Monypenny to Chargé d'Affaires, Bagdad.*

(No. 44.)

Sir,

Mosul, August 16, 1933.

IN continuation of my reports Nos. 41 and 43 of the 10th and 11th August respectively, I have the honour to state that Colonel Stafford informs me that the latest information from the Dohuk area confirms the reports regarding the pillaging of Assyrian villages and also shows that there has been a terrible massacre of Assyrians in that area. It has now been ascertained that—

1. Over 300 Assyrians were killed in cold blood by Kurds in the village of Simel, west of Dohuk.
2. Another 200-300 Assyrians were attacked on the top of a mountain by Kurdish irregular police and were wiped out. It is stated that no Assyrians survived and there were no Kurdish casualties. If this is true, there is only one possible explanation, which is that the Assyrians surrendered and were killed afterwards.
3. Similar incidents have no doubt occurred on a smaller scale in many places.
4. It is estimated that from 700-800 Assyrians have been killed, of whom not more than perhaps 100 were killed by the Iraqi troops in the fighting. (The Iraqi army casualties are stated to have been three officers killed and some thirty or forty men killed or wounded.)
5. Over 1,000 women and children are now herded together in the village of Simel. The Iraqi army is now camped about 1 mile away from that village.

Colonel Stafford informs me that the Minister of the Interior visited Simel two or three days ago and was appalled by what he saw. It is believed that an effort is being made to send some food to the women and children at Simel, but the Minister of Interior refused to employ Major Thomson on relief work, and such measures as are being undertaken by local officials are considered by Colonel Stafford to be totally inadequate. The Minister of Interior was doubtless not anxious that any foreign official should visit Simel so soon after the massacre.

Meanwhile there is a vigorous anti-Christian campaign being carried on in Mosul by a number of local fire-brands. Three of these men, named Muhi-edin-Abdul-Khattab, Seyid Haji Thabit, and Younus Abawi, recently addressed some troops in Mosul and thanked them for killing Assyrians, and urged them to continue the good work. These and some other men, together with Younus Bahri and Ismail Sabri, whom I mentioned in my despatch No. 41, are trying to rouse anti-Christian feeling in the town.

Reports continue to be brought into Mosul by motor-drivers and others who have come in from the Dohuk area to the effect that the Kurdish and Arab tribesmen who looted the Assyrian villages were instigated to do so by Iraqi army and police officers and minor officials; they were given rifles and ammunition and told to do their duty as good Moslems by killing any Assyrian they saw. The Iraqi army itself is stated to have taken very few prisoners. There are many reports, for instance, of Assyrians who had surrendered and handed over their rifles being put into lorries ostensibly to be taken to Mosul, but who were taken out of the village and shot down by machine guns, &c.

The looting of villages is now believed to have spread to the south of Alqosh. Two Chaldean villages are stated to have been looted in that area, and an unconfirmed report now states that some Kurds have attacked the village of Aradin, near Amadia.

It is not known what steps are being taken by the army or the police to restore order. The Minister of Interior is believed to have issued orders to the troops and police that all Kurdish and Arab raiders must be shot at sight. It remains to be seen whether such orders are carried out. Meanwhile there is little doubt that the Christian inhabitants of the Mosul Liwa have every reason to mistrust the ability or the desire of the Iraqi authorities to afford them protection.

I have, &amp;c.

R. G. MONYPENNY.

[E 4908/7/93]

No. 127.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN IRAQ.

*Petitions of the Mar Shimun, Catholicos Patriarch of the Assyrians, concerning the Situation of the Assyrians in Iraq.*

(Letter dated Bagdad, July 31, 1933, and two telegrams dated Beirut, August 1 and 17, respectively.)<sup>(1)</sup>

*Note by the Secretary-General.*

Geneva, August 19, 1933.

IN accordance with the procedure in force, the Secretary-General communicated these communications to the accredited representative of the Iraqi Government at Geneva, for the observations of his Government, on the 19th August, 1933.

The Secretary-General felt obliged to apply to these communications the urgent procedure laid down in the fifth paragraph of the Council resolution of the 27th June, 1921, and consequently has the honour to circulate them, for the information of the members of the Council, without waiting for the observations that the Iraqi Government may wish to present thereon. As soon as these observations reach the Secretariat, the Secretary-General will not fail to circulate them for the information of the members of the Council.

I.—Letter dated Bagdad, July 31, 1933.

*As from the Patriarchate, Mosul, Iraq.*

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, July 31, 1933.

I have the honour to send a copy of a cablegram which I sent you via Syria:—<sup>(2)</sup>

"General Secretariat, Nations, Geneva. Assyrians' situation desperate, compelling refugees crossing Syrian frontier. I, under Government detention, Bagdad, appeal for League's intervention."—MAR SHIMUN, Patriarch.

My correspondence is either censored or confiscated, therefore I am obliged to use indirect methods of sending Assyrian news out of Iraq.

I hope your Excellency has received the cablegram, and that you will do your utmost to bring this question of my people's safety to the consideration of the League of Nations.

I am preparing a report on the present most critical situation, which I will be able to despatch by mail leaving Bagdad on the 4th August.<sup>(3)</sup>

I am using every effort to prevent bloodshed.

I have, &amp;c.

ESHAI MAR SHIMUN,

*By the Grace of God, Assyrian  
Catholicos Patriarch of the  
East.*

II.—Telegram dated August 17, 1933.

*Secretary-General, Nations, Geneva, Suisse.*

Implore League's immediate intervention. Assyrian women, children included in massacre through certain Kurdish tribes armed by Iraq Government.—MAR SHIMUN, Patriarch.

<sup>(1)</sup> The text of the telegram of August 1 is reproduced in the letter of July 31.

<sup>(2)</sup> This telegram was sent from Beirut on August 1.

<sup>(3)</sup> This report has not yet reached the Secretariat. (Notes by the Secretary-General.)



[E 4932/7/93]

No. 128.

*Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Iraq, to Air Ministry.—  
(Received in Foreign Office, August 24.)*

(Secret. Personal.)  
(Telegraphic.)

August 22, 1933.

HAVE arranged with Forbes that if Surma party leaves Bagdad they will be conveyed by Victoria to Palestine in time to catch Haifa boat to Cyprus. I have therefore recalled flying-boats, who are greatly in need of overhaul at base. Surma and party are being conveyed to Bagdad from Mosul under escort of police to-day and will presumably be kept in Bagdad until final arrangements have been made between His Majesty's Government and Iraqi authorities their reception and maintenance in Cyprus. Fifty-seven women and children of levies' families were brought to Bagdad by air this morning and seventeen by road a few days ago. R.A.F. Relief Committee is now working at Mosul, but at present the Government will not allow them into outside districts. Have lent R.A.F. medical officer to Major Thomson, who has not been allowed to operate as president of Iraq Relief Committee at Mosul. Air Commodore Cunningham is controlling the situation at Mosul, where he has been since 5th August. The Iraqi army has now been completely withdrawn from the affected area and is returning to its peace stations.

[E 5012/7/93]

No. 129.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 527.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 15th August, and of a letter from the Mar Shimun, dated the 15th August, respecting the proposed deportation of the Mar Shimun and members of his family.

*Bagdad, August 16, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 129.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, August 15, 1933.

I HAVE the honour, on instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to make the following communication:—

2. The Iraqi Government have asked His Majesty's Government to agree to the immediate deportation of the Mar Shimun and certain of his immediate relatives, including the Lady Surma.

3. In reply to this request, I have been instructed to explain that the question of the agreement of His Majesty's Government to this proposal does not arise. Whether deportation of these persons from Iraq is necessary and whether it can properly be effected are questions for the Iraqi Government alone to decide, although His Majesty's Government desire to draw the Iraqi Government's serious attention to the grave criticism to which they may expose themselves in taking the action proposed unless their case for such action is shown to be a clear and strong one.

4. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government cannot view with indifference the fate of the Mar Shimun and of the other Assyrians concerned, and I have therefore been instructed to request that they may be furnished with a clear statement of the Iraqi Government's intentions towards them.

5. In particular, His Majesty's Government wish to know the intentions of the Iraqi Government in regard to the destination to which it is proposed to deport these persons if deportation is decided on.

6. His Majesty's Government will be glad of an immediate answer to the present note, reserving the right to make it public if circumstances should, in their opinion, make this necessary.

I avail, &amp;c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 129.

*Mar Shimun to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, August 15, 1933.

MIGHT I recall to you our conversation of yesterday, the 14th August, that the British Government had made a decision to remove the patriarchal family—this is, myself, father, brother and Lady Surma—because—

(a) Of danger to its life.

(b) Because of the status of Iraq as an independent State, no protection could be given by the British in this country.

(c) If we left Iraq temporarily, that I should be free to proceed to Geneva, or any place where I could help my Assyrian people.<sup>(1)</sup>

The alternative being that the Iraqi Government had decided to imprison us either in Nasiriyah or Rutbah, and if we state that we are not Iraqis, then they will deport us over the frontier.

You also stated that the Iraqi Government accused me of being the cause of the present situation.

As I have already answered you verbally yesterday, so I now state in writing. The patriarchal family has no wish to avail itself of any protection apart from that afforded to the whole Assyrian people. The most urgent question at the moment is that the British Government, who handed us over to Iraq, should stop the massacre, persecution and extermination of the families, especially when so many of the young men are now serving British interests in this country when they could be defending these helpless families. This to me is much more important than any question of personal safety.

Moreover, if the presence of the patriarchal family of eighteen persons is in danger, and thus endangers the life of the Assyrian people because of their loyalty, then surely their removal to an R.A.F. cantonment at Mosul or Hinaidi would be sufficient protection.

If, as you say, the Arab Government hold me solely responsible for the present situation, and my presence in Iraq prejudices the termination of the massacre and bitter feeling, then in the interests of peace I agree to being transferred under British auspices for a period to such a place that I am free to present in person the case of the Assyrians to the League of Nations. In such a case I would need to take with me a personal attendant.

ESHAI SHIMUN,

By the Grace of God, Catholicos

Patriarch of the Assyrians.

<sup>(1)</sup> Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes has stated that no such condition was either suggested by the Mar Shimun or volunteered by himself in the conversation referred to.



[E 4830/5250/93]

No. 130.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 532.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him copies of correspondence between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad, and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, and of notes to the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command, respecting the deportation of the Mar Shimun and family.

*Bagdad, August 17, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 130.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 16, 1933*

ALTHOUGH the recent disturbances in the north are attributed directly to the mandatory authorities in Syria having, without informing the Government of Iraq, returned their arms to the Assyrians and acquiesced in their crossing the frontier so armed, it is nevertheless clear that the prime instigators of the rebellion of the Assyrians have been the members of the Mar Shimun family, and that they are even now seeking to prolong the rebellion.

The Government of Iraq feels that it can no longer delay either in prosecuting them on the capital charge of conspiring against the safety of the State or of deporting them from the country. In view of the religious veneration with which the members of this family are regarded by the Christians of the Nestorian Sect, the Government prefers the second alternative.

The Government of Iraq have weighty reasons for considering that the matter of deportation would be much facilitated for all concerned if His Majesty's Government would consent to receive the principal members of this family temporarily and until their future is decided by the League of Nations, at some place in British territory, and would arrange for their transport thither.

Copies of deportation orders issued by the Ministry of Interior in respect of Daud, Theodore, Ishai Mar Shimun and Surma Khatun are enclosed.

If His Majesty's Government can see its way so to receive the persons concerned, the Government of Iraq will be deeply grateful if their transport abroad can be arranged for to-morrow, the 17th August. If that is not possible, the Government of Iraq will find it necessary to remove them to Transjordan via Rutba on that date.

I have, &amp;c.

NOURY SAID,

*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 130.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, August 16, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note No. 7764 of to-day's date, in which your Excellency informs me of the intention of the Government of Iraq either to prosecute the Mar Shimun and certain members of his family on a capital charge or to deport them to Transjordan via Rutba on the 17th August. Your Excellency adds that the Iraqi Government prefer the second alternative and have weighty reasons for considering that the deportation would be facilitated if His Majesty's Government would consent to receive the principal members of this family, temporarily and until their future is decided by the League of Nations, at some place in British territory and to arrange for their transport thither.

2. While pointing out to your Excellency that, so far as I am aware, the necessary consent of His Majesty's Government to deportation to Transjordan has not been obtained and would not be granted, I am authorised to inform you that His Majesty's Government, while drawing attention to their views as expressed in my note of the 15th August, are prepared to agree to the request of the Iraqi Government to transport the Mar Shimun and family to a temporary asylum in British territory on the understanding that the Iraqi Government will accept full responsibility for, and eventually refund to His Majesty's Government, the expenses incurred in connexion with their transportation and subsequent maintenance, and that the deportation does not take effect until His Majesty's Government have had time to make the necessary arrangements for the various persons concerned.

I avail, &amp;c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 3 in No. 130.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command.*

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 16, 1933.*

HIS Majesty's Government have in certain circumstances consented to provide facilities for the transportation of the Mar Shimun and several members of his family, and for their temporary reception in Cyprus.

2. These circumstances having now arisen and the Iraqi Government having applied for the above-mentioned facilities in the cases of the Mar Shimun, Daoud and Theodore Mar Shimun and the Lady Surma, I have replied consenting thereto on certain conditions, one of which was that His Majesty's Government should have time to make the necessary arrangements for the various persons concerned.

3. I would therefore request you to transport these persons to Palestine en route to Cyprus at your early convenience. I realise that it may not be possible to move the Lady Surma at the same time as the rest of the party. Indeed, His Majesty's Government consider it preferable for her to be deported separately.

4. I understand from you that, subject to suitable arrangements being made for their reception on leaving the Iraq Command, you are prepared to transport by air the above-mentioned male members of the party, together with an Assyrian attendant on the Mar Shimun, and two Levies selected by you to accompany the Mar Shimun to his final destination and eventually to return to Bagdad, six persons in all, leaving at dawn on Friday, the 18th August.

5. A copy of my telegram of to-day's date to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Jerusalem, is enclosed herewith.<sup>(1)</sup> On receipt of a reply in the affirmative, I would be glad if you would carry out the proposal as arranged.

I have, &amp;c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure 4 in No. 130.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Dear Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Bagdad, August 16, 1933.*

WITH regard to the deportation orders mentioned in this Ministry's letter of to-day, which I had the honour of handing to you personally this morning, you will please find herewith enclosed copies of deportation orders of Ishai Mar Shimun, Daud Mar Shimun and Theodore Mar Shimun.

The deportation order of Surma Khatun is still under consideration, and would be forwarded to you when completed.

Yours sincerely,

NAJJI-EL-ASIL.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



Enclosure 5 in No. 130.

*Deportation Order respecting the Ishai Mar Shimun.<sup>(\*)</sup>*

THE Council of Ministers having, by virtue of the powers vested in them by Ordinance No. 12 of 1933, regarding divestment of Iraqi nationality, adopted a resolution divesting Ishai Mar Shimun of Iraqi nationality; and it having been found that the deportation of the aforesaid person is necessary in the interest of peace and tranquillity;

Therefore, we, Minister of the Interior, in exercise of the powers vested in us by article 2 of the above-mentioned ordinance, do hereby order the deportation of the above-mentioned person beyond the frontiers of Iraq.

For Minister of the Interior,  
NASHAT-AL-SANAWI.

*Iraqi Ministry of the Interior,  
August 16, 1933.*

Enclosure 6 in No. 130.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command.*

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 17, 1933.*

WITH reference to my letter No. 199 of the 16th August, I have the honour to inform you that I have now received a telegram from His Majesty's High Commissioner in Jerusalem to the effect that suitable arrangements will be made for the reception of the Mar Shimun and party at Ramleh on Friday, the 18th August.

2. I would, therefore, be grateful if you would proceed with the transportation of the Mar Shimun and party from the Y.M.C.A. on that date under arrangements made by you.

3. I enclose for your further information copy of a most immediate telegram from the Foreign Office, No. 200 of the 16th August,<sup>(\*)</sup> to the effect that in no case must the Iraqis be allowed to arrest the Mar Shimun, with a view to trial on a capital charge. The same ruling would apply to any attempt by the Iraqi Government to motor him across the desert to Rutba, a journey in which, in present circumstances, his life could not be absolutely guaranteed.

4. You will accordingly observe that the enclosed telegram gives us authority to take any steps we may consider fit for the protection of the life of the Mar Shimun. I trust, however, that the necessity will not arise.

5. I enclose copies of the deportation order which the Iraqi Government inform me they have served on the Assyrians in question.<sup>(\*)</sup> You will observe that no time limit is specified.

I have, &c.  
G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

<sup>(\*)</sup> Copies of orders respecting Daud Mar Shimun and Theodore Mar Shimun, *mutatis mutandis* also received.

<sup>(\*)</sup> Not printed.<sup>(\*)</sup> Enclosure 5.

[E 5016/7/93]

No. 131.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 533.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 17, 1933.*

IN my telegram No. 234 I reported how King Feisal had telephoned to me early in the morning of the 9th August, and assured me in joyful terms that the Assyrians were surrendering *en masse*. I was subsequently obliged to inform you in my telegram No. 238 that this news had proved to be entirely false, despite the fact that it had been circumstantially confirmed by the Iraqi civil and military authorities, the Acting Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior and the Acting Inspector-General of the Iraqi army.

2. I have now the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from a memorandum by the British Military Mission, giving the substance of a telephone message received at 11 p.m. on the 8th August from the British officer attached to the Iraqi Army Commander, the notorious Bakr Sidqi. You will observe that Major Allfrey did not give the information on his own responsibility, but stated that "it was reported," &c. (i.e., by the Iraqi Intelligence Service), and this Iraqi report appears to have been the origin of the whole unfortunate rumour.

3. As I informed you in the first paragraph of my telegram No. 245, Iraqi inefficiency and gullibility apparently magnified a proposal by some 100 Assyrians to give up their arms into a general surrender *en masse*. The rumour grew rapidly, even after the hour at which Major Allfrey telephoned it to General Headlam, and King Feisal, with Arab impetuosity and rashness, leapt to the conclusion that the "rebellion" was all over.

I have, &c.  
(For the Chargé d'Affaires).  
J. G. WARD.

Enclosure in No. 131.

*Extract from Memorandum from Major White, August 9, 1933.**August 8, 1933.*

MAJOR ALLFREY (from Mosul) reported to Inspector-General (General Headlam) by telephone that: it was reported that about 500 of the band, in an area 4 to 5 miles north-west of Dohuk, wished to surrender to the Government, that about 800 of the band were in the Zawa area (137 L/NE 6. a.), that families of Assyrian villagers in this area had come in to Dohuk.

A report from G. Iraqi (morning 9th) states 850 wish to surrender from this area.

*August 12, 1933.*

[E 5027/7/93]

No. 132.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 85.)

Sir,

*Beirut, August 24, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram No. 12 of the 21st August, instructing me to report what passed between me and the French High Commission in the course of conversations relating to the Assyrians who left Iraq for Syria.

2. In the first place, I should explain that I have never discussed the matter with M. Helleu, the Acting High Commissioner, and that throughout my dealings have been with M. Chauvel, Political Director of the High Commission and Acting Secretary-General, in whose hands the matter was left by M. Helleu. My conversations with him have been frequent, and in some cases were conducted by telephone.

3. The first time I saw him was as the result of a telegram dated the 22nd July from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad asking me to keep him informed of the attitude and intentions of the French authorities. This telegram reached me at the same time as his telegrams Nos. 176, 177 and 178 to you, and I had them in mind when I saw M. Chauvel. The latter had not then had time to receive very precise information from the "Assistant Delegate" at Deir-az-Zor, but he confirmed that the French could not and would not receive the Assyrians permanently, and was clearly of the opinion that it was for the Iraq Government to arrange for their return whence they came. As this obviously could not be effected without some delay, so that the Assyrians would have to remain in Syria for a time but could not be allowed to keep their arms, the question was what present action could be taken to avoid trouble over disarmament. He gave me to understand that troops were being sent to the spot to reinforce the existing small detachments available, that arrangements were to be made to post troops on both the river-side and inland of the Assyrians, and



that an endeavour would be made to induce them to surrender ("consigner") their arms temporarily while on Syrian soil. He made it clear that they did not intend to attempt permanent disarmament or to expel the Assyrians by force. At that time he believed that the Assyrians were on Syrian soil, and it was only some time later that, from a report received from Commandant Bonnot accompanied by a photograph, it came to be held here that during practically the whole of their stay across the Tigris the Assyrians were on territory under *de facto* Iraqi administration, on the south side of the Sufan Déré, and drawing at least part of their supplies from Khanik, where there was an Iraqi post. I have doubts as to whether the steps to post troops on both sides of them were ever taken. As a contribution to the question of what present steps to take, I mentioned a concentration camp as a possible solution. Apart from the question of the expense, which M. Chauvel seemed to think would be properly chargeable to the Iraq Government, there was the difficulty of obtaining supplies. The suggestion was made that the Iraqi authorities might be willing to assist in that connexion. Later, however, it became clear that they would not assist, and also that His Majesty's Government did not like the idea of a concentration camp. The matter therefore dropped.

4. M. Chauvel, both then and later, was under the impression that the Iraqi authorities would at once set about devising some scheme by which the Assyrians could be induced to return peaceably to Iraq. On the 25th I spoke again to him. Owing to the slowness of communication with Deir-ez-Zor, he had no fresh news and no instructions had been received from Paris. He believed that not more than 700 Assyrians had crossed the Tigris. On the 27th I saw him again, and gave him suitable extracts from your telegram No. 4 of the 26th July to me and from Bagdad telegrams Nos. 182 and 184 to you. He expressed a desire to know when negotiations for the return of the Assyrians would be initiated by the Iraq Government and how they would be conducted; I therefore asked Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes for information on this point, and learned from his telegram No. 194 to you of the 28th July that to ask this question was looking rather far ahead, seeing that to reach a business-like arrangement the Iraqi emissary would have to have a competent British adviser. I saw M. Chauvel on the 28th, and discreetly intimated that immediate negotiations were unlikely. He was obviously much disappointed. I also pointed out the apparent discrepancy (see Bagdad telegram No. 190 of the 27th July to you) between the promises of the French Government and the acts of the French officers on the spot. He assured me that the instructions twice given were in the sense of the promises made in Paris, and also said that, while it was desired to obtain voluntarily a temporary surrender of arms, the ultimate fate of the arms would depend on the settlement reached by Iraq with the Assyrians (see my telegram No. 8 of the 28th July to you).

5. Later, having seen Bagdad telegram No. 200 of the 31st July to you, it appeared to me that some misapprehension existed there as to the intentions of the French. I therefore asked M. Chauvel if they meant to make conditions to the Assyrians or proposals to the Iraq Government. As the result of what he said, I sent my telegram No. 5 to Bagdad on the 2nd August and a copy to you by air mail. I see from Bagdad despatch No. 511 of the 8th August to you that it is considered that the French did make conditions to the Assyrians. They certainly did so, as regards the latter's arms, on lines which were known as early as the 28th July. It was, however, believed here that the suggestion was that the French would act as intermediaries between the Assyrians and the Iraq authorities in regard to the return of the former to Iraq, that they would agree upon conditions with them and then make proposals to the Iraq Government. This they considered to be no concern of theirs. They were only concerned to ensure that no breach of the peace occurred owing to the presence of armed men in Syria.

6. On the 4th August M. Chauvel told me that Nuri Pasha Said was due to arrive that day. He did not then seem to think that there was any chance that the French would consent to receive the Assyrians as permanent settlers on any conditions. His reasons were—

- (a) That they would not know what to do with them. The Assyrian's main value is as a fighting man. They could not so employ them, as there are no vacancies in the Syrian native levies and no money to increase the establishment.

- (b) That they would not know where to put them. Suitable ground for settlement was not available.
- (c) They have for years past had more or less on their hands a large number of Armenian refugees. While much progress has been made in regard to their disposal a final settlement has not yet been reached, and they did not want a fresh lot of refugees.
- (d) They could not afford the expense, especially as they believed that, once some of the Assyrians had been accepted, all the others would wish to follow them.
- (e) They much doubted whether the Assyrians, if established in Syria, would in a few years be any better off than they are in Iraq. They would in the end once more find themselves under an Arab Government, that of Damascus. Their advent would in any case not be welcomed by the Syrian Government.

7. Nuri Pasha actually arrived on the 5th August, and lunched at Aley with M. Helleu and M. Chauvel. What he told them seems to have induced them to modify, albeit rather unwillingly, their original *non possumus* attitude. He apparently stated that he could guarantee that only a limited number of Assyrians (presumably those of the Tkhuma and Tiari clans) would want to settle in Syria, and that the Iraq Government could make a contribution to the cost of settlement. These suggestions seem to have been considered to afford a possible basis of negotiation, and were referred to Paris. Unfortunately Nuri Pasha left before the reply from Paris, which was not unfavourable, was received, and is not to return.

8. To sum up, the general impressions which I gathered in the course of my various conversations with M. Chauvel were as follows:—

- (a) That, whatever may have been said or suggested by interested parties, the French did not want the Assyrians, and tried to make this clear to all concerned at the outset.
- (b) That they considered it was for the Iraq Government, from whose territory the Assyrians had arrived as most unwelcome guests, to arrange for them to return there as speedily as possible.
- (c) That they felt there was a risk in leaving the Assyrians in possession of their arms, and equally a risk if an attempt were made to disarm them by force. They therefore worked for their temporary disarmament, in the belief that the Iraq Government would be able at an early date to tackle the problem of their return to Iraq.
- (d) That it never entered their heads that it was for them to suggest terms to the Assyrians other than as regards their arms while on Syrian territory or to make proposals to the Iraq Government. The procedure they expected was the exact opposite.
- (e) That, if the need arose, they would, on grounds of humanity, be prepared to feed the Assyrians. They foresaw difficulties over this, and rather hoped the Iraq Government might co-operate. Such action might, in their opinion, have been politic.
- (f) That it did not occur to them that they could be called upon to deal with the case under the 1927 Provisional Agreement for the control of tribal affairs on the frontier.
- (g) That they feel that their policy of temporary disarmament was justified by the fact that the Assyrians to whom they returned their arms, before recrossing the Tigris with them, made an agreement with the Iraq authorities for surrendering them on the other side. That this agreement was not kept was due either to bad faith on the part of the Assyrians or to the firing of a chance shot by one side or the other which brought about general fighting.
- (h) That they resent the attempts made, as they believe, to throw the blame for what happened on the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad, who has been practically accused of bad faith.
- (i) That they feel that the Iraqi authorities did not attempt to prevent the Assyrians from leaving.

It seems clear that this is the case, but that the inactivity of the Iraqi authorities was mainly due to their desire to comply with the advice of His Majesty's Government that nothing should be done likely to provoke an armed



conflict. In the circumstances, I avoided any discussion of this point with M. Chauvel.

9. In all my interviews and talks with M. Chauvel I acted in the belief that it was for me, acting semi-officially, to inform the French here of such facts as might be useful to them in appreciating the situation, and also of the views of His Majesty's Government regarding it, and to let His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires know, as he had asked, the attitude and intentions of the French. All official dealings between the French and the Iraq Government were conducted through the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad, except for the short visit of Nuri Pasha on the 5th August, and two appearances of the Iraqi consul-general at the *sérail* subsequent thereto and in connexion therewith.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 5150/7/93]

No. 133.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 541.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter from the Acting Adviser to the Minister of the Interior, dated the 13th August, respecting Assyrian incidents.

*Bagdad, August 19, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 133.

*Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Bagdad, August 13, 1933.*

I ATTACH for your information a copy of Stafford's S/295 of the 10th August, 1933.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. EDMONDS.

*Memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel Stafford.*

(Secret.)

(No. S/295.)

IN the last paragraph of my S/291 of the 7th August I pointed out the difficulties which the civil authorities were experiencing owing to the absence of news. These difficulties have continued.

Such reports regarding the movements of Assyrians have been confused and contradictory. It is as yet impossible to write anything approaching a consecutive account of what has happened during the last three days.

2. It appears, however, that the bulk of the Assyrians who returned to Iraq succeeded in getting up on to the Jebel Bekhair. Some parties, however, crossed back again into Syria. This is confirmed by the reports of French authorities that they have disarmed over 500, and have interned them at Vanek. A few other Assyrians are probably still on the right bank in Iraq territory. The bands which broke through on to the Jebel Bekhair appear to have split up into small groups. Some of these were rounded up by the military and police forces, but in the absence of definite information it is impossible to say how many. The military forces left Dairabun about the 6th August, leaving the police (about 200 in number) behind quite unsupported. These army troops moved south of the Jebel Bekhair towards Balishki Bala, while the column at Balishki Bala moved up along the main road towards the Zakho Pass.

In the meantime, the Assyrians appeared to have moved into the mountains above Busirian and Girfil, some parties pushing on still further. On the afternoon of the 8th August two Assyrians came into Dohuk saying that a large number of Assyrians, estimated at 700, who were in the mountains above Busirian, wished to surrender. They were told that the surrender would be accepted, and

were allowed to return accompanied by two soldiers. Here, it is to be remarked, that it is remarkable that no officer was sent. The soldiers went with the guides and after passing the bodies of a number of dead Assyrians saw a number of armed Assyrians in front of them. They then returned, and it would be hard to blame them for doing so.

Unfortunately, the next day no surrender was made, though under the direction of the Director-General of Police careful arrangement had been made to accept the surrender. It is, of course, still impossible to know why the Assyrians did not surrender, but it is possible that they were deterred by the following reasons: (1) Reports were being spread that the Iraq troops were killing prisoners; (2) the villages of Busirian, Dari, Sershor and Girfil were looted by Kurds from Zakho qadha on the afternoon of the 8th August; (3) a fight appears to have occurred between Assyrians and Kurds on the mountain during the night of the 8th-9th August.

It was reported that another party of Assyrians, estimated at 250, attacked the Kurdish village of Ziwa on the afternoon of the 8th August. This party was attacked by aircraft and bombed.

The next day, the 9th August, parties of Assyrians were reported to have pushed on to the Sapna Valley and were there engaged by the police. It seems that the police, who were in small numbers, were gradually pushed back and to-day (the 10th August) it is reported that the Assyrians are in the neighbourhood of Dihi village (Sheet 137 C/SW sq. 27. a.). The situation remains obscure, and the location of the main body of the Assyrians is still uncertain.

It is reported that the Assyrians have attacked certain Kurdish villages, probably in their attempts to obtain food.

3. I have noted above that Kurds from Zakho qadha looted the villages of Busirian, Sershor, Dari and Girfil. This was an unfortunate incident. Perhaps the Zakho authorities could have taken steps to prevent their tribes moving, but it is difficult to see how the police in Dohuk could have prevented the looting taking place. The acting mutessarif has issued the most stringent orders to stop this kind of thing, but it was obviously impossible to leave small police guards in these villages in view of the fact that large numbers of hostile Assyrians were known to be in the mountains just above the villages. Steps are being taken to recover the loot.

4. Unfortunately, other cases of looting have been reported. Attempts were made to loot the sheep from Simmel village. The police were forced to open fire and it is reported that one Kurd was killed and one wounded. It is reported that certain Jubur and Shammur tribesmen have crossed the river and in one case are said to have looted a Kurdish village. It was only to be expected that such incidents would happen. The tribesmen, both Kurd and Arab, would inevitably seize the opportunity afforded by the present disturbances. The local authorities are taking all possible steps to prevent further occurrences of this nature, and now that extra police have been recruited it should be possible to prevent them spreading.

5. Except for one small incident, which I will deal with later, Mosul town has remained outwardly quiet. But the most active anti-Assyrian propaganda is being employed and the wildest rumours are being broadcast and believed. One of these rumours was that an Assyrian was arrested near the bridge while carrying a packet of dynamite. This rumour was the cause of this morning's incident. An Assyrian was walking by the bridge when he was set upon by a gang of riff-raff. He was badly beaten about and was brought unconscious into the police station. There was for a short time considerable excitement and panic among the Christians. The police took immediate measures to prevent the trouble spreading and were successful.

There is, however, no doubt that public opinion in the town is most inflamed and any incident may lead to trouble. The stories of atrocities committed by the Assyrians and which have been published in the local newspapers have, of course, still further inflamed local opinion.

6. Counter-stories of atrocities alleged to have been committed by the military forces have unfortunately found credence among the Assyrian levies, with the result that they are reported to be somewhat excited.

One of the rumours that the women of the Busirian villages were outraged by the Kurds is definitely untrue. Most of these women are now in Dohuk and have no complaints of personal ill-treatment.



7. It is quite impossible to make any definite recommendations as to immediate action. It is obviously necessary to get the rebel Assyrians to believe that their surrender will be accepted, but it is difficult to get in touch with them. Attempts, however, are being made to do so.

Naturally, the leaders will have to be punished, but it is not clear who the leaders are. Of course, the original leaders of the exodus are known, but it is reported that Yaku is interned in Syria and Loco and some of the other leaders wounded. Here it is to be noted that the Assyrians' casualties have been heavy.

R. S. STAFFORD,  
*Administrative Inspector.*

*Mosul, August 10, 1933.*

[E 5055/7/93]

No. 134.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 542.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of despatch No. 45 from His Majesty's consul, Mosul, dated the 18th August, respecting the massacre of Assyrians.

*Bagdad, August 21, 1933*

Enclosure in No. 134.

*Consul Monypenny to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(No. 45.)

Sir,

*Mosul, August 18, 1933.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 44 of the 16th August, I have the honour to report that Colonel Stafford and Major Thomson visited Simel yesterday. They state that there is no doubt whatever that about 350 Assyrians were killed in the village of Simel by the Iraqi army troops and not by Kurds as originally reported.

It appears that when the Kurds started looting the Assyrian villages in the Dohuk Qadha, the women and children and those men who had remained in the villages and not taken up arms against the Government, took refuge in Simel. They hoped to find safety in Simel, which was a large village, with a police guard, inhabited by pro-Government Assyrians, and connected by telegraph and telephone with Dohuk.

However, on Thursday the 10th August, at about 6 A.M. the village was raided by Kurds, who carried off all the loot they could find, but did not molest the people. At about 10 A.M. the same day some Iraqi armoured cars arrived and collected the rifles from the Assyrians, who surrendered them, thinking that the army would protect them. On the next day, Friday, the army arrived and shot all the Assyrian men with machine guns in the centre of the village, driving them into the houses and in some cases placing machine guns in the windows and shooting down the men inside. A few women and children are believed to have been killed at the same time. Three or four of them are wounded. One wounded man has survived.

The majority of the murdered Assyrians were men of the Baz, Jelu and other tribes friendly to the Government.

No news of this massacre was allowed to reach Mosul till Tuesday when the Minister of Interior visited Simel and, according to Colonel Stafford, was horrified by what had occurred. There were some 400 women and children at Simel yesterday, but they were sent into Dohuk by the Administrative Inspector. It is stated that some 1,500 women and children are now in Dohuk. They are being kept alive with a little bread and a few melons; otherwise they are utterly destitute. Some 300-400 were brought into Mosul by lorry yesterday evening and dumped in some khans, where they have been left without protection and exposed to the threats and insults of the people of the town.

The Iraqi troops are to march into Mosul this afternoon and preparations are being made to accord them an enthusiastic welcome. I am informed that triumphal arches are being erected in the streets, &c. The Christian inhabitants are once again in a state of terror and expect at any time to be attacked by the crowd. If any trouble does arise there seems little hope of any protection being afforded them by the army. I called on the Minister of Interior yesterday evening and informed him of the prevailing uneasiness. His Excellency assured me that there was not the slightest cause for anxiety.

Colonel Stafford is now discussing relief measures with the Minister of Interior, and will suggest that all the women and children be brought to Mosul and placed in a concentration camp.

A large number of villages in the Dohuk and Sheikhan Qadhas have been looted and burned by the Kurds. The latter appear, however, to have refrained from killing the Assyrians, and there are even cases in which Kurdish chiefs have afforded them shelter and protection.

I have submitted this brief description of the fate of some of the Assyrian villages in Dohuk area. The stories now being brought to Mosul by the Assyrian women cannot all be exaggerations, and if only partly true, show that the troops who took part in the massacre of Simel are guilty of the worst atrocities.

I have, &c.

R. G. MONYPENNY.

[E 5153/7/93]

No. 135.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 546.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of despatch No. 46 from His Majesty's consul, Mosul, dated the 21st August, respecting Assyrian incidents.

*Bagdad, August 22, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 135.

*Consul Monypenny to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(No. 46.)

Sir,

*Mosul, August 21, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 45 I have the honour to report that the troops, returning from the operations against the Assyrians, entered Mosul on the afternoon of the 18th August. A few triumphal arches were erected, not by the municipality, but by the townspeople themselves. I am informed that some of the arches were decorated with water melons steeped in blood with knives embedded in them, to represent, so it is stated, the heads of the defeated Assyrians.

A large crowd followed the troops through the streets to the main square of Mosul where for an hour or so there was much cheering and shouting, and a certain amount of firing into the air with rifles and revolvers, while groups of Arabs danced with daggers in their hands. The demonstration passed off without incident and the Christians in the town are now stated to be temporarily less nervous.

I enclose a copy of a statement drawn up on the 15th August by a number of Christian notables, which gives a fair idea of Christian sentiment in Mosul.<sup>(1)</sup> The statement is unsigned as no Christian dare put his name to any such document at the moment.

The news of the massacre of Simel has reached the town. It is generally believed that the senior officer directly responsible is Colonel Ramadhan, second-

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



in-command to Bakr Sidki; and the officer responsible for turning the machine guns on to the disarmed Assyrians is stated to be Lieutenant Ismail Tohallah, who belongs to a well-known Arab family of Mosul, and was in charge of the armoured cars. This officer is now being talked of as "Qassab" or "Butcher" Ismail, even by the townspeople.

Major Thomson informs me that he has been put in charge of relief measures and has asked for and received 1,000 Iraqi dinars with the promise of more when necessary. He has inspected several khans in the town, but can find nothing suitable. He has, therefore, purchased a number of tents and proposes to put the women and children into a camp on the outskirts of the town.

I enclose a copy of a letter,<sup>(1)</sup> which I have just received from Surma Khanum, from which it will be seen that she has now agreed to be removed from Mosul.

There are rumours this morning of trouble in the Amadia Qadha. Among Moslems it is stated that 200-300 Assyrians have taken to the hills and rebelled against the Government. The Assyrians, on the other hand, say that two of their villages were attacked by Kurds; that the villagers defended themselves for three days, but at last, despairing of any assistance from the Government, they abandoned their homes and took refuge in the hills. I shall endeavour to ascertain from official sources whether there is any truth in these rumours.

I am further informed that the Chaldean Patriarch Emanuel and the Jacobite Bishop Mar Athanasius have signed a telegram addressed to His Majesty King Feisal thanking His Majesty and the army, and stating that the country is now quite peaceful.

I gather they were afraid to refuse to sign the telegram, which was drafted for them by the Iraqi authorities.

I have, &c.

R. G. MONYPENNY.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 5155/7/93]

No. 136.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 548.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 21st August, respecting Assyrians in Iraq.

*Bagdad, August 22, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 136.

*Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy, Bagdad.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and, with reference to the Ministry's note, dated the 7th August, 1933, have the honour to forward the enclosed copy of a telegram, dated the 20th August, 1933, which has been addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations *à propos* of the suppression of the armed rising by Mar Shimun and his supporters, and the measures adopted by the Government for the relief of destitute persons and refugees.

The Ministry avail themselves of this opportunity to renew the expression of their high consideration and esteem.

*Bagdad, August 21, 1933.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 136.

*Telegram to the Secretary-General, League of Nations, Geneva, from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad.*

CONTINUATION our telegram of the 6th August, 1933.

Armed rebellion undertaken by supporters of Mar Shimun with object of destroying our military forces and then causing general massacre among peace-loving sects of Iraq has been suppressed within week of outbreak as result prompt measures taken by Government.

During operations no case occurred oppression by regular or newly-recruited forces of Government against villages and inhabitants, whether women, children or men; casualties on both sides confined to rebels and Government forces. Rebels mutilated dead and wounded, burned bodies officers and killed some women and children.

Overwhelming majority Assyrians supported Government against rebellious followers of Mar Shimun, and gave active assistance either by volunteering for enlistment in police or by preserving order in their districts. About 700 of them still loyally serving in Government forces; thefts occurred in villages belonging to rebels, and others who joined outlaw bands after being abandoned by their families, who took refuge in nearest administrative headquarters. Government took immediate steps; these recovered and returned most of loot to owners.

Government has given compensation for small quantity not recovered. Two of looters killed during pursuit and enquiries proceeding from those arrested.

New police posts established in abandoned villages to give owners confidence to return. Relief committees formed with assistance settlement expert, Major Thomson, to feed and lodge destitute or restore them to homes.

Enquiries proceeding regarding instigators and responsible leaders of armed rebellion; Government investigating allegations of unjustifiable breaches of law.

Government protests energetically against misleading propaganda encouraged by quarters desirous of confusing the issue so as to hide the truth and injure reputation of Iraq.

Security restored. Troops withdrawn to permanent stations.

Detailed statement will be prepared due course.—*Foreign Affairs.*

[E 5054/7/93]

No. 137.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 549.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 22, 1933.*

IN my telegram No. 282 of the 18th August I had the honour to report the successful embarkation of the Mar Shimun and certain members of his family early on that day in a Royal Air Force aeroplane, and their departure on the first stage of their journey to Cyprus.

2. As I informed you in my telegram No. 270, the Minister of the Interior was urging on the 15th August that the Mar Shimun should not be sent away, but should be detained for trial on a capital charge. On the same day I addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as instructed in your telegram No. 191, and received on the following morning a reply, copy of which was sent in my despatch No. 532, to the effect that the Iraqi Government proposed either to try the patriarchal family for conspiracy against the safety of the State, or else to deport them the very next day across the Transjordan frontier by way of Rutbah. Nuri Pasha added that the Iraqi Government preferred the latter alternative and suggested the desirability of His Majesty's Government undertaking the transport of the deportees to a temporary home in British territory. I replied to this communication in a further note dated the 16th August, stating the readiness of His Majesty's Government to arrange for the transport and temporary accommodation of the Mar Shimun and members of his family, but recording unequivocally that the responsibility for the deportation and all expenses incurred by His Majesty's Government in connexion therewith rested on the Iraqi Government alone (my despatch No. 532).

[9941]



3. It was clear on the 16th August that, if the Patriarch and the two principal members of his family were not removed by the Royal Air Force without delay, they would either be arrested on a capital charge and confined in Bagdad in danger of suffering the supreme penalty, or else they would be thrust over the Transjordan frontier and left to the tender mercies of the Bedouin, if, indeed, some "accident" did not intervene to prevent their ever reaching the border. On the same day an ordinance (of doubtful constitutional validity) was hurriedly promulgated to enable the issue of deportation orders against the patriarchal family, who, in law, possessed Iraqi nationality, and such orders were served on the Mar Shimun, his father and his brother at the Y.M.C.A. Copies of the deportation orders were enclosed in my despatch No. 532 of the 17th August, and I am reporting separately on the legal issues involved by the procedure adopted by the Iraqi Government.

4. In view of these rapid developments, I concerted urgently measures with the Air Officer Commanding for the removal of the three members of the patriarchal family from Hinaidi at dawn on the 18th August. As I foreshadowed in my telegram No. 264, it proved no easy matter to obtain the consent of the Mar Shimun to leave the country; however, a letter which I received on the afternoon of the 16th (a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 527 of the 16th August) showed that he was prepared to depart if he could be convinced that such action on his part would prevent further bloodshed. This argument was successfully developed by the Air Officer Commanding in the course of a two hours' interview with the Mar Shimun on the evening of the 17th, and Air Vice-Marshal Burnett, who naturally wished to avoid a "scene" on the aerodrome, possibly in the presence of the levies, eventually obtained the promise of the Patriarch that he would comply with the arrangements for his removal the following morning.

5. The prevailing tension and the urgent necessity for the Mar Shimun's departure were illustrated by an incident in the evening of the 17th which I myself witnessed. In order to satisfy myself that the police measures taken for the protection of the Mar Shimun were adequate, I personally visited on several occasions during that afternoon and evening the premises of the Y.M.C.A. At 7.45 p.m., as I was approaching the building, I saw an Assyrian officer and an orderly from the Iraq levies, who had come into Bagdad in mufti in defiance of the Air Officer Commanding's order confining all ranks of the levies to barracks, and who had attempted to visit their Patriarch, being seized by the police, roughly handled and deprived of the revolvers they were carrying. The orderly succeeded in breaking away after a struggle and was pursued by the police into the darkness of a neighbouring date garden, whence I heard repeated revolver shots. The man made good his escape, but the officer remained in custody. He has been handed back to the Royal Air Force authorities. The Iraqi Government are, however, claiming to prosecute him in the civil courts for resisting the police and for carrying firearms without a licence.

6. It was in these circumstances that I received your telegram No. 208 late on the 17th August, and, as I explained in my telegram No. 283, I did not feel able to interfere with the existing arrangements, since, in my opinion and in that of Air Vice-Marshal Burnett, any delay in the departure of the Mar Shimun would have led inevitably to a most dangerous situation which it might have passed beyond our power to control.

7. Accordingly, at 4.15 a.m. on Friday, the 18th, the Air Officer Commanding, accompanied only by Mr. Ward and an A.D.C., drove up to the Y.M.C.A. through a large force of police, both mounted and foot, supported by mobile units with machine guns. The police authorities displayed no inclination to take any part in the proceedings, beyond supplying two taxis, and stood idly by while the Mar Shimun, his father, his brother and their luggage were embarked in the motor cars and a convoy formed, which proceeded immediately to Hinaidi along a road heavily patrolled by armoured cars and mounted police. Once at the aerodrome the embarkation of the party was a matter of minutes; two "Victorias" were standing by with their engines running, and the Mar Shimun and his companions stepped on board after a hurried exchange of farewells. The Patriarch decided at the last moment not to take an attendant with him, but he was accompanied by two Assyrian officers of the Iraq levies in plain clothes, who were specially detailed to see him safely installed in his temporary home in Cyprus and to return with their news in order

to allay any possible anxiety amongst the levies. The Patriarch, before he left, requested Mr. Ward to convey to me his appreciation for what I had done for him, and he desired to thank me specially for my personal supervision at the Y.M.C.A. the previous evening.

8. At a quarter to five the two aeroplanes rose into the sky against the first light of dawn and, except for a brief halt at Rutbah (where he would have met King Feisal had not His Majesty postponed his departure by Imperial Airways at the last moment), the Mar Shimun had passed perhaps for ever from the soil of Iraq. His disappearance awakened sorrow and anxiety at first amongst the Assyrian community in Bagdad, but they have been reassured and comforted to learn that he is now safe in British hands. I understand that the Assyrian levies have taken his departure (which was concealed from them) calmly and that their commanding officer is satisfied with their attitude.

9. A copy of this despatch is being sent by air mail the 24th August. Original by bag.

I have, &c.  
G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 5156/7/93]

No. 138.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 550.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 22, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 261 of the 14th August, in which I raised the constitutional issue involved by the deportation of the Mar Shimun and other members of his family, I have now the honour to report the steps taken by the Iraqi Government to deal with this problem.

2. An ordinance, a copy of which I enclose, was hurriedly promulgated on the 16th August by which the Council of Ministers was empowered to divest of Iraqi nationality any Iraqi belonging to a family who were not normally resident in Iraq before the Great War, who had committed or had attempted to commit any act considered to constitute a threat to the peace and safety of the State. By virtue of this ordinance the Council of Ministers presumably, although I have not seen a copy of their decision, resolved to divest the Mar Shimun and his family of their Iraqi nationality, which decision left the way clear for the issue of deportation orders by the Minister of the Interior. Translations of the deportation orders themselves were enclosed in my despatch No. 532 of the 17th August.

3. While the Iraqi Government should perhaps be congratulated for attempting to provide a legal basis for the deportations, I am advised that it is by no means certain that the ordinance itself does not offend against the Constitution. Under article 26 (3) of the Constitution the King has a right, when Parliament is not sitting, to issue ordinances with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers, if, *inter alia*, the maintenance of order and public security so demands. It is, however, expressly provided that such ordinances shall not themselves contain provisions contrary to the Constitution. It would seem at least to be arguable that an ordinance which differentiates between categories of persons who have acquired Iraqi nationality by law is out of harmony with article 6 of the Constitution, which lays down that there shall be no differentiation in the rights of Iraqis before the law "whatever differences may exist in language, race or creed."

4. The British adviser to the Ministry of Justice, with whom my legal secretary has discussed this question, believes it possible that this ordinance having served its purpose, will not be approved by Parliament, to whom it must be submitted at the beginning of the next parliamentary session. The effect of non-approval would not be to make the ordinance void *ab initio*, and any acts done by virtue of the ordinance would remain valid. It might, however, make a reversion of the deportation order against the Mar Shimun less difficult should circumstances arise in which his return to Iraq could be contemplated. The Judicial Adviser, I understand, has reason to believe that the Iraqi Cabinet only enacted this ordinance by virtue of necessity, and as they are well aware that its provisions



might be turned against certain of themselves at a later stage, it seems possible that Parliament may indirectly be inspired to withhold approval.

5. I have discussed the legal aspects of the deportation at length, in case these issues should become of importance in the future. The Mar Shimun, although he dislikes being classed as an Iraqi subject, may well become alive to the propaganda value of alleging unconstitutional actions on the part of the Iraqi Government. Should he do so it may prove a matter of some embarrassment to the Iraqi Government, since not only may they have to face the Constitutional issue, but they might well be asked as well to justify their action in the light of article 4 (1) of the guarantees given to the League of Nations, which read with article 1 would appear to lay down that "no law, regulation or official action" should deprive an Iraqi national of any civil or political right, shared with other Iraqi nationals.

I have, &c.  
G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

Enclosure in No. 138.

*Ordinance No. 62 on Divestment of Iraqi Nationality.*

(As published in the local press on August 16, 1933.)

(Translation.)

WE, King of Iraq:

After reference to article 26 (3) of the Constitutional Law, pursuant to the proposal of the Minister of Interior and with the approval of the Council of Ministers, do hereby order the enactment of the following ordinance:—

Article 1. By decision of the Council of Ministers, any Iraqi not belonging to a family who were normally resident in Iraq before the Great War may be divested of Iraqi nationality, if he commits, or attempts the commission of, any act considered to constitute a danger [?threat] to the peace and safety of the State.

Art. 2. The Minister of Interior may order to be deported from Iraq any person divested of Iraqi nationality under article 1 hereof, if he considers his deportation to be necessary in the interest of peace or public tranquillity.

Art. 3. This ordinance shall come into force from the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Art. 4. The Minister of Interior is charged with the execution of this ordinance, which shall be submitted to Parliament at its next session.

Done at Bagdad this 23rd day of Rabi' Al Thani, 1352, and the 15th day of August, 1933.

(Signed by all Ministers.)

[E 5169/7/93]

No. 139.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 555.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 16th August, respecting Turko-Iraqi frontier relations.

*Bagdad, August 23, 1933*

Enclosure 1 in No. 139.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(Confidential.)

My dear Chargé d'Affaires,

*Bagdad, August 16, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for information, copy of a note dated the 14th August, 1933, received from the Turkish Legation, regarding the removal of Assyrians from the vicinity of the Turco-Iraqi frontier, together with a copy of this Ministry's reply thereto dated the 16th August, 1933.

I avail, &c.

NURI-AL-SAID,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 139.

*Translation of Note dated August 14, 1933, from the Turkish Legation, Bagdad, to His Excellency Nuri Pasha Al Said, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

IN accordance with the instructions and orders I have received from my Government, I have the honour to communicate the following to your Excellency:—

My Government are definitely of opinion that by their settlement in the frontier zone the mischievous Assyrian race are availing themselves of the opportunity to create certain troubles. My Government, who attach great importance to (the maintenance of) good neighbourly relations, and who have given proof of this on various occasions, are convinced that the Iraqi Government entertain the same feeling on the subject. I therefore request that the friendly Iraqi Government may remove from the frontier zone the Assyrians already settled in the vicinity of our borders, *e.g.*, in the qadhas of Zakho and Amadiyah, and those to be settled, thereby giving effect to the provisions of the Ankara Treaty of "Bon Voisinage."

I avail, &c.  
(For the Minister Plenipotentiary),  
RUHI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 139.

*Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Turkish Legation, Bagdad.*

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Turkish Legation, Bagdad, and, with reference to the Legation's letter dated the 14th August, 1933, regarding the removal of Assyrians from the vicinity of the Turkish borders, have the honour to state that the Iraqi Government hope that the whole Assyrian question will be brought under discussion at the next session of the League of Nations, and they request that the Government of the Turkish Republic will make these representations of theirs to the Council of the League of Nations at the said session.

The Iraqi Government seize the occasion to declare that they attach the greatest importance to their neighbourly relations with the Government of the Turkish Republic, and they trust that the decision to be adopted by the League of Nations will be satisfactory in this behalf.

The Ministry seize this opportunity to renew the expression of their high consideration and esteem.

*August 16, 1933.*



[E 5162/7/93]

No. 140.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 557.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a secret despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul, Kirkuk, dated the 18th August, respecting Assyrian incidents.

*Bagdad, August 23, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 140.

*Vice-Consul Chapman-Andrews to Acting Consul Ogden.*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Kirkuk, August 18, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, following upon disturbances between Moslem and Christian employees of the Iraq Petroleum Company at Baiji, the situation in Kirkuk during the past few days has given cause for great anxiety. Yesterday, however, it was considerably easier and to-day it is rapidly returning to normal.

2. Baiji is within the Mosul liwa, but it is directly connected by private wire with the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited) at Kirkuk, and this morning I was able to obtain accurate information regarding the disturbances there from Mr. E. A. Kinch, through the courtesy of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

3. On the night of the 8th-9th instant an Armenian employee engaged on the "pipe-line" at Baiji got drunk and insulted some Moslems. A free fight followed and three persons were injured. The offending Armenian was at once removed to Tekrit, where he was fined and imprisoned. The nights of the 10th and 11th were quiet, but on the 12th the Assyrians and Armenians declared that they were afraid to go to work on account of the threats of the Moslems. It was therefore proposed to move all the Christians to a camp outside Baiji, known as "Location K. 2," but the force of police was not sufficient to ensure the safe carrying out of the move. The situation between Moslems and Christians was now very tense, and at 9 P.M. on the 12th there was a riot. Shots were fired, but when the British personnel appeared not a man was to be seen, for both parties had taken cover in their respective quarters, facing one another with a sort of "no-man's-land" between. No wounded were seen lying on the ground, yet an hour later an Assyrian was found stabbed with a knife and left for dead. He died later. Seven other people were wounded. It is thought that the Assyrian who died must have been dragged under cover, when wounded, murdered and his body thrown outside.

4. On the morning of Sunday, the 13th, it was considered advisable to remove all the rioters from Baiji by special train. The police and municipal authorities in Bagdad were, however, strongly opposed to this course, so no one was allowed to leave the depot. Later about seventy Assyrians and Armenians were taken to "Location K. 2." On Monday, the 14th, all employees were at work and reinforcements of police arrived with machine guns. On Tuesday, the 15th, matters took a definite turn for the worse, and at 2 P.M. on that day all the Moslems threatened to cease work unless the Christians who had been given special police protection were removed from Baiji. This demand would not be met, so both Christians and Moslems ceased work. It was now clear that Moslem activities were being organised and directed by some outside body, and as transport drivers returned they were one by one intimidated by their co-religionists and persuaded to cease work. In an effort to restart work, however, a Ford van was driven down to the station yard, but the tyres were ripped off by rioters, the driver dragged away and the van turned over and burnt. Police by this time were endeavouring to quell the disturbance by using a machine gun in the village, but the gun position proved untenable, for it was attacked by rifle fire. The gun was therefore moved to a point outside the village, where its use proved effective in preventing any mass movement either way. One rush was made to capture the gun, but the crowd was driven back, leaving four wounded. By this time the place was surrounded by tribesmen, who,

it seems, had broken away from the control of their sheikhs in the hope of looting Baiji. They had apparently been told that there was a possibility of plunder. The tribesmen were held at bay by the machine guns until Wednesday, the 16th, when strong police reinforcements arrived from Bagdad. The Mutesarrif of Bagdad and the chief of police also arrived on that day. The tribesmen began to disperse, and strong action was taken with the rioters, about forty of whom were arrested or dismissed their employment. Other employees were told that if they wished to restart work they were free to do so; otherwise they must leave at once. About seventy Assyrians and Armenians and the same number of Moslems then left Baiji. The situation at Baiji is now rapidly returning to normal, and work has again commenced in a quiet and orderly manner, albeit on a small scale. Rumours that Englishmen have been wounded and Moslems shot down by police are unfounded. Total casualties throughout the disturbances amount to one Assyrian killed and fifteen persons wounded.

*Kirkuk.*—About forty of the Baiji rioters arrived in Kirkuk on Tuesday, the 15th instant. Among them was one Abdul Samed, a former "labour superintendent" at Baiji and a ringleader during the trouble there.

5. Notices at once appeared in the streets of the bazaar calling upon loyal Kirkukliis to follow the example of their "brothers" and "dear soldiers" in the north and revenge the blood of Moslems shed in Kirkuk in 1925. Assyrian employees of the Iraq Petroleum Company to the number of eighty at once asked leave to cease work and defend their homes. They were, however, prevailed upon to continue in their employment on the understanding that their homes and families would be protected by the police. At this point Captain Growdon, inspecting officer of police, took matters into his own hands. The Mutesarrif and the chief of police had, it seems, for some time been aware that anti-Christian propaganda was being rigorously pursued in Kirkuk, but, without consulting Captain Growdon, they took their own "secret" ways of countering it. When, however, these means had, obviously, failed, Captain Growdon saw the Mutesarrif and the chief of police, and told them that unless strong action were taken at once trouble would break out. Besides interfering with the work of the company and resulting perhaps in the non-fulfilment of the contract as to the actual date on which oil was to be available for shipment at Haifa, this trouble would attract the tribes around and the place would probably be sacked. This interview had the desired effect, and it is not too much to say that Captain Growdon is now, practically, in executive command in all matters affecting public security.

6. This, I consider, to be an achievement worthy of commendation, for, prior to the recent trouble, this officer was merely an adviser whose advice was seldom sought.

7. On the 16th instant the company asked that mounted police be detailed to patrol the road from "New Camp" to the town, for it had been rumoured that Assyrian employees were to be attacked on their way home from work, at 2 P.M. The police were at once forthcoming and the critical time passed without incident. Meanwhile, the Mutesarrif had been co-operating in a sincere endeavour to prevent a disturbance. He summoned Abdul Samed and the other Moslem ringleaders to the Serai and told them in unequivocal language that if they struck at the Christians or otherwise disturbed the peace in these difficult times he would see them hanged; that he himself was half a Christian at heart, and in any case a better Moslem than they were. Abdul Samed was then arrested. The rest of the day passed off without incident. The situation on Thursday was much easier, but the police were disturbed by a report that a mob of about twenty Moslem and Assyrian rioters from Baiji were on their way to Kirkuk. The Moslem element was the more dangerous, but the police, in co-operation with the Iraq Petroleum Company, were prepared. As the men came in they were arrested and the ringleaders at once declared to be no longer in the company's employ. Being therefore "unemployed," they were detained by the police pending removal to their own villages. Most of the trouble-makers are said to come from Kerbala and the south. To-day the situation is well in hand. The work of the company proceeds normally and the danger has passed.

I have, &amp;c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.



[E 5163/7/93]

No. 141.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 558.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a report from Major Allfrey, dated the 18th August, of a note to the Ministry of Interior from the Acting Adviser, dated the 19th August, and of a note to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires from the Acting Adviser, Ministry of Interior, respecting the Assyrian incidents.

*Bagdad, August 23, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 141.

*Major Allfrey to the Head of Military Mission (Iraq).*

Dear General,

*Mosul, August 18, 1933.*

I SEND you a copy of Stafford's report as to what happened at Simel.

This information was obtained by cross-questioning four Ayyssrian men, who dressed themselves as women and so escaped, and some Assyrian women. I see no reason to accept the whole thing as gospel truth, as the evidence is biased and taken from women, who are undoubtedly terrified. The Iraqi police in Simel would say nothing.

I should say that there is no doubt that the main facts are fairly accurate (possibly exaggerated), but that details may be wrong.

Reading the report it would appear that it was premeditated and deliberate massacre, i.e., first of all inducing them to hand in their arms and then killing them. I personally doubt this.

You will see that Stafford says that 200 rifles were collected at 10 A.M. on the 10th August. This was just about the time that I was in Simel police post myself; at that time I was told that thirty-seven rifles had been collected in Simel the day before. When I went to Simel I saw a lot of women and children, but not more than about ten men. There was no mention of any further disarming then, and I think the 300 men who were killed in Simel came in between my visit and the following morning.

I think we want information from the army as to the number of rifles they collected off men in Simel during the action, and also as to the number of casualties, if any, to the army. If the answer to both is nil, then it is a pure massacre. I don't propose to ask Bekr any more about it, as he has apparently lied to me, and I may only put him more on his guard. I have not been to see Bekr at all to-day.

Stafford reports that tribesmen were in Simel on morning 11th raiding, but that they took no part in the shooting.

I do not think it is impossible that the tribesmen started the shooting, and that the Jaish joined in. This fits in with the police report from Simel to Mut: Mosul, which I mentioned yesterday.

Again, the times are doubtful. Air Commodore Cunningham passed Amincol in camp at Alokah at 11 A.M. on the 11th, and so, if the show started about 10 A.M. and lasted two hours, this clears Amincol. Even if it started at 8.30 A.M. and lasted about two hours, Amincol could hardly have been in it, and have arrived at Alokah by 11 A.M. in camp.

Anyhow, in reading Stafford's report please remember that the evidence is biased.

Also Stafford does not wish it mentioned to Iraqis that four men survived, dressed as women. He thinks that they will be murdered in order to silence them.

I still think that it is possible that Bekr had no idea of the proposed action, and that if done, it was done by Hajji Ramadan off his own bat, and that he lost control of the situation. Whether Hajji R. told Bekr the full facts or not I

can't say, but it is reasonable that Bekr would naturally try and produce the best case for Hajji R. that he could. No telephone call from you yet and so Macleod is still in Mosul.

Yours ever,  
C. W. ALLFREY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 141.

*Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

My dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Bagdad, August 19, 1933.*

I ENCLOSE copy of Colonel Stafford's report of the 18th August, 1933, on the massacre at Simel.

2. One or two details appear to conflict with details given to General Headlam by Captain Allfrey, who was at Simel police post himself about 10 A.M. on the 10th August, at which time he saw many women and children and only about ten men; Captain Allfrey suggests that the 300 odd men arrived later in the day and that, therefore, the disarming and the killing both took place on the 11th.

3. Personally, I think that arguments based on time are of little importance; oriental ideas about it are so vague. I have little doubt that the story elicited by Colonel Stafford and here reported is substantially correct. I doubt whether a more infamous, cold-blooded and cowardly massacre has ever disgraced even Turkish history.

Yours sincerely,  
C. J. EDMONDS.

Enclosure 3 in No. 141.

*Memorandum from Colonel Stafford.*

(Secret.)

ON the 17th August I visited Dohuk and Simmel. My main object was to ascertain the state of the refugee women in these two places. I was, however, also able to enquire into and to discover the details of the Simmel massacre.

2. What happened then was as follows:—

After the looting of the Tkhuma villages—Busirian, Girfil, Sarshor and Dari—on the 8th August, the Assyrian cultivators of the small villages on the plain near Simmel began to feel nervous. They therefore left their villages—apparently not all at the same time, but gradually—and came in to Simmel. There is a small police post under a sergeant in this village.

These Assyrian villagers are of mixed tribes, with Baz predominating. They have taken no part in Mar Shimun's agitation. Apart from Simmel itself, from which about thirty men went under the leadership of the Mukhtar Werda, very few men indeed from these villages (perhaps six in all) took part in the exodus to Syria. Those who went have not yet returned.

At 6 A.M. on the 10th August the Slaivani tribe raided Simmel and the neighbouring villages. They only looted the live-stock and did not actually enter Simmel itself. No resistance was offered and no shots were fired.

About 10 A.M. the same day a section of army motor machine-guns came to Simmel. The officer in command told the sergeant in charge of the police post that the Assyrians must all surrender their rifles, according to Government orders. In actual fact no orders whatever had been issued for the disarmament of peaceful Assyrian villagers. The order was duly complied with and about 200 rifles were surrendered.

The Assyrians, who were now completely defenceless, felt frightened with the surrounding country full of Arab and Kurdish tribes on the look-out for loot. All of them, therefore, went up to the police post which is situated on the summit of a small tel. Here the Iraq flag flies and under its protection the Assyrians hoped for safety. They numbered about 330 men and 1,100 women and children.



The sergeant in charge of the post, however, refused to allow them to stay there and told the men to go to the house of Shamasha Gavriel and the house next door. The women to go into houses opposite. This order was carried out. Early on the morning of the 11th August tribesmen again came into Simmel, and this time looted all the personal effects of the inhabitants. The raiders then left. It is reported that the police sergeant took part in this general looting and also took about 400 Iraqi dinars in gold and notes from the women.

At about 10 A.M. a detachment of Iraq army troops, including motor machine-guns, arrived at Simmel. It appears that this detachment belonged to Hajj column under the command of Aqid Hajji Ramadhan. The Assyrians were standing outside the houses. Suddenly, without warning, machine-gun and rifle fire was opened upon them. Those who were not hit ran back in the houses. The military troops followed them and, pushing machine-guns and rifles through the windows, fired into the crowded rooms. The massacre appears to have continued for about two hours. When it ended all the men, except four who had miraculous escapes, had been killed. Among them were several boys of about 14 years old. Four women and eight children were also killed. About six women and children were wounded. For several days they received no attention. The murder of women and children was, however, not deliberate.

The total number massacred in this fashion will never be known. The lowest figure given is 315. The truth is probably rather higher.

The massacre was accompanied by the usual horrors, perhaps the worst was the action of the police sergeant going round the houses in dragging out men who, for protection, had dressed in women's clothes and handing them over to the military to be shot. On the other hand, the Assyrian survivors speak highly of the other policemen, and say that it was owing to them that there were no more casualties among the women and children.

Among the killed was Shamasha Gavriel. He was an old man and had been one of the strongest supporters of the Government policy. He was one of those who at the Mosul meeting on the 11th July said: "Long live Iraq, and long live the army!" For it is to be noted that those massacred had done nothing whatever against the Government, they were peaceful villagers most of whom had come into Simmel to be, along with the original inhabitants of that village, under the protection of the Iraq flag.

These facts, which I have stated above, speak for themselves. They require no comment and no elaboration.

3. It is remarkable that news of this massacre was not known at once. It occurred on the morning of the 11th August. Personally, I did not realise that a massacre on this scale had taken place until the Minister of Interior's return to Mosul from Dohuk on the morning of the 15th August. Even then it was thought that the tribes had been mainly responsible. The Kaïmakam of Dohuk qadha, which is only ten minutes away, himself did not know the extent of the massacre until three days after it had happened. This is because he, as all other civil authorities, have been deliberately kept out of things, entirely by the military authorities and to some considerable extent by the police. He was rung up on the telephone by the police sergeant whilst the massacre was going on and told that there was some firing. Later he was told that there had been some rather heavy fighting with casualties on both sides. But he knew nothing about the massacre till later. It appears that the first realisation of its extent came when the Minister of Interior, accompanied by the Chief of Staff, Iraq Army, Director-General of Police and Kaïmakam of Dohuk, visited Simmel early on the morning of the 15th August. The bodies of the killed had been buried by the troops in such shallow caves that the stench was overpowering. In this atmosphere 1,100 women and children had been living since all their male relatives had been murdered in front of their eyes four days before.

R. S. STAFFORD,  
*Administrative Inspector.*

Mosul, August 18, 1933.

Enclosure 4 in No. 141.

*Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

Bagdad, August 22, 1933.

I FORWARD herewith for information a copy of memorandum No. S/316 of the 20th August, 1933, from Stafford, regarding Assyrians.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. EDMONDS.

Enclosure 5 in No. 141.

*Memorandum from Colonel Stafford.*

(No. S/316. Secret.)

REFERENCE my S/306 of the 16th August, 1933.

I enclose, herewith, for your information (and without comment), translation of Mutessarif, Mosul's Secret S/10969 of the 17th August, 1933, addressed to Ministry of Interior, in which he forwards report of sergeant-in-charge of Simmel Police Post regarding the incidents of the 11th August.

R. S. STAFFORD,

*Administrative Inspector.*

Mosul, August 20, 1933.

Enclosure 6 in No. 141.

*Translation of Mutessarif, Mosul's Secret No. S/10969 of August 17, 1933, to Ministry of Interior, Bagdad.*

SIMMEL incident.

On the 14th instant, the Kaïmakam of Dohuk had informed me on the telephone that a fight had taken place between the Government forces and the Assyrians at Simmel, and as the information did not show the details of the incident, we asked him to send us the details, and he has now forwarded copy of the report of In Charge, Simmel Police Post, of the 14th August, 1933; copy sent herewith for information.

*Translation of Report of August 14, 1933, from In Charge, Simmel Police Post.*

On the 11th August, 1933, at 8.30 A.M. we heard the sound of firing from the direction of Busirian between the deserting Assyrians and the tribes. The firing went on nearing gradually till they reached Simmel and the Assyrians entered the village of Simmel and wanted to attack the post, but we did not give them the chance to do so. They entered the village and the firing became inside the village between the Assyrians and the tribesmen. At that moment we saw the troops coming from Zakho direction and approaching towards Dohuk. On their arrival at the village of Simmel the Assyrians attacked them and the firing now took place between the Assyrians, the troops and the tribes. The attacking continued for about two hours, at the end of which the army left for Dohuk; therefore, we do not know the number of killed and wounded of the troops. The tribesmen started looting the village. There were about fifteen killed and twenty wounded from the tribes. Three hundred and five Assyrians were killed. After that we drove away the tribes from the village. The army returned from Aloka direction and assisted us in the driving away of the tribes. The troops then left and we began guarding the village.



[E 5164/7/93]

No. 142.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 559. Very Secret.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter, dated the 19th August, 1933, from the acting adviser to Ministry of Interior, Bagdad (with enclosure), respecting Assyrians in Iraq.

*Bagdad, August 23, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 142.

*Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

(Very Secret.)

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Ministry of the Interior, August 19, 1933.*

I FORWARD herewith copy of Stafford's S/312 of the 18th August, 1933, regarding the spread of anti-Assyrian feeling to Christians generally.

2. It is most important, in the interests of the Christians themselves, that nobody should be induced by indignation at the army atrocities revealed during the last few days to take precipitate action resembling intervention. When I flew to Mosul on the 16th August I found that Hikmet Beg evidently realised the paramount importance of keeping control of the fanatical feeling in Mosul town itself; this accounted for his unwillingness to use British assistance other than that already available in the existing administrative machine. For instance, he wished to put the administrative inspector in charge of the relief committees and was ready to give him a free hand to go anywhere; unfortunately, the administrative inspector cannot be in five places at once and do five men's work. However, it did not take much persuasion to secure the utilisation of Major Thomson's services; the reappointment of an inspecting officer of police will further strengthen the administrative inspector's hand.

3. For these reasons the appointment of the R.A.F. mission of search for levies' families will not be entirely palatable to Hikmet Beg; it is important that they should proceed with the greatest discretion, and in close co-operation with the Minister.

4. On the 17th August, during my interview at which he finally decided to await the return of Sir F. Humphrys, the King used the following argument in favour of an immediate return to Switzerland:—

In view of the casualties inflicted on the Assyrians, there was clearly a danger that Europe might be tempted to interfere. To this he and the Iraqi nation would never submit; they would fight with the determination of desperation against it; they were not going to get into the position of Turkey before the war, when the presence of Christians gave constant pretexts for European intervention; pressure on Iraq would have the same result as the pressure on Turkey—the creation of a Mustafa Kemal—and would do the Christians no good. He therefore felt that he would do best to go to Europe at once to get in touch with leading personalities and forestall any movement for intervention.

5. The first essential is to try to get things back as far as possible to normal. The army detachments should be withdrawn from Dohuk and all units should return to their normal peace stations; relief for the destitute is already in hand; refugees at Al Qosh can gradually return to their villages in the vicinity under protection of numerous new police posts; a certain number of families can regain contact with their breadwinners as lists are drawn up; the removal to Hinaidi of dependants of levies will reduce the number of refugees to be cared for in Mosul. The Minister is probably as well qualified as anybody to reduce the inflammation of feeling in Mosul city.

6. If the future of the 500 Assyrians now interned in Syria can be quickly settled, that will be an important step forward. Their return to Iraq appears to me unthinkable. It would be simplest if the French would agree forthwith to keep them and utilise for their settlement the large sums I understand to be

available as the result of repayments of advances made to earlier Armenian immigrants (this is League money, not French). The Iraqi Government would doubtless be only too glad to pay the expense of transporting the families to Syria.

7. I understand that Surma is now anxious to leave the country with a number of females and children. This should be encouraged; the disappearance of the Patriarchal family, whose ambitions have contributed so largely to the tragedy, would further tend to ease the situation.

8. It is important to realise that the King and Ministers are no more horrified than the Patriarch at the terrible suffering inflicted on hundreds of innocent Assyrian villagers. The Assyrians themselves were the aggressors; the French deliberately threw a match into the powder magazine; atrocities invariably follow explosions of religious feeling; did not the French actually bombard the city of Damascus? What about the Italian atrocities in Tripoli? Iraq is in good company; at any rate, the Assyrian menace that has troubled Iraq for so long is now liquidated, and that was well worth a few hundred lives; massacres of Christians are the natural and inevitable results of intervention on their behalf; it is merely the operation of a natural law.

9. Many fundamental questions of policy must presumably arise as the result in particular of the atrocious conduct of the army, which now stands out as a political danger of the first magnitude (no revelation to those who have watched its progress and noted the milestones, of which Kadhaiman on the 10th July, 1927, and Sulaimani on the 6th September, 1930, had perhaps been the most noteworthy); the punishment of the persons principally concerned in the massacres, the future of the British military mission, the possibility for any Assyrians, or at any rate the immigrants, to remain in Iraq, and so on. All these must wait until the inflammation is reduced.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. EDMONDS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 142.

*Memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel Stafford respecting Assyrians in Iraq.*

(Very Secret and Confidential.)

I FEEL bound to express my considered opinion that circumstances may arise in the not far distant future which may bring about a situation of definite danger to the large Christian population in Mosul town and outside.

2. My reasons for forming this opinion are as follows:—

- (a) The army is in a most truculent mood, and in view of what actually happened at Simel it is obvious that it is capable of anything.
- (b) During the last two months, and in particular during the last fortnight, a violent campaign of propaganda has lashed the mob into a state of fury. It is true that this campaign is deprecated by the more responsible Moslems of Mosul, but it has none the less had its effect upon the lower classes. It is also true that this campaign was initially directed against the Assyrians, but it has also included all Christians. The spokesmen of this campaign affect to consider all Christians as being traitors to the Iraq State.

3. In consequence, the Christians of Mosul town are living in an acute state of nervous tension. With an excited and entirely undisciplined mob, any small incident might lead to a tragedy. Normally, I consider that the police would be able to deal effectively with the situation, but in view of the present attitude of the army, I am by no means confident that it could do so now.

4. In my opinion, the dangerous time will come when foreign Powers or the League of Nations commence to make protests and demands. In its present mood it is at least possible that the army might attempt to object to foreign interference and to resist. Such action would cause troubles far worse than those which have already occurred.

R. S. STAFFORD,

*Administrative Inspector.**Mosul, August 18, 1933.*



*Memorandum on the Question of the possible Removal of the Assyrian Community in Iraq to (a) Turkey, (b) Persia, or (c) Syria.*

*Origin of the Assyrian Community in Iraq and early Attempts to settle them in Hakkari.*

THE majority of the Assyrian community in Iraq came originally during the war from Turkish and Persian Kurdistan. At Russian instigation, they threw in their lot with the Allies during the war, and, having been twice deserted by the Russians, the survivors fought their way into Iraqi territory, where they were housed and fed for three years at the expense of His Majesty's Government, who, however, were not responsible for the original entry of the Assyrians into the war, or pledged in any way to the interests of that people. In the summer of 1921 the Assyrian refugee camp was closed down, a money grant being made to each family to finance their return to their old homes. Many of these families found their way back to the villages of the Hakkari country, which it was then thought would be included in Iraqi territory. Other Assyrian tribesmen, whose original homes were in the territory which it was recognised would remain Turkish, were still within Iraqi territory near Dohuk and Aqra. The Persian Assyrians dispersed to the towns, awaiting the time when it would be possible for them to return to their homes in the Urmia district. Many of them are waiting still. During the period 1921-24 there seemed every prospect that the Assyrian problem would solve itself, that the majority of the refugees would filter back to their homes in Turkey and Persia, while the remainder would settle down and develop vacant lands in the Mosul district of Iraq. In order to assist this process His Majesty's Government decided to press for a frontier with Turkey which would include within Iraq the greater part of the home lands of the Ottoman Assyrians. In particular, it was decided to advocate the cession to Iraq of the Hakkari Province of Turkey, in which certain Assyrian tribes had their homes. This scheme received its first setback in the summer of 1924, when the Turks, extending their administration into the Hakkari district, expelled those Assyrians who had returned there back into Iraq.

2. Some months earlier the northern frontier of Iraq, which had been left undefined by the Treaty of Lausanne, was discussed between representatives of the United Kingdom and the Turkish Governments at Constantinople. At this conference the Turks refused to consider any frontier which would leave within Iraq the Assyrian lands in Hakkari. In the course of the discussions, however, the Turkish delegate stated that the Assyrians "would still find in Turkish territory the tranquillity and prosperity which they enjoyed there for centuries, provided that they did not repeat the errors which they committed with foreign encouragement at the beginning of the Great War."

3. The hope that the Hakkari Province would be gained for the Assyrians and Iraqis was finally dispelled by the Council of the League of Nations, who, in December 1925, allotted to Turkey the bulk of the territory formerly inhabited by the Assyrians, including the Hakkari Province. In promulgating their frontier award, the Council invited the mandatory Power to grant the Assyrians a measure of local autonomy. The British representative at the Council meeting lost no time in showing that this was impracticable; he pointed out that the frontier awarded by the Council rendered it impossible to find in Iraq suitable territories for the settlement for the Assyrians as a compact and organised community, and finally destroyed their hopes of a separate and homogeneous existence. In the British evidence presented to the League Frontier Commission, on whose report the Council award was based, it had been emphasised that if the Hakkari region were not assigned to Iraq the Assyrians could not be granted any local autonomy, because in that case they could not be settled in homogeneous communities. In making their recommendations to the Council, however, the Frontier Commission appear to have expected that, in the course of time, the mountain-bred Assyrians would drift back to their homes in the Hakkari country, and they apparently did not contemplate, in view of the statement made by the Turkish delegate at the Constantinople Conference, that the Turkish Government would place any obstacles in their way. These expectations, however, were not fulfilled. Ruthless deportations of Assyrians were carried out by the

Turks in the frontier districts in the autumn of 1925 which effectually extinguished any immediate prospect of the Assyrians returning to live under Turkish rule, and since 1925 the Turkish Government have consistently denied the Assyrians access to their former homes.

4. In the Assyrian Petition of the 17th June, 1932, one of the demands made was that the Hakkari region of Turkey should be ceded to Iraq and handed over to the Assyrians. In the observations of His Majesty's Government on the petition, it was pointed out that what lay at the root of the whole petition was the ineradicable longing for their native land in Hakkari. Doubt was expressed, however, whether their return to Hakkari was practicable.

5. The Foreign Office have always been doubtful of the wisdom of pressing for the return of the Assyrians to Hakkari if that province was to remain under the sovereignty of Turkey. Past experience of Christian minorities in Turkey is unfortunate, and it is unlikely that the Turks would give reasonable conditions of security, whereas those responsible for advocating the transfer would be held responsible for anything which might happen to the Assyrians afterwards in Turkey.

*Recent Discussions regarding possible Settlement of Assyrians in Hakkari.*

6. Nevertheless, the Turkish Government have been sounded on various occasions within the last two years regarding their willingness to accept the Assyrians. There was at one time some indication of a possible change of heart on the part of the Turkish Government, e.g., the Iraqi Prime Minister, during a visit to Angora at the end of 1931, formed the impression that the Turks were not unattracted by the idea of readmitting the Assyrians into Hakkari with the object of using them as a counter-weight to the Kurds, with whom the Turkish Government are perpetually in trouble. But when the question was discussed at Geneva in September 1932 between Nuri Pasha and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs as a practical issue, it was clear that the Turks were only prepared to receive the Assyrians in return for impossible conditions. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that Turkey would demand as a *quid pro quo* that she should be formally released from the minority obligations of the Treaty of Lausanne. Alternatively, the Turkish Government might be prepared to cede Hakkari in return for the "Duck's Beak," which is the name given to that part of Syrian territory which lies between the north-west corner of Iraq and Turkey. The idea that a third party (Syria) should pay the price of a cession of territory from Turkey to Iraq was obviously out of the question, and His Majesty's Ambassador in Turkey shortly afterwards explored the possibility of exchanging the Hakkari Province against the Barzan area of Iraq. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, made it clear to Sir G. Clerk that, while he would not mind giving the Hakkari country to Iraq in return for compensation to the west, Barzan was to the east, and nothing would induce him to increase Turkish commitments in that direction.

7. Since then the question has not been discussed, except when Mr. Rendel, in a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador in London on the 23rd August last, mentioned casually that it seemed a pity that the Assyrians, who were excellent material, should not be allowed to return to their native Hakkari mountains, as the Turks might well find them a useful addition to the population. The Turkish Ambassador said he realised the difficulty of the problem, but he was most emphatic that the solution was quite out of the question and could not for a moment be considered.

*Possibility of Settlement in Persia.*

8. It was announced in the *Daily Telegraph* on the 21st March, 1933, that Captain Rassam (who has been prominent in petitioning the League about the Assyrians, and bears a heavy responsibility for fomenting among them discontent against the Iraqi Government) had arranged with the Persian Government that all or any of the Assyrians living in Iraq would be received in Persia.

9. Subsequently, copies of letters exchanged between Captain Rassam and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs were made available to His Majesty's Government by the courtesy of the Iraqi Government. They showed that the announcement in the *Daily Telegraph* was most misleading. All that the Persian



Government were willing to do was to raise the ban which has hitherto been imposed upon the entry of the Assyrians into Persia. The Persian Government were willing to grant them freedom of religion subject to their acceptance of Persian citizenship and complete obedience to all Persian laws and regulations (which would incidentally involve surrendering their rifles); they stipulated that the Assyrians must never form political or national groups or parties. The Persian Government would give no financial assistance, would reserve complete freedom in regard to the choice of places for settlement, and would not permit settlement in one fixed place. It was stipulated that the Assyrians should remain settled in a number of different places and the Persian Government would give no undertaking to grant them freehold land. They would only be permitted to occupy and cultivate land, their position being that of tenant labourers. Lastly, the Persian Government would permit no State or private organisation or any person whatsoever to interfere in matters concerning the emigration or settlement of the Assyrians. It was thus clear that the terms offered by the Persian Government were in many respects unfavourable, as compared with the conditions enjoyed by the Assyrians in Iraq.

*Possibility of Settlement in Syria.*

10. When the Assyrian exodus from Iraq to Syria took place, at the end of July, His Majesty's Government sounded the French Government as to their willingness to accept the emigrants for permanent settlement. The French Government then appeared to have no objection in principle to receiving at all events a limited number as permanent settlers. Consideration of the matter was suspended owing to the fighting which broke out in Iraq, but a telegram has now been sent to Paris asking His Majesty's Ambassador to obtain, if possible, information as to the present attitude of the French Government towards the settlement, not only of those Assyrians who have already taken refuge in Syria, and of their families who are still in Iraq, but of any other portion of the Assyrian community in Iraq which might express a desire for removal, or whose removal the League of Nations might consider desirable.

11. While settlement in Syria may have to be considered as an ultimate solution to the Assyrian problem in Iraq, it is necessary to point out that it would not necessarily be the ideal solution from the point of view of the Assyrians themselves. There is reason to suppose that the local French authorities in Syria are, at best, only lukewarm about the project. They have already on their hands a large number of Armenian refugees and may not wish to add to their minority problems. In addition, it is doubtful whether suitable land for settlement is available, and the question of the employment of the Assyrians may be a difficult one. Their main value is as fighting men, and it appears that there are no vacancies in the Syrian native levies, and no money to increase the establishment.

12. Finally, settlement in Syria might only be a postponement of the problem, since, in the event of Syria being freed from the mandate, the Assyrians would once again find themselves under an Arab Government.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,  
September 4, 1933.*

[E 5192/7/93]

No. 144.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 560.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the Acting Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, dated the 12th August, enclosing copy of a note by Lieut.-Colonel Stafford respecting Assyrians in Iraq.

*Bagdad, August 23, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 144.

*Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.*

Dear Ogilvie-Forbes,

*Bagdad, August 12, 1933.*

I ENCLOSE copy of an interesting note on the Assyrians by Stafford received with his S/283 of the 3rd August, 1933 (the day before the recrossing of the Tigris).

Yours sincerely,  
C. J. EDMONDS.

*Note by Lieut.-Colonel Stafford.*

(No. S/283. Secret.)

*Mosul, August 3, 1933.*

I ATTACH herewith a note which I have written on the Assyrian problem. My main difficulty was to avoid making the note too lengthy. It would be easy to expand many of the points.

I have endeavoured to put up the various points of view as impartially as possible. This does not imply that I necessarily agree with them.

R. S. STAFFORD,  
*Administrative Inspector.*

*Notes on the Assyrian Problem by Lieut.-Colonel R. S. Stafford,  
Administrative Inspector, Mosul and Arbil Liwas.*

THE Assyrian problem presents so many features of extraordinary difficulty, that it is essential, in order to understand how the present position has come about, to know something of the psychology of the conflicting parties. It is necessary to ask why Iraq officialdom, the Assyrians, the Kurds and the townspeople of Northern Iraq have reached their present state of mind.

2. It will be convenient to deal with the Assyrians first—

There is no need to go into pre-war history, except to say that before the war the Assyrians living in their rugged mountain fortresses had little or no contact with the Government. This lack of contact with the Government has, for a variety of reasons, continued to the present day. In consequence the Assyrians know nothing of the Iraq Government, but are filled with suspicions in regard to it. To put the matter concisely, their feelings *vis-à-vis* the Iraq Government appear to be as follows:—

- (i) They object to living as subjects to a Moslem Power.
- (ii) They fear that the Government is not strong enough to prevent the Kurds attacking them as they have been attacked in the past. For to the Assyrians the memories of the year 1842 are still vivid.
- (iii) They consider themselves to be culturally more advanced than the Arabs and object to being subject to what is predominantly an Arab Power.
- (iv) They mistrust Iraqi officials, considering that the majority of them are (a) corrupt, (b) prejudiced against Assyrians. This last opinion has been strengthened recently by the open efforts of local officials to build up an opposition party to the Mar Shimun. I will deal with this point later.
- (v) They consider that certain promises which are alleged to have been made by two successive Iraq Prime Ministers in 1924 and 1925 have not been kept.
- (vi) A certain number of the rank and file have been persuaded by their leaders that the Iraq Government has decided on a general massacre. How absurd this idea is has been proved by the fact that all the able-bodied men of many villages left their families unguarded and at the mercy of any assailant. In some cases the abandoning villagers have asked for protection from the Government which was supposed to be going to massacre them.

[9941]



3. The feelings of the Assyrians regarding the British Government are still more bitter. They forget the early benefits which they received in 1918 when they arrived in Iraq destitute refugees. They remember certain promises which were made to them at different times regarding (1) a measure of autonomy, (2) settlement as a body in one place. They consider that these promises have not been kept in any particular. Their list of grievances in this respect is long. It starts with their having been abandoned in 1915 by the Russians, who were allies of the British. It includes the non-fulfilment of the promises made in 1919 that they would be settled in the north. It is true that such settlement would have entailed the eviction of Kurds from villages in which they had lived for generations, but in view of the frequent revolts of the Kurds against the occupation Government, it seems to have been considered by the British authorities at that time that such treatment of the Kurds was justified. Again, similar promises, together with an undertaking for a degree of local autonomy, were made in 1924. The then Administrative Inspector, Mosul, for instance, is alleged to have said that the Assyrians would be allowed to retain certain Kurdish villages from which the original inhabitants, who had taken part with the Turks in their incursions into Amadiyah Qadha, had been evicted. A little later the Kurds were allowed back and the Assyrians had to leave. Other promises from much higher authorities were also made. It is easy to be wise after the event, but it is quite obvious now that none of these promises were capable of fulfilment. It is possible that they were made when it was still hoped that the Hakkari villages, previously occupied by Assyrians, would be included in Iraq, while again at that time the early termination of the British mandate was not envisaged. This certainly was not envisaged by the Frontier Commission, which in its report emphasised the necessity of the Assyrians being granted no less local autonomy than they had enjoyed before the war. The members of this commission cannot have studied the recent history of the Turkish Empire or they would have realised that during the 19th century there were many semi-autonomous rulers. The Turks were gradually breaking the power of each of these and the turn of the Assyrians would no doubt have come soon. There are proofs that this was the case.

Naturally the decision of the Frontier Commission was a great blow to the Assyrians. Their settlement, however, continued. The labours of Captain Foweraker in 1927-28 resulted in the settlement of the bulk of the Assyrians of the cultivating class. But there had in the meantime grown up a class of young men who knew little of the high mountains or of the agricultural conditions there. These had been employed in the levies and had become accustomed to a standard of living far superior to that enjoyed by their fathers or to that which could be provided by agricultural labour. This class provides the greatest problem of all. For there is nothing harder than to reduce one's standard of living, and yet this is what the Assyrians will be faced with if they go on to the land. And yet owing to their ignorance of Arabic—and in the case of the young men of Kurdish also—little employment in the towns can be hoped for.

There can be little doubt that the character of the Assyrians has suffered as a result of pampering. In addition to this it is an unfortunate fact that the levy soldiers have been taught to have little or no regard for the Iraq Government or its officials. All Assyrian complaints were made through levy headquarters. It may be argued that the lack of sympathy of Iraqi officials may also have been a cause, but it can hardly be disputed that the great majority of Assyrians, and in particular practically all those who had served in the levies did not consider themselves as being Iraqi subjects.

The termination of the mandate in 1932 and the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations as an independent State came, therefore, as a final blow. The Assyrians had never believed the reports that this was going to take place. They were now finally convinced that they had been betrayed by the British. The events of last year are so recent that they need no recapitulation. But in the end the mutiny of the levies was pacified (1) by the levies giving an oath that they would not mix in politics, which oath, it is to be noted, had first to be approved by the Mar Shimun, (2) the promise that the demands of the Assyrians would be heard by the League of Nations. Here it is to be remarked that both the British and the Iraq Governments knew quite well that there was no likelihood whatsoever of these demands being accepted, and this is what took place.

When the Mar Shimun returned to Iraq after his failure at Geneva, he appears to have told his followers that there was no future for them except in Iraq. It is just possible, though, in view of his obstinate character and of his claims for temporal power, perhaps, rather unlikely, that he might then have been prepared to co-operate with the Iraq Government in settlement of those Assyrians who were still landless. What finally prevented him from doing so was his discovery that his most deadly enemy, Malik Khoshaba of the Tiyyar Zair, had been officially appointed as paid president of the Assyrian advisory settlement committee. For during Mar Shimun's absence from Iraq the local authorities had been doing their utmost to build up an opposition party. In this they were partially, but only partially, successful. It is true that the bulk of the Lower Tiyyari and of the Ashuti were detached from him, but the bulk of the Assyrians remained faithful to him. The extent to which this is the case has been amply proved by the recent exodus to Syria. For the Assyrians, who took part in this exodus, are the best settled of all the Assyrians.

It is difficult, therefore, to avoid considering that this appointment of Malik Khoshaba was a mistake. It is, as noted above, very likely that nothing could have induced Mar Shimun to see reason, but this appointment simply made him more obstinate than ever. He could claim with a certain amount of reason that the case was prejudiced against him.

Another mistake, this time of neglect, made by the local authorities was the omission to broadcast immediately after the decision of the League the full facts of the case. It was not until the 10th July that a meeting of the Assyrian leaders was held in Mosul. By which time the detention of the Mar Shimun in Baghdad and the concentration of large military forces in Dohuk qadha had rendered the Assyrians more suspicious than ever. It is true that the Iraq Government had no alternative to these two steps at the time, but a meeting in a calmer atmosphere and with Mar Shimun present, say in February last, might have been successful. The meeting, when it was held, completely failed in its primary object, *i.e.*, the detaching of Assyrians from Mar Shimun. It did, however, serve one purpose. After it there could be no possible doubt as to the policy of the Iraq Government. The Assyrians at last realised what they could expect if they remained in Iraq and that they could hope for nothing more from the British Government. They very rapidly decided that the conditions offered were not good enough. Hence their departure for Syria. It was a stupid thing to do, but the Assyrians are a stupid people. They appeared to think that the French authorities would accept them. They did not stop to think that, while they objected to a Moslem Government in Iraq, they were going to another Moslem Government in Syria, since, of course, it is obvious that the French mandatory régime will not endure for ever.

4. From the above it will be understood that the Assyrians feel very bitterly towards the British Government. This is because they consider that the British Government has broken its word. They do not realise that their demands cannot be granted. Any kind of autonomous State is out of the question and so is any temporal power for the Mar Shimun. They are dissatisfied at living in privately owned and sometimes unhealthy villages, and the argument that the great majority of the Arabs and Kurds in Iraq are living under exactly the same conditions carries no weight with them. They reply that they are superior a people and require better conditions. For it is to be remembered that the Assyrians are convinced that it was only owing to their military feats that the Iraq Government had been able to establish any kind of administration in the north. They feel that they are conquerors and should be treated as conquerors. This is their genuine feeling, fantastic though it may sound. Incidentally, it would be interesting to know what casualties the Assyrian Levies suffered in their various small wars with the Kurds. There is much reason to doubt whether their total casualties were as much as those suffered in one day by a single company of many a British battalion on the Somme or at Ypres. The truth is that the Assyrians have proved themselves to be, under British officers, adepts in guerilla warfare in the mountains. It remains to be proved whether they would be equally good in a serious battle.

The British officers of the levies have, as is the way of British officers everywhere, encouraged the Assyrians to think that they were first-class troops. This was to increase the "esprit de corps." Perhaps this encouragement sometimes took the form of belittlement of other local forces. In any case this encouragement has had the effect of increasing the natural conceit of the Assyrians. And this conceit has no bounds.



The recent claims of the Assyrians which were rejected by the League of Nations show that they have no understanding of practical politics. For they demanded a semi-autonomous enclave in a district where they are a small minority. But their earlier claims went far beyond this. In a book, written by an Assyrian in 1924, the demand was made that an independent Assyrian empire should be established, stretching from Diar Bekr in the north to Kifri in the south: it is not easy to deal with this type of mentality.

5. As for the point of view of Iraq officialdom, owing to other preoccupations comparatively little attention appears to have been paid to the Assyrian problem up to 1930. It is, however, alleged that the Government in 1924 and 1925 promised the Assyrians a measure of local autonomy. The Foweraker settlement was carried out at the expense of the Lunn Fund. In 1930 the activities of Messrs. Cope and Rassam, on behalf of minorities and in particular of Christian minorities, brought the Assyrians to the fore. The reactions of the local officials to this propaganda were most unfavourable, and strong feelings were roused against the Assyrians especially in Mosul town. For it was feared that these activities might interfere with the termination of the British mandate and the obtaining of complete independence. The British Government and certain British officials in Iraq were, of course, accused of supporting these activities. The bitter feelings roused gradually died down, but the suspicions remained. The events of last year, though primarily directed against the British Government, also affected the Iraq Government. The latter realised that it was likely that the new kingdom would be faced with the danger of an intractable and at the same time fully-armed minority in the north. The Iraq Government, as it was bound to do, definitely rejected the demands put forward by the Assyrians, and was quite satisfied when the League of Nations did the same.

It was genuinely hoped that the problem would be solved by land settlement on the lines of the undertaking given by Iraq to the League. For the Iraq Ministers have frequently noted that they realised that a contented body of Assyrians in the north would be a source of strength. It was, however, not understood that land settlement was only part and perhaps the least important part of the problem. The events of the last two months have finally opened the eyes of everyone to the true facts of the case. As no easy solution can be seen, it is not surprising that Iraqi officials have now lost whatever sympathy they ever had towards the Assyrians and view them as a very positive danger.

#### Kurds.

6. Prior to the war the majority of the Assyrians living in what is now Iraq were Rayats. They were definitely a subject people, but as such they were protected against aggression by the Kurdish aghas to no less degree than the Kurds themselves.

The first incursion of the Assyrians into the Amadiyah qadha in 1919, in the course of the ill-fated enterprise of Agha Petros, was the cause of much of the present ill-feeling between Kurds and Assyrians. For, as is well known, the Tiyari and Tkhuma sections broke away from the main expedition and endeavoured to reach their old Hakkiari homes. The severe climatic conditions prevented them from doing so, but on the way up and on their return the Assyrians were guilty of wanton attacks on Kurdish villages. Not only animals and men, but also women and children, are alleged to have been killed. The Kurds were also disquieted by the reports, which apparently had some foundation, that their villages were to be given to the Assyrians, while latterly the claims of the Assyrians for a semi-autonomous enclave in the frontier qadhas have caused still further uneasiness. In consequence, Kurds in Dohuk and Amadiyah qadhas are definitely ill-disposed towards the Tiyari and Tkhuma sections of the Assyrians. In passing, it is to be noted that the Kurds as a rule speak of the Assyrians as Tiyaris and to some extent this name is also used in the towns.

#### People of the Towns.

7. There is no doubt that feeling in Mosul has for some time past been strong against the Assyrians. Every few months some incident occurs which renews suspicion. The last was the stone-throwing incident of May last. The whole truth of this remarkable affair is still not known, but there appears to be little doubt that the stone-throwing was the work of Assyrians, whatever their motive

may have been. This anti-Assyrian feeling is in part religious, it is in part political, but it is also in part based on fear. For the Assyrians are known to be well armed and the 1923-26 riots which occurred in Mosul and Kirkuk are still vividly remembered.

#### The Present Position.

8. The absence of information from the French authorities in Syria renders prophecy as to immediate developments extremely difficult. It is not, as yet, accurately known (1) why the Assyrians gave up their arms to the French on the 30th July; (2) under what conditions, if any, the surrender was made.

The French representatives at the meeting with the Iraqi representatives on the 29th July said that the French mandatory Power had categorically refused to admit Assyrians into Syria now or at any future date. The next day it was reported that the majority of the Assyrians had surrendered their rifles to the French and had been sent to a village named Mugilan, a few miles away. It is therefore possible that the French authorities have changed their minds. It is, however, more probable that the Assyrians on hearing that they would have to surrender their rifles if they returned to Iraq thought that they would force the French authorities to accept them by entering Syria and handing in their rifles. The French authorities were bound by articles 5 and 6 of the Provisional Frontier Agreement of 1927 to remove them from the frontier. But this does not mean that they intend to accept them permanently in Syria. In fact this seems unlikely. It is therefore probable that the Iraq Government will have to take them back. It may be unwilling to do so, but there appears to be no alternative. The Assyrians will, of course, be disarmed, and thus their potentialities for trouble in the future will be lessened. But they will return in a sullen and disappointed mood, and it would be too optimistic to suppose that they will at once settle down as contented citizens of Iraq. It will not be necessary to punish the rank and file. The loss of their rifles will be quite sufficient punishment. Apart from this, there is little doubt that large numbers of those who crossed into Syria were induced to do so by the false promises and propaganda of their leaders. Right up to their surrender to the French, it appears that a considerable number of them were anxious to return to Iraq on any terms. They were prevented from doing so by their leaders, who were still followed by the majority, including all the Tkhuma and most of the Tiyari Zor. Action will certainly have to be taken against certain of these leaders.

R. S. STAFFORD,

*Administrative Inspector.*

[E 5196/7/93]

No. 145.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 574.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad, dated the 29th August, respecting the deportation of the Mar Shimun and the Lady Surma.

*Bagdad, August 29, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 145.

*Sir F. Humphrys to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bagdad.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, August 29, 1933.*

WITH reference to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's note No. 436 of the 16th August concerning the deportation from Iraq of certain members of the family of the Mar Shimun, I have the honour to inform you that Surma Khatun left Bagdad on the 29th August in a Royal Air Force aeroplane en route for Cyprus to join the Mar Shimun.

[9941]

2 A 3



2. I should perhaps remind your Excellency that the action which has been taken by His Majesty's Government in regard to Surma is conditioned by the same reservations as those concerning the transport and maintenance of the Mar Shimun in the second paragraph of Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's note to which I have referred above

I avail, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 5197/7/93]

No. 146.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 576.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 31, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that since my return to Bagdad on the 23rd August I have, in daily interviews, done my utmost to focus the attention of the King and his Ministers on the task of quelling disorders, restoring the confidence of the Christians in the north and relieving the distress of the Assyrian families which have suffered bereavement and the loss of their homes in the recent disturbances.

2. Major Thomson has now complete charge of the relief work and tells me that the funds at his disposal are adequate. As reported in my telegram No. 311, the first figures received of the number of destitute women and children proved to be exaggerated. He now estimates 1,600 as the maximum number of persons in need of relief from the Iraqi Government and all of these will probably have been collected in Mosul under his care in a few days' time. The Air Officer Commanding has also removed to Hinaidi 152 Assyrian women and children belonging to the levies, whom he found to be destitute. It appears that the families of many of the men who joined in Yaku's exodus to Syria have remained in their villages quite unmolested and in no particular distress, except for their natural anxiety as to the fate of their men.

3. Three small committees, on which the Assyrians are represented, have been set up by the local authorities in Mosul. One is working in the Amadiyah district, another in Dohuk and the third in the Alqesh area. Their task is (a) to collect and send to Mosul all destitute Assyrian families, and (b) to arrange for the rebuilding of the villages which had been destroyed and to assess the compensation due for the grain and other property looted from these villages. The three committees will be put under the direction of Colonel Stafford in a few days' time, when Major Wilson takes over from him the duties of Administrative Inspector. Concurrently with the progress of this work arrangements are being made where possible for those who have left their villages to return to them. Additional police posts have already been established to protect these villages from further pillaging and the Minister of the Interior, who has been in Mosul, is giving special attention to the organisation of further protection if necessary. Major Wilkins, of the Iraqi police, is supervising this work locally.

4. The Assyrians still in Syria present a special problem. It is difficult to imagine that they wish to return to Iraq or that the Iraqi Government could be persuaded to allow them to do so. The only solution seems to be for them to remain in Syria. As you are aware Nuri Pasha was discussing with the authorities in Beirut the question of their permanent settlement somewhere in French mandated territory in the Levant and had even offered several thousand pounds for this purpose when his conversations were cut short by the fighting at Dairabun on the 4th August. He tells me that he has now reopened the question through the French Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad with a view to arranging for the families of these men to join them. The first essential is to obtain a full list of their names so that their families may be sorted out and this M. Lépiessier has undertaken to provide as soon as possible. If these families can be sent to join their men the task of relief will be made much lighter.

5. The religious passions which have been aroused by the recent fighting have given me some anxiety. Mischievous persons have been actively engaged in

fostering the bitter feelings which have been engendered between Christians and Mahometans, while the rank and file of the army, flushed with what they feel to be their victory over trained fighters who they had often heard were their betters, have, I learn, often been truculent and arrogant. I have warned the King and his Ministers most seriously of the dangerous situation which may develop if religious fanaticism is not checked, and I have urged them to ensure that the fullest protection is given to the Christians against the danger to which they are exposed in places where popular excitement has not yet died down. The Crown Prince, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior have been in Mosul during the past few days and have, I believe, all exerted themselves to restore tranquillity in the disturbed districts.

6. On the evening of the 30th August at an official party attended by the notables of Mosul, the Prime Minister made an important speech. I have not yet seen the full text, but I understand that he stressed the following four main points: that the Government's recent action had been directed solely against those who had taken up arms against the State and that there was no truth in the allegations which had been made that they had adopted an oppressive policy towards all Christian Iraqis; that they desired all Iraqis of whatever race and religion to live in peace and on friendly relations with each other; that the Government was proclaiming a free pardon to all Assyrians still in Iraq who had taken part in the recent insurrection and that while disorders would always be suppressed with firmness, all law-abiding citizens could be assured of the full protection of the laws of the country.

7. In order to restore public confidence and suppress mischief the Cabinet this morning passed a resolution embracing the following decisions:—

- (i) That during the King's absence from Iraq the laws of the country should be enforced and the administration conducted with firmness and vigour.
- (ii) That for a period of at least one month all public demonstrations, meetings and celebrations should be prohibited.
- (iii) That the press should be closely watched and any tendency to publish articles inciting the hatred of one class or sect of the people against another should be sternly checked especially in Mosul.
- (iv) That the police should be given orders to maintain order and fully to protect all Christians from molestation or insult.
- (v) That officers commanding all units of the army should be given orders to keep their men under strict discipline and to punish severely any high-handedness against civilians.
- (vi) That all Government servants should be warned against loose and provocative talk concerning recent events in the north and instructed to check such talk among the people in coffee shops and other public places.

8. The troops concentrated in the north to deal with the Assyrian threat have been entirely withdrawn from the country districts, and four battalions have already dispersed to their usual stations. Only one battalion additional to the normal garrison of two battalions now remains in Mosul town, and will proceed to its permanent station in a fortnight.

9. The measures which I have described above will, I hope, meet the immediate necessities of the situation. There is, however, a further and more difficult problem which will have to be faced: that of the future of the Assyrians themselves. I will submit my views on this question later.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.



[E 5222/7/93]

No. 147.

## LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Protection of Minorities in Iraq: Petition of M. B. S. Nicolas, dated August 18, 1933, concerning the Situation of Assyrians in Iraq.*

*Geneva, August 28, 1933.*

*Note by the Secretary-General.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 7.)*

IN accordance with the procedure in force, the Secretary-General communicated this letter on the 28th August, 1933, to the Iraqi Government, for its observations.

The Secretary-General felt obliged to apply to this petition the urgent procedure laid down in the fifth paragraph of the Council resolution of the 27th June, 1921. He, therefore, has the honour to circulate it to the members of the Council without waiting for the observations the Iraqi Government may wish to present with reference thereto. As soon as these observations reach the Secretariat, the Secretary-General will not fail to circulate them for the information of the members of the Council.

Enclosure in No. 147.

*M. Nicolas (Marseilles) to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Geneva.*

*August 18, 1933.*

Sir,

FURTHER to my previous letter<sup>(1)</sup> I beg to furnish you hereby with more details regarding the persecution of Assyrians in Iraq.

I am aware that the Government of Iraq addressed a note to the League of Nations complaining of the attitude of the Assyrians and of the French mandate in Syria. This note is false from start to finish. They state among other things that Assyrian bands in Iraq are causing trouble, and they accuse the Assyrian army of burning the bodies of their enemies, which last statement is libellous to the highest degree. The real facts concerning these troubles are as follows:—

In 1920 the British Government appointed a real Assyrian army, which was named 'Assyrian Levy in the vilayet of Mosul.' The object of this corps was to protect British interests in Mesopotamia. Since then this army has never ceased to serve His Majesty's Government in the most loyal and trustworthy manner. May I also remind you of the fact that, in the Great War, the Assyrian people have shown in a practical way their traditional sympathy to the Allies' cause, as their young men went out to the fray and sacrificed their lives for the same ideals, and 90 per cent. of the population met their doom as the price of their faithfulness.

From 1920 to 1933 the Assyrian army led an independent life under British control. Now, this unfortunate people is being compelled to become subjects of the uncivilised Arabs of Iraq.

On the 5th December, 1932, the representative of the Assyrian people addressed a petition to the League of Nations demanding protection and autonomy for his people, whereupon the Government of Iraq launched an ultimatum to the Assyrian army and refugees, ordering them to submit to Iraq and forsake their rights to them.

At the same time they summarily put to death twelve tribe chiefs without troubling to make even the semblance of an enquiry or delivering any judgment whatever. They also arrested the Patriarch Mar Shimun and all the ecclesiastical dignitaries. Further, 315 corpses were found north of Mosul. Three entire villages were completely wrecked and the inhabitants massacred. Thousands of women and children have had to leave their homes and are roaming the country in a state of utter destitution. Famine and death are staring them in the face.

<sup>(1)</sup> Cette lettre, datée du 12 août et relative à la même question, a été considérée irrecevable en vertu de la résolution du Conseil du 3 septembre 1923 (note du Secrétaire général).

This is the work of Arab anti-Christian fanaticism, a well-known scourge of the East.<sup>(2)</sup>

Yaku Malik Smaiel, chief of the tribes of Tyare, in command of a part of the Assyrian army, sent a despatch to the Iraq Government demanding protection against their enemies the Kurds and sundry tribes of Mahometans. On receiving a note of refusal to this demand, he set off peaceably for Syria with his army. On reaching the border they were suddenly and savagely attacked by Iraq troops and lost ninety-five of their young men in this onslaught. This was pure murder and no valid excuse can be given for this assault. As the Christian Assyrians have no protection whatever these days, no protest was raised concerning this piece of useless brutality which occurred on the Syro-Iraq frontier.

All the alleged grievances that the Iraq Government communicate to the League of Nations have no foundation whatever.

We now live in an era when civilisation and international justice are prevalent, and the League of Nations is the body deputed by the whole world to see that no breach of this justice is committed. Therefore, I appeal to you, in the name of God and humanity, to use your influence to put a stop to the intolerable treatment inflicted on the Assyrian people, who are victims of their loyalty.

At Lausanne, in 1923, I heard the British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, very generously declare that Great Britain was assuming responsibility for the welfare of Assyrian people. I have no doubt whatsoever that now the time has come to step in, Great Britain will not leave us in the lurch. And if order cannot be restored in Iraq, may I suggest that all the Assyrian people be taken out of the country and be conveyed to a place of safety, out of harm's way of their hereditary enemies.

I sincerely trust this petition will be submitted to the Council and justice have its way.

I remain, &c.

B. S. NICOLAS.

<sup>(2)</sup> Le Secrétaire général a cru devoir supprimer, dans les copies communiquées aux membres du Conseil, un passage mettant en cause le Chef d'Etat de l'Irak.

[E 5268/7/93]

No. 148.

## LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Protection of Minorities in Iraq: Petitions from Mar Shimun, Catholic Patriarch of the Assyrians, regarding the Position of the Assyrians in Iraq.*

*Note by the Secretary-General.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 8.)*

(Doc. C. 479. 1933. I.)

*Geneva, September 4, 1933.*

THE Secretary-General has the honour to inform the Council that, at the request of the representatives of the Irish Free State, Mexico and Norway on the Council, the question forming the subject of the above-mentioned petitions has been placed on the agenda of the Council's next ordinary session. A copy of the letter from these three members of the Council conveying their request will be found below.

Sir,

*Paris, August 31, 1933.*

A Minorities Committee, composed of the representative of Mexico (the chairman) and the representatives of the Irish Free State and Norway, has considered, in accordance with the terms of the Council's resolution of the 25th October, 1920, the petitions from Mar Shimun, Catholic Patriarch of the Assyrians, regarding the position of the Assyrians in Iraq (document C. 479. 1933. I).



This document was communicated on the 19th August to the representative of the Iraqi Government accredited to the League of Nations, for any observations his Government might wish to make. No such observations, however, have yet reached the League Secretariat.

None the less, the representatives of Mexico, the Irish Free State and Norway considered, at a meeting held on the 31st August, that it was their duty to request you, in accordance with article 10, paragraph 2, of the Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq made at Bagdad on the 30th May, 1932, to take steps forthwith to have the question to which those petitions relate placed on the agenda of the next Council session, and to inform the Iraqi Government accordingly.

They hope that this will allow the Iraqi Government sufficient time to formulate its observations, so that the Council may be able to examine the question on the basis of documentation which will be as full as possible, and of such a nature as to allay public feeling.

We have, &c.

F. CASTILLO NAJERA.  
SEAN LESTER.  
ERIK COLBAN.

[T 10190/10014/379]

No. 149.

*Mr. Dodds to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 226.)

Sir,

*Berne, September 9, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report in confirmation of my telegram No. 10 of yesterday that His Majesty the King of Iraq died of heart failure at his hotel in Berne late in the evening of the 7th September.

2. His Majesty had arrived in Berne on his return from Bagdad on the 2nd September and had resumed his cure under Dr. Kocher. A day or two before His Majesty's death Dr. Kocher requested an eminent heart specialist of Berne, Dr. Schorer, to examine the King's heart. Dr. Schorer discovered that the heart was not in good condition, but not, I understand, that there was anything seriously wrong with it. The examination made after death, however, which was required for the death certificate, showed that there was severe arteriosclerosis of the heart organs, and this was given by the doctors as the cause of death.

3. I learn from His Majesty's entourage that King Feisal complained of fatigue in the afternoon of the day of his death and retired early to bed. He had motored for luncheon to Interlaken and this, in the condition he was in and owing to the severity of the treatment he was undergoing with Dr. Kocher, was presumably too much for him. It is, of course, commonly alleged here by those opposed to Dr. Kocher's unorthodox methods that he is really responsible, but Dr. Kocher has covered himself by obtaining Dr. Schorer's diagnosis and by the death certificate, which was signed by three doctors, referred to above. What is more difficult to explain is the failure of Dr. Schorer to discover the very serious condition of His Majesty's heart.

4. I called on Nuri Pasha early yesterday morning to express my condolences and also on ex-King Ali of the Hejaz, who has been staying in the same hotel at Berne for some time and has also been undergoing the Kocher treatment. He appeared to be much affected. Nuri Pasha asked me to convey the news of His Majesty's death to Sir Francis Humphrys. I did this, as I had the honour to report to you in my telegram No. 10 of yesterday.

5. The Swiss Government intimated to me yesterday morning that they were anxious to do everything in their power to pay respect to His Majesty. The Vice-President of the Confederation, M. Pilet-Golaz, and M. Motta, Federal Councillor, head of the Political Department, called, accordingly, on Nuri Pasha and on ex-King Ali to express the condolences of the Federal Council, and M. Motta was present this morning at the station when Nuri Pasha, ex-King Ali and King Feisal's entourage left with the coffin for Brindisi.

6. As stated in my telegram to Bagdad of last night, of which I had the honour to transmit to you a copy in my telegram No. 12, Nuri Pasha has asked

the Secretary-General of the League of Nations if, in the circumstances, the discussion of the Assyrian question can be postponed. I understand that this can probably be arranged, in which case Nuri Pasha intends to return to Bagdad with the coffin.

7. There is a number of eulogistic references to His Majesty in the Swiss press this morning, but none which call for special comment.

I have, &c.

J. L. DODDS.

[E 5447/7/93]

No. 150.

*Secretary-General, League of Nations, to Foreign Office.—(Received September 16.)*

*Protection of Minorities in Iraq: Situation of the Assyrian Minority.*

THE Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council a letter from the Secretary of the Iraq Diplomatic Bureau accredited to the League of Nations, dated the 8th September, 1933, and his reply thereto, dated the 12th September.

*Geneva, September 13, 1933.*

(i)

*Hôtel Bellevue, Berne.*

*September 8, 1933.*

Sir,

With further reference to my letter, dated the 7th September, 1933, I have the honour to inform you that following the sudden and very regrettable decease of His Majesty King Feisal, his Excellency Nouri Pasha As Said, who was nominated to represent Iraq in the Assyrian question, is obliged to return immediately to Bagdad. He will, therefore, be unable to get into touch with the Minorities Committee in Paris, and it is also most improbable that he will be able to return to Geneva in time to set before the League of Nations the Iraqi Government's comments.

Owing to the circumstances of the case and the present state of calm in Iraq, it would, in our opinion, be preferable to postpone any discussion until the next session of the Council. His Excellency would, therefore, be much obliged if arrangements could be made to this effect.

I have, &c.

M. SHABANDAR.

(ii)

*Geneva, September 12, 1933.*

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated the 8th September, 1933, in which you express the opinion that, in view of the fact that his Excellency Nouri Pasha As Said has been obliged to return immediately to Bagdad, on account of the very regrettable death of His Majesty King Feisal, and that there is at present a state of calm in Iraq, it would be preferable for the Council to postpone its examination of the question concerning the Assyrian minority in Iraq until its next session.

I shall not fail to communicate your letter to the Council. As you are aware, the Council, at its first private meeting, adopts its final agenda and decides the dates on which each question will be discussed. A resolution on the question raised in your aforesaid letter will therefore certainly be taken by the Council at its first meeting.

I have, &c.

J. AVENOL, *Secretary-General*



[E 5685/7/93]

No. 151.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 592.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a report by the Acting Inspector-General, Iraqi Army, on the part taken by the Iraqi army in the repression of the Assyrian rebellion in Northern Iraq in July and August 1933.

*Bagdad, September 14, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 151.

*Report on the part taken by the Iraqi Army in the Repression of the Assyrian Rebellion in Northern Iraq in July and August 1933.*

ON the 22nd July news was received by the Iraqi Government that armed bands of Assyrians, totalling about 1,200 men, had crossed the Tigris at, and below, Feish Khabur and had camped astride the Wadi Sufan, the first 2 or 3 miles of which constituted, on that date, the boundary line between Syria and Iraq.

This force of Assyrians (hereinafter termed "the rebels") was under the leadership of Yaku, son of Malik Ismail. Yaku is an ex-levy officer.

There is no doubt whatever that this exodus of Assyrians was a movement engineered, approved and blessed by Mar Shimun and his advisers; it was intended as a gesture of disapproval of the arrangements for the settlement of the Assyrians in Iraq, which the Iraqi Government was carrying out to the best of its ability in accordance with its promises to the League of Nations. The rebel band was composed almost entirely of men from the Tiari and Tkhouma sections of the Assyrians which are both strong adherents of Mar Shimun. There is good reason to believe that the movement had received some sort of encouragement from the French authorities.

2. The Iraqi Government at once decided that it would not allow the rebels to return to Iraq unless they agreed to surrender their rifles. It accordingly gave orders for the army to take the necessary steps to carry out this decision.

3. By the 25th July a force, as under, had been collected and was on that date disposed as follows, under the pseudonym "Imad Force":—

*Commander:* Ez Zaim (Colonel) Bekr Sidki-el-Askeri.

*"Hajcol"* at Deirabun: Commander, El Aqid (Lieutenant-Colonel) Haji Ramadan.

1st Battalion.

8th Battalion.

1st Mountain Battery.

One squadron, 3rd Cavalry.

One platoon, Motor Machine-Gun Company.

This column established platoon posts at Feish Khabur, Shailkiya, Muhammed El Raban, on left bank of Tigris.

*"Amincol"* at Basitkah Bala: Commander, El Aqid (Lieutenant-Colonel) Amin Zekki.

4th Battalion.

7th Battalion.

Motor Machine-Gun Company (less one platoon).

This column also established platoon posts at points along the Tigris south of the "Hajcol" posts.

On the 27th July the column was joined by:—

One section 3rd Mountain Battery.

One machine-gun squadron and one sabre troop, 3rd Cavalry.

Force headquarters were established with "Hajcol" at Deirabun.

4. On the 25th July two parties of rebels, numbering in all forty-eight, recrossed into Iraq and, after surrendering their rifles to the army posts, proceeded to their homes.

5. On the 27th July Major C. W. Allfrey, M.C., R.A., of the British Military Mission, left Bagdad by air to join force headquarters and assist it as British liaison officer.

6. As the result of communications between the Syrian and Iraqi Governments, the French troops, which had been moved to the area, disarmed the greater portion of the rebels. Information of this reached Bagdad on the 30th July. On the same date it was confirmed that about 150 rebels, who were camped on the south bank of the Wadi Sufan in Iraqi territory, remained armed.

The French moved the disarmed rebels to Derek, but, owing to water and sanitary difficulties at that place, brought them back a few days later to the right bank of the Tigris a little downstream from the junction with Khabur River.

7. During the above events the boundary commission, which was at work demarcating the new Syria-Iraq boundary in this area, was approaching the end of its labours. The new boundary was finally marked by post on the 1st August, and the new frontier line joined the Tigris exactly opposite to Feish Khabur. Consequently, the 150 armed rebels on the Wadi Sufan were now in Syrian territory. Army Headquarters, Bagdad, therefore, ordered O.C. Imad Force to keep a very careful watch on this party, as it appeared possible that it would endeavour to return to Iraq in preference to probable disarmament by the French.

8. In view of a possible advance by the rebels southward along the right bank of the Tigris, the area between Mosul and the frontier had been patrolled by a detachment of cavalry and motor machine guns. On the 1st August, a platoon of motor machine guns penetrated close to the Wadi Sufan, where it met a French officer, who informed it that it was in Syrian territory. The platoon turned back and was fired on by a rebel piquet, and other rebels moved to try and cut off its return southwards. The platoon returned the fire and then withdrew.

9. The French having disarmed all the rebels except about 150, tension was relaxed and the prospect of any serious military action appeared unlikely. I therefore decided to allow Major Allfrey to proceed on the leave from which I had had to keep him back, and to relieve him by Captain MacLeod (Royal Tank Corps), one of the only two other members of the military mission remaining in Iraq at that time. I therefore ordered Major Allfrey to Mosul on the 4th August so that he could hand over to Captain MacLeod early on the 5th and return to Bagdad on the aeroplane which took Captain MacLeod north on the morning of that day.

As the result of this rather unfortunate decision Major Allfrey was not present at Deirabun during the action of the 4th-5th August now to be described.

10. On the morning of the 4th August the French, without informing the Iraqi Government or Iraqi forces in the vicinity, returned their rifles to the rebels and ordered them to go back into Iraq.

Although there is no actual proof available, the sequence of events suggests that Yaku then formed a plan as follows: The 150 rebels on Wadi Sufan were to open "pourparlers" with a view to surrendering their rifles and returning to their homes; leave for this having been obtained, these 150 would be able to cross the Tigris unmolested; they would then form a sort of bridge-head under cover of which the remainder of the rebels would cross, and the whole force would then move east and attack "Hajcol" at Deirabun.

The actual happenings were as follows:—

The Wadi Sufan rebels asked the police post at Khanik to obtain permission for them to cross the Tigris and surrender their rifles to the post at Feish Khabur. (N.B.—Although the Khanik police post was now by the new boundary in Syria, it had not yet been withdrawn.) Permission for the surrender was obtained from Bagdad through the political officer with Imad force.

The rebels began to cross the river about 17.45 hours. They did not, however, cross by the ferry, but forded the river on mule back on a wide front about 1½ miles up-stream from the platoon post. They were able to do this as, during the last week in July, the river had fallen considerably.

The commander of the Feish Khabur post (which was company headquarter) informed force headquarters.

On hearing of the crossing, the political officer at force headquarters instructed the Agha of Feish Khabur to send four men to tell the rebels to go to the platoon post to surrender their rifles. The rebels paid no attention to this request, and told the men to return to their village.



Colonel Bekr Sidki, on receiving news of the crossing of the rebels (about 18.00 hours), at once ordered a company to be embussed and sent to the river as a precautionary measure. This company started off fifteen minutes after the order had been issued. The machine-gun squadron of 3rd Cavalry, which had now joined Hajcol, was also despatched a few minutes later.

Colonel Bekr Sidki himself at once motored to Feish Khabur to study the situation. He saw about 150 rebels, who were apparently taking cover behind shrubs and rocks. He watched the company debuss, deploy and advance towards the rebels. The rebels then opened heavy fire on the company; fire was also opened by rebels on the right bank of the river. It was now 18.45 hours and getting dark. The force commander then returned to Deirabun.

The machine-gun squadron had advanced to northwards of the infantry company, and it, too, came under heavy fire. Owing to the growing darkness, it was some time before it got into touch with the infantry. This forward fight continued for some hours, during which time the main body of rebels must have been crossing the river. The company withdrew gradually to the camp at Deirabun, which was reached about 01.30 (the 5th August). One platoon and the machine-gun squadron remained in position astride the Feish Khabur-Deirabun road about a mile from the camp. During the action a motor lorry with eight soldiers and three boxes of small-arms ammunition was sent out from the camp to replenish ammunition, of which the company reported it was running short. This lorry fell into the hands of the rebels, who killed five soldiers and the lorry driver. The remaining three men got away wounded. Colonel Bekr Sidki reports that the rebels "savagely mutilated the dead: they gouged out their eyes, slit open their stomachs and cut off their noses." With the exception of desultory firing by the platoon and machine-gun squadron west of the camp, there was quiet until about 02.00 hours, when the rebels started a strong attack on No. 2 piquet, which consisted of a rifle section and Lewis gun section. The attack was then extended to No. 3 piquet. Both these piquets put up a stout defence, and, supported by artillery from the main camp, held on to their posts. In No. 2 piquet one man was killed and six men were wounded, a loss which amounted to over half of the garrison. Eventually, and with much difficulty, reinforcements and ammunition reached both piquets. No. 4 piquet was also attacked, but with less vigour. Telephonic communication with the piquets was maintained throughout the attacks.

The attack on these piquets having failed, firing ceased about 03.15 hours. Half an hour later, however, heavy firing restarted, and the rebels commenced a very vigorous attack on 6 and 7 piquets. No. 6 piquet held out, but the rebels succeeded in capturing No. 7 after the officer in command and most of its garrison had been killed or wounded. No. 7 piquet was most important, as it commanded the main camp; its recapture was, therefore, essential. Consequently, after sending a reinforcing platoon to No. 6 piquet and posting a machine-gun platoon near No. 5 piquet, a company supported by artillery fire was ordered to retake No. 7. It was now daylight. This attack failed, but a second attack by another company at about 11.00 hours, supported by artillery, machine-gun fire and bombing by an aeroplane, was entirely successful. Colonel Bekr Sidki reports that on the recapture of the piquet it was found that the rebels had gouged out the eyes of the officer, cut off his lips and cut his body with knives, and also that the bodies of three soldiers had been burnt. Fire was opened on the retreating rebels and losses inflicted. All firing had ceased by about midday.

Shortly after the attacks had started on the northern piquets, Colonel Bekr Sidki sent out orders as follows:—

- (1) Motor Machine-Gun Company (less 1 platoon) and 1 company of infantry from the Mosul garrison to be sent by lorry to Deirabun. (This party reached Deirabun about 15.00 hours, the 5th August.)
- (2) One platoon Motor Machine-Gun Company, and 1 company of infantry to be sent from "Amin Col" by lorry to Deirabun. This party reached Deirabun at 0.300 hours, the 5th August.
- (3) The cavalry squadron, which was watching the gap between No. 2 piquet and the Khabur River to withdraw to Zakho.

From the strength of the attacks, and the amount of rifle fire, it is estimated that the rebel strength was at least 800 men.

The Iraqi casualties in this action were: 3 officers and 31 other ranks killed

and 42 other ranks wounded. About 100 Assyrians dead were accounted for, and their total casualties were probably at least 200.

11. Owing to the heat, the nature of the country, and the exhaustion of the troops and need for reorganisation, no further action was possible for "Hajcol" on the 5th August.

"Amincol" however moved from Rasitka Bala to Mazri. Major Alfrey had joined this column on the 5th August, and reached force headquarters on the 6th. Platoons of motor machine-guns also patrolled the country to south of Deirabun and met a few small parties of rebels on whom it inflicted casualties.

12. On the 6th, 7th, 8th August, the force was employed clearing up the area between Deirabun and Zakho. Practically no rebels were met with, but the troops suffered very severe hardships in this mountainous area from the heat and paucity of water.

On the 8th August, force headquarters and "Amincol" camped at Basitkah Bala, and "Hajcol" at Bawari.

Here they remained until the 11th August when the columns moved respectively to Alokah and Bahrik.

On the 16th August the force broke up. Two battalions and a battery and a squadron went to Dohuk and the remainder returned to Mosul.

On the 20th August, the Dohuk detachment started back for Mosul.

No further operations were undertaken by the army.

#### General Remarks.

13. (a) Suggestions have been made that the rebels who crossed the Tigris on the 4th August, did so intending to surrender, but that the action of the Iraqi army prevented them doing so and that they fought in self-defence.

There appear to be no grounds whatsoever for this suggestion.

If the rebels had wished to surrender they would have crossed in the morning by the recognised crossing at Feish Khabur, and given up their arms to the post there. In actual fact, they crossed over a mile up-stream from the post, in an extended line, and towards dusk.

The attack on the Deirabun position was quite unnecessary and was clearly premeditated and carefully planned: the details must have been worked out before the rebels crossed the river. If the rebels had not desired to attack they could easily have avoided the Iraqi army either by moving along the banks of the Khabur, or by a detour to the south.

(b) There can be no doubt that the officers and soldiers of the Iraqi army fought bravely and well. The rather isolated piquets sustained strong and repeated attacks which they repelled. Only one piquet was lost, and in that there had been heavy casualties. The conduct of the sergeant in charge of No. 2 piquet seems to have been particularly praiseworthy and gallant. In the British army such a man would probably receive at once a commission for gallantry in the field.

(c) Colonel Bekr Sidki, except for a most unfortunate order connected with a small party of prisoners, showed himself a leader of determination, energy and foresight. He is a man of strong will and sees that his orders are carried out. He had considerable experience with the Turkish army in the Great War including the campaign in Gallipoli, and he has recently attended courses of instruction in India and England.

I have no doubt that the influence of his presence inspired his troops and raised the moral of all ranks, and so contributed in no small measure to the success at Deirabun.

(d) The Iraqi army was attacked at Deirabun by a force of almost equal rifle power, consisting of men who have a great reputation as fighters, the majority of whom had received training in the levies. If these rebels had achieved what they undoubtedly expected to do and had "mopped up" the Iraqi troops at Deirabun, there might have been a disaster of the first magnitude, the far-reaching effects of which might well have proved irretrievable. The Government and people of Iraq have good reason to be thankful to Colonel Bekr Sidki and his force for their success on the 4th-5th August.

HUGO HEADLAM, *Brigadier-General,*  
*Acting Inspector-General, Iraqi Army,*  
*during period covered by this report.*

Onfi, September 6, 1933.



*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 593.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 14, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Iraqi Government have passed a Third Amendment Law to the Income Tax Law, which introduces a number of important changes into the machinery for the collection of Iraqi income tax.

2. The new law has been published in the Arabic edition of the *Government Gazette*, and its provisions are made retroactive to the beginning of the present financial year. It has not yet been published in English, but an English edition is under preparation. Owing to the very large number of alterations made to the original law since it was passed in 1927, the Ministry of Finance have decided, I am informed, to publish a complete and revised edition of the law as amended, copies of which will be sent to you as soon as they are obtainable.

3. The new amending law comprises thirty-three lengthy articles, and, in order to save time and to avoid the constant necessity for cross-reference, I have had the attached note prepared summarising it article by article, from which the principal changes made can easily be seen.<sup>(1)</sup> No variation is made in the rate of tax. There are two important new principles introduced, one of which is the adoption of a method of fixed assessment for members of the professional and trading classes according to their income, which is to be assessed by committees appointed in the large towns for this purpose. This method is probably better suited to Iraq than the normal method of obtaining a detailed statement of income, and pursuing the usual formalities of assessment, for these classes. The change has been in contemplation for some time, and the Minister of Finance has been empowered by law since 1926 to call upon tradesmen, merchants and professional men to register themselves for taxation purposes.

4. The chargeable income of shipping and aircraft companies entering the sea and air ports of Iraq will be computed on the basis of 5 per cent. of the amounts receivable from traffic originating in Iraq. Such companies have been liable to pay tax on their profits since the original law was passed, but the Iraqi Government have met with considerable difficulty in their attempts to assess the profits, and the agents of shipping companies have been called upon to provide voluminous details of the trading of their principals. The expedient now introduced attempts to define this liability and, provided that the rate of 5 per cent. is not excessive (which, *prima facie*, it does not appear to be), should prove to be a matter of convenience both to the companies concerned and to the Government. The finance authorities are given powers to detain in Iraq ships, aircraft and persons who delay in satisfying the demands for payment of income tax made upon them, and it is to be hoped that these provisions will not be enforced by the finance authorities in a narrow-minded spirit.

5. The privilege of exemption from tax for the first 150 Iraqi dinars, and the payment of two-thirds tax for the second 150 Iraqi dinars, is now withdrawn from residents abroad and the profits of companies.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 595.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 14, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 337 of the 8th September, I have the honour to report that I first received news of King Feisal's death early on the morning of the 8th September through a telephone message from the palace. I immediately called on the Prime Minister and expressed to his Excellency the condolences of His Majesty's Government and my own personal sorrow for the

death of King Feisal, and my sympathy with Iraq at the tragic loss which she had suffered by this melancholy event. His Excellency thanked me for my words and was good enough to say that the knowledge of the sympathy and support of His Majesty's Government was a great source of comfort to him and his colleagues in their grief and bereavement. He then asked Yasin Pasha to join us, and they discussed with me briefly the action which was necessary in view of the King's death. I advised swift compliance with the provisions of the Organic Law. They agreed and said that arrangements would be made for proclaiming the accession of the Amir Ghazi before the general public were aware of King Feisal's death. They also consulted me about the position of the Cabinet. I said that under their Constitution the Cabinet should resign, and I hoped that they would be reappointed by the new King immediately, without change, as in times of excitement it was important to preserve continuity. The Ministers also sought my advice on several small *protocolaire* questions, and before I took my leave both of them offered me the most solemn, and, I believe, sincere assurances that the Government were resolved, as a duty to the memory of the late King, to maintain the closest and most friendly relations with Great Britain, and to seek the advice and assistance of His Majesty's representatives on all important matters concerning the future of Iraq and the mutual interests of the two countries.

2. At 10 o'clock on the same morning, in the presence of the Cabinet, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the Vice-President of the Senate and senior officials of the Government, His Royal Highness the Amir Ghazi took the oath to defend the Constitution laid down in article 21 of the Organic Law, and he was thereupon proclaimed King, as "Ghazi I." The public were informed of his accession by the firing of a salute of 101 guns. Three minutes later the new King drove in procession to the palace and received the homage of the Royal Family, the Cabinet, former Ministers, high military and civil officials, religious dignitaries and notables of the city. At 2 p.m. His Majesty received the heads of diplomatic missions separately in audience. I said that my Sovereign and His Majesty's Government would be deeply grieved by this tragic loss, and when I spoke of my own personal bereavement the young King broke down and was unable to reply. The same evening the Prime Minister placed the resignation of the Cabinet in His Majesty's hands.

3. On the following morning King Ghazi invited me to see him privately, and I spent an hour with him discussing the immediate necessities of the situation. He spoke feelingly of the great help which his father had always enjoyed from His Majesty's Government, and declared his intention of following his father's policy of friendship and close co-operation with Great Britain. He hoped that I would always extend to him the same degree of confidence and personal counsel as I had given to the late King.

4. A few hours later His Majesty issued a Royal Iradah reappointing all the members of the Cabinet to their old posts. At the customary semi-public ceremony which takes place on such occasions, the Prime Minister made a speech in which he stated that the policy which would be followed in the future would be the same as that to which King Feisal had always adhered in the past, a policy of close friendship and alliance with Great Britain. On Monday, the 11th September, in the presence of a special session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, King Ghazi again took the prescribed oath of loyalty to the Organic Law, and the constitutional formalities of his accession were thereby completed.

5. The death of King Feisal has naturally come as a great shock to everyone in Iraq, and the processions of mourners which have daily thronged the streets of Bagdad since the news of his demise was received testify to the grief which his passing has stirred in the hearts of the people. In political circles, where his shortcomings were realised and often severely criticised, his death has brought with it a keener appreciation of the great work which he accomplished, and a fresh proof of the old adage that water is not rightly valued until the well runs dry. It is realised that King Feisal's death has left a gap in the political life of the country which will never, perhaps, be filled. It was he who founded the Iraq State and who guided it through the many perplexing difficulties which have been encountered during the twelve years of his reign, and those whom he has left to carry on his work are beginning to appreciate more fully the great burden of heavy responsibility which he bore. It was King Feisal's skill and political subtlety which enabled him to hold the delicate balance between Sunni and Shiah, and through his profound understanding of the Arab mind he was able to deal



with his turbulent tribal chieftains with a marked degree of success. The new King has neither the training nor the experience to fit him to continue this work, and there is, I fear, a danger that a Government in which a Sunni Effendi element is always likely to predominate may fail through want of sympathetic understanding either to conciliate the Shi'ahs or to control the sheikhs as successfully as the late King. In internal political circles the loss of his guiding hand will also be acutely felt. In spite of the faults inherent in his highly-strung and imaginative temperament, his noble birth and his romantic leadership of the Arab cause placed him in an exalted position which commanded respect; a position above the local party rivalries and personal jealousies of the country from which he could and did, in a very great measure, rule as well as reign. His successor for some years at any rate will have to play a less influential rôle, and it remains to be seen whether, deprived of King Feisal's control, the governing class will have the wisdom to subordinate party feeling to the interests of the country.

6. His Majesty's death will also bring about a big change in the position of the Ambassador *vis-à-vis* the Iraqi Government. Hitherto British representatives in Iraq have, in the main, exercised their influence on the Government, in all matters outside the scope of normal relations, through friendly and confidential intercourse with the King. In future they will have to rely on more direct relations with the Government, since it is unlikely that King Ghazi will be able, either by persuasion or pressure, to exert much effective influence upon his Ministers. At present the Cabinet seem to be genuinely anxious to ensure that the same close touch is maintained with the Embassy as in the past, and I have been specially requested by the Prime Minister and by Yasin Pasha to continue my frequent visits to the palace, but I anticipate that as time passes it will be found that the death of King Feisal will deprive the Ambassador of the most effective means which he had at his disposal of guiding unobtrusively the policy of the Iraqi Government.

7. Though he comes to the throne with little of his father's glamour and none of his varied experience, the new King is not a factor to be ignored in an appreciation of the possibilities of the future. Though young, he is said already to show signs of being obstinately opinionated, and much will depend on the character of those who win influence over him. Up to the present his views have to a great extent been moulded by the young officers of the army, who have been his companions, and though his military training has made him a plucky horseman and keen cavalry officer, the qualities and ideals of a *beau sabreur* are not sufficient equipment for one who is to sit securely on the Throne of Iraq. As the idol of the army he is exposed to an insidious temptation to vanity that may well lead him to disregard the counsels of wiser men, but it is to be hoped that time and experience will bring him a level head and an armour against that worthless flattery which is the worst enemy of Eastern Kings.

8. The future is necessarily full of uncertainties, but the personal assurances of the new King, the public announcement of the Prime Minister, the confidences revealed to me in private by Yasin Pasha and the tone of the semi-official press all point to a present resolve to work for the continuance of close and friendly relations with Great Britain. I believe that even the extremist politicians realise the necessity for British advice and assistance so long as it leads them along the path of independence and progress. It is my conviction, however, that the present favourable atmosphere will undergo a radical change for the worse if the Council of the League, backed by Great Britain, attempts to force on Iraq a form of foreign intervention which can be shown to be without precedent in its dealings with other sovereign States. Should it appear that the League, with the approval of Great Britain, is trying to take back with its left hand any portion of the independence which it gave with its right hand at Geneva last year, the Iraqi Government will resist with all the resources at their command. In such an event nothing but chaos could result. The generous policy which has been followed in this country by successive Governments in Great Britain for the past twelve years would go down to history as a tragic failure, and France would say "I told you so."

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Tehran, Jedda and Istanbul.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 5522/7/93]

No. 154.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 19.)*

(No. 597.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 14, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during the last two weeks I have received several despatches from His Majesty's consul at Mosul, which contain further distressing details of the events which took place early in August. In the Shaikhan area (Alqosh) two villages in which Assyrians had been settled were completely looted by their owner, a well-known Kurdish Agha (and former Deputy), Sheikh Nuri of Brifka. It seems that Sheikh Nuri first persuaded the Assyrians to surrender their rifles and then drove them from their houses, to take all their property and cattle to be carried off by his men. Four men from one of the villages were detained and sent to Dohuk where they were shot. Another Assyrian village in the same district was also looted by its owner, a Mosul Effendi, who attacked the village with a local band of Yezidis.

2. At Zakho, according to the account of an eye-witness, Iraqi soldiers executed thirty Assyrian prisoners in one day by machine-gun fire (these are the thirty referred to in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 309 of the 28th August), and the local kaimakam is said to have distributed rifles freely to the Kurds, offering a sovereign for every Assyrian head. This is the only report I have received hitherto which incriminates a civil official of the Iraqi Government.

3. Mr. Monypenny has also obtained an account from another eye-witness of the killing of about a dozen Assyrians by Kurds in the Amadiyah district, which, it had hitherto been thought, had remained unaffected by the disturbances. Moreover, at least one Assyrian village seems to have been looted in this area.

4. He has further reported to me that the local authorities have endeavoured to solve the problem of the destitution which has been created by the disturbances by forcing unwilling villagers to return to villages which have been looted and partially destroyed without providing them with even the minimum necessary equipment. I have discussed this gross indifference to the common dictates of humanity with the Acting Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior who has been able to arrange that the work of reconstructing and repopulating the deserted and looted Assyrian villages shall be put under the direct control of Major Thomson. I hope, therefore, that there will be a speedy improvement. Of the camp of refugees in Mosul I have had excellent accounts from several quarters and I am satisfied that Major Thomson has organised it with much skill and resource.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 5536/5250/93]

No. 155.

*Acting Consul Todd to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 20.)*

(No. 41.)

Sir,

*Damascus, September 12, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the death of King Feisal has made a profound impression upon the Moslem population of Damascus.

2. As soon as the news became known thousands of tracts were issued deploring what is considered a great calamity for the Moslem world. The bazaars were closed all day on Saturday, the 9th instant, and prayers were offered up at the midday service in the mosques for the repose of his soul.

3. About 2,000 Moslems were present in the Omayyad Mosque, including all members of the Nationalist block and of the Young Syrian party. Three speeches were made and a poem was read by a certain Sharif-el-Khatib eulogising the late King, who sacrificed his life for his country. After the service in the mosque the crowd proceeded to Merje Square, where King Feisal was crowned in 1920, the Nationalists being in the forefront of the procession, and further speeches were made by members of the Nationalist party.

4. As the crowd were about to disperse a certain Salah-ud-Din Mukhtar Trabulsi, correspondent of the newspaper *El Jami'a-el-Islamich* of Jerusalem,

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made a most offensive speech against the British Government and the League of Nations. He said that although Great Britain received King Feisal with much pomp and ceremony in June, it was all bluff. What really happened was that Great Britain offered him a cup of poison with one hand, whilst shaking hands with him with the other. The British Government caused the Assyrians in Iraq to revolt against the authorities, and immediately the League of Nations took a great interest in the matter. Where was the League, he said, when thousands of Moslems were killed in 1925 by the French in Syria; where was it when Moslems were being murdered by the Jews in Palestine in 1929; where was it when Moslems were being killed in thousands by the British army in the Iraq revolution of 1922?

5. This fiery speech, with two others made afterwards, was followed by a demonstration through the streets. The demonstrators did not get far, however, before they were dispersed by the police, who drew their batons. This event gave rise to rumours, which spread as far as Jerusalem, that this consulate had been attacked with stones by the demonstrators and many windows broken. This was, however, far from being the case, as the demonstrators were never within about 400 yards of the consulate, which was probably their objective.

6. Telegrams of sympathy have been sent to Ghazi the First, King of Iraq, by the Syrian Government, the Nationalist party, the National Action League, the Monarchist party, Young Syrians and various Government institutions. The National Action League and the Young Syrians of the Nationalist party, moreover, sent a deputation to the Iraqi consul-general at Beirut to offer their sincere sympathy.

7. Many Moslems are convinced that King Feisal did not die a natural death and that he was poisoned by the British Government. This is said to be due to a recent article in the *Daily Mail* in the course of which it was stated that competent departments in London doubted very much whether King Feisal would return to Iraq after his cure in Switzerland.

8. The *Alif Ba* assures its readers that King Feisal died "because he was alarmed by the attitude of the British Government towards Iraq in the recent Assyrian troubles," and thus by implication lays his death at the door of the authorities in London. The *Fata-el-Arab* and *El Sha'eb* publish articles in similar terms.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

FRANK H. TODD.

[E 5605/7/93]

No. 156.

#### ASSYRIAN CRISIS.

(*Very Confidential. The attached depositions regarding the events at Simel, and elsewhere in Northern Iraq, in August 1933, have been obtained from reliable sources. It is, however, of great importance that they should be treated as most confidential, and that they should not be quoted or referred to in any way without the specific authority of the Foreign Office.*—(Received September 22, 1933.))

- (1) This woman is a good witness, but was, throughout the fighting at Simel, with a small section of the Assyrian women who remained near the Serai and on the hill-top. Until the slaughter was over and the troops came up the hill to search the women, none of her evidence is really first-hand. —, however, lost none of her own relatives, and her story was extremely matter-of-fact and unemotional.

Q. 1. Do you live in Simel, and from what section of the Assyrian community do you come?

A. 1. Yes; my family is of the Upper Tiari, and we have lived at Simel since we moved from — some thirteen years ago.

Q. 2. Were you in Simel during the recent disturbances?

A. 2. Yes; I have never left the vicinity of the village.

Q. 3. When did the first Government forces arrive in Simel?

A. 3. On Tuesday, the 8th August; others had arrived previously and gone on. These men, who arrived by car, stayed the night and moved off on the following morning.

Q. 4. Did these troops take any action against the inhabitants during their stay in Simel?

A. 4. Yes; they took all the rifles and ammunition from the Tiari section of the village (and possibly others, informant did not know), kept the ammunition and gave the rifles back. About this time a large number of refugees from small villages outside Simel had started to come on foot to Simel to seek refuge and protection under the Iraqi flag.

Q. 5. Did the Assyrian men retain their rifles?

A. 5. No; the Kaimakam from Dohuk also arrived on the 8th August, and on learning what had been done, took also the rifles from our men. He had some armed cars with him. He also stated that he had been ordered to arrest three men and take them to Dohuk (the names were given but not taken down)—a priest, a leader of the Baz, and one of the Raïses of the Tiari. These men were not, however, taken to Dohuk; they were taken out of the cars at Alokah and shot.

Q. 6. How do you know?

A. 6. Their bodies were seen on the road by people who came in afterwards to Simel. They were stripped of their clothing.

Q. 7. Did anything happen on the next day (the 9th)?

A. 7. No; we were very frightened, and most people remained near the Serai for protection.

Q. 8. And on Thursday (the 10th)?

A. 8. On Thursday an armed car arrived from Zakho and took off three men. These were not Tiari, but one was a Raïs of a village section and the others common people. They were called for by name by the army men who came with the cars, and handed over by the police. These men were taken a very short distance along the Zakho road and killed. I think that they were stabbed to death, as no shots were heard. We could see their corpses lying on the road. I saw them myself.

Q. 9. What happened on Friday?

A. 9. On Friday (the 11th) the police sergeant, who had always been unfriendly towards the Assyrians, told us that a general amnesty had been declared by the Iraqi Government, and that we could now return to our houses at the bottom of the hill without fear of further molestation. Up to then we had all—men, women and children—been gathered near the Serai. We were still frightened, but started to make our way back to the village. Half-way there we saw that the village was surrounded by armed cars and soldiers. We started to move back, but a man of the Baz called on us to stop.

Q. 10. What did he say and who was he?

A. 10. — he had been allowed to retain his rifle when the others had been handed over to the kaimakam (see A. 5).

Q. 11. What did he tell you?

A. 11. He stated that he held a letter from the Government, that we had been loyal to the Government, and that all who took refuge in his house would be safe. He said: "I am an Iraqi; follow me and you will be all right." Nearly everybody, men and women, started to rush to his house, while he, together with his son (age about 15), went out to meet the officer who was with the troops on the outskirts of the village. Both were shot down before they had gone many paces. After these shots had been fired, the soldiers made a rush for us.

NOTE.—It was at this point that the witness retired up the hill and took refuge near the Serai. Answers 9, 10 and 11 are first-hand evidence.

Q. 12. Are you sure that the people who attacked you were soldiers of the Iraqi army; were they in uniform and had they machine guns with them?

A. 12. Yes; they were in uniform. I saw three officers with them. They had machine guns. The house of the Man of Baz was crowded (estimated that there were 500 people inside), and they killed all the men; they first fired at the



house with machine guns. Nine women were killed, together with many small children. Many women were wounded.

Q. 13. Were you in the house?

A. 13. No; I had gone back to the police post on the hill.

Q. 14. When all the people were killed in the House of Baz did the troops go away?

A. 14. No; afterwards the troops came up to the police post and searched us all for men who had disguised themselves as women. When they found a man they killed him, sometimes with their bayonet, sometimes by shooting. They threw some down the stairs into the courtyard. They found one priest who was veiling his face with a woman's kerchief and killed him, cutting off his beard and putting it in his mouth as a disgrace. They continued hunting for unkillable men until 6 P.M.

Q. 15. When did the troops leave?

A. 15. They left at sundown that evening, but the armed cars stayed encamped behind the hill.

Q. 16. Were the womenfolk molested?

A. 16. Yes; but not seriously. The troops searched us for money and lifted our clothes. The police sergeant was a beast, and threatened to take away and outrage our young girls.

Q. 17. What was done with the dead bodies; were you allowed to see them?

A. 17. No; they were buried in a great hurry by soldiers who arrived from Zakho on Saturday morning (the 12th). Natural depressions were covered over with earth.

Q. 18. After the fighting, where did you take refuge?

A. 18. All the women and children—there were no men—took refuge near the police post. The policemen were kind to us and wept at our distress (two were Arabs and one a Kurd). We stayed there four or five days with little or no food. The well of the village had been deliberately fouled with the blood of our dead (not an uncommon Arab trick), and we were taken down and forced to drink it. Civilian Arabs brought us food (informant says that they wore "medals"), and the police looked after us and kept the Shammar tribal people away.

Q. 19. Were you personally molested by the soldiers?

A. 19. No; I was one of the first to get back to the police post.

NOTE.—The police appear to have double-crossed the army in that they persuaded the women to deposit their valuables on the roof of the police station for security, kept the army off, and finally took the lot themselves. The men gave up all their money at the beginning.

Q. 20. When did you leave Simel?

A. 20. On the 17th August (Thursday last) I went to Dohuk by car with a police escort. I understand this was organised by the Iraqi authorities in Mosul. I left Dohuk for Mosul on the 21st. During this period we were fed (bread and melons) by a relief committee.

(2) This woman is an excellent witness; calm and unemotional, she, together with a girl child aged 7 and a boy infant in arms, was actually in the house of the Man of Baz during the massacre of its inhabitants. She admits that, crouched in a corner of the courtyard and in fear of her own life and the lives of her children, she did not see all that went on; I think, however, most of her story is true; she is quite definitely vindictive, although she lost none of her own relatives, and is liable to overstate the case against the Iraqi army. The womenfolk were undoubtedly mauled about a good deal, and both she and her daughter stated that in the courtyard of the house they waded "ankle-deep in blood."

Q. 1. After the police sergeant had promised you security and stated that you might return to your houses without fear of molestation, what happened?

A. 1. We were still apprehensive, but started to move back down the hill towards our houses; then we saw the armed cars and Iraqi soldiers. Goriel

Werda, a leader of the Baz, told us that he was an Iraqi, that he held a letter from the Government and that we should be safe in his house. Knowing his friendship with the police in the past, we trusted him and everybody moved downwards towards his house.

Q. 2. How many of you moved into Goriel's house?

A. 2. Possibly 100. It was a big house with a door and a large courtyard. There were many refugees, not of Simel, with us. The men went into the upstairs rooms at the back, leaving us women and children in the courtyard. Goriel had gone out to meet and parley with the troops, but they had shot him and his son.

Q. 3. What happened to the people who had taken refuge in the House of Baz; when did the troops attack you?

A. 3. As soon as Goriel and his son were killed the troops rushed the house in which we had all taken refuge. They had with them rifles and machine guns; the latter they mounted on the road, covering the entrance to the courtyard. (NOTE.—Witness was aware that bullets were coming in through the door, but never saw the machine gun; there may have been one or two dismounted Vickers used; an examination of the building would help to clear up this point.) Afterwards the soldiers entered the house and killed all males—even quite small boys. They then went upstairs and killed our menfolk, who were unarmed, crowded into one room and could not defend themselves. Five armed cars (witness saw them when she came out) were also posted round the house. Many soldiers asked me if the child at my breast was a boy (it was), as they were going to kill all males; I made no reply and hid my face.

NOTE.—A bit of information about the killing of pregnant women was interpolated here, but verification was quite impossible and I did not record it.

Q. 4. After the massacre what did you do?

A. 4. After all the men in the house had been killed, we women pleaded on our knees to be allowed to return with our children to the protection of the police post on the hill. We were taken up under escort; on the way up the officer in charge snatched up a small Assyrian boy who was by the roadside and, holding him by one hand, shot him, saying that no males must be spared.

NOTE.—This seems to have made a profound effect on informant, and I do not think that the story was invented on the spur of the moment.

Q. 5. Did you see any Kurds or Arabs in the village at the same time as the Iraqi troops?

A. 5. Yes; but they kept in the background and looted the houses after the Iraqi army had searched them for any men who might be in hiding; they did not attack us. Many were from the Shammar. These we could see for many days from the hill-top, and the looting continued until Tuesday or Wednesday (the 15th or 16th).

Q. 6. When did you leave Simel?

A. 6. About the 18th August. I was taken to Mosul under police escort. We had had nothing to eat for four days, and then we were given bread and melons.

(3) This man, at first described as a 15-year-old boy, was a prisoner in Dohuk police station for some fifteen days. The fact that he and his party of six survived is probably accounted for by the fact that he comes of a well-known family, that his arrest had been reported to the authorities at Mosul, and that his disappearance would have caused comment. Informant is about 20-22 years old; the whole of his statement after his arrival at the Dohuk lock-up is, I think, true; prior to that I think he was a very frightened Assyrian, who is now trying to appear brave.

Q. 2. Were you in Simel when the fighting took place?

A. 2. No.

A. 3. I went up to Badi by car, and thence by foot to Qaragawana to fetch my aunt, about whose safety I was concerned. Before I reached the latter village, we (I was travelling with three others) were set on by armed Kurds whilst



drinking at a small spring. As we were armed, they did not attack us at once, but when we asked them why they wanted to molest us, they told us that the Government had issued an order (verbal, apparently through the police) that they would receive a reward of 1 dinar for each dead Assyrian, plus his rifle.

Q. 4. What did you do then?

A. 4. We retreated with our rifles to the police post at Qaragawana, followed by the Kurds (some thirty in all), where we surrendered ourselves and our weapons to the police. The police kept our rifles and sent us down under escort (two police and several of the Kurds who had originally threatened us) to the lock-up at Dohuk. On our way down our party was joined by three other Assyrians (Upper Tiaris) who had given themselves up and had come from Qaragawana.

Q. 5. When you got to Dohuk what happened?

A. 5. We were taken before the police officer, who took our thumb-prints and details of our names. Our hands were loosely tied and we were locked up. The jail was empty at the time; we were the first arrivals—seven of us all told. This was on Monday (the 7th).

Q. 6. Did anybody else arrive?

A. 6. Yes; the third day after our detention 11 men (all Assyrians—7 from the Tiari and 4 unknown) were brought in. They told us that they had surrendered to the Government; they were not of Yacou's party and unarmed; the police had taken their money.

Q. 7. And afterwards?

A. 7. Two hours after the arrival of these new prisoners a section of armed cars arrived. The men wore blue shirts (overalls) with white chevrons, and they had with them one officer; the latter wore ordinary army uniform with one star on the shoulder; he was fat, pock-marked and carried a revolver. I saw him at the time and was later kicked and abused by him. These men took the last eleven prisoners (the new arrivals), placed them in the cars—this we could not see, but they were marched out with their hands tied—and drove them away. The officer said: "These men are going off to be killed; your turn will come to-morrow!" On the next morning (Friday, the 11th) Quasha (padre) Dinkha (a priest of the 2nd battalion in the old days) was brought in under arrest; with him were eight other men—Assyrians from Dohuk and Badi.

Q. 8. Did the armed cars come again and take any more prisoners away?

A. 8. Yes; always the same officer; always the same procedure. On the 11th they took away nine men, including the priest. About this time (it coincides with the Simel incident) our treatment both by the police and the soldiers deteriorated and they started to abuse us both by words and kicks; in this they were given a lead by the police officer and the officer in charge of the cars.

Q. 9. When did this daily disappearance of prisoners cease?

A. 9. It didn't; the next morning (12th) a further fifteen men were brought in, together with a priest named Quasha Saada from Simel.

Q. 10. What happened to them?

A. 10. The priest and seven other men were taken off in cars according to the usual programme. This left my original party of seven in the jail, plus a surplus of seven from the last lot of newcomers.

Q. 11. Were any of your people (the original seven) killed?

A. 11. No; but on the next morning (13th) another seven persons arrived from Dostka and Dohuk—five from the first village and two from the last.

Q. 12. What happened to these new arrivals?

A. 12. The priest of Badi (see A. 7 for the death of the first Badi priest), called Shimoel, was taken off with fourteen others and, I presume, killed.

Q. 13. When did this systematic removal of prisoners cease?

A. 13. We had been warned that we were to be killed on the following day (14th or 15th); we ate nothing, being afraid; we were not taken off, although I do not know why. That day Quasha Athniel arrived as a prisoner from Mingesh. On Saturday or Sunday (19th or 20th), whilst we were still awaiting death, the Minister of the Interior (?) arrived at Dohuk and all further orders for killing were rescinded.

Q. 14. When were you freed?

A. 14. Not at once; we stayed in the jail for three days with the priest and then the first party (original) of six, together with myself, were taken down to Mosul, where we first interviewed the chief of police and afterwards the mutessarif, who forgave us.

Q. 15. You then returned to your family?

A. 15. Yes; but before we went the mutessarif told us that but for the intervention of those in high places, the country would have been rid of Assyrians for all time. We had much to be grateful for that our lives were spared.

Q. 16. Until you left Dohuk you were a prisoner in the jail; how do you know that the people taken away by the army were actually slaughtered?

A. 16. We saw bodies of Assyrians on the road between Dohuk and Mosul; the police and the officer also told us that the captives were taken out to be killed. I also know that the women who have looked for those taken away have never found or heard of them. The dead body of one man, who was of the second party taken away by the soldiers, and who is called Wara, was identified by his wife. It was found near Dohuk. My wife was with her (? wife, possibly incorrect) and told me.

(4) A bone-headed peasant farmer, who is too stupid to be anything but honest, and who was mainly concerned in saving his own skin.

Q. 1. Were you in Simel on the 11th August?

A. 1. Yes.

Q. 2. Where were you at the time?

A. 2. I was in the village; and, as there were tribal people round the village, our flocks were not far afield.

Q. 3. When did the soldiers arrive, and had there been any fighting prior to their arrival?

A. 3. The soldiers arrived early in the morning on the 11th (Friday). There had been no previous fighting, but at daybreak some Shammar tribesmen and some Kurds had been trying to loot our flocks and had been frightened off by the police, who had fired over their heads from the hills. This had been taking place for some days; the tribesmen were never far off, but were hiding in the hills.

Q. 4. What did you do when the soldiers arrived?

A. 4. The soldiers arrived by foot from the direction of Zakho; there were also armed cars, which were posted on the main approaches to the village. When the troops started to advance into the village, I asked an Assyrian police friend of mine (one of the permanent post at Simel) if the army was going to attack us. He said that he feared they would and advised me to hide.

Q. 5. What did you do then?

A. 5. I hid in an old barn on the outskirts of the village together with two of my friends; we pulled the roof down on top of us and remained semi-buried until sunset, when the troops went away. The barn, which was derelict, was not searched. I did not see any shots fired, but the troops passed quite close to my house and were formed into close column before they entered the village.

Informant, questioned as to his escape, made the following statement:—

"We hid in the barn until dark, and then made our way out of the village to one of the wooded wadis near Simel; we went like dogs, on all fours, and had to make our way past many dead bodies in the streets; some had been shot and others ripped up with bayonets. We remained hidden in the wadi for ten days (until 21st), living on water and grain, which we brought in from the threshing-floors at night and pounded into flour with stones. On the tenth day we saw an aircraft of the R.I.A.F. dropping leaflets; one fell near us and my friend crawled out and got it. We learnt that a general amnesty had been granted to the Assyrians, and our courage came back. We decided to travel by road to Dohuk; on arrival there we reported to the kaimakam, who took our names; he wanted us to go back to Simel, but we refused. We stayed three days in Dohuk, and were then brought down by Government convoy to Mosul."



- (5) This witness has lost two sons (aged 15 and 21), her husband, who was shot before her eyes, and several near relatives. She gave quite a coherent story of all that she saw, but was in a somewhat emotional state and did not react well to cross-examination on conventional lines; her statements have, therefore, been recorded in narrative form.

On Monday, August 7, we left our village of Qasr-i-Yazidan, taking all our flocks and belongings, and moved into Simel, in order to be under the protection of the Iraqi flag; we knew that robber bands were abroad, and had heard from Goriel, of the Baz Section, that we should be safer under Government protection.

On Tuesday, August 8, some of our sheep and cattle were looted by bands of Kurds and Arabs, who were in the vicinity of Simel, and I was told that four or five shepherds had been killed.

On Wednesday, August 9, I was near the police post and saw the rifles and ammunition of our menfolk placed in a lorry, under instructions from the Kaimakam of Dohuk and the sergeant of the police, and driven away towards Dohuk. Three of our men went with the lorry; they were Quasha Saada, Rais Tailoo and a man whose name I do not know; they said that they were going to Dohuk to tell the authorities that they had handed over their arms as ordered (if possible to secure receipts), and that they and the inhabitants of Simel were loyal to the Government. They never returned, and I heard that they had been killed on their way to Dohuk, near Dulip.

On Friday, August 11, and very early in the morning, we were ordered by the sergeant of the police to return from the vicinity of the Serai on the top of the hill to our houses in the village; we were told by him that nobody need be afraid, and that our lives, as loyal Iraqi subjects, were safe. On our way down, however, we saw the soldiers entering Simel.

Goriel and his brother Yonan (? Younan), who had never left their houses in the village and taken refuge with the rest of us near the police-post, were outside their houses and called on us to seek refuge with them, saying that they were loyal Iraqis and in touch with the Government authorities. A general rush was made for their houses, as everybody believed them and thought that they would be safe under the protection of their roofs. I went into the house of Yonan and ran up to the roof to see where my menfolk were. I saw my son (aged 20); he had been shot in the head; he was covered with blood and running towards the house of Goriel. Afterwards he was among the dead. I then ran down to the courtyard and met my husband and said "Hide yourself"; he replied that he did not want to live as both his sons had been killed.

With my youngest son (age 7) in my arms, I followed my husband to the door of the house of Yonan; the door was blocked by an Iraqi soldier in uniform and with a revolver in his hand. He asked no questions, but shot my husband through the head and emptied the revolver into his body. I was dazed with grief, but managed to run with the rest of the women and children towards the police post on the hill. I was carrying my youngest son; he had slipped in the blood and was covered with it; most people thought him dead. For many days I was as one demented.

On Monday, August 14, we were taken by Government escort to Mosul.

- (6) This witness is a resident of Simel; she was at Simel during the period the 8th August to the 15th August. Her story was given in a steady and unemotional manner; it was checked by careful cross-examination and is considered to be an accurate account of certain of the events which transpired during the period mentioned above.

August 8.—During the morning (time doubtful; approximately between 9 A.M. and 11 A.M.), some Iraqi army cavalry (about 50) and some Iraqi army armoured cars arrived at Simel. The Iraqi army then collected the arms and ammunition of the Assyrian inhabitants of Simel. This was done by a house to house search as well as by the Assyrians themselves taking their arms to the police post as ordered. The rifles and ammunition were deposited in the police post. When this had been done the Iraqi army left Simel and proceeded in the direction

of Aloka. They did not return to Simel on this day. During the afternoon the rifles and licences were returned to the Assyrians under orders of the sergeant in charge of the Simel police post, one named Nafit. The ammunition was not returned. Towards the hour of darkness a large number of Assyrian men and families, comprised of the inhabitants of the villages near Simel, arrived at Simel and spent the night in the village and in the mound near the police post. They had come for protection as they feared that their villages were going to be attacked by Arab and Kurdish tribesmen, who had been seen collecting in the neighbourhood with the ostensible purpose of attacking and looting the Assyrian villages. On the arrival of these men, they were informed by the police that they would be safe in Simel. The remainder of the evening and night passed quietly.

August 9.—Between 1 A.M. and 2 A.M. the Kurdish tribesmen looted a number of sheep belonging to the inhabitants of Simel, which were being tended by Assyrian shepherds quite near Simel. Shots were heard to be fired, and it subsequently transpired that three Assyrian shepherds had been killed, and the sheep driven off by the Kurds. Nothing more transpired until morning. At about 10 A.M. what proved to be the same Iraqi army cavalry and armoured cars was seen to be approaching Simel from the direction of Aloka. On seeing this, the Assyrians became alarmed and collected in and around the police post. They were again reassured by the police as to their safety; when the Iraqi army arrived an officer of the Iraqi army held a consultation with Nafit, the n.c.o. in charge of Simel police post. The outcome of this was that Nafit told the Assyrians to hand over their arms and ammunition to the Iraqi army, who would then go away. The arms were then collected by the police and put into an Iraqi army lorry, which had been brought for the purpose. Many of the Assyrians themselves went to the lorry and placed or handed in their arms. An Assyrian, named Goriel Shimun (uncle of Ezra Effendi of Iraqi Police), was active in helping the police to collect arms, and his was the only rifle not handed in at this time, although afterwards it was subsequently withdrawn by the police. The Iraqi army then departed from Simel, taking with them the lorry containing the arms and also Kasha Sada (chief priest of Simel) and Rais Tailu David. These two men are believed to have been killed by the Iraqi army at Aloka. The Iraqi army left Simel and proceeded in the direction of Aloka. The Assyrians remained in and around the police post because they were afraid to leave it and go to their houses, as they could see Kurds and Bedouin Arabs in the vicinity of the village engaged in looting barley and wheat, which was in piles around the countryside. The police took no action to stop this looting, stating that they had received no orders from Dohuk to do so. No Arab or Kurdish looter entered Simel on this day. The Assyrians were allowed to draw water from the main stream only, which was dirty. They were forbidden to draw water from the village spring. The night of the 9th-10th August passed off quietly, the Assyrians spending the night gathered together in and around the police post.

August 10.—The day passed off quietly. The Assyrians did not move from the vicinity of the police post, except a few whose houses were very near, who went to and fro during the day for the purpose of making some bread. Arabs and Kurds could be seen during the whole day still looting the barley and wheat collected in view of the village. No Arab or Kurdish looter entered Simel on this day. The police appear to have taken not much notice of the Assyrians except to repeat that they could not stop the tribesmen looting the corn as there was no order to do so.

August 11.—In the early hours, when the moon had risen, the watchers (unarmed guards) came and told the Assyrians that they had seen the Arab inhabitants of Simel taking their sheep away from inside the village and driving them in the direction of Aloka. The Assyrians were afraid when they heard this, fearing an attack on the village would take place before dawn. This being so, they all remained awake until sunrise, but nothing happened.

Sometime between 7 A.M. and 8 A.M., the police sergeant in charge of the police post, Simel, gave orders that all the Assyrians were to leave the police post and around it and go to their houses. The Assyrians who lived outside Simel were ordered to go to their houses. These protested that it was unsafe to do so, and in the end the police sergeant told them to go inside the houses of the Assyrians in Simel. The police then pushed and drove all the Assyrians from inside the police post and around it. At this time the police pulled down the Iraqi flag, which up



till now had been flying over the police post. The Assyrians, who were in a mob of men and women and children, hurried to the houses, a large number went into the house and courtyard of one Yonan (a brother of Goriel Shimun already mentioned, and uncle to Ezra Effendi, commandant in Iraqi police), others went into Goriel Shimun's house and courtyard. These were mostly of Baz and other tribes, who had proved themselves supporters of the Iraqi Government. Both Yonan and Goriel assured the frightened Assyrians that they would be safe in their houses and that Government would protect them. Meanwhile, the remainder were scattering to their houses, some endeavouring to find refuge in the houses of the Arabs in Simel whom they had known for years. Before all had found shelter, a number of Iraqi army lorries, filled with soldiers wearing blue uniform, were seen to arrive outside the village apparently from the Zakho direction. The soldiers quickly got out of the lorries, and fire was opened without any warning. In this first burst of fire the witness saw three women and a boy killed outside the houses, and one woman killed in the cookhouse of Yonan's house. The witness was at this time in the upper room of Yonan's house. The witness is uncertain whether the first burst of fire was from automatic weapons or rifles or both. The soldiers then entered the village and firing almost ceased. At this time an officer of the Iraqi army, described as of medium height, very fat, with very thick lips and wearing spectacles or goggles, drove up in a touring car outside Yonan's house. He shouted to the soldiers not to kill the women and children, and ordered the women and children to come out of the houses and go to the police station. The women and children were then allowed to leave the houses. Any man who attempted to leave was killed either by a rifle or revolver shot. The women and children ran to the police station as best they could, and for some time afterwards very heavy firing was heard, which was the Iraqi army killing all the men in the houses. The killing was done at close quarters, and there is no doubt that all the Assyrian men in the houses were slaughtered by the Iraqi army in an organised manner. The police were observed at this time standing on the roof of the police station, but taking no part in the firing. The tribesmen from outside did not take part in this killing, but entered the village after most of the killing had been done and commenced looting the houses. The witness, on arrival at the police station found that about forty or fifty men had taken shelter mostly in the upstairs police room. The sergeant of police went down from the police post and returned with a number of Iraqi army soldiers. On their arrival, he and the other police pushed these men out of the room seven or eight at a time, down the steps to the waiting soldiers, who shot them with revolvers and rifles. These soldiers were wearing blue uniform. Quasha Ismail, who was amongst the men in this room, had a rope put around his neck by the police. He was dragged out by the police and kicked down the steps to the courtyard by Nafit Chaush. The soldiers then seized the rope and dragged him on the ground to the gate of the courtyard, where they shot him, afterwards handing his body back and throwing it on the pile of dead. When this series of killings was going on, the police sergeant ordered the women to clean up the blood from the steps and courtyard. They did this for a time and then refused, telling the police sergeant to turn the machine guns on to them as they would rather die. They were not compelled to do any more cleaning, but the soldiers took the remaining men to be killed down the hill from the police post to a ditch and killed them there. This continued until every man had been killed. Some men were hiding amongst the women and in houses. These were all hunted out and shot by the soldiers. The last of the killings was not finished until sunset. During all this time the tribesmen were looting the houses and taking the women's best wearing apparel and girdles. Soon after dark the Iraqi army went to their lorries and departed in the direction of Aloka. They had some loot loaded up in the lorries. The witness states that she did not see any of the Iraqi army interfere with the women at night. The women remained in the police station. Nafit called for one woman to go to him, but she would not go. Two policemen came down with a lantern and tried to take her, but as she struggled, they gave it up and went away. The Ishmail family were kept in a separate room near Nafit's quarters. It is certain that Nafit violated the wife of Yacub Ismail during the time they were in this room; definite proof of this can be brought. The night of the 11th and 12th passed quietly, the tribesmen were busy looting the village.

August 12.—The Iraqi army returned to Simel at about 9 A.M. in lorries from Aloka. They collected the bodies and put them mostly in a ditch in front of the

house of Khai. In the afternoon, when they had finished burying the bodies, they got into their lorries and returned to Aloka. The Iraqi army did not come near the women in the police post on this day. Looting in the village by tribesmen continued on the 13th and 14th August. The families remained in the police post, and fed mostly on dried water-melon seed. On the 14th August, some bread was sent from Mosul. Most of them were too grief-stricken to eat. No definite charges of ill treatment by the police are made by this witness during this period. The families left Simel for Mosul on the 15th August.

(7) The evidence of this woman was proved by cross-examination.

On the morning of Friday, the 11th August, I was in the police post, Simel, with all the other Assyrians who had gathered there for protection. About 7 A.M. an Iraqi aeroplane flew over Simel and dropped a letter, which was picked up and taken to Nafit Chaush, who was in command of the police post. Some time after this Nafit Chaush ordered us to go down to the houses in the village. The police then pushed us out of the police post, and then pulled down the Iraqi flag which was flying over the post. I went down into the village with my husband —, father-in-law, brother-in-law, and my small daughter. We first of all went to our own house, but I returned to the police post to collect the remainder of our belongings. Some Iraqi army cars were seen approaching Simel from the direction of Zakho. On seeing this I went with my menfolk to the house of Yonan into an upstairs room. There were about forty men in the room and some women. We saw that the Iraqi army cars were five in number. Four lorries with Lewis or machine guns mounted on them, and one smaller car covered in with iron, with guns pointing out of it. These cars were placed as follows: One in front of the window of Yonan's house, one in front of Goriel Shimun's house, one on the road leading to Dohuk, and one behind the garden of Abdul Rahman. The smaller car covered in with iron (armoured), in which I saw an Iraqi army officer, was placed outside the house of Yonan. In all the cars there were Iraqi soldiers in blue uniforms. The Iraqi army officer got out of the armoured car. He was of medium height, very broad, clean shaven, with a red and white complexion like a European. He was dressed in khaki uniform, jacket and shorts. There was some red cloth or braid on the straps of his jacket. The jacket was a lighter colour than the shorts. He wore an Iraqi army topi with a thin red cord round it. When he got out of the car he sent two soldiers to the house of Goriel Shimun. I saw Goriel Shimun standing in the doorway of his house. When they approached Goriel Shimun the soldiers talked loudly, and I could hear what was being said. They told Goriel to come with them. He refused, saying he was an Iraqi subject. The soldiers asked him where his papers were, and he replied that they were with the Kaïmakam of Dohuk. The soldiers then laid hands on him and started to drag him away from his house. Whilst they were dragging him another soldier came up from behind, raised his rifle and shot Goriel in the back; he was killed. They dragged him to a spring nearby, where an old man was standing. The soldiers shot this old man and threw Goriel's body on top of him. By this time a lot more lorries filled with soldiers had arrived. The soldiers got down from the lorries, scattered into the village and entered the houses. There was firing to be heard at this time in other parts of the village. The party of soldiers that entered Yonan's house, where I was, pushed all the women outside, telling them to go to the police post. They could not get me away from my husband. I was clinging to him in the corner of the room, huddled up on the floor. The room was full of Assyrian men unarmed. I think there were quite forty men in the room, which was a large one. Next, the soldiers opened fire from the doorway, some advancing into the room over dead bodies. Bullets were flying everywhere, and I expected to be killed at any moment. The soldiers shot my father and brother-in-law, and all the other men; lastly, they pulled me across the room away from my husband and then shot him. Between ten and fifteen soldiers did the killing in this room. I then went down the steps into the courtyard. I saw there the soldiers kill one old man and one woman who was near the cookhouse. I ran outside and saw the Iraqi army officer still standing near the armoured car. I ran and threw myself at his feet, kissing them, and begging him for mercy and to stop the killing. He said: "Go and ask mercy from Yacu. We are going to kill all



the men and not leave one alive.' He then told me to go to the police post. I got up and went away, weeping, towards the police post. Soldiers were everywhere going into houses and searching for men, killing them when they found them. On the way I saw the dead bodies of nine women and two small girls lying about in the alleyways. When I was still on my way an Iraqi soldier took two rings from my fingers, but otherwise did not hurt me. I must have reached the police post about midday. Women told me that plenty of men had been shot in or near the police station. There was a lot of firing still going on in Simel. On my way from Yonan's house to the police post I passed about thirty Iraqi soldiers on horseback. When I saw them they were not taking part in the killing, but riding about in the streets. When I reached the police post I saw these cavalry riding away from Simel towards Dohuk. I sat in the police post, where I could see the road and look into the village. At intervals I saw parties of Iraqi army soldiers arrive at Simel from the direction of Zakho. Some were in lorries and some on foot. I don't remember seeing any more on horseback. Some of the soldiers came into the village, and some posted themselves outside to stop men escaping. During the afternoon until dark the Iraqi army soldiers left Simel in parties and went on the Dohuk road. One of the first to leave in the afternoon was the armoured car in which I had seen the Iraqi army officer; one armoured lorry went with it. The last party went just before dark. They were mostly the soldiers in blue uniform, who went away in lorries as they arrived. These also went towards Dohuk. After the big killings in the morning, some of the tribesmen from outside entered the village and joined in looting the houses. The looting went on for two or three days. The first looting I saw was when I was going from Yonan's house to the police post. Then I saw the Arab inhabitants of Simel, whom I know, looting the Assyrian houses.

During the late afternoon about ten soldiers in blue uniform came to the police post with Nafit Chaush. They searched amongst the women for any boys or men hiding amongst them. They found twelve, four of them only boys. They shot four of this number in the courtyard. The women beseeched them to take the rest outside, which they did, and shot them there. This was the last killing I saw on this day.

(8) — is an excellent and unemotional witness; in the comparative peace of — village (her normal home), she had more opportunity of observing the trend of local events than those involved in the holocaust of Simel. Her story, mainly derived from cross-examination, is, for the general convenience of the reader, recorded in narrative form.

— I live in — village; most of the inhabitants are Assyrians, although there are some ten Kurdish families. In July five of our menfolk went off and joined Yacou Ismail's party. It was towards the end of this month that we first became frightened for our safety as a small Assyrian community amongst so many Kurds, although, in the past they had been friendly to us.

Early in August (probably about the 7th or 8th), the son of Sheikh Nuri (a Kurdish Agha), who lives at Brifka, came in to see us. He owns a large house in our village, and, as we did not know what to do, we asked his advice. He said that we should be safe from the vengeance of the Government and from our enemies if we took refuge with him, but added that first our menfolk must hand over all their arms as otherwise the Government might accuse him of giving refuge to Yacou's rebels. Our men handed over fourteen rifles; when this was done, the son of Sheikh Nuri told us that all Assyrians were implicated in the rising against the Government; that our men would be shot and that, by right of conquest, he was going to take over our village, our flocks, and all our property. If the Government later called on him to account for it, we might (if alive) get it back; otherwise it was his.

Realising that, unarmed, they stood little chance of saving either their property or their lives, most of our men ran away and hid themselves in the mountains. My brother, — and two others remained; about the 9th August, these were taken by the nephew of Sheikh Nuri (who also owned property in our village) to Dohuk, where they were handed over first to the police and, later, to the Iraqi army. From my brother, I learnt what happened to them after they had been handed over by the police to the soldiers.

My brother told me that at night-fall on the following day, he, with several others, was placed in an armed car and driven towards Mosul; their hands were tied and they were told that they were going to be killed according to the orders of the Government. The car stopped near the village of Shandokahah in a hilly part of the road; here there were soldiers in waiting (about thirty of them) and, as the prisoners were hustled out of the car, they shot them one by one and threw their bodies into a convenient wadi nearby. My brother had got his hands free during the journey and made a dash for freedom; in the half light the soldiers could not see him very well and he was only wounded; he hid that night and later made his way to the village of — where he has been tended by an Assyrian doctor —.

For myself, I came with the rest of our women to Al Qosh, where I remained for fifteen days; later I was brought by the Government cars to Mosul.

FOOTNOTE.—A comparison of this evidence with that given by witness No. 3 — would appear to substantiate the fact that organised killing of the Assyrian male prisoners was carried out by the army cars operating from Dohuk.

[E 5653/7/93]

No. 157.

*The Responsibility of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the Future of the Assyrians.*

THERE appears to be a consensus of opinion that the only satisfactory solution of the problem of the Assyrians is the settlement of the whole community or the bulk of it in some country other than Iraq. When this solution comes to be discussed it will no doubt be suggested both at Geneva and in pro-Assyrian circles in this country that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should contribute substantially, by providing either funds or land, to a settlement scheme, because of the alleged special obligations of His Majesty's Government towards the Assyrians.

2. It becomes necessary, therefore, to establish as exactly as possible the nature of these obligations, if any.

3. There is a widespread belief that the Assyrians were induced by the Allies and by Great Britain, in particular, to enter the war against Turkey, and that, during the war, they were promised by Great Britain eventual independence, or at least autonomy and protection.

4. A careful search has several times been made into archives of the Foreign Office and also into those of the War Office, without revealing any specific pledge by His Majesty's Government to the Assyrians.

5. It is clear, however, that the Assyrians themselves derived from certain events at the end of 1917 the impression that they might expect British support in realising their national aspirations.

6. Great Britain had, at all events, no part in the entry of the Assyrians into the war. This was due solely to Russian instigation. The Assyrians before the war lived in Turkish and Persian Kurdistan. Owing to the paramount influence of Russia in North-West Persia and to the relations between the Nestorian and Orthodox Churches they found themselves, at the outbreak of war, suspect in Turkey and identified with the Allied cause. In the spring of 1915 Russian troops advancing towards Julamerk got into touch with the Ottoman Assyrians and urged them to rise against the Turks. Russian support was promised, and an assembly of Assyrian notables which met at Diz issued a formal declaration of war against Turkey on the 10th May, 1915. When, shortly afterwards, the Russians retired, the position of the Assyrians became untenable, and they were forced to withdraw with their families to Persian territory after hard fighting. On reaching Persia they continued to assist the Russians until the break-up of the Tsarist armies in 1917. This break-up made the Allies anxious about the Caucasian front, and an attempt was made to induce the Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians to act in some sort of unity with the idea of preventing a Turkish advance through Persia towards India. Assyrians and Armenians were trained by Russian instructors at Urumia, where a French military mission established itself. On the British side, Captain G. F. Gracey was sent on a



mission to Urumia towards the end of December 1917 to make friendly approaches to the Kurdish tribes under Simko, and to try to heal the breach between two rival Assyrian leaders, namely, Agha Petros and the Mar Shimun (the predecessor of the present Patriarch). According to an Assyrian account of Captain Gracey's proceedings, taken from a report prepared by the Assyrian Refugees Committee at Tehran towards the end of 1918, Captain Gracey, at a meeting with the Assyrian leaders at which Russian and French representatives were also present, promised the Assyrians British military support and promised that the Allies, if victorious, would grant to the Assyrians "permanent and fundamental protection with all the privileges promised to small and oppressed peoples."

7. Last year, in answer to a request from the Foreign Office for his version of what happened, Captain Gracey wrote a confidential letter to Mr. Gaselee, in which he denied having made the pledge attributed to him, and pointed out that it was not within his province as a junior officer to do so. His own version is that he stated that the future of the Assyrians lay in the success of the Allied cause, and that he would use all his personal influence and support in helping them to attain their ideal. He was not in a position to guarantee any action by the British Government to ensure the independence of the Assyrians, but he felt sure that the Allied Governments would consider sympathetically such representations as the Assyrians might make along these lines.

8. Although Captain Gracey obviously had no power to commit, and his statement did not commit His Majesty's Government, a simple people like the Assyrians would naturally regard him as an accredited British representative, and may, perhaps, be pardoned for interpreting what he said as a pledge, even though cautious, of British support.

9. Moreover, although no specific pledges appear to have been given at any time by His Majesty's Government, it is evident from official statements that His Majesty's Government did regard themselves after the war as under some special obligation towards the Assyrians; and the existence of these statements which are recorded below makes it less important to give further detailed consideration to the implications of what Captain Gracey said at Urumia.

10. It will be remembered that the Assyrians were eventually obliged to retire before the attack of Turks, Kurds and Persians and to seek shelter in territory occupied by British forces. Eventually in 1918 they reached Iraq and were concentrated by the British authorities in a refugee camp at Baquba near Bagdad. On p. 102 of the published report on Iraq for the period October 1920-March 1922, in which their arrival at Baquba and subsequent attempts to settle them are described, the following statement occurred:—

"A definite promise of settlement under a benevolent if not a British Government had been made to them. . . ."

It has been impossible to trace the promise referred to, and, possibly, the statement is only a loose reference to the alleged pledges by Captain Gracey; but a Foreign Office confidential memorandum of the 11th August, 1923, speaks of "general assurances of help, which have been given since 1917."

11. His Majesty's Government certainly did their utmost in the years immediately following the war to fulfil any obligation which they conceived themselves to be under to the Assyrians. Not only were the refugees housed and fed at British expense at Baquba for three years, but after the break-up of that camp His Majesty's Government themselves contributed in 1921 and 1922 more than a quarter of a million sterling from public funds for Assyrian relief and settlement. (In a speech at the Lausanne Conference in 1923, Sir H. Rumbold said that since the armistice His Majesty's Government had spent over £4,000,000 on the Assyrians.) Every effort was made to repatriate the Assyrians or to settle them in the northern parts of Iraq. The bulk of the ex-Ottoman Assyrians returned, in fact, to the Hakkari district of Turkey, and between 1922 and 1924 there seemed good reason to hope that the Assyrian problem would solve itself.

12. The Assyrians, however, continued to rely on British support, believing that they had finally embroiled themselves with Islam by their attitude during the war, and that if they stayed in Asia after the withdrawal of British troops they would be exterminated. Failure to conclude peace with Turkey created a feeling of insecurity, and Assyrian apprehensions were further aroused by the signature in April 1923 of a protocol to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1922, providing that that treaty should terminate when Iraq became a member

of the League of Nations, and at any rate not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. The Assyrians then petitioned for their establishment in their ancient homes (*i.e.*, in Hakkari) under a British protectorate. His Majesty's Government could not contemplate so grave an extension of their responsibilities, but they decided to meet Assyrian aspirations by aiming in the peace settlement with Turkey at the incorporation in Iraq of the Hakkari territory.

13. The Lausanne Treaty left the Turco-Iraqi frontier for future settlement, and, in the first place, an attempt was made to settle it at the Anglo-Turkish Conference at Constantinople in May 1924. Sir Percy Cox then put forward a claim for the inclusion within Iraq of the territory inhabited before the war by the Assyrians. He prefaced this claim with the statement that "His Majesty's Government feel under the strongest obligation to secure their settlement in accordance with the reasonable claims and aspirations of their race."

The Turkish delegate, Fethi Bey, refused to consider this claim, which he regarded as unjust to Turkey, and he added that the Assyrians "would still find in Turkish territory the tranquillity and prosperity which they enjoyed there for centuries, provided that they did not repeat the errors which they committed, with foreign encouragement, at the beginning of the Great War."

14. The Constantinople Conference broke down on this point, and the question of the frontier was referred to the Council of the League of Nations. In a British memorandum addressed to the League on the 14th August, 1924, a further appeal was made for inclusion in Iraq of the Hakkari territory, and this memorandum repeated that "the British Government feel under the strongest obligation to secure their settlement (*i.e.*, the settlement of the Assyrians) in accordance with the reasonable claims and aspirations of their race."

15. In September 1924 the League set up the Mosul Boundary Commission, which examined the question locally. Meanwhile, Fethi Bey's promise at the Constantinople Conference had been belied by the action of the Turkish Government in expelling once more from the Hakkari district the Assyrians who had settled there.

16. The recommendations of the Mosul Boundary Commission were contrary to the British claim for the incorporation of Hakkari within Iraq. The commission expressed the view that whichever State became sovereign over the disputed territory ought to grant local autonomy to the Assyrians. There is little doubt that the commission was influenced by Fethi Bey's promise, and contemplated that the Assyrians would eventually drift back to Hakkari. The Council, however, in promulgating its award on the basis of the commission's recommendations, *i.e.*, in rejecting the British claim to Hakkari, invited the mandatory Power to grant the Assyrians a measure of autonomy in Iraq. It had already been made clear both to the Boundary Commission and to the Council that this was impracticable owing to the fact that suitable land did not exist in Iraq where the Assyrians could be settled in a homogeneous community.

17. Since 1925 the Turkish Government have consistently denied the Assyrians access to their former homes.

18. Although the statements made by Sir Percy Cox at the Constantinople Conference and in the British memorandum of the 14th August, 1924, may be quoted as a reason why His Majesty's Government should now make some special contribution towards Assyrian settlement, it is clear from the above that the main responsibility for the failure to settle the Assyrians lies with the Council of the League, and that His Majesty's Government are to a large extent absolved from their admitted obligations by the strenuous efforts which they made to secure the settlement of the Assyrians, free from Turkish rule, in their old homes in Hakkari territory.

19. There are, however, two other reasons which may be urged why His Majesty's Government should make a special contribution. They are the service rendered by the Assyrians to His Majesty's Government in the Iraq levies and Sir Francis Humphrys's statement before the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1931 regarding the "moral responsibility" of His Majesty's Government.

20. The argument that the Assyrians have served His Majesty's Government in the levies is capable of being over-emphasised. The levies were originally an Arab force of military police, which gradually took over the work of preserving internal order from the British army in Mesopotamia. As a result of the decision



at the Cairo Conference in 1922 to reduce the number of Imperial troops in Iraq, the levies were increased by the addition of Kurdish and Assyrian recruits, and the Assyrian element gradually increased until it is now about five-eighths of the whole force. This was due largely to the necessity for finding employment for the Assyrians, and service in the levies has been of very great economic advantage to the community as a whole. The Assyrians, in fact, are rather under an obligation to His Majesty's Government than *vice versa*. At the same time, there is no doubt that they have rendered good service, and, whatever the reason for their service, they deserve every consideration from His Majesty's Government. Our aerodromes in Iraq are at present largely dependent for their protection on Assyrians, and for that reason, if for no other, it will be well for His Majesty's Government to adopt as generous an attitude as possible on the question of the settlement of the Assyrian community.

21. Perhaps Sir Francis Humphrys's declaration of moral responsibility will be urged as the strongest argument why His Majesty's Government should contribute. It is, in fact, not a very strong argument. The limited scope of the declaration has already been brought out in a separate memorandum. It referred solely to the responsibility of His Majesty's Government in declaring Iraq to be fit for membership of the League of Nations. It is true that the declaration was made to back up an opinion which Sir Francis Humphrys expressed in strong terms that the Iraqi Government could be relied upon to show tolerance towards minorities. It will be said that recent events have shown his opinion to be completely false. Such a statement is naturally difficult to disprove convincingly. But although the excesses against the Assyrians cannot be too strongly condemned, they began as reprisals for an Assyrian rebellion, and there is still no evidence of any systematic persecution of the Assyrians such as was feared by those who were sceptical of the expediency of terminating the mandatory régime. It cannot yet be said, in fact, that Iraq has proved herself unworthy of the confidence placed in her.

22. It will be clear from this memorandum that His Majesty's Government have not, as is sometimes alleged, betrayed the Assyrians or broken any pledges towards them. They have, on the contrary, made every effort for their settlement under suitable conditions, but have been thwarted, in the first place by the Council of the League, and in the second place by the obstinacy of the Assyrians themselves, who have proved difficult to please in the matter of land, and have striven all along for a specially privileged position in Iraq. Nevertheless, though His Majesty's Government are under no specific obligation to take further action on their behalf, their attitude towards the Assyrians in the past, and their close connexion with them, make it difficult for His Majesty's Government to refuse to make some special contribution towards their future settlement. British prestige would be enormously enhanced by an offer to make such a contribution, whereas it would be seriously damaged by reluctance or refusal.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,  
September 22, 1933.*

[E 5640/5250/93]

No. 158.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 23.)*

(No. 87.)

Sir,

*Beirut, September 13, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the news of the sudden death of King Feisal, which became generally known on the afternoon of the 8th, was received by the Moslem element with feelings akin to consternation. The first impression seems to be that without King Feisal, who alone could deal with the European Powers, the Arab cause is lost. Later a rumour began to spread, and gained some acceptance among the more gullible and more fanatical Moslem elements, that His Majesty's Government had had something to do with his sudden death, and it was even suggested that they had directly brought it about. Reports subsequently began to circulate that demonstrations had occurred at Aleppo and Damascus, and on Monday, the 11th, the report that a

hostile demonstration had been made against the British consulate at Damascus was so persistent that I telephoned to Mr. Todd to ask if anything had happened. I understood from him that on the Saturday an attempt had been made to start a demonstration at some distance from the consulate and that the police had at once broken up the gathering. This incident was witnessed by Rear-Admiral im Thurn, who, with Mr. Todd and some officers, happened to be in the vicinity.

2. On the Monday there was to be a funeral service at the principal mosque here. The local authorities appeared to anticipate that something might happen, as, on reaching my office, I noticed several policemen discreetly posted in its vicinity. I therefore telephoned to the *Sûreté générale* and asked if they really thought anything would happen. Their reply was quite reassuring, but about 11 o'clock they telephoned that the gathering at the mosque was much bigger than they had expected and rather excited. They therefore suggested that any British sailors ashore would be better on board. Although I thought that this was rather an excessive precaution, I felt that I ought to pass on the suggestion to Rear-Admiral im Thurn, who ordered that leave should not be granted that afternoon. Luckily by 1 o'clock it was quite clear that nothing would happen and the order was cancelled. Actually all that occurred was that a large crowd with banners made a demonstration of sympathy at the Iraqi consulate-general, where speeches were delivered. Many Moslem shops displayed signs of mourning, with, in some cases, portraits of King Feisal.

3. A suitable message of condolence was sent by the French Acting High Commissioner to the Iraqi Government through the French Legation at Bagdad and M. Helleu also telegraphed to the Emir Abdullah, who replied by telegram. Official communiqués embodying this information have appeared in the local press.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 6363/5250/93]

No. 159.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 24.)*

(No. 608.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, October 10, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice a problem in connexion with the succession to the Throne of Iraq which promises to become of considerable constitutional importance.

2. His Majesty King Ghazi was the only son of the late King, and in the event of his death without male issue a difficult situation would arise. Under article 20 of the Iraqi Constitution the Heir-Apparent to the Throne is declared to be the eldest son of the King in direct line, "in accordance with the provisions of the law of succession." Doubt has been expressed as to the meaning and intention of the concluding words of this article; as to whether they were meant to refer to the Koranic rules of succession to property or to a special statute of the Iraqi Parliament dealing specifically with the succession to the Iraqi Throne. The late King, I understand, took the latter view, and in 1924 pressed his Prime Minister, who was then, as now, Rashid Ali, to enact a law securing the succession to the other branches of the Hashimite family. A draft law was prepared under which the Crown devolved to the uncles of the Amir Ghazi should the latter die without male issue or brothers. For a variety of reasons the law was not proceeded with. At that time, it would appear, there was no general desire to see the Throne pass to a brother of King Feisal, and it was felt that, in the unlikely event of the death of Feisal and his son, it was better to leave the people of Iraq free to choose, if they wished, another dynasty. The Constituent Assembly was at the time considering the draft Constitution, and, although the wording adopted in articles 19 and 20 thereof was not altogether free from doubt, it has always been presumed that the Assembly intended to restrict the succession to the direct male heirs of King Feisal.

3. In 1929 the project of a law of succession was again revived, and in this connexion I would refer you to Lord Passfield's despatch No. 453 of the 26th August, 1929. In the draft law framed in that year the succession was not

[9941]

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extended beyond the direct male issue, possibly still on account of the considerations set out above, and probably also because such an extension would have then involved an amendment of the Constitution, which in the year 1929 was not constitutionally possible under the provisions of article 119. The draft law was not proceeded with.

4. The problem, which in 1929 was of academic interest only, has now become an urgent one, and I took the opportunity of mentioning it to the Prime Minister a few days after the late King's death. The Prime Minister said he was alive to the matter, and he indicated that not only was a law of succession imperative, but that this would involve an amendment of the Constitution. Nothing can now be done until Parliament meets on the 1st November, and even then it would be some time before the succession can be secured. An amendment to the Constitution involves a dissolution of Parliament and an approval by a two-thirds majority of both the old and new Parliaments.

5. The difficulties of the problem, no doubt, in part explain the haste with which the betrothal of King Ghazi to his cousin, Princess Alia, reported in my telegram No. 372 of the 19th September, was arranged. It suggests that the Cabinet may consider that the impending consummation of the marriage with the expectancy of male issue is sufficient insurance against the risks of a vacant Throne to warrant them deferring the enactment of a law of succession until a more convenient season. In fact, the Prime Minister, with whom I again discussed the matter a few days ago, admitted that the enactment of a law of succession presented so many difficulties that he did not think the Government would face it. For instance, he said, supposing that the Egyptian law of succession were adopted, King Ali would be the Heir-Apparent to the Throne of Iraq, and would undoubtedly try to exercise political influence during the lifetime of King Ghazi, which would be most embarrassing to the King and the Government. The position of the Amir Abdullah would also have to be taken into consideration, and he told me privately that the Amir considered himself as the most suitable candidate for "the Throne of all the Arabs" since his brother's death.

6. I told the Prime Minister that I appreciated these difficulties, but he must not forget that, if King Ghazi were to die at any time without a son, a dangerous situation might arise in Iraq, as there would be no heir and nobody would know what to do. The Prime Minister admitted that this was a very real danger, but said that the Cabinet were between the devil and the deep sea. The present was an awkward time to contemplate a general election, though this might become necessary if the Government found itself without a working majority in Parliament. He promised to consult me again after the return of Yasin Pasha and Nuri Pasha from Geneva.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 10645/10014/379]

No. 160.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 26.)*

(No. 610.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 21, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to make the following report on the funeral of the late King Feisal, which took place in Bagdad on the 15th September:—

2. The two Royal Air Force "Victoria" machines, bearing His Majesty's body, King Ali, Nuri Pasha, Jafar Pasha, Rustam Beg Haidar and Tahsin Beg, reached Rutbah from Haifa on the 14th September and, after halting there for the night, arrived at the Bagdad West Civil Aerodrome at 7.30 o'clock on the following morning. An escort of nine Iraqi aircraft accompanied the Royal Air Force machines from Ramadi to Bagdad. The Royal bier was received with full military honours, and then placed on a gun carriage to be borne in state through the city to the burial ground which had been prepared in the gardens adjacent to the Parliament building near the suburb of Muadhdam. Immense crowds lined the streets throughout the route, and at times threatened to break the military cordon which enclosed the official cortege. The police, however, never quite lost control, and the programme of ceremonies was carried through without any

interruption more serious than an occasional halt while the thronging people were pressed back to enable the procession to pass.

3. The Cabinet, the Diplomatic Corps, ex-Ministers, Senators, Deputies and high officials joined the procession outside the palace at about 9 o'clock, and followed on foot, for a distance of 2 miles, to the grave-side. There, after a short religious and military ceremony, including the sounding of the "Last Post," King Feisal's coffin was lowered into the grave, and the Cabinet and the heads of diplomatic missions laid their wreaths. In accordance with the command contained in your telegram, I had the honour of laying a special wreath on behalf of the King. No other diplomatic representatives had received a command of this kind, and His Majesty's gesture was much appreciated by King Ghazi, who telegraphed his personal thanks to Balmoral.

4. Deputations from each of the provinces came to Bagdad for the funeral, and at the conclusion of the official obsequies, these, together with deputations representing the trade guilds and other organised branches of the capital, filed past the late King's grave for several hours.

5. No one who took part in this ceremony could fail to be impressed by the genuine signs of grief which were manifested by every class and section of the population for the loss of their King. The arrangements made for the funeral were dignified, with a proper blend of Eastern and Western custom, and the Iraqi Government are to be congratulated that their military and police forces were able, without British assistance, to control the largest and potentially the most turbulent crowd that Bagdad has witnessed since Iraq became a nation.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 5659/7/93]

No. 161.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 25.)*

(No. 612.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 21, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations on the future of the Assyrians in Iraq. For my present purposes it is convenient to divide them into three categories: (a) Those who are not original inhabitants of villages now within Iraq's borders; (b) those of Yaku's exodus who are now being detained in Syria; (c) those whose original villages are within the borders of Iraq and who can therefore be classed as indigenous inhabitants of the country.

2. The people of category (a), who number about 20,000, present a difficult problem. During the last two years the Iraqi Government have endeavoured, within the limits of their resources, to make these people contented. But, inspired by their Patriarch and his immediate following, many of them have clung passionately to an unrealisable ideal and have remained resolutely discontented. They have now had recourse to arms to gain their ends; blood has been spilt on both sides, and I fear that it would be idle any longer to hope that mutual trust can ever be established between the immigrant Assyrians and the Iraqi Government. Worse still, the promiscuous killing which has taken place has caused relentless blood feuds between the Assyrians and the Kurds which will embitter their relations for many years to come. In these circumstances I am convinced that it would be most dangerous to renew an attempt to settle these Assyrians in Iraq. The only real and lasting solution of the problem is to find a home for them elsewhere. It is, I fully appreciate, far easier to indicate this remedy than to show how it can be applied. Nevertheless, in view of the grave consequences which are likely to follow any further effort to establish them permanently in Iraq, I feel that it is imperative that we should devise some means of resettling them in other lands. I am in no position to review in detail the places to which they might be transferred, but I suggest that it might be possible to find suitable lands in the upland districts of the East African colonies or Cyprus. The Assyrians would doubtless prefer to be resettled all together in one place, but if no suitable territory can be found large enough for this purpose, they could, I think, be divided into tribal groups for settlement in different territories where their safety could be assured under the

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protection of a European Power. The cost involved would be a serious obstacle to the carrying out of such a scheme, even if the necessary land can be found, but in my telegram No. 373 of the 20th September I have put forward suggestions as to the way in which the necessary funds might be found, a large proportion being provided by the Iraqi Government.

3. The people of category (b), who also belong to the immigrant and not the indigenous section of the Assyrians, will not be permitted by the Iraqi Government to return to this country in any circumstances, but, provided the French Government are approached tactfully, it should be possible to arrange for them to be settled with their families in Syria. Syria will, however, sooner or later, be released from mandatory control, and this group of Assyrians will then find themselves in much the same position as they were in Iraq. Their settlement in Syria would therefore be more provisional than permanent, and it might be hoped that in course of time it would be found possible for them to join one of the groups which had been established in other countries.

4. The people of the third category, who have never shown any discontent with their lot as Iraqi subjects and who are still in possession of their original holdings, would not, I am advised, wish to leave Iraq. Their number is, however, small, probably little more than about 400 families in all. They are therefore a comparatively unimportant element, but in the event of it being found possible to transfer them, too, it might be better that they should go.

5. When the Patriarch's petitions come before the League of Nations at the close of the month I anticipate that the Council will attach great importance to the question of the future of the Assyrians, more perhaps than to the recent tragic events in Iraq. Indeed, I think they will be wise to do so, since the sifting of the charges and counter-charges of the Iraqi Government and Mar Shimun will bring no relief to the unfortunate Assyrians either now or in the future. I submit, therefore, that the solution I have suggested should receive urgent consideration, and that His Majesty's Government should at once make enquiries from the Governments of all Colonies, where a suitable climate obtains, as to the existence of vacant land on which the Assyrians could be settled. To be successful the transfer of the Assyrians to another country will have to be carried out under the auspices of the League of Nations, and a League representative will have to visit Bagdad from time to time to co-ordinate the necessary arrangements with a local committee to be appointed by the Iraqi Government for this purpose. I feel confident that a scheme of this kind will give much satisfaction to those friends and sympathisers throughout the world who are at present so anxiously concerned for the future of the Assyrians.

6. In conclusion, I wish to record it as my definite opinion that when the transfer of the Assyrians from this country has been completed the other Christian minorities in Iraq will have nothing to fear for their safety.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 5674/7/93]

No. 162.

*Protection of Minorities in Iraq.—Supplementary Petition of Mar Shimun, Catholicos Patriarch of the Assyrians, concerning the Situation of the Assyrian Minority in Iraq.*

*Note by the Secretary-General.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 26.)*

(C. 519.1933.I.)

BY document C. 504.1933.I the Secretary-General communicated to the Council a letter and a telegram from Mar Shimun, Catholicos Patriarch of the Assyrians, concerning the situation of the Assyrian minority in Iraq, which question has been placed on the provisional agenda of the next session of the Council.

The Secretary-General has now the honour to circulate, for the consideration of the Council, a further telegram from Mar Shimun, dated the 16th September, 1933, concerning the same question.

The text of this telegram is being communicated, for observations, to the Iraqi Government. As soon as these observations reach the Secretariat, the Secretary-General will not fail to communicate them to the Council.

*Geneva, September 19, 1933.*

*Mar Shimun to Secretary-General, League of Nations, Geneva.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nicosia, September 16, 1933.*

Twenty-eight more known Assyrians, including women, massacred between 20th August and 3rd September. Large number individual murders continue. Detailed report follows.—MAR SHIMUN, Patriarch.

[E 3988/447/34]

No. 163.

*Sir John Simon to Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).*

(No. 606.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 27, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 78 of the 8th February last, I have to inform your Excellency that in the course of a conversation at the Foreign Office on the 19th July, concerning Perso-Iraqi relations, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs raised the question of the proposed neutrality pact between Persia and Iraq.

2. Nuri Pasha explained that he had last winter rejected the Persian Government's proposal for the conclusion of such a pact because he considered that it would be incompatible with Iraq's obligations under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. There was, however, no doubt that, if Iraq could meet Persia's wishes in regard to the pact, this would go far towards effecting a much needed improvement in Perso-Iraqi relations. Nuri Pasha, therefore, desired to be advised regarding the possibility of concluding a pact of this nature which would not violate the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance.

3. He was informed in reply that the question seemed chiefly to depend on whether the proposed pact could be so framed as to harmonise with the existing obligations of Iraq and Persia under the Covenant of the League of Nations and other international instruments of a similar character. Persia, Iraq and Great Britain were all members of the League, and the overriding obligations were those of the Covenant, to which the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance itself were also specifically made subordinate. If the proposed neutrality pact was compatible with these obligations it was conceivable that it might be possible so to draft it as to make it compatible with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. This was, however, a point on which expert advice would be required.

4. Nuri Pasha expressed the hope that the matter would be further examined and requested that he might be informed as soon as possible whether any neutrality pact on the lines of that which the Persian Government had proposed to the Iraqi Government could be concluded between the two countries without violating the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance.

5. A copy of the Persian draft of the proposed neutrality convention was enclosed in your despatch No. 21 of the 12th January last, and my comments upon it were contained in my despatch under reference. For present purposes it appears necessary to consider only articles 1 to 3 of this draft, since the remaining articles, which concerned frontier matters, would clearly be out of place in a neutrality convention.

6. You will remember that in my despatch No. 78 I explained that an unqualified obligation to preserve neutrality, such as was contemplated in articles 1 to 3 of the Persian Government's draft, would not only be in conflict with the terms of article 4 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, but would also be inconsistent with the obligations assumed by Iraq and by Persia under the Covenant of the League of Nations; and I suggested that, in drawing the attention of the Iraqi Government to the unsuitability of these articles, you should make this point clear. But in order that the impression should not be given that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty necessarily constituted a bar to the conclusion by Iraq of any

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treaty of friendship or non-aggression, I also suggested that you should inform the Iraqi Government that, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government would be willing to examine, in concert with them, the possibility of framing provisions of a non-aggression type which could be reconciled both with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and with the terms of the Covenant.

7. I presume that, in view of Nuri Pasha's enquiry, you had no opportunity of discussing the matter with the Iraqi Government on these lines. I therefore desire to furnish you with the following additional observations based on the further consideration which has been given to the question of the proposed pact.

8. The principal difficulty presented by bilateral treaties of non-aggression is that either they add nothing to the obligations of the parties concerned under the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, or, if they do, there is a risk of their being inconsistent with those instruments or with any treaties of mutual assistance into which the parties may have entered. In the present case the draft proposed by the Persian Government is plainly inconsistent with Iraq's obligations under the Covenant and the Treaty of Alliance, and, while it is not actually inconsistent with the Pact of Paris, it does deprive each party of the right reserved to him under the pact to go to war with the other party in the event of the latter attacking a third State in violation of the pact.

9. Under the Treaty of Alliance Iraq's obligation to assist His Majesty's Government is expressly made subject to her obligations under the Covenant and the Pact of Paris. It is, therefore, only necessary to save Iraq's right to go to the assistance of His Majesty's Government in cases where she can do so consistently with her obligations under those instruments.

10. I am aware of only two instances of pacts of non-aggression concluded by States which were at the time parties to treaties of mutual assistance with third States. These are the treaties of non-aggression concluded by France<sup>(1)</sup> and Poland<sup>(2)</sup> respectively with the Soviet Union, copies of which are enclosed herein. These two treaties are on much the same lines: in each case the position of the non-Soviet party under the Covenant and under its treaties of mutual assistance is safeguarded (1) by a provision saving the international rights and obligations, not involving acts of aggression against the Soviet Union, which result for the other party from previous treaties, and (2) by a right to denounce the treaty without notice in the event of the other party committing an act of aggression against a third State.

11. I also transmit to you a copy of article 1 of the Model Bilateral Treaty of Non-Aggression produced by the Third Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations of 1928. The second and third exceptions in this article were probably regarded by the authors as sufficient to cover cases such as the present, but I am advised that it would not be safe to rely upon them as they stand; it is not impossible that a case might arise in which Iraq could come to the assistance of His Majesty's Government without violating either the Covenant or the Pact of Paris, but where her action might not be taken either under article 16 of the Covenant or in pursuance of a decision of the Assembly or of the Council of the League or under article 15, paragraph 7, and it is also not impossible, in the light of recent experiences, that, if His Majesty's Government were involved in war, the other belligerent would be the party who had violated the Pact of Paris, even though His Majesty's Government might have been "the first to attack."

12. Should the Iraqi Government decide to submit an alternative to the Persian proposals, it is desirable that this should be based on some respectable precedents. It would, therefore, be well to make use of those indicated above, and it is for consideration whether the best course might not be to take article 1 of the Model Non-Aggression Treaty and to add to the end of exception (2) some words such as these, which are based on the French and Polish treaties with Russia: "Or in virtue of the rights or obligations of one of the high contracting parties under a treaty of mutual assistance concluded by such party with a third State, provided that such action is consistent with the obligations of the said party under the Covenant and the Pact of Paris."

13. It might have been preferable to follow the two treaties in question by confining the exception to treaties of mutual assistance concluded before the Treaty of Non-Aggression, but I am advised that while there would be no objection to this so long as the Treaty of 1930 is in force, it would not be safe to

(1) "Further Correspondence respecting Russia," Part XXV, No. 79.

(2) "Further Correspondence respecting Russia," Part XXV, No. 16.

adopt such a wording, in view of the possibility of the treaty being replaced by a new one under article 11 thereof. In any case the suggested wording avoids the necessity of mentioning the Treaty of Alliance in terms, and the wording is not one to which objection could reasonably be taken.

14. It will be observed that the wording suggested above provides nothing to correspond to that part of article 2 of the Persian draft convention, which deals with economic or financial action. This is a provision which the Soviet Government are always eager to include in their treaties, but it does not, in fact, figure in the Soviet-Polish Treaty, and, apart from any other objections, it is particularly difficult to reconcile with article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

15. The Model Treaty of Non-Aggression also contains provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes between the parties, but this point is not raised in the Persian Government's proposals. Such provisions to this effect would not in any case be necessary if both Persia and Iraq had accepted the Optional Clause or the General Act, but it will be remembered that the scope of Persia's acceptance of the former instrument is exceedingly narrow. The question of the inclusion of some more or less all-embracing procedure for the settlement of disputes between the two countries is one of policy which it seems unnecessary to consider at the present juncture.

16. It is possible that in present circumstances you will consider it unnecessary or undesirable to broach this matter with the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, even after his return from Geneva at least until he raises it again. But should he do so, or should any other favourable opportunity present itself, you may, if you consider it desirable, suggest to Nuri Pasha a solution on the lines indicated in paragraph 12 of the present despatch, if necessary adding an explanation on the lines of paragraphs 14 and 15. You should, however, be careful not to commit His Majesty's Government categorically to any definite advice, but merely to indicate to Nuri Pasha that, if the Iraqi Government really wish to conclude some kind of pact of this nature with Persia and feel that it would improve Perso-Iraqi relations, but are embarrassed about reconciling it with the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance, something on the lines suggested above should be possible. You might conclude by saying, as previously suggested in my despatch No. 78 of the 8th February, that His Majesty's Government would be willing to examine, in concert with the Iraqi Government, the possibility of framing provisions of a non-aggression type on these lines, so as to ensure that the new pact should be in harmony both with the Treaty of Alliance and with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

17. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran and to the United Kingdom delegation at Geneva.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 163.

*Model Bilateral Treaty of Non-Aggression.*

ARTICLE 1.

THE high contracting parties mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of:—

1. The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the previous paragraph.
2. Action in pursuance of article 16 of the League of Nations.
3. Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, or in pursuance of article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed against a State which was the first to attack.



[E 5759/7/93]

No. 164.

(C.522.M.257.1933.VII.)

## ASSYRIAN COMMUNITY.

*Communication from the French Government.**Note by the Secretary-General, September 20.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 28, 1933.)*

WITH reference to documents C.461.M.235.1933.VII and C.481.M.245.1933.VII, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council and members of the League the following communication, dated the 15th September, which he has received from the French Government:—

Sir,

Paris, September 15, 1933.

The Government of Iraq, having, in a telegram addressed to you on the 6th August with the request that you communicate it to all the States members of the League, criticised the French authorities responsible for the application of the mandate in Syria in connexion with the painful events affecting the Assyro-Chaldeans which took place near the Syro-Iraqi frontier at the beginning of August, I have the honour to enclose a statement of the facts, drawn up by the French Government; this statement represents the French Government's observations. I should be obliged if you would be so good as to take the same action on this communication as on the telegram which provoked it.

As the Government of Iraq did not ask that this question should be debated in the Council, I have deliberately refrained from entering into controversy by calling attention to certain points in its telegram which might have given rise to observations from me, and in the attached memorandum I have merely dealt with the following points:—

- (1) The frontier situation during the period referred to.
- (2) The development of events during the same period.

I trust that this information is sufficiently full and accurate to enable the members of the Council and the League of Nations to form an entirely impartial opinion on the events to which it refers.

I have, &amp;c.

(For the Minister for Foreign Affairs),

BARGETON,

Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of  
Political and Commercial Affairs.

*Memorandum regarding the Events referred to by the Government of Iraq in its Telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, dated August 6 last (League of Nations Document C.461.M.235.1933.VII)*

THE present memorandum comprises—

- (1) A study of the frontier situation, which must be clearly explained if the events that took place in the early days of August are to be understood.
- (2) An analysis of those events.  
(A map and a photograph showing the frontier and the position of the posts in the Pesh Khabur area are appended<sup>(1)</sup>.)

(1) *Frontier Situation.*

At the end of July the work on the delimitation of the Syro-Iraqi frontier fixed by the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, dated the 10th September, 1932—which, owing to a variety of circumstances, had been

<sup>(1)</sup> Not reproduced.

interrupted for a considerable time—was nearing completion, in accordance with the provisions of the Franco-Iraqi Agreement reached at Geneva on the 3rd July, 1933. Under that agreement—

“As soon as demarcation has been completed, the two Governments will take possession of the territories assigned to them on either side of the frontier with all the consequent rights of administration.”

Pending the fulfilment of the conditions which would make it possible to occupy the territories assigned to Syria by the delimitation of the frontier, the limit of the Syrian and Iraqi administrative and police zones forming the *de facto* frontier was defined as “a line starting from the Tigris and following the course of the Sufan Dere westward for about 1 mile, and then the watershed formed by the Karachok Dagh as far as the Oued Rumelan.”

In anticipation of the impending completion of the work on the demarcation of the frontier, the High Commissioner requested the Chargé d’Affaires of France at Bagdad, by telegram dated the 31st July, to ask the Iraqi Government what arrangements it proposed to make for the transfer of the territories assigned to Syria.

On the 1st August, the High Commissioner received a telegram from Colonel Iselin, officially notifying him that the work had been completed on the 31st July.

By telegrams dated the 1st and 2nd August, the High Commissioner pressed the French Chargé d’Affaires in Iraq to obtain a reply from the Iraqi Government. Finally, on the 3rd August, considering that this uncertainty, following upon the difficulties that had arisen during the work of the Demarcation Commission, could not continue without causing trouble, the High Commissioner requested the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bagdad to intimate to the Iraqi Government that the mandatory authorities proposed to occupy the restored territories on the 5th August.

The occupation took the form of a motor-machine-gun patrol at 3 P.M. on the 5th August, in the area south of the Karachok Dagh. In view of the continuing uncertainty as to the arrangements made by the Iraqi Government for the transfer of the territory, the officer commanding the patrol was given strict instructions not to go near the Sufan Dere, because, near the confluence of that watercourse and the Tigris, there was an Iraqi police post, which, under the Franco-Iraqi Agreement of the 3rd July, 1933, the Bagdad Government was free to maintain there until the 30th November, 1933.

On the 6th the Iraqi post at Khanik was withdrawn to the Tigris.

On the 7th the Iraqi Government informed the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bagdad, in response to his repeated representations, that it had reason to believe that the post at Khanik had been evacuated and the territories restored at the beginning of the month.

It will be seen from the foregoing that, until 3 P.M. on the 5th August, the Syro-Iraqi frontier stood at the Sufan Dere; that, from that day and hour, owing to the occupation effected, the frontier was transferred to the recently-demarcated line; and that the Iraqi Government officially recognised that transfer on the 7th August.

(2) *Analysis of Events from the end of July to August 9.*

The first contact between the mandatory authorities and the Assyro-Chaldeans attempting to leave Iraqi territory dates from the 17th July.

That day, at about 9 A.M., two men, giving their names as Malek Yakub and Malek Loko, and representing themselves to be emissaries of Mar Shimun, appeared at the office of the Deputy-Inspector of Special Services at Andivar. They stated that, being left by the Iraqi authorities with the choice of bringing pressure to bear on their Patriarch to accept the scheme for the settlement of the Assyro-Chaldeans established by the Iraqi Government or leaving the territory of Iraq, they had decided, with the sanction of Mar Shimun, to emigrate to Syria. In consequence of that decision, some 500 men, in possession of rifles and ammunition that had been issued to them by the British authorities on the expiry of their enlistment-contracts in the levies, had left the villages in which they were settled, and, without the slightest interference at any time from the Iraqi authorities, had marched to the Tigris and crossed the river, and were encamped south of the Sufan Dere, awaiting permission to pass into Syrian territory.



Malek Yakub and Malek Loko added that this migratory movement affected about 300 families, who might be followed by 5,000 more families.

The Deputy-Inspector of Special Services referred the matter to the High Commissioner. The latter, who had no check upon the statements of the men in question in the form of any official intimation from the Iraqi Government, either as to the position in regard to the problem raised by the settlement of the Assyro-Chaldeans in Iraq or as to the nature or extent of the migrations announced, confined his action to instructing the local authorities to reject uncompromisingly the requests made to them. These instructions were given on the 19th July, and the Iraqi authorities, both at Bagdad and at Mosul, were at once informed of them.

Notwithstanding this formal refusal, of which notice was given both to the applicants and to the authorities over them, on the 21st July, at 5 P.M., 500 armed Assyro-Chaldeans (300 of them mounted), who had been encamped to the south of the Sufan Dere since the 17th, crossed the stream and entered Syrian territory.

The Deputy-Inspector at Andivar, when advised of this incursion, at once proceeded to the spot, and convinced the Assyro-Chaldeans that they should recross the Sufan, which they did during the night. On the morning of the 22nd, there was not a single Assyro-Chaldean in Syrian territory.

That same day, the 22nd July, a further contingent of 200 Assyro-Chaldeans, coming from the left bank of the Tigris, crossed the river at Pesh Khabur, without being troubled by the Iraqi authorities, and joined the encampment to the south of the Sufan Dere, bringing its strength up to about 700.

On the 22nd July also, Malek Yakub and Malek Loko again begged the Deputy-Inspector of Special Services at Andivar to give them permission to recross into Syria, threatening to make a forcible crossing if such permission were not given.

On the 23rd July the High Commissioner, informed of what had taken place, instructed the deputy-delegate at Deir-ez-Zor that he should in no case use force to remove from Syrian territory any Assyro-Chaldeans who might enter it; that he should endeavour to secure their withdrawal by persuasion; that he should establish barriers to prevent their infiltration westward; and that he should make any individuals who might cross the Sufan lay down their arms, such arms to remain in the hands of the mandatory authorities as long as these individuals stayed in the territory placed under the control of those authorities.

These instructions were at once made known to the Iraqi Government by the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad, to the British Embassy at Paris by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and to the British consul-general at Beirut by the services of the High Commissioner.

In accordance with these instructions, forces totalling 6 officers and 250 men (50 mounted) were sent to various points to the north of the Sufan Dere to exercise supervision, that area having been entirely empty of troops until the 23rd July.

The same day, the 23rd July, by note, the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs requested the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad that "the Assyrians belonging to tribes which do not follow the custom of seasonal migration, who have entered Syria, should be disarmed, and that article 6 of the Tribal Convention of 1927 should be applied to them." There were no Assyro-Chaldeans in Syria on that date.

At the same time, there arose the question of food supplies for the Assyro-Chaldeans, whom the deputy-delegate at Deir-ez-Zor represented to be beginning to feel a shortage. An unofficial conversation took place on this subject with the British consul-general at Beirut, when it was recognised that, unless steps were taken, these armed men, driven by hunger, might commit acts of violence. Sir Harold Satow noted with satisfaction the information given him regarding the arrangements that the mandatory authorities proposed to make to avert that danger by giving the Assyro-Chaldeans permission to secure food supplies in Syrian territory.

Between the 23rd and 30th July there were no fresh developments.

A few bodies of Assyro-Chaldeans, crossing the Tigris without being troubled by the Iraqi authorities, added themselves to the encampments to the south of the Sufan Dere, whose strength was gradually brought up to 766 men.

Captain Larrieste, Inspector of Special Services at Deir-ez-Zor, who had been sent to the spot on the 23rd, was keeping in contact with the Assyro-Chaldean chiefs and endeavouring to calm them. The Assyro-Chaldeans were

moving freely about in Iraqi territory, maintained apparently friendly relations with the Iraqi police post at Khanik, which was near their encampment, and showed that they were in correspondence with the Mutessarif of Mosul.

At 9 A.M. on the 26th Captain Larrieste went to the Christian village of Khanik, which is in Iraqi territory, to meet the Iraqi Colonel Bakir Bey, who was in command of the Iraqi forces in the Pesh Khabur area. Relying upon a map which represented the Sufan Dere as being situated 1 kilom. to the north of the confluence of the Tigris and the Khabur, Colonel Bakir Bey asserted that the Assyro-Chaldean camp was in Syrian territory. Captain Larrieste had no difficulty in showing that the map and the assertion based upon it were incorrect. In the course of this conversation, Colonel Bakir Bey gave an assurance that any further movement of Assyro-Chaldeans towards the Syrian frontier should be stopped. The Iraqi political officer, who accompanied Colonel Bakir Bey, stated that the Iraqi Government had taken no action against the Assyro-Chaldeans, and that if they were prepared to return to their villages, they would be given every facility, on the sole condition that their arms and ammunition were first handed over to the Iraqi authorities.

During the same period, fifteen Assyro-Chaldeans who had been arrested during the night near Derabun, disarmed and sent to Pesh Khabur, were set at liberty, and at once proceeded to the encampment to the south of the Sufan Dere, using the Pesh Khabur boats, and remaining unmolested by the Iraqi authorities.

In a note on the 27th July the Iraqi Government, referring to its note of the 23rd July, again asked the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad that the clauses of the provisional agreement of 1927 should be applied to the Assyro-Chaldeans. At that date, it should be noted, there were no Assyro-Chaldean groups in Syrian territory.

On the 28th July Captain Larrieste, being aware of the anxiety felt by the Assyro-Chaldeans for the safety of their families, whom they had left in their villages, and fearing that this might lead to trouble, requested and obtained on the following day a further interview with the Iraqi political officer. In the course of this interview the Iraqi political officer denied the rumours of extortion, and reminded Captain Larrieste of the particulars given at the meeting on the 26th July of the conditions under which the Assyro-Chaldeans would be permitted to return to their villages.

On that same evening twenty Assyro-Chaldeans crossed the river without any opposition on the part of the Iraqi forces, and joined the encampment established to the south of Sufan Dere.

In the night of the 29th-30th July 413 Assyro-Chaldeans crossed the Sufan Dere and entered Syrian territory. The local mandatory authorities immediately carried out the instructions issued by the High Commissariat on the 23rd July, and ordered the refugees to hand over to them their arms, consisting of 336 military rifles and 13,000 rounds of ammunition. They also took all the necessary steps to keep these groups near to the frontier and bring back those refugees who were already making their way to Sheikh Ali.

On the morning of the 30th July, therefore, the Assyro-Chaldean camp was situated on either side of the Sufan Dere, a river which contains very little water at this time of the year; 415 individuals, encamped to the north of the river in Syrian territory, had handed over their arms to the mandatory authorities, while 361 men remained in Iraqi territory south of the watercourse.

This situation remained unchanged until the 4th August.

On that date, the Assyro-Chaldeans having at length realised the difficulties which lay in the way of their admission into Syria, concluded with the Iraqi authorities the agreement referred to in the Iraqi Government's telegram of the 6th August to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, and described in the note sent on that same date by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, as follows:—

"On the evening of the 4th August, some of these Assyrians asked the Iraqi Government to allow them to hand over their arms and to accept their act of submission. The Government consented. But it subsequently became evident that the Assyrians' sole aim in so doing was to mislead the Government. For, after crossing the river they attacked the Iraqi detachment which had been sent to receive their arms."

Desiring to benefit under this agreement, the Assyro-Chaldeans who were encamped to the north of the Sufan Dere announced that they intended to return



to Iraqi territory and asked that their arms should be restored to them. This request was complied with. They crossed the watercourse in the morning and towards midday all the groups had assembled in Iraqi territory to the south of the Sufan Dere. At 2.15 p.m. they began to recross the Tigris. At 5 p.m. over 500 individuals had reached the left bank. By 6 p.m. all the Assyro-Chaldeans had recrossed the river and the first groups were setting out for the march eastwards. This was the moment at which a fusillade broke out, during which the fire of the Iraqi automatic arms ranged in battery form on the slopes of the Tell, 800 metres to the east of the Sufan Dere estuary, could be distinctly heard.

The High Commissariat having been informed on the morning of the 5th August both of the return to the Tavaris and of the incidents which had followed, immediately instructed the local authorities that they should, if the Assyro-Chaldeans returned to Syrian territory, henceforth treat them as rebels against the Iraqi Government, disarm all who might come forward and send them to Hasseche until such time as a decision was reached concerning them.

On that same day towards midday his Excellency Noury Pasha Said, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose arrival had been announced two days previously, was received at Aleppo by the delegate-general. Noury Pasha Said, who had left Bagdad that morning by aeroplane, said he had heard before his departure of the return of the Assyro-Chaldeans across the Tigris and of the incidents which had followed. He added that his arrival had been delayed by a long telephonic conversation with His Majesty King Feisal, which he had had on the way at Rutbah Wells.

Noury Pasha Said, after courteously protesting against the fact that the Iraqi authorities had not been notified by the local mandatory authorities of the return of the armed Assyro-Chaldeans to Iraqi territory, proposed to the delegate-general that authorisation should be granted to a group of not more than 1,200 to 1,500 Assyro-Chaldeans to settle in Syria. This group consisted of a minority who were opposed to the plan of settlement in Iraq drawn up by the Iraqi Government and accepted by the majority of the Assyro-Chaldean nation. The Iraqi Government was prepared to place at the disposal of the Syrian Government a sum of about 5,000 dinars to cover the cost of such installation.

The delegate-general replied to Noury Pasha Said that this proposal would be examined in a most friendly spirit and that instructions from Paris would be applied for urgently.

The orders issued that same morning to Deir-az-Zor, regarding the action to be taken in the event of any Assyro-Chaldeans returning to Syria, were communicated to Noury Pasha Said, who declared himself satisfied with them.

On the same day, at Bagdad, the French Chargé d'Affaires received from the Iraqi Government a note again asking that the Provisional Agreement of 1927—to which Noury Pasha Said had made no reference at Aleppo—should be applied to the Assyro-Chaldeans.

That same day, finally, at 3 p.m., the zone south of Sufan Dere, which the delimitation of the frontier had assigned to Syria, was occupied.

On the 6th August a few groups of Assyro-Chaldeans, carrying their wounded, crossed the Tigris, being bombed all the while by Iraqi aeroplanes, and took refuge in Syria. Towards 5 p.m. the Iraqi aeroplane No. 17 released three bombs over the estuary of Sufan Dere and a fourth at 200 metres, on the right bank of the Tigris, 50 metres south of the Sufan, killing one man and wounding three others.

In the course of the afternoon Noury Pasha Said left Aleppo for Damascus, and on the following morning boarded the aeroplane for Bagdad.

In the night of the 6th-7th August the reflux of Assyro-Chaldeans into Syria became more marked and continued until the 8th. On the 9th the refugees numbered 529 able men and thirteen wounded in hospital. The refugees, who had been disarmed directly they entered Syrian territory, were first assembled at Vanik, in the Sufan Dere Valley, and were then sent under escort, via Demir Kapou, to Hasseche, where they remain and are being supplied with the necessities of life by the mandatory authorities.

September 14, 1933.

[E 5879/7/93]

No. 165.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received October 3.)*

(No. 194.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a letter from Nuri Pasha to the French delegate, dated the 29th September, enclosing Iraqi Government's observations on the French memorandum of the 14th September respecting the Assyrian question.

*United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,  
September 30, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 165.

*Nuri Pasha to French Delegate.*

*Iraqi Permanent Delegation,  
Geneva, September 29, 1933.*

Sir,

I HAVE received from the Secretary-General of the League of Nations copy of M. Bargeton's letter of the 15th September, 1933, forwarding a memorandum on the Iraqi Government's telegram of the 6th August last to the Secretary-General regarding the Assyrians.

The memorandum contains many statements which my Government feels it cannot allow to pass unchallenged; at the same time it has no desire to engage in a controversy with the French Government at Geneva. I have therefore preferred to send to you direct my observations on the memorandum in question.

I take the opportunity of pointing out that part I of the memorandum, and consequently part I of my observations, are relevant only to the case of the 361 Assyrians who, according to the memorandum, were never disarmed. The painful facts regarding the 415 men rearmed by the French mandatory authorities in Syria are set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 of part II of my observations.

I have, &c.  
NURI SAID,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 165.

*Observations of the Iraqi Government on the Memorandum of the French Government of September 14, 1933, regarding the Events referred to in the Telegram of the Iraqi Government, dated August 6, 1933.*

#### 1.—Frontier Situation.

BY the terms of the agreement signed on the 3rd July, 1933, by Nuri Pasha and M. Massigli, the new frontier was to come into operation immediately on completion of the demarcation. The evacuation of customs and police posts was provided for separately and was not to affect the assumption of rights of administration as provided for above; actually the only post of any kind in the transferred territory was the police post of Khanik.

2. By his very urgent note of the 1st August, the French Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad informed the Iraqi Government that the French High Commissariat proposed to occupy on the date fixed by the president of the Demarcation Commission the territory transferred to Syria, and that the president of the Demarcation Commission had been requested to confirm the exact date of completion of the demarcation.

3. In the meantime the president of the Demarcation Commission telegraphed, on the 1st August, that demarcation had been completed on the 31st July. It follows that the transfer of territory, with all the rights and obligations of administration, took place as from the 1st August, 1933.



4. On the 1st August a patrol of the Iraqi Motor Machine Guns, reconnoitring in the neighbourhood of Khanik, was fired on by an Assyrian picquet. The patrol was then informed by a party of five French officers, including Colonel Dellok and Captain Larrieste, that it was in Syrian territory, and was invited to withdraw; the patrol withdrew to behind a line Shailkiya-Khanzir, well within the new boundary.

5. On the 3rd August the French Chargé d'Affaires, in his note wrote, in continuation of his note of the 1st August, that the president of the Demarcation Commission had confirmed that demarcation had been completed on the 31st July and enquired what measures the Iraqi Government proposed to take to proceed to the application of the agreement. On the 4th August, in his note, he announced that the French authorities would take over control of the transferred territory on the 5th August. The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs replied, on the 7th August, that the territory had been transferred at the beginning of the month.

6. On the 4th August, at 11.55 hours, the Political Officer attached to the Iraqi forces received a letter, dated the 4th August, at 05.50 hours from Captain Larrieste, of which the following is a translation:—

"I have the honour to inform you that, according to orders received from the High Commissioner, the French forces will occupy this morning the area as far as the frontiers demarcated by the recent commission. I therefore request you to warn the inhabitants, especially the post at Christian Khanik village, to prevent the occurrence of any undesirable incident."

7. The statement in the last paragraph of this part of the memorandum that the Iraqi-Syrian frontier stood at the Wadi Suffan until 3 p.m. on the 5th August is then inexact. The new frontier had come into force automatically from the 1st August, and the Iraqi Government ceased to administer the transferred territory from that date. If the French mandatory authorities did not take steps to make their occupation effective until the morning of the 4th August, as stated by Captain Larrieste, or 3 p.m. on the 5th August, as stated in the memorandum of the French Government, that is their domestic affair and cannot alter the *de jure* and *de facto* position of the frontier line. Actually, the Iraqi Government understands that the French mandatory authorities placed a military post at Tall Khanzir, immediately west of the new line, in the transferred territory, immediately after completion of the demarcation, *i.e.*, on the 1st August; the incident of the invitation to the Iraqi patrol to withdraw behind the new line on the 1st August (see paragraph 4 above) is also relevant. The Iraqi police at Khanik were withdrawn to Shailkiya on the 4th August (not the 6th), when the French authorities actually took over the post (see *Blue Book*, document 89, paragraph 1); but the date has no significance.

8. The date of the Iraqi memorandum of the 7th August also has no significance whatever. The date of the change of administrative control, and consequently responsibility, had been fixed by the Nuri-Massigli Agreement, and was not susceptible of change by unilateral action by either Government.

## II.—Analysis of Events.

(NOTE.—For the convenience of reference, the paragraphs of this part of the French memorandum are numbered from 1 to 35.)

1. The statement attributed to Yaku and Luko in paragraph 2 did not represent the true facts. The Assyrians only began to leave their villages on the 19th July; the first indication received by the Iraqi authorities of the decision they had taken was their arrival at Faishkharbur on the 21st July. They crossed immediately into Syrian territory as admitted in the French memorandum.

2. No intimation was received from the French authorities that Yaku and Luko had visited Aindivar and made the statement attributed to them, in order that the French authorities might have been informed of the true facts; the instructions referred to in paragraph 3 were not conveyed to the Iraqi Government; nor was it known on the 19th July, to the Iraqi Government at any rate, that a migration to Syria had begun.

3. It follows from the above that the statement (paragraph 4 of the memorandum) that the Assyrians had been camped south of the Wadi Suffan since the 17th July is incorrect.

4. The information of the Iraqi Government does not correspond with the statement of the French memorandum to the effect that there were no Assyrians north of the *de facto* frontier between the 22nd and 29th July.

5. On the night of the 29th–30th a large proportion are admitted to have entered Syrian territory. Even if, as stated in the French memorandum, the Assyrians had recrossed from Syria into Iraq before receipt of the Iraqi Government's first request of the 23rd July, for application of the agreement, and were still in Iraq on the 27th, the date of the second request, the French authorities were, by reason of these two requests, fully aware of the unauthorised nature of the migration, and were, therefore, bound, when they did enter Syrian territory, to apply the terms of the agreement, by disarming the Assyrians and removing them sufficiently far from the frontier to ensure that they should create no incident in Iraq. (For the text of the provisional agreement, see *Iraq Blue Book*, document 69.) When the 413 Assyrians were actually disarmed (the first reports that reached the Iraqi Government were to the effect that all but 100 had been disarmed), it was not unnaturally assumed that this had been done as the first step in enforcing the agreement; and a public announcement to this effect was made (see *Blue Book*, document 84, penultimate paragraph).

6. There was no agreement whatever with the Assyrians as stated in paragraph 24 of the memorandum. Some of the men who still retained their arms had intimated their wish to make submission and had been given the usual reply. As regards the French authorities and the Assyrians who had been disarmed, the position was exactly as it had been left by the Iraqi notes of the 23rd and the 27th July and the Khanik meeting when the Iraqi Political Officer, unable to obtain a clear promise from Captain Larrieste that the provisional agreement would be honoured, stressed the importance of the Iraqi Government's being given ample notice of any intention to return the arms (*Blue Book*, document 86).

7. It is to be noted that all reports received by the Iraqi Government place the movement of the Assyrians across the Tigris on the 4th August, far later in the day than the times given in paragraph 25, even allowing for the difference of one hour between Iraqi and Syrian time.

8. With regard to the visit of Nuri Pasha to Syria (paragraphs 27 to 31 of the French memorandum), it should be understood that when he received his instructions on the 3rd August, the return of the Assyrians had not yet begun; his mission was to press the French authorities to carry out their obligations under the provisional agreement to prevent an incident, and to negotiate for the retention in Syria of the Assyrians who had crossed, involving the acceptance of their families. News of the crossing was telephoned to him at Rutba. The incident having occurred, there was no further point in pressing further for the application of the provisional agreement. The Iraqi Memorandum 7284 of the 5th August was, in fact, a protest against the failure to apply the agreement, as requested in the communications of the 23rd and 27th July, or even to reply to them; when this was drafted it was not known that the main body of the Assyrians was involved in the fighting; a further request for the application of the agreement was appended to the protest.

[E 5878/7/93]

No. 166.

Sir John Simon to Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).

(No. 628.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 6, 1933.

THE Iraqi Minister, on his return from Bagdad, called here on the 2nd October, and enquired whether His Majesty's Government had reached any decision regarding the Assyrian question.

2. Jafar Pasha was informed in reply that there did not appear to be any question of His Majesty's Government reaching a decision. The matter was now in the hands of the League of Nations, and everything would depend on the attitude adopted by the Council, as to which it was not possible to prophesy.

3. Jafar Pasha then asked whether His Majesty's Government had considered the possibility of resettling the Assyrians somewhere outside Iraq, *e.g.*,

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in Cyprus. He was informed that whether or not an attempt was to be made to resettle the Assyrians outside Iraq would depend on the attitude adopted by the League. He was fully alive to the difficulties of such resettlement, since the Iraqi Government had already had difficulty in trying to settle the Assyrians on suitable land in Iraq. To resettle them elsewhere would involve very serious difficulties, and would incidentally cost a great deal of money. The transport of the Assyrians from Iraq to their new destination would be only a very small item in this expenditure. Moreover, it was well known that the Iraqi Government were anxious to get rid of the Assyrians, and it was impossible to say what view the League would take as to meeting their wishes in this matter. If adequate finance could be provided, it was possible that the League might be willing to consider the question, in which His Majesty's Government could not well take any initiative.

4. Jafar Pasha then said that it was difficult to realise in England how strong the feeling was in Iraq against the Assyrians, who were regarded as directly responsible for the whole trouble. No one in Iraq would admit that the Iraqi Government were in any way in the wrong. The Minister's attention was drawn to the fact that there was a fundamental difference between the events before and those after the 10th August. Up to that date Iraq was in an extremely strong position, and, although possible errors of judgment had been committed, the Iraqi Government could have made an overwhelming case at Geneva. Subsequent events, however, were of an entirely different character, and nothing that had occurred before the 10th August could adequately excuse such events as the Simel massacre. The position was rendered particularly difficult by the fact that, while the friends and supporters of the Assyrians could only see what had happened after the 10th August, and therefore regarded the Iraqi authorities as entirely to blame for the whole trouble, the Iraqi Government themselves could only see what had happened before that date and sought to justify all subsequent events by the initial armed incursion. Both points of view were equally fallacious and equally unlikely to facilitate a solution. If the Iraqi Government would realise the distinction between the two periods, and frankly admit and deplore the catastrophes which had occurred after the 10th August, they would immensely strengthen their position with European public opinion. The hope was expressed that, if Jafar Pasha was in a position to influence the Iraqi Government or the Iraqi delegation at Geneva, he would use his influence in this direction. To deny or seek to extenuate such events as the Simel massacre would only stiffen opinion against Iraq and make a satisfactory solution more difficult to attain. Far the wisest policy from the Iraqi point of view would have been to welcome an enquiry into all the aspects of the whole affair from its beginning.

I am, &c.  
JOHN SIMON

[E 7265/7/93]

No. 167.

*Memorandum respecting Assyrian Migration into Syria.*

(Very Confidential.)

THE following information regarding the migration of the Assyrians into Syria, and subsequent events in July and August 1933, has been obtained from a reliable Assyrian source. It is, however, of great importance that it should be treated as strictly confidential, and that it should not be quoted or referred to in any way without the specific authority of the Foreign Office:—

1. How many Assyrians returned to Iraq from Syria on the 4th August, 1933?

Two parties crossed from Syria to Iraq on the 4th August, 1933. One party, 700 strong, under Rais Werda of Upper Tiari and Yaqub of Ashitha (Note: Lower Tiari), crossed at 6 P.M., and the other, 300 strong, under Yaqub Malik Ismail (Note: The leader of the expedition into Syria) and Loco Shlimun, crossed at 9 P.M. The remainder of the Assyrians, under the leadership of Shlimun Malik Ismail, were left in camp with the animals on the Syrian side.

2. What was their intention?

The object of the party 700 strong, under Rais Werda, was to surrender their arms to the Iraq Government and return quietly to their villages. They had made previous arrangements for their surrender with the political officer attached to the Iraq army column. They carried white flags. The second party, 300 strong, under Yaqub Malik Ismail and Loco Shlimun, who had no intention of surrendering, crossed to assist the first party after the fight provoked by Yaqub Malik Ismail had begun (Note: See paragraph 4 below).

3. Who were the leaders?

The leaders of the first party were Rais Werda of Upper Tiari and Yaqub of Ashitha. The leaders of the second party were Yaqub Malik Ismail, Loco Shlimun of Tkhuma (Note: Both ex-levy officers), Qasha Gewergis of Tkhuma, Shmouel Tiya of Upper Tiari, Yushiya Ishu of Iyal (Note: First cousin of Mar Shimun), Malik Werda of Diz, Malik Shaikho of Diz, and Ishu Kalaita of Mar Bishu (Note: Formerly interpreter at levy headquarters).

4. In what circumstances was fire first opened? Who fired first?

In accordance with an agreement made between the Iraqi authorities and the Assyrians who wished to surrender, the first party, 700 strong, prepared to cross the river at Faishkhabur. Yaqub Malik Ismail, leader of the no-surrender party, who was in league with the French officer (Note: Presumably French political officer), asked the latter to prevent the crossing of the first party at Faishkhabur as arranged, and to order them to cross south of Kharabashk. This was done. The first party, therefore, having had their arrangements with the Iraq authorities altered, decided to cross under cover of white flags, carried by Rais Werda and others, to make it clear to the Iraq army that they were the party which had decided to submit. A representative of the Iraq army named Mulazim Lazim [sic], with two detachments of the 9th Infantry Battalion, came forward to receive the surrender of the Assyrians. Rais Werda attempted to explain the circumstances in which the arrangements agreed upon for crossing the river had been changed, but the Iraqi officer could not understand Kurdish or Syriac, so the two representatives had no language in common. Following close on Rais Werda was one Nestorius of Tkhuma, a member of Yaqub Ismail's no-surrender party, who had been ordered by his leader to join the ranks of the surrender party and kill the Iraqi officer detailed to receive the submission. This man, in accordance with his instructions, shot the Iraqi officer and a few soldiers. The Iraq army thereupon opened machine-gun fire on the Assyrians, who did not defend themselves until they had received a number of casualties. The remainder of the first party, who were crossing the river, ignorant of the treachery of Yaqub Ismail, and under the impression that the army had started the fight, went to the assistance of their comrades. The second party, under Yaqub Ismail, crossed later and took part in the fight, the French rearming and sending them to the other side of the river, where they fought until morning.

5. How many Assyrians did not cross into Iraq?

About 200. Some of these were left to guard the animals and some had no arms.

6. How many Assyrians, having crossed into Iraq, returned to Syria between the 5th August, 1933, and the 8th August, 1933?

About 310.

7. Did they break up into separate parties; if so, by what routes did they return?

They broke up into several parties. Those of Yaqub Ismail's party returned to Syria early in the morning with their leader. Others returned later in the day, and some during the following day and night. The Assyrians of the surrender party tried to make their way back to their villages in Iraq, some via Zakho and some via the Jabal Bekhair. Very few succeeded. A few died of hunger; some were captured by the Kurds, who handed them over to the Iraq army, by whom they were shot. A few reached Simel, where they were massacred. A number who had escaped to the hills surrendered to the authorities after

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reading the amnesty papers dropped from the air by the Iraqi air force. These were brought in lorries to Dohuk and Aloka, where they were taken out and shot (Note: Informant has slightly misunderstood the question).

8. Do the Assyrians mention any outstanding events during the fighting?

The Assyrians state that the fight was the result of the declaration of a religious war against Christians by both the Iraqi civil and military authorities. They further state that prisoners were killed; that Kurds were rewarded (at the rate of 1 dinar and the rifle of the Assyrian concerned) for each Assyrian prisoner brought in, or for proof of each Assyrian killed; that Assyrians were burnt alive; and that the dead were mutilated by the cutting of their noses and lips.

9. Is there any talk of burning tents with dead inside them during the fighting?

The Assyrians set fire to the tent of the seventh picquet, to show those behind that the picquet had been captured. The dead bodies of one officer, said to be Mulazim Abdul Sattar, and of a few soldiers were in the tent.

10. What are the intentions of the Assyrians at present in Syria?

They are waiting for the decision of the League of Nations. They will only return and settle in Iraq on condition that the League of Nations guarantees their safety under a different Administration. Failing this, they desire to settle in Syria, or some other suitable country.

11. What did they think would become of their families when the men left Iraq and fought?

They believed that the Iraqis would not molest their families, bearing in mind the fact that Kurdish women and children had not been interfered with during the operations against Sheikh Mahmud and Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan. Lady Surma guaranteed that no harm would come to their families as long as the British were in Iraq.

12. What is their attitude towards the Iraq Government? Is it defiant, or are they subdued and depressed?

(i) The present attitude of those in Syria is one of bitterness. They do not trust the Iraq Government and will never rely on any promises made by it. They want revenge.

(ii) In the Dohuk and Sheikhan districts, where massacres, looting and disarming took place, they are subdued and depressed, but others (Note: Who have not been disarmed?) are still defiant in spirit, though their defiance is not at present being translated into action. They will have recourse to action when attempts are made to disarm them.

13. Did Mar Shimun know of their plans to move, and when was the decision taken, and in what circumstances?

Mar Shimun apparently knew all about the plans. Yaqub Ismail and Loco Shlimun, on the advice of the acting mutessarif (Note: Of Mosul) had agreed to proceed to Bagdad to advise Mar Shimun to become reconciled to the Government. They first reported their mission to Lady Surma. She definitely stated that Mar Shimun would in no circumstances be reconciled to the Government. They therefore asked what they should do, as they had promised to go to Bagdad. She thereupon replied that Mar Shimun would wish them to carry out their plans (i.e., the plans which they later did carry out) (Note: It is not clear from this that Mar Shimun did know about the plans regarding the movement to Syria. It is possible that Lady Surma acted entirely on her own initiative).

14. To what extent, if any, were the French involved before the original move into Syria took place?

According to general talk, the French consul in Mosul was on two occasions consulted regarding the movement to Syria and agreed to, if he did not actually encourage, it.

Foreign Office, October 6, 1933.

[E 5962/7/93]

No. 168.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Iraq: Settlement of the Assyrian Community in Iraq.*

*Note by the Secretary-General.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 7.)*

THE Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council, for information, a letter dated the 20th September, 1933, from his Excellency Nuri Pasha Al Said, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Iraq, referring to action taken as a result of the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, and accompanied by a document entitled: "Correspondence relating to Assyrian Settlement from the 13th July, 1932, to the 5th August, 1933." (1)

Geneva, September 28, 1933.

To the Secretary-General,

Bagdad, September 20, 1933.

In my letter No. 4244 of the 14th May, 1933, (2) I had the honour to record, for the information of the Council, the preliminary steps taken by the Iraqi Government to implement the declaration made by its representative at the sixty-ninth session of the Council, pending arrival of the expert who was to assist in settling landless Assyrians.

2. I have now to inform you, with great regret, that owing to the refusal of Mar Shimun to acquiesce in the Council's decision of the 14th December, 1932, (3) his organisation of a mass emigration to Syria of even settled Assyrians, and the subsequent armed attack made by a large force of his followers on the Government troops, no further progress has been made. The circumstances are fully set forth in the accompanying Blue Book published by the Government.

3. In view of the manifest unwillingness for political reasons of a large number of the Assyrian immigrants, even those happily established on the land since twelve years, to settle down peaceably in Iraq, and in view of the recent bloodshed that has exacerbated intertribal animosities, my Government is forced to the conclusion that the whole Assyrian question will now require consideration *de novo*.

A further communication on this subject will be addressed to you in due course.

NURI SAID,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(1) A limited number of copies of this document only having been received, it is not possible to distribute more than one copy to each member of the Council.

(2) See document C. 332.1933. VI.

(3) The resolution referred to was adopted by the Council on December 15, 1932; see *Official Journal*, 13th year, No. 12, p. 1984.

[E 5963/7/93]

No. 169.

*Protection of Minorities in Iraq.—Situation of the Assyrian Minority.*

*Observations of the Iraqi Government on the Petitions of the Mar Shimun of July 31, August 1 and 17, 1933.*

*Note by the Secretary-General, Geneva, September 28, 1933.—(Received October 7.)*

(C. 545.1933.I.)

BY Document C. 504.1933.I., the Secretary-General circulated, for the examination of the Council, the above-mentioned petitions from the Mar Shimun. He now has the honour to circulate to the Council the observations of the Iraqi Government thereon, which were forwarded to him by a letter from the permanent delegation, dated the 26th September, 1933.

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*Observations on Petitions by Mar Shimun.*

By his letter of the 2nd September, 1933, the Secretary-General informed the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs that a Minorities Committee had examined a petition from Mar Shimun of the Assyrian community, had decided to bring the question dealt with in the petition to the attention of the Council in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 10 of the declaration signed by the Iraqi Government on the 30th May, 1932, and requested the Iraqi Government to draw up its observations with as complete a documentation as possible.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. The only recent petitions from Mar Shimun communicated to the Iraqi Government up to the 20th September, 1933, are: (1) A letter dated Bagdad, the 31st July, 1933; (2) a telegram referred to in the letter, and despatched from Beirut on the 1st August; (3) a telegram despatched from Beirut on the 17th August, 1933.<sup>(2)</sup>

3. As regards the first two of these complaints, the situation on the 31st July of Mar Shimun and of those Assyrians who followed his instructions is clearly explained in paragraphs 1 to 15 of Part I of the Blue Book transmitted to the Secretary-General under Nuri Pasha's letter of the 20th September, 1933.<sup>(3)</sup> At this date Yaku's band was, in Syrian territory near the frontier, refused admission further into Syria by the French mandatory authorities, but only permitted to return to Iraq on conditions that would reduce its potentialities for continued armed defiance of Government authority. It is to be noted that Mar Shimun addressed his appeal to the League of Nations, not before the decision to organise a mass emigration to Syria, but only on the 31st July, when his mad adventure, intended to force the hand of the mandatory authorities in Syria or of the League, had clearly failed. No further comment seems necessary.

4. The third document is dated the 17th August, that is to say, after the outbreak of the Assyrian rebellion and its suppression. The outbreak of fighting on the evening of the 4th August and the subsequent operations leading to the suppression of the rebellion, have been referred to in the telegram of the Iraqi Government of the 6th August,<sup>(4)</sup> and the 20th August, 1933,<sup>(5)</sup> and the Blue Book. This is not the place to give a full account of the operations. The specific allegation of Mar Shimun, however, calls for the following observations on the recruitment of additional police to reinforce the police already present in the area:—

5. On the evening of the 5th August, the position was that a violent attack by Yaku's band on the Iraqi army camp at Dairabun had been defeated. The casualties give an indication of the severity of the fighting; of the Iraqi army, 3 officers and 31 men killed, and 41 men wounded; of the Assyrians, 130 men killed, and an unknown number wounded (the numbers of the Assyrians killed were only ascertained subsequently). As far as was known at this time, approximately 1,000 Assyrians seemed to have broken through the army cordon and were presumed to be moving eastwards. At the same time, numerous small bands of belated Assyrians were hastening from villages (some had started out from as far east as Diana, near Rowanduz) westwards to join Yaku.

6. In these circumstances, on the evening of the 5th August, orders were given to the Director-General to recruit up to 500 additional foot-police from the mountaineer population of the north; the numbers authorised were subsequently increased to 1,070, to provide for the protection of villages. Recruitment was completed by the evening of the 9th August. The allegation that Kurds were being armed presumably refers to these recruits. These additional police were not indiscriminately used. They included 100 loyal Assyrians, and operated under regular police officers; a large proportion of these were detailed for the special duty of protecting villages, a duty which could not have been undertaken without them. The allegation that women and children were being killed by specially armed Kurds can then be disposed of at once; indeed, the ascertained almost total absence of casualties among women and children during the temporary dislocation of the administrative machine, following the attack of the 4th–5th August, is one of the most remarkable features of the whole affair.

<sup>(1)</sup> See C. 494.1933.I. (Note by the Secretary-General.)

<sup>(2)</sup> See C. 504.1933.I. (Note by the Secretary-General.)

<sup>(3)</sup> See C. 544.1933.I. (Note by the Secretary-General.)

<sup>(4)</sup> See C. 461.M.235.1933.VII. (Note by the Secretary-General.)

<sup>(5)</sup> See C. 481.M.245.1933.VII. (Note by the Secretary-General.)

[E 6173/7/93]

No. 170.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 17.)*

(No. 622.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, October 2, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 574 of the 29th August, I have the honour to submit the following report upon the circumstances in which Surma Khatun, aunt of Mar Shimun, was removed by the Royal Air Force from Iraq, together with other members of the Patriarchal family.

2. Surma Khatun was included from the first among those members of the Mar Shimun family whom the Iraqi Government held responsible for the outbreak in the north, and in paragraph 7 of Sir R. Vansittart's telegram No. 181 of the 18th August Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes was authorised to arrange for her removal to an asylum in British territory on the same conditions as the Patriarch himself, though preferably on a separate occasion. It became clear, however, at the interview with the Mar Shimun at His Majesty's Embassy on the 14th August, that the removal of Surma Khatun outside Iraq would probably involve at the same time that of a considerable body of dependent women and children (Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's telegram No. 264).

3. As instructed in Sir R. Vansittart's telegram No. 192, Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes addressed a note to the Iraqi Government on the 15th August (a copy of which was enclosed in his despatch No. 527 of the 16th August) enquiring the intentions of the Iraqi Government towards the Mar Shimun and certain of his immediate relatives, including his aunt Surma, whose fate His Majesty's Government could not view with indifference. This drew from the Iraqi Government on the following day a note to the effect that they considered the members of the Mar Shimun family the "prime instigators of the rebellion of the Assyrians," and proposed either to try them for conspiracy against the safety of the State or to deport them without delay. Nevertheless, they considered the preferable course would be for His Majesty's Government to "consent to receive the principal members of this family temporarily and until their future is decided by the League of Nations at some place in British territory," and to arrange for their transport thither. Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes informed the Iraqi Government on the same day that His Majesty's Government agreed to the suggestion on the understanding that the Iraqi Government would "accept full responsibility for, and eventually refund to His Majesty's Government, the expenses incurred in connexion with their transportation and subsequent maintenance." (Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's despatch No. 532 of the 17th August.) Later on the same day the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs communicated copies of deportation orders against Mar Shimun, his father and brother, and stated that "the deportation order of Surma Khatun is still under consideration and would [sic] be forwarded to you when completed." The three men were safely removed by the Royal Air Force on the 18th August in the circumstances described in Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's despatch No. 549 of the 22nd August.

4. No such order was in fact ever issued against Surma, although article 1 of "Ordinance No. 62 on the divestment of Iraqi Nationality" (Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's despatch No. 550 of the 27th August), which was hurriedly passed on the 15th August, gave the Iraqi Government power to take the same action against her or any other member of the Patriarchal family as they had already taken against Mar Shimun and his two companions. King Feisal raised the question of her deportation again in conversation with Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes on the 21st August (Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's telegram No. 293), but Surma took the initiative herself by requesting that His Majesty's Government should move her and the Patriarchal family to a place of safety in British territory, since she feared for their lives (Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's telegram No. 289). She followed this application by suddenly and unexpectedly leaving her house in Mosul on the 22nd August and proceeding to Bagdad with twenty-two dependants and servants, where the whole party were lodged in the Y.M.C.A. (Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's telegram No. 299) on their arrival the following day.

5. It proved possible to reduce the numbers of the party by leaving behind the servants and the family of Romie (sister of Surma), who found accommodation with relatives in Bagdad. The remaining women and children, fourteen in



all, were removed by the Royal Air Force to Haifa on the 29th August, whence they proceeded to Cyprus the following day by steamer, passages being reserved by the High Commissioner for Palestine. The Iraqi Government was informed of the departure of Surma Khatun in a note of the 29th August (my despatch No. 574 of the 29th August), and were reminded that her removal was carried out under the same reservations as those formally recorded in the case of Mar Shimun in the second paragraph of Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's note of the 16th August.

6. It will be seen from the foregoing that although the Iraqi Government had every intention of deporting Surma Khatun formally, such action on their part was forestalled by the decision of Surma to come to Bagdad and herself to ask for removal to British territory. In order to avoid her actual deportation and the excitement which it would undoubtedly have caused, and which would have prolonged the existing dangerous tension, I used the authority given in Sir R. Vansittart's telegrams Nos. 181 and 224 to remove her as soon as possible to join Mar Shimun in Cyprus. The Air Officer Commanding was unable, for obvious reasons, to countenance the stay of any of the party at Hinaidi, and as it would have been difficult as well as inhuman to separate from Surma those of her companions who had always formed part of the Patriarchal household in Mosul, the wives of Daud and Zia Mar Shimun and their children were permitted to accompany her.

7. Surma Khatun was removed to British territory under the same reservations as Mar Shimun and his companions, the Iraqi Government being formally charged with the responsibility for all expenses incurred in their transport and subsequent maintenance. No specific mention was made of the women and children who journeyed with her, since they are the immediate dependants of members of the Patriarchal family and in oriental eyes have no separate existence, sharing naturally the fortunes of their men folk. The Iraqi Government has always envisaged the removal of the whole household at Mosul, which formed the inner circle of the Mar Shimun family, and in my interviews with the late King and his successor, the Patriarchal family as an entity, and not simply its principal members, formed the basis of our discussion about the allowance to be paid for their support from the Royal privy purse (see my telegrams Nos. 306 and 366). The family circle who formerly lived life in common in the Patriarchal house in Mosul will shortly be completed by the arrival of Zia, uncle of Mar Shimun, who is leaving voluntarily for Cyprus by the overland route.

8. Surma Khatun was not informed categorically that His Majesty's Government could assume no financial liability in respect of herself and the dependants accompanying her. No such statement had been made to the Mar Shimun himself, and it seemed injudicious at the time to convey to Surma a warning of this nature, which might have led her to reconsider her most fortunate decision to leave the country voluntarily, and have precipitated thereby further trouble with the Iraqi Government. At the same time no expense in connexion with the removal of her party (other than the cost of the flight to Haifa) will fall upon His Majesty's Government, all expenses being defrayed privately or from the private means of members of the family.

9. As regards the question of maintenance in Cyprus, the family seem to be at present adequately provided for, in addition to small private means, by the allowance granted by King Feisal, and which King Ghazi has promised to maintain, so long as Mar Shimun does not indulge in active propaganda against Iraq. It appears to me self-evident that no financial liability can attach to His Majesty's Government for the support of this family, who were compelled to leave Iraq through circumstances for which His Majesty's Government are in no way responsible, and whose removal by British agency was sanctioned solely as an act of humanity and in the interests of their personal safety and public order in Iraq.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 6175/7/93]

No. 171.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 17.)*

(No. 625.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the Ministry of the Interior, Bagdad, dated the 1st October, enclosing a report from the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, respecting the Assyrians at Amadiyah.

*Bagdad, October 4, 1933.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 171.

*Mr. Wilson to Mr. Ward.*

(Secret.)

Dear Ward,

*Bagdad, October 1, 1933.*

I FORWARD herewith copy of report of Administrative Inspector, Mosul, of the 25th September, 1933.

It is, indeed, fortunate that we have Majid Beg as kaïmakam, Amadiyah, and he may be able to prevent trouble till the snow damps the ardour of both Kurds and Assyrians.

The Assyrians at Chailki are, I gather, talking of revenge in a very foolish manner, the more foolish since they had seventy rifles taken from them when they attempted to join Yaku.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. F. WILSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 171.

*Report by the Administrative Inspector, Mosul.*

(Secret.)

*Mosul, September 28, 1933.*

DURING the last fortnight disquietening rumours have been current in Mosul regarding the situation in Amadiyah Qadha. When I visited Amadiyah on the 25th and 26th September, I did my best to ascertain whether these rumours had any foundation. Actually, the situation in Amadiyah Qadha is extremely delicate, and but for one factor would be critical. This factor is that the kaïmakam, Majid Beg, is the one man in Iraq who is capable of preventing trouble. If he were not there, I consider that trouble would be practically certain in the near future. As he is there, I consider that there is a reasonable chance of it being avoided.

2. This is fully realised by the Assyrians. I saw a number of Mukhtars of Assyrian villages. They were unanimous in stating that it was solely owing to the efforts of Majid Beg that nothing occurred in the Barwari Bala district during the recent disturbances. They also say that they knew that Majid Beg is doing his utmost to recover the loot from the three or four villages which had been looted in the qadha.

3. Nevertheless, the Assyrians of Amadiyah Qadha are alarmed. Public security is by no means good. Small thefts or attempts at thefts are of almost nightly occurrence. The Kurds make little or no attempt to conceal their desire to loot the Amadiyah Assyrians in the same way as those in Shaikhan and Dohuk Qadhas have been looted. This is partly owing to greed. But it is partly owing to dislike of the Assyrians. This dislike had to be masked as long as the Kurds thought that the Assyrians were under British protection. It is now realised that they are not, and they thus appear to be an easy prey. There is no doubt that the majority of the Kurds in the Amadiyah district would welcome other outbreaks in order that they might benefit from loot and revenge. In consequence, a campaign of



petty complaints against the Assyrians is now in progress. Most of these complaints are clearly untrue.

4. Nor have the Assyrians been backward in entering on a campaign of counter-complaints, partly true and partly false. The inevitable result is that feeling between Kurds and Assyrians is thoroughly embittered.

5. But it is the feeling of the Amadiyah district Assyrians *vis-à-vis* the Government which has changed even more greatly. Prior to the 4th August the majority of the Assyrian leaders, viz., Malik Khoshaba and Malik Zaya Shams-el-Din of the Lower Tiari and Rais Khigo of the Ashuti and Bishop Yowalaha, the last of whom represents the pre-war Assyrian inhabitants of Barwari Bala, were the strongest opponents of Mar Shimun. It is a little doubtful whether the rank and file really supported these leaders against Mar Shimun, but in any case they did not take part in the exodus. It is now known that only the following took part or endeavoured to take part in the exodus:—

- (1) *Tokhouma*, from the villages of Pirozawe, Dohuki, Barikar, Bairbunk and Sikrine. Sixty of these are now interned in Syria and about twenty are unaccounted for. They have possibly been killed.
- (2) The *Alamun* and *Geramus* sections of the Upper Tiari from the villages of Chamsus, Tahlaf and Challiki. It is not clear whether these actually reached Syria or not. Probably they did not. In any case the majority of them are back. On their way back they killed the Mukhtar of the Kurdish village of Broshki, and in revenge the Kurds looted the villages of Chamsus and Tahlaf. They appear to be living now at Challiki and are accused of agitating against the Government. About seventy rifles have been taken from them.
- (3) About seventy *Ashuti* attempted to go to Syria, but the majority of them failed to get through. All but three have returned.
- (4) About twelve of the *Rumtas* from Savra Zor, Cham Chariti, Massitki and Qaliatu villages made a very belated effort to go to Syria on the 3rd August, but were induced to return by Malik Maksud. The tragedy of this section and the murder of twelve men by the Kurds I have recounted under my S/363 of the 11th September.

It will thus be seen that the great majority of the Assyrians in Amadiyah Qadha took no part in the Syrian exodus. It appears, however, that the news of what occurred in Dohuk and Shaikhan Qadhas reacted most unfavourably upon them. This news has rendered them extremely receptive to the propaganda of the Mar Shimun party; and this propaganda is as strong as ever. It is stated that Mar Shimun will induce the League of Nations to punish Iraq, that Mar Shimun will be granted all his original demands, that King Feisal did not die a natural death, but was murdered. This propaganda is ridiculous, and can be answered easily enough. What is not so easy to answer is argument of the following kind: "Well, we always told you that the Iraq Government intended to massacre Assyrians. You were, nevertheless, fools enough to trust the Government; and now you know what has happened in Dohuk and Shaikhan. Many Assyrians, who had trusted the Government, were killed by the armed forces of the Government. There the Government showed itself incapable of protecting innocent villagers from looting, even if it did not, as some people say, actually encourage the tribes to loot."

It will easily be understood that with such an atmosphere of mutual suspicion any spark may cause an explosion.

6. The main problem at the moment is to induce the Assyrian shepherd sections to go down to the plains. Normally, the movement to the winter pastures in Dohuk and Shaikhan (mainly Shaikhan) should already have commenced. But these sections are displaying great reluctance to come down from the mountains, or at most to go further than the Sapna Valley, which, climatically, and owing to its limited area, is quite unsuitable for winter grazing. Their reluctance is caused by the fear—

- (1) That they may be attacked on the road down;
- (2) That when they reach their winter grazing grounds they may be subject to attacks, since Assyrians in those areas have already been looted;
- (3) That when they arrive they will be disarmed.

The Kaimakam of Amadiyah is doing his best to reassure them, and it is to be hoped that he will succeed. But it is clear that police guards will have to accompany them on their way down. I will take this up with the mutessarif.

7. To sum up. The present position is full of danger, but the presence of Majid Beg in Amadiyah allows a reasonable hope that trouble will be avoided. There is, however, no possible doubt that trouble will occur, sooner or later. The Assyrians are all exceedingly difficult people to handle, even with patient and sympathetic officials. The great majority of Iraqi officials are neither patient nor sympathetic. A small incident might easily cause a general outbreak. The Assyrians certainly do not want to rise against the Government at the present time, despite occasional idle threats and boastings; but they are so stupid, and now so frightened, that it is quite possible that they might commit some sort of folly which would bring about a further tragedy.

As I have written above, as long as Majid Beg is in Amadiyah one may hope that there will be no trouble; but, sooner or later, trouble is an absolute certainty. It can only be avoided—

- (1) By the departure of the Assyrians;
- (2) By their complete disarmament.

The second alternative is out of the question. If disarmament was successfully carried out, the Assyrians would be at the mercy of their greedy and hostile neighbours. If disarmament was attempted, it might well be resisted, and this would be the spark to fire the magazine.

Therefore, in the interests of the Assyrians themselves and of the Iraqi Government, it is essential that the Assyrians should leave Iraq. To allow them to remain would be a crime, for which there could be no forgiveness.

R. S. STAFFORD,  
*Administrative Inspector, Mosul  
and Arbil Lines.*

[E 6194/7/93]

No. 172.

#### LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

#### *Protection of Minorities. Situation of the Assyrian Minority in the Kingdom of Iraq.*

*Report by the Representative of Spain.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 17.)*

THE Council is called upon to consider the question of the situation of the Assyrian minority in the Kingdom of Iraq in consequence of the initiative taken by the representatives of Mexico, the Irish Free State and Norway, members of the Minorities Committee which examined various petitions from Mar Shimun, "Catholikos," Patriarch of the Assyrians. The Iraqi Government has laid before the Council its observations on these petitions by its notes dated the 26th September and the 5th and 9th October. Further, in compliance with the desire expressed by the Council in its resolution of the 15th December, 1932, in which it was requested to keep the Council informed of the measures taken for the settlement of the Assyrians in Iraq, the Iraqi Government has forwarded to the Secretary-General a series of communications relating to this settlement, including a Blue Book<sup>(1)</sup> containing correspondence on the subject of the settlement of the Assyrians and a report<sup>(2)</sup> by Major Thomson, the expert appointed by the Iraqi Government to assist it in the work of settling the Assyrians, giving a detailed account of the measures taken by the Iraqi Government to carry out the settlement scheme.

2. The petitions contain information relating to events which took place last August in the Mosul area, when, it is asserted, some of the Assyrian population suffered treatment which, if these reports should prove correct, the Council could not hesitate to condemn. The Iraqi Government, on the other

<sup>(1)</sup> C.544.1933.VI.

<sup>(2)</sup> C.577.1933.VI.



hand, alleges that the events complained of by the petitioner were consequent upon measures it was obliged to take to put down an armed rising of Assyrian rebels, in which, it suggests, the petitioner himself was not wholly unconcerned, and such an attitude on the part of members of the minority would also, of course, deserve energetic condemnation by the Council. It should also be observed that, until these events took place, the Iraqi Government was carrying on in normal conditions the settlement of the Assyrians as provided for by the above-mentioned Council resolution. Neither the Council nor its *rapporteur* is in a position to form an accurate idea of these confused and complicated events on which to base an estimate of the respective responsibilities of the parties, and especially of the Assyrian revolt and its causes, the punishment of the excesses it involved, and the influence of one on the other.

I would propose that the Council now express its regret at finding itself called upon to deal with such a case as this, and take note of the assurances that the representative of Iraq has just given to the Council, to the effect that his Government is determined to do all in its power to prevent any repetition of such regrettable incidents.

3. At the same time, a mere perusal of the documents before the Council and those contained in the Iraqi Government's Blue Book, to which it refers in its observations, will make it clear that the Council's action in this matter might have no practical effect, even if the Council went so far as to institute an enquiry into the events of last August, and *a fortiori* if it confined itself to making recommendations to the Iraqi Government. All the impressions I have gained from reading the documents, and from conversations with persons thoroughly familiar with the problem, have convinced me that we are dealing with a question which I shall not hesitate to call exceptional. One of the greatest difficulties of this question—if not the greatest of all—is that a section—the size of which cannot at present be determined—of the Assyrian population of Iraq does not seem to look upon itself as permanently and finally incorporated in the Iraqi State, and, in fact, would prefer to leave the country if it were given the indispensable facilities and reasonable guarantees that its departure, and especially its resettlement in a country which would not necessarily be adjacent to Iraq, would be effected under conditions satisfactory from every standpoint. In this connexion I should like to point out that the Council, in its resolution of the 15th December, 1932, expressed its confidence that, if the contemplated measures did not provide a complete solution of the problem and there remained Assyrians unwilling or unable to settle in Iraq, the Iraqi Government would take all such measures as might be possible to facilitate the settlement of the said Assyrians elsewhere. In my view, these exceptional circumstances make it necessary for the Council to consider, in the matter with which it has now to deal, solutions and measures which would perhaps exceed the scope of the protection of minorities in the strict sense.

4. The Government of Iraq has expressed its conviction that the contingency contemplated in the resolution of the 15th December, 1932, to which I have just referred, has now arisen. It has declared itself willing to contribute as generously as its own resources permit to facilitate the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of the Assyrians who wish to leave it. It has, however, asked the assistance of the League in finding lands on which they could be settled. For my own part, I am convinced that in this matter the Council should not hesitate to carry its task through to the end, thereby facilitating a constructive solution of the problem, the necessity of which is apparently recognised not only by the Government but also by the minority affected. Accordingly, I venture to propose that the Council set up a committee consisting of five of its members, to which the Council itself would delegate extensive powers, to consider first of all whether such a solution as that outlined above would be possible in practice, and, if so, to take, in close co-operation with the Iraqi Government, all such steps as it might think fit with a view to the preparation and execution of a detailed scheme for the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of such Assyrians as might express the desire to leave the country, it being clearly understood that such part of the Assyrian population as remained in Iraq would be regarded as a minority to which would be applicable the provisions of the Iraqi declaration on the protection of minorities, and which would, further, be bound by the obligations of loyalty to the State recalled by the Assembly in its resolution of the 21st September, 1922. The committee might also examine, in consultation with the Iraqi Government,

and on the basis of reports furnished by the latter, the measures taken by that Government in order to give full effect to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, so far as concerns any Assyrians who may wish to remain in Iraq. I propose that the committee be asked to submit to the Council at our next ordinary session a report on the progress of its work.

5. Having regard to the profound anxiety that has been caused by recent events, I trust that, until it has been possible to put into effect the arrangements outlined above, the Iraqi Government will be good enough to keep the committee regularly informed of the measures taken to ensure the safety of the Assyrians in Iraq, to assist the families left destitute in consequence of those events, and to rebuild those villages which have been wholly or partly destroyed through the same events.

6. If the Council agrees to the foregoing suggestions, I shall submit proposals as to the composition of the contemplated committee.

Geneva, October 13, 1933.

[E 6228/7/93]

No. 173.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 648.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 12, 1933.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 387 of the 24th September, I have the honour to transmit herewith a précis of a report by Mr. A. H. Ditchburn, O.B.E., a Land Settlement officer in the service of the Iraqi Government. Mr. Ditchburn was instructed last month by the Iraqi Government to investigate the conditions of the villages in the Mosul Province affected by the recent Assyrian disturbances and to submit recommendations for their restocking and repair.

2. It would appear that sixty-four Assyrian, or partly Assyrian, and four non-Assyrian villages were affected. Of these latter two are Chaldean and two are Jacobite, but there was no loss of Chaldean or Jacobite life, with the doubtful exception of the headman of one of the Jacobite villages.

In regard to the Shaikhan district, where the large village of Alqosh is situated, Mr. Ditchburn sums up his report as follows:—

"In the twenty-two plundered villages the true losses suffered will never be known, but the fact is incontrovertible that, throughout the recent upheaval, when for a few days there was complete lawlessness in this district, not a single man, woman or child of the Assyrian villages was killed or wounded."

It is noteworthy that the Iraqi army did not enter this district, and that the police saved at least three Assyrian villages from being looted by their arrival in armed cars for their protection at an opportune moment. This goes to show, I think, that the Civil Government throughout these disturbances was averse to the taking of life; that the tribesmen, if left to themselves, had no other object but loot, and that the Iraqi army must bear the responsibility for practically all the killing that has occurred.

3. Mr. Ditchburn's remarks regarding the attitude of the Assyrians towards their future are interesting. It is to be feared that many who are abandoning land which is adequate to support them are deliberating making themselves destitute, and the problem of supporting a landless population in the towns during the coming winter is likely to prove very difficult. I am convinced that the only lasting solution of the Assyrian problem is the transportation to another country of all but the few original indigenous Assyrians. I agree that this operation is likely to take two years to complete, and I am of opinion that when it is well under way the waverers in the villages will all decide to go. In the meantime, it is good news that many are prepared to make the best of things, to return to their villages and sow their crops until the League has found them land in another country.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.



Enclosure in No. 173.

*Précis of Report by Mr. A. H. Ditchburn, O.B.E., Land Settlement Officer, on the Condition of the Villages in the Mosul Liwa affected by the recent Disturbances.*

THREE districts (qadhas) are concerned, the districts of Amadia, Dohuk and Shaikhan. Mr. Ditchburn visited and made a separate report to the Governor of the Mosul Province on each of these three districts. The total population under review was about 74,870, which includes 11,153 Assyrians, i.e., under one-sixth of the whole. The numbers of Assyrian or partly Assyrian villages affected were 4 in Amadia, 42 in Dohuk, 18 in Shaikhan, i.e., 64. Four entirely non-Assyrian villages in Shaikhan also suffered (two Chaldean and two Jacobite).

In the district of Amadia two Assyrian villages were looted, principally by Kurds. The Assyrian men of these villages were understood to have all been in the exodus. Most of the looted property has been recovered, thanks to the efficiency of the local prefect (kaimakam), and £78 and a certain amount of relief in kind have been issued by the Government.

In Dohuk, the district which suffered most, and which contained 4,967 Assyrians out of a total population of 35,140, forty-two villages were affected, of which twenty-two have been abandoned by the Assyrians. The villages appear to have been plundered by Arabs, Yezidis and Kurds, the Yezidis in many cases even looting those Assyrians who had sought their protection. It is impossible to ascertain the total quantity of grain which has been stolen, but the authorities have subsequently taken over and stored at Dohuk 137,396 kilog., and have spent, up to the 30th September, £297 towards repairing or rebuilding houses. Apparently no assistance in kind has been granted in this district.

In Shaikhan, where an Assyrian population of about 1,186 were affected out of a total non-Moslem population of 1,930, eighteen Assyrian or partly Assyrian villages and four entirely non-Assyrian Christian villages were looted by Arabs and Yezidis. In relief, the Government have granted up to the 30th September the equivalent of £600, i.e., £136 in cash and the rest in reconstruction services, which should be completed in three weeks.

Of the four non-Assyrian Christian villages, two were inhabited by Chaldeans, one of which was completely destroyed and the other looted by Arabs, and two by Jacobites (Syrian Orthodox), in one of which the headman died of injuries.

Into the Shaikhan district the Government have drafted fifty-nine additional police.

The total sum spent by the Government on relief in the above three districts to date amounts to approximately £975, plus certain compensation in kind for the two Assyrian villages in Amadia.

With regard to the future, Mr. Ditchburn emphasises the uncertain and contradictory attitude of the Assyrians, some of whom desire to remain in the country, and others who absolutely decline to return to their holdings. Mr. Ditchburn sums up the situation as follows:—

“The present state of mind of these people is a psychological matter with which this report is concerned only so far as it relates to the subject on which I was ordered to report, viz., the condition of their villages. As in Shaikhan qadha, so in Dohuk, the Assyrians who left and reoccupied their villages now want to leave. I do not know these people or the district well enough to understand the baffling attitude of this particular community. Their revolt caused them to suffer serious loss of life and property. They have evinced little gratitude to their Kurdish neighbours when such afforded them protection. They possess at the moment some highly fertile lands, comparable in agricultural productivity to any in the Near East. There is no shortage of water, grain is plentiful, and they are rich in live-stock and other assets. The levies, too, provide many with permanent subsidies. Yet it is possible to go to one village where men will confront one with views which to them seem sacrosanct, that they are prepared to give up all material benefits to follow their Patriarch, and, in an adjoining village, to find that the people want to settle down and resume their normal life.

“Assuming they will be found another home in another country, it seems unlikely that such a move could be carried out under two years or so. In the meantime, what is happening in Dohuk and Shaikhan is that, not only are large numbers refusing to return to their homes, but those who have returned seem bent on leaving. Hence, too, the feverish anxiety to convert the village assets into cash. As already explained, twenty-two villages out of forty-two are deserted and ten or more reoccupied ones are emptying. I venture to urge that the major issue at present is to endeavour to stop further migration to the towns, and to urge the people to cultivate their holdings. This means providing looted villages with immediate necessities to face the coming winter. Full details of such requirements have been provided in this and my previous report. To allow them to drift into the towns in poverty and without work will reduce them to the state of mind of some Assyrians who on being asked by me why they went to Syria replied that they did so because they were told the French would keep them without working as the English did in Baquba.”

[E 6229/7/93]

No. 174.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 18.)*

(No. 649.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 12, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to enclose an historical summary of the development of the Assyrian question in Iraq, for the drafting of which I am indebted to Mr. Ward. I have considered that the compilation of a summary from the records available in the Chancery would be useful at a time when the question of Assyrian settlement is engaging the attention of the League, especially in view of the misconceptions which seem to be prevalent, particularly in the columns of the press, in regard to the history of this complicated case.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 174.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION IN IRAQ.

Part I: 1914-25 (*Outbreak of the Great War to the League of Nations Decision on the Turco-Iraqi Frontier*).

RELIGIOUS propaganda was apparently being disseminated by the Russians among the Nestorian Christians on the Turco-Persian border before the outbreak of war. When the Russian forces advanced into Turkey-in-Asia the Nestorians rose at their instigation and attacked the isolated posts and settlements in their neighbourhood. However, in the autumn of 1915 the Russians retreated and the Nestorians, faced by overwhelming Turkish forces, were compelled to evacuate their country and to join their Persian co-religionists in the plain west of Lake Urumia. Here they were reorganised by the Russians into an irregular force and held their own until the Russian débâcle in 1917.

2. In January 1918 a proposal to employ them after the Bolshevik revolution in conjunction with White Russians fell through owing to the dispersal of the Russians before any plans could be made. The condition of the Nestorians became desperate, and they appealed to the British in Mesopotamia for assistance. A convoy of arms and munitions was sent up to them under a guard of hussars. But the convoy arrived too late. Turks, Kurds and Persians fell upon the Nestorians and they were obliged to retreat to Hamadan, suffering heavy losses. At Hamadan General Dunsterville retained most of the able-bodied men to work on the roads, but the remainder, some 25,000 refugees, were sent down to Baqubah and placed in a concentration camp. It should be noted that the Nestorians did not, as is often stated, fight side by side with British forces as allies in the Great War. They rebelled against the Turks on behalf of the Tsar, and when



the Russians cracked they were saved by the British from annihilation. The name Assyrians, which came to be applied to them later, is a misnomer. It is as a church, and not as a nation, that they should be described.

3. Sir Percy Cox estimated that there were 35,000 Nestorians (hereafter referred to as Assyrians) at Baqubah in 1919; of these, some 10,000 were Persian subjects from the Urumia district who had become involved in the same fate as their co-religionists from Turkey. The camp lasted for over two years, and before its closure in August 1920 had cost the British taxpayer £3 million. It was soon found that the camp conditions were demoralising and pauperising the refugees, whose ancient tribal organisation was breaking up, and steps were taken to try to arrange for their return to their homes. Largely with this object Amadia was occupied in 1919, but after the murder of Captain Willey and his assistants a new scheme was propounded for settling the Baqubah refugees within the Mosul Vilayet in an enclave formed by taking lands from rebellious Kurds in the Amadia region. Unfortunately, consideration of this project was delayed by the Arab revolt of 1920, and it became no longer practicable to carry out the necessary evictions. However, the Baqubah camp was evacuated in the summer of 1920 and the refugees moved to a camp at Mindan, north-east of Mosul.

4. A beginning was made in 1919 with enlisting Assyrians in the Iraq levies. Two battalions were raised, and acquitted themselves well in punitive operations in Kurdistan. In 1920, led by British officers, they routed 600 Kurds who attacked the repatriation camp; General Haldane (the General Officer Commanding) maintained that, "but for this action, a large portion of the Mosul Division might have been swamped in the wave of anarchy."

5. After the 1920 revolt was over a further belated attempt was made to resettle the Assyrians *en masse* under the leadership of Agha Petros, who had made himself regarded as a national leader in the temporary eclipse of the Mar Shimun family (the Patriarch had been murdered in 1918 by Simko; he was succeeded by a youth who died of consumption, and in 1920 by the present Ishai Mar Shimun, then a small boy). The scheme provided for the creation of a Nestorian buffer State on the Turco-Persian border, and it was hoped that under its protection the Urumia and Hakkari districts could be resettled. One-quarter of the Nestorian "nation" held back in loyalty to the patriarchal house, and were settled round Aqra and Dohuk. The remainder set forth at the end of October accompanied by three British officers and armed and supplied from British sources. Their march ended rapidly in a *débâcle*; hostilities broke out immediately with the Kurds, and the Tkhuma and Tiari tribesmen used the excuse of pursuit to break away from the main body and pillage Kurdish villages indiscriminately. The others were caught by an early winter and returned to Mindan, where the Tkhuma and Tiari were also eventually brought back. Sir Percy Cox attributed the failure of Agha Petros to the "reckless imprudence of the mountaineers and the refusal of the Urumians to accept our advice and help." He went on to say that this fiasco was due as much to the lack of any "common feeling or real organisation" among the Assyrians as to difficulties of a geographical or climatic nature; "though they formed one congregation in theory, in practice most of them cared only for their own clan or village and very little for the fate of others."

6. In August 1921 it was decided to attempt to settle the Assyrians by "infiltration," and the Mindan camp was broken up. Sixty lakhs of rupees (£450,000) was provided, and this allowed of a cash payment of 122 rupees per head in the camp (some 20,000 persons). The Persian Nestorians, despite grave warnings, tried to filter back to their Urumian homeland through Bagdad, but were almost all unsuccessful and overtaken by misfortune, many returning subsequently to Iraq. An attempt was made to settle the Turkish Nestorians tribe by tribe in the mountainous country around Dohuk, Zakho and Amadia, but the work was impeded by the uncertainty regarding the frontier with Turkey.

7. The mountaineers from former Turkish territory comprised from 1921 onwards the vast majority of "Assyrians" in Iraq. In contradistinction to the weaker, but more civilised, Urumia Plain dwellers they were described by Sir Percy Cox in 1922 as "in normal times just as truculent as other Kurdish tribes and no less savage." At the time of the dispersal of the refugees in Mindan camp, much trouble was caused by intrigues between the Agha Petros and Mar Shimun sections. The followers of Agha Petros, some 6,500 in number, had to be restrained from effecting a "concentration"; finally, some moved north into

their old homes and others were dispersed with difficulty around Dohuk and Amadia. It proved possible, however, to settle some 7,500 of the more amenable elements in villages within Government control, but this success was largely neutralised by the 1920 settlements in the Dohuk-Aqra Plains becoming stricken with malaria and their inhabitants drifting away. At the same time recruits were plentiful for the levies, some 2,000 men joining in one month, and Sir Percy Cox testified to their value, under British officers, for purposes of frontier defence against the Turks.

8. During 1922 the process of filtering back to their original homes continued, and by the end of the year it was estimated that over 1,000 families<sup>(1)</sup> (all Tiari, Tkhuma and Barwari Bala) had been repatriated. Over 1,900 rifles had been issued to tribesmen. At the same time the irregular levies were transformed into an organised force with three Assyrian battalions, and the defence of Kurdistan allotted to them. The influence of the patriarchal family was of value in overcoming misunderstandings due to the uncertainty of the future, which at one time were holding up the enlistment of Assyrians.

9. Unfortunately, the years 1923-24 saw a new and increasing antipathy develop between the Assyrians and the Moslem population. This was due, in the opinion of the League Commission of 1924-25 "partly to the lack of tact displayed by the Assyrians." Turkish and communal propaganda, however, was being directed against the Assyrians, who were increasingly suspect to Moslems as the recipients of special treatment. Ill-feeling led to an extensive brawl in the Mosul bazaar in August 1923, to demonstrations against 800 Assyrian refugees repatriated from Constantinople, and, finally, to the Kirkuk riot in May 1924, when an Assyrian levy battalion, despite the efforts of their British officers and their own native non-commissioned officers, ran amok in the town and killed and wounded more than 100 Moslem men, women and children, including policemen, by indiscriminate shooting. A few of the ringleaders in this massacre were awarded light sentences of imprisonment, which were afterwards cancelled by the order of King Feisal. Then, when the desirability of resettling the Assyrians in a homogeneous block in their old homes was becoming daily clearer, events occurred the effect of which could only be to perpetuate their dispersal among a Moslem population.

10. The tendency of the Assyrians to move up towards their old homes had continued, although the complete uncertainty which prevailed in the absence of any sort of fixed frontier with Turkey impelled them to remain within a zone which, although outside the boundaries of the Mosul Vilayet, was within British administrative influence. It was reckoned that this British "zone" in the Hakkari contained the homelands of two-thirds of the "Turkish" Assyrians, and it was clear that if the "zone" could be retained the problem of settlement would become relatively easy. Unfortunately, however, this territory had been overlooked in the negotiations for a treaty of peace with Turkey. The abortive Treaty of Sèvres, indeed, not only left the Nestorian country to Turkey, but gave the latter Amadia as well; and the Treaty of Lausanne of July 1923 did not mention the repatriation of Assyrians to their old homes, and left the question of the frontier to be decided by "friendly agreement" in nine months, or failing that by the Council of the League of Nations (article 3 (2)). Pending frontier delimitation the *status quo* was to prevail.

11. In April 1924, however, His Majesty's Government suggested to the Iraqi Government, who expressed agreement, the desirability of settling the Assyrians within the extended borders of the Mosul Vilayet as an autonomous community under Iraqi sovereignty, acting as a buffer against Turkey. In the following month, at the Constantinople Conference (set up in accordance with article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne), Sir Percy Cox formally demanded the extended Hakkari frontier from Turkey, and the claim was repeated in a memorandum to the Council of the League of Nations in August. Turkey replied with an uncompromising refusal to consider a claim which, they argued, had never been advanced before, and by going beyond the boundaries of the Mosul Vilayet infringed both the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Lausanne.

12. Immediately afterwards matters came to a head. Despite warnings from the British authorities the Assyrians, who had returned to the disputed area, attacked and captured the new Turkish Wali of Hakkari, who was on a tour of exploration in the district. He was saved from death and released through

<sup>(1)</sup> An Assyrian "family" is customarily reckoned at five persons.



the intervention of the Assyrian Malik Khoshaba, but the Turks were roused, and in September a punitive column ravaged the new settlements and compelled their inhabitants (mostly Upper Tiari) to fly for their lives back to Iraq. The arrival of 8,000 refugees, 2,000 of whom were entirely destitute, virtually undid all the progress in settlement achieved in the preceding years. Meanwhile, the Turks were raiding within the boundaries of the Mosul Vilayet, and the Council of the League of Nations, as a matter of urgency, fixed a provisional frontier, the "Brussels Line" (roughly the old Mosul Vilayet boundary), leaving the Hakkari entirely outside, decreed that the *status quo* should be peacefully maintained until the frontier had been delimited, and despatched a commission of three "neutrals" to report on the whole Turco-Iraqi frontier question. During this critical period the Assyrian Levies performed frontier duty and earned high praise for their discipline, not a single man deserting at a time when their villages were in flames and their families fleeing from Turkish savagery.

13. The Frontier Commission reported to the Council of the League in September 1925. They recommended the "Brussels Line" and the retention of the Mosul Vilayet in Iraq, subject to His Majesty's Government pledging themselves to continue the mandate for twenty-five years or until such time as Iraq entered the League; but they awarded the whole Hakkari territory to Turkey on the grounds (1) that His Majesty's Government were out of order in raising a new territorial claim subsequent to the Conference of Lausanne, and (2) that the Assyrians had been in the wrong originally for rebelling without provocation during the war against the Turks, who could not fairly now be penalised by losing the territory. Although His Majesty's Government stated categorically to the commission that if the part of the Hakkari country claimed were not given to Iraq, no local autonomy could be accorded to the Assyrians, since it would not be possible to settle them homogeneously, the commission concluded with the recommendation that "the Assyrians should be guaranteed the re-establishment of the ancient privileges which they possessed in practice if not officially before the war. Whichever may be the Sovereign State; it ought to grant these Assyrians a certain local autonomy, recognising their right to appoint their own officials and contenting itself with a tribute from them to be paid through the agency of their Patriarch." It can only be assumed that the commission envisaged the ultimate return of the Assyrians to their Hakkari enclave; the latter, however, were determined not to have anything further to do with the Turks and remained of their own volition in Iraq, within whose boundaries no uninhabited and climatically suitable area existed in which 20,000 people could be settled as a united community. No form of administrative autonomy can be organised for a people scattered in small groups over a wide area, and the fixing of the frontier so as to include only a fragment of the old Assyrian homelands within Iraq made it virtually impossible for the Iraqi Government to carry out the recommendation of the commission under this head.

14. The recommendations of the commission on the Turco-Iraqi frontier were accepted by the Council of the League in spite of the vehement protests of the British representative, embodied in their decision of December 1925 and brought into force by the tripartite Treaty of Angora, signed by the United Kingdom, Turkey and Iraq in June 1926.

Part II: 1926-July 1933 (*from the Treaty of Angora to the Assyrian Exodus under Yaku Malik Ismail*).

15. The final loss of the Hakkari district and the home country of some two-thirds of the 20,000 refugees necessitated a fundamental change in the policy of Assyrian settlement. The considered policy of His Majesty's Government had been expressed in the pronouncement by the High Commissioner in May 1924, and provided for:—

- (1) The return of the bulk of the refugees (Tiari, Tkhuma, Baz and Jilu tribesmen) to that part of the Hakkari sandjak which it was hoped to obtain from Turkey.
- (2) The settlement of the remainder in vacant Government lands in the neighbourhood of Dohuk and Amadia.

A "generous measure of liberty in the management of their purely local affairs" was to be accorded to those settled under both (1) and (2), and in the case of (2)

the Iraqi Government were to provide lands free of rent. The Iraqi Government had formally agreed to this policy, but only the lesser part of it could now ever be put into practice. Moreover, the work of settlement within the reduced area available was to be made even more difficult by the intransigent refusal of the Turkish Government to permit the return of Assyrians to Turkish territory under any conditions (in direct opposition to Fethi Bey's assurances at the Constantinople Conference of May 1924, which had impressed the League of Nations Frontier Commission) and by their energetic protests as soon as it was proposed to settle any Assyrians within range of the frontier.

16. However, the Iraqi Government had been induced to promise lands for all Assyrians dispossessed irretrievably in consequence of the frontier decision, and after the Treaty of Angora of June 1926 had removed all uncertainty as to the position a new start on the work of settlement was made in earnest in 1927. Already in 1926 assistance was being accorded to Assyrians locally to secure resettlement in better localities; their sheep tax and rifle licence duty were entirely remitted, and the Lunn charitable fund was freely used to provide agricultural capital. Meanwhile, the community was being enriched by the wages of the 3,000 men employed in the levies. In the following year, the High Commissioner visited Mosul in the spring to inspect personally the work of settlement, and at his suggestion the Iraqi Council of Ministers passed a resolution promising to do all that was possible to settle the refugees in vacant lands and to assist them by special exemptions from taxation. In June Captain Foweraker, an ex-levy officer, was appointed special Assyrian Settlement Officer for one year, responsible to the High Commissioner direct and paid from British funds.

17. The situation of large numbers of the Assyrians was at this time unsatisfactory; in many cases they were living on lands that were unsuitable (although the best that could be found within Iraq); in others, they enjoyed no security of tenure; and as a general rule they were too scattered for any real cohesion even by tribes. Of those who had been finally driven from the Hakkari, the Upper Tiari and the Tkhuma were stationed in the Dohuk and Amadia districts; the Jilu and the Baz in the plains north of Mosul, and the Lower Tiari remained in the indifferent lands they acquired in 1921-22 among the Barwari Bala Kurds. Much anxiety was felt by them all as to their future.

18. To remedy the situation schemes were proposed for settlement within the Arbil Liwa (the Mosul Liwa being too crowded to allow for new settlements), principally in the Harir plains and the mountainous Baradost area. A most successful settlement of some 450 Shamsdinan families from Dohuk was carried out on the estates of the Kurd Ismail Beg in the Harir plains near Rowanduz; but the Baradost scheme was obstructed at the outset by the claims and opposition of Kurdish chiefs and the attitude of the Turks (see paragraph 15). In the Mosul Liwa only some 500 families were permanently settled, and it was reckoned that 2,200 families remained to be tackled, at an estimated cost of 3½ lakhs of rupees. Unfortunately, this sum was not available, appeals to charity evoked no response, probably owing to an over-optimistic impression of the situation which had been given in England and America by certain observers.

19. Despite the shortage of money and the renewed failure of the Baradost scheme to materialise (this time owing to the inertia of the Assyrian would-be settlers themselves), 1928 was a most successful year for Assyrian settlement. By the end of the year 1,700 families had been permanently settled, and only 500 were left over. Moreover, many earlier settlements were flourishing owing to the thrift and hard work of their owners, who were often conspicuously more prosperous than their long-established Kurdish neighbours. About half the settled Assyrians were the tenants of private individuals, but a system had been introduced by which leases were drawn up under the supervision of the *kaimakam*. The remainder of the Assyrians were settled in Government-owned villages or possessed their land in freehold. A somewhat disquieting symptom, however, was the preference of the Assyrians for short-term leases, with the implication that they at least did not regard their settlement as permanent, however successful. Any tendency towards increased autonomy, such as that favoured by the League Commission in circumstances that could never materialise, was undesirable for two reasons: First, because the power and prestige of the tribal chiefs had begun to wane; secondly, because in the interests of the Assyrians themselves (settled by necessity in scattered groups), it was essential not to go any further towards according them special treatment, which would discriminate



against and embitter their vastly more numerous Moslem neighbours. At the same time, the Assyrians, in common with the other religious minorities, have always been allowed to settle through their own ecclesiastical authorities all matters involving the personal status of members of their community.

20. After the efforts of the preceding year there were few developments in 1929, although some 100 families were resettled in Government villages in the Mosul Liwa. The Baradost scheme hung fire once more, largely because the Iraqi Government failed to give the necessary sanction for the settlers to move until late in the year. A few, under the leadership of Malik Ismail of the Upper Tiari, did move in and begin cultivation in the late summer, but future prospects were blighted by the recrudescence towards the end of the year of the propaganda of the Sheikh of Barzan, probably inspired by Turkey, which insinuated, without justification, that Moslem Kurds were being dispossessed of their land in favour of Christian Assyrians. As usual, the fault was not entirely on one side. A beginning was quite rightly being made towards equalising the incidence of taxation on Assyrians in their increasingly prosperous state (for example, they were now charged one-fifth of the rifle licence paid by Kurds). But the disappearance of their cherished exemptions led the Assyrians to protest, and to complain to British officials or through their Patriarch to the High Commissioner, and this habit of short-circuiting the Iraqi Administration caused much Iraqi resentment against the Assyrians.

21. Nevertheless, great progress had manifestly been made. At the end of the year it could be said that the Assyrians had "ceased to be refugees in fact as well as theory," and, apart from their often tactless and aloof attitude, the Iraqi officials found them well-behaved and law-abiding.

22. Unfortunately, progress was not to be maintained. In 1930, as before in 1924, the Sisyphus rock of Assyrian settlement began once more to slip back down the long slope. Inevitably both sides were to blame. On the one hand, the Assyrians read with alarm that the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 foreboded the imminent end of the mandate and contained no guarantees for them. On the other hand, the Iraqi Government, emboldened by the impending advent of independence, lost interest in conciliating an alien minority who, they considered, had already received an unjustifiable measure of special treatment. The atmosphere was embittered by the activities of the Assyrian propagandists, Cope and Rassam, and the irresponsible endeavours of certain Bagdadi politicians, to divert the active dislike of the Kurds from Arabs on to Assyrians. The murder of five Assyrians near Rowanduz by Kurdish bandits was never brought home to the offenders and caused much resentment among the levies. The fact that the Assyrian problem had now come into politics led to the Iraqi Council of Ministers refusing to continue the remissions of taxation to Assyrian settlers (ruling that the resolution of 1927 only applied to that year), and to the Minister of the Interior holding up resettlement in the Mosul Liwa, by requesting a formal ruling on future policy before the lease of further Government lands could be granted to Assyrians.

23. In 1931 settlement made little progress, though the political atmosphere at least did not deteriorate further. Yet another attempt was made to settle the Baradost area; the Iraqi Government were now disposed to be more helpful and offered considerable assistance, including release from rent for the first four years. But at this juncture the insurgent bands of Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan irrupted into the district, law and order disappeared, and the Baradost scheme was again postponed. Real efforts were made during the course of the year to win the confidence of the Assyrians, and the example of the High Commissioner in touring their districts was followed by King Feisal, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior. The dispute of the previous year about remissions of taxation was concluded by the Council of Ministers approving all past exemptions, though refusing in future to grant discriminatory treatment, except to cultivators of any race genuinely developing new land.

24. The *détente* of the first part of 1931 did not endure. The young Patriarch had now grown up and, unfortunately, his obstinate and suspicious nature, backed by his formidable aunt, Surma Khanum, tended ever more to throw the influence of the patriarchal house against trying to secure a reasonable settlement within Iraq. In particular the Patriarch refused to have anything to do with the Baradost scheme on the ground that he would be satisfied with nothing less than a single homogeneous settlement for the whole Assyrian

community. In October 1931 a petition was presented to the League of Nations through His Majesty's Government urging the necessity for removing all Assyrians from Iraq before the termination of the mandate. This was apparently designed to impress the League with the plight of the community, but events soon showed that the Assyrian leaders intended to try to gain their ends by direct action.

25. The Assyrian levies had not been in action since 1927 and their numbers had been reduced to two battalions with ancillary troops, since the Iraqi army had relieved them on garrison duty; in the 1930 operations against Sheikh Mahmud they were deliberately held in reserve to avoid creating blood feuds with the Kurds in view of the approaching termination of the mandate. However, some 1,700 men were still serving and drawing good pay from the British Treasury.

26. In April 1932 Mar Shimun and his aunt toured the levy camps at Hinaidi, Mosul, Diana and Sulaimani and induced the levy officers to enter a secret pact by which they would resign and join a national concentration in the north unless an ultimatum submitted by the Patriarch were accepted. On the 1st June the officers notified the Officer Commanding Iraq Levies that they would cease serving in a month's time, since they were dissatisfied with the failure of His Majesty's Government to ensure them security in the future. An Assyrian concentration in the Dohuk-Amadia area, headed by the dissident levy officers, foreboded grave disorder and certain disaster; most of the Assyrians had received military training in the levies and they had in their hands over 3,000 modern British rifles, since the practice had been up to 1928 to present levies on their discharge with a new rifle and 200 rounds of ammunition. Moreover, the chances of avoiding it appeared slender when the terms of the Assyrian *sine qua non* became known. For in a petition addressed to the Permanent Mandates Commission and forwarded under cover to the High Commissioner on the 18th June Mar Shimun and his followers demanded administrative autonomy (the rights of a Turkish "millet"), the creation of a special Assyrian sub-district in an area predominantly Kurdish, the recognition of the temporal and spiritual authority of the Patriarch and the rendition of the Sanjak of Hakkari by the Turks—in addition to a number of more reasonable demands, including the provision of schools, hospitals, church funds and parliamentary representation. These demands were to be accepted by the League and embodied in the Iraqi Constitution by the 28th June or the levies would withdraw their services.

27. The High Commissioner made every effort to induce the Assyrian leaders to realise the folly of their demands and the impossibility of rushing the League, and he laboured to make the levy officers realise the gravity of the step they were proposing to take. At the last moment, largely owing to the impression created by the arrival of a British battalion by air from Egypt, and only after the levies had been disarmed at Hinaidi, Mosul, Diana and Sulaimani by the men of the Northamptonshire Regiment, Mar Shimun was persuaded to instruct the levies to continue to serve, at any rate until the League had adjudicated upon the petition. In return the levies were rearmed after an interval and kept temporarily at existing strength, though some 250 of the more restless elements were allowed to take their discharge. The Assyrians were informed that the more reasonable and practical among their demands would be considered without delay, and the Iraqi Government were induced to set up a committee consisting of one Assyrian, the British Administrative Inspector in the Mosul Liwa and the Kaimakam of Dohuk to study further settlement possibilities.

28. The High Commissioner tried for four days at Geneva to induce the Council to consider the Assyrian petition before the termination of the mandate on the 3rd October. The *rapporteur*, however, held that this would have been contrary to the rules of the League, while Iraq was still subject to mandate, and that the petition must be referred in the first instance to the Permanent Mandates Commission, which did not sit till later in the month. The Permanent Mandates Commission rejected the demand for administrative autonomy, but advocated the settlement of Assyrians in a homogeneous body in a suitable region, adding without any apparent justification that they were not satisfied that such a region could not be found within the borders of Iraq. This resolution came before the Council in the same month and was referred to a special sub-committee of British, French and Italian members. The Iraqi Government refused to accept a League



commissioner to enquire into the possibilities of homogeneous settlement, as this had already been found in August 1932 by the Advisory Committee mentioned in paragraph 27 to be quite impracticable, nor would they accept the co-operation of the Nansen Office. Finally, agreement was obtained and a resolution passed which—

- (1) Adopted the Permanent Mandates Commission's view that administrative autonomy for the Assyrians was impossible within Iraq;
- (2) Noted with satisfaction the readiness of the Iraqi Government to select a foreign expert to assist them in the settlement of all landless inhabitants of Iraq, including Assyrians, and in carrying out a scheme for settling the Assyrians under suitable conditions "so far as may be possible in homogeneous units"; and
- (3) Expressed confidence that, if necessary, the Iraqi Government would facilitate the settlement outside Iraq of Assyrians unwilling to settle in the country.

29. The Iraqi Government must be given the credit for doing their best to carry out the wishes of the Council as regards settlement. They accepted the recommendation of the Advisory Committee for settlement in the Dashtazai area, and procured a credit of £13,000 for the necessary preliminary irrigation work. A Main Settlement Committee was formed in Mosul under the presidency of the mutessarif, and a local board of six representative Assyrians set up for the purposes of consultation and liaison. In the spring Major Thomson began his work as the foreign expert whom the Iraqi Government had undertaken to appoint.

30. Unfortunately Mar Shimun returned from Geneva in January disappointed and embittered. He persuaded the levies to give the undertaking of loyalty and abstention from politics, which the Air Officer Commanding demanded from those retained to serve in the aerodrome guards, and he opposed a wild scheme of the notorious Captain Rassam for mass emigration to Persia. But towards the Iraqi Government he adopted a rigidly unhelpful and obstructive attitude. He was deeply incensed at the not altogether wise efforts of the Iraqi officials to build up a pro-Government party round the person of Malik Khoshaba, and refused to co-operate with the Settlement Committee and Major Thomson, or to serve on the Advisory Board, even as president. Finally, in June, he was summoned by the Iraqi Government to Bagdad, in an endeavour to persuade him to co-operate in the settlement work. But his presence in Bagdad only led to an acrimonious correspondence with the Minister of the Interior on the vexed subject of the Patriarch's temporal power. Nothing was decided, and the Government, alarmed at the growing uneasiness in the north, ended by forbidding him to leave Bagdad, despite his protests, thereby committing a grave error of tactics.

31. In the north things had gone from bad to worse ever since, in May, the Iraqi Army Commander in Mosul had stupidly used the pretext that stones had been flung by Assyrians at the house of an Iraqi officer to issue ball ammunition to his troops. This incident was liquidated with difficulty (largely through the help of the Air Officer Commanding), but in the following month an incipient revolt by Yaku, the son of Malik Ismail, who refused to obey the orders of the Kaimakam of Dohuk, was barely prevented by the personal intervention of the British Administrative Inspector. A glimmer of hope came from the meetings of the 10th and 11th July, at which the policy of the Government was explained to all the principal Assyrian leaders. But this soon faded, and in place of a visit to Bagdad, which they had promised to undertake with a view to dispelling the growing tension, Maliks Yaku and Luco put themselves at the head of the Assyrian exodus to Syria, which was destined to end so tragically. As in 1920, at the time of Agha Petros's march, and as in 1924, when the Turks were provoked by the attack on the Vali of Hakkiari, it was the firebrands of the Upper Tiari and Tkuma tribes who involved their more reasonable compatriots in disaster.

[E 6257/7/93]

No. 175.

*Assyrian Question: Speech by the United Kingdom Delegate, Sir John Simon, at the Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on October 14, 1933. —(Received in Foreign Office, October 19.)*

IT is only a short time ago, in December 1932, that the Council last gave careful consideration to the problem of the Assyrians in Iraq and adopted a resolution approving of proposals put forward by the Iraqi Government for their settlement. It is a source of deep disappointment that within so short a time events have occurred which have made it necessary for this question to appear once more on our agenda.

The question as it now presents itself is evidently, from the documents before the Council, of an extremely complex character, and in some of its details might give rise to much controversial discussion. We must all feel grateful to the *rapporteur* for the able manner in which he has presented to us its essential aspects.

It is not disputed that in the course of events which occurred last August in the north of Iraq some sections of the Assyrian population were treated in a manner which merits the severest condemnation. The Iraqi representative has admitted as much here at this table in the presence of us all; he has deplored the commission of excesses. It is true that the documents before us indicate that prior to these events an important element of the Assyrians had taken up a most improper attitude towards the Iraqi Government and had acted in a manner which also deserves censure. At the same time, these facts cannot possibly be regarded as justifying the excesses which were committed.

The apportionment of blame, however, is a somewhat barren proceeding. The main duty of the Council is to devote itself to the future rather than to the past in an endeavour to seek a lasting and honourable settlement of a problem which, as the *rapporteur* points out, possesses very exceptional features. I therefore welcome, on behalf of the Government which I represent, the broad view which the *rapporteur* has taken and the suggestions which he makes for arriving at a constructive solution. The Council in its resolution of December last decided, after the fullest consideration, upon the best arrangements that could be made for Assyrians in Iraq. It now appears from the documents before us that a considerable number of Assyrians do not desire to remain in Iraq under these arrangements. I accordingly warmly support the proposal which has been put before us that the Council should set up a committee of five or six of its members whose first task will be to consider and, if possible, to execute a detailed plan for the settlement outside Iraq of those Assyrians who wish to leave the country. The Iraqi Government, as we learned just now from their honourable representative, support this proposal and recognise that a generous contribution from Iraqi resources should be made to this end. I am confident that, if satisfactory measures can be devised to carry out such a plan of resettlement, the Council will have found a happy and, I trust, an enduring solution for one of the most perplexing difficulties with which it has ever been confronted.

[E 6256/7/93]

No. 176.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received October 19.)*

(No. 229.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, dated the 14th October, respecting the petitions submitted by the Mar Shimun to the League of Nations regarding the Assyrian minority in Iraq.

*Geneva, October 15, 1933.*



Enclosure in No. 176.

*Sir John Simon to Secretary-General, League of Nations.*

Sir,

October 14, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to League document C. 535/1933 I containing certain petitions submitted by the Mar Shimun to the League of Nations regarding the situation of the Assyrian minority in Iraq.

It does not fall to the United Kingdom delegation to comment in detail on these petitions. At the same time they contain certain misstatements which closely concern Sir Francis Humphrys, now His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, and which are of such a nature that it is impossible to pass them over in silence.

In the first place, on p. 4 of the document the Mar Shimun implies that Sir Francis Humphrys made, but did not fulfil, "many definite and helpful promises" in connexion with the Assyrian petition of the 17th June, 1932, which was considered by the Council last year. It is only necessary, however, to peruse the letters from Sir Francis Humphrys which the Mar Shimun has attached to his petition of the 16th August last to see that, while Sir Francis Humphrys indicated those demands in the petition of the 17th June, 1932, which he himself considered to be reasonable subjects for consideration, he repeatedly made it clear that it was not within his power to accept them, since the decision regarding them rested, in the first place, with the Iraqi Government and with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and, ultimately, with the League of Nations, whose attitude it was impossible for him to foretell.

More serious, perhaps, in view of its immediate bearing on the events now under consideration by the Council, is the erroneous account of a conversation at Geneva between Sir Francis Humphrys and the Mar Shimun on the eve of Iraq's admission to membership in the League, which appears on p. 27 of the League document under reference. The Mar Shimun alleges that Sir Francis Humphrys then admitted that in 1931 arrangements were well in train to massacre the Assyrians, and that he had taken prompt action to stop such a massacre.

What actually occurred at the interview was that the Mar Shimun complained to Sir Francis Humphrys that the Assyrians lived in constant fear of massacre. Sir Francis Humphrys explained to him that, in his opinion, there was no danger of any harm coming to them provided that they behaved as loyal citizens in the Iraqi State. At no point in the conversation did Sir Francis Humphrys say that he had taken any action to stop a massacre in 1931 or at any other time. On the contrary, he said that he regarded the rumours of a massacre in 1931 as entirely without foundation. The Mar Shimun then said that he referred to economic rather than to physical massacre, and instanced the probable loss of employment in the levies and in the railway and oil companies, and his fear of a general denial to the Assyrians of their rights. Sir Francis Humphrys pointed out that, although the existing numbers of Assyrians employed in the levies would have to be reduced, the Air Officer Commanding had agreed to enlist a considerable number of Assyrians in the new Air Defence Force which was to replace the levies. As regards employment elsewhere, Sir Francis Humphrys said he would always do his best to ensure that they were given equal rights and equal opportunities with other Iraqis, but that he could not hold out any hope of exclusive privileges.

I shall be grateful if you will communicate this letter to the members of the Council of the League, for their information.

I have, &amp;c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 6262/7/93]

No. 177.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 19.)*

(No. 427.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, October 19, 1933.

PRIME Minister and Minister of the Interior have called on me separately to express warm gratitude of Iraqi Government for friendly and helpful attitude displayed by British delegation at Geneva towards their difficulties in Assyrian

case. They have both assured me that Iraqi Government will spare no pains to co-operate loyally with League Committee in the matter of settlement outside the country of those Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq, and in the meantime will do everything possible for their protection and well-being.

[E 6279/7/93]

No. 178.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Iraq: Settlement of the Assyrian Community in Iraq.**Note by the Secretary-General.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 20, 1933.)*

THE Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council, for information, a letter dated the 9th October, 1933, from his Excellency Nury Pasha Al Said, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Iraq, together with a short report by Major Thomson, the expert appointed by the Government of Iraq for the settlement of the Assyrians, in accordance with the Council resolution of the 15th December, 1932.<sup>(1)</sup>

Geneva, October 10, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 178.

*Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Secretary-General, League of Nations.**Iraq Permanent Delegation,*

Geneva, October 9, 1933.

WITH reference to my letter of the 20th September, 1933,<sup>(2)</sup> I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the Council, copy of a short report by Major Thomson, the expert engaged by the Iraqi Government to assist it in the task of Assyrian settlement, in accordance with the Council's decision of the 15th December, 1932.

NURY SAID,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Major Thomson to Minister of the Interior, Bagdad.**Office of the Assyrian Settlement,*

Mosul, September 28, 1933.

(Confidential.)

In accordance with your instructions I beg to submit a brief report on my investigations on the subject of Assyrian settlement in Iraq.

I would emphasise that in the time given to me to write this report it is quite impossible to deal as fully and adequately with the question as I should like.

I understand that this report is to be submitted to the League of Nations, and I must therefore request that in submitting this report the League of Nations be informed of your request to me for a brief report and also of the very limited time which has been given me in which to prepare my report.

D. A. THOMSON,

Adviser on Assyrian Settlement.

*Note of Preliminary Investigations for Assyrian Settlement in Iraq.*

This report is a general up-to-date survey of the Assyrian settlement problem and also a collection of data, statistics, &c., made during the two months of actual investigation of this question.

The exodus of Assyrians into Syria and the consequent conditions of internal unrest rendered any further consideration of the problem impossible for the time being.

<sup>(1)</sup> See *Official Journal*, 13th year, No. 12, p. 1984.<sup>(2)</sup> Note by the Secretary-General: Reproduced in document C. 544.1933.VI.



On my arrival in Iraq on the 31st May, 1933, I made it my first duty to study the history of the Assyrians, both prior to and since their entry into Iraq up to the present.

This was done both from official records and relevant literature and by personal interviews with leading members of the Assyrian community.

On the 4th June I met the Mar Shimun in Bagdad, and had with him a conversation of more than two hours' duration.

I found him suspicious of my appointment and the scope of my terms of reference, and critical in a vague and indefinite way of what he believed to be the Government settlement policy.

At first he declined to make any counter-proposals or even to assist me by introductions to the Assyrian leaders with whom he consulted.

I urged the necessity of the latter point, but he remained adamant, and I can only assume that for some obscure reason he did not wish me to see these people other than in his presence.

As regards the Government settlement policy, he undertook to let me have in writing a full statement of his views on the subject and this he confirmed later by letter. I much regret that his promise has never materialised.

It should be noted that some days prior to my arrival the question of "Temporal and Spiritual Power" of the Mar Shimun had been raised by the Iraqi Government.

From the general tone of the conversation, and the veiled allusions to the subject made by Mar Shimun, I could only feel that the personal factor loomed large in his argument, and the future of the Assyrian people was a secondary matter.

I tried to impress on him that his first duty as Patriarch was to subordinate his personal ambitions, and that he should work for the welfare and future of his people. I explained that my appointment was by virtue of a promise made by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations to appoint an adviser on the question of the settlement of Assyrians in Iraq, and that he could rest assured that I would see that right was done by them to the best of my ability. On the other hand, non-co-operation by him with me could only reflect unfavourably both on him personally and on his people, as by such action he would be denying the responsibilities which were his by virtue of his position amongst the Assyrian people.

I regret that our meeting was very definitely unproductive of any form of working agreement.

The whole issue then became further embarrassed by the definite refusal of the Mar Shimun to agree with the Government on the question of the extent of his powers and duties as Patriarch of the Assyrian Church.

The inability of the Mar Shimun to agree to the Government formula, and his consequent retention in Bagdad, caused the atmosphere of mistrust, suspicion and non-co-operation towards land settlement, which already existed, to become markedly accentuated, and this it has unfortunately been found impossible to dispel.

Failing the co-operation of the Mar Shimun, I decided that my only course was to get into immediate touch with the Assyrians as a whole, to interview all their leaders, visit the Assyrian villages, and enquire into their conditions and obtain their views on settlement in Iraq. Also to have meetings with the mukhtars and chief men of those villages which I was unable to visit personally.

On questioning the Assyrian villagers as regards their settlement, the chief answer, with few exceptions, was the same: "We are refugees, and, unless we are told by the Mar Shimun to settle, we remain refugees." This attitude undoubtedly fostered by the Mar Shimun's orders was bound to lead to an *impasse*.

Further discussion with these people emphasised the opinion I had already formed, namely, that the Mar Shimun and/or his representatives had not fully and clearly explained to the Assyrians generally his failure to win the agreement of the League of Nations to the claims he had submitted.

Consequently, it was felt that only by freely and clearly explaining the true facts to the Assyrian leaders could they be made to understand the real position of affairs. With this end in view it was decided to have a meeting in the mutessarif's office, Mosul, on the 10th July, 1933, of all the Assyrian tribal maliks, raises and notables. At this meeting the final decision of the League of

Nations, made on the 15th December, 1932, was read and explained in its relation to the requests contained in the Mar Shimun's position of September 1932, and the policy of the Government regarding citizenship, land tenure, suggested area for settlement, &c., were also explained.

On the following day a further meeting was held to reply to questions arising out of the statements of the previous day.

When the meeting finally concluded, it was felt that it had done much towards generally clearing the atmosphere of doubt and misunderstanding, and created an opening for constructive settlement work.

The impression was formed during this meeting that the maliks of the chief Assyrian tribes, who had asked the Mar Shimun to plead their case at Geneva, believed that the Mar Shimun, as their representative, still felt it his duty to continue to support their requests. It was suggested that if they could meet the Mar Shimun and further discuss the question with him, he and they could modify their views so as to be more in conformity with the general Government policy. It was believed that they then realised that acceptance of this policy was the only feasible course in the circumstances.

It was therefore suggested to certain Assyrian leaders, the Metropolitan Mar Yusif, Malik Andrios of Jilu, Yaqo Ismail of Upper Tiari, who is the son of Malik Ismail who was sick in hospital in Bagdad, and Lucco Shlimon of Tkhuma, that they should go to Bagdad and consult with the Mar Shimun.

After several private meetings, the Metropolitan was finally unable to accept the suggestion, but the other three agreed, and definitely stated at a final interview on the 13th July that they would leave for Bagdad at once. They certainly left Mosul, not southwards to Bagdad, as was intended, but northwards to the Assyrian villages of Dohuk Qadha, with what consequences is now only too well known.

#### *Land Tenure.*

Land tenure may be roughly of two kinds:—

- (1) Government-owned land.
- (2) Private-owned land.

In the case of Government-owned land, tenants who have cultivated satisfactorily and paid their taxes regularly after ten years' tenancy acquire the right to a freehold in their land. This freehold can only be legally given by a Land Commission, of which there are at present several working in various parts of Iraq.

In the case of privately-owned land, any freehold right in the land cultivated can only be obtained by the tenant by purchase.

The latter method of acquirement of land has been successfully carried out by the Armenian colony at Havraiz, aided by loans from the Armenian Benevolent Society in Paris.

Tenure of privately-owned land by lease or agreement is the accepted procedure. Assyrians, who in past years settled in villages, took out leases for three years; these leases generally fell in many years ago and the agreements have never been renewed, consequently the tenant holds his land on a doubtful yearly tenancy.

The reason of this non-renewal of leases being the hope, ever present in the hearts of the greater numbers of Assyrians, that the day of their general exodus was at hand.

I have even met cases of villages in which, owing to some groundless rumour of an imminent move, the villagers as a whole have sown no winter crops, believing that they would have left the country before the next harvest.

#### *Density of Population.*

The density of population in Mosul and Arbil Liwas varies from 8-64 persons per square kilometre, though more generally from 8-32 persons per square kilometre in the country areas. In the towns the density is 256 persons per square kilometre. This represents a fairly dense population, especially when it is remembered that the lands in question are largely mountainous and therefore unsuitable for cultivation.



*Conditions.*

The villages and their lands occupied by Assyrians come under two heads:—

- (1) Those on Government land.
- (2) Those on land owned by private persons.

In the first case, the inhabitants are entirely Assyrian. In the second case, there may be also inhabitants who are either Kurds, Yezidis or Arabs.

There are 116 villages occupied in whole or in part by Assyrians, and of these thirty-eight villages are on Government land and seventy-eight on land owned by private landlords.

On investigation of local land conditions, I was faced by the definite fact that there was little or no land, certainly belonging to Government, which would fulfil the requirements demanded by the Assyrians, namely, mountainous country with fertile valleys and running water.

Again, it was impossible to settle these people in homogeneous groups of villages and at the same time conform with the decision of the League, namely, "that the existing rights of the present population shall not be prejudiced."

Any movement of local inhabitants, even by the purchase by Government of lands from private owners, is bound to have most undesirable repercussions, and can only accentuate the enmity that exists between the Kurd and the Assyrian.

I visited various areas, both Government-owned and privately-owned, which it appeared might be suitable for settlement.

*(1) Deshtazi Area.*

This area was already under consideration by Government, one of the proposals to make it suitable for settlement being the building of an irrigation canal of considerable length, and the construction of which entailed many engineering difficulties.

The Government had already approved a sum of 13,000 I.D. to cover the cost of this irrigation scheme, and a detailed survey was being made when I visited the area.

I confess the proposition did not appeal to me, nor did it to those Assyrians whom it was proposed to settle there.

*(2) Champashai Area.*

This land is privately-owned, but the owner is prepared to sell. There is land available for 200 families, in addition to 120 families, mainly Arabs, already settled there. The ground is exceedingly fertile and would produce excellent winter crops, and, being on the banks of the Tigris, could be easily irrigated by pumps or ordinary local methods.

*(3) Qaz Fakhra.*

Government riverain land on the Tigris 8 miles north of Mosul. This is excellent and valuable land and easily worked by local irrigation methods. It would hold forty families.

*(4) Khargooz.*

Government riverain land on the Tigris, 2 miles north of Mosul. This is excellent and valuable land and easily worked by local irrigation methods. It would hold thirty families.

*(5) Aqra Cadha.*

This area lies south and north-west of Aqra town, and is rolling, down-like land, which would yield excellent winter crops and fine grazing for sheep and cattle. Water can be obtained from wells at from 2 to 4 metres depth.

*(6) Villages capable of Development.*

Appendices C and D show lists of villages in various qadhas which are capable of development either by increasing the number of villagers or by reoccupation.

From these appendices it will be seen that a considerable area of land is available for occupation, though in some cases development of a sufficient water supply would be necessary.

*Education.*

The following are the education facilities available for Assyrian children:—

*Mosul Liwa—*

Number of Assyrian primary schools under Government's supervision ...	3
One at Sumail, at Kani Masi, and at Jerahiya.	
Number of Assyrian students attending the above schools ...	341
Number of Assyrian students in Government schools	194
Number of schools run by Mr. Panfil, of the American Mission ...	27
Number of Assyrian students attending Mr. Panfil's schools ...	1,068

*Arbil Liwa—*

Number of Assyrian students attending Government schools ...	27
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*Sulaimaniya Liwa—*

Number of Assyrian students attending Government schools ...	14
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It will be noted that a comparatively small number of children attend Government schools, where they get instruction in Arabic, but not in Syriac.

The complaint of Assyrians that they are not given greater opportunities for employment in Government offices is definitely negated by their general ignorance of Arabic, written or spoken, and their disinclination to qualify themselves for such posts by availing themselves of the facilities provided by the Government in its schools.

*Health.*

The health of persons, both adults and children, in the villages visited was generally good. Malarial infection is common, and in villages, when the malaria is particularly prevalent, magalosplenia is general amongst the children.

The prevalence of malaria is only to be expected, as the Assyrians are ardent rice-growers and cultivate this cereal wherever sufficient water is available. In spite of warnings from the medical authorities, and even of orders by local kaimakams, that rice should not be grown except at a considerable distance from the village, the Assyrians are apparently prepared to suffer the discomforts of chronic malaria and its deleterious effects on their children rather than forgo their rice cultivation.

Quinine is supplied free on demand to mukhtars of villages.

It should be noted that, though the incidence of malaria may be high, it falls on Moslems and Christians alike.

*Medical Facilities.**Mosul Liwa—*

One hospital with following sections in Mosul:—

- (a) Special room for out-patients.
- (b) Special room for venereal disease.
- (c) Isolation hospital.
- (d) Hospital and pharmacy for the prisoners.

Twenty pharmacies distributed through Mosul Liwa, of which one is the travelling pharmacy.



## List of medical staff—

- 1 civil surgeon.
- 7 doctors.
- 4 pharmacists.
- 19 dressers.
- 33 nurses.

## Arbil Liwa.

- 1 hospital.
- 7 pharmacies throughout the Liwa.

## List of medical staff—

- 1 civil surgeon.
- 3 doctors.
- 4 pharmacies.
- 3 dressers.

*Privileges to Assyrians by the Iraq Government.*

The following list of privileges extended to the Assyrians by the Iraq Government may be of interest :—

- (a) A remission of sheep tax and land revenue to settlers amounting to a sum of 52,669 rupees.
- (b) A monthly grant to the Mar Shimun of 21½ I.D.
- (c) A grant of 96,000 rupees for relief of those driven out of Turkey in 1924.
- (d) Remission of rifle tax or reduction of licence fee for private rifles.
- (e) Increased medical facilities.
- (f) Special education grant.

*Settlement.*

It must not be assumed that the Assyrian people in Iraq are, in fact, a homeless and destitute people. They describe themselves as refugees and homeless mainly because they are not living in their old mountain homes across the Turkish border, and from my experience they certainly cannot claim as a people to be destitute. Very many Assyrians have occupied their villages and lived there prosperously and contentedly for thirteen years. Many more have lived and earned their living in cities and towns of Iraq since the days of the Bakubah refugee camp.

More again are normally of a nomadic temperament, and move with their flocks of sheep seasonally through Mosul Liwa.

For settlement purpose I would, therefore, divide the Assyrians into three groups :—

- (a) Townsmen.
- (b) Agriculturalists.
- (c) Pastoralists.

Prolonged residence in Bakubah and Minian refugee camps has gone far towards the conversion of a proportion of a race of mountaineers to a people preferring the comforts and attractions of a town life, and this is especially evident amongst the younger generations of Assyrians.

When these camps were closed many of the older people with some of their families returned to the land either as agriculturalists or pastoralists, others remained in Bagdad or moved to their towns in Iraq.

In dealing with the question of the settlement of the Assyrian people one must consider in the main the agriculturalists and the pastoralists; townsmen are generally unsuitable for land settlement, and from my enquiries I am convinced that few, if any, of these people would be prepared to try the experiment of agriculture or shepherding.

Iraq has been faced with and dealt with the Assyrian settlement problem on four previous occasions. In 1921 some 500 families were settled in Dohuk and Aqra Qadhas.

In 1922 the Upper and Lower Tiari, the Tkhuma, Baz and Jilu were repatriated to their pre-war homes and the problem appeared solved, as, with the return of these refugees to their original homes, sufficient lands were available in Mosul and Arbil Liwas for the remainder.

In the autumn of 1924 as a result of an affray between Tkhuma tribesmen and the Turkish Vali of Julamerl, who was tax collecting, Turkish troops were sent to deal with these tribesmen, and forced a complete evacuation by the Assyrians of their home lands. Some 2,290 families returned to Iraq and the Assyrian settlement problem was in being once more.

These people were then settled temporarily in Dohuk and Shaikhan Qadhas.

In July 1927 a British officer was appointed settlement officer. This officer, though possessed of considerable knowledge of the different Assyrian tribes, and speaking their language fluently, at once met with obstruction from those whom he tried to settle.

Though faced with enormous difficulties, by the end of 1928 he was able to effect a redistribution with the object of grouping settlers as far as possible according to tribes. In carrying out this settlement funds amounting to some £5,500, supplied by the Sir Henry Lunn Fund, were distributed to Assyrians to help them in their settlement.

When the settlement officer retired at the end of 1928 it was estimated that but a few hundred families required final settlement.

During the following years ceaseless attempts were made to complete the settlement and the possibilities of various areas were carefully examined, but obstacles of all kinds were created by the settlers which necessitated the postponement of each scheme for one reason or another.

In 1932 I believe that no more than 350-400 families wishing to settle remained without land, and these were chiefly the pastoral Ashutis of the Lower Tiari.

In 1933 it has fallen to me to complete the settlement; from the beginning I have been faced by a spirit of non-co-operation and suspicion, and the acute nature of the final methods of obstruction are only too well known, and so for the present the problem of Assyrian settlement in Iraq at any rate must be left dormant and unsolved.

*List of the Appendices.*

- List showing number of Assyrian families settled in villages (Appendix A).
- List showing number of Assyrian families by tribes (Appendix B).
- List of villages which can hold additional families (Appendix C).<sup>(1)</sup>
- List of empty villages in Mosul Liwa (Appendix D).<sup>(1)</sup>
- List of Assyrians in Government and other employ (Appendix E).
- Census of Assyrians and their distribution in Iraq (Appendix F).

## Appendix A.

*List showing Number of Assyrian Families settled in Villages.*

Name of Qadha.	Number of Families in Agha Village.	Number of Families in Government Village.	Total Number of Families.	Number of Agha Villages.	Number of Government Villages.	Total Number of Villages.
Amadiyah ..	258	245	503	13	12	25
Aqra ..	..	80	80	..	5	5
Arbil ..	19	..	19	1	..	1
Dohuk ..	706	290	996	32	11	43
Rowanduz ..	363	..	363	10	..	10
Shaikhan ..	253	18	271	19	2	21
Zakho ..	..	2	2	..	1	1
Zaibar ..	42	105	147	3	7	10
Grand total ..	1,641	740	2,381	78	38	116

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



## Appendix B.

*List of Number of Families by Tribes.*

Name of Tribe.	Number of Families in Agha Villages	Number of Families in Government Village.	Total Number of Families.	Number of Agha Villages.	Number of Government Villages.	Total Number of Villages.
Tkhuma ..	167	136	303	7	4	11
Upper Tiari ..	96	141	237	7	7	14
Lower Tiari ..	122	304	426	7	15	22
Baz. ..	223	10	232	15	1	16
Shemzadinan ..	427	48	475	15	2	17
Ashotis ..	..	6	6	..	2	2
Jilu ..	194	15	209	15	1	16
Tiari ..	15	..	15	2	..	2
Arboshi ..	20	..	20	1	..	1
Talis ..	15	..	15	1	..	1
Kafri ..	45	..	45	2	..	2
Dizis ..	35	..	35	1	1	2
Marbeshos ..	..	76	76	..	2	2
Barwari Saiwin ..	84	..	84	3	..	3
Qochanis ..	..	4	4	1	3	4
Different tribes (in Dohuk Town)	200	..	200	1	..	1
	1,641	740	2,381	78	38	116

## Appendix E.

*List of Assyrians in Government and other Employ.*

Number of Assyrians, other than levies, employed by Air Force ..	540
Number of Assyrians employed by the Education Department (teachers) ..	4
Number of Assyrians employed by the American Mission in Iraq (teachers) ..	36
Number of Assyrians employed by the Health Department—	
(a) Doctors ..	3
(b) Pharmacist ..	1
(c) Dressers ..	11
(d) Nurses ..	3
Number of Assyrians employed by the Iraq levies—	
(a) Officers ..	29
(b) Other ranks ..	774
Number of Assyrians employed by the Irrigation Department ..	3
Number of Assyrians employed by the Public Works Department ..	59
Number of Assyrians employed by Veterinary and Agricultural Departments ..	3
Number of Assyrians employed by the Posts and Telegraphs Department ..	4
Number of Assyrians employed by the Iraq Ministry of Defence—	
(a) Officers ..	5
(b) Other ranks ..	68
Number of Assyrians employed by the Iraq Police Department—	
(a) Officers ..	3
(b) Other ranks ..	494

Number of Assyrians employed by the oil companies in Iraq—

(a) I.P.C. ...	81
(b) Rafidain Oil Company ...	6
(c) B.O.D. ...	4

Number of Assyrians employed by the Iraq Railways ... 143  
 Number of Assyrians employed by the Customs and Excise Department ... 13

Grand total ... 2,287

## Appendix F.

*Census of the Assyrians and Manner of their Settlement in Iraq.*I.—*Estimated Strength and Distribution of Assyrians.*

It is impossible to obtain accurate statistics; the estimated strength of the Assyrians in Iraq at the present time is as follows:—

(1) Assyrians whose pre-war homes were in areas now within the Kingdom of Iraq ...	Families. 409
(2) Refugee ex-Ottoman subjects ...	3,500
Total ...	3,909

I.e., 3,909 families at the usual average of five souls to a family ... 19,545

(NOTE.—The Mar Shimun stated in 1929 to his Excellency the High Commissioner that there were then approximately 15,000 Ottoman Assyrian refugees in Russia, and this figure was confirmed about the same time by the Norwegian Legation in Moscow.

Although these Assyrians do not come within the scope of this report, this fact has been quoted as a matter of interest.)

Detailed statistics of Assyrians in Iraq are as follows:—

1. The Assyrians whose pre-war homes were in areas now within the Kingdom of Iraq, and who did not leave their villages during the Great War, are domiciled in the Barwari Bala and the Nerwa Raikan Nahiyahs of the Amadiyah Qadha, the majority of their villages being situated within a few miles of the Iraq-Turkish frontier.

The latest statistics received from the Mosul Liwa authorities show the following distribution:—

Barwari Bala Nahiya ...	305 families in 24 villages.
Nerwa Raikan Nahiya ...	104 " " 7 "
Total ...	409 " " 31 "

2. Refugee ex-Ottoman subjects whose pre-war homes were in areas now situated in Turkish territory.



A rough estimate of ex-Ottoman subjects who are refugees in Iraq appears to be 3,500 families (17,500 souls) comprising the following sections:—

Sections.	No. families.
Upper Tiari ...	400
Lower Tiari ...	1,090
Tkhuma ...	250
Diz ...	80
Jilu ...	350
Baz ...	350
Qudshanis ...	65
Lewin ...	50
Albak ...	40
Serai ...	50
Marbishu ...	225
Gawar ...	30
Nauchiya (Shemzdinan, Girdi, &c.) ...	480
Sat ...	40
Total ...	3,500

(17,500 souls.)

Of these 3,500 families, it is estimated that 2,381 families (11,905 souls) have been allotted land in Iraq, leaving a balance of 1,119 families of ex-Ottoman Assyrian refugees who have not been settled, the following being an approximate of this balance:—

Families of levy soldiers and employees in R.A.F. ...	600
Families of the Assyrians serving in the Iraq army ...	50
Families of Assyrian policemen ...	250
Families of refugees who have obtained employment in towns ...	219
Total ...	1,119

The supporters of these families are mostly in employment at present. It is highly improbable that more than 400 of these families would wish to become either agriculturalists or pastorals. The remainder are townsmen, bred and born.

[E 6282/7/93]

No. 179.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received October 20.)*

(No. 238.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a record of meeting of the Council Committee on the 17th October, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

*Geneva, October 18, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 179.

*Assyrian Question: Record of Meeting of the Council Committee at Noon on October 17.*

M. OLIVAN, Spanish Minister in Stockholm, who was acting for M. de Madariaga, was chosen as chairman of the committee.

He invited observations, and I pointed out that the first task of the committee, in accordance with the *rapporteur's* report, which had been adopted by the Council on the 14th October, was to consider the possibility of the settlement outside Iraq of those Assyrians who wished to leave. I said that I had received an advance copy of a document which the Iraqi delegation had communicated to

the Secretary-General of the League for the information of the committee. I did not wish to make detailed observations on this document, but the first paragraph had particularly struck me, and (as it was found that the document had not yet reached certain members of the committee) I read it out, as follows:—

"The time factor is one of the most important considerations to be borne in mind in giving effect to the Council's decision. The situation in Northern Iraq is naturally still tense; the sooner something concrete can be done, the better both for the Government and the Assyrians. A reasonably good scheme that can be put into operation at once is, therefore, preferable to an otherwise better scheme the ultimate execution of which is doubtful or likely to be delayed."

I said that I entirely agreed with the first part of this paragraph, namely, that the time factor was important, and that it was desirable that the committee should act as quickly as possible. But while emphasising this I felt also that it was unwise to hurry too much. The object to be aimed at was a settlement scheme in the best interests of the Assyrians themselves, and it would be a pity to adopt the first scheme which came to hand because it looked attractive on the surface, only to find afterwards that some better possibility had been overlooked. There was, however, one point on which it seemed possible that immediate progress might be made. The French representative at the Council meeting of the 14th October had indicated the willingness of the French Government to continue discussions with the Iraqi Government for the transfer to Syria of the families of those Assyrians who had remained in Syria after the exodus. The transfer of these families, if it could be arranged, might be a most useful first step. It would show the Assyrians that something concrete was being done and would help to relieve the situation in Iraq and restore confidence.

M. Massigli saw objection to proceeding piecemeal with the subject. It was no use settling one portion of the Assyrians in one place and another portion elsewhere. It seemed to him that the problem should be treated as a whole in all its aspects. The French Government were certainly prepared to discuss the question of the transfer of families, but the Iraqi document to which I had referred, and of which he also had received an advance copy, showed that the Iraqis were now aiming at much more than this and were trying to thrust upon the French several entire tribes of Assyrians. He could not admit that the burden of settling a large part of the Assyrians should thus be thrust upon the French in advance of a consideration of the problem as a whole. He thought that the first step ought to be the preparation of a document by the League Secretariat, showing in effect what the problem was which the committee had to face. For instance, no one knew at present how many Assyrians required settlement. The Iraqi document to which reference had been made mentioned some 19,000 souls. On the other hand, the Mar Shimun spoke of 40,000 to 60,000.

I replied that I was entirely in sympathy with M. Massigli's remarks about the necessity of studying the problem as a whole, and I had certainly not intended to indicate that the question of the transfer of families was the only one to be dealt with at the moment or to suggest that the burden of settlement should be thrown upon the French Government. All I had intended was to draw attention to one aspect of the problem on which it seemed to me that immediate progress could be made, while the consideration of the eventual settlement of the Assyrians as a whole was being proceeded with. I had contemplated, in fact, that the settlement in Syria of those Assyrians now there, together with the transfer of their families from Iraq, would be of a provisional nature only until a decision had been taken regarding the future permanent home of the Assyrians. The Assyrians now in Syria were those who had been most discontented with their lot in Iraq and might be expected to be the first to proceed to their new home when one was found. As regards the ascertainment of the number of the Assyrians to be settled, there was a dilemma. If the Assyrians in Iraq were asked now whether they wished to leave the country or not, most of them would, no doubt, be unable to make up their minds without knowing what their ultimate destination was to be. Nevertheless, it seemed to me that it would be best to assume that most of them would wish to be transferred, and the safest basis on which to work would be to try to find a region large enough, if necessary, to accommodate all those now in Iraq, who, according to Major Thomson's report, numbered some 20,000. The Mar Shimun, when speaking of a much greater number, no doubt had in mind



those Assyrians who were scattered in various parts of the world outside Iraq. There were colonies, I understood, in South Russia, Greece, France and America, and the Mar Shimun would no doubt like to collect all these into a compact group if it were possible. I thought that it would be all to the good if an area could be found for the Assyrians sufficient to allow of this concentration, but the problem immediately before the committee was to settle the 20,000 Assyrians of Iraq. It seemed to me that this was a question which ought, as soon as possible, to be placed in the hands of settlement experts, and I suggested that it would be wise to enlist the services of the Nansen Office, which already had wide experience of such matters.

M. Massigli was somewhat critical of the proposal to employ the Nansen Organisation, which was in process of liquidation, and M. Azcarate also indicated his preference for not transferring the matter to the Nansen Organisation.

I said that I did not think it was necessary to entrust the whole matter to the Nansen Organisation, but it seemed to me that what was wanted was a small committee which would combine the experience of the League Secretariat with that of the Nansen Organisation.

The chairman asked whether I would make a specific proposal. I replied that I thought that a committee of experts might be set up to collect all the information necessary to enable the committee in due course to consider various solutions and to come to a decision. I suggested that the committee might consist of a representative of the League Secretariat, a representative of the Nansen Organisation, and an expert to be nominated by the Iraqi Government to supply the necessary information regarding the Assyrians in Iraq.

M. Massigli still saw difficulties in the way of the direct participation of the Nansen Office in such a committee, and once more expressed his preference for the idea that the League Secretariat, after consulting the Nansen Office, should prepare a document for consideration by the committee containing all the essential facts and information as to possible solutions.

M. Azcarate said that the League Secretariat had already a good deal of information available, and it would be easy for them to consult the Nansen Office, with which they were constantly in touch, without engaging the committee in any way towards that Office. The Secretariat could also no doubt get into touch with the Iraqi delegation, and there would be no great difficulty in preparing the kind of document which M. Massigli had in mind, setting down the facts of the situation and indicating possibilities of a solution so far as existing information permitted.

I then said that in addition to consulting the Nansen Organisation it might be necessary to ask certain individual Governments whether they had at their disposal land for the settlement of the Assyrians.

M. Azcarate said that he did not think that the League Secretariat at this stage could enter into negotiations with individual Governments. I disclaimed any idea of negotiations, and said that what I had in mind was simply an invitation to various Governments to indicate whether, in fact, they were in a position to offer land. I suggested that such an invitation might well be sent out without delay, so that the replies might be available for incorporation in the document which was contemplated. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would, I felt sure, be ready to explore the possibilities in the Colonial Empire without any specific invitation, and possibly the Governments of other members of the committee might act similarly. I felt it necessary to add, however, to avoid misunderstanding, that the difficulties of settlement were obvious, and that I knew at present of no area in the overseas possessions of His Majesty's Government which was suitable and available for Assyrian settlement.

The general feeling of the meeting was, however, that it was difficult to send out any such invitation to Governments, at all events until the problem had been further considered and the requirements were more definitely known. As there was considerable force in this argument, I felt that it was difficult to press the matter further. I said, therefore, that much depended on when the document, which it was contemplated that the League Secretariat should draw up, would be ready. If it was a question of only a few days I was quite willing to accept the proposal which M. Massigli had originated, as the first step. When all available information had been collected by the League Secretariat, we could then consider whether it was necessary to approach certain Governments or not. If, however, the proposed document would take long to draw up, I thought there might be

advantage in approaching various Governments forthwith and including their replies in the report.

M. Azcarate said that he thought a report of the type contemplated could be drawn up in a very short time.

The chairman asked whether it could be prepared in time for a further meeting of the committee, say on the 26th October.

M. Azcarate having indicated that this was possible, the chairman then suggested that the League Secretariat should, after consultation with the Nansen Office, prepare a report for consideration, and that the date for the committee's reassembly to consider the report should be provisionally fixed for the 26th October.

I then reverted to the question of negotiations between the French and Iraqis and enquired whether in M. Massigli's view it would be possible for these to take place without waiting for the presentation of the Secretariat's report and its consideration by the committee. M. Massigli said that he saw no objection to immediate negotiations, and that Nuri Pasha was, in fact, on the point of leaving for Paris to begin them.

The meeting then adjourned until the 26th October.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Geneva, October 18, 1933.

[E 6289/7/93]

No. 180.

*Seventy-seventh Session of the Council, League of Nations.*

*Extract from the Provisional Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, Public, held on October 14, 1933, at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 21.)*

3359. *Protection of Minorities: Situation of the Assyrian Minority in Iraq.*

YASSIN PASHA AL HASHIMI, representative of Iraq, came to the Council table.

M. DE MADARIAGA, *rapporteur*, observed that he would submit his report after the Council had heard the representative of Iraq.

YASSIN PASHA AL HASHIMI, representative of Iraq, pointed out that, on the one hand, a Minority Committee of the Council had decided, on the 31st August, 1933, to bring to the notice of the Council the question dealt with in two petitions telegraphed to the League by the Patriarch of the Assyrians, dated, respectively, the 31st July and the 17th August, 1933. Those complaints had since been expanded into a series of long, written petitions, embodying—

- (a) Complaints against the manner in which the Iraqi Government was conducting Assyrian land settlement; and
- (b) Complaints that the Iraqi Government had violated the guarantees of full protection of life and liberty in respect of the Assyrian minority.

On the other hand, the Iraqi Government, in compliance with a request of the Council, had submitted, in its letters of the 20th September and the 9th October, 1933, full reports on its endeavours to implement the Council resolution of the 15th December, 1932, regarding settlement. In the first of those letters, the Government had reported that, owing to the obstruction of certain elements of the Assyrians, little progress had been made, and it would wish to consider the Assyrian question *de novo*. By a letter dated the 30th September, 1933, the Government had requested that the matter dealt with in the letter of the 20th September, that was to say, the report on the progress of settlement asked for by the Council, should be placed on the agenda.

The questions now requiring consideration were consequently three:—

- (a) Had the Iraqi Government honestly and to the best of its ability endeavoured to implement the Council resolution of the 15th December, 1932?

[9941]



(b) Had any section of the Assyrian minority failed to carry out honestly and to the best of its ability the duties incumbent on persons belonging to minorities to co-operate as loyal fellow-citizens with the nation to which they now belonged—duties emphasised by the Assembly as early as 1922?

(c) Had the Iraqi Government violated any of the minority guarantees?

He would take those questions in order.

Had the Iraqi Government honestly and to the best of its ability endeavoured to implement the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932? The answer could only be "Yes." Even the complaints of the petitioner related, for the most part, to the resolution itself and to the events that had preceded it. The whole of the Assyrian question had been exhaustively examined by the competent organs of the League in 1932. The resolution of the 15th December was the result, and that resolution must obviously constitute the point of departure for any reconsideration of the Assyrian problem. The two reports he had just mentioned, which might conveniently be referred to as the "Blue Book" and "Major Thomson's report," showed clearly what had been done. The promised expert had been engaged with the least possible delay; official and Assyrian advisory committees had been formed, before his arrival, to look for land and to examine the requirements of the Assyrians; the Government had voted considerable sums of money for such irrigation projects as might prove feasible; leading Assyrians had been invited to put forward for consideration any concrete scheme they wished; the expert had made a thorough examination of the whole country. Politically, the Government had left nothing undone to convince the Assyrians of its goodwill.

Had any elements of the Assyrians failed to carry out the duty incumbent upon persons belonging to minorities to co-operate as loyal fellow-citizens with the nation to which they now belonged? The answer, again, must be "Yes." Immediately after the Council decision of the 15th December, 1932, the Patriarch, in a letter to the Mandates Commission, had protested against it. The curt refusals returned to all invitations, whether from the Administration or the settlement expert, to co-operate in the work or even to submit original schemes, were recorded in the Blue Book and Major Thomson's report. The Blue Book also gave instances of specific refusals to admit the obligation of loyalty until "after settlement according to the policy which had been and still was existing amongst the Assyrians." That policy was known to and had been rejected by the Council. The campaign of disobedience under arms, beginning even before the arrival of the settlement expert, and culminating in the armed exodus to Syria and the subsequent attack on the Iraqi military forces, were also there described.

Had the Iraqi Government violated the minority guarantees? He would leave that to the Council to answer after it had heard what he now had to say.

In the first place, the reason why the Assyrians presented a problem was not that they were Christians, while the Iraqi Government was Moslem. He desired to make that point with all the emphasis he could command. There were in Iraq thousands of unarmed Christians not belonging to the Assyrian tribal confederation, as well as some Assyrians whose original homes were in Iraq, who had lived happily for centuries with their neighbours in the very districts which were represented as exposed to savage attack.

Apart from the few hundred autochthonous families, the Assyrians now in Iraq were not an original Iraqi minority. They had come to Iraq as refugees and immigrants. As time had gone on, many of those who were settled on the land had accepted the position and had become loyal citizens of the State. Others would never admit that they were Iraqi nationals owing allegiance to Iraq, but claimed to be homeless refugees; this disloyal element had always constituted a danger. Obedience to their Patriarch (whose office was hereditary) was instinctive in all Assyrians, and the threatened concentration in the summer of 1932 had shown how easily even those living contentedly on the land could be influenced to act against their better judgment.

The Assyrians as a whole constituted a large tribal confederation, more formidable than any of the great tribes in Iraq, by reason of their numbers—over 6,000 fighting men, well armed with modern British rifles, for the most part highly trained in the arts of war by long service in the levy force maintained by the British Government, and led, even after discharge, by their own former

trained Assyrian officers; their martial qualities were constantly vaunted in the publications of their friends. Interesting light was thrown on the attitude of some of the Assyrians by the extraordinary petition of B. S. Nicolas, dated the 18th August, 1933, which had been circulated to the Council, and in which both the British-officered levies and the armed Assyrian tribesmen were indifferently referred to as the "Assyrian army," a "real army," "living an independent life"; indeed, the disloyal elements had always regarded both these bodies as instruments of their political ambitions.

Readers of the Blue Book would not have failed to notice the strain of grave anxiety that had run through the whole correspondence after the decision of the League had been given. The Iraqi Government had done its utmost to reassure the Assyrians and to prepare for the task of final settlement. In the face of obstruction, and even armed defiance, it had acted with a patience and moderation which were criticised by many as weakness. As the situation had grown worse, the terrible possibilities, once a shot had been fired, had been realised by all the responsible authorities. For two and a half months the Government had steered dead slow through a dangerous mine-field, and on the 1st August it seemed to have emerged into clear water. About 1,000 armed men had assembled and crossed into Syria without incident. The majority, the most reckless nucleus, of the gathering had been disarmed by the French mandatory authorities, in due fulfilment, as it seemed, of their treaty obligations. The reduced numbers who retained their arms were no longer formidable; the risk of bloodshed seemed to be past. The men of the exodus were to be readmitted to Iraq after negotiation with the French authorities, the only condition being that they should surrender their arms. The Government's feelings of profound relief were reflected in the announcement it had made on the 1st August that the danger was over. He would not have wished at that meeting to strike a discordant note, but in justice to his country, of which so many hard things had been and were being said, he felt obliged to remind the Council that the explosion need never have occurred had it not been for the unfortunate affair of the rearming of Yaku's followers, which made possible the attack of the 4th to 5th August.

Had the surprise attack on Dairabun camp succeeded, as it well might have done, the consequences would certainly have been appalling. Yaku's Assyrians would have been joined by the remainder of their comrades and would have marched—a force of 6,000 rifles—to carve out the independent enclave of their dreams, as indeed they had planned to do before; the restraining authority of the Government would have ceased to exist; bitter racial and religious fighting might have spread to the whole of Northern Iraq. The members of the Council would, he felt sure, agree that that was a picture very different from the one usually associated with the term "minority."

After the Dairabun action, which had lasted for a night and a day, Yaku's force had broken up into a number of parties. It had been reported that approximately 1,000 had broken through the army cordon and were moving eastward to join the numerous small bands of belated Assyrians who were known to have set out to join Yaku. There had, therefore, been every reason to fear that an extremely serious situation was certain to develop if the rebels succeeded in concentrating in the area between Dohuk and Amadiya.

The recent history of few countries could be innocent of cases in which military officers, even those conscious of great reserves of strength, had in the face of a sudden crisis taken action subsequently adjudged to have been unjustifiably drastic. The enquiries made by the Iraqi Government now showed that in the heat of the action—when smarting with indignation at the simulated surrender at Faishkhabur, when the first casualties were inflicted on them, and at reports, partially at any rate authenticated, of the burning and mutilation of their comrades—and in the subsequent pursuit, certain elements of the army had behaved with unjustifiable severity. Between the 8th and 12th August some parties of tribesmen had taken advantage of the temporary dislocation of the administrative machine to loot a number of villages abandoned by their inhabitants. Innocent persons had inevitably suffered.

The Iraqi Government did not wish to conceal that excesses had been committed; it deplored them no less sincerely than the Governments represented on the Council. All the available police forces had been concentrated on the task of restoring order. A beginning had been made without delay, as the Council had already been informed, to do the best to make amends to the sufferers and to



care for the dependants, even of the guilty. The Iraqi Government was determined to leave nothing undone to ensure that there should be no repetition of those unfortunate events.

The excesses committed by certain Assyrian tribes against the Kurds in 1919, when an attempt to repatriate them had degenerated into a looting and raping expedition, the riots in Mosul town in 1923, and the incidents in Kirkuk in May 1924, when two companies of the Assyrian levy had run amok and killed fifty of the townspeople, including women and children, had left bitter memories. The unconstitutional ambitions of the disloyal leaders had already alarmed the politically-minded classes. Those leaders, for their part, had never concealed their antipathy for what they called an Arab Moslem Government, and had never ceased to endeavour to sow distrust in the minds of the Assyrians generally. The settling of the Assyrians on the land under such conditions had always been a matter of great difficulty. The Government claimed that it had done everything in its power to bring it about, but its efforts had been of no avail. The tragic events of last August had created a situation which appeared to be beyond local remedy; that was a fact that must be faced. The mutual trust which the Government had tried so hard to create did not exist. If the disloyal Assyrians remained in Iraq, the Government would be compelled to retain a large force in the north to preserve law and order. The Assyrians, affected by recent events, for their part would not be able to live at peace with their neighbours after what had happened. There would be a feeling of insecurity which was likely to spread to other minorities, and incidents, engendered by misunderstanding and lack of mutual confidence, would almost inevitably occur. This state of affairs would be a source of continual anxiety, both to the Iraqi Government and to the League.

The Iraqi Government felt it must now fall back on the second alternative contemplated by the Council itself in its resolution. It had come to that conclusion with a sense of profound disappointment. Most of the Assyrians, by reason of their industry and agricultural skill, might well, differently advised and led, have formed a most useful and valuable element in the population of Northern Iraq. Their tragic exile from their homes in the mountains, the malevolent fate which seemed to have dogged all attempts to resettle them in or near those homelands, had won them widespread sympathy. In the interests of all concerned, the happiness of the Assyrians themselves and the reputation of Iraq, it was essential to find a new home elsewhere for the Assyrian immigrants who wished to leave or were unwilling to settle peaceably and to be incorporated finally into the Iraqi State, a home where they could make a fresh start. The Iraqi Government was prepared to make its contribution, as generous a contribution as its resources permitted, to help them on their way. There was one thing it could not do, and that was to find land. That could only be done by the League of Nations, and to it his Government appealed.

M. DE MADARIAGA presented the following report: (1) He pointed out that the proposed committee (p. 4) would consist of five members plus the *rapporteur*.

SIR JOHN SIMON said that only a short time ago, in December 1932, the Council had given careful consideration to the problem of the Assyrians in Iraq, and had adopted a resolution approving of proposals put forward by the Iraqi Government for their settlement. It was a source of deep disappointment that within so short a time events had occurred which had made it necessary for the question to appear once more on the agenda.

The question as it now presented itself was evidently, from the documents before the Council, of an extremely complex character and in some of its details might give rise to much controversial discussion. Everyone would feel grateful to the *rapporteur* for the able manner in which he had presented its essential aspects.

It was not disputed that in the course of events which had occurred last August in the north of Iraq, some sections of the Assyrian population had been treated in a manner which merited the severest condemnation. The Iraqi representative had admitted as much at that table in the presence of all; he had deplored the commission of excesses. It was true that the documents before the Council indicated that prior to those events, an important element of the

(1) Eastern (Iraq), October 17, 1933, Section 1.

Assyrians had taken up a most improper attitude towards the Iraqi Government and had acted in a manner which also deserved censure. At the same time, those facts could not possibly be regarded as justifying the excesses which had been committed.

The apportionment of blame, however, was a somewhat barren proceeding. The main duty of the Council was to devote itself to the future rather than to the past, in an endeavour to seek a lasting and honourable settlement of a problem which, as the *rapporteur* had pointed out, possessed very exceptional features. He therefore welcomed the broad view which the *rapporteur* had taken and the suggestions which he had made for arriving at a constructive solution. The Council, in its resolution of December last, had decided, after the fullest consideration, upon the best arrangements that could be made for the Assyrians in Iraq. It now appeared from the documents that a considerable number of Assyrians did not desire to remain in Iraq under those arrangements. He accordingly warmly supported the proposal that the Council should set up a committee of five or six of its members, whose first task would be to consider and, if possible, to execute a detailed plan for the settlement outside Iraq of such Assyrians as wished to leave the country. The Iraqi Government, as the Council had just learnt from its representative, supported that proposal and recognised that a generous contribution from Iraqi resources should be made to that end. He was confident that if satisfactory measures could be devised to carry out such a plan of resettlement, the Council would have found a happy and, he trusted, an enduring solution for one of the most perplexing difficulties with which it had ever been confronted.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR wished to associate himself explicitly with the *rapporteur's* conclusions and with the very generous observations in his report.

In consequence of the mandate entrusted to her, France had the administration of territories bordering upon Iraq, and had received the direct impact of the painful events that had led to the present discussion—events which illustrated the difficulties that the complexity of races and religions in those regions involved both for the peoples themselves and for those who held a mandate to watch over them. He would follow the advice of the representative of the United Kingdom, and would not dwell upon the past, but would consider only the future.

He warmly congratulated the *rapporteur*, M. de Madariaga, on having dealt with the problem in all its aspects, and on not having hesitated to contemplate, for such Assyro-Chaldeans as might not wish to remain in Iraq, solutions which were the outcome and the confirmation of a tradition that did great honour to the League. The League had already done splendid work for refugees, and would yet have to do more. M. de Madariaga had been perfectly right to treat those distant regions from the same standpoint.

As for France, as he (M. Paul-Boncour) had just said, she had already, owing to proximity, received the direct impact of those events, and had had temporarily to receive some hundreds of Assyro-Chaldeans in Syrian territory. She was prepared to continue, within the scope of the general settlement that was to be reached under the auspices of the League, the conversations that had been entered into by the Iraqi Government with a view to the conveyance of the families of those refugees to Syria and the financial settlement that that would involve. At the same time to avoid raising too high hopes which could not be realised, he wished to say that Syria's absorptive capacity was governed by circumstances both geographical, financial, and political, which the French Government, with its responsibility towards the mandated territories, was bound to bear in mind.

He was, therefore, happy to find in M. de Madariaga's report the idea that the Committee of the Council, which would have to study the possibilities of settling such Assyro-Chaldeans as might wish to leave Iraq, should not necessarily limit its enquiries to the regions adjacent to Iraq; for the wider the geographical scope of its enquiries, the greater would be the chance of finding a satisfactory solution, especially in the case of a people that had scattered colonies over both continents.

The Iraqi Government's announcement—which the Council must highly appreciate—that it was willing of its own accord to assist, financially and in any other way, the departure of those who, for reasons of which they were the best judges, did not seem to look upon themselves as finally incorporated in Iraq, did



great honour to that Government, and would undoubtedly make the League's task much easier. He was, therefore, confident that the League would use its best endeavours to find a solution on the lines of the conclusions of the report. France, for her part, would give every assistance in her power.

M. CASTILLO NAJERA said he had had the honour to be chairman of the committee that had considered the affair under discussion; the other members, the representatives of the Irish Free State and Norway, were no longer members of the Council. He was delighted by the outcome of the affair, and associated himself with the congratulations offered to M. de Madariaga.

The committee, when it met in Paris on the 31st August, had had before it not only Mar Shimun's petition, but also documents of other kinds received from private sources (press cuttings, &c.), which, far from contributing any new light, had only increased the confusion and made it very difficult to assess the blame.

The events of August had aroused wide interest throughout the world. After the Paris meeting, which had been given publicity everywhere, he had received numerous letters, press cuttings, and requests for interviews. He would hold those documents at the disposal of the committee to be appointed, and they might be of use in finding a solution that would prevent any repetition of such occurrences. He was sure that, with the help of the contribution offered by the representative of Iraq and the goodwill of the Powers whose representatives had just spoken, a solution would be found for this highly complicated problem.

(The conclusions of the report were adopted.)

M. DE MADARIAGA desired, since the report had been adopted, to make a proposal as to the five members of the Council who might be associated with the *rapporteur* to form the committee referred to in the conclusions of the report. He suggested that they should be the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Denmark and Mexico.

(The *rapporteur's* proposal was adopted.)

[E 6467/7/93]

No. 181.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

### *Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.*

*Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat for the Members of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 27, 1933.)*

ACCORDING to the report of Major Thomson, the expert appointed by the Government of Iraq for the settlement of the Assyrians (document C.577.1933.VI), the Assyrian population in Iraq numbers about 19,545. The report gives details of the number already settled, the number awaiting settlement, the number living in towns, &c.

In addition, the Iraqi Government, by letter dated the 16th October, 1933, has sent a note for the members of the committee, which has been circulated to them,<sup>(1)</sup> giving estimates of the classes and the number of the Assyrian population who are desirous of emigrating. It appears from this note that it is improbable that the autochthonous Assyrian population, numbering 2,045 persons, would wish to leave the country. According to these figures, therefore, there remain 17,500 persons whose intentions with regard to settlement outside Iraq have to be ascertained.

<sup>(1)</sup> C. Min. Ass./1.1933.

The Secretariat feels bound, however, to point out to the committee that these figures differ greatly from those obtained from other than Iraqi sources. Most of the Assyrian petitions that have been submitted to the Mandates Commission estimate the Assyrian population in Iraq at 30,000 (as in Captain Rassam's petitions of the 23rd September, 1930), or even more. Mar Shimun himself, in conversation with members of the Permanent Mandates Commission and members of the Secretariat, has always maintained that the true figure was 35,000. This is also the estimate which the chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission gave the Council at its December session as the minimum figure for the Assyrian population in question.

2. The past activities of the League offer little or no useful precedent to the committee for its work in connexion with the transfer of the Assyrian population out of Iraq. The problems that confronted the Græco-Bulgarian and Græco-Turkish Emigration Commissions were fundamentally different. One of the problems which the Græco-Bulgarian Commission had to consider will also, however, face the committee when it comes to deal with the question of transfers; namely, how to ensure that the Assyrian population shall give a plain and genuine declaration as to whether they wish to emigrate, how to control the conditions in which their self-determination on the subject of emigration is exercised, how to avert such incidents as might degenerate into conflicts, and so on.

One special problem arose when the exchange of Turkish and Greek population was effected, and the way in which it was settled may be of some interest to the committee. The execution of the exchange was limited by a clause for the benefit of the Moslem population of Albanian origin in Greece. In order to ensure that the exchange should not affect persons who were intended to be exempt from it, and who remained under the protection of the League, guaranteed to them by the Greek Minority Treaty, the Council, on the 11th December, 1924, passed a resolution requesting the neutral members of the commission to act, with the consent of the two Governments, as the mandatories of the Council for the protection of this Moslem population of Albanian origin in Greece. In pursuance of that resolution, the mandatories periodically reported to the Council on the accomplishment of the task entrusted to them.

3. The Secretariat has communicated with the secretary-general of the Nansen Office for Refugees, Mr. Johnson, in order to ascertain what schemes the office might have prepared for the settlement of the refugees. Appended hereto is a scheme drawn up by the Nansen Office jointly with the "Paraná" Colonisation Company, affecting an area in Southern Brazil, which would be specially suitable for mass colonisation and would offer favourable conditions, not only climatic, but also economic, administrative, &c. Mr. Johnson informs the Secretariat that the company could arrange for the settlement of 20,000 people within about nine or ten months.

As to Mar Shimun's suggestion that the Assyrian emigrants might be received in Canada, Mr. Johnson regards it as impracticable, even for a small number of people, on account of the very strict Canadian immigration laws.

The idea of a settlement in the United States, which was advanced in certain philanthropic and ecclesiastical circles, cannot, in Mr. Johnson's opinion, be seriously considered.

Lastly, the Minister of Ecuador in Switzerland, M. Zaldumbide, has informed the *rapporteur*, M. de Madariaga, and M. de Azcarate, that his Government would consider with real interest the possibility of receiving at least part of the Assyrian population in Ecuador. As many as 10,000 people could be received, provided they were not all settled at once. The area under consideration is stated to consist of forests, pasture and arable land. It is situated in mountainous regions, at an altitude of about 5,000 feet, the climate being relatively temperate. The Minister of Ecuador added that he would be happy to discuss the details of his proposal with the committee as soon as possible, if the committee so desired, as the Ecuadorean Government would have to obtain powers from Parliament, before the dissolution of the latter, to enter upon definite negotiations.

Geneva, October 24, 1933.



Enclosure in No. 181.

## PROJET REVISÉ.

Office international Nansen pour les Réfugiés sous l'autorité de la Société des Nations.

(Confidentiel.)

## Établissement de Réfugiés au Brésil.

AFIN de pouvoir parer dans une certaine mesure à l'augmentation du chômage parmi les réfugiés par suite de la crise économique prolongée, l'Office s'est efforcé d'examiner avec la plus grande attention toutes les possibilités d'établissement de réfugiés en Amérique du Sud.

Parmi ces possibilités, des propositions qui lui ont été soumises de Parana lui paraissent en tous points dignes d'intérêt, ainsi que l'ont confirmé les rapports que l'Office a fait établir à leur sujet par un expert impartial.

La compagnie en question, au capital de £1,700,000, possède entièrement le capital de trois compagnies brésiliennes qui disposent d'environ 3,056,000 acres et de la ligne de chemin de fer d'Ourinhos à Jatahy par Cornelio Procopio, dont la longueur est d'environ 184 kilom.

## Situation.

Les terres envisagées sont situées au nord de l'Etat de Parana, entre les fleuves Tibagy, Paranapanema et Yvaby, dans le district de Jatahy. Une ligne de chemin de fer mène directement de São Paulo à Jatahy d'où le siège de la compagnie, Londrina, qui est situé à 20 kilom., peut être atteint facilement à l'aide d'un service d'automobiles. Une ligne de chemin de fer est du reste déjà en construction, de Jatahy à Londrina.

Cette région est couverte de forêts vierges dont la terre rouge est très fertile et pourra pendant de nombreuses années se passer de tout engrais. L'eau est abondante; rivières et ruisseaux sillonnent le pays; de nombreuses sources jaillissent spontanément et d'autres doivent être captées à une assez grande profondeur. L'altitude varie entre 350 et 750 mètres. La température atteint au maximum 38/9 degrés centigrades et au minimum 1 degré au-dessous de zéro. Cette dernière température est cependant exceptionnelle. Le climat est sain et libre de malaria. L'hôpital que la compagnie a installé comprend une salle d'opérations, de sorte que tous les cas graves peuvent être traités immédiatement. Une école comptant quarante élèves est installée à Heimtal; une seconde sera fondée sous peu à Londrina.

## Culture.

Ce terrain très fertile permet de planter une quantité de produits; parmi ceux-ci figurent le café, le tabac, le maïs, les haricots, le riz, le manioc, la pomme de terre et les fruits. Le maïs permet l'élevage des porcs qui donne un résultat rémunérateur.

## Écoulement des produits.

Le développement de cette colonie est si rapide que les colons pourront, si le mouvement continue, vendre sur place une grande partie de leur production pour nourrir les nouveaux arrivants, les ouvriers travaillant aux routes, aux voies ferrées, &c. En outre, la compagnie de chemins de fer, dont il est question plus haut, a déjà baissé ses tarifs à plusieurs reprises, de sorte que l'exportation sur les grands centres ne rencontre plus de difficultés à l'heure actuelle, d'autant plus que la ligne reliant Jatahy à Londrina est en construction.

Il ne s'agit pas, à proprement parler, d'une compagnie de colonisation. Elle a acheté et vend des terres dans une région où elle construit une ligne de chemin de fer; elle a donc tout intérêt à ce que cette région se peuple et devienne prospère le plus vite possible.

## Possibilités d'emploi.

La compagnie emploie de préférence les colons établis sur ses terres pour tous les travaux, tels que construction de routes, voies de chemin de fer et autres, qu'elle peut avoir à exécuter.

## Coût de l'Établissement.

## (1) Achat du Terrain.

Le prix moyen de la terre actuellement vendue par cette compagnie est d'environ 500 milreis par alqueire (1 alqueire = 2.42 hectares).

Pour l'immigration d'un nombre important de familles d'agriculteurs capables, la compagnie admettrait les conditions suivantes par famille, sur la base de 5 alqueires = 12.1 hectares :

Payables en Europe	£10
Payable au Brésil—	Milreis.
à la fin de la deuxième année	500
à la fin de la troisième année	500
à la fin de la quatrième année	500

A ces dernières sommes payables au Brésil, il y a lieu d'ajouter 8 pour cent d'intérêt par an, c'est-à-dire au total 360 milreis.

En résumé, la somme à verser se monte à :

Premier paiement	£10
Palements échelonnés avec intérêts 1,860 milreis	£31

## (2) Coût de l'Installation.

	Milreis.
Défrichement d'un demi alqueire	150
Plants et semences	50
Petite maisonnette en bois	350
Entretien d'une famille de quatre personnes adultes pendant neuf mois à raison de 200 milreis par mois	1,800
Instruments de travail	100
Porcs, chèvres, volailles, &c.	200
Soit au total	2,650

De ces calculs, il résulte que les dépenses initiales pour l'établissement au Brésil se montent à :

£10 pour le premier acompte sur l'achat des terres, et 2,650 milreis pour l'installation, le défrichement et la construction d'une maison, soit au total, à environ £54 au cours de 60 milreis par £.

A cette somme, il y a lieu d'ajouter le prix de passage réduit que la Conférence des Compagnies de Navigation a bien voulu accorder à l'office pour les voyages des réfugiés de tout port européen à tout port sud-américain, et qui est de £17.

Le Gouvernement brésilien se charge du transport gratuit des nouveaux arrivants du port de débarquement jusqu'à Ourinhos. De cette ville à Jatahy et de Jatahy au lieu d'établissement, le transport est effectué gratuitement par la compagnie. D'autre part, la société en question met à la disposition des colons des logements jusqu'au moment où leurs propres maisonnettes sont construites.

Comme il a été dit plus haut, ces propositions ont été examinées très soigneusement. Les experts qui ont eu l'occasion de se rendre sur place se sont prononcés non seulement sur la qualité des terres et la possibilité de leur exploitation, mais ont encore souligné que la direction de cette compagnie ne cesse de prodiguer ses conseils aux colons, ce qui facilite dans une grande mesure leur tâche, tout particulièrement durant la première année de leur séjour au Brésil.

Cette offre est subordonnée au cours des changes et du marché des terres et la compagnie se réserve par conséquent le droit de la modifier.



[E 6507/105/93]

No. 182.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 28.)*

(No. 435.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, October 28, 1933.*

It is likely that the Cabinet will shortly resign on the question of their ability to meet Parliament. Opinion is divided on this point, and the King is personally not in favour of dissolution. If the Cabinet resigns it is likely that the King will offer premiership to Yasin Pasha if he undertakes to form Government without asking that Parliament should be dissolved. King and the Prime Minister consult me frequently, and I am advising against drastic changes in the Cabinet just now to avoid popular excitement and stirring up of extreme nationalist feelings at the time when continuity in a calm atmosphere is clearly to be desired.

[E 6514/105/93]

No. 183.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 30.)*

(No. 437.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, October 29, 1933.*

MY telegram No. 435.

Cabinet has resigned and Yasin Pasha has refused to form a new Government on the King's conditions. I suggested to the King to-day that difficulty might be got over by asking the present Cabinet to carry on for ten days or a fortnight on the ground that his inexperience did not enable him to deal with the situation more promptly. In the meantime, Parliament would reassemble 1st November and could be dissolved immediately if it showed hostility to the policy of present Cabinet, which is the policy of the late King. Differences might then be settled by reshuffle of two or three seats.

I have warned the King against the danger of entrusting Government to men of extreme Nationalist and pan-Arab views. I have emphasised that Iraq needs a policy of peaceful progress internally and cordial relations with her ally and neighbouring States. The King said that he would take my advice.

[E 6580/7/93]

No. 184.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 667.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, October 19, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 625 of the 4th October and to previous correspondence regarding incidents between Kurds and Assyrians in the Amadia district, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a report from the Administrative Inspector at Mosul on the murder of three Assyrians by Kurds from Turkish territory.

2. I understand that the "Karamusiyyin" are a small tribal division affiliated to the Tkhuma, whose reputation for wildness they fully share. The particular incident in question is the logical consequence of a blood feud, which appears to have been begun by the Assyrians themselves, but I am bringing it to your notice as it is possible that attempts will be made to involve the responsibility of the Iraqi authorities.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 184.

*Memorandum from the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to the Ministry of Interior, Bagdad.*

(Secret.)

*Mosul, October 14, 1933.*

REFERENCE my telegram of the 10th October, 1933.

I forward herewith copy of a letter from Kaïmakam Amadiyah of the 8th October, 1933.

I am informed that the kaïmakam has returned to the Qaramus the forty rifles which he had taken from them last month.

R. S. STAFFORD,

*Administrative Inspector,**Mosul and Arbil Liwas.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 184.

*Translation of Kaïmakam Amadiyah's Letter of October 8, 1933, to the Mutessarif, Mosul.*

ON the 29th October, 1933, three men of the Karamusiyyin tribe were killed in the fields of Chailki Village. From enquiries made by the police it appeared that the murderers are Na'mo, Tayar (the brother of Meho-al-Majuli, the well-known band leader, who has recently been killed by the Karamusiyyin and Ashutis, while directing an attack against them), and five others, all residents of Jaman Village, in Turkey. The reason for the murder is due to the existence of enmity and feud between the two tribes on account of the abduction of a woman previously, and the death of Meho. A large number of Zakho inhabitants, while returning to their houses, have seen the band under reference. Further, Tayar has sent information to the relatives of the deceased regarding the matter, telling them that he has avenged himself. I shall communicate with the frontier authorities, and ask for the extradition of the murderers on completion of investigation. Please communicate with Hakkari and Van Vilayets, and ask them to arrest the murderers and to prevent the repetition of such acts.

[E 6581/7/93]

No. 185.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 669.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, October 19, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 422 of the 12th October, His Majesty's consul at Mosul reports that the number of Assyrians (other than those in the Rest Camp) at present in Mosul is believed to be considerably in excess of previous estimates. There are, he says, about 600 families (2,000 persons), of whom some 400 families were more or less permanently resident. The rest are refugees from the country districts. A large percentage of the men are unemployed and although many are living on savings or being supported by private charity, it is possible that there will be much distress during the coming winter. The administrative inspector has informed the Iraqi authorities, and something will have to be done to induce those who have come in from the country to return to their lands.

2. Mr. Monypenny further reports that about 200 Assyrian women and children recently visited the consulate to seek assistance. They pleaded poverty and declared that it was not safe for them to return to their quarters. They were, however, persuaded to return and the local authorities informed. Mr. Monypenny gathers that the main purpose of their visit was to press for their removal from Iraq preferably to Cyprus.

2. His Majesty's consul adds that when Major Thomson requested the Assyrian leaders to furnish a list of those men who desired to leave Iraq, the latter declined to do so on the ground that this information might be used by the Iraqi authorities to bring pressure on to them to return to their villages.



4. I observe that the *Daily Herald* of the 9th October publishes an interview with the Mar Shimun in Geneva, in which the Patriarch is reported to have stated that the atrocities still continue. Apart from the murder of three Assyrians by Kurds from across the Turkish border, reported in my despatch No. 667 of the 19th October, I know of no such case and I will not fail to report any incident if properly authenticated.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 6552/7/93]

No. 186.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 240.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the Second Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, on the 26th October, 1933, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*United Kingdom Delegation,  
Geneva, October 29, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 186.

*Record of Second Meeting of the Assyrian Committee on October 26, 1933.*

THE committee had before it:—

- (1) The memorandum (C/Min.Ass./2.1933) prepared by the Secretariat on the settlement of the Assyrians in Iraq;
- (2) Document C/Min.Ass./4.1933.I, containing (a) a letter from the Mar Shimun of the 24th October making certain suggestions for the committee's work, and (b) a further letter from the Mar Shimun dated the 25th October enumerating certain possibilities of settlement; and
- (3) a letter from Professor Keller (C/Min.Ass./3.1933).

The Chairman of the committee (the Spanish representative) observed that (2) (a) above seemed to be concerned less with practical suggestions for settlement than with past events and expressed the view that it was outside the competence of the committee to go into most of the Mar Shimun's points. Points 9, 11 and 12 might, however, be borne in mind when detailed treatment of the problem was undertaken, but he thought that the remainder of the Mar Shimun's communication should be ignored. The Italian and French delegates agreed that the committee should not take official cognisance of the Mar Shimun's letter. The United Kingdom delegate also agreed, pointing out that much of the Mar Shimun's letter covered points which had already been dealt with by the Council and that the vague and unsubstantiated allegations of further incidents related to the period ended the 28th September, i.e., only four days after the date of the last petition from the Mar Shimun which had been before the Council. The Danish representative did not think that the committee could leave out of account past events and those taking place at present since they might affect the numbers to be settled. The chairman replied that if new facts arose they would perhaps have to be examined, but so far as the present committee was concerned they must remember that the Council had deliberately decided not to enter into an enquiry into the past.

M. Azcarate pointed out that the Iraqis themselves might quite possibly be not only willing but anxious to give explanations in reply to the Mar Shimun's statements. The present committee was not bound by the ordinary rules governing a Minorities Committee of Three, but had been specially appointed by the Council for a given purpose and was entitled, in his view, to hear anything bearing materially on the problem it had to consider.

The United Kingdom Representative asked whether the Mar Shimun's letter should be considered as a petition and therefore as falling for treatment by a normal Committee of Three and not by the present committee.

M. Azcarate replied that he thought that it bore to such an extent on the work of the present committee that it ought not to be subjected to the usual minorities procedure.

The United Kingdom Delegate suggested that the committee should take no official cognisance of the letter unless the Iraqi Government made observations on it which made it necessary to consider afresh what procedure ought to be adopted regarding it.

The Chairman said he would take it that for the moment at least the committee did not wish to examine the letter.

The chairman then pointed out that the committee would require the collaboration of the Iraqi Government and proposed that the Iraqi representative should be invited to assist at the committee.

The United Kingdom Delegate agreed with this suggestion, and pointed out that the sooner he could be brought into the work of the committee the more willing would his collaboration be. Moreover, Nuri Pasha, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, was already in Geneva and had been waiting at the disposal of the committee.

It was therefore decided to invite Nuri Pasha to be present at the following meeting of the committee.

The Chairman, observing that the Mar Shimun had, in his letter of the 25th October, mentioned the possibility of settlement in Syria, then asked the French delegate whether he could give details regarding the negotiations with Nuri Pasha in respect of the families of Assyrians already in Syria.

The French Delegate explained that no decision had yet been arrived at, since it was the view of the French Government that the settlement of Assyrians, whose transfer to Syria had been proposed by Nuri Pasha, could only be effected as part of a general plan of settlement. The French Government would not wish to keep in Syria any Assyrians who wished to go to Brazil or such other place as might eventually be decided upon for their transfer.

The Chairman mentioned the Ecuadorean Minister's indication of interest in the problem before the committee and proposed that the committee should ask the Ecuadorean Government to submit details.

M. Azcarate, however, thought it more prudent not to encourage the idea that the committee was anxious to arrange for settlement in Ecuador, where the prospects were not nearly so promising as in Brazil. He suggested therefore that the Ecuadoreans should simply be informed that if they desired to put forward a detailed plan the committee would be prepared to consider it, thus leaving to them the initiative of putting forward proposals if they thought fit. This was agreed to.

The Chairman then raised the question of calling in a member of the Nansen Refugee Office or other person qualified to speak as an expert on refugee matters.

The United Kingdom Delegate said that he would like to see the technical aspects of the question eventually put into the hands of the Nansen Office, working, of course, in close touch with the League Secretariat. The committee had (1) to find out whether the Brazilian Government were willing to agree to the scheme for settlement in Brazil; and (2) if this agreement were secured to work out the details of settlement. He suggested that the second of these tasks fell within the scope of the Nansen Office.

The Chairman, however, said that for the moment he had only envisaged bringing in one or two experts to take part in the work of the committee.

M. Azcarate agreed that there were two aspects of the question: (1) The committee had to decide whether to examine seriously settlement in Brazil; (2) for the technical side of the problem he saw great advantage in bringing in the Nansen Office, which was, as a matter of fact, the author of the Brazilian



scheme. The committee might begin by inviting M. Werner and Major Johnson, president and secretary-general respectively, of the Nansen Office, to assist at the committee's meetings. Later, the committee could consider the manner in which the details of the scheme could be worked out.

The French Delegate thought it might be embarrassing to enter into any arrangement with Brazil until the question of finance had been to some extent settled.

The United Kingdom Delegate, however, suggested that before this question could be usefully examined, it would be necessary for experts to work out a detailed plan with an estimate of costs, showing what proportion of the capital outlay would be recoverable, and how far therefore the financing could be in the nature of a loan. As regards the Brazilian Government, it seemed only necessary at present to secure their agreement in principle.

The Chairman then enquired whether the committee would agree to invite (1) the president and the secretary-general of the Nansen Office, (2) an Iraqi representative, and (3) a Brazilian representative to be present.

M. Azcarate doubted the advisability of having a Brazilian representative present which might give the impression that the question was more advanced than was in fact the case. He thought the approach to the Brazilian Government at this stage should be quite general.

The United Kingdom Delegate entirely agreed. He raised the question, however, whether it would be ultimately for the committee itself to negotiate with the Brazilians and other interested parties. He had supposed that this task would be entrusted to the secretariat and the Nansen Office in collaboration.

To this the Chairman replied that in his opinion the committee could not well separate without having achieved something concrete.

The United Kingdom Delegate agreed, but suggested that it was the committee's task to decide on the principles and general lines to be worked out by settlement experts, but not necessarily to go into all the details.

The Chairman, however, considered that not many questions of principle arose which did not in fact amount to problems of detail.

To an enquiry by the French Delegate whether the Brazilian Government had been sounded in any way, M. Azcarate replied that the Brazilian Government certainly knew of the Paraná Company's scheme for colonising the land which that company had acquired, but it was not known whether they would consent to its application to the Assyrian case.

The committee then decided (1) to invite M. Werner, Major Johnson and Nuri Pasha to assist at the meeting of the committee on the following day; (2) to empower the Secretary-General to ascertain through the most appropriate channel whether the Brazilian Government would consent in principle to the settlement of the Assyrians in Brazil; and (3) to empower the Secretary-General to indicate to the Ecuadorean Minister at Berne that the committee would be prepared to consider any detailed plan which his Government might wish to put forward.

I have, &c.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Geneva, October 27, 1933.

[E 6554/7/93]

No. 187.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received October 31.)  
(No. 243.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the third meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council on the 27th October, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

Geneva, October 29, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 187.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Third Meeting of the Council Committee held at 11 A.M. on  
October 27, 1933.

IN addition to the members of the committee, Nuri Pasha, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the president and secretary-general of the Nansen Office, M. Werner and Major Johnson, were present.

The President, after welcoming Nuri Pasha and the representatives of the Nansen Office, invited M. Azcarate to explain the steps he had taken on the previous day with the Brazilian Minister in Berne.

M. Azcarate said that, in accordance with the committee's decision of the previous day, he had at once seen the Brazilian Minister at Berne, who had promised to telegraph immediately to his Government to enquire whether they would consent in principle to the application to the Assyrians of Iraq of the scheme for the settlement of refugees in Brazil drawn up by the Nansen Office in co-operation with Paraná Plantations (Limited). M. Azcarate had explained that the Assyrians were for the most part an agricultural and pastoral people, and the Brazilian Minister had said that, although he could in no way commit his Government, this information led him to hope for a favourable reply. In response to a question by M. Azcarate, the Brazilian Minister had indicated that he saw no objection, pending the reply from the Brazilian Government, to the committee proceeding provisionally with examination of the technical aspects of the project for settlement in Brazil.

The President then asked the representative of the Nansen Office to explain the Brazilian scheme in detail, and, at the request of M. Werner, Major Johnson made a statement.

He said that the project had first been studied for the settlement of Russian refugees. A favourable report on the Brazilian companies concerned had been obtained from His Britannic Majesty's consul-general at São Paulo, and a favourable report had also been obtained on the British parent company, Paraná Plantations (Limited). In view of the fact that the parent company was British and that it held a controlling interest in the Brazilian companies concerned, the Nansen Office had thought it well to obtain a report which might be regarded as entirely impartial, and, through the agency of the Swiss Government, such a report had been obtained from M. Redard, the counsellor of the Swiss Legation at Rio de Janeiro. The Nansen Office had also had the advantage of personal consultation with M. Redard when he was on leave in Europe after writing his report. M. Redard's account had been most favourable. An important factor in the scheme was that the Nansen Office had received full assurances from Paraná Plantations (Limited) that there would be no objection to the group settlement of the Assyrians. Unofficial soundings of the Brazilian Government had also been favourable on this point, and had, in addition, shown that the Assyrians would be free in the exercise of their religion. Major Johnson understood that rapidity of execution was a desirable element in the scheme, and his conversations with Paraná Plantations (Limited) had shown that, if a decision could be taken in the near future, i.e., within the next few weeks, by the Council Committee, it would be possible for the transfer of 20,000 persons from Iraq to the area concerned in Brazil to be effected between March and September next. Major Johnson emphasised that the climate in the area was temperate. The Nansen Office had, of course, had wide experience in refugee settlement, and he thought that their past performances were a guarantee that the work of Assyrian settlement would be satisfactorily carried out. He thought that the representative of the Office in Syria could be detached for this special work. A most important item was the question of cost. This had been estimated at £110-£120 inclusive per family to cover transport and initial settlement. It was possible that, if there was long delay in settlement, the price of the land might increase, and it was necessary to guard against this. Other expenses could probably be scaled down, and he thought that, in particular, cheaper shipping rates might be arranged. He thought, in fact, that it would be safe for the committee to

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work on a basis of £100 per family. There was also the question of the expenses of the Nansen Office. He thought that the Office could lend assistance so far as central services were concerned without an increase in the budget. But it would no doubt be necessary to send a representative to Iraq and to keep a representative for some time in Brazil. This would mean additional expense. He recalled that the liquidation of the Nansen Office was due to be completed in 1938, but he thought that this would create no obstacle. One year should suffice for the actual settlement operation. There would then be the question of the recovery of expenses. It was not necessary, of course, for the whole organisation to remain in being for such a purpose and the work could no doubt be entrusted to a reduced organisation, or even to the League Secretariat.

*M. Werner* said that he would like some information as to the conditions in which the Assyrians would expect to be settled. Could they live in small groups or must they live together in a large community, in fact, in a sort of national park?

At the request of the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, *Mr. Edmonds* explained that the unit of the Assyrians was, in the first place, the family, and, in the second place, the village. The Assyrians lived in villages which might consist of ten houses or a hundred houses.

*Nuri Pasha* said that he considered the idea to be generally satisfactory. The cost was, however, heavy. He recalled that *Yasin Pasha* had promised at the meeting of the Council on the 14th October to make as generous a contribution as the resources of Iraq would allow towards helping the Assyrians on their way. It was clear, however, that the League of Nations would have to bear their share. He enquired whether the Nansen Office estimate included the cost of transport from Mosul to the coast, i.e., either to Basra or to the Syrian coast.

*Major Johnson* replied that the estimate of £100 per family was not from Iraq but from a European port, and he thought that Beirut might be regarded as such a port.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked whether the Iraqi delegation were in a position to say what transport from Mosul to the Syrian coast would cost.

*Nuri Pasha*, after consultation with *Mr. Edmonds*, said that he thought it might work out at about £4 a family. He would refer the Nansen Office figures to Bagdad and ascertain what amount the Iraqi Government would be prepared to contribute.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked if the Nansen Office could say what immediate capital outlay would have to be provided and what proportion of this outlay, if any, might be expected to be recoverable.

*Major Johnson* replied that assuming that 20,000 Assyrians required to be settled, the actual outlay would be £400,000. The Nansen Office would hold the title deeds of the land until the settlers repurchased their lots, and it was probable that owing to the rise in the value of the land they might ultimately recover more than the original purchase price. He explained, however, that *Paraná Plantations (Limited)* were not counting on profit from the sale of land. Their present margin of profit on such sale was indeed so small as to be not a commercial proposition. He had pointed this out to the company, and asked how they could proceed on this basis. The company had explained that they were depending mainly for their profit on building up a prosperous community which would be compelled increasingly to use for transport and freight the railway which the company were building. As to the proportion of the capital outlay which the Nansen Office might expect to recover, he thought that, assuming favourable general conditions, a return of 75 per cent. might be expected.

*M. Massigli*, who did not attend the early part of the meeting, then came in. He urged the desirability of establishing an early and precise scheme. It seemed necessary to him that one of the first questions which the committee must consider was that of finance. How was the money for the Brazilian scheme to be raised and how much were the Iraqi Government prepared to contribute?

*The President* explained that the Iraqi representative was referring this point to his Government. The President continued that it seemed to him that in considering the question of cost it was desirable in the first place to ascertain what number of Assyrians would wish to leave Iraq.

*The United Kingdom Representative* referred to the difficulty of establishing precisely at this stage which of the Assyrians would wish to leave. The only practical course seemed to be for the committee to work on a basis that a minimum number of the Assyrians, say 10,000, might be expected to require settlement. He suggested that the Nansen Office should work out more precise details and a more precise estimate on this basis and on a *pro rata* basis for, say, every hundred families over and above this minimum of 10,000.

It was agreed that the Nansen Office should continue to work on this basis, but the *President* emphasised that it was necessary, before much further progress could be made, to know the size of the contribution which might be expected from the Iraqi Government.

*The Mexican Representative* raised the question whether those Assyrians who might not be able to purchase the land allotted to them might not be faced with the loss of their land and with unemployment.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that in that connexion he would like to know with whom the settlers would have to treat in the matter of the repurchase of their land. He assumed that the Nansen Office would purchase the land in the first place, and that the settlers in repurchasing it would have to deal with the Nansen Office and not direct with the company. If that were so, it seemed to him that there was little fear of the Assyrians being victimised.

*Major Johnson* confirmed that the settlers would in the matter of repurchase have to deal direct with the Nansen Office. He was interrupted by *M. Werner*, who said that naturally the Assyrians would have to be treated with consideration. They came from a great distance and a very different country, and could not be expected to adapt themselves all at once to new conditions. In the first two or three years the settlers would be lucky if they made their own living, without being able to pay instalments for the repurchase of their land. If they did make an effort to make their own living, the Nansen Office would be content with this and they could not in the circumstances turn them out if they were unable to pay the instalments at first. It might be therefore that any recovery of capital outlay might be considerably delayed. He thought there should be no illusions on that point.

*Nuri Pasha* explained that it would be a mistake to suppose that the Assyrians were poor. Some of them, on the contrary, were quite well off and owned a certain amount of property in the shape of flocks, &c., which could be liquidated before they left Iraq.

*The President* thanked the representatives of the Nansen Office for the explanations which they had given. He made it clear that the committee had not yet decided actually to entrust any task to the Office, but he hoped they would continue the examination of the project tentatively.

*M. Werner* said that they would be glad to do so without in any way committing the Council Committee.

The Nansen representatives then withdrew, and the *President* proposed that a further meeting of the committee should be held the same afternoon.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Geneva, October 28, 1933.



[E 6555/7/93]

No. 188.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 31.)*

(No. 244.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the fourth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council on the 27th October, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*Geneva, October 29, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 188.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of Fourth Meeting of the Council Committee at 4 P.M. on  
October 27, 1933.*

(Attended by Iraqi Delegation.)

THE President, in opening the meeting, proposed that, pending the receipt of the further information which the Iraqi representative had undertaken to obtain concerning the financial contribution which his Government would be prepared to make towards the resettlement outside Iraq of those Assyrians who no longer wished to remain in the country, it would be well for the committee to consider what arrangements would be required to enable the necessary preparatory and other work to be carried out satisfactorily at the Iraq end. He asked the Iraqi representative to make suggestions.

Nuri Pasha said that it was difficult at this stage for him to give details of how the work might be done by the Iraqi Government. What he envisaged, however, was that the Iraqi Government would set up a local committee consisting of the settlement expert, an administrative inspector, the local kaimakam and a representative of the Assyrians to keep in touch with the Nansen Office (if they were eventually entrusted with the work of organising transportation and resettlement). The committee would first of all explain the present situation to the Assyrians, and find out which of them wished to leave. When these preliminary arrangements had been made, it might be useful for a representative of the Nansen Office to co-operate with this local committee in carrying out the emigration.

The French Representative pointed out that there appeared to be several different problems with which this local committee would have to deal: (1) To reassure the Assyrians at the present time by explaining to them the decisions which the League of Nations had taken regarding their future; (2) to secure that only those Assyrians who wished to leave the country were actually transferred to the new settlement; (3) to make suitable arrangements to enable those Assyrians who had movable and immovable property in Iraq to liquidate their assets before proceeding to the place which might be chosen for their resettlement. He thought that it would be in the interests both of the Iraqi Government and of the Assyrians, and certainly desirable from the point of view of the Committee of the Council, that some League organisation or representative should participate in this work.

The Italian and Danish Representatives expressed their agreement.

The President entirely agreed with the views of the French representative and suggested that from the outset the committee which the Iraqi representative had proposed should be joined by a representative of the Nansen Office.

Nuri Pasha said that it would be difficult for the Iraqi Government to do more than to agree that a representative of the Nansen Office should join the local committee when the time came to move the Assyrians who elected to leave Iraq. A Nansen representative would have no local experience and could not usefully

assist the committee in the early tasks which it would fall to them to carry out. As regards the anxiety which had been expressed by some members of the committee that some Assyrians might be forced to leave the country against their will, he would like to point out that, when the Nansen representative came to take over the Assyrian emigrants, each one would, if he wished, have an opportunity to protest if any pressure had been brought to bear to persuade him to leave Iraq.

The President agreed with the views of the French representative and asked M. Azcarate to enlighten the committee as to the manner in which similar work had been carried out in the past.

M. Azcarate explained that he had gone into the question of a precedent for work of this kind and had been unable to find an exact parallel in the previous experience of the League. He instanced, however, the work of the Special Commission which had been appointed to carry out the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, and explained that at that time the neutral members of the commission had been nominated as mandatories of the League of Nations to ensure that some special elements of the population whose exchange was not obligatory were not forced to leave their homes against their wishes.

Nuri Pasha said that he did not consider that the precedent given by M. Azcarate provided a sufficiently close parallel to be a guide for the work which had to be undertaken in Iraq. The task which had to be accomplished under the resolution adopted by the Council was that of providing a place of resettlement for those Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq. The Iraqi Government desired to facilitate the carrying out of this work in every possible way and had no motive whatsoever for bringing pressure to bear on any Assyrians to leave the country. They were quite happy that those who desired to stay should remain. Moreover, as he had already pointed out, any case of undue pressure being brought to bear on any Assyrian to leave Iraq would immediately come to light when the Nansen representative took over the emigrants for transportation to their new home. He considered that the work which had to be carried out in Iraq fell into two categories, that which would be necessary before the departure of the emigrant Assyrians and that which would be required for the final arrangements for their departure.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he understood the Iraqi representative to propose that the suggested local committee should be entrusted with three tasks: (a) To take immediate steps to set at rest any doubts which there might be in the minds of the Assyrians as to their future by going round from village to village and explaining the nature of the decision which had been adopted by the Council; (b) to ascertain the wishes of the Assyrians concerning resettlement; and (c) to make arrangements for their departure. At what stage did the Iraqi representative propose that a representative of the Nansen Office should begin to co-operate in the work of this local committee?

The Iraqi Representative replied that his idea was that the representative of the Nansen Office should come to Iraq to co-operate in the work of this local committee as soon as the plans for the resettlement of those who wished to leave Iraq had been sufficiently advanced to enable transportation to begin.

The Danish Representative said that he was entirely in accord with the French representative and with the opinion expressed by the president, that it was most desirable that a representative of the Nansen Office should participate in the work of the local committee from the beginning.

The French Representative said he thought that it was desirable for the committee to be quite clear as to the principal tasks which it was suggested that the local Iraq Committee should undertake. As he understood it, it seemed that it was proposed that this local committee should carry out three main duties: (1) Tranquillisation of the Assyrians by explaining to them the decisions taken by the League; (2) enquiry as to those Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq; (3) the preparation for departure of those who elected to go. It appeared to him that there was a very big difference between these duties, and possibly it might be necessary to vary the composition of the local committee at the time when these different duties were undertaken. Nevertheless, he felt that, in order



properly to discharge their obligations to the Council, and also in order that they might be able to meet public criticism, it was essential that the Committee of the Council should have some means of keeping in close touch with the local committee in Iraq throughout their work.

The President said that he was in complete agreement with the remarks of the French representative.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that, perhaps, the wishes of the Committee of the Council to maintain close touch with the local committee in Iraq could be met if the Iraqi Government were to arrange to communicate to the Committee of the Council copies of all instructions issued to the local committee concerning their work, and also copies of the periodical reports, which, no doubt, the local committee would themselves submit to the Iraqi Government.

The President said that he thought this was a very useful suggestion.

Nuri Pasha desired to explain to the committee his fears, which he said were shared by the Iraqi Government, that the introduction of any outside element into the personnel of the local committee would give rise to serious misunderstanding in Iraq and might possibly lead to local troubles. It was not merely a matter of sovereignty, but of practical difficulty. He did not understand what objections there were to the committee which he had proposed should be set up in Iraq, and which, after all, would contain a non-Iraqi majority, nor did he appreciate what advantages it was expected to derive from the inclusion in that committee of a Nansen representative before the time came for the emigrant Assyrians to be moved. He agreed that, when everything was ready for the move to take place, a Nansen representative should come to Iraq to take over the emigrants, but he did not see in what way a Nansen representative could helpfully participate in the work of that committee before that stage had been reached. Moreover, in his opinion, it was questionable whether, under the terms of the resolution adopted by the Council, it was within the power of the Committee of the Council to introduce any kind of outside intervention into what, properly speaking, was a purely local matter. He deplored what appeared to be a want of confidence in the good faith of the Iraqi Government, and assured the committee that such an attitude was groundless.

The United Kingdom Representative said that the committee naturally had the greatest interest in the arrangements which were to be made in Iraq, and must be assured that everything was done fairly and efficiently. It was necessary that the committee should be kept in close touch with what was being done, particularly in the matter of ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians; but he asked the committee to consider whether it would not meet the case if a Nansen representative were associated with the local committee suggested by Nuri Pasha, not only with the third of the tasks which would be entrusted to it, but also with the second.

Confused and desultory discussion followed, and the President suggested that it would perhaps assist the committee to find a solution of this question if they were to adjourn for a short time for private conversations, with a view to endeavouring to find a common basis of accord. He also suggested that M. Azcarate, having heard the views expressed by the different members of the committee, should endeavour to produce a draft resolution which would give satisfaction to all points of view.

This proposal was adopted. After an interval of about half an hour the committee reassembled and considered a draft (Annex) which was submitted to them by M. Azcarate. The Iraqi Representative said that this draft appeared to him in principle to provide a satisfactory basis for a resolution likely to be acceptable to his Government, but he requested that he should be given an opportunity to study it in detail.

The committee thereupon decided to adjourn and to meet again on the 28th October at 3.30 p.m.

Geneva, October 27, 1933.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Annex.

# ASSYRIAN COMMITTEE.

M. Azcarate's Draft Resolution, October 27, evening.

LE Gouvernement de l'Irak nommera un comité local, composé de . . . et chargé de collaborer, par l'intermédiaire de ce Gouvernement, avec le Comité du Conseil de la Société des Nations pour l'exécution des plans qui seront élaborés pour l'établissement en dehors de l'Irak des Assyriens qui exprimeraient le désir d'abandonner le pays.

Ce comité aura pour première tâche de rassurer la population en leur expliquant le sens des décisions prises par la Société des Nations et dont la mise en exécution fait le sujet des études du comité.

Un représentant de l'Office international Nansen pour les Réfugiés, désigné par cet office en accord avec le Comité du Conseil, se rendra en Irak le plus tôt possible pour préparer, en collaboration avec le comité local, le départ de la population en question et, notamment :

1. Pour déterminer, en collaboration avec le comité local, les personnes qui exprimeront la volonté de quitter le pays;
2. Pour prendre, en collaboration avec le comité local, toutes les mesures se rapportant au départ, comme, par exemple, la liquidation des biens, la participation aux frais de transport et d'établissement, &c.

[E 6747/5250/93]

No. 189.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 683.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 26, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to report that a ceremony in memory of the late King Feisal was held in Bagdad on Tuesday, the 24th October, the fortieth day after His Majesty's funeral. The invitations issued included foreign representatives and British officials of the Iraqi Government. Some 1,500 people were seated, and a small crowd gathered round the enclosure during the proceedings. There were no manifestations of popular feeling, and the proceedings were well organised and dignified throughout.

2. His Majesty King Ghazi arrived at 3.45 p.m., accompanied by his Cabinet, and the ceremony, which was to last until 6.15 p.m., opened with two minutes' silence and a recitation of appropriate verses from the Koran.

3. Two of the telegrams received on this occasion were then read aloud: one from Mustafa-al-Nahas Pasha, president of the Egyptian Wafd, and one from Hashim Beg Al Atasi, leader of the Syrian "National Block" party.

4. The way was then clear for speakers, to the number of nineteen. Four Moslems of Iraq; two Shias, two Sunnis, a Druse and a Christian from the Lebanon; three Syrian Moslems from Damascus; two Moslems from Palestine and two from Transjordan; the Emir Hasan-al-Atrash from the Jebel Druse, and a native of the State of Alawiyeen.

5. The speeches were on the whole anodyne. The Iraqi speakers, three of whom were poets, were careful to avoid any definite reference to a Pan-Arab Confederation or to the union of Iraq and Syria. The visitors were members of delegations who had come to Bagdad as the guests of the Government. The Moslems from Syria and the Lebanon urged the people of Iraq to work for the unity of Iraq and Syria under a Hashimite King, swearing allegiance to King Ghazi as successor of "King Feisal of Syria," and renewing the pledge made to King Feisal when he was proclaimed King of Syria in Damascus in 1919.

6. The two speakers from Palestine, Akram Z'aitir and Suleiman-al-Tajjal-Faruqi, bewailed the lot of Arab Palestine, and appealed to the Iraqi people for sympathy and succour against Zionism and the policy which supported Zionism against the Arabs. The Transjordan speakers confined themselves to enumerating the virtues of the departed King, and the Druse pledged their allegiance to King Ghazi.

7. In this connexion, I would like to place on record that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior have recently assured me that the



present Government does not propose to support the policy of union with Syria, which was so dear to the heart of the late King Feisal.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 6767/7/93]

No. 190.

# ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 3 P.M. on October 28, 1933.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 6.)*

*The President*, in opening the meeting, informed the committee that he had received news from the Iraqi delegation that the Iraqi Cabinet had resigned and that, in consequence, Nuri Pasha felt unable further to participate in the deliberations of the committee. He felt that this news put the committee in a somewhat difficult position and might possibly prevent them from continuing their work. He pointed out, moreover, that before any further progress could be made it would be necessary for the committee to await a reply from the Brazilian Government to the enquiry which had been addressed to them by M. Azcarate, and also for a reply from the Iraqi Government concerning the amount of the contribution which it would be possible for them to make towards the expenses of carrying out the resettlement outside Iraq of the Assyrians who wished to leave the country.

*The United Kingdom Representative* suggested that there was still a good deal of work which the committee could do pending the receipt of the replies to which the president had referred. Nor did he think that the resignation of the Cabinet in Baghdad need cause the committee to suspend their deliberations. He understood that, prior to the receipt of the news of the resignation of the Cabinet, Nuri Pasha had prepared a modified draft of the resolution which had been drawn up the previous evening, and he hoped that it would still be possible for this to be laid before the committee for consideration.

The question was raised whether it would serve any useful purpose to continue the consideration of the draft if there was no one on the Iraqi side with authority to discuss it, and the suggestion was made that, until a new Iraqi Government was formed, it might not even be possible to deal with the Iraqi permanent delegation.

*The United Kingdom Representative* saw no reason why discussions should not continue with the Iraqi permanent delegation. Presumably the Government which had just resigned would continue to deal with current affairs until its successor was appointed, and it might very well be that a new Government would be formed quite speedily. In any case, the Assyrian question remained and could not be left in the air, and his view was that the committee must push on with the consideration of the draft resolution if this could be done in any way.

Information was then received that a member of the Iraqi delegation, who was then in consultation with Nuri Pasha, would appear before the committee in a few minutes' time to make a statement.

It was agreed that the discussion of the draft resolution should, if possible, be continued with him and the French representative suggested that, while the committee were waiting, they might usefully discuss one or two other aspects of the problem with which they were dealing. In the first place he would like to suggest that, before a decision was taken to adopt the plan for resettlement in Brazil, which had been put forward by the Nansen Office, the committee should examine the possibilities of settling the Assyrians in some other country. It would be unfortunate, he thought, if the committee were to proceed on the assumption that the desired resettlement could be effected in the territory of the Paraná Plantations Company only to discover, after the lapse of several weeks, that for political, economic or other reasons, the scheme was not suitable. In that event, if no alternative scheme had been studied, the committee would find themselves in a somewhat embarrassing position. In the second place, he thought it

was necessary in any event that the committee should elaborate a more detailed machinery for handling the task of transportation and resettlement, which would have to be undertaken, whatever destination might ultimately be chosen for the Assyrians.

*The President* expressed the opinion that the Brazilian scheme was certainly the most attractive of the propositions which had come before the committee for consideration. Nevertheless, he agreed with the French representative that it would be a great advantage for the committee to have even negative results from enquiries as to the possibilities of settlement elsewhere. In making their report ultimately to the Council, it would, he thought, certainly be necessary for the committee to show that they had carefully examined a number of alternative schemes, and it was undesirable that it should appear that they had merely adopted the Brazilian project without regard to other possibilities, simply because it happened to exist in the archives of the Nansen Office.

*The French Representative* said that this was precisely his own view.

*The Italian Representative* thought it was very difficult to know how a world-wide enquiry of the kind, which appeared to be in the minds of the president and the French representative, could be carried out. The Nansen Office, in their endeavours to settle refugees, had no doubt considered the possibilities of settlement in all likely countries, and he thought that the office might usefully prepare a note on their experience in this regard. Such a note would make it clear to the committee whether it would be in any way worth while for an approach to be made to any countries other than Brazil regarding facilities for settling the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he entirely agreed that the committee should not limit themselves to consideration of the Brazilian scheme. He had himself contemplated at the outset of the committee's work that it would be necessary to send out a circular to the Governments of members of the League, or to a certain number of them, enquiring whether they saw any prospect of being able to receive the Assyrians. He still thought it might be desirable to make some such enquiry. His fear was that it might delay matters, whereas the situation in Iraq was still uncertain and a speedy solution was desirable. *Prima facie*, however, it seemed doubtful whether conditions would be found elsewhere so favourable as those which, from the information furnished by the Nansen Office, appeared to obtain in the Paraná scheme, and if on further examination this scheme proved to be as promising as it sounded, he did not think its adoption should be held up while a purely *pro forma* enquiry was being conducted in various parts of the globe. An enquiry of certain States certainly should, in his opinion, be made, but he suggested that Governments approached should be asked to reply within a given time-limit, and that if the Brazilian plan proved feasible and no obviously better proposal was received within a certain time, the Brazilian plan should be proceeded with.

*The President* agreed with the remarks of the United Kingdom representative.

*M. Azcarate* said that he thought that it would be difficult for the Secretariat to undertake a world-wide enquiry regarding facilities for resettling the Assyrians, but, in collaboration with the Nansen Office, the Minorities Section would undertake an examination of the question of what other countries appeared likely to be able to offer facilities for the resettlement of the Assyrians, and he would then arrange that the Governments of suitable countries should be approached in the same manner as the Brazilian Government.

The committee agreed to this proposal.

*Mr. Edmonds* then joined the committee and explained that, owing to the resignation of the Iraqi Cabinet, Nuri Pasha felt unable to take his place at the table. He had, however, been authorised by Nuri Pasha to put before the committee a slightly amended draft of the resolution drawn up the preceding evening. If this amended draft proved acceptable to the committee, Nuri Pasha was prepared to use all his influence to get it accepted by the new Iraqi Cabinet, when formed. (Annex I.)



A confused discussion then followed as to the "juridical status" of the draft, in view of Nuri Pasha's uncertain position, and in particular as to whether it could be regarded as an official Iraqi counter-draft.

*The United Kingdom Representative* suggested that it was unnecessary to pay too much attention to the niceties of the situation. The point was whether the draft now under discussion was acceptable to the committee or not. If it was acceptable it could be telegraphed to the Iraqi Government by the Iraqi delegation as something which the committee were prepared to accept as soon as they were notified that it was agreed to by the Iraqi Government.

This suggestion having been adopted, the *Danish Representative*, supported by the *United Kingdom Representative*, pressed for the inclusion in the draft resolution of details regarding the composition of the local committee.

*The United Kingdom Representative* stressed the importance of this from the point of view of reassuring public opinion as to the way in which the Assyrians would be dealt with.

*The Committee* eventually agreed that they would be prepared to adopt the draft provided that the first part thereof was amended to show that the local committee would be composed as suggested by Nuri Pasha at the fourth meeting of the Council Committee.

Mr. Edmonds took note of the wishes of the committee and undertook to communicate them to Nuri Pasha, although he felt that the latter might have some difficulty in supporting the proposed modification.

*The President*, with the concurrence of the committee, suggested that in any event the Iraqi delegation should, if it thought fit, communicate to the Iraqi Government the text of the resolution amended in the manner desired by the committee, and should enquire whether the Iraqi Government approved of it in that form (amended text: Annex II).<sup>(1)</sup>

*The Committee* then reverted to the discussion of the proposal for resettlement in Brazil.

*The President* and the *French Representative* both expressed a desire for further and more detailed information from the Nansen Office concerning this proposal, and the president suggested that Major Johnson should be asked, at the next meeting, to reply to any questions which members of the committee might like to put to him in this regard.

*The United Kingdom Representative* reminded the committee that they had already before them considerable documentation on this subject, and that, in addition, the president and secretary-general of the Nansen Office had already explained the proposal in detail to the committee. He thought that if Major Johnson were to be asked to attend another meeting, it would be an advantage that the committee should, in advance, specify the nature of the additional information which they required, and that, with this end in view, a *questionnaire* should at once be drawn up which could be passed to Major Johnson before he came to the committee. In this way the committee could be sure of obtaining all the additional information which individual members desired should be placed at the committee's disposal. The *United Kingdom Representative* added that he was in a position to give to the committee for their confidential information two short notes, one a statistical report on the financial position of Paraná Plantations (Limited), and one a British consular report on the subsidiary companies in Brazil. He explained that these documents had been prepared, not in view of Assyrian settlement, but in order to assist the Nansen Office when that office was considering Paraná as a place for settling refugees in general. He thought that the documents might perhaps help the members of the committee to determine what further questions should be put to Major Johnson. He emphasised, however, that they were communicated without in any way engaging the responsibility of His Majesty's Government in the

<sup>(1)</sup> NOTE.—Late in the evening Mr. Edmonds was able to inform the president that Nuri Pasha had communicated the resolution in the form desired by the committee (Annex II) to the Iraqi Government and had asked them to inform the Iraqi delegation at Geneva whether they could accept it.

United Kingdom for Paraná Plantations (Limited). His Majesty's Government could naturally take no responsibility for a private company, although they had no reason to suppose that this company was anything but a reputable one.

*The President* thanked the *United Kingdom Representative* and accepted copies of these documents for circulation to members of the committee (see document C/Min./Ass./7). He then said that, while he felt personally a great need for further general information on the Brazilian settlement scheme, he did not feel in a position to frame a *questionnaire*. He thought, perhaps, that Major Johnson, when he came to a meeting, would himself be able to suggest the points on which further information should be given to the committee.

*The French Representative* was also unable to indicate on what particular points he desired further details, but joined the president in recommending that the committee should have the advantage of further discussion with Major Johnson.

It was accordingly agreed that Major Johnson should be invited to be present at the committee's next meeting on Tuesday morning, the 1st October.

*The Italian Representative* said that he would be unable to attend this meeting on account of a prior engagement.

*The Committee* therefore decided that the meeting should be informal and should be restricted to unofficial conversation with Major Johnson with a view to enabling those who desired and could attend to ask any questions which they wished to put.

Before the committee dispersed, the *French Representative* referred to the anxiety which was being felt by the French authorities in Syria regarding the possibility of a further exodus of Assyrians from Iraqi territory. Reports had been received that such an exodus was about to take place, but the accuracy of this news had not yet been confirmed. The French Government were, he said, quite willing to consider, on humanitarian grounds and as a purely temporary measure, the reception in Syria of the families of those Assyrians who were now in that country, but they could not contemplate an indefinite liability to receive further bands of Assyrians who might wish to leave Iraq. When the French Government had first received reports, indicating that more Assyrians were thinking of marching into Syria, instructions had been issued that they should not be allowed to cross the frontier, but should either be persuaded to return to Iraq or detained on the border. In view, however, of the representations which were made by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs and by His Majesty's Embassy in Paris concerning the dangerous situation which might result from parties of Assyrians being turned back from the frontier, the French Government had agreed that the Assyrians who might be on their way to Syria should be allowed to cross the frontier on the following conditions:—

1. That, in this matter, the French Government in Syria should be regarded as acting with a mandate from and at the request of the Council Committee.
2. That the retention of such Assyrians in Syria should be strictly temporary.
3. That the representative of the Nansen Office in Syria should be sent to the frontier, with specialist French officers, to sort out such Assyrians on the frontier with a view to admitting into Syria only those who belonged to the Upper Tiari and Tkhuma tribes, to which those Assyrians already in Syria mainly belonged, and rejecting elements from other tribes, whose presence in Syria might serve as an incentive to the remainder of those other tribes to follow.
4. That the cost of the maintenance of Assyrians admitted into Syrian territory should be borne by the Iraqi Government.

With regard to the last condition, the French representative pointed out that the plan of the French Government would be to hand over all these fugitive Assyrians to the care of the Nansen Office representative in Syria, and that the bill for their maintenance should be passed to the Iraqi Government. He added that, as he had already mentioned, reports of the arrival of further parties of



Assyrians on the Syrian frontier at present lacked confirmation, but he had considered it desirable that the committee should be informed of the attitude which the French Government would adopt should any more fugitive bands attempt to cross over from Iraq. He emphasised that, in any event, precipitate flights of this kind into Syrian territory were most embarrassing to the authorities there, and he trusted that all possible steps would be taken in Iraq to calm the Assyrians and to dissuade them from fleeing from the country until the committee of the Council had been able to arrange for their organised transport to another place for resettlement.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Geneva, October 28, 1933.

#### Annex I.

The committee takes note of the intention of the Iraqi Government to nominate a reliable local committee to proceed forthwith to reassure the Assyrians by explaining to them the exact meaning of the decision of the Council of the League of Nations and that a committee of the Council is actively examining plans for its execution.

As soon as possible after the place of settlement has been definitely fixed, a representative of the Nansen Office for Refugees, appointed by that office in agreement with the president of the committee of the Council, will proceed to Iraq to collaborate with the above-mentioned local committee in the task of—

- (a) Ascertaining what persons wish to leave the country.
- (b) Taking all necessary measures required for their departure, such as liquidation of property, participation by intending emigrants in the cost of transport and resettlement, conveyance from their homes to the port selected, &c.

Full reports on the work will be forwarded through the Iraqi Government to the committee of the Council.

#### Annex II.

The committee takes note of the intention of the Iraqi Government to nominate a local committee, consisting of the land settlement expert, an administrative inspector, the kaïmakam and the Assyrian village headman concerned, to proceed forthwith to reassure the Assyrians by explaining to them the exact meaning of the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, and that a committee of the Council is actively examining plans for its execution.

As soon as possible after the place of settlement has been definitely fixed, a representative of the Nansen Office for Refugees, appointed by that office in agreement with the president of the committee of the Council, will proceed to Iraq to collaborate with the above-mentioned local committee in the task of—

- (a) Ascertaining what persons wish to leave the country.
- (b) Taking all necessary measures required for their departure, such as liquidation of property, participation by intending emigrants in the cost of transport and resettlement, conveyance from their homes to the port selected, &c.

Full reports on the work will be forwarded through the Iraqi Government to the committee of the Council.

[E 6803/7/93]

No. 191

#### ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of Sixth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 10-30 A.M. on October 31, 1933.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 8.)*

IT had been the intention that this meeting should be in the nature of an informal conversation between certain members only of the committee and Major Johnson. The Italian representative was, however, able to attend after all, and as the committee was thus at full strength, the meeting resumed its formal character.

The President informed the committee that he had received a note from the Brazilian Minister at Berne, intimating that he had duly addressed an enquiry to the Brazilian Government concerning their willingness in principle to accept a large number of Assyrian colonists on the Paraná Plantations land. The note showed that the Brazilian Minister had misunderstood one important point and had informed his Government that the Assyrians were Roman Catholics.

In reply to questions from various members of the committee, Captain Holt explained that while a number of the Assyrians in question were converts to Presbyterianism, the great majority were Nestorians. The Catholic branch of the Assyrian race was the Chaldeans, whose affairs were not at present in question.

The President suggested that the secretariat should take immediate steps to explain the position to the Brazilian Minister in order to remove what might be a serious misunderstanding. This was agreed to.

The President said that he had also been informed by the Iraqi delegation that a reply had been received from the Iraqi Government concerning the committee's draft resolution on the subject of the formation of a local committee in Iraq to deal with certain questions concerning the Assyrians. He thought, however, that as Major Johnson wished to leave that day for London in connexion with the work of the Nansen Office, it would be best that the committee should begin their meeting with a further general discussion of the proposals which the Nansen Office had put forward with regard to the settlement of Assyrians in Brazil.

Major Johnson said that he proposed to go to London at once to discuss this matter personally with the head office of the Paraná Plantations Company, and would be glad to know whether any members of the committee desired information on any particular points. There was one matter on which he thought it was desirable that he should make an explanation to the committee. This was the arrangements for the purchase of the land on which the Assyrians might be settled. The plan usually adopted by the Nansen Office in settling refugees on the Paraná Estates was to make an initial payment of £10 on behalf of each family of settlers towards the purchase price of the 12 hectares of land generally allotted to them, the balance of about £30 being paid by the settlers themselves in three annual instalments, beginning in the second year of their settlement. If the property required for each family were bought outright by the Nansen Office, about £25 per family would have to be added to the initial capital outlay which would be required. That is to say, approximately £125 per family would be needed for transport and resettlement, as compared with the figure of £100 per family which he had given to the committee previously.

In discussing this explanation some members of the committee expressed their preference for the purchase outright by the Nansen Office of the property to be assigned to the Assyrian settlers. They maintained that it would be most desirable that the Assyrians should be safeguarded from any possibility of being exploited by the company, and this could be guaranteed if their financial relations were solely with the Nansen Office. Some discussion followed regarding the social services which it would be necessary to organise for the Assyrians when settled in their new home. It was agreed that educational and medical assistance would be necessary, and members of the committee were generally of the opinion that an appeal might be made to benevolent organisations to help in this regard.



*The French Representative* suggested, for consideration, that instead of purchasing separate plots for each family it might be more satisfactory for the Nansen Office to acquire from the company a large tract of territory which their representative in Brazil could himself divide among the Assyrian colonists according to the special requirements of each family.

*The Danish Representative* noted that the project put forward by the Nansen Office (document C/Min.Ass./2.1933) provided for the allotment of 12 hectares to each family of settlers. He would like to know whether this was considered to be sufficient or whether, as appeared to be contemplated in the report, which had been made by the counsellor of the Swiss Legation at Rio de Janeiro, more land might not be required by certain types of Assyrian settlers.

*Mr. Edmonds* said that he thought that 12 hectares, representing about 30 acres of land, was quite as much as the average Assyrian family could handle by themselves, and was, he considered, more than that which was usually worked by Assyrian families now settled in Iraq.

*The President* then raised the question of the arrangements which might be necessary for those Assyrians who did not normally maintain themselves by agriculture. He said that he understood that the Brazilian Government did not favour non-agricultural colonists.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that there were certainly a considerable number of Assyrians now in Iraq who were not engaged in agriculture. There was a tendency to drift to the towns where he understood that many of the Assyrians were employed as servants. A few were employed on the railways in Iraq and by the oil companies. Still more were serving in the levies and police. But as the majority came from ordinary peasant stock and had probably had experience of work on the land, it should not be difficult, he thought, for them to adapt themselves to work on the land in Brazil. One of the advantages, however, of the project which had been put forward by the Nansen Office was that there was reasonable prospect of a certain number of settlers finding manual and other work in connexion with railway construction and in the townships which appeared to be developing.

*Mr. Edmonds* referred the committee to the document which had been put forward by the Iraqi delegation (C/Min.Ass./1.1933), in which some details had been given of the number of Assyrian families at present established on the land in Iraq and of others employed in the towns. He offered the suggestion that it might be best to arrange first for the transfer and resettlement of the entirely agricultural element and to allow other categories who wished to emigrate to follow afterwards.

*The Danish Representative* enquired whether Major Johnson could give the committee any information about the juridical status of the Paraná Plantations Company in Brazil. He would like to know, for example, whether they enjoyed any special legal privileges *vis-à-vis* the Brazilian Government.

*Major Johnson* undertook to endeavour to obtain information on this point during his visit to London.

The committee then devoted some time to discussing to what extent it would be desirable that the Assyrians settled in Brazil, or elsewhere, should be held liable to refund the cost of their transfer and establishment in the place of resettlement.

*Major Johnson* explained that the practice of the Nansen Office was to make each family of refugees liable to refund all the money which had been spent on them, including that expended on transport. The normal system (*i.e.*, as practised in Syria) was that the Nansen Office held the title deeds of the property on which the refugees were settled, and these were not handed over to the settlers until, by annual instalments, all expenditure incurred on their behalf by the Office had been refunded. It was the experience of the Nansen Office that these conditions encouraged hard work and thrift among the refugees whom they had settled, and he thought that it would be a mistake to make free grants of land and passages to any class of refugee colonist, even if sufficient funds were available to enable this to be done. In the experience of the Office, such treatment would only lead to pauperisation and the weakening of the moral stamina of the

refugees themselves. The members of the committee, in discussing this point, while agreeing in principle with Major Johnson's views, showed a tendency to consider it desirable that the Assyrians should be exempted from repayment of some part of the money which it would be necessary to spend on their resettlement outside Iraq. No decision was, however, adopted on this point.

(After this Major Johnson withdrew from the meeting.)

*The President* then invited M. Shabandar to explain to the committee the reply which had been received from the Iraqi Government regarding the committee's draft resolution concerning the local committee in Iraq.

*M. Shabandar* distributed copies of this draft resolution amended in accordance with the suggestions put forward by the Iraqi Government, which, in each instance, he had underlined<sup>(1)</sup> in order that the committee might easily see where alterations had been introduced (see annex). He reminded the committee, however, that owing to the resignation of the Cabinet it would not be possible for a definite decision concerning the resolution to be reached until a new Government had been formed.

A discussion followed in which the committee generally expressed themselves willing to adopt all the amendments proposed by the Iraqi Government, except the introduction of the words "as far as local circumstances permit" in the second line and the substitution of the words "with the local authorities" for "with the above-mentioned local committee" in line 13.

It was pointed out that the first of those amendments implied that the composition of the local committee might be changed at any moment, and even that in certain districts no committee might be set up at all.

*M. Shabandar*, although without precise information, expressed his personal opinion that the amendment was simply designed to guard against unforeseen contingencies, such as the inability of one of the persons concerned to serve, owing, perhaps, to illness.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that any committee naturally ran the risk of variation owing to illness, but there seemed no reason why the committee should not be set up in the first place in the form originally proposed without qualification. He suggested, however, that the saving clause might be designed solely to refer to the alternation of the *kaimakam* and the *mudir*, and if this was so, it would be clearer to delete the words "as far as local circumstances permit" and to insert some such phrase as "according to local circumstances" after the words "*kaimakam* or *nahiya mudir*."

All the members of the committee were opposed to the substitution of the words "with the local authorities" for the words "with the above-mentioned local committee." It was pointed out that the result would be to remove any guarantee regarding the way in which the Assyrians would be dealt with, and, in particular, the way in which their wishes regarding departure from Iraq would be ascertained.

*The Danish Representative* suggested that the two phrases should be combined, to read "with the above-mentioned local committee and the local authorities," as he saw some advantage in the Nansen representative having wide powers of contact.

*The United Kingdom Representative* expressed his preference for the simple reinsertion of the words "above-mentioned local committee," as the addition proposed by the Danish representative seemed to create an element of uncertainty as to who would actually carry out the tasks of ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians, &c. European public opinion would require to be satisfied that the interests of the Assyrians would be safeguarded, and he hoped the Iraqi delegate would not only put this point of view to his Government, but would also represent to them that the resolution as originally worded would be a safeguard against criticism for the Iraqi Government themselves as showing the fairness of their intentions towards the Assyrians.

(1) Printed in italics in Annex.



The President and other members of the committee also urged upon the Iraqi delegate the importance of showing that Assyrian interests would be safeguarded, and the responsibility of the committee on this point. They indicated, however, that they saw no objection to, and possibly some advantage in, the Danish representative's proposal.

Finally, it was decided to request the Iraqi representative to reply to his Government making the following suggestions:—

- (1) That the phrase "as far as local circumstances permit" should be omitted, but that if the Iraqi Government attached a special importance to the retention of some such words, the phrase "the kaimakam or nahiya mudir" might be altered to read "the interested kaimakam or nahiya mudir according to local circumstances," and that the words "above-mentioned local committee" should be retained with the addition, if the Iraqi Government desired, of "and the local authorities."

M. Shabandar undertook to act on this suggestion, but again pointed out that he could not expect to receive definite instructions until a new Government had been formed in Bagdad.

Geneva, October 31, 1933.

#### Annex.

THE committee takes note of the intention of the Iraqi Government, as far as local circumstances permit, to nominate a local committee, composed of the land settlement expert as president, an administrative inspector, the kaimakam or nahiya mudir and the Assyrian village headman concerned, to explain to the Assyrians the exact meaning of the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, and that a committee of the Council is actively examining plans for its execution. As soon as possible after the place of settlement has been definitely fixed, a representative of the Nansen Office for Refugees appointed by that Office in agreement with the president of the committee of the Council will proceed to Iraq to collaborate with the local authorities in the task of (a) ascertaining what persons wish to leave the country; (b) taking all necessary measures required for their departure, such as liquidation of property, participation by intending emigrants in the cost of transport and resettlement, conveyance from their homes to the port selected, &c. Full reports of the work will be forwarded through the Iraqi Government to the committee of the Council.

[E 6804/7/93]

No. 192.

#### ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Council Committee held at 4 P.M. on October 31, 1933.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 8.)*

THIS was a private meeting of the committee, sitting without an Iraqi representative.

The President said that it did not appear possible for the committee to make much substantial progress pending replies from the Brazilian and Iraqi Governments and the outcome of Major Johnson's visit to London. A short adjournment therefore seemed advisable, and he understood that this would meet the plans of those delegates who were not permanently stationed in Geneva. In the first place, however, he understood that the United Kingdom representative had some observations to make on the present stage of the committee's work.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought it might be useful before the committee decided to adjourn to review the progress which had already been made in its work and to consider the next steps to be taken.

He recalled that the committee had been established—

- (a) To consider whether the settlement outside Iraq of those Assyrians who might wish to leave the country would be possible in practice, and, if so, to take all necessary steps, in collaboration with the Iraqi Government, to prepare and execute a detailed scheme.
- (b) Eventually, to examine, in consultation with the Iraqi Government, the measures taken by that Government to give full effect to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, so far as concerns those Assyrians who might remain in Iraq.
- (c) To receive reports from the Iraqi Government regarding the measures taken to assure the safety of the Assyrians in Iraq, to assist families left destitute by the events of last August and to rebuild villages wholly or partially destroyed in the course of those events.

In the accomplishment of the first of these tasks, the point of departure was the Secretariat's memorandum of the 24th October, which concerned itself with—

- (1) The number of the Assyrians in Iraq.
- (2) The safeguards required in ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians as to their departure from Iraq.
- (3) The place of eventual settlement.

As regards the first of these questions, the Secretariat had felt bound to point out that the figures quoted by Major Thomson were less than previous estimates obtained from non-Iraqi sources. The United Kingdom representative observed that these estimates were merely in the nature of round figures, and did not possess the same value as the carefully worked-out and detailed statement by Major Thomson, whose figures were, moreover, generally confirmed from an independent source, i.e., the League Commission on the Mosul Boundary. On p. 83 of the report of that commission it was stated that "the total number of Assyrians to be settled would be only about 20,000 if the Assyrians from Persia returned to their own country." The same report estimated the number of Persian Assyrians in Iraq at 5,000. Nevertheless, even if 20,000 were taken as the total figure, this did not mean that 20,000 would have to be resettled elsewhere. It was quite possible that a number might wish to remain in Iraq, particularly those who had their pre-war homes in what is now Iraq.

On this question of numbers the committee had, by implication, in the draft resolution provisionally accepted on the 28th October, decided that the wishes of the Assyrians should be ascertained as soon as a place of settlement had been definitely decided upon; and in the meantime it had agreed to work on the assumption that a minimum of 10,000 would require to be resettled.

The second question concerned the safeguards to be adopted in ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians as to their departure from Iraq. The draft resolution provisionally accepted on the 28th October provided that these wishes should be ascertained by a committee in which there would be Assyrian participation, and in which, as Nuri Pasha had himself pointed out, there would be a non-Iraqi majority, counting the Assyrians as non-Iraqi for this purpose. The draft resolution further provided that a Nansen Office representative, who would, in fact, be the representative of the Council committee, would collaborate with this local committee, whose reports would be made available to the Council committee. If this resolution were ultimately adopted and carried out, the United Kingdom representative thought it could be claimed that the interests of the Assyrians during this important stage of the work would have been fully safeguarded. Unfortunately, the Iraqi Government had proposed amendments which would greatly diminish the value of the draft resolution. But their decision was not yet final and there was time for negotiation.

As regards question (3), i.e., the place of eventual settlement, various places have been suggested. They were Brazil, Syria, the Argentine, France, Spain, Cyprus, Palestine, Canada, the United States, Persia, Ethiopia and Ecuador. If the United Kingdom representative had understood the French representative rightly, the French Government were not prepared to consider the settlement in Syria of all the Assyrians who might wish to leave Iraq. The Secretariat might perhaps enquire regarding the possibilities in the Argentine, but the United Kingdom representative assumed that neither France nor Spain could be seriously considered. Enquiries made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had shown that settlement in Cyprus was unfortunately impracticable.

[9941]

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The committee would readily understand why Palestine was out of the question. As regards Canada, the Secretariat's report showed that Major Johnson considered it impracticable on account of the strict immigration laws. Although the United Kingdom representative could not speak on behalf of the Canadian Government, his information was to the same effect. The United States could not, in the view of the Nansen Office, be seriously considered. The United Kingdom representative recalled that at an earlier meeting he had mentioned that the possibility of settlement in Persia had been explored by the Assyrians themselves without success. He could offer no opinion on the prospects of Ethiopia, but he was inclined to doubt whether general conditions there were such as to warrant the committee in considering it as a suitable place of settlement. As regards Ecuador, a detailed plan was awaited if the Ecuadorean Government saw fit to produce one.

The United Kingdom representative continued that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had been actively exploring for some time the possibility of settlement in the Colonial Empire. Although these enquiries were still proceeding and he was not yet in a position therefore to make a definite statement, he could tell the committee, and felt he ought to tell them, that no suitable area had yet been found in which land could be made available for the Assyrians. Nor were His Majesty's Government aware that any place could be found in the self-governing Dominions, though the League Secretariat might wish to include the Governments of those Dominions among those to whom an enquiry should be addressed.

On this point, while the committee was ready to consider any other solution which the League Secretariat might be able to discover, the only practicable solution at present available appeared to be settlement in Brazil.

The work of the committee in considering settlement in Brazil was at present held up—

- (a) For the answer of the Brazilian Government to an enquiry whether they were prepared in principle to receive the Assyrians.
- (b) For the final decision of the new Iraqi Government, when formed, regarding the draft resolution provisionally approved by the committee on the 28th October concerning the local organisation to be set up in Iraq to ascertain the wishes of the Assyrians regarding departure, and to prepare for that departure, and regarding the amount which the Iraqi Government would be prepared to contribute towards settlement in Brazil if that were decided upon.

If these answers were favourable, the points which would remain for consideration were—

- (1) Where the remainder of the money over and above the Iraqi contribution was to come from.
- (2) Under what general conditions the Assyrians were to be settled in Brazil.
- (3) How detailed plans for the move were to be drawn up.

Of these, the first two would presumably require decisions by the committee before settlement in Brazil could be put before the Assyrians as a concrete proposal. But as soon as these decisions had been taken it seemed to the United Kingdom representative that the remainder of the work of settlement could be definitely entrusted to the Nansen Office, working in close collaboration with the League Secretariat, the Council committee being kept informed of developments and being called together when necessary to take decisions should difficulties arise.

For the moment then, the questions which the committee could usefully consider were two. The first was the question of finance, and to enable the committee to consider what steps must be taken it would be useful if the Nansen Office could state how previous movements of refugees had been financed. The United Kingdom representative was sure that the League Secretariat also could offer useful suggestions based on their previous experience.

The second question concerned the general conditions under which the Assyrians were to be settled in Brazil. These might be considered under two headings:—

- (a) Physical and economic.
- (b) Political.

On the first of these headings, a considerable amount of information was already before the committee, which was also aware that a favourable impartial report has been obtained from the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio de Janeiro. At the same time the committee might justifiably feel that it could not take the responsibility of sending the Assyrians to the area concerned without satisfying itself by some further enquiry that conditions were such that the Assyrians might be expected to adapt themselves to them. The most appropriate arrangement, if the Iraqi Government would agree, might be that Major Thomson's services should be placed at the disposal of the committee for this purpose and that, accompanied by a representative of the Nansen Office, he should visit the area concerned as soon as it was practicable for him to do so.

The United Kingdom representative said that he would like at this point to clear up a misapprehension concerning Major Thomson's present position which he thought existed in the minds of some of his colleagues. Major Thomson was not a servant of the Iraqi Government in the ordinary sense, *i.e.*, he was not a permanent official. He had been engaged purely temporarily by the Iraqi Government for the sole purpose of carrying out the League decision—the decision of the Council of the 15th December, 1932, regarding Assyrian settlement. He was a doctor, had had considerable administrative experience and knew Assyrian requirements. The objection to sending him to Brazil was the great delay which would be involved, and this objection was a serious one. Moreover, the Iraqi Government might not be able to spare Major Thomson from Iraq, and in that event the committee might wish to consider the despatch of some other suitably qualified person to accompany a Nansen representative to Brazil. Alternatively, it might be possible to arrange for a small commission of consuls from São Paulo to visit the area. This would no doubt be the quickest arrangement, but such a commission would not, of course, have first-hand knowledge of Assyrian requirements, and it was doubtful, therefore, whether its report would possess any greater value than the report of the Swiss counsellor of Legation which was already available. It seemed advisable in any case that a Nansen representative should be associated with any investigation.

As regards political conditions, no doubt the Brazilian Government, before accepting the Assyrians, would require certain information and assurances regarding them. The committee, on its side, would no doubt require information from the Brazilian Government as to the status which the Assyrians would have in Brazil. The machinery for this mutual supply of information had to be set up.

A point which also required consideration was the provision of funds to cover any extra expense over and above its normal budget to which the Nansen Office might be put in carrying out work entrusted to it by the committee, as well as the expense which would be incurred if it were decided to send out someone to make a preliminary investigation in Brazil.

The United Kingdom representative, in conclusion, suggested that, when the outstanding points had been discussed, it might be useful to record the present position of the committee's work in the form of a minute or resolution.

*The President*, on behalf of the committee, expressed appreciation of the United Kingdom representative's statement of the position. He suggested that one of the most important, if not the most important, of the points which had been dealt with therein was that which concerned the financial aspect of the transfer and resettlement of the Assyrians. He felt that, before any further progress could be made, it was essential that the committee should know more clearly how much money was likely to be contributed by the Iraqi Government, and how much it would be possible to obtain from other sources. Clearly, if the contribution of the Iraqi Government was to be limited, as had been suggested by Nuri Pasha privately in conversation, to £40,000, the high cost of the Brazilian proposal would render it impracticable, and other alternatives would have to be sought urgently. The expenditure which would have to be undertaken fell into two categories: (a) Preliminary expenditure which might be incurred in the investigation of likely schemes; (b) the expenditure which would be incurred in the actual execution of the plan of resettlement finally adopted. It might be suggested that expenditure of the first class could be undertaken before the problem of financing the settlement scheme had been resolved. For his part, however, he considered that it would be unwise to incur any financial liabilities whatever until the sources from which money could be obtained to meet them



had been more clearly defined. He did not wish to be indiscreet, but he thought that it would be of interest to all members of the committee to know whether it was probable that financial assistance would be forthcoming from the United Kingdom Government.

*The United Kingdom Representative* replied that he much regretted that he was not in a position to reply to this question or to commit his Government in any way on the point. As the result of the mandate which they had held for Iraq and of their past relations with the Assyrians, the United Kingdom Government had, of course, a peculiarly close interest in the Assyrian question, but they no longer had any greater responsibilities than other members of the Council. The resettlement of the Assyrians, and the financing of it, were questions which concerned the League as a whole, and he would like to suggest that the League Secretariat, in collaboration with the Nansen Office, should prepare a note, for the information of the committee, on the manner in which analogous operations had been financed in the past.

*The Danish Representative* and *Dr. Kerno*, who was representing the League Secretariat, suggested that some financial assistance might be obtainable from ecclesiastical and other benevolent organisations, which from a feeling of Christian solidarity had shown constant interest in the welfare of the Assyrians and their Church.

*The President* asked the United Kingdom representative whether he thought that British organisations of this sort would be prepared to contribute.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that if the committee, as now seemed likely, suspended its work for a few days, he proposed in the interim to go to London, and while there he would be glad to make such informal enquiries as he could as to what financial assistance might be expected from charitable organisations in the United Kingdom. Although he could not promise to be in a position on his return to offer the committee any precise information on this point, he could do his best to explore the ground. Again, however, he saw no reason why assistance from such sources should be expected from the United Kingdom alone. Mention had been made of "Christian solidarity," and he hoped that means might be found, on this basis, of raising funds in other countries, in view of the wide interest taken in the Assyrian question.

*The Danish Representative* pointed out that the committee had already received a communication from the Geneva office of the International Bureau for Church Co-operation, and this and other similar organisations throughout the world would, it might be hoped, respond generously to any appeal for help which the committee might later on think fit to make.

*Dr. Kerno* expressed his willingness to approach the above-named office informally.

*The French Representative* referred to the possibility, which the committee should not overlook, of the Assyrians themselves being able to contribute towards the cost of their transport and resettlement.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he had no personal knowledge of the individual capacity of the Assyrians to pay a contribution of this kind, but he would ask Captain Holt to give the committee any information which he had on this point.

*Captain Holt* said that the capacity of families to pay a contribution towards the cost of their transport and settlement outside Iraq would, of course, vary very much in individual cases. Many of the families who were likely to wish to leave Iraq had suffered heavy loss in the recent disturbances, but others had been quite untouched and should be in a position to contribute substantially towards the cost of their resettlement. Many of the latter might be able to pay as much as £40 or £50, or, in some instances, even more. He thought that most families would be eager to obtain full title to the land on which they would be settled, and that the arrangements outlined by Major Johnson at the meeting which had been held in the morning would be an effective inducement to those who had capital to contribute to the best of their ability towards the expenditure which would be incurred on their behalf.

*The French Representative* mentioned the possibility of raising funds in the United States of America.

After some further general discussion, the *President* said that it appeared that the committee as a whole were in agreement with the observations which the United Kingdom representative had made at the beginning of the meeting, and suggested that some form of resolution should now be adopted accordingly.

*The United Kingdom Representative* intimated that he had, in anticipation of some such suggestion, already prepared, on the basis of the statement which he had made, a tentative draft resolution, which, if the committee desired, he would submit for discussion.

*The President* thanked the United Kingdom representative and asked him to put this draft before the committee for consideration.

A short discussion followed, in the course of which a few minor textual amendments were made to the draft put forward by the United Kingdom representative. The text as adopted is annexed.

Geneva, October 31, 1933.

#### Annex.

##### *Text of Resolution adopted by the Council Committee on October 31, 1933.*

##### THE committee—

Considering that further substantial progress with its work cannot be made pending the receipt of replies—

1. From the Brazilian Government concerning their attitude in principle towards settlement of Assyrians from Iraq in the Brazilian Province of Paraná;
2. From the Iraqi Government regarding—
  - (a) The draft resolution provisionally accepted by the committee on the 28th October, 1933;
  - (b) The financial contribution which they are prepared to offer towards the cost of the resettlement in Brazil of those Assyrians who no longer wish to remain in Iraq;

Decides to ask its president to convene a further meeting as soon as he considers it desirable.

In the meantime the committee requests the League Secretariat—

- (a) To continue its enquiries regarding the possibility of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq in countries other than Brazil.
- (b) To make enquiries as to the most appropriate method of raising such funds for settlement as may be necessary to supplement the eventual contribution of the Iraqi Government.
- (c) Should the reply now awaited from the Brazilian Government be favourable, to prepare for the committee's consideration the draft of an enquiry which might be addressed to the Brazilian Government as to the general conditions under which the Assyrians would be settled in Brazil.

The committee further resolves in principle that, before deciding on the place of settlement, it will cause an independent investigation to be made regarding the suitability of that place for Assyrian settlement.

Finally, it decides that, once a destination has been agreed upon for the Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq, the task of preparing and executing plans for transfer and settlement of these Assyrians shall be entrusted, under conditions which will be defined later by the committee, to the Nansen Office, working in close collaboration, through the League Secretariat, with the Council Committee. In the meanwhile, the committee requests the Nansen Office to continue, without commitment, to study detailed arrangements for the transport of Assyrians to Brazil and their settlement on the land at the disposal of Paraná Plantations (Limited).



[E 6831/105/93]

No. 193.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 9.)*

(No. 450.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bagdad, November 9, 1933.*

REFERENCE is to my telegram No. 437.

His Majesty told me at an interview last night that Yasin Pasha had definitely refused to form a new Cabinet unless he were granted the immediate dissolution of Parliament and complete freedom to choose his new Ministers. His Majesty considered that if he accepted these conditions, the new Parliament would be packed by Yasin with his nominees, and it would be impossible to represent the new Administration as a strong national non-party Government such as we both think the country's interests demand.

It is probable that the King will to-day summon the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Jamil Madfai, to form a Cabinet.

It is likely that the new Cabinet will be composed as follows:—

- (1) Prime Minister: Jamil Madfai.
- (2) Defence and temporary Foreign Affairs: Nuri Pasha.
- (3) Interior: Naji Shaukat.
- (4) Communications and Works: Rustam Haider.
- (5) Finance: Nasrat-al-Farsi.
- (6) Justice: Jamal Baban (Kurd).
- (7) Education: Salih Jabbar (Shiah).

Nasrat-al-Farsi was Minister of Finance in the Naji Shaukat Government of 1932. Jamal Baban was Minister of Justice in the last Cabinet of Nuri Pasha.

It is probable that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs will eventually be given to Naji Suwaidi.

[E 6832/105/93]

No. 194.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 9.)*

(No. 451.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bagdad, November 9, 1933.*

KING is issuing this evening a Royal Irada appointing new Cabinet, as anticipated in my telegram No. 450. There will be no dissolution of Parliament. I consider that the new Cabinet is well balanced and that the Chamber will give it their confidence.

I have urged in private conversation that the combination for a considerable period of two important offices under Nuri Pasha may lead to unnecessary jealousy, and that the work is more than he can cope with. At the present time, however, there is no one better fitted for the post of Minister of Defence.

[E 6887/105/93]

No. 195.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 13.)*

(No. 696.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him translation of the Speech from the Throne, read by King Ghazi, on the opening of the parliamentary session on the 1st November, 1933.

*Bagdad, November 2, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 195.

*Translation of Speech from the Throne, read by King Ghazi, on the opening of the Parliamentary Session on November 1, 1933.*

AS we stand before you this moment with the help of God to open your distinguished Assembly, there rises before us the painful memory of the founder of this State and builder of its glory, my late father and father of the whole nation, whom may God envelope with His mercy and receive into His heavenly paradise.

He left us after a long and continuous struggle, during which he spared neither health nor comfort in the service of this beloved home-land. He died a martyr to duty, bequeathing to us, in the history of his life, which was full of big achievements and great hopes, a high ideal and a source, from which we may draw energy and strength for the realisation of what was his aspiration, and, following in his step, may always proceed forward with our beloved nation. He received the summons of his Lord with a mind well satisfied, commanding us to be united and strong. He will face the Almighty God with a peaceful conscience.

Gentlemen,

Our relations with the various States are proceeding on a basis of good understanding and amity. The development and strengthening of these relations is one of our most special aspirations. The last visit which the one of whom the nation has been bereaved paid to His Majesty King George the Fifth, and the demonstrations of mutual friendship and amity which characterised that visit, have had the happiest effect in the strengthening of the bonds of friendship between the peoples of the two allied States. Similarly, the result of the work of the two ministerial delegations to London and Geneva are such as gives cause for satisfaction.

Some of the Assyrians misunderstanding the objects of our Government brought about a rebellion, which compelled our Government to take disciplinary action against them. The great vigilance which the people exercised during that unfortunate incident has no doubt given a most effective lesson to those who may contemplate prejudicing the peace and unity of this country.

The endeavours exerted by our delegation at Geneva in regard to the removal from Iraq of these dissatisfied Assyrians have borne fruit, and it is confidently hoped that arrangements for the execution of this project will be completed at an early date.

Gentlemen,

Peace and tranquillity prevail throughout the whole Kingdom, thanks to God. Upon its formation the new Cabinet will put up its programme. We have no doubt that all realise the importance of the present circumstances and that every one is doing all that is in his power for the enhancement of the country's position and for raising it to a befitting place among the nations of the world.

We pray the Almighty God to lead your steps into the right path and to grant you success in all your endeavours.

[E 6581/7/93]

No. 196.

*Sir John Simon to Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).*

(No. 724.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 15, 1933.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 669 of the 19th October, regarding the numbers and condition of those Assyrians who are living outside the rest camp at Mosul.

2. In view of the apprehension expressed by the British officials concerned that there may be much distress among these Assyrians during the coming winter, I shall be glad if you will instruct His Majesty's consul at Mosul to keep you fully informed of the situation, and if you will report to me if there are indications that the distress is becoming so serious as to render it desirable to consider the possibility of an appeal to private charity for its alleviation.



3. You will realise that if acute distress, involving possible loss of life, were to occur among these Assyrians, and it were subsequently to be said that such distress could have been alleviated by private charity from this country if the necessary steps had been taken to approach the proper quarters in time, His Majesty's Government might be placed in an invidious and embarrassing position if they had in fact taken no action in the matter.

4. At the same time I am not clear how this distress can be developing in the manner described while Major Thomson and Colonel Stafford are in the area concerned and entrusted with the task of forestalling or relieving it, and I shall be glad to receive your further observations on this aspect of the matter.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 7096/308/93]

No. 197.

*Foreign Office to Law Officers of the Crown.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, November 25, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour, by direction of Secretary Sir John Simon, to invite a reference to the opinion given to the Treasury on the 29th March last by the then Law Officers of the Crown in the matter of the date gardens in Iraq of the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah. Copies of the case submitted to them and of their opinion are enclosed for convenience of reference (Paper A).

2. In view of that opinion it has become necessary to consider whether it would be desirable to submit to arbitration the question whether the Iraqi Government are bound under their treaty obligations towards His Majesty's Government to assume responsibility for implementing the undertakings given in 1914 by His Majesty's Government to the two sheikhs. This question formed the subject of an opinion given by your predecessors to the Colonial Office in 1930, copies of which are enclosed (Paper B), but the situation has changed in certain respects since that opinion was given, and Sir John Simon is accordingly anxious to have the benefit of your opinion as to the prospects of such an arbitration in the circumstances as they now exist.

3. The most important change in the situation is that, while the arbitration contemplated in 1930 would have taken place under the treaty of the 10th October, 1922 (Paper C), the situation is now governed by the treaty of the 30th June, 1930 (Paper D), which, in accordance with article 7 thereof, has now replaced the treaty of 1922. It follows from this that the provision under which the case would have to be referred to arbitration would be article 10 of the 1930 treaty instead of article 17 of that of 1922, while the provision under which it would be contended that the obligations of His Majesty's Government towards the two sheikhs had devolved upon the Government of Iraq would be the second paragraph of article 8 of the later treaty instead of articles 10 and, possibly, 4 of the earlier one.

4. Under article 17 of the 1922 treaty, His Majesty's Government had a right to refer the present question to the Permanent Court of International Justice without the agreement of the Government of Iraq. The effect of article 10 of the 1930 treaty is that the dispute must be submitted either to the Council of the League of Nations or to some form of arbitration. For the purposes of this reference, Sir John Simon thinks that it may be assumed that the Iraqi Government would agree to the question being referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, but, as Iraq has not signed the optional clause, the reference would have to be by special agreement and not by a unilateral written application (see article 40 of the statute of the court). The terms of a special agreement for this purpose would, of course, be a matter for negotiation with the Iraqi Government; but, before these negotiations are opened, Sir John Simon would be glad to know whether, in existing circumstances, you agree with the view expressed by your predecessors in 1930 that any reference to the Permanent Court should, if possible, be framed in the widest possible terms so as to cover all the grounds on which it might be held that the obligation to implement the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government to the two sheikhs has devolved on the Iraqi Government.

5. The question then arises whether those grounds have been affected by the developments which have occurred since 1930. As stated above, the relevant provision of the 1930 treaty is the second paragraph of article 8, which replaces article 10 of the 1922 treaty. Paragraph 3 of the reference by the Colonial Office to your predecessors, dated the 17th May, 1930, shows that, while the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government to the two sheikhs were mentioned to the Iraqi Government after the signature of the 1922 treaty, they were not included in the list of the commitments referred to in article 10; and paragraph 4 of the same reference states what occurred in regard to these undertakings in connexion with the abortive treaty of 1927. After the signature of the 1930 treaty, but before its submission to the Iraqi Parliament, the British High Commissioner in Iraq addressed a note (Paper E) to the Iraqi Prime Minister, in which he referred to the method to be adopted for dealing with these commitments of His Majesty's Government in the list of international obligations devolving upon Iraq under article 8 of the new treaty, and he proposed, in the event of certain negotiations for the possession of the sheikhs' properties not having reached finality before the communication of this list to the Iraqi Government, to insert mention of these obligations towards the sheikhs in the list, but to append a footnote to the effect that, in the event of these negotiations proving unsuccessful, the question would need to be discussed further between the two Governments. The Iraqi Prime Minister replied on the same day (Paper F) that this procedure was acceptable to the Iraqi Government. Accordingly, on the 18th October, 1930, the High Commissioner addressed a letter to the Iraqi Prime Minister (Paper G) in which he referred to the correspondence of the 19th August and enclosed a list of "international instruments referred to in the second paragraph of article 8" of the new treaty, in which the undertakings entered into with the two sheikhs were included, with a footnote in the terms which had been agreed upon. It will be seen, therefore, that, while the undertakings given to the two sheikhs were never officially communicated to the Iraqi Government under article 10 of the 1922 treaty, and while the communication made in 1927 was in connexion with negotiations for a new treaty, which has never come into force, the obligations in question were included in the list officially communicated to the Iraqi Government of the commitments devolving on Iraq under article 8 of the 1930 treaty. To this extent the position of His Majesty's Government would seem to be stronger now than it was in 1930, though the effect of this communication, as showing that the obligations in question have now devolved upon the Government of Iraq, may be somewhat weakened by the statement that, in the event of the negotiations for purchase failing (as, in fact, they have so far done), the question would need to be discussed further between the two Governments.

6. The reasons put forward in paragraph 5 of the reference to your predecessors of the 17th May, 1930, for suggesting that, apart altogether from the express provisions of any treaty, it might be possible to contend that the responsibility in respect of these undertakings had devolved on the Iraqi Government would appear to be unaffected by subsequent developments.

7. As regards the point suggested in paragraph 8 of that reference relating to the fact that the Sheikh of Koweit is an independent sovereign, and consequently not subject to the jurisdiction of the Iraqi courts or authorities, the legal position of the sheikh remains what it was in 1930, but the Istihlak tax (see paragraphs 7 to 9 of the recent reference to you from the Treasury (Paper A)) is a tax of rather a different nature from the tax on the gardens which was under consideration by your predecessors in 1930, and levied in a different manner. It is for consideration whether any contention based on the international status of the sheikh could be supported in the case of the Istihlak tax, except in so far as it is levied on dates which never ceased to be the property of the sheikh. It may also be relevant that, in a case affecting the title to a small date garden (Bashiyeh) included in those the position of which is under consideration judgment was given recently against the sheikh in the Iraqi courts, without, so far as is known, his Excellency having either challenged the jurisdiction of the courts on the ground of his sovereign status or explicitly waived his immunity. Efforts, so far unsuccessful, have also been made to serve a writ on him in respect of the most important of the gardens (Faddaghiyeh). It should be made clear, however, that the acceptance of service without protest in the case of the small



Bashiyeh garden appears to have been an isolated incident, which cannot, it is arguable, carry the weight of a long dealing extending over a course of years, much less operate as a bar to the sheikh's raising the question of sovereignty, and it should be added that, in the event of the suitors in respect of the Faddaghiyeh garden proving successful in their efforts to serve a writ on the sheikh in respect of that garden, his Excellency would be advised formally to raise a plea of sovereignty in the first place, and, if it is overruled, to submit to the jurisdiction of the Iraqi courts only under protest. In this connexion it may also be observed that, according to some writers, questions arising out of the ownership of land within the territory of a foreign State form an exception from the general immunity from process of a foreign sovereign.

8. There remains the question whether, in the event of an arbitration under the treaty of 1930, it would be possible to rely to any extent, should it be desired to do so, on the provisions of the treaty of 1922. On this point it is suggested that, in order to answer the question whether, under article 8 (2) of the treaty of 1930, the undertakings given to the sheikhs had devolved on Iraq, a court would have to go into the whole previous history of the matter, including what had taken place under the treaty of 1922, and, in particular, the position under article 10 of that treaty. In 1930 it was also proposed to rely to some extent upon article 4 of the 1922 treaty, and it is suggested that some use could still be made of this point, on the ground that Iraq had, during the currency of the 1922 treaty, been under an obligation to ask the advice of His Majesty's Government under article 4 with regard to these undertakings, and had failed to do so.

9. I have accordingly the honour to request you to be so good as to take the enclosed papers into your consideration and to favour Sir John Simon with your opinion upon the following points:—

- (1) Whether, in the event of the matter being submitted to arbitration, there would be a reasonable possibility of its being held that the Iraqi Government are bound to implement the undertakings given to the two sheikhs.
- (2) Whether, in any other respect, the opinion given by your predecessors in 1930 requires modification in the light of existing circumstances.

In dealing with the above questions, you will perhaps be so good as to give your opinion upon the force in the present circumstances of the different arguments suggested in the reference to your predecessors in 1930.

10. Sir John Simon would also be grateful for any observations of a general character which you may be good enough to offer.

I have, &c.  
G. W. RENDEL.

Enclosure in No. 197.

Paper A.

Treasury case submitted to Law Officers, and opinion (March 29, 1933) (E 1735/308/93/33).

Paper B.

Law Officers' opinion given to Colonial Office, 1930 (Confidential, 13925, p. 15).

Paper C.

Treaty of October 10, 1922 (Cmd. 2370).

Paper D.

Treaty of June 30, 1930 (Cmd. 3797).

[E 6272/41/93]

Paper E.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Iraqi Prime Minister.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*London, August 19, 1930.*

IN the course of our conversations on the subject of the immunity from taxation enjoyed by the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit in respect of their date gardens in Iraq, your Excellency and I discussed the method of dealing with this matter in the list of international obligations devolving upon Iraq under article 8 of the Treaty of Alliance signed on the 30th June, 1930, which I have undertaken to communicate to your Excellency before the Iraq Parliament is invited to approve of the ratification of the treaty. As I have informed your Excellency, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom approve of your proposal that the Iraq Government should open private negotiations with the sheikhs for the purchase of their properties in Iraq.

It is possible, however, that these negotiations may not have reached finality before the time comes for me to communicate the above list to the Iraq Government. In such event, His Majesty's Government propose to insert mention of the obligation towards the sheikhs in the list, but at the same time to append a footnote to the effect that private negotiations are proceeding with a view to the liquidation of this obligation, and that if these are unsuccessful the question will need to be discussed further between the two Governments.

I shall be glad to learn from your Excellency that this procedure will be acceptable to the Iraq Government.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Paper F.

*Iraqi Prime Minister to Sir F. Humphrys.*

Sir,

*London, August 19, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of to-day's date, relative to the method of dealing, in the list of international obligations devolving upon Iraq under article 8 of the Treaty of Alliance signed on the 30th June, 1930, with the question of the immunity from taxation enjoyed by the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit in respect of their date gardens in Iraq.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the procedure indicated in the second paragraph of your letter is acceptable to the Iraq Government.

I have, &c.  
NOURY SAID.

Paper G.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Iraqi Prime Minister.*

(Confidential.)

My dear Prime Minister,

*Bagdad, October 18, 1930.*

WILL you please refer to your Excellency's letter dated the 30th June, 1930, addressed to me on the occasion of the signature of the new Anglo-Iraq Treaty, asking to be furnished in due course with a complete list of the international instruments referred to in the second paragraph of article 8 of the treaty.

I have now received from His Britannic Majesty's Government a list of these instruments, of which I enclose a copy for your Excellency's information. His Britannic Majesty's Government desire me to explain that, although an exhaustive examination has been made of the various international instruments to which His Majesty's Government are a party, and which involves them in some degree of responsibility in respect of Iraq, it is possible, although unlikely, that the present list may not prove to be exhaustive, and that instruments which would properly fall within the category envisaged in the second paragraph of article 8 may later be found to have been overlooked.



I should also explain that only those instruments have been included in the accompanying list which might be held to involve a continuing obligation on the part of His Majesty's Government after the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations and thus to call for the process of substitution contemplated in the second paragraph of article 8, and that no instruments have been included creating obligations of such a character that they must, in so far as the responsibility of His Majesty's Government is concerned, terminate automatically upon the termination of the mandatory régime.

With regard to item 1 on the accompanying list, I would invite your Excellency's attention to the notes exchanged between your Excellency and myself on the 19th August on the subject of the immunity from taxation enjoyed by the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit in respect of their date gardens in Iraq.

Yours sincerely,  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

*List of International Instruments referred to in the second paragraph of Article 8 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of June 30, 1930.*

1. Undertakings entered into with the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah in 1914 in respect of their date gardens in Iraq.<sup>(1)</sup>
2. The San Remo Oil Agreement, the 25th April, 1920.
3. The Anglo-French Boundary Convention, the 23rd December, 1920.
4. The Treaty Settlement of Lausanne, the 24th July, 1923.
5. The Treaty of Angora, the 5th June, 1926.

<sup>(1)</sup> Private negotiations are proceeding with a view to the liquidation of this commitment. If these are unsuccessful, the question will need to be discussed further between the two Governments.

[E 7238/105/93]

No. 198.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 27.)*

(No. 720.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, November 16, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 451 of the 9th November, I have the honour to inform you that the new Cabinet formed by Jamil Beg-al-Madfa'i faced the Chamber for the first time on the 1st November. The omission of Yasin Pasha from the Cabinet is, in my opinion, not so significant as it might appear at first sight to be. The reason for the resignation of the late Prime Minister, Rashid Ali Beg, was the refusal of King Ghazi to dissolve Parliament, and Yasin Pasha informed me that he felt bound in honour to Rashid Ali, rather than to personal conviction, to decline to form a new Government or, indeed, to become a member of it, unless the King gave way on this point. Yasin Pasha assures me, however, that he does not intend to embarrass the young King by opposing the new Government in Parliament, and that he hopes to be of some service to King Ghazi and his country by giving advice behind the scenes when asked to do so. Possibly his intention is to join the Cabinet later or to accept the premiership after a decent interval in case the present Government fails to retain His Majesty's confidence, remembering that in normal circumstances the life of an Iraqi Cabinet does not last more than a few months.

2. The session opened with the first reading of the National Service Law, which was received with acclamation. Then followed the election of a president to fill the vacancy created by Jamil Beg's appointment to the premiership. The choice of the Chamber fell upon Rashid Beg-al-Khoja, formerly Iraqi consul-general at Beirut. He was the Government candidate and his election by sixty-six votes out of the seventy-three cast may be taken as a vote of confidence in the new Cabinet.

3. After the election of the president the Prime Minister made a statement on the policy of the new Government, the full text of which forms an enclosure to this despatch. This vague mixture of platitudes and pious hopes sheds very little

light on the principles which will guide the Cabinet in governing and administering the country, but I think that it may be assumed that, in its main lines, their policy will differ very little from that of the last Cabinet.

4. At the close of the meeting the president read out a Royal iradah proroguing Parliament for a period of thirty days.

5. The National Service Law mentioned in paragraph 2 above will form the subject of a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 198.

*Translation of Speech delivered by the Prime Minister in the Chamber of Deputies on November 12, 1933.*

DEPENDING on assistance from the Almighty and on the valuable confidence placed in it by His Majesty the King, our Cabinet ventured upon assuming the burden of government, realising the importance of the responsibility placed on its shoulders and resolved to lead the country forward on the road to power and advancement.

Gentlemen! The object of this Cabinet in regard to foreign policy is to maintain the relations of amity and friendship obtaining between this State and other States, and to endeavour to strengthen and fortify these relations on the basis of an exchange of benefits.

In regard to domestic affairs, the Cabinet's immediate object is to strengthen the spirit of tranquillity in the souls of the people. As you are aware, tranquillity is the foundation of progress, which can be made only in an atmosphere of peace and order, in which each individual realises both his rights and his obligations. Personal right is a sacred thing, and the carrying out of our obligations towards the society in which we live is a vital necessity. To urge the discharge of individual obligations, to develop the civil conscience of the nation by instilling respect for the provisions of the Constitution and for democratic traditions, to avoid biased proceedings prejudicial to the public interest, these are among the most important objects of the Cabinet. The nation's need for these matters is a pressing one, and the Cabinet is intent on securing them by all possible means.

Former Cabinets presented to you many detailed programmes, in which reference was made to the necessity of ensuring justice, of lending attention to health and educational affairs, of strengthening national defence, of expanding agriculture and irrigation, of mitigating the effects of the economic crisis, of developing the country's economic resources, &c. There is no difference of opinion over these matters as being essential constituents of national existence, and as being most needed by Iraq of all nations. It is equally essential, in our opinion, so to dispose of the moral and material forces of the country as to ensure the quickest and least costly exploitation thereof.

During the last ten years this country made considerable progress. Bearing in mind that we are still in an early stage of reconstruction, we should double our efforts in the service of our beloved country.

The Government will exert themselves to the utmost for the realisation of those objects and for the development of the country with the greatest possible expedition. Detailed plans will be disclosed later on, when they are laid before you.

Upon assuming the burden of responsibility, the Cabinet held before itself for guidance the last words of the great departed one and founder of this nation, in which he urged the nation to be strong and united. In fact, unity is the foundation of strength; it demands co-operation and collaboration between the Government and the various classes of the people. With this principle in view, the Cabinet introduces itself to the whole nation, seeking support in its endeavours for the revival of the nation's old glories and for the enhancement of its position.



[E 7437/7/93]

No. 199.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 4.)*

(No. 735.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 22, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Iraqi Government have now taken the necessary steps to give effect to the first part of the resolution of the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations referred to in my telegram No. 456 of the 13th November.

2. A local committee has been constituted in Mosul, under the presidency of Major D. B. Thomson, in accordance with the declared intention of the Iraqi Government, and I enclose herewith a copy of the letter and enclosures in which Major Thomson has been given instructions as to the manner in which this local committee are to proceed with the first phase of their work.

3. The Iraqi Government are forwarding copies of their instructions to Major Thomson, and of their circular to the Assyrians, to the Committee of the Council for their information, and are also preparing a report containing the information called for in paragraph 5 of the report of the Spanish representative adopted by the committee on the 14th October. I will endeavour to obtain and forward to you a copy of this report when it has been completed.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 199.

*Ministry of Interior to Major Thomson, Assyrian Settlement Expert, Mosul.*

November 21, 1933.

BY a resolution passed on the 13th October, 1933, the Council of the League of Nations stated that the greatest difficulty of the Assyrian question was that a part of the Assyrian population who live in Iraq did not look upon itself as permanently and finally incorporated in the Iraqi State, and would, in fact, prefer to leave Iraq and be resettled in another country if given the necessary facilities; it then set up a committee of its members to consider (a) whether a solution by settlement outside Iraq of Assyrians unwilling to stay would be feasible, and, (b) if so, to take, in close co-operation with the Iraqi Government, the necessary steps for the preparation and execution of a detailed scheme for settlement outside Iraq of such Assyrians as might express the desire to leave the country, it being clearly understood that the Assyrians who remained in Iraq would be regarded as the minority to which, on the one hand, the provisions of the Iraqi Declaration on the protection of minorities would apply, and which, on the other, would be bound by the obligations of loyalty to the State which the Assembly of the League of Nations has specifically emphasised.

2. I forward herewith copy of a resolution passed, with the agreement of the Iraqi Government, by the above-mentioned Committee of the Council, defining the procedure to be followed in Iraq.

3. I hereby appoint you president of the committee charged with the task of explaining the resolution of the League Council to the Assyrians. Major W. C. F. A. Wilson, Administrative Inspector, Mosul, will be vice-president. The kaïmakams or mudirs affected will join the committee as members in their respective administrative units.

4. You should arrange to summon representative Assyrians and village headmen to convenient centres and distribute to them copies, in Syriac, of the accompanying announcement and give them any further explanations they may require.

*Minister of Interior.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 199.

*Copy of Resolution.*

COMMITTEE takes note of intention of Iraqi Government to nominate local committee, consisting of land settlement expert, an administrative inspector, the interested kaïmakam or nahiya mudir, according to local circumstances, and the Assyrian village headman concerned, to proceed forthwith to explain to Assyrians exact meaning of decision of Council of League of Nations, and that a committee of the Council is actively examining plans for its execution.

As soon as possible after place of settlement has been definitely fixed, a representative of the Nansen Office for Refugees appointed by that office in agreement with president of Committee of Council will proceed to Iraq to collaborate with above-mentioned local committee and local authorities in task of—

- (a) Ascertaining what persons wish to leave the country.
- (b) Taking all necessary measures required for their departure, such as liquidation of property, participation by intending emigrants in cost of transport and resettlement, conveyance from their homes to the port selected, &c.

Full reports on work will be forwarded through Iraqi Government to Committee of Council.

Enclosure 3 in No. 199.

*Copy of Announcement.*

To the Assyrians,

THE League of Nations has understood that a number of Iraqi (including ex-Ottoman) Assyrians do not wish to stay in Iraq. It has therefore set up a committee to examine the possibility of finding a place outside Iraq for the resettlement of those Assyrians who express their wish to leave Iraq.

2. It must be known to all that the committee formed by the League Council has not yet found a suitable place. As soon as such a place has been found you will be informed, and a committee which has been formed under my presidency in collaboration with a representative of the Nansen Organisation for Refugees will then tour the villages inhabited by Assyrians and enquire from each family in each village whether it wishes to stay in Iraq or to go to the new place of settlement. Every head of a family will have perfect liberty to say whether he wishes to go or to stay. Arrangements for the transport of the families who wish to go to the place fixed will then be made in collaboration with the Nansen representative.

3. We should like to repeat here that the new place for settlement has not yet been found, and it is probable, therefore, that a considerable period will elapse before the arrangements for transport are completed. It is very unlikely that anyone will be moved before next July. It is also probable that, at first at any rate, only cultivators will be accepted in the new settlement. It is therefore most important that the Assyrians shall stay in their villages and carry on with their cultivation and other agricultural pursuits. In this way they can maintain themselves, and when the time comes those who wish to go will start their new life with greater chances of success and prosperity.

4. Those Assyrians who wish to stay in Iraq are perfectly free to do so. They may confidently expect the same protection of life and property as is enjoyed by all other Iraqis; the guarantee regarding the minorities given by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations will apply to them. But they must understand that they are nothing but Iraqi subjects and are bound to obey the laws and be loyal to the Iraqi Government.



[E 7426/7/93]

No. 200.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 4.)*

(No. 265.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the eighth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council on the 29th November respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*Geneva, December 1, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 200.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 10.30 A.M. on November 29, 1933.*

The President said that the meeting had been called in order to exchange views on the various outstanding questions prior to further discussions with Major Johnson, Secretary-General of the Office, and M. Shabandar, Iraqi permanent delegate in Geneva, both of whom, he suggested, should be invited to attend the next meeting of the committee.

*Constitution of Local Committee in Iraq.*

Dr. Kerno reported that the resolution provisionally adopted by the Council Committee at its sixth meeting on the 31st October regarding the local organisation to be set up in Iraq to prepare for the removal of the Assyrians had since been accepted by the Iraqi Government, and the president, in accordance with the authority given to him by the Council Committee, had ordered its publication. The text had been circulated to the committee in Document C/Min.Ass./11.

*Financial Contribution of the Iraqi Government.*

Dr. Kerno circulated copies of a letter sent to the Iraqi permanent delegate on the 17th November (see Annex) enquiring whether the Iraqi Government had taken a decision regarding its financial contribution towards the Brazilian scheme.

No reply having been received, it was agreed that M. Shabandar should be asked, when he attended the next meeting of the committee, whether he was in a position to state his Government's decision.

*Correspondence with the Brazilian Government.*

Dr. Kerno explained that several reminders had been addressed to the Brazilian Minister at Berne. The latter had sent to Rio de Janeiro by mail various documents communicated to him by the League Secretariat and did not feel able to press his Government for a reply until they had received these documents. He had promised to telegraph on the 20th November, and M. Azcarate had since pressed him to do so again.

The President offered to go to Berne to see the Brazilian Minister personally and explain to him the present position and the urgency of the matter in the hope of inducing him to put pressure on his Government to extract from them an early reply.

The members of the committee welcomed this proposal, and it was arranged that the president should, if possible, go to Berne on the 30th November.

*Correspondence with the Government of Ecuador.*

The President drew attention to the letter of the 11th November from the Ecuadorean Minister at Berne, which had been circulated to the committee. He

pointed out that, whereas in the first place the Ecuadorean Minister had given the impression that he was putting forward an offer on behalf of his Government, the letter of the 11th November showed that he had taken a purely personal initiative. The letter was of a very vague nature, and it was evident that there was little hope of any practicable scheme of settlement in Ecuador.

Dr. Kerno observed that, in the letter sent to the Ecuadorean Minister in accordance with the decision of the committee at its second meeting, a request had been made for a concrete scheme. The letter of the 11th November was not in any way concrete. The Secretariat had replied by giving such information as was available regarding the Assyrians.

It was agreed not to pursue the matter further for the time being, but to leave it open.

*Correspondence with Ecclesiastical Organisations.*

Dr. Kerno explained that letters had been circulated from the Inter-Church Aid Bureau and the Christian Social Council of Great Britain in order that the committee might, if it thought fit, approach those organisations with regard to a financial contribution. His private enquiries *vis-à-vis* of the Inter-Church Aid Bureau had not led him to expect any substantial financial assistance from that body.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that, at the seventh meeting of the committee, he had undertaken, while in London, to make informal enquiries, if possible, as to the amount of financial assistance which might be expected from ecclesiastical and charitable sources in Great Britain. An enquiry of this sort was clearly one of some difficulty, and it was hard to form any reliable opinion as to what amount of money might be expected to be raised. He had been advised, however, from a quarter which had experience of this kind of work, that it might be possible, if an appeal were properly launched and organised, to raise perhaps as much as £25,000. It was doubtful if more than this could be obtained. This was, of course, a purely personal opinion and given merely by way of indication. The United Kingdom representative said that it had been suggested to him that the best method of procedure would be to set aside some particular item of the total cost of any settlement scheme and issue an appeal to ecclesiastical and charitable organisations to cover that particular item. He recalled that, in the latest report of the Nansen Office (Document C/Min.Ass./13), the suggestion was made that the representative of the Nansen Office, who might be ultimately appointed to superintend the settlement operations in Parana, should have at his disposal a fund for social services. It seemed appropriate that this fund should be provided from private charitable sources, but they might also perhaps be asked to contribute towards the cost of the maintenance of the Assyrians during the first nine months in Brazil.

The President thanked the United Kingdom representative for this information and said that the possibility of setting aside some particular item to be covered by private contributions would be borne in mind.

*Possibility of Contributions from American Sources.*

Dr. Kerno said that he had taken soundings on this point, but had met with discouraging replies. In view of the present internal situation in the United States and the amount of unemployment which existed there, it appeared to be quite useless to expect contributions towards Assyrian resettlement from the United States.

*Investigation in Brazil.*

The President recalled that the committee had resolved in principle to institute an independent investigation into the Brazilian scheme of settlement, and he desired to know whether the members of the committee were definitely of opinion that such an investigation should take place. He understood that the president of the Nansen Office was very anxious that there should be an independent investigation before the Nansen Office assumed responsibility for the scheme. The president said that he thought that the investigation would have to be dependent upon the reply of the Brazilian Government regarding their



willingness in principle to accept the Assyrians. He understood that the Nansen Office were willing to pay the expenses of a Nansen representative, and that there would be no difficulty about the payment from League funds of the expenses of an Assyrian expert, if it were decided to send one. As a matter of form, however, this would require the consent of the President of the Council, acting on the recommendation of the Secretary-General.

*The French Representative* expressed the view that it was desirable for an investigation to take place. As regards the association with it of an Assyrian expert, he suggested that it might be possible to find such an expert from among the British officers who had commanded the Assyrians in Iraq.

*Dr. Kerno* explained that the Nansen Office had wished their representative to be M. Burnier, who was actually their representative in Syria and engaged in the work of Armenian settlement there. M. Werner had pointed out that, if M. Burnier went to Brazil, it would be necessary for him to pay a short prior visit to Iraq to acquaint himself with Assyrian requirements. A telegram had been sent to M. Burnier to ascertain whether he was able to go to Brazil, and it appeared from his reply that this was unfortunately quite impossible, owing to the work on which he was at present engaged.

*The President* said that an enquiry certainly seemed desirable to him, as in the absence of such an enquiry, the committee would be taking a heavy responsibility.

*The Italian Representative* agreed.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he also agreed with the president. In addition to safeguarding the responsibility of the Council Committee, it was also necessary to convince the Assyrians that the proposed scheme was suitable. The possibility must also be borne in mind that the Assyrians might eventually refuse to go to Brazil. In that case it would be desirable that the Council Committee should be in a position to demonstrate beyond doubt to public opinion that the scheme offered to the Assyrians was one which it was unreasonable of them to refuse. The United Kingdom delegate said that he felt that the Nansen Office ought to be associated with the proposed investigation, and that it was desirable that someone with personal knowledge of Assyrian requirements should also be associated with it. He hoped in a short time to be able to suggest a suitable candidate as an Assyrian expert, but was not yet in a position to do so.

The question was raised whether the committee had power to send investigators to Brazil without a decision by the League Council. It was pointed out that wide powers had been delegated to the committee by the Council, which covered all steps necessary to ascertain the practicability of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq, and of preparing and executing plans. It was agreed therefore that the committee had the necessary power and that it was unnecessary to have a legal opinion on this point, as had been suggested by the Danish representative.

*Dr. Kerno* said that the Treasury of the League were very reluctant to find the funds necessary for the investigation.

It was the general feeling of the committee, however, that the expenses of the investigation, other than those which the Nansen Office were willing to bear, ought to be borne by the League.

*The Danish Representative* referred to the delay which might be caused by the enquiry. The members of the commission of enquiry might not be immediately available, might have to go first to Iraq to ascertain Assyrian requirements, and a considerable time would be taken up by their journey out to Brazil, their stay there, and their return.

*The French Representative* pointed out that, if an Assyrian expert were associated with the enquiry, no prior visit to Iraq should be necessary.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he understood that it would be possible to leave Bordeaux on the 16th December by a ship which arrived at Santos on the 29th December. The journey of the Swiss counsellor, who had previously visited the area concerned, showed that the headquarters of Parana

Plantations (Limited) could be reached in two days. The enquiry on the spot should not take very long, although it might be desirable also for the investigators to discuss matters with the Provincial Government concerned and even with the Central Government in Rio. It seemed unnecessary, however, to await the return of the investigators to Europe. It should be possible for them to send a telegraphic report to the Council Committee of a nature which would permit the committee to take decisions.

It was agreed to arrange matters if possible so that the investigators would be in a position to leave by the 16th December, thus giving an opportunity for a decision on the place of settlement to be taken before the meeting of the League Council in January next.

The suggestion was made that it might be desirable to associate with the investigation M. Redard, the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio, or some other person with local knowledge.

#### *Enquiry regarding Possibilities of Settlement elsewhere than in Brazil.*

*The President* recalled that, in the committee's resolution of the 31st October, the League Secretariat had been requested to continue its enquiries as to the possibility of settling the Assyrians in countries other than Brazil. He asked whether the enquiries of the Secretariat had produced any result.

*Dr. Kerno* replied in the negative. He saw no alternative to Brazil, unless one of the British Dominions were prepared to take the Assyrians. He observed that the United Kingdom representative, at the seventh meeting of the committee, had undertaken to make enquiries on this point.

*The United Kingdom Representative* replied that *Dr. Kerno* was under a misapprehension. At the seventh meeting of the committee he (the United Kingdom representative) had said that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were still making enquiries as to whether there was any place in the Colonial Empire, *i.e.*, the colonies and dependencies of the United Kingdom. He had also said that he was unaware of any place in those colonies and dependencies where the Assyrians could be settled. The enquiries of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were still proceeding, and he was not yet therefore in a position to make a definite statement. He could say, however, that no suitable place had yet been discovered. Most of the territories which might at first sight seem suitable were either already overpopulated or had an unemployment problem or did not contain available land. In others, the Assyrians could not be introduced without creating serious racial problems.

As regards the Dominions, the United Kingdom representative pointed out that he had already endeavoured to make it clear that he could not speak on their behalf. So far as his information went, however, he doubted whether any suitable place could be found in the Dominions. If the committee wished, however, to make quite sure on this point, he suggested that the most suitable course was for the League Secretariat to approach the Dominion Governments direct. With regard to *Dr. Kerno's* statement that no alternatives to Brazil had yet come to light, he asked whether enquiries had actually been made into possibilities in the Argentine and in Abyssinia.

*Dr. Kerno* replied that, so far as the League's information went, the Argentine Government appeared to be unlikely to accept the Assyrians.

*The Italian Representative*, on the strength of personal experience of Abyssinia, expressed the view that that country would be quite unsuitable.

*The Danish Representative* said that he had understood that the northern territory in Australia might be possible.

*Dr. Kerno* undertook to make further enquiries regarding the Argentine and Australia.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked whether the League Secretariat had been able to make any progress regarding the other enquiry which they had been requested to make in the committee's resolution of the 31st October, namely, as to the manner in which funds should be raised to supplement the eventual Iraqi contribution.



Dr. Kerno said that the Nansen Office had only funds for its own establishment. These were derived partly from the League budget and partly from the proceeds of the sale of Nansen stamps. In carrying out refugee work the normal method of the Nansen Office had been to issue appeals for funds, signed by eminent persons, such as, for instance, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood. There had been cases in which individual Governments had made contributions. He understood that such a contribution had been made on one occasion by the Norwegian Government. Dr. Kerno thought the only means of raising such funds as might be necessary to supplement the Iraqi contribution and whatever the Assyrians themselves could pay would be by an appeal issued by the Nansen Office.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that at the seventh meeting of the committee he had been asked whether any contribution might be expected from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. He had indicated then that His Majesty's Government considered the matter to be one which concerned the League as a whole, and it was for that reason that he had suggested that the League Secretariat should prepare a note on the manner in which analogous operations had been financed in the past. Since the date of the committee's last meeting, the question had been considered by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and he was now authorised to state that, in their view, the cost of resettling the Assyrians, in so far as it was not met by the Iraqi Government or by the Assyrians themselves, should be borne by the League as a whole. His Majesty's Government were for their part willing to pay their share of the League contribution, but could only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme. The United Kingdom representative pointed out that Dr. Kerno had so far spoken only of schemes financed by the Nansen Office. It would be interesting to know whether a scheme in any way analogous had been financed by the League, and, if so, in precisely what manner it had been done.

Dr. Kerno said that he could recall no suitable precedent, but he would make further enquiries into the matter.

The French Representative expressed doubt whether a League contribution was practicable. He could think of no State which would be prepared to contribute.

The Danish Representative raised the question whether a League scheme was constitutionally possible, and the President and the Italian Representative made it clear that they shared his doubt on this point.

The opinion was expressed that the committee could certainly not accept financial responsibility of this nature on behalf of the League, and that it was doubtful whether even the Council could do so. The point seemed to be one which could only be decided by the Assembly of the League.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that a legal opinion on this point should be obtained. While he disclaimed any desire to enter into past history in detail, he felt it necessary to point out that His Majesty's Government considered that the root of the present trouble lay in the decision of the League Council in 1925, when it determined the boundary between Iraq and Turkey.

In spite of the most earnest representations of His Majesty's Government and the statement made by the British representative that the decision would remove any hope of settling the Assyrians in a compact group in that part of the world, the League had assigned the old homelands of the Assyrians, in the Hakkari territory, to Turkey. It was for this reason that His Majesty's Government felt that the resettlement of the Assyrians should be a League responsibility.

The French Representative and the President of the committee deprecated any discussion of responsibility and expressed the view that, if the committee attempted to concern itself with such questions, it would be straying far outside its competence. The president was inclined to think, and his view was evidently shared by the other members of the committee other than the United Kingdom representative, that the utmost which it would be possible for the committee to do would be, in its report to the Council in January next, to state the cost of the

Brazilian scheme, if adopted, the amount of the Iraqi contribution, and the amount, if it could be ascertained, of what might be expected from the Assyrians themselves. The committee would then simply point out that there remained a balance, and that it was for the Council to decide how this balance was to be met.

The general view of the members of the committee, other than the United Kingdom representative, appeared to be that probably the only course open to the Council would be to issue an appeal for funds from public and private sources.

While on the subject of finance, the French Representative referred to the problem of liquidating the property of the Assyrians in Iraq before their removal to Brazil. If such property were placed on the market at the same time, the effect would be to reduce prices, and it was necessary to guard against the Assyrians being the losers in this way. He suggested that the matter was one in which the Iraqi Government might well take the responsibility. He thought that the prices should be fixed by the Nansen representative who eventually went out to Iraq, and that the Iraqi Government should agree to pay these prices. It was possible that the proceeds might be formed into a "caisse," which should be used to defray the expenses of settlement, the amount being credited to the individual Assyrians concerned as a refund of the money spent on their settlement.

The President expressed the view that this was an interesting suggestion which might be borne in mind, but which could more properly be discussed at a later stage.

It was agreed that Major Johnson should be invited to attend the next meeting of the committee to give any necessary explanations regarding the report of the conversations in London.

The question was raised whether the Iraqi permanent delegate in Geneva should be asked to attend this meeting.

The United Kingdom Representative expressed the view that, as the whole scheme largely depended on the financial contribution which the Iraqi Government would provide, it was desirable to keep the Iraqi delegate as far as possible *au courant* with the discussions on the Brazilian scheme. He suggested that it might be desirable, therefore, to invite the Iraqi delegate to attend the next meeting.

This was agreed to, and the President said that he would take the opportunity of asking the Iraqi Government whether the local committee provided for in the Council Committee's resolution on the local organisation to be set up in Iraq had in fact yet been established; and whether the reply of the Iraqi Government had yet been received regarding the amount of the contribution which they were prepared to make to the Brazilian scheme if adopted.

J. STERNDAL BENNETT.

#### Annex to Enclosure.

#### Note to the Iraqi Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations.

M. le Délégué permanent,

Genève, le 17 novembre 1933.

DANS son rapport présenté au Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 14 octobre 1933, M. de Madariaga, représentant de l'Espagne, a constaté que le Gouvernement de l'Irak s'était déclaré disposé à contribuer, aussi généreusement que le lui permettaient ses propres moyens, à faciliter l'établissement en dehors de l'Irak des Assyriens qui voudraient quitter le pays. Dans des conversations officieuses avec les membres du Comité du Conseil, son Excellence Nouri Pacha a bien voulu promettre de saisir sans délai son Gouvernement de cette question.

Le Comité du Conseil devant reprendre ses travaux dans quelques jours, son président m'a chargé de vous faire connaître qu'il serait très heureux de savoir si votre Gouvernement a déjà pu prendre une décision au sujet du montant de sa contribution financière. Il serait évidemment désirable que cette contribution soit de telle nature qu'elle permette au comité d'envisager un plan concret d'établissement avec de grandes possibilités de succès.



A titre de simple indication, je me permets d'ajouter que, d'après les négociations préliminaires du Secrétaire général de l'Office Nansen avec la Parana Plantation Limited, le coût total du transport et de l'établissement de 2,000 familles de cinq personnes (au total 10,000 personnes) s'élèverait à environ 300,000 livres sterling.

Veuillez, &c.  
AZCARATE,  
Secrétaire général adjoint.

[E 7467/7/93]

No. 201.

*Note of Conversation between the Chaldean Patriarch and Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.—(Communicated by His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad, November 23; Received December 5.)*

THE Chaldean Patriarch came to see me on the 21st November, accompanied by his English-speaking procurator. The visit had no special object other than courtesy.

The conversation naturally turned on—

- (1) The position of the Christians in general.
- (2) The Assyrians in particular.

The Chaldean Patriarch, as an Iraqi and as head of the largest denomination of native Christians and being the only prelate in the Senate, can, not unreasonably in the circumstances such as the present, be regarded in some way as representative of the whole Christian body. His services towards pacification and the avoidance of further massacres in the north last August will not lightly be forgotten.

With regard to (1), he said that the action of the extremist Assyrians had inflicted a wound on all Christians here which would take years to heal. The Assyrians had raised the bogey of religious war and intolerance, which in Mesopotamia had been laid a century ago. It was touch and go with the big Christian villages of Tel Kaif and Alqosh. The latter would certainly have shown fight against the army, and the result would have been a general pogrom of Christians all over the country. He added that his relations with the then Minister of the Interior, Hikmet Sulaimani, were very good, and he had no difficulty whatever in persuading the Ghazi to visit Alqosh to note the large number of his Christian subjects there and their loyalty to the throne. Nevertheless, the present situation of all Christians was very difficult, certain passions having been aroused in the hearts of the meaner spirits, especially in certain circles in Mosul. Those in authority wished, in certain cases, to attack the Christians for their own private ends, and were prepared to incite the mob on grounds of religion.

His companion also mentioned that now that the British had surrendered their mandate the Christians were worse off than in the Turkish days, when the Turks at least favoured them as a counterweight to the Arabs, when their schools had better treatment and when Government appointments were more open to them than at present. French protection made itself felt in those days, but now the Christians had only the guarantee made by Iraq to the League, and one year had not elapsed before they had experience of how these guarantees were respected. This was the opinion of the Christians of all denominations.

2. With regard to the Assyrians, the Patriarch said that from two to three thousand were given shelter and protection by the other Christians, with whom a certain number of Assyrians still remained. Certain Assyrian leaders had thanked him. Provided they were allowed to retain their arms a great number would have been content to have settled down in Iraq, as they enjoyed special fiscal privileges, and the Arabs would not dare to attack them. But it was the provocative attitude of the Patriarchal family and of their supporters and the desire to maintain the temporal power of the Mar Shimun that proved their

undoing. He thought that they would not go to Brazil even at the bidding of the Mar Shimun, and hinted that the saner elements in Iraqi politics would be very sorry to lose a great many of the Assyrians, who would form a defence against the Turks.

The old man was clear and coherent in spite of his 83 years.

G. O.-F.

November 23, 1933.

[E 7480/7/93]

No. 202.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 5.)*

(No. 266.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the ninth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 29th November, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*Geneva, December 3, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 202.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 4 P.M. on November 29, 1933.*

AT the beginning of the meeting, in addition to the members of the committee, the permanent Iraqi delegate—M. Shabandar—was present and on behalf of the Nansen Office, M. Werner, the President, and Major Johnson, the Secretary-General.

The President explained that the meeting had been called to give an opportunity to the members of the committee to raise any questions suggested by the record of the recent conversations in London between Paraná Plantations (Limited) and Major Johnson (Document C/Min. Ass/13) and to give an opportunity to Major Johnson to make any supplementary observations which he thought necessary.

Major Johnson said that there were two or three points which he would like to bring out. The first was that payment to Paraná Plantations (Limited) was to be at the rate of exchange of the day, on the understanding that the company would not accept payment at less than 4d. to the milreis, and would not expect the League to pay at a higher rate than 4½d. to the milreis. He observed that payment was not to be made all at once, but in three instalments spread over twelve months. Another point which he wished to emphasise was that the company required two and a half months' notice of the arrival of the first batch of settlers. This was necessary in view of the preparatory work which had to be done, e.g., clearing, building of roads, preparation of camps and transport, &c. If notice were given by the 1st January, 1934, it was hoped to settle all the Assyrians during 1934, but if the notice was delayed beyond the 1st January, the accomplishment of the task would be correspondingly retarded.

M. Werner said that before the committee proceeded to discuss Major Johnson's report in detail there were one or two general observations which he would like to make. The resolution which the Council Committee had passed regarding the organisation to be set up in Iraq provided that a representative of the Nansen Office should go to Iraq to collaborate with the local committee and with the local authorities in certain tasks. In order that the Nansen representative might have a clear idea of the position, there was one point which it was necessary to establish, namely, the freedom of the Assyrians to choose whether they would remain in Iraq or go elsewhere. M. Werner recalled that the rapporteur's report to the Council of the 13th October contemplated a scheme



for the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq "of such Assyrians as might express the desire to leave the country." He understood that Assyrians who did not want to go were quite free to stay in Iraq and that no pressure was to be brought upon them to leave. He knew that the League Secretariat shared this understanding, but he would like to have the assurance that the committee confirmed it. If the Assyrians did not wish to go to Brazil, the alternative must be, in his view, that they should remain in Iraq, where, according to the *rapporteur's* report, they would have the benefit of the minority guarantees.

*The Italian Representative* pointed out that the Council Committee's resolution on the organisation to be set up in Iraq provided that steps should be taken to ascertain which of the Assyrians wished to leave the country.

*The French Representative* quoted the following passage from the *rapporteur's* report: "It being clearly understood that such part of the Assyrian population as remained in Iraq would be regarded as a minority to which would be applicable the provisions of the Iraqi declaration on the protection of minorities and which would, further, be bound by the obligations of loyalty to the State recalled by the Assembly in its resolution of the 21st September, 1922."

*The President* said there seemed no doubt that the Assyrians would be quite free to choose whether they should leave Iraq or not and that if they chose to stay the conditions under which they would remain were those stated in the *rapporteur's* report.

*M. Werner* then said that, in his view, it would be necessary to inspect the territory to which it was proposed to send the Assyrians and that this inspection should be carried out by competent persons. He thought that it was a very great responsibility for a single investigator to judge whether or not the territory was suitable. He thought that it would be better therefore that more than one person should go. A further point was that it seemed desirable that whoever was chosen to investigate should first of all go to Iraq to acquaint himself with the local conditions of the Assyrians.

*The President* said that the committee had already considered this question and that the principle of an independent enquiry had been accepted. The modalities only remained to be settled, and this would be done as soon as the reply of the Brazilian Government regarding their willingness to receive the Assyrians had been received. It was probable that the enquiry would be conducted by more than one person and to avoid the necessity of sending anyone to Iraq and thus losing valuable time, the committee was trying to find someone with the necessary knowledge of the Assyrians. One of the members of the committee had undertaken to try to find a candidate with the necessary experience and hoped to be able to propose a name shortly.

*M. Werner* raised the point whether the investigators might not be sent without waiting for the Brazilian reply.

*The Danish Representative* expressed the view that it was necessary to know the attitude of the Brazilian Government in principle.

*The French Representative* pointed out that the reply of the Brazilian Government was expected from day to day, and that if investigators were sent out without awaiting it their mission might suddenly be rendered useless, after they had started, by the receipt of a negative reply from the Brazilian Government.

*The President* at this point read a letter sent to him by the Brazilian Minister at Berne saying that the question of receiving Assyrians in Brazil was being considered by the Brazilian Ministry of Labour. The President explained that the committee were anxious to do what was possible to expedite the reply of the Brazilian Government and with this object he himself proposed to discuss matters personally with the Brazilian Minister at Berne. It had not been possible to fix an interview for the 30th November, but he had arranged it for the 1st December. The President pointed out that it was difficult for the committee to decide upon an investigation which would involve certain expenses without knowing the attitude in principle of the Brazilian Government. He hoped, however, that there would not be a long delay in the despatch of the Brazilian reply, and the committee were hoping that it might be possible for the investigators to go out by a ship

which left Bordeaux on the 16th December and which would permit them to arrive on the spot about the end of December.

*M. Werner* returned to the idea of sending investigators first of all to Iraq. He said that if this involved too much delay it might be possible for *M. Burnier*, the Nansen Office representative in Syria, to pay a short visit to Iraq, and to send a report on the Assyrians, which might be useful as a basis for the investigation in Brazil.

*The President* repeated that it was hoped to avoid the necessity of sending anyone to Iraq, by associating with the investigation someone with Assyrian experience.

*M. Werner* said that he had made enquiries of *M. Burnier* as to whether there was not someone in Syria, possibly in the French High Commission, who was acquainted with Assyrian requirements. He hoped to have a reply in a day or two and would communicate it at once to the committee. He repeated that, in his view, more than one person should go to Brazil, and again emphasised the responsibility which would lie with the investigators. As regards expense, the Nansen Office would be glad to bear the expense of one of the members of the investigating commission.

*The President* expressed appreciation of this offer, which he said the committee would gladly bear in mind.

*The Italian Representative* said that as the Nansen Office was prepared to bear the expense of one of the investigators and to share the responsibility, it would only be fitting that the Nansen Office should nominate one of the investigators.

*M. Werner* said he was afraid that *M. Burnier* would not be able to go to Brazil as he could not be spared from Syria. As he had said, however, he hoped to be in a position shortly to suggest the name of some person with Assyrian experience.

*The Italian Representative* suggested that if *M. Burnier* could not go perhaps some other representative of the Nansen Office might go. *M. Werner* seemed somewhat reluctant to make any definite recommendation, and turned the discussion to another point, namely, the difficulty of preparing plans without knowledge of Assyrian requirements, and, in particular, of the numbers of Assyrians who might be likely to wish to leave Iraq. Would it not be possible, he asked, to ascertain the wishes of the Assyrians forthwith? Perhaps *M. Burnier* could go for a short time to Iraq to assist in this matter.

*The President* pointed out that according to the resolution regarding the organisation to be set up in Iraq, which had been accepted by the Iraqi Government, the ascertainment of the wishes of the Assyrians was to take place after a place of settlement had been fixed.

*M. Werner* wondered whether some kind of rough preliminary estimate could not be made unofficially before that stage was reached.

*The President* said that it seemed to him a matter of considerable difficulty, as it was most doubtful whether the Assyrians would be prepared to commit themselves until they knew what was to be offered to them. He doubted, therefore, whether any preliminary enquiry would serve a useful purpose.

It was then decided to go through Major Johnson's report, paragraph by paragraph, in case members of the committee had any questions to raise. The following points were considered.

#### *Title to the Lands.*

*The Danish Representative* asked whether it was proposed that the land should be purchased outright by the Nansen Office, and, if so, whether it was possible for this to be done before the wishes of the Assyrians had been ascertained or not. It seemed to him that the Assyrians might be unwilling to take any decision unless a firm offer was made to them, and from this point of view it seemed necessary, if possible, to sign the contract for the purchase of the land before approaching the Assyrians.



It was pointed out, however, that the present offer of the company was for the settlement of not more than 10,000 nor less than 9,000 Assyrians, and the question was raised as to what the position would be if a contract for land to accommodate this number were signed, and the Assyrians refused to go to Brazil or went in much smaller numbers.

*The President* asked M. Shabandar if he could give any indication of the numbers of Assyrians who might be expected to wish to leave Iraq.

M. Shabandar said that he could not do so. The question was a very difficult one. Pressed to give an opinion, he said that he thought that very many more Assyrians might elect to remain in Iraq than had been at first anticipated. He thought that perhaps only 5,000 would want to go. The limits, in his opinion, might be placed at 4,000 and 15,000.

The question was raised whether some sort of preliminary agreement at least ought not to be signed with the company before the Assyrians were approached, and in view of the obvious difficulty of this, the *President* suggested that perhaps a contract might be based on a sliding scale. To facilitate further consideration of the suggestion, Major Johnson undertook to obtain from Paraná Plantations (Limited) a sliding scale estimate showing what the costs would be for every thousand Assyrians, with 4,000 and 15,000 as the minimum and maximum limits.

#### *Cost of Land.*

*The Danish Representative*, while expressing appreciation of the reduction which Major Johnson had been able to secure in the original price asked for the land, still thought that the price demanded was excessive. He suggested that whoever went to Brazil as investigator might examine the price of the land in the neighbourhood. Major Johnson said that the Nansen Office had considerable experience of buying land in various parts of the world, and he could assure the committee that the prices asked by the Paraná Plantations (Limited) compared most favourably with those ruling elsewhere.

The Danish Representative still urged that they should be compared with those ruling in Brazil, and that this should be part of the task of the investigator. This led to a discussion of the character of the proposed investigating commission, and the Italian representative once more raised the question whether one of the members should not be the representative of the Nansen Office. M. Werner was evidently reluctant to commit himself to any definite recommendation, but ultimately indicated that he would probably nominate Major Johnson.

#### *Initial Settlement.*

*The Danish Representative* observed that the company proposed to give paid employment in making roads, &c., to those settlers who went out first. Were the wages of this employment fixed?

Major Johnson replied that it was the practice of the company to give employment to the colonists on its estimates, and the Assyrians would receive the same wages as other colonists, i.e., Germans, Danzigers and Japanese.

#### *Temporary Maintenance in Brazil.*

Major Johnson drew attention to the large item in the company's estimate for the provision of maintenance for the first nine months in Brazil. He said that this estimate was excessive compared with what was paid by the Nansen Office in Syria, and that it ought to be possible to effect some reduction. The company, being a commercial concern, had naturally allowed a considerable margin in their estimate on this head, but were not anxious to make a profit out of the maintenance of the settlers. Indeed, they felt that the maintenance of the Assyrians would be a considerable responsibility, which they would prefer to be borne by the Nansen Office. They were prepared, therefore, instead of providing maintenance themselves, to act directly as the agents of the Nansen Office. This meant that all purchases would be made by a Nansen representative in Paraná, the company allowing him to make full use of their organisation and charging only the cost of administration.

(M. Werner, Major Johnson and M. Shabandar withdrew at this point and the committee continued in private session.)

*The President* said he had ascertained that the Iraqi representative had no news regarding the contribution of the Iraqi Government, and that it would apparently be necessary for parliamentary sanction to be obtained before an offer could be made.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he understood that it was quite true that parliamentary sanction would be necessary before any contribution could actually be made. It need not necessarily be assumed, however, that the reply of the Iraqi Government must, therefore, be correspondingly delayed. He thought it might be possible for the Iraqi Government to state the kind of contribution which they would eventually be prepared to ask Parliament to sanction. He wondered, however, whether the delay might not be due to the unwillingness of the Iraqi Government to commit themselves before knowing the attitude of the Brazilian Government.

*The President* then informed the committee that his proposed interview with the Brazilian Minister at Berne had been fixed for the 1st December in the afternoon. Meanwhile, however, information had been received by the United Kingdom representative which it seemed necessary for the committee to consider at once.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that Paraná Plantations (Limited) had received a telegram from their local representative in Brazil to the effect that the Brazilian Ministry of Labour approved only a trial immigration of 100 families. The United Kingdom representative felt that it was important to find out whether this information was correct, and, if so, whether the view of the Ministry of Labour was adopted by the Brazilian Government. In the latter case, it might be possible to make representations in Rio de Janeiro in an endeavour to forestall an embarrassing reply on these lines, and to see whether it was not possible to induce the Brazilian Government to adopt a more favourable attitude, especially as only a decision of principle was required at the present stage, subject to discussions of details and to various other considerations.

*The President* said that, if the news received was correct and the attitude of the Ministry of Labour was endorsed by the Brazilian Government, the position would certainly be serious and would make it practically impossible to continue with the Brazilian scheme. He was therefore favourable to the idea of representations in Rio de Janeiro to try to induce the Brazilian Government to consider the matter further before sending the contemplated reply.

*The French Representative* thought that there might be a danger of the Brazilian Government resenting collective representations, and he thought the task of approaching them should be entrusted to a single diplomatic representative. He suggested that the most appropriate course would be, in view of the nationality of the president of the Council Committee, that the Spanish Ambassador at Rio should act on behalf of the committee.

*The United Kingdom Representative* endorsed this suggestion, but thought that it might be useful that the representatives in Rio of the Governments represented on the Council Committee should be instructed to support the representations of the Spanish Ambassador if, in the latter's view, this would help rather than complicate matters.

*The French Representative* and the *President* thought that the effect of successive representations from several representatives might have a bad effect on the Brazilian Government. The French representative suggested, however, that, in view of the special interest of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in this question, the United Kingdom representative in Rio might appropriately support the Spanish Ambassador, even if the representatives of the other Governments concerned did not.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he felt quite sure that His Majesty's Ambassador would be prepared to support the Spanish Ambassador in any way which might be appropriate. As this was a League matter, however, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom might prefer that His Majesty's Ambassador at Rio did not act in any way differently from the other



representatives concerned, and he could not, therefore, commit His Majesty's Ambassador to any sort of separate action without referring the matter to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

The President said that he also naturally could not say without reference to his Government whether they were prepared to allow the Spanish Ambassador to act in the manner suggested. He did not suppose, however, that they would have any objection, and he would telephone to Madrid as soon as possible to try to obtain the necessary authority for instructions to be sent to the Spanish Ambassador.

It was agreed that the other representatives in Rio of the Governments represented on the Council Committee should be informed of whatever instructions might eventually be sent to the Spanish Ambassador, in case the latter wished to consult them or desired their support.

Some discussion followed on the nature of the instructions to be sent to the Spanish Ambassador if the Spanish Government were willing. It was suggested that it should be pointed out that a decision on the lines apparently contemplated by the Brazilian Ministry of Labour would mean that it would be practically impossible to proceed with the scheme of settlement in Brazil owing to the fact that it was urgently necessary to remove from Iraq a large proportion, if not all, of the Assyrian population, and that the Assyrians desired to be settled in a homogeneous group. It was also suggested that the good qualities of the Assyrians should be pointed out to the Brazilian Government, who should be asked to consider the humanitarian aspect of the question.

The President was authorised to cause instructions on the above lines to be sent to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio without further consulting the committee if the Spanish Government agreed.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 7481/7/93]

No. 203.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 5.)*  
(No. 267.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the tenth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 30th November, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

*Geneva, December 3, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 203.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Tenth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 4 P.M. on November 30, 1933.*

THIS was a private meeting of the committee, sitting without the Iraqi permanent delegate and without representatives of the Nansen Office.

*Communications to various Governments.*

Dr. Kerno first read the draft of a letter which had been prepared for despatch by the League Secretariat to various Governments, asking them to inform the Secretariat whether they would be prepared to consider the reception of those Assyrians who might wish to leave Iraq. The Secretariat proposed to send a communication of this nature to the Argentine, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and South Africa.

Dr. Kerno asked whether similar communications should be sent to the Governments of Mexico, Peru and Bolivia.

The Mexican Representative said that he saw no chance of the Mexican Government accepting the Assyrians, mainly on account of the strict immigration laws in force. There was, however, no objection to the Secretariat addressing the Mexican Government if it was thought advisable to do so.

With regard to Bolivia and Peru, it was agreed that a communication would serve no practical purpose.

The Mexican representative asked whether a communication on the lines suggested might not be sent to the Government of Ecuador, but it was agreed that, in view of the correspondence which had already taken place with the Ecuadorean Minister, this was unnecessary.

The United Kingdom Representative raised two questions. In the first place, it was necessary to have replies to the proposed communications at a very early date. He recalled that at an earlier meeting he had referred to the possibility that the Brazilian scheme might be found feasible, but might have to be held up pending the receipt of replies from other Governments to whom enquiries had been addressed, more as a matter of form than in the expectation of a favourable result. He wondered, therefore, whether it was not possible to ask for replies by a certain date. The other point was that, if possible, more detailed information about the Assyrians should accompany the proposed communications. He could not help feeling that the difficulty in Brazil was perhaps that it was not sufficiently clearly realised who the Assyrians were. It was possible that they were being confounded with what were generically known in Central and South America as "Syrians," a term which, he believed, included Palestinians and Arabs. He suggested that the League Secretariat might find useful information about the origin of the Assyrians in the report of the Mosul Boundary Commission, while their more recent history was contained in the special report prepared by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to assist the League Council when considering the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq.

The general feeling of the committee was that it would be inadvisable to specify any time-limit for a reply to the proposed communication. On the other hand, the urgency of the matter should be stressed, and the President suggested that a time-limit should, in effect, be included without being actually specified, by indicating that the committee desired to be able to present a report on the subject to the Council at its next meeting in January and wished to be in a position to consider possible destinations for the Assyrians before then. This suggestion was agreed to.

The president also suggested that the League Secretariat should consult the documents mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, in case they contained information which it would be advisable to communicate to the Governments concerned.

*Representations in Rio de Janeiro.*

The president then informed the committee that the Spanish Government had consented to instruct the Spanish Ambassador at Rio to act as had been suggested at the last meeting of the committee. He had accordingly asked that instructions should be sent in the following sense:—

The Ambassador should first explain the capacity in which he was acting, i.e., as the representative of the Council Committee, owing to the fact that the president of the committee was Spanish. He should then enquire whether the news which had reached the committee that the Brazilian Ministry of Labour were only prepared to accept a limited number of families on trial was correct, and, if so, whether this attitude had been endorsed by the Brazilian Government? In the latter case, he should point to the difficulty which such a question would create owing to the urgency of the removal of the Assyrians from Iraq and their desire for settlement in a homogeneous group, and should invite the Brazilian Government to consider the matter further on humanitarian grounds, taking into account the good qualities of the Assyrians, namely, their long tradition of Christianity and civilisation on European lines, the discipline which the majority had acquired from military service, their reputation for thrift and industry, and the unlikelihood of their becoming a social or economic burden. Finally, he should represent the urgency of the matter and ask for an early reply, emphasising that



it was at that stage only a question of a decision in principle, subject to discussion of details, the practicability of the scheme put forward by Paraná Plantations (Limited), and the eventual attitude towards it of the Assyrian population in Iraq.

The president said that the Spanish Ambassador was being instructed to keep in contact with his colleagues, who might be in a position to assist him, and particularly with the British Ambassador, on account of the information probably in the latter's possession on the Assyrian question in general.

#### *Investigation in Brazil.*

The Committee then considered the question of an eventual enquiry in Brazil into the suitability for Assyrian settlement of the territory belonging to Paraná Plantations (Limited).

The President said that it was for decision whether such an enquiry should take place before the Brazilian reply was received, or whether it must wait until after that reply. Furthermore, if the reply was favourable, but only to a limited extent, it was for consideration whether the enquiry should still take place.

The French Representative said that so long as there was a risk of a negative reply, it seemed useless to start an enquiry. If, on the other hand, a reply was received expressing willingness to accept a limited number of Assyrians, then the question would depend on the limit. If only 100 families were to be received, it would be useless to proceed with the scheme. On the other hand, if the limit were as high as, say, 1,000 families, it might be worth while to examine the matter further. It seemed to him that all the committee could do for the moment was to study the mechanism of an investigation. He thought that it might be left to the president to decide whether the Brazilian reply, when received, made it worth while to go on with the investigation, and if he thought that it did, to give instructions for the enquiry to begin.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he agreed with the French representative that it was useless to send out investigators so long as there was a risk of a negative reply. If, however, the result of the representations which were being made in Rio showed that the Brazilian Government did, in fact, intend to accept only a limited number of families, then it would be for consideration whether an attempt should not be made to induce the Brazilian Government to hold up such an answer until someone with Assyrian experience could go out to Brazil and explain to the Brazilian Government who the Assyrians were and what their requirements were. In such a case the investigator or investigators would have a double task, *i.e.*, to examine the suitability for Assyrian needs of the area proposed in Brazil and to give explanations to the Brazilian authorities.

The President said that this would be more than an enquiry. It would virtually entail diplomatic negotiations. His opinion was that such negotiations should be left to the diplomatic representatives in Rio rather than to an expert sent out as investigator. He thought that the reply to the Spanish Ambassador should be awaited, and that, if it gave room for hope, the question of the despatch of an investigator should be considered further.

The United Kingdom Representative explained that he had not intended to suggest that the investigator should be entrusted with negotiations; his idea had been that it might in certain circumstances be useful for the local diplomatic representatives to have his assistance in the capacity of an expert who could explain Assyrian requirements and characteristics.

The President feared that the expense of sending out an expert for this purpose might be criticised, if the Brazilian scheme ultimately came to nothing.

The Danish Representative suggested that, while the attitude of the Ministry of Labour possibly resulted from the existence of an unemployment problem, it might also be due to suspicion of the Assyrians themselves.

The United Kingdom Representative said that this was why he had suggested for consideration the idea of sending an expert to give explanations. He thought, however, that the point might be left for further consideration until the reply to the Spanish Ambassador had been received.

The President said that if the difficulty arose from an unemployment problem, it would clearly be of no use to pursue the matter; but if, on the other hand, it arose from ignorance of the Assyrians, then the suggestion made by the United Kingdom representative might be useful.

The Danish Representative said that it seemed important to find out what was the reason underlying the attitude of the Brazilian Ministry of Labour.

The President said that if the reply from the Spanish Ambassador was not clear on this point, he might be authorised to have the point elucidated without further reference to the committee. He thought that the committee should now consider the mechanism of the proposed investigation, in case it was found necessary to proceed with it and advisable to do so at short notice. It was for consideration whether it was necessary to send an investigator to Iraq in the first place before an enquiry took place in Brazil, and, if so, whether it was essential that the same persons should carry out the enquiry in Iraq and in Brazil. Another point was what instructions should be given to the investigator.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought it would save time if the committee discussed first the composition of the commission of investigation which would be sent to Brazil. He had promised to try to find a candidate with Assyrian experience, and now suggested to the committee the name of Brigadier Browne. He explained that Brigadier Browne, who was 55 years of age, had first been appointed to the Iraqi Levies in 1925, and had commanded the levies from April 1926 to April 1933. During that time the levies had been in the main composed of Assyrians, their numbers decreasing from 4,000 to 2,000. These Assyrians had been accompanied by their families and Brigadier Browne had thus had every opportunity of becoming acquainted with Assyrian customs, requirements, &c. Furthermore, he had travelled extensively in Assyrian districts in Iraq, and was therefore well acquainted with conditions in Assyrian villages.

The United Kingdom representative added that it seemed important that the expert who would be sent out to Brazil to examine the scheme from the point of view of its suitability for Assyrian settlement should be not merely a person with experience of the Assyrians, but also, if possible, someone who was favourably regarded by both the Iraqi Government and the Assyrians themselves. Although not in a position to make any categorical statement about the views of the Iraqi Government and the Assyrians, he thought that the choice of Brigadier Browne was likely to be well received by both sides.

The President and the other members of the committee agreed that Brigadier Browne appeared to be a most suitable choice, and authorised the United Kingdom representative to ascertain without commitment, and with every reservation, whether, if Brigadier Browne received an invitation to proceed to Brazil on behalf of the committee, he would be disposed to accept.

The president said that Brigadier Browne's qualifications appeared to be such that it seemed unnecessary to have any other Assyrian expert. He thought it desirable, however, that some diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Brazil, and with local knowledge, should be attached to the investigator.

The French Representative suggested that if M. Redard, the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio de Janeiro, were available, it would be most appropriate that he should accompany the investigator in view of the fact that he already knew the area concerned.

The President asked Dr. Kerno to enquire whether M. Redard was still in Rio, and if so, whether the Swiss Government, if asked to lend his services, would be prepared to do so.

It appeared from remarks by the president and the French representative that they contemplated an investigation conducted simply by Brigadier Browne and M. Redard.

The United Kingdom Representative therefore asked whether it was not intended that a representative of the Nansen Office should be associated with the investigation as originally contemplated. It seemed to him that neither Brigadier Browne nor M. Redard could be regarded as settlement experts, and that it was desirable that a settlement expert should be associated with them.



*The Italian Representative* recalled that the president of the Nansen Office had been most anxious for a local investigation to be made before the Nansen Office assumed responsibility for the settlement scheme, and that M. Werner had offered to pay the expenses of such a representative.

*The French Representative* suggested that if the Nansen Office felt it necessary on their own account to examine the Brazilian scheme, they might send out a representative on their own responsibility at a later stage when it had been established that the area concerned was suitable for Assyrian settlement.

*The Danish Representative* expressed the opinion that it was desirable that the committee should not appear in any way to be cold-shouldering the Nansen Office.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that, apart from the intrinsic desirability of associating a Nansen representative with the proposed investigation, he thought it would be most difficult after what had passed at the last meeting, in the presence of M. Werner, not to do so.

*The President* said that he had been most careful at the previous meeting not to enter into any commitment regarding the association of a Nansen representative with the investigation. He had simply thanked M. Werner for his offer to nominate a representative and to pay his expenses, and had said that the offer would be borne in mind.

*The Danish and United Kingdom Representatives* said that even if there were no definite commitment, it seemed very difficult, in view of what had passed, not to accept M. Werner's offer. They pointed out that the committee had already decided, in principle, to entrust the work of settlement to the Nansen Office.

*The President* said that, so far as he remembered, the resolution passed by the committee on the 31st October, at its seventh meeting, had provided for the work of settlement to be entrusted to the Nansen Office only after a destination had been agreed upon.

*Dr. Kerno* read the relevant passage of the resolution, pointing out that the president's impression was correct, and also that the work of settlement was eventually to be entrusted to the Nansen Office "under conditions which will be defined later by the committee." Nevertheless, Dr. Kerno thought that as the committee were asking the Nansen Office eventually to take responsibility, it would be difficult not to give them an opportunity of studying the scheme on the spot, at the same time as it was being investigated by the Assyrian expert.

*The Danish Representative* observed that if there were to be two investigations, the first by an Assyrian expert, and the second afterwards by the Nansen Office, there would be delay, and he could see no purpose in this delay.

*The President* said that there was a point which he felt some diffidence in mentioning. Though M. Werner had shown some reluctance to say whom he proposed to nominate, he had eventually indicated that it would probably be Major Johnson. He wondered whether, as the Assyrian expert now provisionally chosen was a British subject, it would be considered entirely appropriate to associate with him another British subject, namely, Major Johnson. Personally, he had no objection to the investigation being carried out by two British subjects, but it seemed to him possible that the arrangement might cause some little surprise, and perhaps be criticised.

*The French Representative* indicated that he shared the president's view.

*The Danish Representative* said that he could not accept this point of view. The persons who would go to investigate in Brazil might be British subjects, but they would not be going out as British subjects. They would be international officials, the servants of the League, and he could not admit that the question of nationality should be taken into account.

*The Italian Representative* entirely agreed with the Danish representative. The question, he said, was a technical one, and it seemed necessary to send out persons who were best fitted to do the work without regard to nationality.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he was grateful to the president for having raised this point, as the prospect of sending out an investigating mission which might have the appearance of a British mission had caused him a little uneasiness. He felt that it was probably difficult to find anyone with sufficient Assyrian experience who was not a British subject. In the nature of the case, therefore, it seemed inevitable that the Assyrian expert should be British. For this reason he had welcomed the original intention of the president of the Nansen Office to nominate M. Burnier as the Nansen representative. Had M. Burnier been available, he thought there could have been no ground for criticism of the composition of the mission. Unfortunately, M. Burnier no longer appeared to be available, and the United Kingdom representative thought it could only be left to M. Werner to select the alternative representative whom he might think most suitable. It might be preferable that the representative should not be British, but the question of nationality seemed to be a secondary one. For his part, he thought that the main thing was that the Nansen representative should be well qualified for the task.

After some further discussion, it was agreed in principle to entrust the investigation to Brigadier Browne, if he would accept, and to arrange for him to be accompanied, as advisers and experts, by a representative of the Nansen Office and a local diplomatic or consular officer, preferably M. Redard.

The question was then raised as to the moment at which the investigator should be sent out. It was agreed that there could be no question of this until the Brazilian attitude in principle was known.

*The French Representative* suggested that it should be left to the president to decide whether the Brazilian answer was such as to warrant the sending out of the investigator.

*The President* indicated that he was willing to accept responsibility as far as he could, but it might be a matter of considerable difficulty to decide the particular point at issue.

*The Italian Representative* suggested that it should be left to the president to set the machinery in motion, or alternatively, if the situation was not sufficiently clear, when the reply of the Spanish Ambassador at Rio had been received, to call a further meeting of the committee.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he did not entirely understand these suggestions. Was the proposal that the committee should now adjourn, leaving to the president the responsibility to decide on the next step when news was received about the Brazilian attitude? If so, it seemed to him to be placing an unfair responsibility upon the president. He did not see how the committee could possibly justify an adjournment at the present stage. Certain enquiries were being made in Rio, upon which the whole fate of the Brazilian scheme depended, and it seemed to him that the committee must continue in session until it learnt the result of these representations and was in a position to appreciate the situation and to decide what must be done next.

*The President* said that, although he had been willing to accept a certain amount of responsibility, he would certainly prefer that the reply from Rio should be considered by the whole committee.

It was agreed that the committee should continue in session, and the question of delegating responsibility to the president for deciding on the moment for beginning the investigation in Brazil thus fell to the ground.

A short discussion followed on the terms of reference for any investigation which might take place, and the Danish representative suggested that when they were settled, it might be useful for the committee to have a discussion with the Nansen Office representative and with Brigadier Browne, if this could be arranged.

The question of such a discussion was left in suspense, to be reconsidered once the decision had been definitely taken to send out investigators.

*The President* suggested that a draft resolution should be prepared for eventual adoption when the situation was clearer regarding the investigation, and in particular stating what the duties of the investigator would be.



It was decided to entrust the drafting of such a resolution to the United Kingdom representative, in consultation with the French representative.

The question was raised whether the consent of the Brazilian Government ought to be obtained before an investigation took place.

*The French Representative* took the view that as the investigation was not into the suitability of Brazil for colonisation, but simply into the suitability of a particular scheme submitted by a private company, it was not necessary to get the prior consent of the Brazilian Government.

It was agreed, however, that it would be desirable at the appropriate moment to warn the Brazilian Government that the committee intended to institute such an investigation and to explain to the Brazilian Government the object and scope of the enquiry.

As the President proposed to visit Berne on the following day, it was decided not to hold a further meeting until the 2nd December.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 7482/7/93]

No. 204.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 5.)*

(No. 268.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the eleventh meeting of Assyrian Committee of Council on the 2nd December respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

*United Kingdom Delegation,  
Geneva, December 3, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 204.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Council Committee, held at 10.30 A.M. on December 2, 1933.*

THE President said that he had not yet received news of the result of the representations which the Spanish Ambassador had been instructed to make at Rio de Janeiro. He had, however, on the preceding day visited the Brazilian Minister at Berne. The latter had no news regarding the attitude of his Government. M. Olivan had emphasised the urgency of the matter, and had referred to the report which had reached the committee that the Brazilian Ministry of Labour was only disposed to accept a limited number of Assyrian families on trial. He had pointed out that a limited acceptance of this nature would not solve the problem with which the Council Committee were faced, and in fact would only embarrass the committee, and make it difficult for them to proceed further with the Brazilian scheme, since they were seeking a plan which would allow of the removal from Iraq, with as little delay as possible, of all the Assyrians who might wish to leave, and their settlement in a single group.

The Brazilian Minister had said that he believed that his Government had been rather apprehensive about the suggested immigration of Assyrians. There had been an unfortunate occasion on which a colonisation company had introduced a number of the most undesirable immigrants, and the Brazilian Government were therefore somewhat cautious. Moreover, it appeared that they had believed the Assyrians to be "Syrians," who were usually small traders, hawkers and mendicants. M. Olivan had endeavoured to remove this misapprehension and had explained, so far as he was able, the good qualities which the Assyrians were reputed to possess. He had expressed the hope that, if the Brazilian Government thought it necessary to limit the number of immigrants at the outset, they would

fix a much higher limit than was apparently contemplated. It would be helpful if the limit could be not less than 9,000 to 10,000 persons and if, in any case, it could be elastic. By that he meant that the Brazilian Government should indicate their willingness to accept more if the first batch of settlers proved satisfactory. The Brazilian Minister had said that the Brazilian administrative machine worked extremely slowly and he was doubtful, therefore, of the possibility of any immediate reply. He promised, however, to telegraph the same day to the Government to emphasise the urgency of the matter and to impress upon them the importance of the question of numbers. M. Olivan had urged upon him the humanitarian aspect of the question, and had explained the *démarche* which was being made at Rio.

The president expressed the view that there was nothing to be done, but to await the reply from the Spanish Ambassador at Rio, and he proposed on the 4th December, if no reply had been received, to ask the Spanish Government to send a reminder.

The committee then considered the question of the proposed investigation in Brazil.

In reply to a question from the president, the *United Kingdom Representative* said that Brigadier Browne had been approached without commitment, in the manner authorised by the committee, and that, although he was naturally unable to take a definite decision until he knew precisely what was expected of him, he was prepared, in principle, to accept an invitation to go out to Brazil.

The United Kingdom representative then circulated the attached draft resolution (Annex A) which, in accordance with the committee's request, he had prepared in consultation with the French representative.

Dr. Kerno said that he had telephoned to Berne to find out whether M. Redard was still in Brazil and whether, in that case, the Swiss Government would be prepared to place his services at the disposal of the committee, if invited to do so. He had ascertained that M. Redard was still in Brazil, and the question of utilising his services was being submitted to M. Motta.

The draft resolution was then examined.

The President suggested that the reference to Brigadier Browne in the last paragraph of the draft should be omitted, and the paragraph worded impersonally, so as to be appropriate in the event of Brigadier Browne being unable to serve and some other investigator being eventually chosen in his place.

The French Representative suggested that the last sentence of paragraph 2 of the draft should be amplified, so as to invite the investigator in a supplementary report to make any recommendation which he might think desirable as regards the method of settling the Assyrians in the area in question.

The Danish Representative thought there was some danger of an amendment so worded being resented by the Nansen Office as impinging upon their province.

The French Representative explained that what he had in mind was that the Assyrian expert might be invited to offer suggestions as to whether the method of settlement by individual families, suggested by Paraná Plantations (Limited), was suitable for the particular case of the Assyrians, or whether it would be preferable to settle them in villages according to tribes.

It was felt that the objection of the Danish representative had some force, and as no suggestions were immediately forthcoming which would overcome the difficulty, the *United Kingdom Representative* suggested that since there was no question of adopting the draft resolution until the attitude of the Brazilian Government had been cleared up, the best course was for him to try after the meeting, in consultation with the French and Danish representatives, to find a form of words which would embody the French representative's idea, but would not give offence to the Nansen Office. This was agreed to.

The Danish Representative said that he presumed the resolution would be eventually published. It was necessary, therefore, to look at it from the point of view of its possible effect on the Iraqi Government and on the Brazilian Government. He saw nothing in the resolution which could give any offence to the Iraqi



Government. As regards Brazil, the first paragraph gave the impression that the object of investigation was to see whether Brazil was suited to the Assyrians. He would like to include some phrase which made it seem that the object of the investigation was equally to establish that the Assyrians were suited to Brazil.

It was agreed that the United Kingdom representative should consult with the Danish representative to see whether amendments on these lines could be introduced into paragraph 1.

*The Danish Representative* then suggested that it was most desirable that Brigadier Browne, before proceeding to Brazil, should visit Geneva for a conversation with the committee. He thought that if such a conversation did not take place, there might be room for some misunderstanding. Brigadier Browne might not appreciate exactly what kind of a report the committee desired.

*Dr. Kerno* said that it was extremely difficult for the League Secretariat to find money for any purpose, and if the expense of a journey to Geneva could be avoided, it would be an advantage.

*The President* said that it seemed to him that the expense of a journey to Geneva must be very small and that this consideration should not be allowed to stand in the way of a visit by Brigadier Browne if it were thought necessary.

*The Italian Representative* thought that the draft resolution would make clear to Brigadier Browne what was expected of him.

*Dr. Kerno* pointed out that, according to the draft resolution, Brigadier Browne would receive all relevant documents from the League Secretariat.

*The French Representative* suggested that it might be sufficient, if Brigadier Browne required supplementary information, that he should discuss the matter with the United Kingdom representative, who, if he returned to London in time, could act as the mandatory of the committee. Otherwise it might be that the Foreign Office would be prepared to acquaint Brigadier Browne with the nature of his task.

*The Danish Representative* said that he was quite sure that Brigadier Browne would obtain all the necessary information in this way. At the same time it seemed to him an advantage that there should be a personal discussion between the brigadier and the committee. Otherwise, if things went wrong, the committee might complain that the brigadier had not carried out their wishes, and the brigadier might reply that he had had insufficient opportunity of informing himself of those wishes. It was probable, in fact, that the brigadier would himself feel the need of such a discussion before setting out for Brazil.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he was quite ready to act on behalf of the committee, if required to do so, and he felt sure that the Foreign Office would do what was possible to facilitate matters. At the same time, he felt strongly that, if time permitted, it would be greatly preferable, for the reasons advanced by the Danish representative, that there should be personal contact between Brigadier Browne and the committee as a whole.

*The President* suggested that, as a preliminary measure, perhaps it might be arranged for Brigadier Browne to visit the Foreign Office and for the situation to be explained to him without any commitment. He could then be asked whether he himself thought a visit to Geneva, for consultation with the committee, necessary. In that event the financial difficulty must be overcome. It was impossible to inform him that he could not visit Geneva; if that were done, he would be able to say at a later stage that he had not been sufficiently informed before proceeding to Brazil.

*The French Representative* said that the question of time alone might make it difficult for a visit to Geneva to be arranged.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he would try to arrange for the situation to be explained to Brigadier Browne, as a preliminary measure, without commitment, as suggested by the president.

*The President* then raised the question as to what was to be done if the scheme for settlement in Brazil broke down. That possibility must be envisaged, and, for his part, he expected very little from the enquiries which the League Secretariat was addressing to various other Governments. If none of these Governments sent a favourable reply, what would be the committee's position? Should they simply report to the Council that they had not been able to find any place of settlement? Alternatively, what fresh efforts could be made? He excused himself for raising these hypothetical questions, but it seemed necessary to take stock of the position and to decide what should be done in certain eventualities.

*The Danish Representative* said that the president's attitude needed no excuse. It was one of realistic foresight. He wondered whether, if the Brazilian Government offered to accept a limited number of families, however small that number might be, it would not be worth while to accept the offer in the hope of the number being eventually increased. He thought it might be at least worth while to ask the Assyrians whether they were prepared to accept a limited offer of this nature.

*The President* referred to recent press reports from Iraq on the Assyrian question and, in particular, to reports which had appeared in the *Times*, to the effect that the Assyrians were already stopping work in the expectation of early removal from Iraq and to the effect that a campaign was being conducted in the Iraqi press against any contribution by the Iraqi Government towards their resettlement. The president recalled that the committee's task was not merely to endeavour to resettle the Assyrians outside Iraq, but to concern itself with the position of the Assyrians in Iraq, and with the possibility of their remaining in that country. He wondered, in fact, whether it was not time for the committee to consider some steps to carry out the second part of its task, namely, to investigate the measures to be taken in order to give effect to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, in the case of those Assyrians who might remain in Iraq.

*The French Representative* pointed out that the *rapporteur's* report in which this task had been specified spoke of measures for settlement in Iraq only as regards those Assyrians who wished to remain in Iraq. The committee was not empowered to arrange for the settlement in Iraq of those who wished to leave, but were not yet in a position to do so.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that the present position was discouraging, but, after all, the task of the removal of a race was bound to be a difficult one. It seemed only possible to proceed step by step, and the first step was evidently to clear up the attitude of the Brazilian Government. The question of consulting the Assyrians regarding their willingness to go to Brazil, if only a limited number could be accepted, must depend on the numbers which the Brazilian Government were willing in the first place to receive. It was urgently necessary, if further trouble in Iraq was to be avoided, that at least those Assyrians most closely associated with the Mar Shimun, namely, the Tiari and Tkuma tribes, should be removed at an early date. They numbered, he believed, between 4,000 and 5,000. If the Brazilian limit was less than this, the Brazilian plan could probably not be accepted. But if a limit of 5,000 could be obtained, with an understanding that more might be admitted eventually, the matter might be worth considering.

According to the *rapporteur's* report, which had been adopted by the Council on the 14th October, the first task of the Council Committee was to consider whether the settlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq was possible in practice. This passage had been purposely inserted in the report, because it had been anticipated that insuperable difficulties might be encountered. If no suitable place could be found in which to settle the Assyrians, the committee would have to report accordingly to the Council, and there would be no reflection upon the committee for so doing. At the same time, it would be most regrettable if the committee found itself obliged to take this course. If, therefore, the Brazilian scheme broke down, every effort must be made to find some alternative. If the Brazilian Government were only prepared to accept a small number of Assyrians, the United Kingdom representative did not think that the only course open to the committee was to put such a limited offer before the Assyrians. Enquiries were



being made of other Governments, and the result of these enquiries would have to be awaited and every effort made to supplement them in other quarters. It was only after every effort to settle the Assyrians outside Iraq had been exhausted that the question which the president had raised of the settlement in Iraq of those Assyrians who could not be settled outside would have to be faced.

*The French Representative* said that, if the Brazilian Government were unwilling to accept more than a small number of Assyrians on trial, it might be worth while to inform the Brazilian Government that the committee had intended to send out Brigadier Browne to investigate the settlement scheme in Parana, and that, if it would assist them in taking a decision, the committee would be willing to send out Brigadier Browne, in any case, to give explanations about the Assyrians. *The United Kingdom Representative* agreed, and recalled that he had already made a similar suggestion at the previous meeting.

*The Danish Representative* said that it seemed important to find out how many Assyrians the Brazilian Government would take, if they were only prepared to receive a limited number, and that it was equally important to induce the Brazilian Government to accept the principle of elasticity, *i.e.*, to say that they would be prepared to accept more Assyrians within a comparatively short time if the first batch were of a satisfactory character.

It was agreed that no further progress could be made on the questions raised by the president until the result of the representations at Rio was known.

*Dr. Kerno* then circulated a note prepared by the Secretariat, as a result of its enquiries as to whether any precedent existed for a contribution by the League to refugee settlement (see Annex B).

It was agreed that there was no purpose in calling a further meeting until the Brazilian attitude was known. The next meeting was accordingly fixed provisionally for the 5th December, with discretion to the president to advance or delay it, according to the news which he might receive from Rio.

J. C. STERNDALÉ BENNETT.

#### Annex A.

##### *Draft Resolution.*

The Committee,

Considering that, in view of the exceptional nature of the problem with which it is confronted, it would be assuming a grave responsibility if, before taking a decision regarding the scheme submitted by Parana Plantations (Limited) for the settlement of those Assyrians who may wish to leave Iraq, it did not take steps to satisfy itself as to the suitability for this particular purpose of the area concerned, by means of an independent and impartial investigation on the spot conducted by some person specially qualified to form an opinion by reason of his knowledge of Assyrian needs and characteristics,

Decides to invite Brigadier J. G. Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., until recently the Officer Commanding the Assyrian Levies in Iraq, to proceed to Brazil on its behalf as soon as possible, and to report to the committee by telegram, after local investigation, whether, in the light of his special knowledge, he is of opinion that the scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians submitted by Parana Plantations (Limited) offers a reasonable prospect of success. The report should draw attention to any considerations which the investigator may think it desirable for the committee to take into account.

The committee considers that it would be of assistance to the investigator to be accompanied by a diplomatic or consular officer with local knowledge, and, bearing in mind the special qualifications of the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio de Janeiro, decides to request the Swiss Government to be good enough to permit the services of M. Redard to be utilised in this manner.

Furthermore, the committee recognises the advantage which it might be to the investigator to have the benefit also of the advice of an expert in settlement work, and gratefully accepts, therefore, the offer of the president of the Nansen

Office to nominate such an expert to accompany the investigator, at the expense of the Nansen Office.

The committee authorises its president to acquaint the Brazilian Government with the proposal to conduct an investigation, and requests the Nansen Office to inform Parana Plantations (Limited) also, in order that the necessary local arrangements may be made.

The cost of the investigation, apart from the expenses of the expert nominated by the president of the Nansen Office, will be met from League funds.

In the event of Brigadier Browne's acceptance of the invitation which is to be addressed to him, the committee requests the League Secretariat to furnish him with all available information which may assist him in the accomplishment of his task.

#### Annex B.

##### *Note du Secrétariat.*

Le budget de la Société des Nations n'a jamais contribué directement au financement des différentes actions d'établissement de réfugiés.

1. Pour les réfugiés russes et arméniens, la Société des Nations s'est bornée à subvenir aux frais d'administration. En effet, le Haut-Commissaire pour les réfugiés russes et arméniens (le Dr. Nansen) avait à sa disposition un bureau qui faisait partie du Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations et, pendant un certain temps, du Bureau international du Travail. Depuis la création de l'Office international Nansen pour les Réfugiés, l'Assemblée lui accorde annuellement une somme forfaitaire pour ses frais administratifs (à peu près 300,000 francs suisses).

Les frais d'établissement et d'assistance sont couverts par le produit du timbre Nansen (5 francs-or, payables par chaque réfugié non indigent) et par des contributions d'organisations et de personnes privées.

2. Dans le cas des réfugiés grecs et bulgares, la Société des Nations n'a même pas subvenu aux frais administratifs. Toutes les dépenses furent couvertes par des emprunts contractés par les Gouvernements hellénique et bulgare, sous les auspices de la Société des Nations. Les frais administratifs (par exemple les dépenses de la Commission mixte gréco-bulgare) furent couverts par des contributions des deux Gouvernements intéressés.

[E 7531/7/93]

No. 205.

*Mr. Sterndale Bennett to Mr. Rendel.—(Received December 6.)*

*United Kingdom Delegation  
to the League of Nations.*

*Geneva, December 5, 1933.*

My dear George,

ALTHOUGH it is to be hoped that the explanations by the diplomatic representatives in Rio may succeed in saving the Brazilian scheme, the prospects of that scheme going through are, at the moment, so poor that it seems advisable to consider what is to be done if it breaks down.

2. The League Secretariat have at length sent out enquiries to the Argentine, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and South Africa. In the case of Mexico, the enquiry seems to be a pure formality, and I do not myself know why it was ever suggested. Nor have I any confidence in the efficacy of League action of this sort in the case of the other Governments. The enquiry will, of course, be considered, but it is unlikely to be considered favourably unless some kind of unofficial influence can be exercised on the Government concerned. When the Council or the Assembly is meeting and members of the Governments of the various States are in Geneva, it is possible to get something done by personal discussion, but at other times it seems very difficult for the League to bring any effective influence to bear.

3. I am becoming more and more convinced, in fact, that there is little prospect of anything being done about the Assyrians, at all events before the next Council meeting, unless His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are prepared to take a greater measure of responsibility and initiative than they



have hitherto been willing to assume. It is all very well to say that the matter is in the hands of the League and must remain a League responsibility, but, whether we like it or not, our credit is very much involved. There is a tendency here already to regard our offer of a financial contribution as merely hypocritical and made with full knowledge that a League contribution is impracticable; and no one will ever believe that the necessary land really cannot be found in the Empire. But, apart from the odium which those who believe in our "moral responsibility" will see that we get, there are very practical dangers as well if Assyrian resettlement outside Iraq breaks down.

4. In the first place, there will be a renewed movement in favour of some special measures for the protection of the Assyrians in Iraq if they are compelled to remain there. This will certainly lead to conflict between Iraq and the League, and His Majesty's Government will be in a most difficult and embarrassing position. Lastly, there is very real danger that, if the Assyrians are not moved from Iraq within a comparatively short space of time, there may be further outbreaks of violence there, and again the position of His Majesty's Government will be very difficult. On all hands, therefore, there seems to be a strong case for redoubling the efforts of His Majesty's Government to get the Assyrian problem solved by resettlement outside Iraq.

5. Although I would personally be in favour of settling the Assyrians outside the Empire, it seems to me that a question which, if the Brazilian scheme breaks down, ought to be considered—perhaps by the Middle East Official Sub-Committee—is whether it is not, after all, desirable to make an effort to find land within the Empire. This would mean overcoming the difficulties foreseen by the Colonial Office, and also, I think, the scruples of the Dominions Office about discussing possibilities with the Dominions.

6. Alternatively, if it is decided, after full consideration, that it is really undesirable that the Assyrians should be within the Empire, the possibility might be considered of bringing the influence of His Majesty's Government to bear on the Governments of likely countries. The only countries in which it seems *prima facie* possible to find a satisfactory home for the Assyrians in a compact group are, I think, the Argentine, Abyssinia and, in the last resort, Syria. The possibility of Syria I have already discussed in an earlier letter. I have not pressed for an official enquiry to be sent by the League to the Abyssinian Government, partly because my colleagues have not shown any enthusiasm for Abyssinia, but mainly because I gathered from Barton, before I left England, that a formal League enquiry would probably not be a very good way to set the ball rolling, and that it would be necessary for the ground to be prepared in advance. There may be drawbacks about Abyssinia, but it might, all the same, be a country in which the Assyrians could lead a congenial life, and it might be worth while to try to find out, either through our representative at Addis Ababa, or through the Abyssinian Minister in London, whether the Abyssinian Government would favourably consider a League enquiry as to their willingness to receive the Assyrians. As regards the Argentine, it has been suggested to me that the most promising line of approach would be to discuss possibilities, in the first place, with British railway interests there, getting them, if they considered the project feasible, to influence the Argentine Government to send a favourable reply to the League.

7. If it is impossible to find a home for the Assyrians *en masse*, it will be necessary to consider whether they can be settled in groups in various countries. There would no doubt be criticism of this, and opposition from the Mar Shimun, but, after all, the essential point is that those of the Assyrians who feel that they cannot remain in Iraq under existing conditions must be removed from Iraq if further trouble is to be avoided.

8. The best scheme might be that all those who feel that they cannot stay in Iraq should be removed to some temporary base outside Iraq, and that the Nansen Office, or some other organisation specially set up for the purpose (*e.g.*, a High Commissioner, as in the case of German refugees), should arrange, in the course of time, for their permanent settlement elsewhere, as and when opportunity offered.

9. I have been wondering whether there would be any prospect of settling the Assyrians in this way in the Balkan countries. The idea may be entirely impracticable, but it seems to me that there are parts of the Balkans in which the Assyrians might feel thoroughly at home. Perhaps, at all events, the idea is

worth discussing with Southern Department, and, if they do not rule it out entirely, the views of our Ministers in the various Balkan countries might perhaps be obtained privately.

10. This letter may be somewhat premature, and may strike you even as a little wild. But I am convinced that, unless we do make a real effort, this Assyrian problem will drag miserably on, without a "lasting and honourable solution," and we may be storing up for ourselves a heap of further trouble for the future.

Yours ever,

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 7610/7/93]

No. 206.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 11.)*

(No. 755.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, November 30, 1933.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 724 of the 15th November, regarding the possibility of distress occurring amongst the Assyrians in Mosul during the coming winter, I have the honour to inform you that Major Thomson's camp is intended only for destitute women and children who have lost their bread-winners, and aged men incapable of maintaining themselves by work. It cannot, therefore, alleviate the situation which may possibly arise from the concentration in Mosul town of a large number of families from the outside villages. Those who have crowded into the town appear to be making no serious effort to find work, and when the meagre resources which they may possess at present are exhausted they may become a difficult problem.

2. During my recent visit to Mosul, I gathered that the Assyrians there anticipated that sooner or later someone would provide for them by organising a camp similar to that which was established at Baqubah when the Assyrians first took refuge in Iraq. Apart from the pernicious moral and material consequences of such an arrangement, there appears to be no practical possibility of a camp of this kind being set up again, and the only solution of the problem is to endeavour, as the Iraqi Government are doing, to persuade these people to return to their villages. I am pressing the Iraqi Government to agree to reissue a reasonable number of rifles with about twenty rounds of ammunition to all who will return to their villages and resume their normal life, pending a decision concerning their future. I also hope that, as a result of the explanations which the local committee are making to all Assyrians concerning the decision adopted by the Council of the League, some of those now idle in Mosul will realise the wisdom of going back to work on the land.

3. I am instructing His Majesty's consul at Mosul to keep me fully informed of the general condition of the Assyrians living in Mosul, and, as far as may be possible, of the safety and welfare of those remaining in the villages, and I shall not fail to report to you if it appears desirable that an appeal should be made to private charity in England to assist them.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 7705/7705/93]

No. 207.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 14.)*

(No. (A) 26. Overseas Trade.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, November 25, 1933.*

AS I understand that the possibility of the enactment of labour legislation is a matter of concern to contractors contemplating commitments in Iraq, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the draft Labour Law now on the stocks.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. This draft has been supplied privately to my commercial secretary and should be treated as confidential; but there is no objection to communication of its

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



contents to *bona fide* enquirers if considered desirable. The text has not been accepted by the Cabinet or Parliament and is, therefore, liable to amendment. It will, however, serve to indicate the lines upon which the Iraqi Government are working in this connexion.

3. You will observe, in the first place, that the draft contains no reference to a minimum wage. Nor are maximum hours laid down, except in so far as article 3 provides for minimum periods of rest; but it should be noted that article 2 permits the issue of regulations "prescribing the hours of labour for any trade or industry." Under article 4 children under 12 years of age may not be employed in an industrial undertaking, and there are provisions regarding the employment of women and of young persons between the ages of 12 and 16 years. A definite scale of workman's compensation is prescribed in article 11, culminating with employer's liability to the extent of two years' pay in the event of death or permanent incapacity; but, under article 12, this only applies to registered workers (and therefore not, presumably, to casual labour) and does not apply to employers (such as the oil companies) operating a pension scheme which includes provisions for workman's compensation not less favourable to the workers than those in the law.

4. It should be understood that this draft law is not the result of any local movement in favour of labour legislation, but was prepared in order that Iraq might be able to discharge the obligations which now devolve upon her as a member of the League of Nations under article 23 (a) of the Covenant. The matter is dealt with fully in paragraph 16 of the report of His Majesty's Government to the League on the Administration of Iraq for the year 1931, and in paragraph 9 of the report for the period January to October 1932. The International Labour Office may be expected to encourage enactment of the measure, which is likely, in any case, to proceed to the Statute Book under its own momentum. Possibly certain Iraqi politicians may welcome it as a means of victimising foreign enterprise in this country, but as the provisions of the existing text apply indiscriminately to all industrial undertakings there seems little to justify apprehension on this score, except, perhaps, the clause quoted above permitting the issue of regulations to prescribe the hours of labour in a particular trade or industry.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 7726/7/93]

No. 208.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 14.)*

(No. 269.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the twelfth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council on the 11th December, 1933, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*United Kingdom Delegation,  
Geneva, December 12, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 208.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Twelfth Meeting of the Council Committee, held at 10.30 A.M. on  
December 11, 1933.*

ALL the members of the committee were present, with the exception of the Mexican representative. In addition, M. Azcarate, of the League Secretariat, attended.

*Settlement in Brazil.*

The President said that a reply had been received from the Spanish Ambassador at Rio, shortly after the last meeting of the committee, to the effect

that the Brazilian Government contemplated the acceptance of one hundred families only. The Spanish Ambassador had said, however, that he had succeeded in obtaining a promise from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to take the matter up with the Ministry of Labour in the hope of enlarging this limit. Some days later, the Spanish Ambassador, who, of course, was without full details, had been recommended by the Spanish Government to enter into direct contact with the British Ambassador and to consult with the latter as to what further action could best be taken to move the Brazilian Government from the attitude which they had taken up. Now, however, a note had been received from the Brazilian Minister at Berne purporting to give the definitive reply of his Government, which was as the Spanish Ambassador had anticipated, and which attached certain conditions even to accepting so limited a number as 100 families. (A copy of this letter is attached as Annex A<sup>(1)</sup>.) The categorical nature of this reply would be discouraging, but for the fact that the United Kingdom representative apparently had news that conversations in Rio de Janeiro were still continuing.

The United Kingdom Representative said that when the instructions decided upon at the meeting on the 29th November had been despatched to the Spanish Ambassador, His Majesty's Ambassador had been informed in case he could render any unofficial assistance to the Spanish Ambassador. Two reports on the position had since been received from His Majesty's Ambassador. According to the first, there appeared to be some reason to suppose that the Ministry of Labour might agree to a larger immigration of Assyrians, if persuaded of the practicability of the scheme and of the desirability as immigrants of the Assyrians. The second report had only just arrived. From it, it appeared that the reluctance of the Brazilian Government to accept the Assyrians in greater numbers was due to three reasons:—

- (a) Ignorance about the Assyrians;
- (b) A fear that the Brazilian Government were themselves expected to provide land for settlement; and
- (c) A prejudice on general principles to immigration *en masse*.

According to the report, a memorandum on the practicability of the scheme had just been submitted to the Brazilian Government by the local representative of Paraná Plantations (Limited), and in one way or another the favourable characteristics of the Assyrians were being brought to the notice of the Brazilian Government. The Spanish Ambassador had evidently been very active, and had done everything possible, and was still doing everything possible, to induce the Brazilian Government to take up a more favourable attitude. The United Kingdom representative understood that his Excellency was on the point of seeing the Minister of Labour personally, and no doubt the president of the committee would shortly be receiving a direct report from him.

The President said that in the circumstances it appeared to have been unnecessary to call the committee together that morning, and, had the information just received and communicated by the United Kingdom representative been available earlier, he would not, of course, have done so. The position really was now the same as when the committee last sat on the 2nd December. The attitude of the Brazilian Government was still not definitely cleared up. He had come to the meeting prepared to discuss the matter on the basis of the Brazilian Minister's note, and he did not know whether the committee would now wish, before proceeding further, to await the result of the conversations which were still taking place in Rio, or whether it considered that anything could be gained by discussing hypothetically what action should be taken if the attitude of the Brazilian Government remained as described in the Brazilian Minister's note. M. Olivan thought that it would be dangerous to reject the offer entirely. It seemed also undesirable to accept it as it stood. He thought it might be best to give it full consideration, and in the first place to obtain certain supplementary explanations regarding it. For instance, it was necessary to know whether the number of 100 families was final, or whether the Brazilian Government, if the experiment turned out satisfactorily, would be prepared to accept larger numbers. Again, the time factor was of importance, and it was necessary to ascertain the length of the experimental period which the Brazilian Government had in mind.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



If the immigrants were agriculturalists, it would obviously take more than a few months to make sure that the experiment was going to be a success. M. Oliven asked whether the members of the committee wished to discuss the matter hypothetically, as he had suggested, or simply to wait for further news from Rio.

*The United Kingdom Representative* expressed the view that the only thing to be done for the moment was to endeavour to develop the conversations which were proceeding in Rio in the direction of inducing the Brazilian Government to depart from the attitude taken up in the Brazilian Minister's note. There was at least a hope that the Brazilian Government might consent to abolish or enlarge the proposed limit.

It might, however, be of some use to exchange ideas as to what should be done if the conversations in Rio failed to shake the Brazilian Government. He agreed with the President that it would be undesirable to reject the Brazilian offer out of hand, although it promised so little. On the other hand, it seemed impossible to accept it in its present form. Such a decision would be criticised by opponents of the League, who would represent the League, when asked to settle some ten or twenty thousand Assyrians, as being satisfied with having found a home for 500. Further, the decision would be opposed by the Assyrians, who objected to being split up, and it would be opposed by the Iraqis, who would say that it afforded no solution to the problem in Iraq. Before accepting definitely a limited solution of this sort, it would be necessary to wait until replies from other Governments approached showed that there was no prospect of settling the Assyrians in a compact group elsewhere. Even then it would be difficult to adopt the Brazilian offer unless it could be definitely stated that there was a prospect of the eventual settlement in Brazil of all the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq; and it would be assuming a considerable responsibility to send 100 families to Brazil as an experiment, unless the League were in a position to ensure their repatriation to Iraq, or their settlement in some other place if the experiment in Brazil proved a failure. The question of repatriation to Iraq had only to be stated for the difficulty to be realised. For these reasons the United Kingdom representative thought there were two possible courses before the committee if the Brazilian offer remained unchanged. One was to inform the Brazilian Government that the committee had received their offer with interest, but that it did not unfortunately afford a solution to the problem which confronted the committee. The latter was bound, therefore, before considering it further, to await the result of enquiries which had been addressed to other Governments, regarding the possibility of their accepting all the Assyrians who might wish to leave Iraq, but would like to reserve the right to discuss the matter further with the Brazilian Government at a later stage. The other course was to thank the Brazilian Government and to remind them that all they had been asked for was a decision of principle, subject to discussion of details; that the committee proposed, before proceeding further, to send experts to satisfy it that the scheme proposed by Paraná Plantations (Limited) was really suitable for Assyrian settlement; and that, if the result of the investigation were satisfactory, the committee would like to arrange for further discussion of the matter with the Brazilian Government. It might be possible in these further discussions, in which the experts could participate in Rio, to induce the Brazilian Government to admit larger numbers than they were at present prepared to do.

The United Kingdom representative reminded the committee that, besides satisfying itself as to the physical suitability of the Paraná scheme, before accepting any Brazilian offer, it would also have to satisfy itself as to the status which the Assyrians would enjoy in Brazil. It was naturally impossible to expect the Brazilian Government to accept anything in the nature of "minority guarantees." At the same time, the committee would be bound to get some official statement from the Brazilian Government to the effect that the Assyrians would enjoy religious toleration. Furthermore, there was the difficult question of nationality. The national status of the Assyrians in Iraq was sufficiently complicated. Most of them were technically Iraqi nationals, but some were not, and some who possessed Iraqi nationality technically refused to admit it. But when those Assyrians who were technically Iraqis went to Brazil, it would clearly be unreasonable in all the circumstances of the case to expect the Iraqi Government to continue to regard them as Iraqi nationals and to protect them. It was necessary, therefore, to look rather closely into the question of what status these Assyrians would enjoy, unless and until they acquired Brazilian nationality.

*The President* enquired whether the United Kingdom representative thought it necessary to have an investigation on the spot and to clear up this question of status if only a small number of Assyrians were going to Brazil on trial.

*The United Kingdom Representative* replied that, if only a small number were sent to Brazil, it could only be on the assumption that, if the experiment turned out satisfactorily, all the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq might in due course hope to follow. The committee must therefore, he suggested, proceed, even if only a trial number were sent, in precisely the same way as though it was deciding to settle all the Assyrians in Brazil.

*The President* asked whether he was right in supposing that the United Kingdom representative proposed that there should be further immediate discussion with the Brazilian Government.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he thought that the first stage was to await the result of the conversations now going on in Rio. When a reply had been received from the Brazilian Government which might fairly be regarded as final, and if the committee then felt that it was worth while to proceed with the matter, he thought that the investigator should be sent to Brazil, and that the question of the status of the Assyrians should be cleared up before any offer was finally accepted.

*M. Azcarate* said that he thought the first thing to do was to fix clearly the character of the present Brazilian offer. He thought that it should be pointed out to the Brazilian Government that, if it meant that only a maximum of 100 families would be accepted, it put the committee in a most difficult position. If, on the other hand, the Brazilian Government were ready to have 100 families as an experiment, then negotiations could be pursued. It would be a difficult matter to choose the 100 families in Iraq, and it would be necessary to know how long the experimental period was intended to be. It seemed impossible to do anything further without a definite assurance from the Brazilian Government that it would take more than 100 families, and he thought that the point should be clearly put to them.

*The President* said that he thought that the local investigations in Rio must be going in the direction indicated by M. Azcarate, and he thought it would be a good thing to send a further telegram to the Spanish Ambassador asking him to continue his efforts to induce the Brazilian Government to enlarge the limit, and to ascertain the length of time which they contemplated for the experimental period.

*The French Representative* pointed out that the Brazilian reply was capable of a double meaning. It might mean that the Brazilian Government were willing to accept 100 families on trial and that, if not satisfactory, these families would be sent back. On the other hand, it might mean that, if the 100 families sent on trial proved satisfactory, the Brazilian Government would be prepared to accept more. It seemed necessary to make sure that the latter meaning was the one which the Brazilian Government intended.

*The Danish Representative* raised the question of the guarantee which the Brazilian Government desired from the League of Nations that the immigrants would be agriculturalists. It was clearly impossible for the League to give any such guarantee.

*The United Kingdom Representative* recalled that the Iraqi delegation had in October calculated a report by Major Thomson, which had included a list of Assyrians who were not agriculturalists. The number of persons not in agricultural employment was quite considerable, though most of the persons concerned were soldiers or policemen, and it had been hoped that they would have no difficulty in reverting to agriculture. At the same time it was impossible to say that all those who desired or ought to be removed from Iraq were agriculturalists.

*The President* pointed out that the guarantee which the League was asked for referred only to the first 100 families, and it seemed necessary at the appropriate moment to arrange for the first 100 families to be carefully selected, so that they should only contain agriculturalists.



It was eventually decided that the president of the committee should ask his Government to send a further telegram to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio, quoting the letter from the Brazilian Minister at Berne, and asking the Spanish Ambassador to continue to do everything possible to secure the abandonment or enlargement of the limit. The telegram would also state that the committee assumed the Brazilian reply to mean that, if the first 100 families were satisfactory, more Assyrians would be accepted, and it would ask the Spanish Ambassador to confirm this. It would also ask the Spanish Ambassador, in the event of the Brazilian Government being unwilling to enlarge the limit, to find out what length of time the Brazilian Government considered suitable for the experimental period. The Ambassador would also be asked to explain that the Council Committee hoped, by measures of selection in Iraq, to be able to give satisfaction to the Brazilian Government regarding the agricultural character of the 100 families whom the latter were prepared to admit as an experiment.

The president said he hoped to be able to get a telegram on these lines sent to the Spanish Ambassador on the following day.

#### *Proceedings of Local Committee in Iraq.*

The committee then considered document C./Min.Ass./15 containing a copy of the instructions issued by the Iraqi Government to the local committee in Iraq under Major Thomson's presidency, and a copy of an announcement to be made by Major Thomson to the Assyrians.

The President said that he had examined the document with the League Secretariat, and two points seemed to require the Council Committee's attention. In the first place, the announcement to the Assyrians seemed to imply that the ascertainment of the wishes of the Assyrians and the arrangement for the transport outside Iraq of those who wished to leave would be carried out by the local committee, in collaboration with the Nansen representative, rather than by the Nansen representative in collaboration with the local committee. He thought that the latter had been the intention of the Council Committee.

It was pointed out, however, that the resolution adopted by the Council Committee on the 31st October spoke of the Nansen Office representative proceeding to Iraq to collaborate with the local committee, and it was agreed that there did not seem to be any point to take up with the Iraqi Government.

The president said that the second point was that it appeared from paragraphs 3 and 4 of the instructions issued to Major Thomson that the constitution of the local committee, as envisaged by the Iraqi Government, was not quite in accordance with the Council Committee's resolution of the 31st October. These paragraphs made it appear that the committee would consist of Major Thomson, Major Wilson, and an Iraqi administrative official only, and that Assyrian headmen would not be members of the committee, but would only be called in to receive information.

The United Kingdom Representative drew attention to the fact that the actual text of the Council Committee's resolution had been communicated to Major Thomson as an enclosure to the instructions which were being criticised, and that it should be quite clear, therefore, what the intention of the Council Committee was. It might be that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the instructions were not intended in any way to alter the constitution of the local committee as laid down in that resolution, but simply to refer to the machinery for assembling various members. He thought, however, that the point was one which ought to be cleared up with the Iraqi representative.

Dr. Kerno asked whether the Iraqi representative who was at present not in Geneva, but in the country, should be asked to attend a meeting for this purpose.

It was agreed that the point was of no real importance until it came to the stage of ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians about leaving Iraq. Furthermore, it was difficult to ask the Iraqi representative to attend a meeting of the committee simply to clear up this matter of detail. If he attended, it would be difficult not to inform him of the present position in Brazil, which might be undesirable. It was agreed, therefore, to leave the point for the moment and to clear it up with the Iraqi representative at a later stage.

The Danish Representative drew attention to the passage in Major Thomson's announcement to the Assyrians that it was very unlikely that anyone would be moved before next July. He did not know that the Iraqi Government had any special reason to suppose that this was the case.

The French Representative suggested that it had probably been thought desirable to make the statement because most of the Assyrians were cultivators, and it was necessary that they should be induced to carry on with their work and sow crops which might be harvested before they left Iraq.

The President agreed that the phrase had no doubt some connexion with the reports which had recently appeared in the press that the Assyrians were refusing to sow crops in the hope of early removal from Iraq.

#### *Correspondence with the Mar Shimun.*

The President circulated for information copies of a letter which he had received from the Mar Shimun, dated the 30th November (Annex B)(<sup>1</sup>), and of the reply which he had sent on the 7th December (Annex C)(<sup>1</sup>). He explained that, although there might be something to be said for the considerations which the Mar Shimun put forward in his letter, he had felt it impossible for the committee to take official cognisance of it, and hoped that the committee would approve of the somewhat evasive personal reply which he had sent.

General approval was indicated.

#### *Conversation with the Ecuadorean Minister.*

Dr. Kerno reported that the Ecuadorean Minister had visited the Secretariat on the 6th December, and had stated that he had submitted to his Government the information regarding the Assyrians supplied by the Secretariat. In view of the great distance, and the fact that an electoral campaign was proceeding in Ecuador, he did not expect any reply from his Government before the end of January next. He thought that his Government would insist that immigration should be by echelons of 50 to 100 families, and that the Assyrians should not be settled in exclusive enclaves. He hoped also that the Assyrians would prove peaceful settlers and would forget their somewhat bellicose past.

#### *Investigation in Brazil.*

Dr. Kerno reported that the Swiss Government had consented to the services of M. Redard being utilised, if necessary, by the committee in connexion with the proposed investigation in Brazil.

#### *League Contribution to Assyrian Settlement.*

Dr. Kerno distributed a note by the treasurer of the League on this subject (Annex D)(<sup>1</sup>). He recalled that the United Kingdom representative had, at an earlier meeting, stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were prepared to pay their share of a League contribution towards Assyrian settlement, but could only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme. This had raised the question whether a League contribution was, in fact, practicable. The enclosed note had been prepared in response to a request from the United Kingdom representative.

In reply to a question from the Danish representative, Dr. Kerno explained that the memorandum was not designed to cover the question of the expenses of a possible investigation in Brazil. The question of the expenses of such an investigation had already been settled in principle. It was proposed to charge the expenses to the working capital fund, in the expectation that ultimately they would be recovered from the general fund provided for Assyrian settlement.

#### *Letter from Argentine Minister at Berne.*

Dr. Kerno distributed the text of the reply of the Argentine Minister to the enquiry which had been addressed to him by the League Secretariat regarding the willingness of the Argentine Government to accept the Assyrians. The reply is attached as Annex E.(<sup>1</sup>)

(<sup>1</sup>) Not printed.



*Future Procedure.*

It was decided to leave it to the president to call a further meeting as soon as he thought that the attitude of the Brazilian Government had been sufficiently defined by the conversations proceeding in Rio to enable the committee to take decisions. The president was authorised in the meantime to take such supplementary steps as he thought necessary to elucidate the Brazilian attitude.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

December 12, 1933.

[E 7924/27/93]

No. 209.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 27.)*

(No. 772.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 9, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 240 of the 12th April last, regarding the opening of the new air port at Bagdad, I have the honour to report that the Iraqi Government continue to extend the facilities afforded in this country to civil aviation.

2. The additional night flying equipment at the Bagdad air port, mentioned in paragraph 5 of that despatch, is now in course of erection. At this time of the year the Imperial Airways mail aeroplane from India lands there weekly after dark.

3. During the summer, a Marconi Adcock wireless direction-finder was installed at Rutbah Wells, and the aerodrome there will shortly be provided with a flood light. The new direction-finder is an up-to-date apparatus. It overcomes the night error to which other forms of direction-finder are susceptible. I understand that, although its installation has cost the Iraqi Government about £1,500, no charge will be made to those who make use of it. It will be of considerable assistance to Messrs. Imperial Airways if, as proposed, they institute a night flying service across the desert next spring.

4. I have sent a copy of this despatch to Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 7925/7/93]

No. 210.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 27.)*

(No. 773.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter from Sir K. Cornwallis, dated the 9th December, respecting the Assyrian refugee camp at Mosul.

Bagdad, December 14, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 210.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Sir F. Humphrys.*

Dear Sir Francis,

Bagdad, December 9, 1933.

I FORWARD herewith, for information, a copy of a letter of the 6th December, 1933, from Major Thomson, regarding Assyrians.

Yours sincerely,

K. CORNWALLIS.

*Copy of a Letter of December 6, 1933, from Major Thomson, President of the Relief Committee, to His Excellency Naji Beg Shawkat, Minister of Interior, Bagdad.*

I FORWARD you herewith a report on the Assyrian Refugee Camp in Mosul up to the end of November, 1933:—

1. *Local Committee.*

On the 20th August his Excellency the Minister of Interior approved the formation of the following local committee to deal with Assyrian refugees from Dohuk and other areas affected by the disturbances:—

The committee was as follows:—

Major D. B. Thomson, president.  
Faiq Beg the Mudir Tapu, member.  
Abdul Aziz Effendi, member.  
Kasha Kina, member.  
Malik Khamo, member.  
Abdul Aziz Effendi, secretary.

2. *Admissions to Camp.*

(a) The camp was opened on the 21st August, 1933, and by the 30th August there were 1,294 women and children in the camp.

On the 14th September the total in the camp was 1,563.

This number has remained more or less constant up to the end of November, when there were 1,536 men, women and children in the camp.

During the period the 14th September to the 30th November a further 213 persons were admitted, and 169 persons either removed by the R.A.F. to Hinaidi or by their relatives.

Though the camp is primarily for destitute women and children, it was found necessary to admit some seventy men, who were destitute through blindness, paralysis, loss of limbs or old age.

(b) Of the 1,536 persons in camp on the 30th November, 1933, 578 women and children have either husbands or grown-up sons now in Syria.

(c) There are twenty-seven orphan boys and girls in the camp. Of these twenty-five have been accepted by individuals in the camp who have undertaken responsibility for them. Two boys have been sent to the orphanage of the Papal Delegate in Mosul.

3. *Composition of Camp.*

(a) *Accommodation.*—The refugee camp is composed of three houses *en suite*, in all twenty-four rooms of varying size, and thirty-one E.P. tents and sixty-eight 180-lb. tents, an ablution tent, latrines, a medical dispensary, kitchens and stores. Water is laid on stand-pipes to both the houses and tents. Electric light is provided in the houses, and lanterns in the tents.

(b) *Distribution.*—Five hundred and forty-eight persons are accommodated in the houses and 984 persons in tents.

(c) *Amenities.*—Hot water is provided daily from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M. for ablution and clothes-washing purposes.

Wood issued daily for heating rooms and tents at the rate of 1 lb. per individual, big or small, spoons, bowls, grass mats, buckets, tishts, and earthen water jars to each family sufficient for their requirements.

Adults have on an average three blankets. Clothing, in the form of jerseys, pull-overs and jackets, has been purchased locally and issued to each person.

One hundred maunds of sheep's wool (fleeces) were purchased locally, and have been issued to the women, and this wool they have spun and knitted into stockings and socks, &c., for themselves and their children.



## 4. Food.

The rations are amply sufficient, and consist of—

Tea, sugar and bread at 8 A.M.

Bread and fruit at 12 noon.

Meat, vegetables, ghee and rice on four days per week at 3.30 P.M.

Vegetables, ghee and rice on three days per week at 3.30 P.M.

The food is distributed in the rooms or tents by attendants.

Fresh milk is distributed twice daily to all children recommended by the medical officer. At present 220 pints are distributed morning and evening.

## 5. Health.

By the kindness of the Air Officer Commanding, Air Vice-Marshal Burnett, C.B., D.S.O., the services of Flight-Lieutenant Dixon, R.A.F. (med.), were wholly placed at the disposal of the local committee, until the 20th October.

The services of this officer were very much appreciated, not only by the committee but also by the Assyrian refugees.

The health of the camp has been satisfactory. A small outbreak of diphtheria was quickly and successfully dealt with.

As is to be expected in a large community mostly living in tents in this cold weather, there have been a number of people sick with malaria, coughs, &c.

During the period the 21st August to the 30th November, there have been seventy deaths and eighteen births.

The deaths have been confined to children mostly under two years of age, and the number is not excessive in view of the condition of the children when they arrived in the camp after very trying experiences to their mothers and themselves.

## 6. Finance.

The Iraq Government has freely met all demands for funds to finance the administration of the camp.

The amount expended from the opening of the camp on the 21st August up to the 30th November is 4,405 I.D. Of this sum a considerable amount was spent in the initial stages of the formation of the camp.

The sum actually spent on the running of the camp does not exceed 200 I.D. per week. This amount covers food, milk, rent of the houses, tents, pay of staff, electric light and minor incidental expenses.

Copy has been sent to the Adviser, Ministry of Interior, the Mutessarif, Mosul Liwa, and the Administrative Inspector, Mosul.

[E 7930/84/93]

No. 211.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 27.)*

(No. 780. Secret.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, December 13, 1933.*

LORD GLENCONNER, who was appointed general manager of the Mosul Oil-fields last July, arrived in Bagdad on a tour of inspection on the 15th November and left on the 8th December. While in Bagdad he had several interviews with Rustam Beg Haidar, Minister of Economics and Communications, and Nuri Pasha, on the subject of the operations of the company, and, particularly, in regard to the payment of the instalment of dead rent, amounting to £125,000 gold, equivalent to about £190,000, in accordance with article 10 of the convention, which is due on the 1st January.

2. Lord Glenconner informed me that the company were not in a position to raise fresh capital on the London market until the value of their concession had been proved; in other words, until oil of a marketable quality had been struck. Three rigs had been erected in the Mosul Province and drilling had already reached a depth of about 120 feet. He said that he had arranged for a cable to be sent to him from London each week reporting progress, but it was, of course,

open to doubt whether oil would be struck by the 31st March, on which date the period of grace for payment of next year's dead rent to the Iraqi Government would expire.

3. Lord Glenconner informed me that he had spoken very frankly to Rustam Haidar about the company's position, and he said that, if the prospects of the company did not greatly improve by the 31st March, they would have to default over payment of the dead rent unless they were granted an extension of time. This would mean, under article 15 (i), that the Government would have the right of cancelling the concession. Lord Glenconner told me that he had informed Rustam Haidar that, if an extension of time were granted, the company would be prepared to work at least twice as many rigs this year as they were required to do under the agreement, and he said that if the concession were cancelled he did not think that the Iraqi Government would find any other foreign company who would be willing to conclude an agreement on such onerous terms as had been accepted by the British Oil Development Company.

4. I pointed out to Lord Glenconner that it was possible that, if there was default over the payment due next March and the concession was cancelled, the Government might employ foreign experts at their own expense to drill in selected areas west of the Tigris, and if oil of a suitable quality was discovered they might put up the concession for tenders again in the hope of obtaining at least equally favourable terms, after pocketing a year's dead rent from the British Oil Development Company and taking over all their gear for nothing.

5. The question of a pipe-line to the Mediterranean was also touched upon in my conversations with Lord Glenconner, who told me that his Italian and German colleagues on the board were in favour of constructing a pipe-line to Alexandretta. The cost, he said, was estimated at about 3 millions and the Germans hoped to obtain the bulk of the contract for the pipes. I told him that my personal opinion was that the country through which such a pipe-line would pass was one of the most potentially disturbed areas in the Middle East and that the security from a British point of view was nil. I thought that it would be in the ultimate interests of the Mosul Oilfields Company to come to an arrangement with the Iraq Petroleum Company for the use on commercial terms of their pipe-line to Haifa, and remarked that wherever oil might be struck in his company's concessional area it should not be very costly to join up with the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipe-line, which was liable to be duplicated if the world conditions of the oil industry permitted.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 7934/7/93]

No. 212.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 27.)*

(No. 784.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, December 14, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 735 of the 22nd November, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter and enclosure which I have received from Sir Kinahan Cornwallis on the subject of the work of the local Assyrian Committee at Mosul.

2. I also enclose an extract from the *Iraq Times* which, in its edition of the 11th December, gave prominence to a Geneva news telegram announcing that the Brazilian Government had refused permission for Assyrian immigration on a large scale.

3. I am informed that this news has caused much depression among the Assyrians.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[9941]

2 L 3



Enclosure 1 in No. 212.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Sir F. Humphrys.*

Dear Sir Francis,

Bagdad, December 9, 1933.

I FORWARD a copy of a memorandum of the 5th December, 1933, from the president of the local Assyrian Committee to the Minister of the Interior.

2. As I have already informed you verbally, Naji Beg has instructed the mutessarif, Mosul, to issue sufficient rifles to the Assyrians for their self-protection, provided that it is done in a manner which will not excite public criticism. Wilson informs me that the arrangements which are being made are satisfactory.

3. I am sure that Naji Beg will have no hesitation in impressing on the chief Kurdish aghas that petty thieving will not be permitted.

4. Major Thomson, in his report, confirms that a large number of Assyrians—chiefly from the Lower Tiari, Jelu, Ashuti and Baz—now say that they are not prepared to go to the same country as Mar Shimun and his followers. We have had reports of this before, but nothing of a sufficiently definite character to justify representation to the Committee of the League.

I presume that the Iraq Government will forward Major Thomson's report to the Committee of the League and recommend that another place be found for these people. It is a pity that no mention of numbers is made in the report; Major Wilson thinks that the total will not exceed 5,000 souls, but he admits that this is merely conjecture.

The question is extremely difficult. On the one hand, it is necessary from every point of view that the Assyrians who have caused so much trouble should be sent to some other country; on the other hand, the local Assyrians, who have suffered so severely, make a special appeal to one's sympathy, and it would be unfair to subordinate their claim for assistance to that of the Mar Shimun party simply because they are less likely to give trouble. Since, at the most, their number will not apparently exceed 1,000 families, I suggest that every effort be made to place them in one of the colonies, for instance, Kenya. Their natural inclination is, I think, to stay in Iraq, and they are only deterred from doing so by a sense of insecurity. It is possible that this feeling will disappear as time goes on, and that when faced with the question they will decide to remain, but, since they have made representations to Major Thomson, it is clearly the duty of Government to do its best to help them.

5. I am obtaining details as to the number of widows, children and women who are "without any form of supporter." These people must have male relations, and the obvious course is to make arrangements with them through their chiefs.

6. The question of providing for the pastoral people and the town dwellers, amongst whom can be reckoned most of the demobilised levies, appears to rest with the League Committee rather than with the Iraq Government. The committee has information regarding these elements and presumably has their case under consideration. At the same time I shall recommend that, in forwarding the report, the Iraq Government calls the attention of the committee to this problem.

Yours sincerely,

K. CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 212.

*Copy of a Letter of December 5, 1933, from President of the Local Committee to His Excellency Naji Beg Shawkat, Minister of Interior, Adviser, Ministry of Interior, Mutessarif, Mosul, and Administrative Inspector, Mosul.*

IN accordance with your letter of the 21st November, 1933, appointing me president of the local committee for dealing with the evacuation of Assyrians from Iraq, the committee proceeded on the 28th November to Dohuk.

We interviewed Mar Serkis, the mukhtars and chief men of all Assyrian villages in Dohuk Qadha, explained to them the terms of the decision of the League of Nations and distributed to them copies of the decision and also the statement of the committee.

On the 29th November we saw Mar Yawalahah and the mukhtars and chief men of the Assyrian villages in Amadiyah Qadha.

On the 1st December the committee proceeded to El Qosh, and there saw the mukhtars and chief men of the Assyrian villages of Shaikhan Qadha.

On the 4th December we visited Aqra, and there saw the mukhtars and chief men of the Assyrian villages in Aqra Qadha and Zaibar (Nahla area).

The absolute necessity of all Assyrians cultivating this winter was impressed on all mukhtars, and those in Amadia, Aqra and Zaibar were willing to do so. In Shaikhan and Dohuk they were not willing to do so, pleading lack of public security and want of rifles. The committee are strongly of opinion that sufficient rifles should be returned to all the Assyrian villages in Shaikhan, Aqra and Zaibar. It is understood that the Amadia villages retain their rifles.

It is considered that it is only by the return of rifles to villages that a feeling of confidence and trust in Government can be properly restored.

Arrangements could be made for mukhtars of villages to be responsible for rifles returned to villages.

The committee feel that the Government should take steps to impress on the chief Kurdish aghas that they view with the greatest disapproval the petty thieving and pilfering of Assyrian animals and property which is undoubtedly still being carried out by irresponsible Kurds. The enforcement of a firm policy of public security would go far towards re-establishing the confidence of the Assyrians in the Government.

The committee, during their various interviews, were impressed by the fact, which they had already formed independently and which had been reported in writing and verbally, that a large number of the Assyrians were definitely not prepared to be transferred from Iraq to any country in which they would be within the sphere of influence of the Mar Shimun.

This feeling is chiefly in the Lower Tiari, Ashuti, Jelu and Baz tribes. There are also many others who individually have expressed their objection to following the Mar Shimun.

The committee consider that this aspect of the case should be fully considered and laid before the League of Nations for their consideration. It must be remembered that these tribes were absolutely loyal to the Iraq Government, and did their best to implement the policy of the British Government in this respect, and it is they who have suffered by far the most heavily, in loss of men and property.

It is our considered opinion that those who have been loyal and borne the heat and burden of the day should be given some form of preferential treatment in their final disposal.

There are other questions which the committee consider should be dealt with before the arrival of the Nansen representative.

Namely: How it is proposed to deal with the large number of widows and children and women without any form of supporter.

The very large number of men, many with families, who are *not* cultivators, and have lived all their lives in towns, as clerks, servants, &c.

The large number of people who are entirely pastoral and whose only livelihood is acquired from shepherding; this refers especially to the Ashutis.

The question also of how the demobilised levies should be dealt with needs careful consideration. These men have lived a particular type of life, and in many cases have never cultivated, but rather enjoyed good pay and the comforts of a town life, and so are not primarily fitted to be agriculturalists.

There is no doubt in the minds of the committee that when the time comes for opting as to leaving Iraq or remaining in Iraq a considerable number of individual Assyrians will opt for Iraq. This, however, is not an important matter at the moment.

The committee will visit Batas and Diana during the present week, and also interview the leading local Assyrians in Mosul.

I am sending 200 copies of the League statement and that of the committee in Assyrian, as it is considered advisable that these papers be distributed to the Assyrians in Bagdad and also to the Assyrian levies at Hinaidi.



[E 7935/7/93]

No. 213.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 27.)*

(No. 785.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter from Sir K. Cornwallis, dated the 14th December, respecting the Assyrians in Iraq.

*Bagdad, December 14, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 213.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Sir F. Humphrys.*

Dear Sir Francis,

*Bagdad, December 14, 1933.*

I FORWARD herewith for information a copy of a memorandum of the 11th December, 1933, from Major Thomson regarding Assyrians.

Yours sincerely,

K. CORNWALLIS.

*Copy of a letter of December 11, 1933, from Major Thomson, President of the Assyrian Local Committee, Mosul, to His Excellency Naji Beg Shawkat, Minister of Interior, Bagdad.*

IN continuation of my report No. 302, dated the 5th December, 1933.

1. The Local Assyrian Committee on the 7th December visited Batas, and was joined by the Mudir Batas. It met Mar Yussuf and the mukhtars of the Assyrian villages in that area.

The same procedure was carried out here as at previous meetings.

When the question of winter sowing was discussed, it was found that a considerable number of the villagers had disposed of their oxen, sheep and wheat at ridiculously low prices and only retained sufficient wheat to last till next summer.

The excuse made was that the newspapers had announced that the League of Nations had stated that the Assyrians were to be moved as soon as possible. This, of course, was a ridiculous excuse, and there is every reason to believe that their action was the result of correspondence from the Mar Shimun to Mar Yussuf.

It is of interest to note that I personally saw Mar Yussuf and some of his followers on the 15th October at Harir and impressed on him the necessity of all Assyrians ploughing and sowing winter crops, and on no account should anyone dispose of his animals, or possessions.

This advice I repeated to Mar Yussuf in a letter written to him on the 14th November, which he received on the 19th November.

The committee impressed on the mukhtars the absolute necessity of sowing winter crops, that otherwise they would be in great want by next summer, and that their precipitate action in no way could commit the Iraq Government to give them help should they be in want.

They were advised to borrow ploughs and oxen if necessary and carry on their normal life.

On our return the following day, we noticed a number of Assyrians busy ploughing in the Batas-Harir areas.

2. On the 8th December the committee was joined by the Kaïmakam Rowanduz at Diana, and the local mukhtars were interviewed.

In this area the people have on the whole cultivated better than in the Batas area, and have not disposed of their animals in the same way. In fact, the Mukhtar of Alana informed us that he had made the people of his village cultivate as in past years, and he had forbidden them to sell their animals.

Undoubtedly all the ex-Ottoman Assyrians in this area who are Shemzdin by tribe will leave Iraq when the time comes.

3. On the 9th December the committee met the representatives and mukhtars of the Assyrians at present in Mosul.

Two meetings were held, one being attended by the followers of Mar Shimun, and the other by those who refuse to follow him.

The position was explained to both meetings.

The leaders of those who refuse to follow Mar Shimun, the Lower Tiari, Ashuti, Baz, Jelu were asked to supply figures as soon as possible of the number of families they estimated were in their following.

The necessity of accuracy and certainly of *no exaggeration* in the figures was emphasised.

4. A point has arisen during the tour of the committee which is considered worthy of consideration, namely, the recovery of loans, &c., by the Assyrians to Kurds, Yezidis and Arabs. These undoubtedly amount to a very considerable sum.

The committee suggest that a British judge or failing him an Iraqi judge be appointed to deal with this question. Should the Iraq Government agree to this proposal, it is considered that the sooner the judge takes up his duties the better.

5. The committee impressed on each meeting the inadvisability of accepting every statement they read in the local press as being authentic. They were advised to communicate either with me or with Major Wilson should any statement concerning their move arise in the press or from any other source of which they had not been informed by the committee.

Copy to the Adviser, Ministry of Interior, the Mutessarif, Mosul Liwa, and the Administrative Inspector, Mosul.



## CHAPTER III.—SYRIA AND GENERAL.

[E 3662/210/65]

No. 214.

*Consul-General Sir H. E. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 65.)

Sir,

Beirut, June 24, 1933.

THE *La Syrie* of the 24th printed a paragraph to the effect that the High Economic Commission at a meeting held on the previous day had definitely approved a scheme submitted by the Director of Economic Services of the French High Commission for the creation of a "free zone" at Beirut, and that shortly a decree would be issued laying down the conditions under which a concession for this zone would be granted to the Beirut Port Company. At the meeting there were present, in addition to the official members of the Economic Commission, the Lebanese and Syrian Directors of Public Works, representatives of the Beirut and Damascus Chambers of Commerce and delegates from other parts of the area under French mandate.

2. I learn on what seems to be good authority that this report is only partially correct in that it has been decided that, if they wish it, the ports of Tripoli, Lattakia and Alexandretta and the cities of Damascus and Aleppo will also be able to create "free zones." If this is really so, it should be a disappointment to the Beirut merchants, who would like a monopoly, which would tend to strengthen the position of the place as the leading commercial centre.

3. Nothing has yet been decided, I am informed, as to the details of the scheme. So far as Beirut is concerned, the only possible site would seem to be either on or to the east of the existing mole or cross-arm of the harbour. This has of late years been considerably widened, and work is at present actually proceeding on it, but this is merely to repair damage caused by winter storms. At the shore end some reclamation work is in slow progress. The work seems to be proceeding slowly and it does not convey any impression of great efficiency. The main trouble, and to overcome it will entail great expense, is that the outer side of the mole and the anchorage beyond it are directly exposed to northerly winds. These are not frequent, but cannot be ignored. An occasional gale, or high wind, from that quarter springs up and quite suddenly, sometimes even in the summer months. I enclose a rough sketch<sup>(1)</sup> showing the position, from which it will be seen that until some protection can be afforded either by the extension of the existing breakwater or the construction of a new one both shipping outside the mole and quay space on its exposed side will be liable to some risk of damage. Such an extension has often been talked of and plans have been made, but the scheme has always been postponed on the ground of expense.

4. If a free zone is to be created, with things as they are, in the vicinity of the east mole, it looks as if the authorities had decided on a half-measure which may fail in its object.

5. In addition to wishing to attract merchandise to and from Persia and Iraq to Syrian ports, the French wish to retain and, if possible, to increase the existing cross-desert passenger traffic with those countries. To this end a Decree 89/L.R. of the 21st June, of which a copy is enclosed, has just appeared. This grants, under the conditions therein laid down, very valuable privileges to transport companies carrying annually not less than 1,500 passengers and maintaining a monthly service of not less than three journeys. Those carrying over 2,000 passengers a year will receive total customs exemption and those carrying between 1,500 and 2,000 passengers a 50 per cent. reduction of duty on vehicles, tyres, inner tubes, spare parts, petrol and oil. Also petrol and oil brought into Syria in reasonable quantities on a return journey will be admitted duty free. In the past, privileges on similar lines have been granted to certain specified transport companies only.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not reproduced.

Enclosure in No. 214.

*Arrêté No. 89 L.R. du 21 Juin 1933, réglementant le Régime des Exonérations douanières en faveur des Sociétés de Transports transdésertiques effectuant un Service régulier de Transport de Voyageurs.*

PAR arrêté en date de ce jour, le Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban vient d'accorder aux compagnies transdésertiques assurant les services réguliers de transport de voyageurs, certaines facilités douanières, dans le but de favoriser le développement de ces transports.

Ce texte est le premier de ceux qui seront appelés à réglementer l'ensemble du trafic de transit, dont l'importance pour les pays sous mandat français n'a pas besoin d'être soulignée.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française

Arrête :

Titre I.—Dispositions générales.

Article 1<sup>er</sup>. Les sociétés automobiles de transports transdésertiques, qui effectuent ou effectueront un service régulier de transport de voyageurs entre les Etats du Levant sous mandat français et l'Irak ou la Perse, bénéficieront des avantages précisés à l'article 2 ci-après.

Sont considérées comme ayant assuré un service de transport régulier, celles des sociétés visées ci-dessus qui auront effectué, au minimum, trois voyages aller-retour au cours de chacun des mois de l'année.

Art. 2. Les sociétés de transports transdésertiques ayant transporté annuellement plus de 2,000 voyageurs bénéficieront de l'exonération douanière totale en faveur des matériels et articles désignés à l'article 3.

Celles qui auront transporté annuellement de 1,500 à 2,000 voyageurs bénéficieront d'une réduction de 50 pour cent des droits de douane applicables, au moment de leur importation, aux matériels et articles désignés à l'article 3.

Art. 3. Les avantages douaniers, dont il est fait mention aux articles précédents, sont applicables :

(a) Aux voitures automobiles dont l'usage exclusif sera réservé aux transports transdésertiques des voyageurs et de leurs bagages;

(b) Aux pneumatiques et chambres à air nécessaires à ces véhicules sur le parcours kilométrique exclusif qu'ils effectuent pour lesdits transports, aller et retour;

(c) Aux pièces de rechange et aux articles exclusivement destinés à l'entretien de ces véhicules;

(d) Aux essences et aux huiles lubrifiantes employées à la consommation de ces véhicules sur le parcours kilométrique exclusif qu'ils effectuent pour lesdits transports à l'aller seulement, jusqu'à Bagdad ou Mossoul. Pour le trajet de retour, les approvisionnements en essences et huiles lubrifiantes seront admis en franchise à l'entrée en Syrie, sous la réserve que la quantité importée de l'étranger n'excédera pas les besoins de véhicule.

Cette admission particulière en franchise n'entrera pas en ligne de compte pour les formalités prévues à l'article 15 du présent arrêté.

Art. 4. Pour bénéficier de ces avantages douaniers, lesdites voitures automobiles devront être importées par un des ports des Etats du Levant sous mandat français, sous le couvert de connaissements à l'ordre de la société intéressée.

La même règle est applicable aux articles de consommation et d'entretien énumérés à l'article précédent (pneumatiques, chambres à air, essences, huiles lubrifiantes, pièces de rechange et outils).

Toutefois, ces derniers articles, ainsi que les voitures automobiles, pourront également bénéficier de l'exonération douanière, bien qu'importés sous le couvert de connaissements à ordre ou établis au nom d'un commerçant à la condition expresse que les marchés passés avec le fournisseur soient antérieurs à la date du dépôt en douane de la déclaration de consommation afférente à ces voitures et articles. La douane en donnera main-levée au vu d'attestations sous la signature des directeurs des sociétés intéressées, indiquant la date du marché intervenu et certifiant que les articles importés sont destinés à leurs services de transports transdésertiques; ces articles feront ensuite l'objet, selon la règle



générale prescrite par l'article 6, de déclarations-soumissions d'admission temporaire au nom des sociétés intéressées.

Art. 5. Pour bénéficier des avantages prévus aux articles 2 et 3, la compagnie intéressée devra :

- (a) N'affecter à ces transports que des voitures obligatoirement immatriculées dans les États du Levant sous mandat français;
- (b) Avoir souscrit une police d'assurance couvrant la responsabilité civile du transporteur pour les risques d'accidents et pour un montant qui ne devra pas être inférieur à 2,500 L.L.S. par voyageur.

Art. 6. Les voitures automobiles et les articles de consommation et d'entretien de ces voitures, énumérés à l'article 3, seront admis temporairement en franchise des droits de douane, sous le couvert de déclarations-soumissions d'admission temporaire comportant engagement :

- (1) De n'utiliser ces véhicules qu'aux transports transdésertiques des voyageurs, à l'exclusion absolue de tout autre usage, et de n'employer les produits énumérés à l'article 3 qu'à la consommation et à l'entretien de ces voitures;
- (2) D'acquitter immédiatement les droits de douane et telles amendes que le Service des Douanes jugerait nécessaire d'appliquer, au cas de constatation par les agents des douanes ou telles autres autorités compétentes, soit d'emploi de ces véhicules ou des articles de consommation et d'entretien à un usage autre que celui qui est prévu au paragraphe précédent, soit de circulation illicite de ces véhicules ou de consommation délictueuse, sur un parcours non autorisé, des articles énumérés à l'article 3 (sauf le cas de dérogations consenties par la Douane);
- (3) De ne pas rétrocéder éventuellement les voitures et articles de consommation et d'entretien ou de ne pas désaffecter ces véhicules du service des transports transdésertiques (soit en cours d'usage, soit au moment de leur vente, après mise hors d'usage), sans en aviser préalablement l'Administration des Douanes et avant que cette administration ait réalisé, auprès de l'acheteur, le montant des droits exigibles.

Les importations des véhicules et d'articles de consommation et d'entretien devront faire l'objet de déclarations-soumissions d'admission temporaire distinctes.

Art. 7. Pour garantir l'ensemble des engagements souscrits dans les diverses déclarations-soumissions d'admission temporaire, chaque société intéressée sera tenue à son choix :

- Soit de déposer à la caisse d'une Direction des Douanes une garantie en numéraire dont le montant sera fixé par cette administration;
- Soit de souscrire à cette direction un engagement général, cautionné par un établissement bancaire connu et agréé par cette administration, garantissant, pour l'ensemble des importations privilégiées de la société, le paiement des droits et amendes exigibles.

#### Titre II.—*Contrôle par la Douane de l'Usage des Véhicules et des Articles de Consommation et d'Entretien.*

Art. 8. Les sociétés intéressées devront tenir :

- (1) Un registre paraphé par la Douane portant indication, par voyage, du nombre et des noms des voyageurs transportés;
- (2) Deux registres également paraphés par la Douane, l'un relatif aux voitures automobiles, l'autre afférent aux articles de consommation et d'entretien, sur lesquels seront consignées toutes les importations privilégiées. Sur ces registres seront exactement reproduites les énonciations de chaque déclaration-soumission, c'est-à-dire le numéro et la date de leur enregistrement par la Douane, ainsi que les caractéristiques suivantes des véhicules et articles admis temporairement en franchise :

- (a) Pour les voitures automobiles, l'origine et la marque, les numéros du moteur et de la carrosserie, la force motrice, le genre de fabrication, la valeur, le poids et toutes indications nécessaires au Service des Douanes pour la liquidation éventuelle des droits d'entrée;
- (b) Pour l'ensemble des articles de consommation et d'entretien : la nature, l'origine, la valeur et le poids; en outre, le nombre de litres pour les essences et

huiles; le nombre d'unités et les dimensions pour les pneumatiques et chambres à air.

Les sociétés bénéficiaires devront présenter ces registres à toutes réquisitions des agents des douanes.

Le Service des Douanes tiendra, de son côté, pour chacune des sociétés intéressées, des registres identiques et comportant les mêmes indications.

Art. 9. Les conducteurs de chaque automobile effectuant un transport transdésertique seront munis d'un carnet particulier à chaque voiture et dont la première page devra reproduire les caractéristiques du véhicule indiquées au paragraphe (2) de l'article 8.

Ce carnet devra être visé à chaque voyage, à l'aller et au retour, au poste douanier frontière syrien. Ce visa comportera vérification et indication du nombre des voyageurs transportés.

En outre, les conducteurs devront, à chaque voyage et à leur arrivée au point de destination final en Irak ou en Perse, présenter leur carnet au visa des autorités consulaires françaises ou de l'autorité locale.

Les visas apposés par les Douanes syro-libanaises et par les autorités consulaires françaises ou locales à l'étranger, devront indiquer la date et l'heure de chaque départ, passage ou arrivée et la certification d'identité de chaque voiture.

Art. 10. A chacun de leurs retours dans les États sous mandat français, les conducteurs des voitures automobiles devront représenter leur carnet à la douane pour vérification des formalités prescrites.

Art. 11. Les voitures automobiles faisant l'objet de déclarations-soumissions d'admission temporaire seront revêtues, dès l'importation, des deux lettres "A. T." peintes sur la carrosserie des véhicules, très apparentes et d'une couleur tranchant sur celle de la carrosserie, de manière à permettre le contrôle inopiné en tous lieux de l'usage de ces véhicules.

#### Titre III.—*A purement des Déclarations-Soumissions relatives aux Véhicules.*

Art. 12. Le délai de l'admission temporaire de chaque voiture est fixé à un an. Si à l'expiration de ce délai il a été reconnu que la société intéressée a satisfait aux conditions fixées aux articles 1<sup>er</sup>, 2, 5 et 13, la franchise ou la réduction de 50 pour cent des droits de douane sera définitivement acquise en faveur de la société.

Dans le cas contraire les droits de douane exigibles seront acquittés d'après la valeur du véhicule à ce moment. Le produit des droits récupérés ne pourra, toutefois, être inférieur à 50 pour cent du montant des droits exigibles à l'entrée.

En cas de cession avant mise hors d'usage constatée par la Douane, d'une voiture ayant déjà bénéficié de la franchise, les droits de douane exigibles seront acquittés d'après la valeur du véhicule au moment de la cession. La même règle sera appliquée en cas de cession d'un véhicule ayant déjà bénéficié de la réduction de 50 pour cent des droits de douane, compte tenu toutefois des droits primitivement acquittés.

Art. 13. La franchise douanière ou la réduction des droits de 50 pour cent, en ce qui concerne les véhicules, ne sera accordée aux voitures importées par la société intéressée que sous réserve que ledit véhicule aura assuré un service transdésertique pendant une période de 6 mois au minimum.

Art. 14. Le Service des Douanes sera seul juge des dérogations qui pourraient être consenties aux prescriptions des articles 12 et 13 au cas d'accident ou de tout autre événement imprévu mettant le véhicule dans l'impossibilité de circuler.

#### Titre IV.—*A purement des Déclarations-Soumissions relatives aux Articles de Consommation et d'Entretien.*

Art. 15. A l'expiration de chaque année et si les conditions de franchise ou de réduction du droit prévues par le présent arrêté sont remplies, le Service de Douane dressera une liste récapitulative des voyages effectués durant la période envisagée par les voitures automobiles de la société intéressée.

Cette liste servira à déterminer le parcours kilométrique total accompli durant ladite période par chaque véhicule et la franchise douanière ou la réduction de 50 pour cent des droits sera accordée aux quantités d'articles de consommation et d'entretien des véhicules utilisés pour ce parcours.



Ces quantités seront établies d'après le taux moyen de consommation fixé par décision de M. le Secrétaire général du Haut-Commissariat.

Art. 16. Le délai d'admission temporaire des articles de consommation et d'entretien des véhicules est fixé à une année.

Ne pourront toutefois être imputées sur les comptes d'apurement les soumissions d'admission temporaire ayant moins de trois mois de date.

A l'expiration de ce délai, si la déclaration-soumission n'est pas entièrement apurée, les droits de douane exigibles devront être acquittés sur les quantités n'ayant pas bénéficié de la franchise ou de la réduction de 50 pour cent des droits de douane ou feront l'objet d'une nouvelle admission temporaire. Ce renouvellement d'admission temporaire ne sera consenti que pour les quantités fixées par le Service des Douanes, qui correspondront aux besoins normaux de l'exploitation en cause pour une durée de trois mois.

Art. 17. Si les conditions de franchise ou de réduction des droits prévues au présent arrêté ne sont pas remplies, les droits de douane exigibles au moment de l'importation des articles de consommation et d'entretien seront récupérés.

#### Titre V.—Dispositions répressives.

Art. 18. Les amendes et pénalités applicables au cas de défaut d'accomplissement des engagements souscrits dans les déclarations-soumissions d'admission temporaire, ainsi que dans tous les cas d'infractions aux dispositions du présent arrêté, seront celles prévues par la réglementation douanière répressive.

Sans préjudice de l'application de ces amendes et pénalités, la récidive de contraventions et délits constatés à l'encontre des sociétés intéressées peut entraîner le retrait du bénéfice des dispositions du présent arrêté.

#### Titre VI.—Dispositions spéciales.

Art. 19. Les sociétés intéressées qui, à la date de la signature du présent arrêté, auront déjà introduit, en douane et sous le couvert de garanties non encore annulées, des voitures automobiles et articles de consommation et d'entretien de ces véhicules, seront tenues de régulariser leur situation envers la Douane dans le moindre délai et sans qu'il soit tenu compte du nombre de voyages effectués en ce qui concerne les voitures exclusivement affectées au service des voyageurs.

Art. 20. Les dispositions du présent arrêté seront applicables pendant une durée de cinq années courant à dater du jour de leur mise en vigueur.

Pour le cas où la décision serait prise d'abroger la présente réglementation à l'expiration de la période de cinq années fixée ci-dessus, cette mesure serait portée à la connaissance des sociétés de transports transdésertiques intéressées, par voie d'avis publié dans le *Bulletin officiel des Actes administratifs du Haut-Commissariat*, un an au moins avant la date d'expiration de ladite période.

Cette mesure ne donnera ouverture, en aucun cas, à des actions en indemnité contre l'Administration.

Art. 21. L'Arrêté No. 1607 du 8 octobre 1927 est abrogé pour tout ce qui concerne le transport transdésertique de voyageurs.

[E 3663/117/89]

No. 215.

[C. 409.1933.VI.]

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: FRONTIER BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA.

*Work of the Demarcation Commission.*

FRANCO-IRAQI AGREEMENT OF JULY 3, 1933.

*Note by the Secretary-General.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 5.)*

THE Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council a letter from the French Government, dated the 3rd July, 1933, transmitting the text of an agreement concluded on that date by the Government of France, mandatory Power for Syria and the Lebanon, and the Government of Iraq, and

requesting the withdrawal from the Council's agenda of the question of interpretation submitted to the latter by the French Government on the 21st June, 1933.

#### I.—Letter from the French Government.

(Translation.)

I have the honour to communicate to you herewith the arrangement which has just been signed between his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Iraq and the French representative to give effect to the arbitral decision pronounced on the 15th May by the chairman of the Commission for the Demarcation of the Frontier between Syria and Iraq.

This agreement having dispelled all misunderstanding between the two Governments as regards the interpretation of the Council's resolution of the 3rd October, the French Government thinks that it is no longer necessary for the Council to examine the question which it submitted to the latter on the 21st June.

In these circumstances I should be glad if you would withdraw the question from the Council's agenda.

#### II.—Franco-Iraqi Agreement of July 3, 1933.

(Translation.)

The French Government and the Government of His Majesty the King of Iraq, having both accepted arbitral decision No. 11 of the chairman of the commission, dated the 15th May, fixing as the frontier from Tell Dahraya to the Tigris "the straight line running from Tell Dahraya to the Tigris," have agreed to give effect to it as follows:—

(a) To request the chairman of the commission to hand to their respective delegations, to supplement his above-mentioned decision, a large-scale map showing the points on that straight line where pillars are to be erected.

(b) To have those pillars erected immediately by their topographical sections, which will get into direct touch with each other for this purpose.

(c) To request the chairman of the commission to be prepared, should any doubt arise between those topographical sections as to the determination on the ground of any points fixed on the map, to settle the matter by an arbitral decision.

In the view of the two Governments, this work of demarcation on the ground should not take more than fifteen days.

(d) As soon as demarcation has been completed, the two Governments will take possession of the territories assigned to them on either side of the frontier with all the consequent rights of administration. It is understood that the rights and customs of the tribes will be safeguarded and that a reasonable time will be allowed for the removal and transport of certain customs and police posts; this time limit may on no account be prolonged beyond the 30th November, 1933.

Done at Geneva in duplicate, the 3rd July, 1933.

NOURY SAID.  
R. MASSIGLI.

[E 3688/2079/91]

No. 216.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 6.)*

Sir,

*India Office, July 4, 1933.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of despatch No. 623-S from Consul-General Fowle, Bushire, dated the 8th June, on the subject of smuggling between Koweit and Iraq.

I am, &c.  
S. F. STEWART.



Enclosure in No. 216.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Fowle to Sir F. Humphrys.*

(No. 623-S. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, June 8, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a very interesting and useful report by Colonel Dickson on the subject of contraband from Koweit.

I am sending copies to the Government of India and His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

I have, &c.

T. C. FOWLE, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

(Confidential.)

*Note on the Contraband Problem of Iraq with her Neighbours, and in particular how it affects Koweit.*

#### I.—General.

IN order to understand the whole contraband question in its proper perspective one must for a start appreciate that, of the States bordering on the Persian Gulf, we have two distinct groups holding diametrically opposite policies in the matter of customs tariffs:—

- (a) Persia, Iraq and Saudiyeh, all believers in the theory that the sole object of tariffs is to increase the revenue of the State, and to this end instructing their Customs Departments to make their duties as high as possible.
- (b) Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar, Debai (including the Trucial Coast generally), all Arab States lying on the western shore of the Persian Gulf, whose firm belief is that low tariffs will attract trade to their ports to the definite detriment of the high tariff countries mentioned in (a) above. A not unnatural or incorrect assumption, seeing that their chief revenue is derived from their transit trade with the interior, and also the pearl trade, which is almost entirely in their hands.

It stands to reason, therefore, that those countries, (b) above, in the Persian Gulf possessing such low customs duties as 4 per cent. *ad valorem* are going to get most of the trade where the necessities of life are concerned, while their inhabitants are going to engage in the contraband business with their neighbours possessing high tariffs, (a) above.

#### II.—Contraband Traffic between Arab States in the Persian Gulf and Persia.

(a) Persia's policy in recent years of introducing prohibitive tariffs all along her seaboard has naturally been taken full advantage of by the States on the Arab side mentioned in paragraph I above, and, until the arrival of the new Persian navy, the running of contraband from the Arab coast to Persia was a most easy and lucrative pastime. Those chiefly engaged in the business were the inhabitants of the Trucial Coast, with their ingrained love of piracy and adventure (as witness the rise of Debai from a village to a large town in twenty years), although Bahrein, Qatar and Koweit have not been far behind in the game.

(b) The advent of Persia's new navy, and the strenuous efforts which Persia has since made to stop this illicit traffic, have already made themselves felt, and contrabandists working from the Arab side of the Gulf are now looking round for less risky fields for their operations. Not unnaturally, they have turned their attention to the next two best countries for making profits, viz., Saudiyeh and Iraq.

Both these States maintain high customs duties as part of their national policy, especially on such things as sugar, tea, piece-goods, silks, silver thread, &c.

(c) The Kingdom of Saudiyeh, of the two, is the less easy to run contraband into, even though it has a long and desolate coast line, with hundreds of starving Bedouins only too ready to run cargoes into the interior in order to make a little profit. The reasons for this are as follows:—

1. The terror which Ibn Saud's harsh and cruel Viceroy of Hassa, Ibn Jaloui, inspires among the Bedouins.
2. The fact that the tribes of Hassa are almost all at enmity with each other and will invariably give each other away. All know this.
3. The fact that Ibn Jaloui employs a small army of "Murra" trackers to follow up the tracks of every caravan suspected of moving from the coast into the interior until it is found and can explain its movements.
4. The fact that any Bedouin tribe which captures a caravan carrying contraband is allowed to take three-quarters of the whole cargo caught, the State only requiring the camels, a quarter of the goods, and the culprits.

(d) Iraq, on the other hand, has a small but conveniently sheltered coastline, with many shoals, round about the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, and in the northern reaches of the Khor Abdulla, also a long and, from the contrabandists' point of view, a most tempting, desert frontier, several hundred miles in length, with police posts very far apart, and a miserably weak preventive system of car patrols, which can easily be avoided, especially during the great heat of summer, by determined persons, who know the country with their eyes shut and do all their marches by night.

Last, but not least, Iraq does not, as far as the writer is aware, go in for the policy of getting her Bedouin tribes to co-operate with Government by a good system of subsidies and suitable rewards for catching the contraband runners, with the result that every tribal man's hand is against his own Government and well in league with every contraband runner.

#### III.—Koweit and Contraband Running.

(a) If we reflect on the fact that there has been a failure of the pearl industry in the Gulf for the last four years, and that the King of Saudiyeh has done his utmost to restrict trade between Koweit and the interior of Nejd by a system of land blockade extending over a period of nine years, it is not to be wondered at that Koweit has interested herself—and still does—in running contraband goods into her two neighbours' territories, Saudiyeh and Iraq, and into Persia when she can.

Actually, because of the fact that Persia has always maintained easily the highest customs tariff of her neighbours (as much as 200 per cent. *ad valorem* on some kinds of goods), and the fact that Saudiyeh comes next (with an approximately 100 per cent. tariff on some goods), Iraq, with her more moderate customs duties, has been and is the least sinned against, for, quite naturally, contrabandists make for the country offering the highest returns.

(b) As mentioned in paragraph II (a) above, the activities of the Persian navy have made it more dangerous than before to run illicit cargoes to Persia. Nevertheless, the traffic still exists, for profits are enormous. The business is mostly in the hands of Tangistani tribesmen, who sail across from Persia to Koweit with cargoes of grain, fruit, oat fodder, and "abbah" cloth. They take back tea and sugar. Those who supply them in Koweit are mostly Persian merchants, long domiciled in Koweit, who have friends and relatives on the other side, who know the ropes. Cargoes are paid for in Koweit and are run to the coast of Persia, between Lingah and Bushire, the carrier going halves in the profits, when goods are disposed of. The difficult coastline of Persia is ideal for these operations. A few small cargoes are run to the Persian villages on the Barmashir channel, running from Mohammerah to the sea; these are all small cargoes, however, and bring in little profit.

(c) After Persia, most of the contraband trade leaving Koweit goes into Nejd, sometimes by camel direct across the southern border, and at other times by camels going west into the Iraq southern desert, and then, when opposite Qassim, breaking up into parties of two and three, and making for Qassim by a swift dash across the intervening desert. The most common method is for dhows to



take cargoes down the coast to the vicinity of Jinneh Island and Abu Ali, where there are a host of convenient shoals and hiding places. From there cargoes are landed on the mainland, where the starving Awazim, Bani Khalid, Ajman and Mutair, who incidentally all have relatives in Koweit to put them wise, are only too ready to co-operate if they safely can.

It may not be out of place to mention that, at the time of writing, the duty fixed by the Sandiyeh Government on sugar entering Hassa is 11 rupees on a bag costing 11 rupees, so it is worth risking much to get the stuff in free.

(d) As regards Iraq, who, as I have mentioned above, is the third in order of States sinned against: What contraband does go from Koweit across her borders, is run in the following manner:—

- (1) By small dhow to the entrance of the Shatt-al-Arab and to the upper reaches of Khor Abdulla.
- (2) By camel and donkey across the western frontier of Koweit.

Method (1) is usually managed as follows: Small traders from the various villages on the Iraq side of the lower reaches of the Shatt-al-Arab come down to Koweit by small boat or "ballam," containing crews of perhaps four to five men each. They find things very cheap, as compared with the cost and trouble of getting the same articles at Basra. The difference is probably about a quarter of what they would have to pay in their country. These boats, which come laden with fruit, vegetables, firewood, &c., for all of which Koweit is dependent on Iraq, fill up with loads sufficient to fill their boats, approximately ten to thirty bags of sugar or other dutiable articles. The crews then try and get back under cover of night, either by entering the Shatt-al-Arab and creeping past Fao customs post, or by dumping their cargoes on the boggy mud-flats existing at the top end of the Khor Abdulla, whence confederates at once take the goods over and hide them in the many villages and hamlets existing in the palm belt of the Shatt-al-Arab.

It is true that occasionally small Koweit dhows are hired to run these cargoes, but they are the exception and not the rule.

Method (2) is managed as follows and, as far as one can gather, much the bigger volume of contraband traffic goes into Iraq this way: For six months in each year Koweit State is overrun by the Muntafik and Hamar Lake shepherd tribes. Approximately some 15,000 persons, male and female, enter Koweit after the first fall of rain (November) and spread themselves like locusts over the whole country from Safwan to the Koweit neutral zone and as far west as Rigai in the Batin. These people are all the time sending parties into Koweit to sell their sheep, wool and ghee and in return buy food and clothing, part of which is, of course, for their own legitimate needs, but a large portion is for passing on to confederates, who come down from the Euphrates from as far west as Samawa, and live with them until such time as they can run the stuff they have bought across the western frontier of Koweit. These confederates are all tough and well-armed customers, who dress and look like shepherds. They arrive with plenty of money and either come into the town and buy themselves, or depute the shepherd tribal women to do so. The contraband so run usually goes through to the thickly populated tribal country on both sides of the Euphrates: Little of it, it is said, finds its way into the towns.

The shepherd tribes do not themselves engage much in the actual running of contraband across the border, as for the most of their sojourn in Koweit they are too busy minding their flocks; they do, however, harbour other tribesmen from Iraq, who easily pass locally for Iraqi shepherds. When, however, the time comes for them, the shepherds, to move back to their homes in Iraq, which happens each year in April and May, then each tent and family loads up as much contraband as it possibly can on its donkeys and takes it back to its home on the Euphrates for personal consumption. The volume of this particular form of contraband trade is nothing like that dealt with by their friends, the gentry, who come down from the Euphrates with money in plenty especially to buy goods, for these work with camels (not donkeys) supplied by the Dhafir, Muntafik and Jasha'am tribes, which carry five times as much as the small donkey of the country.

(e) There is another method, equally successful with that above mentioned. It is the Dhafir and Shammar tribal method. Every year, just before summer sets in (April and May), several sections of these two tribes move into Koweit and camp on the wells of Jahara or south near the Subaihiyeh and Tawil wells. They come ostensibly to "summer" near the "Arfaj" grazing grounds, which Koweit

is famed for. The visitors number anything from thirty to 300 tents. They all have their "pals," especially the Dhafir in their rear, across the border in the Iraq southern desert. Nothing is easier for these sections camped in Koweit territory than to shelter Iraq contrabandists in the same way as the shepherd tribes do. These latter, more often than not paid agents of merchants in the towns along the Euphrates, sit quiet in camp and make their purchases through the medium of the Bedouin with whom they are living. These latter can be seen in droves coming into the town daily and marching back to their camps with fully loaded camels. If one stops them and asks where the stuff is going to, they invariably reply: "For ourselves and our friends, we are engaged in 'musabilah'; Iraq is too expensive for us to-day, and we are forced to come and buy our daily needs from Koweit."

These Dhafir and Shammar purchases are of course run, by means known to the Bedouin only, across to their brethren in Iraq, and then, slowly and surely and in small amounts, find their way up to the Euphrates towns. Original bales, boxes, &c., are carefully broken and repacked into smaller parcels before the Euphrates is reached.

(f) It may be of interest to mention here that Haji Abdulla Williamson, at one time in our intelligence service, used before the war to run camels and contraband from Koweit to Damascus by the desert route. During the Muntafik rebellion against the Turks on the Euphrates he ran rifles and ammunition from Muscat to the rebels. He used to land his cargoes on the Hassa coast, south of the Koweit neutral zone, convey them past Subaihiyeh and Jahara and across the Batin up to the Euphrates, and employed the Dhafir, Shammar and Ajman Bedouin for the purpose as described in (e) above. Haji Abdulla, with whom I have discussed the contraband question, has expressed his entire agreement with the contents of this note.

#### IV.

This contraband problem, I fear, is not going to be an easy one for Iraq to handle, nor would the Koweit authorities find it any easier to tackle, however willing they be to co-operate. This for the simple reason that Koweit—

- (a) is looked upon by all Bedouin of North-East Arabia as their natural home and market for all their wants, and it is the policy of Koweit to encourage this feeling in spite of Ibn Saud's blockade;
- (b) Koweit would to-day die a natural death if this one remaining outlet for her desert trade were denied her;
- (c) any attempt of the sheikh to control what the Bedouin bought or took out would be playing directly into the hands of Ibn Saud, and would be a deadly blow to his prestige.

Furthermore, it would be quite impossible for anyone in Koweit to say what was legitimate or what illegitimate trade where the desert Arab was concerned. They come from the north, south and west of the State, and it is not the shopkeepers' concern to ask where their stuff goes, nor, indeed, would our friend of the desert say where he intended to take his purchases, for fear lest one of Ibn Saud's spies in the town reported his movements to Al Bagaawi, Ibn Saud's chief blockade officer.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Sheikh of Koweit does all in his power to encourage trade with the desert tribes in the hopes that all goods will eventually find their way to Nejd, and so annoy Ibn Saud.

#### V.

Undoubtedly the one and only really effective or satisfactory method for Iraq to adopt will, in the long run, be to reduce her customs duties on all imports to the lowest possible figure that she can afford, this as a matter of policy, and above all to give up entirely the idea of treating her Customs Department as a revenue-producing concern.

Iraq is surrounded by long, lonely and difficult frontiers, all eminently suited to the professional contraband runner's methods. If she maintains her present very high import duties, as she is trying to do, she will have to employ large numbers of preventive police, whose upkeep and maintenance will swallow up all



profits made. This is the writer's considered view on the situation, and he has been able to study the problem from both sides of the picture, both when he was Political Officer in charge of the Muntafik for five years, and to-day with his four and a half years' experience of Koweit.

## VI.

One last point: One notices that there is a growing tendency in Iraq and elsewhere to believe that the people of Koweit town are the actual "contrabandists" and are the bold villains who are for ever going backwards and forwards into Iraq plying their nefarious trade. This is an entirely erroneous idea. The Koweitis are quite content to sit in their shops and sell their wares. The actual contraband runners are always Persians, Nejdīs or Iraqis, who come from their own countries armed with the necessary funds. These gentry, as mentioned elsewhere, are always in the closest touch with confederates on their side of the border, who are a necessary part of the game.

## VII.

A final point: Let it not be thought that no contraband comes from Nejd into Iraq, just because of the fact that Nejd maintains a higher tariff than Iraq. It is common local knowledge that luxuries, such as silver thread "zerri," "unwoven silks" and especially "Japanese piece-goods," which to-day are being dumped in ever-increasing quantities and at far below fair trade prices into the Hejaz and Hassa, are regularly being brought up into Iraq via Qassim, by Bedouins who have no transport charges to bear.

It should never be forgotten that a camel journey from, say, Medina to Iraq is nothing at all to a Bedouin. It is, indeed, a sort of pleasure and pastime, and enables him to see new faces and bring back strange goods in return. There are signs also that melted-down silver is going into Iraq from Nejd to-day in considerable quantities. The Iraq Customs are no doubt aware of this.

## VIII.

To sum up: If Iraq seriously desires to check the flow of contraband across her borders, the writer, with very great diffidence, offers the following advice:—

- (a) She should reduce her present customs all round, and get away from the idea of looking upon the Customs Department as a money-producing concern.
- (b) She should, as Ibn Saud does, get her tribal elements on the border to assist by offering them three-quarters of the proceeds of any contraband they can catch, or be the means of catching.

At the same time Iraq should realise that (b) is a double-edged weapon, and one which, like the boomerang, might easily come back and hurt the thrower—in this case, Iraq.

H. R. P. DICKSON, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*Political Agent.*

Koweit, May 29, 1933.

[E 3776/210/65]

No. 217.

Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 71.)

Sir,

Beirut, July 4, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 68 of the 24th June, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of Decree No. 91 L.R. relative to the establishment of "free zones" at ports in Syria and the Lebanon. This is preceded by a communiqué of the French High Commission pointing out that similar zones can

be created at Damascus, Aleppo and Homs. The decree deals with the matter on general lines and further decrees laying down all necessary details will appear later. These I will report as soon after their appearance as possible.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

Enclosure in No. 217.

*L'Arrêté général réglementant le Régime des Zones franches en Syrie et au Liban a été signé Mercredi, 28 Juin.*

*Le Communiqué du Haut-Commissariat.*

EN date du 28 juin 1933, le Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban a signé un arrêté portant réglementation générale des zones franches.

Les dispositions de cet arrêté permettent à tout port maritime des territoires sous mandat français de soustraire au régime douanier une partie de ses dépendances en vue de la constitution d'une zone franche, sur la proposition des États ou Gouvernements locaux, et sur la demande, suivant le cas, des organismes chargés de l'exploitation des ports, de sociétés régulièrement constituées, des chambres de commerce locales ou des municipalités.

Le même régime pourra être étendu aux villes de Damas, Alep et Homs, centres principaux de transit et d'industrie dans l'intérieur, dans lesquels un emplacement particulier pourra être affecté à l'établissement d'une zone franche.

Ces mesures répondent à la double préoccupation de favoriser le transit des marchandises et de faciliter le conditionnement et l'utilisation des produits locaux destinés à l'exportation.

*Arrêté No. 91 L.R. du 28 Juin réglementant les Zones franches.*

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu les décrets du Président de la République française en date des 23 novembre 1920 et 3 septembre 1926,

Arrête :

Article 1<sup>er</sup>.—Dans tout port maritime des États du Levant sous mandat français, une partie des dépendances du port, dénommée "zone franche," peut être soustraite au régime douanier.

*Le Régime des Marchandises.*

Les marchandises de toute nature et de toute origine, étrangère ou nationale, peuvent, hors des cas prévus à l'article 6, être introduites en zone franche, où elles sont réputées hors du territoire douanier.

Ces marchandises, à leur entrée, pendant leur séjour dans la zone franche et au moment de leur exportation ou de leur réexportation, sont affranchies, sous réserve de la disposition prévue au dernier paragraphe de l'article 14, de tous droits de douane, d'importation, d'exportation et de transit, des droits de consommation, d'échelle et d'octroi et de toutes taxes autres que celles instituées au profit de l'organisme chargé de l'exploitation de la zone franche.

Aucun délai ne peut être imposé par le Service des Douanes en ce qui concerne la durée du séjour des marchandises déposées en zone franche.

Ce régime pourra être étendu aux villes de Damas, Alep et Homs, centres principaux de transit et d'industrie dans l'intérieur, dans lesquelles pourra être affecté à l'établissement d'une zone franche un emplacement donnant les garanties indispensables au Service des Douanes.

*Choix et Délimitation des Zones.*

Art. 2.—Les zones franches seront constituées par arrêté du Haut-Commissaire de la République française sur la proposition des États ou Gouvernements locaux et sur la demande, suivant le cas, des organismes chargés de l'exploitation

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des ports, des sociétés régulièrement constituées, des chambres de commerce locales ou des municipalités.

L'arrêté créant la zone franche en déterminera exactement :

- (1) Les limites et la superficie qui pourra comprendre des terrains faisant partie du domaine public et les propriétés particulières nécessaires à la constitution de cette zone;
- (2) La partie de la zone qui devra être réservée à des locations aux usagers.

Le mode de clôture et les moyens de surveillance de la zone, qui devront être conçus et établis de façon à prévenir le versement frauduleux des marchandises privilégiées sur le territoire douanier, ainsi que les heures d'ouverture et de fermeture, seront fixés par le règlement prévu à l'article 3.

#### *Les Charges de l'Exploitation.*

Art. 3.—L'organisme régulièrement constitué, chargé de l'exploitation d'une zone franche, sera tenu d'établir et d'exploiter, sur les emplacements compris dans cette zone, aux conditions d'un règlement ou d'un cahier des charges approuvé par l'arrêté d'institution, les entrepôts couverts ou à découvert, voies ferrées, outillages nécessaires à l'emmagasinage, au transport et à la manutention des marchandises.

Il aura à pourvoir à toutes les dépenses nécessitées par cette organisation.

Il prendra également à sa charge le supplément de frais auquel donnera lieu la surveillance du périmètre de la zone franche par l'Administration des Douanes.

Pour l'indemniser des dépenses d'aménagement ainsi mises à sa charge, l'établissement bénéficiaire pourra être autorisé à percevoir à son profit des taxes ou loyers, dont la nature et le montant maximum devront être fixés par l'arrêté institutif.

Les locataires des parcelles comprises dans les zones franches pourront élever des constructions sur ces parcelles, dans les conditions qui seront fixées par le règlement visé ci-dessus.

Art. 4.—Les zones franches pourront être supprimées par des arrêtés rendus dans les mêmes formes que les arrêtés institutifs. Ces arrêtés fixeront le délai au cours duquel les marchandises se trouvant dans la zone franche devront être évacuées.

Tout ce qui concerne l'affectation des terrains, bâtiments, outillages compris dans la zone, ainsi que les dispositions que pourrait motiver le retour à l'état de choses antérieur, feront l'objet de dispositions particulières dans les actes institutifs.

#### *La Manipulation des Marchandises.*

Art. 5.—Sont librement autorisées dans les zones franches toutes opérations de conditionnement, de nettoyage, de triage, de mélange, d'assortiment, la manipulation, de criblage, de division, de torréfaction, de broyage, de concassage, de pulvérisation, modifications de marchandises ou autres transformations qui pourront être déterminées par l'arrêté créant la zone ou par des arrêtés subséquents, y compris la manipulation de tabacs étrangers et les mélanges avec les tabacs de production nationale.

D'une manière générale, pourront être effectués les mélanges de produits étrangers avec d'autres produits étrangers ou avec des marchandises nationales ou nationalisées.

#### *Articles prohibés.*

Art. 6.—Sont interdites à l'entrée des zones franches les marchandises que l'autorité a déclaré prohibées ou qui sont monopolisées par l'Etat.

L'autorisation spéciale nécessaire pour l'importation dans les Etats sous mandat français, la fabrication et le stockage des substances assimilables aux explosifs ou dangereuses, reste obligatoire en zone franche.

Ne pourront être introduites dans ces zones les matières inflammables ou infectes que dans des conditions prévues dans l'arrêté institutif de la zone, répondant aux nécessités de la sécurité publique et de l'hygiène.

L'introduction des armes et munitions de toute nature est formellement interdite dans les zones franches.

Art. 7.—Est et demeure applicable dans les zones franches la législation en vigueur dans les territoires du Levant sous mandat concernant la protection de la propriété commerciale, industrielle, littéraire, artistique et musicale.

Tous les produits ayant subi une transformation en zone franche devront porter, à leur sortie, la marque apparente et indélébile : " Zone franche de. . . "

#### *Plombage, Estampillage.*

Art. 8.—Le régime de la zone franche ne comporte, en principe, dans les enceintes qui la constituent, aucune autre action de l'Administration des Douanes que celle se rapportant à la recherche des marchandises qui en sont exclues en vertu de l'article 6 et à l'établissement des statistiques commerciales.

Les agents de l'Administration des Douanes ont le droit de pénétrer à tout moment et de circuler librement dans la zone franche.

Lorsque l'Administration des Douanes est sollicitée par les intéressés d'opérer sur des marchandises placées en zone franche, elle le fait, lorsque l'opération est régulière, en appliquant ses tarifs ou en exigeant toutes formalités ou garanties conformes à sa réglementation, telles qu'acquets-à-caution, soumissions cautionnées, plombage, estampillage, escorte, &c.

#### *Dispositions diverses.*

Art. 9.—Les marchandises ne peuvent être débarquées ou introduites en zone franche que moyennant l'autorisation de l'organisme chargé de son exploitation et sous réserve de l'observation des dispositions du présent arrêté.

En outre, les marchandises étrangères destinées, à leur importation, à une zone franche établie dans une ville de l'intérieur, ne pourront être acheminées que sous la garantie d'acquets-à-caution.

Art. 10.—Les marchandises provenant de la zone franche ne peuvent être embarquées ou expédiées que moyennant l'autorisation de l'organisme chargé de son exploitation et sous réserve, le cas échéant, d'accomplissement des formalités prévues aux articles 11 et 12.

#### *Passage en Territoire douanier.*

Art. 11.—Lorsque les marchandises passeront de la zone franche en territoire douanier, elles seront soumises, suivant le cas, aux droits du tarif normal ou du tarif maximum des douanes, en vigueur au moment du dépôt de la déclaration de consommation, et aux autres taxes et droits exigibles.

Dans tous les cas où l'Administration des Douanes n'aura pas été mise en mesure de reconnaître avec certitude l'origine de la marchandise, les droits du tarif maximum seront exigibles.

Pour les marchandises taxées *ad valorem* la valeur imposable sera celle du produit dans l'état où il est présenté à la douane au moment de la sortie de la zone franche. L'estimation de cette valeur sera faite dans les conditions prévues par la réglementation douanière.

Pour les marchandises soumises aux droits spécifiques, le droit sera perçu sur la base des quantités, nombres et unités de mesure déclarés au moment de la sortie des marchandises de la zone franche, sous réserve des dispositions prévues au dernier alinéa de l'article 17.

#### *Le Ravitaillement des Navires.*

Art. 12.—Il est interdit d'habiter, de consommer et de vendre au détail dans les zones franches, sauf l'exception ci-après :

Tous les navires pourront se pourvoir en zone franche du matériel d'armement de toute nature, d'attache et mobile, correspondant à leurs besoins.

Tous les navires à vapeur ou à moteur de plus de 100 tonneaux nets, nationaux ou étrangers, touchant un port dans lequel existe une zone franche pourront, en outre, s'y ravitailler en vivres divers et matières consommables nécessaires à leur appareil moteur.

Les autorisations d'approvisionnement seront délivrées par le Service des Douanes sur déclaration spéciale des intéressés.

Art. 13.—L'organisme chargé de l'exploitation de la zone franche devra prendre, vis-à-vis de l'Administration des Douanes, l'engagement cautionné de se conformer, en ce qui le concerne, aux obligations édictées par l'article 14.



L'arrêté institutif précisera dans quelle mesure la responsabilité de cet organisme pourra être mise en cause, dans le cas où ses préposés auraient eu connaissance d'infractions aux prescriptions de l'article 6, sans que l'administration en ait été avisée.

#### *Les Formalités administratives.*

Art. 14.—Les manifestes ou extraits certifiés conformes des marchandises débarquées en zone franche maritime, ou les feuilles de gros des marchandises introduites dans les zones franches de l'intérieur, devront être communiqués à l'Administration des Douanes, immédiatement après le débarquement ou le déchargement, par les capitaines de navires, compagnies de navigation ou par les fondés de pouvoirs des compagnies chargées du transport sous acquit-à-caution.

De son côté, l'organisme chargé de l'exploitation de la zone franche devra remettre à l'Administration des Douanes, dans les trente-six heures suivant le débarquement ou le déchargement, une liste distincte par bateau, train ou véhicule, comprenant l'énumération complète du nombre et du genre des colis, de leurs marques et numéros de la nature de la marchandise et de sa provenance.

Les obligations prévues aux deux paragraphes qui précèdent incombent aux mêmes assujettis pour l'embarquement ou l'expédition des marchandises provenant de la zone franche.

Les marchandises nationales ou nationalisées introduites dans la zone franche sont soumises au dépôt d'une déclaration en douane. Ces produits seront passibles :

- (1) De tous les droits et taxes exigibles, s'ils sont réintroduits en territoire douanier;
- (2) Du droit de sortie éventuellement exigible, s'ils sont exportés.

#### *L'Enregistrement.*

Art. 15.—Les marchandises ne peuvent être déposées dans la zone franche que sous réserve d'inscription sur des registres d'entrée et de sortie, établis d'après les modèles agréés par l'Administration des Douanes, tenus par les dépositaires ou propriétaires des marchandises et contenant toutes les indications des listes prévues par l'article 14, ainsi que toutes celles qui seront de nature à permettre l'identification des marchandises.

Ces registres devront être à la disposition constante des agents de l'Administration des Douanes chargés de s'assurer que la zone franche fonctionne dans les conditions réglementaires.

L'Administration des Douanes tient, de son côté, à titre de contrôle et pour l'établissement des statistiques commerciales, des registres d'entrée et de sortie conformes aux précédents.

#### *Réexportation.*

Art. 16.—Les marchandises étrangères nationalisées par le paiement des droits de douane dans les Etats du Levant sous mandat français, qui seront introduites en zone franche pour les besoins des opérations qui y sont autorisées, ne pourront bénéficier, sous les conditions prévues par la réglementation douanière, du remboursement des droits de douane perçus à l'importation que si, dans un délai maximum de deux ans, elles sont effectivement réexportées en pays étranger.

#### *Pénalités.*

Art. 17.—La découverte en zone franche de marchandises qui en sont exclues, entraîne, à l'égard des propriétaires, dépositaires, de leurs préposés ou complices et généralement de toutes les personnes citées par l'article 12 de l'Arrêté 103/S du 29 avril 1925, l'application des pénalités prévues par la réglementation douanière en matière d'importation sans déclaration de marchandises prohibées.

Les mêmes pénalités sont applicables dans les mêmes circonstances à l'égard de l'organisme chargé de l'exploitation de la zone franche dont la responsabilité se trouverait engagée en vertu des dispositions de l'article 13.

Le versement frauduleux sur le territoire douanier de marchandises placées en zone franche entraîne, à l'égard de ses auteurs, coauteurs, complices et toutes personnes citées au 1<sup>er</sup> alinéa, l'application des pénalités prévues par la réglementation douanière en matière d'importation en contrebande de marchandises prohibées ou non prohibées, selon le cas.

Le défaut d'accomplissement des formalités prévues aux articles 14 et 15 entraîne, à l'égard des assujettis à ces obligations, l'application des pénalités prévues par l'Arrêté 2390 du 22 janvier 1924, article 1<sup>er</sup>.

D'une manière générale, les infractions douanières commises à l'occasion du fonctionnement des zones franches sont, dans les limites imposées par le présent arrêté à l'intervention de l'Administration des Douanes, passibles des pénalités prévues par la réglementation douanière.

Art. 18.—Le Secrétaire général du Haut-Commissariat est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

*Beyrouth, le 28 juin 1933.*

Le Haut-Commissaire,  
H. PONSOT.

Le Secrétaire général,

J. HELLEU.

Le Conseiller du Haut-Commissariat  
aux Affaires économiques,  
RECLUS.

Le Conseiller du Haut-Commissariat  
aux Affaires financières,  
ABADIE GASQUIN.

Pr. l'Inspecteur général du Sce. du  
Contrôle des Sociétés concession-  
naires et des Travaux publics,  
PECHIER.

L'Inspecteur général des Douanes,  
GOMBAULT.

Le Conseiller législatif du H.-C.,  
A. MAZAS.

[E 4159/120/89]

No. 218.

*Acting Consul Todd to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 37.)

Sir,

*Damascus, July 20, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the local press comments on the appointment of M. de Martel as the successor of M. Henri Ponsot are generally favourable.

2. The *Fata-el-Arab* (Moderate) hopes that the new High Commissioner will use his abilities and experience in oriental affairs to bring about a complete solution of the Syrian question, so that Syria will realise that she is at last a country having the same rights as other independent countries and able to treat political and social questions as she understands them. The journal hopes that he will not spend too much time studying a question which has already been studied in all its aspects by previous commissioners and by the Quai d'Orsay. Franco-Syrian collaboration is inevitable, and this collaboration should be directed towards enabling Syria to realise her known claims, and enabling France to consolidate her moral and material interests in this part of the Near East. Syria is at present menaced by a policy which can be described as an economic blockade, the centre of which is Haifa. In such circumstances, the régime of M. de Martel should comprise economic and political competition. Nothing, this paper asserts, could be more effective in eradicating the influence of Haifa than a comprehensive and well-conceived plan of political and economic action in which France and Syria would act in common.

3. *Al Chaab* (Moderate) thinks that France, noticing that M. Ponsot was unsuccessful in untying the Syrian knot in spite of a programme prepared very thoroughly, has had recourse to another man of experience, in the person of M. de Martel, who is an expert in oriental politics and possesses a deep knowledge of the oriental character, customs, traditions, &c. The journal hopes that M. de Martel will not come to Syria before he has mastered every question, large and small.



4. The *Alef Ba* (anti-Nationalist) says that the new High Commissioner will not arrive in Syria without his "new costume," which is now being made in Paris. In other words, it is very probable that he will not spend months and years in studying the question, as his predecessors have done, but will proclaim what has already been accomplished and keep an eye on its application.

5. The reaction of the extreme Nationalists to the new appointment is not clearly defined as their organ, *Al Ayyam*, was indefinitely suspended a short while ago. However, the following statement of one of their number no doubt sums up the general opinion of their party.

6. The Nationalists, he said, see in the appointment a proof that France desires to rid herself of Syria, to conclude a treaty with her, and to introduce her as a member of the League of Nations. One of the factors, he continued, which has induced France to make the change is that she considers that M. Ponsot, having brought matters to the point of a treaty, is no longer capable of taking the last hurdle, i.e., that of the actual negotiation and conclusion of a treaty.

7. The press does not contemplate the possibility of the whole question being put into the melting-pot and the progress achieved up to the present largely dissipated as a result.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

FRANK H. TODD.

[E 4217/305/91]

No. 219.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 1.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and is directed to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, from which it will be seen that with effect from the 1st August, 1933, the India Office will take over those responsibilities in respect of the Persian Gulf work, including oil matters, which have hitherto been discharged by the Colonial Office.

*Colonial Office, July 29, 1933.*

Enclosure in No. 219.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting Resident of the Persian Gulf, Bushire.*

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Colonial Office, July 29, 1933.*

MY despatch of 15th April, 1924, No. 13.

His Majesty's Government have decided that India Office shall with effect from 1st August take over responsibilities hitherto discharged by Colonial Office in respect of Persian Gulf work, including oil. You should, therefore, from that date address Secretary of State for India in all cases in which you have hitherto addressed to Secretary of State for the Colonies, and instructions will issue to you from India Office on behalf of His Majesty's Government on all matters on which they have hitherto issued from Colonial Office. Position of Government of India in regard to Gulf work will remain unchanged, and you should continue to repeat correspondence to them as at present.

(Repeated to Government of India, No. 1880.)

[E 4268/210/65]

No. 220.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 447.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 12, 1933.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 356, dated the 7th June last, concerning the exploitation by Syrian interests of the trans-desert routes, and in particular to paragraph 8 of that despatch, I have the honour to inform you that the French High Commission in Beirut have notified those concerned that an overland mail service from Damascus to Bagdad will come into operation on the 12th July connecting with the Simplon-Orient and Taurus express. The service is to run twice a week. The mails are scheduled to leave London on Fridays and Mondays, and to reach Bagdad on the following Thursdays and Sundays—a saving of at least thirty-six hours in comparison with present timings via Palestine.

2. I understand that the Syrian Postal Administration have already notified the International Office at Berne of this new service, but that the Iraqi Government have protested on the ground that it conflicts with an agreement reached in 1929 between the postal authorities of Iraq and Syria, which provided for co-operation in all mail services between Damascus and Bagdad. Further, the Syrian authorities apparently contemplate that the mails should cross the desert between Damascus and Rutbah two days in the week when the road is not patrolled. This is contrary to the regulations prescribed in both countries in order to ensure the security of the route, and the Iraqi authorities have not been consulted in the matter. Thirdly, the special transit due to be collected by the Syrian Post Office from other post offices using the route, for payment to the trans-desert transporters, is fixed at 50 gold centimes per kilogramme. The agreed rate since 1929 has been 1 gold franc per kilogramme, and this is the rate at which Haim Effendi Nathaniel is paid on account of his mail service via Amman.

3. So far no reply has been received to the Iraqi protest, but it is not unlikely that the Syrian postal administration will claim that the 1929 agreement lapsed when the Iraqi Government gave Haim Effendi a monopoly in 1932 to carry all their overland mail via Amman.

4. This is not the first time that the Simplon-Orient and Taurus express route has been used for the Bagdad overland mails, but previous attempts were unsuccessful owing to delay in the Turkish post office at Istanbul and failure to connect with the motor convoys at Damascus. It appears, however, that for the service now arranged by the authorities in Syria the mails will not be handed over to the Turkish Post Office at Istanbul, but will remain in the hands of the International Wagons-Lits Company, and there will be no question of missing connexion at Damascus if the mail convoys are allowed to cross the desert on any day of the week. The new service is therefore likely to be both quicker and cheaper than those now operated via Amman, so that the bulk of the mails will probably revert to the Damascus route.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

G. OGILVIE-FORBES.

[E 4452/120/89]

No. 221.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 76.)

Sir,

*Beirut, July 17, 1933.*

AT the official reception held on the 14th July the news became known that M. Ponsot had been appointed Resident-General in Morocco and that M. de Martel, French Ambassador at Tokyo, is to succeed him.

2. Rumour had already been busy with the future of M. Ponsot before he left on the 2nd July. While he had stated to those who went to say good-bye to him that it was his definite intention to return early in the autumn and finish the work he had in hand, no great astonishment seems to have been caused by the news



that after all he will not return. In High Commission circles the view held seems to have been that he might leave for good early next year. The change, due no doubt to the fact that M. Saint could as a Senator no longer remain abroad, is considered from the local point of view to have occurred at the most inconvenient moment possible.

3. For some time past M. Ponsot's health has clearly not been all that could be desired. A tiring climate, a disappointing and unsatisfactory task and an unhealthy manner of life have no doubt all contributed to this. While a good trencherman, he takes no exercise and he has no hobby and apparently no interest outside his work. At this he has toiled early and late, to the great discomfort of his staff. Even before his recent illness, which at one moment threatened to take a serious turn, he seemed to show occasional signs of discouragement and weariness and he once admitted that, whereas in his early days in Syria he had been inclined to worry over things, of late he had rather ceased to care.

4. While it cannot be maintained that M. Ponsot was in any sense a great High Commissioner, the country has at any rate been quiet during his term of office. This does not mean that public order has been perfect or that there have not been occasional disturbances of a political complexion, but there have been no major troubles. Unfortunately, he became so involved in local politics that he seemed to have little time for matters of practical importance, such as the administration of justice and fiscal and customs policy. When he first arrived it was given out that he was a practical man, but little in his subsequent acts has confirmed this. While, intentionally, much has been left to the native local authorities, these could, doubtless, by inspiration, have been guided into more useful paths than those they have hitherto followed.

5. It can, I think, be said with truth that M. Ponsot was not happy in his choice of subordinates. Not all those who served under him were, of course, selected by him, but on the whole it can be truthfully said that, with certain exceptions, he had a distinctly second-rate body of men working for him, and especially in the outlying districts.

6. I only approached him personally in rare instances where the importance of the matter seemed to justify an appeal to him, but whenever I did so I obtained satisfaction. Socially he was on the whole retiring, although on occasions he could wake up and seem to enjoy himself.

7. It is not known when M. de Martel will take up his post, but it seems to be expected that he will not arrive until the late autumn. It would be useful to me to have some information regarding him based on the reports of your Department.

I have, &c.  
H. E. SATOW.

[E 5583/257/31]

No. 222.

*Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 138.)  
Sir,

*Prague, September 16, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 128 of the 31st July last, I accepted the invitation of the president and executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and of the Zionist Organisation to be present at the inaugural meeting of the 18th Zionist Congress on the 21st ultimo.

2. The congress was attended by 316 delegates, elected by over half a million members of the Zionist Organisation in forty-six different countries. Poland alone provided 131 delegates, Palestine 50, the United States 30, England, Canada and South Africa together 20, and Roumania 13. The Jews of Soviet Russia were not represented, nor, for the first time in the history of the Zionist movement, were those of Germany. The organ of the German Zionists, the *Jüdische Rundschau*, was suppressed on the eve of the congress by the German Government, whose views were so clearly expressed in the *Völkischer Beobachter* that no German Zionist was willing to take risks involved by participation in the congress. Of the 316 delegates no fewer than 136 belonged to the Labour party.

Next in importance was the General Zionist party, represented by 73 delegates; 51 delegates belonged to the Revisionist, 36 to the Mizrahi (Orthodox), and 11 to the Radical parties.

3. The inaugural ceremony, which took place in the vast Lucerna Concert Hall, was attended by at least 4,000 persons. The Czechoslovak Government were represented by Dr. Pavlu, Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Polish Government by the Polish Minister, and members of the Spanish and Greek Legations were also present. The congress opened in a tense atmosphere, created by a catastrophe which has affected Jewry as a whole and by a grave event affecting the relations between the various Zionist parties, namely, the persecution of the Jews in Germany and the murder at Tel Aviv, a few months ago, of Dr. Arlosoroff, the distinguished leader of the Labour party in Palestine. The president of the Zionist Organisation delivered his inaugural speech in Hebrew, but he employed the French language when thanking the Czechoslovak Government for their hospitality, and greeted me, in my capacity as representative of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in English, with the following words:—

"In this hour of our trial and suffering, we meet here to discuss all the problems connected with the Jewish people and the National Home. It need hardly be pointed out to what extent all our schemes and desires depend on the great experience, the wisdom and goodwill of the mandatory Power. With the fullest appreciation of Great Britain's authority, we look for her valuable assistance. In the deepest sorrows of our present situation in the countries of oppression it was a real consolation to us to see your greatest men rising against injustice, atrocities and ungoverned racial passions. Allow me to express to you and your Government our tribute of everlasting appreciation."

In the brief speech which I made in reply, I referred as directed to the anxiety of the mandatory Power at all times to carry out in full its obligations under the mandate. I understand that throughout the meetings of the congress and of the committees appointed by it, Hebrew and Yiddish were the languages generally employed, the use of German being studiously avoided as far as possible, although almost all the delegates must have been well acquainted with that language.

4. On the 22nd August Professor Brodetsky, of Leeds University, director of the political department of the Zionist executive in London, delivered before the congress an address on the political aspect of the Zionist movement. While admitting that improvements had taken place since the change of Government and High Commissioner in 1931, Professor Brodetsky severely criticised several recent official decisions and proposals. Referring to the reports by Mr. French on agricultural settlement and land policy in Palestine, he observed that the Colonial Secretary in his statement in Parliament had dealt only with the resettling of displaced Arabs with the help of a new loan, and had stated that the Government must prevent further displacement of Arabs in future. Professor Brodetsky maintained that hundreds of Jewish settlers had been labouring under difficulties as great as those of large numbers of poor fellaheen, and that they therefore demanded that the Government policy should be based on the principle of parity as between Jew and Arab, especially as the Jews contributed at least 50 per cent. of Palestine's revenue, and as they had conferred vast benefits on the Arabs and the country generally. Finally, he expressed the hope that the Government might adopt a more liberal policy in regard to immigration, particularly in view of the exodus of Jews from Germany. He was convinced that anything tending to break down the relation of confidence and co-operation between the Jews and the mandatory Power must be avoided at all costs. The executive recognised and were grateful for the more understanding attitude of the present Government towards them. The Jews had too few friends in the world not to rejoice in the possession of the friendship of Great Britain and over the great wave of indignation which swept over that country at the reports of the persecutions suffered by the Jews in Germany. But where was the reflexion of this indignation to be found in the policy governing the admission of Jews to Palestine? There was room for Jews in Palestine; there would be room in the next decade for hundreds of thousands, and within a few generations for millions.

5. The General Council of the Zionist Organisation, which met in Prague several days before the congress opened, had decided that the wisest course to



follow with regard to the question of the treatment of Jews in Germany, would be to prevent a general debate on this question as well as any attempt to secure the proclamation of a boycott of German goods, and it, therefore, appointed a special commission, consisting of representatives of all parties, which undertook the duty of framing suitable resolutions for adoption by the congress. The Revisionist delegates to the congress demanded a general debate, but their motion was defeated. I enclose herein the text of the resolutions drawn up by the special commission, which were the first resolutions passed by the congress.<sup>(1)</sup> They give expression to the indignation felt at the injustice and degradation inflicted on the Jews in Germany, and to the determination of the Zionists of the whole world not to rest until the policy of persecution shall have ceased. They contain three specific demands: (1) That the civilised world, especially the League of Nations, should help the Jews in their fight for the recovery of the rights of the Jews in Germany, and should take steps to facilitate the immigration of refugees into other countries; (2) that the mandatory Power should open the gates of Palestine to as many refugees from Germany as possible and expedite the establishment of the Jewish National Home; and (3) that the League of Nations, and, individually, all those States which have approved the terms of the Palestine mandate, should assist the Jews, politically and financially, to establish the National Home.

6. The general debate on the political report of the Zionist executive lasted several days, a great deal of time being wasted by the representatives of the various parties, chiefly by the Revisionist and Labour delegates, who were too busily engaged in mutual recrimination to be able to devote themselves seriously to the study of practical problems. All parties, however, united in voicing their dissatisfaction with the policy of the Palestine Government, and I understand that no delegate, least of all any member of the executive, attempted to make out a case for the course pursued by the Colonial Office and the Palestine Administration, the general opinion being that the proposed Legislative Council and the measures contemplated in connexion with the new loan would prove injurious to Jewish interests.

7. The Labour party was throughout the congress continuously attacked by the other parties, which are jealous of the influence it has acquired owing to its present strength, and which accuse it of desiring to acquire sole control over all activities in Palestine, more especially over the machinery of immigration, land settlement and education. The widest of the gulfs separating the parties is that between the Labour party and the extreme wing of the Zionist organisation, the Revisionists. It has increased of late for two reasons: The disappointment of the Revisionists at finding the Labour party so strongly represented at the Prague Congress, and the indignation of the Labour party at the murder of their leader, Dr. Arlosoroff, a crime in connexion with which two members of the Revisionist party in Palestine, recognised as the assailants by the widow, have been arrested. Before the beginning of the congress, the General Council of the Zionist Organisation examined the allegation made by the Labour party that a terrorist group of Revisionists exists in Palestine, and discussed that party's demand that an immediate investigation should be undertaken. The Revisionists refused to allow any resolution to be drawn up for submission to the congress, and the matter was thereupon referred to that body. Amid the tumult and confusion created by the protesting Revisionists the congress adopted by 197 votes to 62 a resolution to the effect that the General Council should appoint a commission to make an investigation in Palestine, and should, on receipt of the commission's report, take steps if necessary to eradicate from the Zionist movement any elements guilty of employing terroristic methods.

8. The congress brought its deliberations to an end on Monday morning, the 4th September, at 9 o'clock, after a session of seventeen hours' duration, during which the numerous resolutions drafted by the various commissions were adopted. I enclose herein a summary, prepared by the secretary-general of the congress, of the political, as distinct from the purely domestic and financial resolutions.<sup>(1)</sup> In these resolutions the congress repeated its demand that the gates of Palestine should be opened wide for Jewish immigration, and appealed to the mandatory Power to facilitate in particular the immigration of German Jews. It instructed the executive to place the facts relating to the persecutions by the German Government before the League of Nations, and appealed to the Government and

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

people of the United States for help. It instructed the executive to carry out the plan devised in 1929 for the obtaining of a loan from the League of Nations; protested against the decisions of His Majesty's Government based on the French reports, reaffirmed the desire of the Jewish people to live in harmony with the Arabs, and expressed appreciation of the steps taken towards the settlement of Jews in Transjordan.

9. The congress further elected its new executive, which represents a limited coalition between the Labour party and a section of the "General" Zionists, neither the Orthodox party nor the major portion of the "General" Zionists being included. Dr. Nahum Sokoloff was re-elected president of the Zionist Organisation, and hence, automatically, of the Jewish Agency. A considerable number of delegates appear to have been in favour of electing in his place Dr. Weizmann, but Dr. Weizmann refused their proposal that he should present himself as candidate, being unwilling to do so unless he could be sure of a sweeping majority. He has, however, consented to co-operate with the executive in the work of assisting the settlement of the Jews in Palestine.

10. Owing to the prolongation of the session of the congress beyond the limit fixed for it, the meetings of the Council, Administrative Committee and Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency (designated in the mandate as the body authorised to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in matters relating to the National Home), which were to have been held after the congress, had to be held simultaneously with it. The problem of the agency, which was enlarged in 1929 by the inclusion of non-Zionist Jews on a basis of equality with the Zionist representatives in the Council, Administrative Committee and Executive Committee, has been exercising the Zionists, who maintain that the share of authority given to the non-Zionists is out of proportion to their value to the movement, and who accordingly proposed to reduce their number in the executive from five to three. The case of the non-Zionist delegates was weakened by the fact that a number of them failed to come to Prague for the meeting of the agency, and a compromise was eventually reached which provided that the non-Zionists should elect three members to the executive and leave the other two seats empty, while retaining their right to fill them. It was also agreed that a post of joint, or associate, chairman should be created in the Administrative Committee, the posts of chairman and associate chairman should be held by a Zionist and non-Zionist in rotation, in such a way that whenever the chairman is a Zionist, his associate should be a non-Zionist, and *vice versa*. Mr. Neville Laski, K.C., president of the Board of Deputies and joint president of the Joint Foreign Committee, was elected associate chairman of the Administrative Committee of the agency.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Berlin.

I have, &c.

K. T. GURNEY.

[E 5635/2689/89]

No. 223.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 22.)*

(Nos. 384 and 385.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, September 22, 1933.*

(R.) KING ALI informed me this morning that he would accompany Amir Abdullah to Amman, arriving about 24th September, and that he proposed to leave Amman for Haifa on 27th September, visiting his father's tomb at Jerusalem on the way. He will sail evening of 27th September from Haifa to Trieste and stay about a month in Switzerland, probably Lucerne, ostensibly for the benefit of his health. (End of R.)

I learn privately that his real reason is to get into touch with French and discover whether there is any prospect of his being invited to accept the Throne of Syria. I understand that King Ali's candidature would be unwelcome to his nephew.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Nos. 36 and 37.)



[E 6382/120/89]

No. 224.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 24.)*

(No. 96.)

Sir,

*Beirut, October 16, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Comte de Martel, the new French High Commissioner for Syria and the Lebanon, arrived on the afternoon of the 12th October, and was received with the same ceremonial as was his predecessor. On reaching the Residency he first received the Patriarchs and other ecclesiastical dignitaries, the members of the consular body and certain deputations. Then the President of the Lebanese Republic arrived to pay his official visit, which was returned on the following day. On the 14th October M. de Martel proceeded officially to Damascus to make his first acquaintance with the Syrian authorities. He was received ceremonially on the same lines as in Beirut. To-morrow he is holding at the Beirut Residency a general reception on less formal lines.

2. His arrival has not only, as is natural, aroused general interest, but has also given rise to expectations of better times. After the hesitations and uncertainties of the previous régime, which seemed to be leading nowhere, there is an undoubted feeling of hopefulness that M. de Martel, who has been depicted as a man who takes decisions and acts upon them, may live up to this reputation so that under his guidance things will go forward.

3. I have reason to believe that he is anxious to make the acquaintance of His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, and that he contemplates a visit to Jerusalem for the purpose so soon as an occasion convenient for all parties concerned arises.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 6791/210/65]

No. 225.

*Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 7.)*

(No. 98.)

Sir,

*Beirut, October 20, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy<sup>(1)</sup> of Decree No. 138/LR of the 27th September according for a limited period certain valuable privileges to transport undertakings which are prepared to move not less than 12,000 tons of freight across the Syrian desert in a period of eighteen months beginning from the 1st January, 1934. Those wishing to take advantage of the facilities offered must bind themselves to this effect not later than the 31st December next.

2. I had at first thought that this decree was to be regarded as further evidence of the desire of the French authorities in Syria to stimulate and encourage trans-desert freight services, a matter regarding which His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad addressed you in his despatch No. 356 of the 7th June last. I learn, however, that the decree has been issued with a special object. According to my information, the Skoda Works are to supply the machinery for a number of sugar factories which are to be set up in Persia, and the hope is that this machinery, weighing 12,000 tons or more, may be sent overland through a Syrian port. A number of large lorries will be required, and it was believed that if customs duty had to be paid on them, on the fuel used and on the spare parts and accessories the cost of moving the machinery across the desert would be prohibitive. It has therefore been decided to remit all customs duty for a period of eighteen months, which is reckoned ample time for the machinery to be moved.

3. The facilities (article 1) are as follows: Temporary duty-free (a) entry of vehicles intended for freights transportation; (b) of tyres and inner tubes; (c) of spare parts and accessories necessary for upkeep; and (d) of petrol and lubricating oil. Articles 2 to 4 of the decree indicate the procedure which has to be followed to obtain the right to benefit by the facilities offered. Articles 5 to 8

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

describe the methods of customs control to be enforced to prevent abuse of the facilities. According to article 9, on the expiry of the period of eighteen months for which duty-free entry has been granted, either the vehicles must be re-exported or duty paid on their then value. If sold before the expiry of the eighteen months the duty which would have been chargeable at the time of importation must be paid. The remaining articles of the decree deal with various points of detail. Article 12 imposes a penalty if less than 12,000 tons of freight is transported in the eighteen months.

4. The issue of this decree is a move in what the local press sees fit to describe as the "trans-desert transport war" between the areas under British and French mandate. Newspaper articles are frequent, which, taking as a rule for their text the imminent official opening of the Haifa harbour, harp upon the determined attempt which is being made by the British to shut out Syria from any share in the cross-desert transit trade to Iraq and beyond, of which the inevitable sequel will be the ruin of the port of Beirut. The main object of these articles is probably to attempt to stimulate the French authorities to take some immediate action as the result of which the enlargement and improvement of the Beirut harbour will be brought about. Schemes have been devised and plans have been made, but nothing has been done. In theory the creation of "free zones" at Beirut and elsewhere has been sanctioned, but in practice so far no steps have been taken to carry out the project. Doubtless, the real trouble lies in the fact that the Beirut Port Company is slow to move with the times and adopt new methods, anxious to make as much money as possible with its existing organisation and either unwilling to spend a penny more than it need on improvements or unable to find the money for them. The British in Palestine have been able to create a modern port at Haifa. At Beirut a French company is content to go along more or less as in the past. The trouble is that the mandatory authorities have a certain weakness for French companies and are unwilling to put the screw on when necessary. It does not seem to be realised that it is in the end the public which says the last word and that it is advisable to try and give the public the best that is possible.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 6825/6498/31]

No. 226.

*Consul Mackereth to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 9.)*

(No. 49.)

Sir,

*Damascus, November 1, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the news of the disorders in Palestine has caused some excitement among that section of the Damascus population which comes under the influence of the pan-Arab political parties. On Saturday last the bazaars were closed by the shopkeepers out of fear of damage by the crowds led by young ardent of the Arab cause. Inflammatory articles were published in the Islamic and Christian papers alike, and a demonstration was arranged to take place in front of this consulate. As a precautionary measure the Syrian authorities posted additional police, and the French General Commanding sent a company of Infanterie coloniale to bar the road to the consulate and to occupy tactical points in the grounds. I was a little astonished by this military parade, which was a trifle embarrassing, but I confess to agreeing with the French principle of showing force in order not to have need to use it, and so I duly expressed my thanks to the authorities for their solicitude.

2. It does not appear to me that the mass of the population of Damascus has any very deep feelings about a Jewish immigration that has not yet immediately affected them. Nevertheless, the vague elemental fear to which a definite feeling of cultural inferiority gives rise, that the new Jews in Palestine, by force of eventual economic developments, will drive the town Arab into agrarian serfdom, provides a fertile ground in which pan-Arab agitators can sow ideas of violence and resistance to the Zionist movement. Thus the tendency is for each successive outbreak in Palestine to have a cumulatively greater repercussion in Syria. Unfortunately for the French this anti-Zionist discontent does not serve to neutralise the anti-French attitude of the local nationalists, but adds



rather to the general abhorrence of foreigners and their ways felt by the local populations. The French do not lose sight of this and they grumble quietly at having to bear our troubles as well as their own.

3. Although the French delegate took early and energetic measures to control the virulence of the press, it is very evident that every single newspaper feels bound to provide its Moslem readers with lurid tales of bloody clashes between their brethren and the police in Palestine, and they insist that the situation is far worse than the official communiqués make out. The criticism, which grows more bitter, against the increased immigration of Jews, arising out of Palestine's being offered as an asylum for expelled German Jews, is directed entirely against Great Britain, and in the mosques, by pamphlets, and formal protests, the people are being taught a kind of hymn of hate to execrate Britain because of her Zionist policy.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, and His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

[E 6222/122/93]

No. 227.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 18, 1933.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 25th October, I am directed by Secretary Sir John Simon to request you to inform Secretary Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister that he has had under further consideration the question of the gauge of the proposed Haifa-Bagdad Railway.

2. As Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister is aware, expert opinion has been fairly evenly balanced on the important point whether the proposed railway, when its construction has been finally decided on, should be of standard or of metre gauge. Although this divergence of opinion still exists, it is clear from the memorandum, a copy of which was enclosed in Foreign Office letter of the 16th October, that Colonel Tainsh and Sir Frederick Palmer, who are respectively the chief advocates of the metre and standard gauge for the proposed railway, are now agreed that it will be impracticable to build the railway on the metre gauge if it is established that the Beisan-Haifa section of the Hejaz Railway cannot be converted to that gauge. In these circumstances the Secretary of State has considered it desirable to concentrate for the moment on the issue whether the conversion of the Beisan-Haifa section of the Hejaz Railway is in itself a practical proposition, since, if it is decided that it is not, all concerned would admit that the Haifa-Bagdad Railway must be of standard gauge and the question would thus automatically solve itself. A decision in the contrary sense would, on the other hand, leave the question of the gauge of the proposed railway unchanged, *i.e.*, undetermined pending a final decision by an expert body, in the light of the technical, economic, financial, and political factors involved.

3. The question of changing the gauge of the Beisan-Haifa section of the Hejaz Railway is, of course, closely bound up with the status of that railway. As Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister is aware, the Moslem world and King Ibn Saud in particular claim that the Hejaz Railway is Wakf, and that the mandatory Powers have, therefore, no right to administer the sections of the railway lying in the territory of Syria and Palestine. Although recognising the religious character of the railway, His Majesty's Government do not admit this contention, since there is no evidence to show that the railway was ever constituted Wakf; and, basing themselves on the opinion given at Geneva on the 18th April, 1925, by Professor Borel in an arbitral award relating to the distribution of the Ottoman Public Debt, His Majesty's Government hold the view that the Hejaz Railway was the property of the Ottoman Empire, and that in virtue of the Lausanne Peace Settlement its ownership passed to the States in which it is now situated.

4. That ownership is, however, subject to certain obligations arising out of the declaration regarding the Hejaz Railway, which was made on behalf of His Majesty's Government and of the French Government at the fifth meeting of the Economic and Financial Commission of the Lausanne Conference (*Lausanne*

*Conference Blue Book*, p. 604). Sir John Simon accordingly considers that the first question to be decided is whether there is anything in that declaration which debars His Majesty's Government from making any change in the gauge of the Beisan-Haifa section of the Hejaz Railway.

5. Sir John Simon has no doubt that it would be contrary to the Lausanne declaration actually to detach any part of the Hejaz Railway and hand it over to another undertaking such as the Haifa-Bagdad Railway. He is advised, however, that a change of gauge of the Beisan-Haifa section would not of itself necessarily involve a transfer of that section of the line from one railway to the other, and he assumes that, if the gauge of the Beisan-Haifa section were changed, that section would, nevertheless, remain part of the Hejaz Railway.

6. But the effect of this change of gauge would in any case be that, whereas trains could run right through from Bagdad to Haifa, pilgrim traffic on the Haifa-El Mezeirah branch of the Hejaz Railway would be compelled to change trains at Beisan in order to pass from the metre gauge to the 1.05 metre gauge of the remainder of the Hejaz Railway. The Secretary of State is of the opinion that it would be contrary to the spirit of the Lausanne declaration to make any alteration in the Hejaz Railway which would adversely affect the interests of pilgrims using the line. It appears to him, therefore, that the proposed change of gauge could only be justified under the Lausanne declaration if it could be shown that the profits which would result to the Hejaz Railway from the change (as compared with those which would be received if the change were not made) would be so great that the pilgrim traffic would, in fact, be benefited, *i.e.*, that there would be so much extra to spend on the Hejaz Railway as a whole, and so much surplus to be spent for the assistance of pilgrims as a whole, in accordance with the last paragraph of the declaration, as clearly to outweigh the obvious disadvantage of pilgrims no longer being able to travel without change from Haifa to the main line of the Hejaz Railway.

7. The Secretary of State is advised that it would be impossible to demonstrate in advance that this would be so. Moreover, if, as would probably be the case, the proposed conversion were carried out at the expense of the Haifa-Bagdad Railway Company, interest on the money expended would presumably be a first charge on any profits accruing from the working of the converted section. In this event it appears most unlikely that any profits would be available, at least for many years to come, for the improvement of other parts of the Hejaz Railway or for the assistance of pilgrims.

8. In these circumstances it appears to Sir John Simon that His Majesty's Government are debarred by the terms of the Lausanne declaration from converting the gauge of the Beisan-Haifa section of the Hejaz Railway. Even if this were not so, it seems to him that almost insuperable practical objections arise out of the declaration which would stand in the way of the proposed conversion. The necessity of devoting any profits realised from the Beisan-Haifa section of the railway to the upkeep and improvement of the whole railway, and of devoting any sums left over after such improvement to the assistance of pilgrims, might create considerable difficulties in the administration of the new Haifa-Bagdad Railway. Moreover, if the undertaking contained in the first half of the Lausanne declaration were ever implemented, the recommendations of the Advisory Council contemplated therein would be likely to cause serious embarrassment to the Haifa-Bagdad Railway Company.

9. Thus the matter at issue is intimately bound up with the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Lausanne declaration. In the view of the Secretary of State there can be no question of His Majesty's Government departing from that declaration. Moreover, even if they were ready to depart from it, they could only do so in agreement with the French Government, who would be unlikely to go out of their way to facilitate to this extent the construction of the Haifa-Bagdad Railway, which they would recognise as a serious competitor of the North Syria Railway.

10. No mention has been made in the foregoing paragraphs of the attitude which the Moslem world and the Arab world in particular would be likely to adopt towards such a radical alteration of the *status quo* as a change of the gauge of a section of the Hejaz Railway. Sir John Simon does not doubt, however, that it would be one of considerable resentment, which he considers it would be most undesirable to arouse, unless it could be shown that the change would be not only practical, but also beneficial for all concerned. For the reasons already stated

[9941]

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this does not appear to be possible, and he therefore inclines to the view that any idea of converting the Beisan-Haifa section of the Hejaz Railway must be abandoned. He would, however, be glad to learn whether Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister shares the above views on this important issue. Meanwhile, I am to suggest that the High Commissioner for Palestine might well be consulted on the whole matter, in view of the close association of Palestine and Transjordan with the Haifa-Bagdad Railway project, and with the Hejaz Railway itself.

I am, &c.

G. W. RENDEL.

[E 6957/4006/65]

No. 228.

*Sir John Simon to Lord Tyrrell (Paris)*

(No. 1811.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 21, 1933.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 714 of the 24th May, 1932, I have to inform you that the report of the Czechoslovak representative on the 23rd session of the Permanent Mandates Commission (League Document No. C 496.1933.VI) contains the following passage concerning the frontier between Palestine and Syria and the Lebanon:—

"The commission's observations on the administration of Palestine contain a reminder of the promise given at the Council of the 30th January, 1932, by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom regarding the western section of the frontier between Syria and Palestine. The two mandatory Powers concerned will, I feel sure, communicate for approval at the earliest possible date the agreement relating to that section of the frontier."

2. The report of the Czechoslovak representative has now been adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. In these circumstances it seems probable that it will be necessary for the two mandatory Powers to communicate to the Council for their approval the agreement concerning the Palestine-Syria frontier which was completed by the notes exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the French Government on the 7th March, 1923. In the first instance, however, I shall be glad if you will approach the French Government informally, drawing their attention to the recommendation of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and ascertain their views as to the next step to be taken in this matter.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 7151/178/44]

No. 229.

*Note by Mr. S. C. Wyatt, Representative of the British Bondholders on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.—(Communicated by Mr. Waley, Treasury, November 21, 1933.)*

#### OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT.

##### *Levant States under French Mandate.*

UNDER a contract of 1929 with the Ottoman Debt Council, the States undertook to settle their share on the same basis as the Turkish contract of 1928.

2. Owing to the non-execution of the Turkish contract and to the consequent heavy fall in the market prices of Ottoman Bonds, the States, by the strict application of their contract, were able to redeem their share in an unexpectedly short period of time. In fact, in June 1933, the outstanding balance due by the States had been reduced to a few thousand Ottoman Bonds redeemable by purchase and certain other bonds not redeemable by purchase.

3. Inasmuch as the situation would have been complicated (as regards redemption) by the execution of the new Turkish agreement of April 1933, under which all Ottoman Bonds are being withdrawn, a review and a reconsideration was evidently in the interests both of the Levant States and of the Debt Council.

4. Consequently, a fresh arrangement was negotiated with the States (July 1933) under which the above-mentioned bonds, redeemable by purchase, were so redeemed by funds supplied by the States. As regards the other bonds, which could not be redeemed by purchase, a cash payment of 31,320,000 fr. was made by the States to the council, on the basis of a 7½ per cent. discount of the annuities still due for such bonds under the 1929 contract.

This payment was distributed by the Debt Council to bondholders in September 1933.

5. The Levant States are now free from all liability to bondholders in respect of the Ottoman Public Debt.

*Paris, November 16, 1933.*

[E 7245/120/89]

No. 230.

*Consul Mackereth to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 27.)*

(No. 56.)

Sir,

*Damascus, November 20, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 12 and 13, I have the honour herewith to transmit to you a copy of the official text, supplied to me by the French delegate, of the Treaty of Alliance, signed in Damascus by the French Ambassador de Martel on behalf of France, and by Hakkı Bey El Azem, Prime Minister of the Syrian Government, on behalf of Syria, dated the 16th November, 1933.

2. It remains now for the Syrian Parliament to ratify or reject the treaty as signed by its Prime Minister. Without doubt it will meet with lively opposition from the pan-Arab Nationalists, but intensive lobbying, on oriental lines, of the Deputies is being conducted by and on behalf of the French delegation. M. Veber told me this morning that he was afraid a majority for ratification might not be forthcoming; he had hopes, however, that there would in the end be a bare majority in its favour.

3. The alternatives to ratification leave an opening for speculation. The French official view appears to be that in the event of the Parliament's rejecting the treaty, a pro-treaty Government can be established deriving its authority from French arms. The official communiqué rather naïvely states that the parliamentary vote on the treaty will provide a proof to France and the League of Nations of the possibility or otherwise of Syria's obtaining its independence by way of agreements.

4. It has been officially and gratuitously proclaimed that the Franco-Syrian Treaty is more generous to Syria than the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was to Iraq. But they protest overmuch. Certainly, the Franco-Syrian Treaty follows along the broad lines of its predecessor in type, yet the curious and obviously intentional vagueness of the drafting, unusual in French texts, leaves ample room for the suspicion that France has no intention of relinquishing her hold on Syria if she can help it. This, of course, the Nationalists realise and multiply their prayers for another European conflict, hoping thereby that the French grip may be slackened. The treaty now signed furnishes in almost every article a bone for future contention, and the fifth paragraph of article 5 provides the means whereby France will be on the spot when the wrangle begins. By article 6, provision is made against a lack of French magistrates, advisers and officials. Possibly the form of General Noury Said's letter (III) of the 30th June, 1930 (attached to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930), made little appeal to the French official mind.

5. In article 5 of Protocol B, France promises to use her good offices to obtain Syria's admission into the League of Nations, if and when Syria has realised the programme of reforms set out in the preceding articles of that protocol. The time required for the completion of the programme is put quaintly as a "délai normal de quatre années," whatever that may eventually be held to mean.



6. Should the treaty be ratified by the Parliament, or otherwise obtain formal recognition, I propose to address you in further detail on the subject of its fuller implications.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to Aleppo, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 230.

*Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre la France et la Syrie.*

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement syrien, Considérant les progrès réalisés en application de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations dans la voie de l'affermissement de la Syrie comme nation indépendante;

Vu l'intention exprimée par le Gouvernement français devant la Société des Nations de conclure, en tenant compte de l'évolution déjà accomplie, un traité avec le Gouvernement syrien;

Vu l'accord des deux Gouvernements pour réaliser, suivant un programme bien précisé, toutes conditions propres à assurer l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations;

Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance pour définir, sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance, les relations qui subsisteront entre les deux États après la cessation du mandat, et de fixer dans les conventions annexes, qui entreront en vigueur à la même date que le traité, les conditions et modalités d'application de certaines de ses clauses.

Pour atteindre ce but dans les conditions les plus favorables, les hautes parties contractantes ont également convenu de préciser le programme de l'évolution des institutions actuelles dans les divers domaines où la collaboration active et confiante des deux Gouvernements est nécessaire pour réaliser, dans le plan intérieur comme dans le plan international, les conditions requises par la Société des Nations suivant les principes généraux déjà fixés par elle pour qu'il puisse être mis fin au régime du mandat.

Dans ce but, les hautes parties contractantes ont fixé leur accord dans les trois documents qui suivent:

I.—Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance;

II.—Protocole A, relatif aux conventions annexes appelées à entrer en vigueur en même temps que le traité, lors de l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations;

III.—Protocole B, relatif au programme à réaliser au cours de la période préparatoire pour assurer par voie d'accord, et dans le cadre du statut organique, l'évolution des institutions actuelles, en vue du transfert progressif des responsabilités au Gouvernement syrien.

A cette fin, son Excellence le Président de la République française et son Excellence le Président de la République syrienne ont délégué comme leurs plénipotentiaires:

Son Excellence le Président de la République française: le Comte de Martel, Ambassadeur de France, Haut-Commissaire de la République française, Commandeur de la Légion d'Honneur, &c.;

Son Excellence le Président de la République syrienne: M. Hakki Bey El Azem, Président du Conseil des Ministres, Commandeur de la Légion d'Honneur, &c.;

Qui, s'étant communiqué leurs pouvoirs et les ayant trouvés en due forme, ont conclu ce qui suit:

*I.—Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance.*

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Il y aura paix et amitié perpétuelles entre la France et la Syrie.

Une alliance est établie entre les deux États indépendants et souverains en consécration de leur amitié et des liens qui les unissent pour la défense de la paix et la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts communs.

ARTICLE 2.

En toute matière de politique étrangère de nature à affecter leurs communs intérêts, les deux Gouvernements conviennent de se consulter pleinement et sans réserve.

Au regard des Puissances étrangères, ils s'engagent à adopter une attitude conforme à leur alliance et à éviter toute action de nature à compromettre leurs relations avec les autres Puissances.

Chaque Gouvernement accrédiitera auprès de l'autre un représentant diplomatique.

Partout où le Gouvernement syrien ne serait pas directement représenté, le Gouvernement français assurera par ses propres agents la protection des ressortissants et des intérêts syriens, conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières.

ARTICLE 3.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes prendront toutes mesures utiles pour assurer, au jour de la cessation du mandat, le transfert au seul Gouvernement syrien des droits et obligations résultant de tous traités, conventions et autres actes internationaux conclus par le Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne la Syrie ou en son nom.

Le Gouvernement français donnera tout son appui au Gouvernement syrien en vue de faciliter la révision des accords et engagements internationaux qui subsisteraient à cette date et qui ne seraient plus en harmonie avec la situation internationale nouvelle de la Syrie.

Les droits qui seraient accordés, lors de cette révision, aux nationaux et ressortissants d'une Puissance étrangère seraient acquis *de plano* aux nationaux et ressortissants français.

ARTICLE 4.

Au cas où un différend entre la Syrie et un État tiers engendrerait une situation de nature à créer un risque de rupture avec cet État, les deux Gouvernements se concerteraient en vue du règlement de ce différend par les voies pacifiques, conformément aux stipulations du Pacte de la Société des Nations ou de toute autre convention internationale applicable à un tel cas.

Si en dépit de leurs communs efforts les deux Gouvernements se trouvaient sous la menace d'un conflit armé, ils se concerteraient sans délai sur les mesures de défense nécessaires.

ARTICLE 5.

La responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre en Syrie et celle de la défense du territoire incombent au Gouvernement syrien.

Toutefois, en vue de faciliter l'exécution des obligations qui lui incombent aux termes du présent traité, le Gouvernement français accepte de prêter son concours militaire à la Syrie pendant la durée de ce traité, suivant les prévisions de la convention annexe.

Il est spécifié que le maintien de certaines forces militaires, aériennes ou navales françaises ne constitue pas une occupation et ne portera pas atteinte aux droits souverains de la Syrie.

Ces forces et les établissements qui leur sont rattachés restent placés sous le régime de l'exterritorialité. Elles continueront à jouir des immunités et privilèges dont elles bénéficieront au moment de l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité.

Le Gouvernement français prêtera son concours pour l'organisation, l'instruction, l'armement et l'équipement des forces militaires syriennes et des forces de gendarmerie suivant les prévisions de la convention annexe. Il mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement syrien les missions et les officiers dont la présence serait jugée utile à cet effet par les deux parties contractantes, conformément aux prévisions de la convention relative à cet objet.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement français met à la disposition du Gouvernement syrien les conseillers techniques, magistrats et fonctionnaires dont la présence sera jugée utile par les deux parties contractantes pour le fonctionnement de certains services publics, conformément aux prévisions et spécifications de l'accord annexe.



## ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à maintenir les garanties permanentes de droit public stipulées dans la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie en faveur des individus et des communautés, et à donner plein effet à ces garanties.

En ce qui concerne les droits des minorités ethniques et confessionnelles et leur statut personnel, il s'engage à assurer un traitement conforme aux principes généraux qui ont reçu l'adhésion de la Société des Nations en ce qui touche ces matières.

## ARTICLE 8.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'accordent, en ce qui les concerne, pour constater l'opportunité de maintenir la communauté d'intérêts économiques existant pour l'ensemble des territoires visés par l'Acte de Londres du 24 juillet 1922.

## ARTICLE 9.

Le présent traité est conclu pour une durée de vingt-cinq ans.

Les conventions et accords annexes d'application auront la même durée que le traité lui-même, à moins qu'une durée moindre soit stipulée dans l'acte, ou à moins que les hautes parties contractantes soient d'accord pour les reviser afin de tenir compte de situations nouvelles.

Les négociations pour le renouvellement ou la modification du traité seront ouvertes si, à partir de la vingtième année de son application, un des deux Gouvernements le demande.

## ARTICLE 10.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et l'échange des ratifications effectué aussitôt que possible.

Il sera communiqué à la Société des Nations.

Ce traité entrera en vigueur, en même temps que les conventions et accords annexes prévus au Protocole A, au jour de l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations.

Les accords annexes prévus au Protocole B, relatifs au programme à réaliser au cours de la période préparatoire, entreront en vigueur aussitôt après l'échange des ratifications du traité.

## ARTICLE 11.

A partir de l'entrée de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement français est déchargé des responsabilités qui lui incombent aux termes de l'Acte de Londres du 24 juillet 1922.

## ARTICLE 12.

Le présent traité est rédigé en français et en arabe; ces deux textes sont officiels, le texte français faisant foi.

Au cas où une contestation s'élèverait au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'application de ce traité, et où cette contestation n'aurait pu être réglée définitivement par voie de négociation directe, les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de recourir aux procédures de conciliation et d'arbitrage prévues par le Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Fait à Damas, en quadruple exemplaire, le 16 novembre 1933.

II.—*Protocole A relatif aux Conventions et Accords appelés à entrer en vigueur en même temps que le Traité, lors de l'Admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations.*

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour négocier et conclure, dans le plus bref délai :

Les conventions militaires dont le principe est inscrit à l'article 5 du traité;

L'accord relatif aux fonctionnaires prévu à l'article 6 du traité;

L'accord judiciaire, les conventions d'établissement et les accords financiers destinés à donner effet aux clauses de l'Acte de Londres relatives à ces divers objets.

## ARTICLE 2.

Ces différents accords, qui font partie intégrante du traité, seront communiqués à la Société des Nations et entreront en vigueur, à moins de prévision différente, au jour de l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations.

III.—*Protocole B relatif au Programme à réaliser au Cours de la Période préparatoire pour assurer par Voie d'Accord, et dans le Cadre du Statut organique, l'Évolution des Institutions actuelles, en vue du Transfert progressif des Responsabilités au Gouvernement syrien.*

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de donner effet dans le moindre délai aux études en cours relatives à la conclusion de divers accords touchant :

1. Les questions militaires et l'organisation de l'armée nationale;
2. Les questions financières visées dans l'Acte de Londres du 24 juillet 1922;
3. La situation des fonctionnaires français au service de l'Etat.

## ARTICLE 2.

Le Gouvernement français associera progressivement le Gouvernement syrien à la gestion des affaires extérieures.

Il favorisera en outre la préparation diplomatique du transfert de responsabilités prévu à l'article 3 du traité.

## ARTICLE 3.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes conviennent de la nécessité de l'existence de services d'intérêt commun entre les territoires visés par l'Acte de Londres du 24 juillet 1922.

Le fonctionnement de ces services fera, dès que faire se pourra, l'objet d'un accord spécial qui fera partie du traité.

## ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à élaborer, en accord avec le Gouvernement français, les lois organiques et les dispositions législatives qui seraient nécessaires pour donner effet aux garanties inscrites dans la Constitution actuelle de l'Etat de Syrie en faveur des individus et des communautés, notamment en ce qui concerne l'égalité devant la loi (articles 6 et 26), la liberté de conscience, le respect des intérêts religieux et des statuts personnels (article 15), la liberté de pensée (article 16), la liberté de l'enseignement (articles 19 et 28), l'accès aux emplois publics (article 26) et la représentation des minorités confessionnelles (article 37).

## ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à user de ses bons offices pour obtenir l'admission de la Syrie dans la Société des Nations après la réalisation du programme défini aux articles précédents et aussitôt que les progrès réalisés le permettront.

Le programme de cette évolution est établi suivant la prévision d'un délai normal de quatre années.

Fait à Damas, en quadruple exemplaire, le 16 novembre 1933.

## EXCHANGE OF NOTES.

*President of the Syrian Republic to French High Commissioner.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

*Damas, le 16 novembre 1933.*

Pour faire suite à nos récents entretiens relatifs au Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre la France et la Syrie et à l'occasion de la signature de ce traité, il me paraît nécessaire de préciser les vues du Gouvernement syrien en ce qui concerne le régime administratif des liwas (sandjaks) autonomes de Lattaquié et du Djebel Druze.

Le Gouvernement syrien considère que les liwas de Lattaquié et du Djebel Druze font partie de la Syrie.



Il reconnaît néanmoins que la situation particulière de ces régions rend nécessaire de leur réserver un régime spécial.

Ce régime devra s'inspirer des vœux des populations de ces régions.

Veillez agréer, &c.

(Signature.)

*French High Commissioner to the President of the Syrian Republic.*

M. le Président,

*Damas, le 16 novembre 1933.*

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, vous référant à nos récents entretiens relatifs au Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre la France et la Syrie à l'occasion de la signature de ce traité, vous avez bien voulu préciser les vues du Gouvernement syrien en ce qui concerne le régime des Gouvernements autonomes de Lattaquié et du Djebel Druze.

En prenant acte de cette obligeante communication, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que la position prise par le Gouvernement français sur ces mêmes sujets, en prévision des évolutions ultérieures, ne diffère pas des dispositions de l'Acte de Londres du 24 juillet 1922. Cette position est la suivante :

Le Gouvernement français est disposé à examiner, immédiatement avant le moment où sera présentée la demande d'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, les modifications susceptibles d'être apportées à la situation actuelle de ces deux Gouvernements autonomes.

Cet examen portera tant sur la définition du régime de ces deux Gouvernements que sur les conditions dans lesquelles sera maintenue et garantie l'autonomie administrative et financière dont ils jouissent actuellement.

Les représentants qualifiés des populations intéressées seront appelés à participer à cette étude, dont les conclusions ne prendront effet qu'avec leur accord.

Veillez agréer, &c.

(Signature.)

*President of the Syrian Republic to the French High Commissioner.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

*Le 16 novembre 1933.*

Comme suite à la signature du Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre la France et la Syrie et aux lettres échangées précisant le point de vue du Gouvernement de la République syrienne, en accord avec celui du Gouvernement de la République française, au sujet du régime spécial des liwas (sandjaks) de Lattaquié et du Djebel Druze, et dans le but de préparer l'évolution à entamer à ce sujet, j'ai l'honneur de vous exposer ce qui suit :

Le Gouvernement syrien vous prie de bien vouloir prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour rattacher à ce Gouvernement, dès aujourd'hui, le recours à la juridiction suprême (Cour de Cassation) et les services des wakfs des liwas susindiqués.

Veillez agréer, &c.

(Signature.)

*French High Commissioner to the President of the Syrian Republic.*

M. le Président,

*Le 16 novembre 1933.*

En réponse à la lettre de votre Excellence précisant le point de vue du Gouvernement syrien au sujet de la demande de rattachement à ce Gouvernement du recours à la juridiction suprême (Cour de Cassation) ainsi que des services des wakfs des Gouvernements de Lattaquié et du Djebel Druze, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que je suis disposé à accueillir ce vœu.

Dans le but de répondre à cette fin, je prends dès maintenant toutes dispositions utiles pour que ces mesures puissent prendre effet au jour de la ratification du traité.

Veillez agréer, &c.

(Signature.)

[E 7275/4006/65]

No. 231.

*Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 28.)*

(No. 1639.)

Sir,

*Paris, November 25, 1933.*

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your despatch No. 1811 of the 21st instant, I enquired to-day at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs what they thought the next step should be in the light of the reminder, contained in the report of the Czechoslovak representative on the 23rd session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, of the promise given by the United Kingdom and French delegates to the Council of the League on the 30th January, 1932, regarding the communication, for approval, of the agreement relating to the western section of the frontier between Syria and Palestine as completed by the exchange of notes between His Majesty's Government and the French Government of the 7th March, 1923.

2. The Director of the Afrique et Levant Department, to whom my enquiry was addressed, replied that in the circumstances he agreed that the promise should be implemented; he thought that this might best be done by means of a joint letter from the two Governments. He had, however, no very fixed ideas as to procedure, and the French Government will, I think, be ready to adopt any method which may commend itself to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

TYRRELL.

[E 7756/120/89]

No. 232.

*Consul Mackereth to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 15.)*

(No. 63.)

Sir,

*Damascus, December 8, 1933.*

I HAVE the honour herewith to transmit to you a copy of "Arrêté" No. 176/L.R. issued on the 30th November, 1933, by the French High Commissioner and published on the 6th December, 1933. By this "arrêté" the reins of government are placed in the hands of the President of the Syrian Republic, acting upon the advice of the Cabinet. This régime replaces for the time being the system of constitutional government.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to Aleppo, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

Enclosure in No. 232.

*Arrêté No. 176/L.R. pris en Exécution de l'Acte de Mandat, réglant à titre temporaire l'Exercice du Pouvoir législatif dans l'Etat de Syrie.*

LE Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu les décrets du Président de la République française en date des 23 novembre 1920 et 16 juillet 1933;

Vu la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie, notamment en ses articles 30 et 116;

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 174/L.R. du 24 novembre 1933, portant suspension de la Chambre des Députés;

Attendu que le fonctionnement des pouvoirs publics, tels qu'ils sont organisés par la Constitution, se trouve temporairement suspendu,

Arrête :

Article 1<sup>er</sup>.—A titre provisoire, le Président de la République syrienne a qualité pour prendre des décrets ayant force de loi, notamment en matière budgétaire, sur avis conforme du Conseil des Ministres.

[9941]

2 P



Les décrets de caractère législatif sont pris avec la sanction du Haut-Commissaire, qui les rend exécutoires.

Art. 2.—Le secrétaire général du Haut-Commissariat est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

Bejruth, le 30 novembre 1933.

Le Haut-Commissaire,  
D. DE MARTEL.

Le Secrétaire général p. i.,  
CHAUVEL.

Le Conseiller législatif,  
A. MAZAS.

[E 7828/7828/89]

No. 233.

Consul-General Sir H. Satow to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 19.)  
(O.T. No. 125.)

Sir,

Beirut, December 9, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 6th December a paragraph appeared in the *Syrie*, a newspaper which is in close touch with the French High Commission, to the effect that very early steps are to be taken both to enlarge the Port of Beirut and to endeavour to establish railway communication between Beirut and Iraq and Persia via Aleppo and Mosul.

2. This decision is described as being due to the intention of M. de Martel to push ahead with schemes likely to be of economic value to the country. Three personalities in the financial world were in Beirut last week through whom, according to the newspaper, the schemes are to be realised. They were, M. Bérard, "administrateur délégué" of the Banque de Syrie et du Grand-Liban, M. Jean Coste, director-general in Paris of the D.H.P. Railway, and M. de Monicand, director-general in Paris of the Beirut Port Company. The former has already left for France to deal with the financial side of the matter, while M. Coste has gone to Tehran to get into touch with Persian Government. M. de Monicand is leaving Beirut shortly.

3. Whatever may be the issue of M. Coste's negotiations at Tehran, it seems certain that immediate action is to be taken as regards the enlargement of the Port of Beirut. Whether the newspaper statement that a sum of 40 million francs is immediately available is true or not, it is a fact that the officials of the Port Company are working feverishly to complete plans and other material which M. de Monicand wishes to take with him when he leaves in a few days.

4. My information as regards the work contemplated at the port is that it is planned to extend the main breakwater in an easterly direction for about 478 metres. The existing east mole, which has within the last few years been very considerably widened and has recently had a new outside facing, will be very slightly lengthened so as to bring its northerly extremity parallel to the breakwater. On its outside a bay will be formed by reclamation work both at the shore end and to the east, where a wide mole will be created. The bay so formed with quays on the three sides will have a base of about 350 metres and sides of 300 metres. The depth of water at the base will be 8½ metres and at the sides 10 metres. Ships berthed in this bay would be protected by the prolonged breakwater. Should trade conditions justify this, a second bay could later be formed to the east to which protection would be afforded either by a further prolongation of the breakwater or by the building of a new one from the shore in a westerly direction.

5. I enclose a plan<sup>(1)</sup> of the existing port and also a plan<sup>(1)</sup> of Beirut on which is indicated approximately the work which under the scheme is to be carried out.

6. Since I wrote the foregoing I happened to meet in the corridors of the High Commission M. Nidelet, the manager of the Port Company and of the D.H.P. Railway Company. I congratulated him on his approaching

<sup>(1)</sup> Not reproduced.

activities, and from his reply it is clear that an enlargement of the port is to take place. He spoke of the employment which would be given and of the wisdom of carrying out the work by stages. He had, I think, just come from seeing M. de Martel and he told me that a M. Laferrière of the Banque de Syrie was actually still with the High Commissioner discussing the financial side of the scheme.

I have, &c.  
H. E. SATOW.

[E 7900/7900/34]

No. 234.

Department of Overseas Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received December 22.)

THE Comptroller-General of the Department of Overseas Trade presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and transmits herewith copy of despatch Overseas Trade (A) No. 176, from His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, dated the 14th December, 1933, respecting the inauguration of a new regular service to the Persian Gulf by the Lloyd Triestino Company.

Department of Overseas Trade,  
December 21, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 234.

Sir E. Drummond to Sir John Simon.

(Overseas Trade (A) No. 176.)

Sir,

Rome, December 14, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the *Sole* of the 13th instant reports that the Lloyd Triestino Company will inaugurate, on the 23rd instant, a new regular service to the Persian Gulf, in connexion with important undertakings going forward in this part of Asia, not up to the present served by Italian vessels, as a result of the construction of important public works put in hand by the Persian Government with a view to developing the economic activity of the country and to increasing its trade with Europe.

2. This programme includes several bridges, electric power stations and a railway trunk of 600 kilom., which will link up the vast hinterland to the port of Bandar-Shahpur, all of which have been entrusted to Italian industry.

3. The new shipping service will be included in the seven lines at present worked by the Lloyd Triestino Company to India, the Far East and Dutch East Indies and the *Fenicia* will operate the service.

I have, &c.  
ERIC DRUMMOND.